The Project Gutenberg EBook of Memoirs of Three Civil War Generals,
Complete, by U. S. Grant, W. T. Sherman, P. H. Sheridan

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net


Title: Memoirs of Three Civil War Generals, Complete

Author: U. S. Grant, W. T. Sherman, P. H. Sheridan

Release Date: August 16, 2006 [EBook #4546]

Language: English

Character set encoding: ASCII

*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THREE CIVIL WAR GENERALS ***




Produced by David Widger. Additional proofing was done by Bryan
Sherman on the Sherman series.  The Grant series was originally
produced by Glen Bledsoe






MEMOIRS OF THE UNION'S THREE GREAT CIVIL WAR GENERALS



CONTENTS:
     The Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant
     The Memoirs of William T. Sherman
     The Memoirs of Philip H. Sheridan





PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT, complete

by U. S. Grant




PREFACE.

"Man proposes and God disposes."  There are but few important events in
the affairs of men brought about by their own choice.

Although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs I had
determined never to do so, nor to write anything for publication.  At
the age of nearly sixty-two I received an injury from a fall, which
confined me closely to the house while it did not apparently affect my
general health. This made study a pleasant pastime.  Shortly after, the
rascality of a business partner developed itself by the announcement of
a failure.  This was followed soon after by universal depression of all
securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good part of
the income still retained, and for which I am indebted to the kindly act
of friends.  At this juncture the editor of the Century Magazine asked
me to write a few articles for him. I consented for the money it gave
me; for at that moment I was living upon borrowed money.  The work I
found congenial, and I determined to continue it.  The event is an
important one for me, for good or evil; I hope for the former.

In preparing these volumes for the public, I have entered upon the task
with the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any one, whether on
the National or Confederate side, other than the unavoidable injustice
of not making mention often where special mention is due.  There must be
many errors of omission in this work, because the subject is too large
to be treated of in two volumes in such way as to do justice to all the
officers and men engaged.  There were thousands of instances, during the
rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds of
heroism which deserve special mention and are not here alluded to.  The
troops engaged in them will have to look to the detailed reports of
their individual commanders for the full history of those deeds.

The first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was written before
I had reason to suppose I was in a critical condition of health.  Later
I was reduced almost to the point of death, and it became impossible for
me to attend to anything for weeks.  I have, however, somewhat regained
my strength, and am able, often, to devote as many hours a day as a
person should devote to such work.  I would have more hope of satisfying
the expectation of the public if I could have allowed myself more time.
I have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest son, F. D. Grant,
assisted by his brothers, to verify from the records every statement of
fact given.  The comments are my own, and show how I saw the matters
treated of whether others saw them in the same light or not.

With these remarks I present these volumes to the public, asking no
favor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader.

U. S.  GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, July 1, 1885.


CONTENTS

VOLUME I.

CHAPTER I. ANCESTRY--BIRTH--BOYHOOD.

CHAPTER II. WEST POINT--GRADUATION.

CHAPTER III. ARMY LIFE--CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR--CAMP SALUBRITY.

CHAPTER IV. CORPUS CHRISTI--MEXICAN SMUGGLING--SPANISH RULE IN MEXICO
--SUPPLYING TRANSPORTATION.

CHAPTER V. TRIP TO AUSTIN--PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND-LIEUTENANT--ARMY OF
OCCUPATION.

CHAPTER VI. ADVANCE OF THE ARMY--CROSSING THE COLORADO--THE RIO GRANDE.

CHAPTER VII. THE MEXICAN WAR--THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO--THE BATTLE OF
RESACA DE LA PALMA--ARMY OF INVASION--GENERAL TAYLOR--MOVEMENT ON
CAMARGO.

CHAPTER VIII. ADVANCE ON MONTEREY--THE BLACK FORT--THE BATTLE OF
MONTEREY--SURRENDER OF THE CITY.

CHAPTER IX. POLITICAL INTRIGUE--BUENA VISTA--MOVEMENT AGAINST VERA CRUZ
--SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VERA CRUZ.

CHAPTER X. MARCH TO JALAPA--BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO--PEROTE--PUEBLA--SCOTT
AND TAYLOR.

CHAPTER XI. ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO--BATTLE OF CONTRERAS--ASSAULT
AT CHURUBUSCO--NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY
--STORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC--SAN COSME--EVACUATION OF THE CITY--HALLS OF
THE MONTEZUMAS.

CHAPTER XII. PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT--CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF
MEXICO--THE ARMY--MEXICAN SOLDIERS--PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

CHAPTER XIII. TREATY OF PEACE--MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS--REGIMENTAL
QUARTERMASTER--TRIP TO POPOCATAPETL--TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO.

CHAPTER XIV. RETURN OF THE ARMY--MARRIAGE--ORDERED TO THE PACIFIC COAST
--CROSSING THE ISTHMUS--ARRIVAL AT SAN FRANCISCO.

CHAPTER XV. SAN FRANCISCO--EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES--LIFE ON THE
PACIFIC COAST--PROMOTED CAPTAIN--FLUSH TIMES IN CALIFORNIA.

CHAPTER XVI. RESIGNATION--PRIVATE LIFE--LIFE AT GALENA--THE COMING
CRISIS.

CHAPTER XVII. OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION--PRESIDING AT A UNION MEETING
--MUSTERING OFFICER OF STATE TROOPS--LYON AT CAMP JACKSON--SERVICES
TENDERED TO THE GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER XVIII. APPOINTED COLONEL OF THE 21ST ILLINOIS--PERSONNEL OF THE
REGIMENT--GENERAL LOGAN--MARCH TO MISSOURI--MOVEMENT AGAINST HARRIS AT
FLORIDA, MO.--GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND--STATIONED AT MEXICO, MO.

CHAPTER XIX. COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERAL--COMMAND AT IRONTON, MO.
--JEFFERSON CITY--CAPE GIRARDEAU--GENERAL PRENTISS--SEIZURE OF PADUCAH
--HEADQUARTERS AT CAIRO.

CHAPTER XX. GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND--MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT--BATTLE
OF BELMONT--A NARROW ESCAPE--AFTER THE BATTLE.

CHAPTER XXI. GENERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND--COMMANDING THE DISTRICT OF
CAIRO--MOVEMENT ON FORT HENRY--CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY.

CHAPTER XXII. INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON--THE NAVAL OPERATIONS--ATTACK
OF THE ENEMY--ASSAULTING THE WORKS--SURRENDER OF THE FORT.

CHAPTER XXIII. PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS--UNOCCUPIED
TERRITORY--ADVANCE UPON NASHVILLE--SITUATION OF THE TROOPS--CONFEDERATE
RETREAT--RELIEVED OF THE COMMAND--RESTORED TO THE COMMAND--GENERAL
SMITH.

CHAPTER XXIV. THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING--INJURED BY A FALL--THE
CONFEDERATE ATTACK AT SHILOH--THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT AT SHILOH--GENERAL
SHERMAN--CONDITION OF THE ARMY--CLOSE OF THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT--THE
SECOND DAY'S FIGHT--RETREAT AND DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

CHAPTER XXV. STRUCK BY A BULLET--PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE
CONFEDERATES--INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH--GENERAL BUELL--GENERAL JOHNSTON
--REMARKS ON SHILOH.

CHAPTER XXVI. HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD--THE ADVANCE UPON
CORINTH--OCCUPATION OF CORINTH--THE ARMY SEPARATED.

CHAPTER XXVII. HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS--ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS
--ESCAPING JACKSON--COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS--HALLECK APPOINTED
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF--RETURN TO CORINTH--MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG--SURRENDER
OF CLARKSVILLE--THE ADVANCE UPON CHATTANOOGA--SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A
MICHIGAN REGIMENT.

CHAPTER XXVIII. ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLE
OF IUKA.

CHAPTER XXIX. VAN DORN'S MOVEMENTS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--COMMAND OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE.

CHAPTER XXX. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG--EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN
--OCCUPATION OF HOLLY SPRINGS--SHERMAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS--SHERMAN'S
MOVEMENTS DOWN THE MISSISSIPPI--VAN DORN CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS
--COLLECTING FORAGE AND FOOD.

CHAPTER XXXI. HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS--GENERAL MCCLERNAND IN
COMMAND--ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG'S POINT--OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG
--FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG--THE CANAL--LAKE PROVIDENCE--OPERATIONS
AT YAZOO PASS.

CHAPTER XXXII. THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--CRITICISMS OF THE
NORTHERN PRESS--RUNNING THE BATTERIES--LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA
--DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS.

CHAPTER XXXIII. ATTACK ON GRAND GULF--OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER XXXIV. CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON--GRIERSON'S RAID--OCCUPATION OF
GRAND GULF--MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK--BATTLE OF RAYMOND.

CHAPTER XXXV. MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON--FALL OF JACKSON--INTERCEPTING
THE ENEMY--BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL.

CHAPTER XXXVI. BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK
--INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS.

CHAPTER XXXVII. SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES'S BLUFF
--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THE
ASSAULT--THE FLAG OF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FOR
SURRENDER--ACCEPTING THE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER XXXIX. RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS--PROPOSED
MOVEMENT UPON MOBILE--A PAINFUL ACCIDENT--ORDERED TO REPORT AT CAIRO.



Volume one begins:




CHAPTER I.

ANCESTRY--BIRTH--BOYHOOD.

My family is American, and has been for generations, in all its
branches, direct and collateral.

Mathew Grant, the founder of the branch in America, of which I am a
descendant, reached Dorchester, Massachusetts, in May, 1630.  In 1635 he
moved to what is now Windsor, Connecticut, and was the surveyor for that
colony for more than forty years.  He was also, for many years of the
time, town clerk.  He was a married man when he arrived at Dorchester,
but his children were all born in this country.  His eldest son, Samuel,
took lands on the east side of the Connecticut River, opposite Windsor,
which have been held and occupied by descendants of his to this day.

I am of the eighth generation from Mathew Grant, and seventh from
Samuel.  Mathew Grant's first wife died a few years after their
settlement in Windsor, and he soon after married the widow Rockwell,
who, with her first husband, had been fellow-passengers with him and his
first wife, on the ship Mary and John, from Dorchester, England, in
1630.  Mrs. Rockwell had several children by her first marriage, and
others by her second.  By intermarriage, two or three generations later,
I am descended from both the wives of Mathew Grant.

In the fifth descending generation my great grandfather, Noah Grant, and
his younger brother, Solomon, held commissions in the English army, in
1756, in the war against the French and Indians.  Both were killed that
year.

My grandfather, also named Noah, was then but nine years old. At the
breaking out of the war of the Revolution, after the battles of Concord
and Lexington, he went with a Connecticut company to join the
Continental army, and was present at the battle of Bunker Hill.  He
served until the fall of Yorktown, or through the entire Revolutionary
war.  He must, however, have been on furlough part of the time--as I
believe most of the soldiers of that period were--for he married in
Connecticut during the war, had two children, and was a widower at the
close.  Soon after this he emigrated to Westmoreland County,
Pennsylvania, and settled near the town of Greensburg in that county.
He took with him the younger of his two children, Peter Grant.  The
elder, Solomon, remained with his relatives in Connecticut until old
enough to do for himself, when he emigrated to the British West Indies.

Not long after his settlement in Pennsylvania, my grandfather, Captain
Noah Grant, married a Miss Kelly, and in 1799 he emigrated again, this
time to Ohio, and settled where the town of Deerfield now stands.  He
had now five children, including Peter, a son by his first marriage.  My
father, Jesse R. Grant, was the second child--oldest son, by the second
marriage.

Peter Grant went early to Maysville, Kentucky, where he was very
prosperous, married, had a family of nine children, and was drowned at
the mouth of the Kanawha River, Virginia, in 1825, being at the time one
of the wealthy men of the West.

My grandmother Grant died in 1805, leaving seven children.  This broke
up the family.  Captain Noah Grant was not thrifty in the way of "laying
up stores on earth," and, after the death of his second wife, he went,
with the two youngest children, to live with his son Peter, in
Maysville.  The rest of the family found homes in the neighborhood of
Deerfield, my father in the family of judge Tod, the father of the late
Governor Tod, of Ohio.  His industry and independence of character were
such, that I imagine his labor compensated fully for the expense of his
maintenance.

There must have been a cordiality in his welcome into the Tod family,
for to the day of his death he looked upon judge Tod and his wife, with
all the reverence he could have felt if they had been parents instead of
benefactors.  I have often heard him speak of Mrs. Tod as the most
admirable woman he had ever known.  He remained with the Tod family only
a few years, until old enough to learn a trade.  He went first, I
believe, with his half-brother, Peter Grant, who, though not a tanner
himself, owned a tannery in Maysville, Kentucky.  Here he learned his
trade, and in a few years returned to Deerfield and worked for, and
lived in the family of a Mr. Brown, the father of John Brown--"whose
body lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul goes marching on."  I
have often heard my father speak of John Brown, particularly since the
events at Harper's Ferry.  Brown was a boy when they lived in the same
house, but he knew him afterwards, and regarded him as a man of great
purity of character, of high moral and physical courage, but a fanatic
and extremist in whatever he advocated.  It was certainly the act of an
insane man to attempt the invasion of the South, and the overthrow of
slavery, with less than twenty men.

My father set up for himself in business, establishing a tannery at
Ravenna, the county seat of Portage County.  In a few years he removed
from Ravenna, and set up the same business at Point Pleasant, Clermont
County, Ohio.

During the minority of my father, the West afforded but poor facilities
for the most opulent of the youth to acquire an education, and the
majority were dependent, almost exclusively, upon their own exertions
for whatever learning they obtained.  I have often heard him say that
his time at school was limited to six months, when he was very young,
too young, indeed, to learn much, or to appreciate the advantages of an
education, and to a "quarter's schooling" afterwards, probably while
living with judge Tod.  But his thirst for education was intense.  He
learned rapidly, and was a constant reader up to the day of his death in
his eightieth year.  Books were scarce in the Western Reserve during his
youth, but he read every book he could borrow in the neighborhood where
he lived.  This scarcity gave him the early habit of studying everything
he read, so that when he got through with a book, he knew everything in
it.  The habit continued through life.  Even after reading the daily
papers--which he never neglected--he could give all the important
information they contained.  He made himself an excellent English
scholar, and before he was twenty years of age was a constant
contributor to Western newspapers, and was also, from that time until he
was fifty years old, an able debater in the societies for this purpose,
which were common in the West at that time.  He always took an active
part in politics, but was never a candidate for office, except, I
believe, that he was the first Mayor of Georgetown.  He supported
Jackson for the Presidency; but he was a Whig, a great admirer of Henry
Clay, and never voted for any other democrat for high office after
Jackson.

My mother's family lived in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, for several
generations.  I have little information about her ancestors.  Her family
took no interest in genealogy, so that my grandfather, who died when I
was sixteen years old, knew only back to his grandfather.  On the other
side, my father took a great interest in the subject, and in his
researches, he found that there was an entailed estate in Windsor,
Connecticut, belonging to the family, to which his nephew, Lawson Grant
--still living--was the heir.  He was so much interested in the subject
that he got his nephew to empower him to act in the matter, and in 1832
or 1833, when I was a boy ten or eleven years old, he went to Windsor,
proved the title beyond dispute, and perfected the claim of the owners
for a consideration--three thousand dollars, I think.  I remember the
circumstance well, and remember, too, hearing him say on his return that
he found some widows living on the property, who had little or nothing
beyond their homes.  From these he refused to receive any recompense.

My mother's father, John Simpson, moved from Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania, to Clermont County, Ohio, about the year 1819, taking with
him his four children, three daughters and one son.  My mother, Hannah
Simpson, was the third of these children, and was then over twenty years
of age.  Her oldest sister was at that time married, and had several
children.  She still lives in Clermont County at this writing, October
5th, 1884, and is over ninety ears of age.  Until her memory failed her,
a few years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond recovery when the
Democratic party lost control in 1860.  Her family, which was large,
inherited her views, with the exception of one son who settled in
Kentucky before the war.  He was the only one of the children who
entered the volunteer service to suppress the rebellion.

Her brother, next of age and now past eighty-eight, is also still living
in Clermont County, within a few miles of the old homestead, and is as
active in mind as ever.  He was a supporter of the Government during the
war, and remains a firm believer, that national success by the
Democratic party means irretrievable ruin.

In June, 1821, my father, Jesse R. Grant, married Hannah Simpson.  I was
born on the 27th of April, 1822, at Point Pleasant, Clermont County,
Ohio.  In the fall of 1823 we moved to Georgetown, the county seat of
Brown, the adjoining county east.  This place remained my home, until at
the age of seventeen, in 1839, I went to West Point.

The schools, at the time of which I write, were very indifferent.  There
were no free schools, and none in which the scholars were classified.
They were all supported by subscription, and a single teacher--who was
often a man or a woman incapable of teaching much, even if they imparted
all they knew--would have thirty or forty scholars, male and female,
from the infant learning the A B C's up to the young lady of eighteen
and the boy of twenty, studying the highest branches taught--the three
R's, "Reading, 'Riting, 'Rithmetic."  I never saw an algebra, or other
mathematical work higher than the arithmetic, in Georgetown, until after
I was appointed to West Point.  I then bought a work on algebra in
Cincinnati; but having no teacher it was Greek to me.

My life in Georgetown was uneventful.  From the age of five or six until
seventeen, I attended the subscription schools of the village, except
during the winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9.  The former period was spent in
Maysville, Kentucky, attending the school of Richardson and Rand; the
latter in Ripley, Ohio, at a private school.  I was not studious in
habit, and probably did not make progress enough to compensate for the
outlay for board and tuition.  At all events both winters were spent in
going over the same old arithmetic which I knew every word of before,
and repeating:  "A noun is the name of a thing," which I had also heard
my Georgetown teachers repeat, until I had come to believe it--but I
cast no reflections upon my old teacher, Richardson. He turned out
bright scholars from his school, many of whom have filled conspicuous
places in the service of their States.  Two of my contemporaries there
--who, I believe, never attended any other institution of learning--have
held seats in Congress, and one, if not both, other high offices; these
are Wadsworth and Brewster.

My father was, from my earliest recollection, in comfortable
circumstances, considering the times, his place of residence, and the
community in which he lived.  Mindful of his own lack of facilities for
acquiring an education, his greatest desire in maturer years was for the
education of his children. Consequently, as stated before, I never
missed a quarter from school from the time I was old enough to attend
till the time of leaving home.  This did not exempt me from labor.  In
my early days, every one labored more or less, in the region where my
youth was spent, and more in proportion to their private means.  It was
only the very poor who were exempt.  While my father carried on the
manufacture of leather and worked at the trade himself, he owned and
tilled considerable land.  I detested the trade, preferring almost any
other labor; but I was fond of agriculture, and of all employment in
which horses were used.  We had, among other lands, fifty acres of
forest within a mile of the village.  In the fall of the year choppers
were employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-month.  When I was
seven or eight years of age, I began hauling all the wood used in the
house and shops.  I could not load it on the wagons, of course, at that
time, but I could drive, and the choppers would load, and some one at
the house unload.  When about eleven years old, I was strong enough to
hold a plough.  From that age until seventeen I did all the work done
with horses, such as breaking up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn and
potatoes, bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood,
besides tending two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood for
stoves, etc., while still attending school.  For this I was compensated
by the fact that there was never any scolding or punishing by my
parents; no objection to rational enjoyments, such as fishing, going to
the creek a mile away to swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting my
grandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles off, skating on the
ice in winter, or taking a horse and sleigh when there was snow on the
ground.

While still quite young I had visited Cincinnati, forty-five miles away,
several times, alone; also Maysville, Kentucky, often, and once
Louisville.  The journey to Louisville was a big one for a boy of that
day.  I had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to Chilicothe,
about seventy miles, with a neighbor's family, who were removing to
Toledo, Ohio, and returned alone; and had gone once, in like manner, to
Flat Rock, Kentucky, about seventy miles away.  On this latter occasion
I was fifteen years of age.  While at Flat Rock, at the house of a Mr.
Payne, whom I was visiting with his brother, a neighbor of ours in
Georgetown, I saw a very fine saddle horse, which I rather coveted, and
proposed to Mr. Payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the two I was
driving.  Payne hesitated to trade with a boy, but asking his brother
about it, the latter told him that it would be all right, that I was
allowed to do as I pleased with the horses.  I was seventy miles from
home, with a carriage to take back, and Mr. Payne said he did not know
that his horse had ever had a collar on.  I asked to have him hitched to
a farm wagon and we would soon see whether he would work.  It was soon
evident that the horse had never worn harness before; but he showed no
viciousness, and I expressed a confidence that I could manage him.  A
trade was at once struck, I receiving ten dollars difference.

The next day Mr. Payne, of Georgetown, and I started on our return.  We
got along very well for a few miles, when we encountered a ferocious dog
that frightened the horses and made them run.  The new animal kicked at
every jump he made.  I got the horses stopped, however, before any
damage was done, and without running into anything.  After giving them a
little rest, to quiet their fears, we started again.  That instant the
new horse kicked, and started to run once more.  The road we were on,
struck the turnpike within half a mile of the point where the second
runaway commenced, and there there was an embankment twenty or more feet
deep on the opposite side of the pike.  I got the horses stopped on the
very brink of the precipice.  My new horse was terribly frightened and
trembled like an aspen; but he was not half so badly frightened as my
companion, Mr. Payne, who deserted me after this last experience, and
took passage on a freight wagon for Maysville.  Every time I attempted
to start, my new horse would commence to kick.  I was in quite a dilemma
for a time.  Once in Maysville I could borrow a horse from an uncle who
lived there; but I was more than a day's travel from that point.
Finally I took out my bandanna--the style of handkerchief in universal
use then--and with this blindfolded my horse.  In this way I reached
Maysville safely the next day, no doubt much to the surprise of my
friend.  Here I borrowed a horse from my uncle, and the following day we
proceeded on our journey.

About half my school-days in Georgetown were spent at the school of John
D. White, a North Carolinian, and the father of Chilton White who
represented the district in Congress for one term during the rebellion.
Mr. White was always a Democrat in politics, and Chilton followed his
father.  He had two older brothers--all three being school-mates of mine
at their father's school--who did not go the same way.  The second
brother died before the rebellion began; he was a Whig, and afterwards a
Republican.  His oldest brother was a Republican and brave soldier
during the rebellion.  Chilton is reported as having told of an earlier
horse-trade of mine.  As he told the story, there was a Mr. Ralston
living within a few miles of the village, who owned a colt which I very
much wanted.  My father had offered twenty dollars for it, but Ralston
wanted twenty-five.  I was so anxious to have the colt, that after the
owner left, I begged to be allowed to take him at the price demanded.
My father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all the horse was worth,
and told me to offer that price; if it was not accepted I was to offer
twenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him, to give the
twenty-five.  I at once mounted a horse and went for the colt.  When I
got to Mr. Ralston's house, I said to him:  "Papa says I may offer you
twenty dollars for the colt, but if you won't take that, I am to offer
twenty-two and a half, and if you won't take that, to give you
twenty-five."  It would not require a Connecticut man to guess the price
finally agreed upon.  This story is nearly true.  I certainly showed
very plainly that I had come for the colt and meant to have him.  I
could not have been over eight years old at the time.  This transaction
caused me great heart-burning. The story got out among the boys of the
village, and it was a long time before I heard the last of it.  Boys
enjoy the misery of their companions, at least village boys in that day
did, and in later life I have found that all adults are not free from
the peculiarity.  I kept the horse until he was four years old, when he
went blind, and I sold him for twenty dollars.  When I went to Maysville
to school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, I recognized my colt as one
of the blind horses working on the tread-wheel of the ferry-boat.

I have describes enough of my early life to give an impression of the
whole.  I did not like to work; but I did as much of it, while young, as
grown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at the
same time.  I had as many privileges as any boy in the village, and
probably more than most of them.  I have no recollection of ever having
been punished at home, either by scolding or by the rod.  But at school
the case was different.  The rod was freely used there, and I was not
exempt from its influence.  I can see John D. White--the school teacher
--now, with his long beech switch always in his hand.  It was not always
the same one, either.  Switches were brought in bundles, from a beech
wood near the school house, by the boys for whose benefit they were
intended.  Often a whole bundle would be used up in a single day.  I
never had any hard feelings against my teacher, either while attending
the school, or in later years when reflecting upon my experience.  Mr.
White was a kindhearted man, and was much respected by the community in
which he lived.  He only followed the universal custom of the period,
and that under which he had received his own education.



CHAPTER II.

WEST POINT--GRADUATION.

In the winter of 1838-9 I was attending school at Ripley, only ten miles
distant from Georgetown, but spent the Christmas holidays at home.
During this vacation my father received a letter from the Honorable
Thomas Morris, then United States Senator from Ohio.  When he read it he
said to me, "Ulysses, I believe you are going to receive the
appointment."  "What appointment?"  I inquired.  "To West Point; I have
applied for it."  "But I won't go," I said.  He said he thought I would,
AND I THOUGHT SO TOO, IF HE DID.  I really had no objection to going to
West Point, except that I had a very exalted idea of the acquirements
necessary to get through.  I did not believe I possessed them, and could
not bear the idea of failing.  There had been four boys from our
village, or its immediate neighborhood, who had been graduated from West
Point, and never a failure of any one appointed from Georgetown, except
in the case of the one whose place I was to take.  He was the son of Dr.
Bailey, our nearest and most intimate neighbor.  Young Bailey had been
appointed in 1837.  Finding before the January examination following,
that he could not pass, he resigned and went to a private school, and
remained there until the following year, when he was reappointed.
Before the next examination he was dismissed.  Dr. Bailey was a proud
and sensitive man, and felt the failure of his son so keenly that he
forbade his return home.  There were no telegraphs in those days to
disseminate news rapidly, no railroads west of the Alleghanies, and but
few east; and above all, there were no reporters prying into other
people's private affairs.  Consequently it did not become generally
known that there was a vacancy at West Point from our district until I
was appointed.  I presume Mrs. Bailey confided to my mother the fact
that Bartlett had been dismissed, and that the doctor had forbidden his
son's return home.

The Honorable Thomas L. Hamer, one of the ablest men Ohio ever produced,
was our member of Congress at the time, and had the right of nomination.
He and my father had been members of the same debating society (where
they were generally pitted on opposite sides), and intimate personal
friends from their early manhood up to a few years before.  In politics
they differed. Hamer was a life-long Democrat, while my father was a
Whig. They had a warm discussion, which finally became angry--over some
act of President Jackson, the removal of the deposit of public moneys, I
think--after which they never spoke until after my appointment.  I know
both of them felt badly over this estrangement, and would have been glad
at any time to come to a reconciliation; but neither would make the
advance.  Under these circumstances my father would not write to Hamer
for the appointment, but he wrote to Thomas Morris, United States
Senator from Ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy at West Point
from our district, and that he would be glad if I could be appointed to
fill it.  This letter, I presume, was turned over to Mr. Hamer, and, as
there was no other applicant, he cheerfully appointed me.  This healed
the breach between the two, never after reopened.

Besides the argument used by my father in favor of my going to West
Point--that "he thought I would go"--there was another very strong
inducement.  I had always a great desire to travel.  I was already the
best travelled boy in Georgetown, except the sons of one man, John
Walker, who had emigrated to Texas with his family, and immigrated back
as soon as he could get the means to do so.  In his short stay in Texas
he acquired a very different opinion of the country from what one would
form going there now.

I had been east to Wheeling, Virginia, and north to the Western Reserve,
in Ohio, west to Louisville, and south to Bourbon County, Kentucky,
besides having driven or ridden pretty much over the whole country
within fifty miles of home.  Going to West Point would give me the
opportunity of visiting the two great cities of the continent,
Philadelphia and New York.  This was enough.  When these places were
visited I would have been glad to have had a steamboat or railroad
collision, or any other accident happen, by which I might have received
a temporary injury sufficient to make me ineligible, for a time, to
enter the Academy.  Nothing of the kind occurred, and I had to face the
music.

Georgetown has a remarkable record for a western village.  It is, and
has been from its earliest existence, a democratic town.  There was
probably no time during the rebellion when, if the opportunity could
have been afforded, it would not have voted for Jefferson Davis for
President of the United States, over Mr. Lincoln, or any other
representative of his party; unless it was immediately after some of
John Morgan's men, in his celebrated raid through Ohio, spent a few
hours in the village.  The rebels helped themselves to whatever they
could find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses, and many ordered
meals to be prepared for them by the families.  This was no doubt a far
pleasanter duty for some families than it would have been to render a
like service for Union soldiers.  The line between the Rebel and Union
element in Georgetown was so marked that it led to divisions even in the
churches.  There were churches in that part of Ohio where treason was
preached regularly, and where, to secure membership, hostility to the
government, to the war and to the liberation of the slaves, was far more
essential than a belief in the authenticity or credibility of the Bible.
There were men in Georgetown who filled all the requirements for
membership in these churches.

Yet this far-off western village, with a population, including old and
young, male and female, of about one thousand--about enough for the
organization of a single regiment if all had been men capable of bearing
arms--furnished the Union army four general officers and one colonel,
West Point graduates, and nine generals and field officers of
Volunteers, that I can think of. Of the graduates from West Point, all
had citizenship elsewhere at the breaking out of the rebellion, except
possibly General A. V. Kautz, who had remained in the army from his
graduation.  Two of the colonels also entered the service from other
localities.  The other seven, General McGroierty, Colonels White, Fyffe,
Loudon and Marshall, Majors King and Bailey, were all residents of
Georgetown when the war broke out, and all of them, who were alive at
the close, returned there.  Major Bailey was the cadet who had preceded
me at West Point.  He was killed in West Virginia, in his first
engagement.  As far as I know, every boy who has entered West Point from
that village since my time has been graduated.

I took passage on a steamer at Ripley, Ohio, for Pittsburg, about the
middle of May, 1839.  Western boats at that day did not make regular
trips at stated times, but would stop anywhere, and for any length of
time, for passengers or freight.  I have myself been detained two or
three days at a place after steam was up, the gang planks, all but one,
drawn in, and after the time advertised for starting had expired.  On
this occasion we had no vexatious delays, and in about three days
Pittsburg was reached.  From Pittsburg I chose passage by the canal to
Harrisburg, rather than by the more expeditious stage.  This gave a
better opportunity of enjoying the fine scenery of Western Pennsylvania,
and I had rather a dread of reaching my destination at all.  At that
time the canal was much patronized by travellers, and, with the
comfortable packets of the period, no mode of conveyance could be more
pleasant, when time was not an object.  From Harrisburg to Philadelphia
there was a railroad, the first I had ever seen, except the one on which
I had just crossed the summit of the Alleghany Mountains, and over which
canal boats were transported.  In travelling by the road from
Harrisburg, I thought the perfection of rapid transit had been reached.
We travelled at least eighteen miles an hour, when at full speed, and
made the whole distance averaging probably as much as twelve miles an
hour.  This seemed like annihilating space.  I stopped five days in
Philadelphia, saw about every street in the city, attended the theatre,
visited Girard College (which was then in course of construction), and
got reprimanded from home afterwards, for dallying by the way so long.
My sojourn in New York was shorter, but long enough to enable me to see
the city very well.  I reported at West Point on the 30th or 31st of
May, and about two weeks later passed my examination for admission,
without difficulty, very much to my surprise.

A military life had no charms for me, and I had not the faintest idea of
staying in the army even if I should be graduated, which I did not
expect.  The encampment which preceded the commencement of academic
studies was very wearisome and uninteresting.  When the 28th of August
came--the date for breaking up camp and going into barracks--I felt as
though I had been at West Point always, and that if I staid to
graduation, I would have to remain always.  I did not take hold of my
studies with avidity, in fact I rarely ever read over a lesson the
second time during my entire cadetship.  I could not sit in my room
doing nothing.  There is a fine library connected with the Academy from
which cadets can get books to read in their quarters.  I devoted more
time to these, than to books relating to the course of studies.  Much of
the time, I am sorry to say, was devoted to novels, but not those of a
trashy sort.  I read all of Bulwer's then published, Cooper's,
Marryat's, Scott's, Washington Irving's works, Lever's, and many others
that I do not now remember.  Mathematics was very easy to me, so that
when January came, I passed the examination, taking a good standing in
that branch.  In French, the only other study at that time in the first
year's course, my standing was very low.  In fact, if the class had been
turned the other end foremost I should have been near head.  I never
succeeded in getting squarely at either end of my class, in any one
study, during the four years.  I came near it in French, artillery,
infantry and cavalry tactics, and conduct.

Early in the session of the Congress which met in December, 1839, a bill
was discussed abolishing the Military Academy.  I saw in this an
honorable way to obtain a discharge, and read the debates with much
interest, but with impatience at the delay in taking action, for I was
selfish enough to favor the bill.  It never passed, and a year later,
although the time hung drearily with me, I would have been sorry to have
seen it succeed.  My idea then was to get through the course, secure a
detail for a few years as assistant professor of mathematics at the
Academy, and afterwards obtain a permanent position as professor in some
respectable college; but circumstances always did shape my course
different from my plans.

At the end of two years the class received the usual furlough, extending
from the close of the June examination to the 28th of August.  This I
enjoyed beyond any other period of my life.  My father had sold out his
business in Georgetown--where my youth had been spent, and to which my
day-dreams carried me back as my future home, if I should ever be able
to retire on a competency.  He had moved to Bethel, only twelve miles
away, in the adjoining county of Clermont, and had bought a young horse
that had never been in harness, for my special use under the saddle
during my furlough.  Most of my time was spent among my old
school-mates--these ten weeks were shorter than one week at West Point.

Persons acquainted with the Academy know that the corps of cadets is
divided into four companies for the purpose of military exercises.
These companies are officered from the cadets, the superintendent and
commandant selecting the officers for their military bearing and
qualifications.  The adjutant, quartermaster, four captains and twelve
lieutenants are taken from the first, or Senior class; the sergeants
from the second, or junior class; and the corporals from the third, or
Sophomore class.  I had not been "called out" as a corporal, but when I
returned from furlough I found myself the last but one--about my
standing in all the tactics--of eighteen sergeants.  The promotion was
too much for me.  That year my standing in the class--as shown by the
number of demerits of the year--was about the same as it was among the
sergeants, and I was dropped, and served the fourth year as a private.

During my first year's encampment General Scott visited West Point, and
reviewed the cadets.  With his commanding figure, his quite colossal
size and showy uniform, I thought him the finest specimen of manhood my
eyes had ever beheld, and the most to be envied.  I could never resemble
him in appearance, but I believe I did have a presentiment for a moment
that some day I should occupy his place on review--although I had no
intention then of remaining in the army.  My experience in a horse-trade
ten years before, and the ridicule it caused me, were too fresh in my
mind for me to communicate this presentiment to even my most intimate
chum.  The next summer Martin Van Buren, then President of the United
States, visited West Point and reviewed the cadets; he did not impress
me with the awe which Scott had inspired.  In fact I regarded General
Scott and Captain C. F. Smith, the Commandant of Cadets, as the two men
most to be envied in the nation.  I retained a high regard for both up
to the day of their death.

The last two years wore away more rapidly than the first two, but they
still seemed about five times as long as Ohio years, to me.  At last all
the examinations were passed, and the members of the class were called
upon to record their choice of arms of service and regiments.  I was
anxious to enter the cavalry, or dragoons as they were then called, but
there was only one regiment of dragoons in the Army at that time, and
attached to that, besides the full complement of officers, there were at
least four brevet second lieutenants.  I recorded therefore my first
choice, dragoons; second, 4th infantry; and got the latter.  Again there
was a furlough--or, more properly speaking, leave of absence for the
class were now commissioned officers--this time to the end of September.
Again I went to Ohio to spend my vacation among my old school-mates; and
again I found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special use, besides
a horse and buggy that I could drive--but I was not in a physical
condition to enjoy myself quite as well as on the former occasion.  For
six months before graduation I had had a desperate cough ("Tyler's grip"
it was called), and I was very much reduced, weighing but one hundred
and seventeen pounds, just my weight at entrance, though I had grown six
inches in stature in the mean time.  There was consumption in my
father's family, two of his brothers having died of that disease, which
made my symptoms more alarming.  The brother and sister next younger
than myself died, during the rebellion, of the same disease, and I
seemed the most promising subject for it of the three in 1843.

Having made alternate choice of two different arms of service with
different uniforms, I could not get a uniform suit until notified of my
assignment.  I left my measurement with a tailor, with directions not to
make the uniform until I notified him whether it was to be for infantry
or dragoons.  Notice did not reach me for several weeks, and then it
took at least a week to get the letter of instructions to the tailor and
two more to make the clothes and have them sent to me.  This was a time
of great suspense.  I was impatient to get on my uniform and see how it
looked, and probably wanted my old school-mates, particularly the girls,
to see me in it.

The conceit was knocked out of me by two little circumstances that
happened soon after the arrival of the clothes, which gave me a distaste
for military uniform that I never recovered from.  Soon after the
arrival of the suit I donned it, and put off for Cincinnati on
horseback.  While I was riding along a street of that city, imagining
that every one was looking at me, with a feeling akin to mine when I
first saw General Scott, a little urchin, bareheaded, footed, with dirty
and ragged pants held up by bare a single gallows--that's what
suspenders were called then--and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tub
for weeks, turned to me and cried:  "Soldier! will you work?  No,
sir--ee; I'll sell my shirt first!!" The horse trade and its dire
consequences were recalled to mind.

The other circumstance occurred at home.  Opposite our house in Bethel
stood the old stage tavern where "man and beast" found accommodation,
The stable-man was rather dissipated, but possessed of some humor.  On
my return I found him parading the streets, and attending in the stable,
barefooted, but in a pair of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons--just the color
of my uniform trousers--with a strip of white cotton sheeting sewed down
the outside seams in imitation of mine.  The joke was a huge one in the
mind of many of the people, and was much enjoyed by them; but I did not
appreciate it so highly.

During the remainder of my leave of absence, my time was spent in
visiting friends in Georgetown and Cincinnati, and occasionally other
towns in that part of the State.



CHAPTER III.

ARMY LIFE--CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR--CAMP SALUBRITY.

On the 30th of September I reported for duty at Jefferson Barracks, St.
Louis, with the 4th United States infantry.  It was the largest military
post in the country at that time, being garrisoned by sixteen companies
of infantry, eight of the 3d regiment, the remainder of the 4th.
Colonel Steven Kearney, one of the ablest officers of the day, commanded
the post, and under him discipline was kept at a high standard, but
without vexatious rules or regulations.  Every drill and roll-call had
to be attended, but in the intervals officers were permitted to enjoy
themselves, leaving the garrison, and going where they pleased, without
making written application to state where they were going for how long,
etc., so that they were back for their next duty.  It did seem to me, in
my early army days, that too many of the older officers, when they came
to command posts, made it a study to think what orders they could
publish to annoy their subordinates and render them uncomfortable.  I
noticed, however, a few years later, when the Mexican war broke out,
that most of this class of officers discovered they were possessed of
disabilities which entirely incapacitated them for active field service.
They had the moral courage to proclaim it, too.  They were right; but
they did not always give their disease the right name.

At West Point I had a class-mate--in the last year of our studies he was
room-mate also--F. T. Dent, whose family resided some five miles west of
Jefferson Barracks.  Two of his unmarried brothers were living at home
at that time, and as I had taken with me from Ohio, my horse, saddle and
bridle, I soon found my way out to White Haven, the name of the Dent
estate.  As I found the family congenial my visits became frequent.
There were at home, besides the young men, two daughters, one a school
miss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine.  There was still an
older daughter of seventeen, who had been spending several years at
boarding-school in St. Louis, but who, though through school, had not
yet returned home.  She was spending the winter in the city with
connections, the family of Colonel John O'Fallon, well known in St.
Louis.  In February she returned to her country home.  After that I do
not know but my visits became more frequent; they certainly did become
more enjoyable.  We would often take walks, or go on horseback to visit
the neighbors, until I became quite well acquainted in that vicinity.
Sometimes one of the brothers would accompany us, sometimes one of the
younger sisters.  If the 4th infantry had remained at Jefferson Barracks
it is possible, even probable, that this life might have continued for
some years without my finding out that there was anything serious the
matter with me; but in the following May a circumstance occurred which
developed my sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it.

The annexation of Texas was at this time the subject of violent
discussion in Congress, in the press, and by individuals.  The
administration of President Tyler, then in power, was making the most
strenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was, indeed, the great
and absorbing question of the day.  During these discussions the greater
part of the single rifle regiment in the army--the 2d dragoons, which
had been dismounted a year or two before, and designated "Dismounted
Rifles"--was stationed at Fort Jessup, Louisiana, some twenty-five miles
east of the Texas line, to observe the frontier.  About the 1st of May
the 3d infantry was ordered from Jefferson Barracks to Louisiana, to go
into camp in the neighborhood of Fort Jessup, and there await further
orders.  The troops were embarked on steamers and were on their way down
the Mississippi within a few days after the receipt of this order.
About the time they started I obtained a leave of absence for twenty
days to go to Ohio to visit my parents.  I was obliged to go to St.
Louis to take a steamer for Louisville or Cincinnati, or the first
steamer going up the Ohio River to any point.  Before I left St. Louis
orders were received at Jefferson Barracks for the 4th infantry to
follow the 3d.  A messenger was sent after me to stop my leaving; but
before he could reach me I was off, totally ignorant of these events.  A
day or two after my arrival at Bethel I received a letter from a
classmate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th, informing me of the
circumstances related above, and advising me not to open any letter post
marked St. Louis or Jefferson Barracks, until the expiration of my
leave, and saying that he would pack up my things and take them along
for me.  His advice was not necessary, for no other letter was sent to
me.  I now discovered that I was exceedingly anxious to get back to
Jefferson Barracks, and I understood the reason without explanation from
any one.  My leave of absence required me to report for duty, at
Jefferson Barracks, at the end of twenty days.  I knew my regiment had
gone up the Red River, but I was not disposed to break the letter of my
leave; besides, if I had proceeded to Louisiana direct, I could not have
reached there until after the expiration of my leave.  Accordingly, at
the end of the twenty days, I reported for duty to Lieutenant Ewell,
commanding at Jefferson Barracks, handing him at the same time my leave
of absence.  After noticing the phraseology of the order--leaves of
absence were generally worded, "at the end of which time he will report
for duty with his proper command"--he said he would give me an order to
join my regiment in Louisiana.  I then asked for a few days' leave
before starting, which he readily granted.  This was the same Ewell who
acquired considerable reputation as a Confederate general during the
rebellion.  He was a man much esteemed, and deservedly so, in the old
army, and proved himself a gallant and efficient officer in two wars
--both in my estimation unholy.

I immediately procured a horse and started for the country, taking no
baggage with me, of course.  There is an insignificant creek--the
Gravois--between Jefferson Barracks and the place to which I was going,
and at that day there was not a bridge over it from its source to its
mouth.  There is not water enough in the creek at ordinary stages to run
a coffee mill, and at low water there is none running whatever.  On this
occasion it had been raining heavily, and, when the creek was reached, I
found the banks full to overflowing, and the current rapid.  I looked at
it a moment to consider what to do.  One of my superstitions had always
been when I started to go any where, or to do anything, not to turn
back, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished.  I have
frequently started to go to places where I had never been and to which I
did not know the way, depending upon making inquiries on the road, and
if I got past the place without knowing it, instead of turning back, I
would go on until a road was found turning in the right direction, take
that, and come in by the other side.  So I struck into the stream, and
in an instant the horse was swimming and I being carried down by the
current.  I headed the horse towards the other bank and soon reached it,
wet through and without other clothes on that side of the stream.  I
went on, however, to my destination and borrowed a dry suit from my
--future--brother-in-law.  We were not of the same size, but the clothes
answered every purpose until I got more of my own.

Before I returned I mustered up courage to make known, in the most
awkward manner imaginable, the discovery I had made on learning that the
4th infantry had been ordered away from Jefferson Barracks.  The young
lady afterwards admitted that she too, although until then she had never
looked upon me other than as a visitor whose company was agreeable to
her, had experienced a depression of spirits she could not account for
when the regiment left.  Before separating it was definitely understood
that at a convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not let the
removal of a regiment trouble us.  This was in May, 1844.  It was the
22d of August, 1848, before the fulfilment of this agreement.  My duties
kept me on the frontier of Louisiana with the Army of Observation during
the pendency of Annexation; and afterwards I was absent through the war
with Mexico, provoked by the action of the army, if not by the
annexation itself. During that time there was a constant correspondence
between Miss Dent and myself, but we only met once in the period of four
years and three months.  In May, 1845, I procured a leave for twenty
days, visited St. Louis, and obtained the consent of the parents for the
union, which had not been asked for before.

As already stated, it was never my intention to remain in the army long,
but to prepare myself for a professorship in some college.  Accordingly,
soon after I was settled at Jefferson Barracks, I wrote a letter to
Professor Church--Professor of Mathematics at West Point--requesting him
to ask my designation as his assistant, when next a detail had to be
made. Assistant professors at West Point are all officers of the army,
supposed to be selected for their special fitness for the particular
branch of study they are assigned to teach.  The answer from Professor
Church was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt I should have been
detailed a year or two later but for the Mexican War coming on.
Accordingly I laid out for myself a course of studies to be pursued in
garrison, with regularity, if not persistency.  I reviewed my West Point
course of mathematics during the seven months at Jefferson Barracks, and
read many valuable historical works, besides an occasional novel.  To
help my memory I kept a book in which I would write up, from time to
time, my recollections of all I had read since last posting it.  When
the regiment was ordered away, I being absent at the time, my effects
were packed up by Lieutenant Haslett, of the 4th infantry, and taken
along.  I never saw my journal after, nor did I ever keep another,
except for a portion of the time while travelling abroad.  Often since a
fear has crossed my mind lest that book might turn up yet, and fall into
the hands of some malicious person who would publish it.  I know its
appearance would cause me as much heart-burning as my youthful
horse-trade, or the later rebuke for wearing uniform clothes.

The 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on the reservation at Fort
Jessup, about midway between the Red River and the Sabine.  Our orders
required us to go into camp in the same neighborhood, and await further
instructions.  Those authorized to do so selected a place in the pine
woods, between the old town of Natchitoches and Grand Ecore, about three
miles from each, and on high ground back from the river.  The place was
given the name of Camp Salubrity, and proved entitled to it. The camp
was on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with spring branches in the valley, in
front and rear.  The springs furnished an abundance of cool, pure water,
and the ridge was above the flight of mosquitoes, which abound in that
region in great multitudes and of great voracity.  In the valley they
swarmed in myriads, but never came to the summit of the ridge.  The
regiment occupied this camp six months before the first death occurred,
and that was caused by an accident.

There was no intimation given that the removal of the 3d and 4th
regiments of infantry to the western border of Louisiana was occasioned
in any way by the prospective annexation of Texas, but it was generally
understood that such was the case. Ostensibly we were intended to
prevent filibustering into Texas, but really as a menace to Mexico in
case she appeared to contemplate war.  Generally the officers of the
army were indifferent whether the annexation was consummated or not; but
not so all of them.  For myself, I was bitterly opposed to the measure,
and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the most
unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation.  It was an
instance of a republic following the bad example of European monarchies,
in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional
territory.  Texas was originally a state belonging to the republic of
Mexico.  It extended from the Sabine River on the east to the Rio Grande
on the west, and from the Gulf of Mexico on the south and east to the
territory of the United States and New Mexico--another Mexican state at
that time--on the north and west.  An empire in territory, it had but a
very sparse population, until settled by Americans who had received
authority from Mexico to colonize. These colonists paid very little
attention to the supreme government, and introduced slavery into the
state almost from the start, though the constitution of Mexico did not,
nor does it now, sanction that institution.  Soon they set up an
independent government of their own, and war existed, between Texas and
Mexico, in name from that time until 1836, when active hostilities very
nearly ceased upon the capture of Santa Anna, the Mexican President.
Before long, however, the same people--who with permission of Mexico had
colonized Texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then seceded
as soon as they felt strong enough to do so--offered themselves and the
State to the United States, and in 1845 their offer was accepted.  The
occupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of the
movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory
out of which slave states might be formed for the American Union.

Even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in which
the subsequent war was forced upon Mexico cannot.  The fact is,
annexationists wanted more territory than they could possibly lay any
claim to, as part of the new acquisition. Texas, as an independent
State, never had exercised jurisdiction over the territory between the
Nueces River and the Rio Grande. Mexico had never recognized the
independence of Texas, and maintained that, even if independent, the
State had no claim south of the Nueces.  I am aware that a treaty, made
by the Texans with Santa Anna while he was under duress, ceded all the
territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande--, but he was a prisoner
of war when the treaty was made, and his life was in jeopardy.  He knew,
too, that he deserved execution at the hands of the Texans, if they
should ever capture him.  The Texans, if they had taken his life, would
have only followed the example set by Santa Anna himself a few years
before, when he executed the entire garrison of the Alamo and the
villagers of Goliad.

In taking military possession of Texas after annexation, the army of
occupation, under General Taylor, was directed to occupy the disputed
territory.  The army did not stop at the Nueces and offer to negotiate
for a settlement of the boundary question, but went beyond, apparently
in order to force Mexico to initiate war.  It is to the credit of the
American nation, however, that after conquering Mexico, and while
practically holding the country in our possession, so that we could have
retained the whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a round
sum for the additional territory taken; more than it was worth, or was
likely to be, to Mexico.  To us it was an empire and of incalculable
value; but it might have been obtained by other means.  The Southern
rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the Mexican war.  Nations, like
individuals, are punished for their transgressions.  We got our
punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times.

The 4th infantry went into camp at Salubrity in the month of May, 1844,
with instructions, as I have said, to await further orders.  At first,
officers and men occupied ordinary tents.  As the summer heat increased
these were covered by sheds to break the rays of the sun.  The summer
was whiled away in social enjoyments among the officers, in visiting
those stationed at, and near, Fort Jessup, twenty-five miles away,
visiting the planters on the Red River, and the citizens of Natchitoches
and Grand Ecore.  There was much pleasant intercourse between the
inhabitants and the officers of the army.  I retain very agreeable
recollections of my stay at Camp Salubrity, and of the acquaintances
made there, and no doubt my feeling is shared by the few officers living
who were there at the time.  I can call to mind only two officers of the
4th infantry, besides myself, who were at Camp Salubrity with the
regiment, who are now alive.

With a war in prospect, and belonging to a regiment that had an unusual
number of officers detailed on special duty away from the regiment, my
hopes of being ordered to West Point as instructor vanished.  At the
time of which I now write, officers in the quartermaster's, commissary's
and adjutant--general's departments were appointed from the line of the
army, and did not vacate their regimental commissions until their
regimental and staff commissions were for the same grades.  Generally
lieutenants were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in the staff
corps.  If they should reach a captaincy in the line before they arrived
at a majority in the staff, they would elect which commission they would
retain.  In the 4th infantry, in 1844, at least six line officers were
on duty in the staff, and therefore permanently detached from the
regiment.  Under these circumstances I gave up everything like a special
course of reading, and only read thereafter for my own amusement, and
not very much for that, until the war was over.  I kept a horse and
rode, and staid out of doors most of the time by day, and entirely
recovered from the cough which I had carried from West Point, and from
all indications of consumption.  I have often thought that my life was
saved, and my health restored, by exercise and exposure, enforced by an
administrative act, and a war, both of which I disapproved.

As summer wore away, and cool days and colder nights came upon us, the
tents. We were occupying ceased to afford comfortable quarters; and
"further orders" not reaching us, we began to look about to remedy the
hardship.  Men were put to work getting out timber to build huts, and in
a very short time all were comfortably housed--privates as well as
officers.  The outlay by the government in accomplishing this was
nothing, or nearly nothing.  The winter was spent more agreeably than
the summer had been.  There were occasional parties given by the
planters along the "coast"--as the bottom lands on the Red River were
called.  The climate was delightful.

Near the close of the short session of Congress of 1844-5, the bill for
the annexation of Texas to the United States was passed.  It reached
President Tyler on the 1st of March, 1845, and promptly received his
approval.  When the news reached us we began to look again for "further
orders."  They did not arrive promptly, and on the 1st of May following
I asked and obtained a leave of absence for twenty days, for the purpose
of visiting--St. Louis.  The object of this visit has been before
stated.

Early in July the long expected orders were received, but they only took
the regiment to New Orleans Barracks.  We reached there before the
middle of the month, and again waited weeks for still further orders.
The yellow fever was raging in New Orleans during the time we remained
there, and the streets of the city had the appearance of a continuous
well-observed Sunday.  I recollect but one occasion when this observance
seemed to be broken by the inhabitants.  One morning about daylight I
happened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a rifle not far off,
I looked out to ascertain where the sound came from.  I observed a
couple of clusters of men near by, and learned afterwards that "it was
nothing; only a couple of gentlemen deciding a difference of opinion
with rifles, at twenty paces."  I do not remember if either was killed,
or even hurt, but no doubt the question of difference was settled
satisfactorily, and "honorably," in the estimation of the parties
engaged.  I do not believe I ever would have the courage to fight a
duel.  If any man should wrong me to the extent of my being willing to
kill him, I would not be willing to give him the choice of weapons with
which it should be done, and of the time, place and distance separating
us, when I executed him.  If I should do another such a wrong as to
justify him in killing me, I would make any reasonable atonement within
my power, if convinced of the wrong done.  I place my opposition to
duelling on higher grounds than here stated.  No doubt a majority of the
duels fought have been for want of moral courage on the part of those
engaged to decline.

At Camp Salubrity, and when we went to New Orleans Barracks, the 4th
infantry was commanded by Colonel Vose, then an old gentleman who had
not commanded on drill for a number of years.  He was not a man to
discover infirmity in the presence of danger.  It now appeared that war
was imminent, and he felt that it was his duty to brush up his tactics.
Accordingly, when we got settled down at our new post, he took command
of the regiment at a battalion drill.  Only two or three evolutions had
been gone through when he dismissed the battalion, and, turning to go to
his own quarters, dropped dead.  He had not been complaining of ill
health, but no doubt died of heart disease.  He was a most estimable
man, of exemplary habits, and by no means the author of his own disease.



CHAPTER IV.

CORPUS CHRISTI--MEXICAN SMUGGLING--SPANISH RULE IN MEXICO--SUPPLYING
TRANSPORTATION.

Early in September the regiment left New Orleans for Corpus Christi, now
in Texas.  Ocean steamers were not then common, and the passage was made
in sailing vessels.  At that time there was not more than three feet of
water in the channel at the outlet of Corpus Christi Bay; the
debarkation, therefore, had to take place by small steamers, and at an
island in the channel called Shell Island, the ships anchoring some
miles out from shore. This made the work slow, and as the army was only
supplied with one or two steamers, it took a number of days to effect
the landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp and garrison
equipage, etc.  There happened to be pleasant weather while this was
going on, but the land-swell was so great that when the ship and steamer
were on opposite sides of the same wave they would be at considerable
distance apart.  The men and baggage were let down to a point higher
than the lower deck of the steamer, and when ship and steamer got into
the trough between the waves, and were close together, the load would be
drawn over the steamer and rapidly run down until it rested on the deck.

After I had gone ashore, and had been on guard several days at Shell
Island, quite six miles from the ship, I had occasion for some reason or
other to return on board.  While on the Suviah--I think that was the
name of our vessel--I heard a tremendous racket at the other end of the
ship, and much and excited sailor language, such as "damn your eyes,"
etc.  In a moment or two the captain, who was an excitable little man,
dying with consumption, and not weighing much over a hundred pounds,
came running out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as he
was, and crying, that his men had mutinied.  It was necessary to sustain
the captain without question, and in a few minutes all the sailors
charged with mutiny were in irons.  I rather felt for a time a wish that
I had not gone aboard just then.  As the men charged with mutiny
submitted to being placed in irons without resistance, I always doubted
if they knew that they had mutinied until they were told.

By the time I was ready to leave the ship again I thought I had learned
enough of the working of the double and single pulley, by which
passengers were let down from the upper deck of the ship to the steamer
below, and determined to let myself down without assistance.  Without
saying anything of my intentions to any one, I mounted the railing, and
taking hold of the centre rope, just below the upper block, I put one
foot on the hook below the lower block, and stepped off just as I did so
some one called out "hold on."  It was too late.  I tried to "hold on"
with all my might, but my heels went up, and my head went down so
rapidly that my hold broke, and I plunged head foremost into the water,
some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that it seemed to me I
never would stop.  When I came to the surface again, being a fair
swimmer, and not having lost my presence of mind, I swam around until a
bucket was let down for me, and I was drawn up without a scratch or
injury. I do not believe there was a man on board who sympathized with
me in the least when they found me uninjured.  I rather enjoyed the joke
myself. The captain of the Suviah died of his disease a few months later,
and I believe before the mutineers were tried.  I hope they got clear,
because, as before stated, I always thought the mutiny was all in the
brain of a very weak and sick man.

After reaching shore, or Shell Island, the labor of getting to Corpus
Christi was slow and tedious.  There was, if my memory serves me, but
one small steamer to transport troops and baggage when the 4th infantry
arrived.  Others were procured later.  The distance from Shell Island to
Corpus Christi was some sixteen or eighteen miles.  The channel to the
bay was so shallow that the steamer, small as it was, had to be dragged
over the bottom when loaded.  Not more than one trip a day could be
effected.  Later this was remedied, by deepening the channel and
increasing the number of vessels suitable to its navigation.

Corpus Christi is near the head of the bay of the same name, formed by
the entrance of the Nueces River into tide-water, and is on the west
bank of that bay.  At the time of its first occupancy by United States
troops there was a small Mexican hamlet there, containing probably less
than one hundred souls. There was, in addition, a small American trading
post, at which goods were sold to Mexican smugglers.  All goods were put
up in compact packages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable for
loading on pack mules.  Two of these packages made a load for an
ordinary Mexican mule, and three for the larger ones.  The bulk of the
trade was in leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and calicoes.  The
Mexicans had, before the arrival of the army, but little to offer in
exchange except silver.  The trade in tobacco was enormous, considering
the population to be supplied.  Almost every Mexican above the age of
ten years, and many much younger, smoked the cigarette.  Nearly every
Mexican carried a pouch of leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in the
hands, and a roll of corn husks to make wrappers.  The cigarettes were
made by the smokers as they used them.

Up to the time of which I write, and for years afterwards--I think until
the administration of President Juarez--the cultivation, manufacture and
sale of tobacco constituted a government monopoly, and paid the bulk of
the revenue collected from internal sources.  The price was enormously
high, and made successful smuggling very profitable.  The difficulty of
obtaining tobacco is probably the reason why everybody, male and female,
used it at that time.  I know from my own experience that when I was at
West Point, the fact that tobacco, in every form, was prohibited, and
the mere possession of the weed severely punished, made the majority of
the cadets, myself included, try to acquire the habit of using it.  I
failed utterly at the time and for many years afterward; but the
majority accomplished the object of their youthful ambition.

Under Spanish rule Mexico was prohibited from producing anything that
the mother-country could supply.  This rule excluded the cultivation of
the grape, olive and many other articles to which the soil and climate
were well adapted.  The country was governed for "revenue only;" and
tobacco, which cannot be raised in Spain, but is indigenous to Mexico,
offered a fine instrumentality for securing this prime object of
government.  The native population had been in the habit of using "the
weed" from a period, back of any recorded history of this continent.
Bad habits--if not restrained by law or public opinion--spread more
rapidly and universally than good ones, and the Spanish colonists
adopted the use of tobacco almost as generally as the natives.  Spain,
therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from this source,
prohibited the cultivation, except in specified localities--and in these
places farmed out the privilege at a very high price.  The tobacco when
raised could only be sold to the government, and the price to the
consumer was limited only by the avarice of the authorities, and the
capacity of the people to pay.

All laws for the government of the country were enacted in Spain, and
the officers for their execution were appointed by the Crown, and sent
out to the New El Dorado.  The Mexicans had been brought up ignorant of
how to legislate or how to rule. When they gained their independence,
after many years of war, it was the most natural thing in the world that
they should adopt as their own the laws then in existence.  The only
change was, that Mexico became her own executor of the laws and the
recipient of the revenues.  The tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenue
under the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not the very last, of
the obnoxious imposts to be repealed.  Now, the citizens are allowed to
cultivate any crops the soil will yield.  Tobacco is cheap, and every
quality can be produced. Its use is by no means so general as when I
first visited the country.

Gradually the "Army of Occupation" assembled at Corpus Christi.  When it
was all together it consisted of seven companies of the 2d regiment of
dragoons, four companies of light artillery, five regiments of infantry
--the 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th--and one regiment of artillery acting as
infantry--not more than three thousand men in all.  General Zachary
Taylor commanded the whole.  There were troops enough in one body to
establish a drill and discipline sufficient to fit men and officers for
all they were capable of in case of battle.  The rank and file were
composed of men who had enlisted in time of peace, to serve for seven
dollars a month, and were necessarily inferior as material to the
average volunteers enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, and
also to the volunteers in the war for the preservation of the Union.
The men engaged in the Mexican war were brave, and the officers of the
regular army, from highest to lowest, were educated in their profession.
A more efficient army for its number and armament, I do not believe ever
fought a battle than the one commanded by General Taylor in his first
two engagements on Mexican--or Texan soil.

The presence of United States troops on the edge of the disputed
territory furthest from the Mexican settlements, was not sufficient to
provoke hostilities.  We were sent to provoke a fight, but it was
essential that Mexico should commence it.  It was very doubtful whether
Congress would declare war; but if Mexico should attack our troops, the
Executive could announce, "Whereas, war exists by the acts of, etc.,"
and prosecute the contest with vigor.  Once initiated there were but few
public men who would have the courage to oppose it.  Experience proves
that the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, no
matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or
history.  Better for him, individually, to advocate "war, pestilence,
and famine," than to act as obstructionist to a war already begun.  The
history of the defeated rebel will be honorable hereafter, compared with
that of the Northern man who aided him by conspiring against his
government while protected by it.  The most favorable posthumous history
the stay-at-home traitor can hope for is--oblivion.

Mexico showing no willingness to come to the Nueces to drive the
invaders from her soil, it became necessary for the "invaders" to
approach to within a convenient distance to be struck. Accordingly,
preparations were begun for moving the army to the Rio Grande, to a
point near Matamoras.  It was desirable to occupy a position near the
largest centre of population possible to reach, without absolutely
invading territory to which we set up no claim whatever.

The distance from Corpus Christi to Matamoras is about one hundred and
fifty miles.  The country does not abound in fresh water, and the length
of the marches had to be regulated by the distance between water
supplies.  Besides the streams, there were occasional pools, filled
during the rainy season, some probably made by the traders, who
travelled constantly between Corpus Christi and the Rio Grande, and some
by the buffalo. There was not at that time a single habitation,
cultivated field, or herd of domestic animals, between Corpus Christi
and Matamoras.  It was necessary, therefore, to have a wagon train
sufficiently large to transport the camp and garrison equipage,
officers' baggage, rations for the army, and part rations of grain for
the artillery horses and all the animals taken from the north, where
they had been accustomed to having their forage furnished them.  The
army was but indifferently supplied with transportation.  Wagons and
harness could easily be supplied from the north but mules and horses
could not so readily be brought.  The American traders and Mexican
smugglers came to the relief.  Contracts were made for mules at from
eight to eleven dollars each.  The smugglers furnished the animals, and
took their pay in goods of the description before mentioned.  I doubt
whether the Mexicans received in value from the traders five dollars per
head for the animals they furnished, and still more, whether they paid
anything but their own time in procuring them.  Such is trade; such is
war.  The government paid in hard cash to the contractor the stipulated
price.

Between the Rio Grande and the Nueces there was at that time a large
band of wild horses feeding; as numerous, probably, as the band of
buffalo roaming further north was before its rapid extermination
commenced.  The Mexicans used to capture these in large numbers and
bring them into the American settlements and sell them.  A picked animal
could be purchased at from eight to twelve dollars, but taken at
wholesale, they could be bought for thirty-six dollars a dozen.  Some of
these were purchased for the army, and answered a most useful purpose.
The horses were generally very strong, formed much like the Norman
horse, and with very heavy manes and tails.  A number of officers
supplied themselves with these, and they generally rendered as useful
service as the northern animal in fact they were much better when
grazing was the only means of supplying forage.

There was no need for haste, and some months were consumed in the
necessary preparations for a move.  In the meantime the army was engaged
in all the duties pertaining to the officer and the soldier.  Twice,
that I remember, small trains were sent from Corpus Christi, with
cavalry escorts, to San Antonio and Austin, with paymasters and funds to
pay off small detachments of troops stationed at those places.  General
Taylor encouraged officers to accompany these expeditions.  I
accompanied one of them in December, 1845.  The distance from Corpus
Christi to San Antonio was then computed at one hundred and fifty miles.
Now that roads exist it is probably less.  From San Antonio to Austin we
computed the distance at one hundred and ten miles, and from the latter
place back to Corpus Christi at over two hundred miles.  I know the
distance now from San Antonio to Austin is but little over eighty miles,
so that our computation was probably too high.

There was not at the time an individual living between Corpus Christi
and San Antonio until within about thirty miles of the latter point,
where there were a few scattering Mexican settlements along the San
Antonio River.  The people in at least one of these hamlets lived
underground for protection against the Indians.  The country abounded in
game, such as deer and antelope, with abundance of wild turkeys along
the streams and where there were nut-bearing woods.  On the Nueces,
about twenty-five miles up from Corpus Christi, were a few log cabins,
the remains of a town called San Patricio, but the inhabitants had all
been massacred by the Indians, or driven away.

San Antonio was about equally divided in population between Americans
and Mexicans.  From there to Austin there was not a single residence
except at New Braunfels, on the Guadalupe River.  At that point was a
settlement of Germans who had only that year come into the State.  At
all events they were living in small huts, about such as soldiers would
hastily construct for temporary occupation.  From Austin to Corpus
Christi there was only a small settlement at Bastrop, with a few farms
along the Colorado River; but after leaving that, there were no
settlements except the home of one man, with one female slave, at the
old town of Goliad.  Some of the houses were still standing.  Goliad had
been quite a village for the period and region, but some years before
there had been a Mexican massacre, in which every inhabitant had been
killed or driven away.  This, with the massacre of the prisoners in the
Alamo, San Antonio, about the same time, more than three hundred men in
all, furnished the strongest justification the Texans had for carrying
on the war with so much cruelty.  In fact, from that time until the
Mexican war, the hostilities between Texans and Mexicans was so great
that neither was safe in the neighborhood of the other who might be in
superior numbers or possessed of superior arms.  The man we found living
there seemed like an old friend; he had come from near Fort Jessup,
Louisiana, where the officers of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2d
dragoons had known him and his family.  He had emigrated in advance of
his family to build up a home for them.



CHAPTER V.

TRIP TO AUSTIN--PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND LIEUTENANT--ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

When our party left Corpus Christi it was quite large, including the
cavalry escort, Paymaster, Major Dix, his clerk and the officers who,
like myself, were simply on leave; but all the officers on leave, except
Lieutenant Benjamin--afterwards killed in the valley of Mexico
--Lieutenant, now General, Augur, and myself, concluded to spend their
allotted time at San Antonio and return from there.  We were all to be
back at Corpus Christi by the end of the month.  The paymaster was
detained in Austin so long that, if we had waited for him, we would have
exceeded our leave.  We concluded, therefore, to start back at once with
the animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for their
food, it was a good six days' journey.  We had to sleep on the prairie
every night, except at Goliad, and possibly one night on the Colorado,
without shelter and with only such food as we carried with us, and
prepared ourselves.  The journey was hazardous on account of Indians,
and there were white men in Texas whom I would not have cared to meet in
a secluded place. Lieutenant Augur was taken seriously sick before we
reached Goliad and at a distance from any habitation.  To add to the
complication, his horse--a mustang that had probably been captured from
the band of wild horses before alluded to, and of undoubted longevity at
his capture--gave out. It was absolutely necessary to get for ward to
Goliad to find a shelter for our sick companion.  By dint of patience
and exceedingly slow movements, Goliad was at last reached, and a
shelter and bed secured for our patient.  We remained over a day, hoping
that Augur might recover sufficiently to resume his travels.  He did
not, however, and knowing that Major Dix would be along in a few days,
with his wagon-train, now empty, and escort, we arranged with our
Louisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick lieutenant until
thus relieved, and went on.

I had never been a sportsman in my life; had scarcely ever gone in
search of game, and rarely seen any when looking for it.  On this trip
there was no minute of time while travelling between San Patricio and
the settlements on the San Antonio River, from San Antonio to Austin,
and again from the Colorado River back to San Patricio, when deer or
antelope could not be seen in great numbers. Each officer carried a
shot-gun, and every evening, after going into camp, some would go out
and soon return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the entire
camp.  I, however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun;
except, being detained over a day at Goliad, Benjamin and I concluded to
go down to the creek--which was fringed with timber, much of it the
pecan--and bring back a few turkeys.  We had scarcely reached the edge
of the timber when I heard the flutter of wings overhead, and in an
instant I saw two or three turkeys flying away.  These were soon
followed by more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirty
had left from just over my head.  All this time I stood watching the
turkeys to see where they flew--with my gun on my shoulder, and never
once thought of levelling it at the birds.  When I had time to reflect
upon the matter, I came to the conclusion that as a sportsman I was a
failure, and went back to the house.  Benjamin remained out, and got as
many turkeys as he wanted to carry back.

After the second night at Goliad, Benjamin and I started to make the
remainder of the journey alone.  We reached Corpus Christi just in time
to avoid "absence without leave."  We met no one not even an Indian
--during the remainder of our journey, except at San Patricio.  A new
settlement had been started there in our absence of three weeks, induced
possibly by the fact that there were houses already built, while the
proximity of troops gave protection against the Indians.  On the evening
of the first day out from Goliad we heard the most unearthly howling of
wolves, directly in our front.  The prairie grass was tall and we could
not see the beasts, but the sound indicated that they were near.  To my
ear it appeared that there must have been enough of them to devour our
party, horses and all, at a single meal.  The part of Ohio that I hailed
from was not thickly settled, but wolves had been driven out long before
I left.  Benjamin was from Indiana, still less populated, where the wolf
yet roamed over the prairies.  He understood the nature of the animal
and the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited number
of them.  He kept on towards the noise, unmoved.  I followed in his
trail, lacking moral courage to turn back and join our sick companion.
I have no doubt that if Benjamin had proposed returning to Goliad, I
would not only have "seconded the motion" but have suggested that it
was very hard-hearted in us to leave Augur sick there in the first
place; but Benjamin did not propose turning back.  When he did speak it
was to ask: "Grant, how many wolves do you think there are in that
pack?" Knowing where he was from, and suspecting that he thought I would
over-estimate the number, I determined to show my acquaintance with the
animal by putting the estimate below what possibly could be correct, and
answered:  "Oh, about twenty," very indifferently.  He smiled and rode
on.  In a minute we were close upon them, and before they saw us.  There
were just TWO of them.  Seated upon their haunches, with their mouths
close together, they had made all the noise we had been hearing for the
past ten minutes.  I have often thought of this incident since when I
have heard the noise of a few disappointed politicians who had deserted
their associates.  There are always more of them before they are
counted.

A week or two before leaving Corpus Christi on this trip, I had been
promoted from brevet second-lieutenant, 4th infantry, to full
second-lieutenant, 7th infantry.  Frank Gardner,(*1) of the 7th, was
promoted to the 4th in the same orders.  We immediately made application
to be transferred, so as to get back to our old regiments.  On my
return, I found that our application had been approved at Washington.
While in the 7th infantry I was in the company of Captain Holmes,
afterwards a Lieutenant-general in the Confederate army. I never came in
contact with him in the war of the Rebellion, nor did he render any very
conspicuous service in his high rank.  My transfer carried me to the
company of Captain McCall, who resigned from the army after the Mexican
war and settled in Philadelphia.  He was prompt, however, to volunteer
when the rebellion broke out, and soon rose to the rank of major-general
in the Union army.  I was not fortunate enough to meet him after he
resigned. In the old army he was esteemed very highly as a soldier and
gentleman. Our relations were always most pleasant.

The preparations at Corpus Christi for an advance progressed as rapidly
in the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if we had been
there.  The principal business consisted in securing mules, and getting
them broken to harness.  The process was slow but amusing.  The animals
sold to the government were all young and unbroken, even to the saddle,
and were quite as wild as the wild horses of the prairie.  Usually a
number would be brought in by a company of Mexicans, partners in the
delivery.  The mules were first driven into a stockade, called a corral,
inclosing an acre or more of ground.  The Mexicans,--who were all
experienced in throwing the lasso,--would go into the corral on
horseback, with their lassos attached to the pommels of their saddles.
Soldiers detailed as teamsters and black smiths would also enter the
corral, the former with ropes to serve as halters, the latter with
branding irons and a fire to keep the irons heated.  A lasso was then
thrown over the neck of a mule, when he would immediately go to the
length of his tether, first one end, then the other in the air.  While
he was thus plunging and gyrating, another lasso would be thrown by
another Mexican, catching the animal by a fore-foot.  This would bring
the mule to the ground, when he was seized and held by the teamsters
while the blacksmith put upon him, with hot irons, the initials "U. S."
Ropes were then put about the neck, with a slipnoose which would tighten
around the throat if pulled.  With a man on each side holding these
ropes, the mule was released from his other bindings and allowed to
rise.  With more or less difficulty he would be conducted to a picket
rope outside and fastened there.  The delivery of that mule was then
complete. This process was gone through with every mule and wild horse
with the army of occupation.

The method of breaking them was less cruel and much more amusing.  It is
a well-known fact that where domestic animals are used for specific
purposes from generation to generation, the descendants are easily, as a
rule, subdued to the same uses.  At that time in Northern Mexico the
mule, or his ancestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used except
for the saddle or pack.  At all events the Corpus Christi mule resisted
the new use to which he was being put.  The treatment he was subjected
to in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and effective.

The soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our large
cities, and, with the exception of a chance drayman among them, it is
not probable that any of the men who reported themselves as competent
teamsters had ever driven a mule-team in their lives, or indeed that
many had had any previous experience in driving any animal whatever to
harness.  Numbers together can accomplish what twice their number acting
individually could not perform.  Five mules were allotted to each wagon.
A teamster would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly the
same color and general appearance for his team.  With a full corps of
assistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mules
together.  In two's the men would approach each animal selected,
avoiding as far as possible its heels.  Two ropes would be put about the
neck of each animal, with a slip noose, so that he could be choked if
too unruly.  They were then led out, harnessed by force and hitched to
the wagon in the position they had to keep ever after.  Two men remained
on either side of the leader, with the lassos about its neck, and one
man retained the same restraining influence over each of the others.
All being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started. The
first motion was generally five mules in the air at one time, backs
bowed, hind feet extended to the rear.  After repeating this movement a
few times the leaders would start to run.  This would bring the
breeching tight against the mules at the wheels, which these last seemed
to regard as a most unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resist
by taking a seat, sometimes going so far as to lie down.  In time all
were broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully, but
there never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a Mexican
mule get entirely loose.  Their drivers were all teamsters by the time
they got through.

I recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under the
saddle, not only for some time at Corpus Christi, where he was broken,
but all the way to the point opposite Matamoras, then to Camargo, where
he got loose from his fastenings during the night.  He did not run away
at first, but staid in the neighborhood for a day or two, coming up
sometimes to the feed trough even; but on the approach of the teamster
he always got out of the way.  At last, growing tired of the constant
effort to catch him, he disappeared altogether.  Nothing short of a
Mexican with his lasso could have caught him.  Regulations would not
have warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man with a lasso
to catch that mule; but they did allow the expenditure "of the mule," on
a certificate that he had run away without any fault of the
quartermaster on whose returns he was borne, and also the purchase of
another to take his place.  I am a competent witness, for I was
regimental quartermaster at the time.

While at Corpus Christi all the officers who had a fancy for riding kept
horses.  The animals cost but little in the first instance, and when
picketed they would get their living without any cost.  I had three not
long before the army moved, but a sad accident bereft me of them all at
one time.  A colored boy who gave them all the attention they got
--besides looking after my tent and that of a class-mate and
fellow-lieutenant and cooking for us, all for about eight dollars per
month, was riding one to water and leading the other two.  The led
horses pulled him from his seat and all three ran away.  They never were
heard of afterwards.  Shortly after that some one told Captain Bliss,
General Taylor's Adjutant-General, of my misfortune.  "Yes; I heard
Grant lost five or six dollars' worth of horses the other day," he
replied.  That was a slander; they were broken to the saddle when I got
them and cost nearly twenty dollars.  I never suspected the colored boy
of malicious intent in letting them get away, because, if they had not
escaped, he could have had one of them to ride on the long march then in
prospect.



CHAPTER VI.

ADVANCE OF THE ARMY--CROSSING THE COLORADO--THE RIO GRANDE.

At last the preparations were complete and orders were issued for the
advance to begin on the 8th of March.  General Taylor had an army of not
more than three thousand men.  One battery, the siege guns and all the
convalescent troops were sent on by water to Brazos Santiago, at the
mouth of the Rio Grande.  A guard was left back at Corpus Christi to
look after public property and to take care of those who were too sick
to be removed.  The remainder of the army, probably not more than twenty
five hundred men, was divided into three brigades, with the cavalry
independent.  Colonel Twiggs, with seven companies of dragoons and a
battery of light artillery, moved on the 8th.  He was followed by the
three infantry brigades, with a day's interval between the commands.
Thus the rear brigade did not move from Corpus Christi until the 11th of
March.  In view of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day over
narrow roads, through dense forests and across large streams, in our
late war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three thousand
men should have been broken into four columns, separated by a day's
march.

General Taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the troops,
and in this instance, I doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as the
aggrieved party and was not willing to injure them further than his
instructions from Washington demanded.  His orders to the troops
enjoined scrupulous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons and
the payment of the highest price for all supplies taken for the use of
the army.

All officers of foot regiments who had horses were permitted to ride
them on the march when it did not interfere with their military duties.
As already related, having lost my "five or six dollars' worth of
horses" but a short time before I determined not to get another, but to
make the journey on foot.  My company commander, Captain McCall, had two
good American horses, of considerably more value in that country, where
native horses were cheap, than they were in the States. He used one
himself and wanted the other for his servant.  He was quite anxious to
know whether I did not intend to get me another horse before the march
began.  I told him No; I belonged to a foot regiment.  I did not
understand the object of his solicitude at the time, but, when we were
about to start, he said:  "There, Grant, is a horse for you."  I found
that he could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long march
while his lieutenant went a-foot.  He had found a mustang, a three-year
old colt only recently captured, which had been purchased by one of the
colored servants with the regiment for the sum of three dollars.  It was
probably the only horse at Corpus Christi that could have been purchased
just then for any reasonable price.  Five dollars, sixty-six and
two-thirds per cent. advance, induced the owner to part with the
mustang.  I was sorry to take him, because I really felt that, belonging
to a foot regiment, it was my duty to march with the men.  But I saw the
Captain's earnestness in the matter, and accepted the horse for the
trip.  The day we started was the first time the horse had ever been
under saddle. I had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him,
though for the first day there were frequent disagreements between us as
to which way we should go, and sometimes whether we should go at all.
At no time during the day could I choose exactly the part of the column
I would march with; but after that, I had as tractable a horse as any
with the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. He never
ate a mouthful of food on the journey except the grass he could pick
within the length of his picket rope.

A few days out from Corpus Christi, the immense herd of wild horses that
ranged at that time between the Nueces and the Rio Grande was seen
directly in advance of the head of the column and but a few miles off.
It was the very band from which the horse I was riding had been captured
but a few weeks before. The column was halted for a rest, and a number
of officers, myself among them, rode out two or three miles to the right
to see the extent of the herd.  The country was a rolling prairie, and,
from the higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the earth's
curvature.  As far as the eye could reach to our right, the herd
extended.  To the left, it extended equally. There was no estimating the
number of animals in it; I have no idea that they could all have been
corralled in the State of Rhode Island, or Delaware, at one time.  If
they had been, they would have been so thick that the pasturage would
have given out the first day. People who saw the Southern herd of
buffalo, fifteen or twenty years ago, can appreciate the  size of the
Texas band of wild horses in 1846.

At the point where the army struck the Little Colorado River, the stream
was quite wide and of sufficient depth for navigation. The water was
brackish and the banks were fringed with timber. Here the whole army
concentrated before attempting to cross. The army was not accompanied by
a pontoon train, and at that time the troops were not instructed in
bridge building.  To add to the embarrassment of the situation, the army
was here, for the first time, threatened with opposition. Buglers,
concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite side, sounded the
"assembly," and other military calls.  Like the wolves before spoken of,
they gave the impression that there was a large number of them and that,
if the troops were in proportion to the noise, they were sufficient to
devour General Taylor and his army.  There were probably but few troops,
and those engaged principally in watching the movements of the
"invader."  A few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam the
stream, and all opposition was soon dispersed.  I do not remember that a
single shot was fired.

The troops waded the stream, which was up to their necks in the deepest
part.  Teams were crossed by attaching a long rope to the end of the
wagon tongue passing it between the two swing mules and by the side of
the leader, hitching his bridle as well as the bridle of the mules in
rear to it, and carrying the end to men on the opposite shore.  The bank
down to the water was steep on both sides.  A rope long enough to cross
the river, therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon, and
men behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon "beating" the mules
into the water.  This latter rope also served the purpose of bringing
the end of the forward one back, to be used over again.  The water was
deep enough for a short distance to swim the little Mexican mules which
the army was then using, but they, and the wagons, were pulled through
so fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead, that no time was left
them to show their obstinacy.  In this manner the artillery and
transportation of the "army of occupation" crossed the Colorado River.

About the middle of the month of March the advance of the army reached
the Rio Grande and went into camp near the banks of the river, opposite
the city of Matamoras and almost under the guns of a small fort at the
lower end of the town.  There was not at that time a single habitation
from Corpus Christi until the Rio Grande was reached.

The work of fortifying was commenced at once.  The fort was laid out by
the engineers, but the work was done by the soldiers under the
supervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining general
directions.  The Mexicans now became so incensed at our near approach
that some of their troops crossed the river above us, and made it unsafe
for small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of camp.  They
captured two companies of dragoons, commanded by Captains Thornton and
Hardee.  The latter figured as a general in the late war, on the
Confederate side, and was author of the tactics first used by both
armies.  Lieutenant Theodric Porter, of the 4th infantry, was killed
while out with a small detachment; and Major Cross, the assistant
quartermaster-general, had also been killed not far from camp.

There was no base of supplies nearer than Point Isabel, on the coast,
north of the mouth of the Rio Grande and twenty-five miles away.  The
enemy, if the Mexicans could be called such at this time when no war had
been declared, hovered about in such numbers that it was not safe to
send a wagon train after supplies with any escort that could be spared.
I have already said that General Taylor's whole command on the Rio
Grande numbered less than three thousand men.  He had, however, a few
more troops at Point Isabel or Brazos Santiago.  The supplies brought
from Corpus Christi in wagons were running short.  Work was therefore
pushed with great vigor on the defences, to enable the minimum number of
troops to hold the fort.  All the men who could be employed, were kept
at work from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of the day.
With all this the fort was not completed until the supplies grew so
short that further delay in obtaining more could not be thought of.  By
the latter part of April the work was in a partially defensible
condition, and the 7th infantry, Major Jacob Brown commanding, was
marched in to garrison it, with some few pieces of artillery.  All the
supplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest of the
army to Point Isabel, were left with the garrison, and the march was
commenced with the remainder of the command, every wagon being taken
with the army.  Early on the second day after starting the force reached
its destination, without opposition from the Mexicans.  There was some
delay in getting supplies ashore from vessels at anchor in the open
roadstead.



CHAPTER VII.

THE MEXICAN WAR--THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO--THE BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA
PALMA--ARMY OF INVASION--GENERAL TAYLOR--MOVEMENT ON CAMARGO.

While General Taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the little
garrison up the river was besieged.  As we lay in our tents upon the
sea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the Rio Grande could be
distinctly heard.

The war had begun.

There were no possible means of obtaining news from the garrison, and
information from outside could not be otherwise than unfavorable.  What
General Taylor's feelings were during this suspense I do not know; but
for myself, a young second-lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gun
before, I felt sorry that I had enlisted.  A great many men, when they
smell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray.  When they say so
themselves they generally fail to convince their hearers that they are
as anxious as they would like to make believe, and as they approach
danger they become more subdued.  This rule is not universal, for I have
known a few men who were always aching for a fight when there was no
enemy near, who were as good as their word when the battle did come.
But the number of such men is small.

On the 7th of May the wagons were all loaded and General Taylor started
on his return, with his army reinforced at Point Isabel, but still less
than three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on the Rio Grande.
The road from Point Isabel to Matamoras is over an open, rolling,
treeless prairie, until the timber that borders the bank of the Rio
Grande is reached.  This river, like the Mississippi, flows through a
rich alluvial valley in the most meandering manner, running towards all
points of the compass at times within a few miles.  Formerly the river
ran by Resaca de la Palma, some four or five miles east of the present
channel.  The old bed of the river at Resaca had become filled at
places, leaving a succession of little lakes.  The timber that had
formerly grown upon both banks, and for a considerable distance out, was
still standing.  This timber was struck six or eight miles out from the
besieged garrison, at a point known as Palo Alto--"Tall trees" or
"woods."

Early in the forenoon of the 8th of May as Palo Alto was approached, an
army, certainly outnumbering our little force, was seen, drawn up in
line of battle just in front of the timber.  Their bayonets and
spearheads glistened in the sunlight formidably.  The force was composed
largely of cavalry armed with lances.  Where we were the grass was tall,
reaching nearly to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stock
was pointed at the top, and hard and almost as sharp as a
darning-needle. General Taylor halted his army before the head of column
came in range of the artillery of the Mexicans.  He then formed a line
of battle, facing the enemy.  His artillery, two batteries and two
eighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in position at
intervals along the line.  A battalion was thrown to the rear, commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel Childs, of the artillery, as reserves.  These
preparations completed, orders were given for a platoon of each company
to stack arms and go to a stream off to the right of the command, to
fill their canteens and also those of the rest of their respective
companies.  When the men were all back in their places in line, the
command to advance was given.  As I looked down that long line of about
three thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also armed,
I thought what a fearful responsibility General Taylor must feel,
commanding such a host and so far away from friends.  The Mexicans
immediately opened fire upon us, first with artillery and then with
infantry.  At first their shots did not reach us, and the advance was
continued.  As we got nearer, the cannon balls commenced going through
the ranks.  They hurt no one, however, during this advance, because they
would strike the ground long before they reached our line, and
ricochetted through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see them
and open ranks and let them pass.  When we got to a point where the
artillery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and the battle
opened on both sides.

The infantry under General Taylor was armed with flint-lock muskets, and
paper cartridges charged with powder, buck-shot and ball.  At the
distance of a few hundred yards a man might fire at you all day without
your finding it out.  The artillery was generally six-pounder brass guns
throwing only solid shot; but General Taylor had with him three or four
twelve-pounder howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen-pounders
before spoken of, that had a long range.  This made a powerful armament.
The Mexicans were armed about as we were so far as their infantry was
concerned, but their artillery only fired solid shot.  We had greatly
the advantage in this arm.

The artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line, and opened
fire.  The infantry stood at order arms as spectators, watching the
effect of our shots upon the enemy, and watching his shots so as to step
out of their way.  It could be seen that the eighteen-pounders and the
howitzers did a great deal of execution.  On our side there was little
or no loss while we occupied this position.  During the battle Major
Ringgold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer, was mortally
wounded, and Lieutenant Luther, also of the artillery, was struck.
During the day several advances were made, and just at dusk it became
evident that the Mexicans were falling back. We again advanced, and
occupied at the close of the battle substantially the ground held by the
enemy at the beginning.  In this last move there was a brisk fire upon
our troops, and some execution was done.  One cannon-ball passed through
our ranks, not far from me.  It took off the head of an enlisted man,
and the under jaw of Captain Page of my regiment, while the splinters
from the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains and bones, knocked
down two or three others, including one officer, Lieutenant Wallen,
--hurting them more or less.  Our casualties for the day were nine killed
and forty-seven wounded.

At the break of day on the 9th, the army under Taylor was ready to renew
the battle; but an advance showed that the enemy had entirely left our
front during the night.  The chaparral before us was impenetrable except
where there were roads or trails, with occasionally clear or bare spots
of small dimensions.  A body of men penetrating it might easily be
ambushed.  It was better to have a few men caught in this way than the
whole army, yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river should
be relieved.  To get to them the chaparral had to be passed.  Thus I
assume General Taylor reasoned.  He halted the army not far in advance
of the ground occupied by the Mexicans the day before, and selected
Captain C. F. Smith, of the artillery, and Captain McCall, of my
company, to take one hundred and fifty picked men each and find where
the enemy had gone.  This left me in command of the company, an honor
and responsibility I thought very great.

Smith and McCall found no obstruction in the way of their advance until
they came up to the succession of ponds, before describes, at Resaca.
The Mexicans had passed them and formed their lines on the opposite
bank.  This position they had strengthened a little by throwing up dead
trees and brush in their front, and by placing artillery to cover the
approaches and open places.  Smith and McCall deployed on each side of
the road as well as they could, and engaged the enemy at long range.
Word was sent back, and the advance of the whole army was at once
commenced.  As we came up we were deployed in like manner.  I was with
the right wing, and led my company through the thicket wherever a
penetrable place could be found, taking advantage of any clear spot that
would carry me towards the enemy.  At last I got pretty close up without
knowing it.  The balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead, cutting
the limbs of the chaparral right and left.  We could not see the enemy,
so I ordered my men to lie down, an order that did not have to be
enforced.  We kept our position until it became evident that the enemy
were not firing at us, and then withdrew to find better ground to
advance upon.

By this time some progress had been made on our left.  A section of
artillery had been captured by the cavalry, and some prisoners had been
taken.  The Mexicans were giving way all along the line, and many of
them had, no doubt, left early.  I at last found a clear space
separating two ponds.  There seemed to be a few men in front and I
charged upon them with my company.

There was no resistance, and we captured a Mexican colonel, who had been
wounded, and a few men.  Just as I was sending them to the rear with a
guard of two or three men, a private came from the front bringing back
one of our officers, who had been badly wounded in advance of where I
was.  The ground had been charged over before.  My exploit was equal to
that of the soldier who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one of
the enemy.  When asked why he did not cut off his head, he replied:
"Some one had done that before."  This left no doubt in my mind but that
the battle of Resaca de la Palma would have been won, just as it was, if
I had not been there.  There was no further resistance. The evening of
the 9th the army was encamped on its old ground near the Fort, and the
garrison was relieved.  The siege had lasted a number of days, but the
casualties were few in number.  Major Jacob Brown, of the 7th infantry,
the commanding officer, had been killed, and in his honor the fort was
named. Since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on the
ground occupied by the fort and troops, which has also taken his name.

The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma seemed to us engaged, as
pretty important affairs; but we had only a faint conception of their
magnitude until they were fought over in the North by the Press and the
reports came back to us.  At the same time, or about the same time, we
learned that war existed between the United States and Mexico, by the
acts of the latter country.  On learning this fact General Taylor
transferred our camps to the south or west bank of the river, and
Matamoras was occupied.  We then became the "Army of Invasion."

Up to this time Taylor had none but regular troops in his command; but
now that invasion had already taken place, volunteers for one year
commenced arriving.  The army remained at Matamoras until sufficiently
reinforced to warrant a movement into the interior.  General Taylor was
not an officer to trouble the administration much with his demands, but
was inclined to do the best he could with the means given him.  He felt
his responsibility as going no further.  If he had thought that he was
sent to perform an impossibility with the means given him, he would
probably have informed the authorities of his opinion and left them to
determine what should be done.  If the judgment was against him he would
have gone on and done the best he could with the means at hand without
parading his grievance before the public.  No soldier could face either
danger or responsibility more calmly than he.  These are qualities more
rarely found than genius or physical courage.

General Taylor never made any great show or parade, either of uniform or
retinue.  In dress he was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything in
the field to indicate his rank, or even that he was an officer; but he
was known to every soldier in his army, and was respected by all.  I can
call to mind only one instance when I saw him in uniform, and one other
when I heard of his wearing it, On both occasions he was unfortunate.
The first was at Corpus Christi.  He had concluded to review his army
before starting on the march and gave orders accordingly.  Colonel
Twiggs was then second in rank with the army, and to him was given the
command of the review.  Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General Worth, a
far different soldier from Taylor in the use of the uniform, was next to
Twiggs in rank, and claimed superiority by virtue of his brevet rank
when the accidents of service threw them where one or the other had to
command.  Worth declined to attend the review as subordinate to Twiggs
until the question was settled by the highest authority.  This broke up
the review, and the question was referred to Washington for final
decision.

General Taylor was himself only a colonel, in real rank, at that time,
and a brigadier-general by brevet.  He was assigned to duty, however, by
the President, with the rank which his brevet gave him.  Worth was not
so assigned, but by virtue of commanding a division he must, under the
army regulations of that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet rank.
The question was submitted to Washington, and no response was received
until after the army had reached the Rio Grande.  It was decided against
General Worth, who at once tendered his resignation and left the army,
going north, no doubt, by the same vessel that carried it.  This kept
him out of the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma.  Either the
resignation was not accepted, or General Worth withdrew it before action
had been taken.  At all events he returned to the army in time to
command his division in the battle of Monterey, and served with it to
the end of the war.

The second occasion on which General Taylor was said to have donned his
uniform, was in order to receive a visit from the Flag Officer of the
naval squadron off the mouth of the Rio Grande.  While the army was on
that river the Flag Officer sent word that he would call on the General
to pay his respects on a certain day.  General Taylor, knowing that
naval officers habitually wore all the uniform the "law allowed" on all
occasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive his
guest in the same style.  His uniform was therefore got out, brushed up,
and put on, in advance of the visit.  The Flag Officer, knowing General
Taylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that it
would be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilian's
dress, left off his uniform for this occasion.  The meeting was said to
have been embarrassing to both, and the conversation was principally
apologetic.

The time was whiled away pleasantly enough at Matamoras, while we were
waiting for volunteers.  It is probable that all the most important
people of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before we
got there, but with those remaining the best of relations apparently
existed.  It was the policy of the Commanding General to allow no
pillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual use
without satisfactory compensation, so that a better market was afforded
than the people had ever known before.

Among the troops that joined us at Matamoras was an Ohio regiment, of
which Thomas L. Hamer, the Member of Congress who had given me my
appointment to West Point, was major.  He told me then that he could
have had the colonelcy, but that as he knew he was to be appointed a
brigadier-general, he preferred at first to take the lower grade.  I
have said before that Hamer was one of the ablest men Ohio ever
produced.  At that time he was in the prime of life, being less than
fifty years of age, and possessed an admirable physique, promising long
life.  But he was taken sick before Monterey, and died within a few
days.  I have always believed that had his life been spared, he would
have been President of the United States during the term filled by
President Pierce.  Had Hamer filled that office his partiality for me
was such, there is but little doubt I should have been appointed to one
of the staff corps of the army--the Pay Department probably--and would
therefore now be preparing to retire.  Neither of these speculations is
unreasonable, and they are mentioned to show how little men control
their own destiny.

Reinforcements having arrived, in the month of August the movement
commenced from Matamoras to Camargo, the head of navigation on the Rio
Grande.  The line of the Rio Grande was all that was necessary to hold,
unless it was intended to invade Mexico from the North.  In that case
the most natural route to take was the one which General Taylor
selected.  It entered a pass in the Sierra Madre Mountains, at Monterey,
through which the main road runs to the City of Mexico.  Monterey itself
was a good point to hold, even if the line of the Rio Grande covered all
the territory we desired to occupy at that time.  It is built on a plain
two thousand feet above tide water, where the air is bracing and the
situation healthy.

On the 19th of August the army started for Monterey, leaving a small
garrison at Matamoras.  The troops, with the exception of the artillery,
cavalry, and the brigade to which I belonged, were moved up the river to
Camargo on steamers.  As there were but two or three of these, the boats
had to make a number of trips before the last of the troops were
up. Those who marched did so by the south side of the river.
Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigade
commander, and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force.
One day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in the
month of August, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, particularly for
Northern men.  The order of marching was changed and night marches were
substituted with the best results.

When Camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the Mexican
hamlet.  I was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to the
regiment.  The teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transport
all supplies from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande over the level
prairies of Texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of the
reinforced army in a mountainous country.  To obviate the deficiency,
pack mules were hired, with Mexicans to pack and drive them.  I had
charge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the pack
train to supplement them.  There were not men enough in the army to
manage that train without the help of Mexicans who had learned how.  As
it was the difficulty was great enough.  The troops would take up their
march at an early hour each day.  After they had started, the tents and
cooking utensils had to be made into packages, so that they could be
lashed to the backs of the mules.  Sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles and
mess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way.  It
took several hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the time
we were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standing
so long with their loads on their backs. Sometimes one would start to
run, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load; others
would lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get on
the top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-poles for part of
their loads would manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a sapling
while they would take the other.  I am not aware of ever having used a
profane expletive in my life; but I would have the charity to excuse
those who may have done so, if they were in charge of a train of Mexican
pack mules at the time.



CHAPTER VIII.

ADVANCE ON MONTEREY--THE BLACK FORT--THE BATTLE OF MONTEREY--SURRENDER
OF THE CITY.

The advance from Camargo was commenced on the 5th of September. The army
was divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day's
march.  The advance reached Cerralvo in four days and halted for the
remainder of the troops to come up.  By the 13th the rear-guard had
arrived, and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed as
before, a day separating the divisions.  The forward division halted
again at Marin, twenty-four miles from Monterey.  Both this place and
Cerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seen
running and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when the
people returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which must
have given them a favorable opinion of Los Grengos--"the Yankees."  From
Marin the movement was in mass. On the 19th General Taylor, with is
army, was encamped at Walnut Springs, within three miles of Monterey.

The town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass, and is
backed by a range of hills of moderate elevation.  To the north, between
the city and Walnut Springs, stretches an extensive plain.  On this
plain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood a
strong fort, enclosed on all sides, to which our army gave the name of
"Black Fort."  Its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the full
extent of their range.  There were two detached spurs of hills or
mountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were also
fortified.  On one of these stood the Bishop's Palace.  The road to
Saltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire of
the guns from these heights.  The lower or eastern end was defended by
two or three small detached works, armed with artillery and infantry.
To the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of that
the range of foot-hills.  The plaza in the centre of the city was the
citadel, properly speaking.  All the streets leading from it were swept
by artillery, cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets. The
house-tops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications by
the use of sand-bags for parapets.  Such were the defences of Monterey
in September, 1847.  General Ampudia, with a force of certainly ten
thousand men, was in command.

General Taylor's force was about six thousand five hundred strong, in
three divisions, under Generals Butler, Twiggs and Worth.  The troops
went into camp at Walnut Springs, while the engineer officers, under
Major Mansfield--a General in the late war--commenced their
reconnoissance.  Major Mansfield found that it would be practicable to
get troops around, out of range of the Black Fort and the works on the
detached hills to the north-west of the city, to the Saltillo road.
With this road in our possession, the enemy would be cut off from
receiving further supplies, if not from all communication with the
interior. General Worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, was
given the task of gaining possession of the Saltillo road, and of
carrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter. He
started on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th.  The divisions
under Generals Butler and Twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east and
north sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of the
movement under General Worth. Worth's was regarded as the main attack on
Monterey, and all other operations were in support of it.  His march
this day was uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavily
about the Bishop's Palace and the other outside fortifications on their
left.  General Worth reached a defensible position just out of range of
the enemy's guns on the heights north-west of the city, and bivouacked
for the night.  The engineer officers with him--Captain Sanders and
Lieutenant George G. Meade, afterwards the commander of the victorious
National army at the battle of Gettysburg--made a reconnoissance to the
Saltillo road under cover of night.

During the night of the 20th General Taylor had established a battery,
consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a ten inch mortar,
at a point from which they could play upon Black Fort.  A natural
depression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in it
from the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established on
the crest nearest the enemy.  The 4th infantry, then consisting of but
six reduced companies, was ordered to support the artillerists while
they were intrenching themselves and their guns.  I was regimental
quartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of camp
and the public property at Walnut Springs.  It was supposed that the
regiment would return to its camp in the morning.

The point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the work
performed without attracting the attention of the enemy.  At daylight
the next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, what
seemed to me at that day, great fury.  My curiosity got the better of my
judgment, and I mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what was
going on.  I had been there but a short time when an order to charge was
given, and lacking the moral courage to return to camp--where I had been
ordered to stay--I charged with the regiment As soon as the troops were
out of the depression they came under the fire of Black Fort.  As they
advanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east, or lower,
end of the city, and of musketry. About one-third of the men engaged in
the charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes.  We
retreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward and
perpendicular to the direct road running into the city from Walnut
Springs.  I was, I believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in the
charge who was on horseback.  When we got to a lace of safety the
regiment halted and drew itself together--what was left of it.  The
adjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Hoskins, who was not in robust
health, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot in the
charge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish that
he could be mounted also.  I offered him my horse and he accepted the
offer.  A few minutes later I saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man,
mounted, not far away.  I ran to him, took his horse and was back with
the regiment in a few minutes.  In a short time we were off again; and
the next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that I recollect of
being in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lower
batteries.  The adjutant to whom I had loaned my horse was killed, and I
was designated to act in his place.

This charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed.  We belonged to the
brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, and he had received
orders to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry them if he
could without too much loss, for the purpose of creating a diversion in
favor of Worth, who was conducting the movement which it was intended
should be decisive.  By a movement by the left flank Garland could have
led his men beyond the range of the fire from Black Fort and advanced
towards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire as
could be expected.  There was no undue loss of life in reaching the
lower end of Monterey, except that sustained by Garland's command.

Meanwhile Quitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, had
reached the eastern end of the city, and was placed under cover of the
houses without much loss.  Colonel Garland's brigade also arrived at the
suburbs, and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reached
house-tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering the
approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedily
captured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy.  An
entrance into the east end of the city was now secured, and the houses
protected our troops so long as they were inactive.  On the west General
Worth had reached the Saltillo road after some fighting but without
heavy loss.  He turned from his new position and captured the forts on
both heights in that quarter.  This gave him possession of the upper or
west end of Monterey.  Troops from both Twiggs's and Butler's divisions
were in possession of the east end of the town, but the Black Fort to
the north of the town and the plaza in the centre were still in the
possession of the enemy.  Our camps at Walnut Springs, three miles away,
were guarded by a company from each regiment.  A regiment of Kentucky
volunteers guarded the mortars and howitzers engaged against Black Fort.
Practically Monterey was invested.

There was nothing done on the 22d by the United States troops; but the
enemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from Black Fort and the batteries
still in their possession at the east end of the city.  During the night
they evacuated these; so that on the morning of the 23d we held
undisputed possession of the east end of Monterey.

Twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city, and well covered
from the fire of the enemy.  But the streets leading to the plaza--all
Spanish or Spanish-American towns have near their centres a square
called a plaza--were commanded from all directions by artillery.  The
houses were flat-roofed and but one or two stories high, and about the
plaza the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops being protected
from our fire by parapets made of sand-bags.  All advances into the city
were thus attended with much danger.  While moving along streets which
did not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the fire, and
from the view, of the enemy except at the crossings; but at these a
volley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were invariably
encountered.  The 3d and 4th regiments of infantry made an advance
nearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss.  The loss of the 3d
infantry in commissioned officers was especially severe.  There were
only five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officers
present, and five of these officers were killed.  When within a square
of the plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to a
halt.  Placing themselves under cover from the shots of the enemy, the
men would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags on the neighboring
houses.  The exposure of a single head would bring a volley from our
soldiers.

We had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that our
ammunition was growing low.  I volunteered to go back (*2) to the point
we had started from, report our position to General Twiggs, and ask for
ammunition to be forwarded.  We were at this time occupying ground off
from the street, in rear of the houses.  My ride back was an exposed
one.  Before starting I adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthest
from the enemy, and with only one foot holding to the cantle of the
saddle, and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, I started at full
run.  It was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire, but
these I crossed at such a flying rate that generally I was past and
under cover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired.  I got
out safely without a scratch.

At one place on my ride, I saw a sentry walking in front of a house, and
stopped to inquire what he was doing there.  Finding that the house was
full of wounded American officers and soldiers, I dismounted and went
in.  I found there Captain Williams, of the Engineer Corps, wounded in
the head, probably fatally, and Lieutenant Territt, also badly wounded
his bowels protruding from his wound.  There were quite a number of
soldiers also.  Promising them to report their situation, I left,
readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was soon with
the troops at the east end.  Before ammunition could be collected, the
two regiments I had been with were seen returning, running the same
gauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in, but with
comparatively little loss.  The movement was countermanded and the
troops were withdrawn.  The poor wounded officers and men I had found,
fell into the hands of the enemy during the night, and died.

While this was going on at the east, General Worth, with a small
division of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the opposite
end of the city.  He resorted to a better expedient for getting to the
plaza--the citadel--than we did on the east. Instead of moving by the
open streets, he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways from
one to another.  Without much loss of life, he got so near the plaza
during the night that before morning, Ampudia, the Mexican commander,
made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison.  This stopped
all further hostilities.  The terms of surrender were soon agreed upon.
The prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses and
personal property with them.

My pity was aroused by the sight of the Mexican garrison of Monterey
marching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the same feeling was
experienced by most of our army who witnessed it.  Many of the prisoners
were cavalry, armed with lances, and mounted on miserable little
half-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry their
riders out of town.  The men looked in but little better condition.  I
thought how little interest the men before me had in the results of the
war, and how little knowledge they had of "what it was all about."

After the surrender of the garrison of Monterey a quiet camp life was
led until midwinter.  As had been the case on the Rio Grande, the people
who remained at their homes fraternized with the "Yankees" in the
pleasantest manner.  In fact, under the humane policy of our commander,
I question whether the great majority of the Mexican people did not
regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming.  Property
and person were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all
the products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before.
The educated and wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere,
abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they were
in the possession of the invaders; but this class formed a very small
percentage of the whole population.



CHAPTER IX.

POLITICAL INTRIGUE--BUENA VISTA--MOVEMENT AGAINST VERA CRUZ--SIEGE AND
CAPTURE OF VERA CRUZ.

The Mexican war was a political war, and the administration conducting
it desired to make party capital out of it.  General Scott was at the
head of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional
capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost
indisputable and does not seem to have been denied by President Polk, or
Marcy, his Secretary of War.  Scott was a Whig and the administration
was democratic.  General Scott was also known to have political
aspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil
positions as military victories.  It would not do therefore to give him
command of the "army of conquest."  The plans submitted by Scott for a
campaign in Mexico were disapproved by the administration, and he
replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that,
if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration,
success could not be expected.  This was on the 27th of May, 1846.  Four
days later General Scott was notified that he need not go to Mexico.
General Gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take
the field.  Colonel Zachary Taylor--a brigadier-general by brevet--was
therefore left in command.  He, too, was a Whig, but was not supposed to
entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall of
Monterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the Whig papers
at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the
Presidency.  Something had to be done to neutralize his growing
popularity.  He could not be relieved from duty in the field where all
his battles had been victories:  the design would have been too
transparent.  It was finally decided to send General Scott to Mexico in
chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan:
that is, capture Vera Cruz and march upon the capital of the country.
It was no doubt supposed that Scott's ambition would lead him to
slaughter Taylor or destroy his chances for the Presidency, and yet it
was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure
the prize.

The administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve.  It
was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful
issue, or the political object would be unattained.  Yet all the capable
officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man
selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a
prominent candidate for the Presidency.  It was necessary to destroy his
chances promptly.  The problem was to do this without the loss of
conquest and without permitting another general of the same political
party to acquire like popularity.  The fact is, the administration of
Mr. Polk made every preparation to disgrace Scott, or, to speak more
correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace
himself.

General Scott had opposed conquest by the way of the Rio Grande,
Matamoras and Saltillo from the first.  Now that he was in command of
all the forces in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor most of his regular
troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the
line then in possession of the invading army.  Indeed Scott did not deem
it important to hold anything beyond the Rio Grande, and authorized
Taylor to fall back to that line if he chose.  General Taylor protested
against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon
Buena Vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief
in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio Grande.

Scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to
capture Vera Cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two
hundred and sixty miles in the interior.  He was promised all he asked
and seemed to have not only the confidence of the President, but his
sincere good wishes.  The promises were all broken.  Only about half the
troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was
withheld and Scott had scarcely started for Mexico before the President
undertook to supersede him by the appointment of Senator Thomas H.
Benton as lieutenant-general.  This being refused by Congress, the
President asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of
the same grade, with the view of appointing Benton to the rank of
major-general and then placing him in command of the army, but Congress
failed to accede to this proposition as well, and Scott remained in
command: but every general appointed to serve under him was politically
opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile.

General Scott reached Brazos Santiago or Point Isabel, at the mouth of
the Rio Grande, late in December, 1846, and proceeded at once up the
river to Camargo, where he had written General Taylor to meet him.
Taylor, however, had gone to, or towards Tampico, for the purpose of
establishing a post there.  He had started on this march before he was
aware of General Scott being in the country.  Under these circumstances
Scott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn
from Taylor, without the personal consultation he had expected to hold
with his subordinate.

General Taylor's victory at Buena Vista, February 22d, 23d, and 24th,
1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not
been in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically,
made his nomination for the Presidency by the Whigs a foregone
conclusion.  He was nominated and elected in 1848.  I believe that he
sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace
afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the
highest office in the gift of any people, the Presidency of the United
States.

When General Scott assumed command of the army of invasion, I was in the
division of General David Twiggs, in Taylor's command; but under the new
orders my regiment was transferred to the division of General William
Worth, in which I served to the close of the war.  The troops withdrawn
from Taylor to form part of the forces to operate against Vera Cruz,
were assembled at the mouth of the Rio Grande preparatory to embarkation
for their destination.  I found General Worth a different man from any I
had before served directly under.  He was nervous, impatient and
restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted
him.  There was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was
known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point
of our embarkation to carry the army, but General Worth moved his
division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been
going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison.  The length of the
marches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supply
of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and
sometimes short.  General Worth on one occasion at least, after having
made the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops were
in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made the
march that night which had been intended for the next day.  Some
commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them
without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days without
accomplishing so much. General Worth belonged to this latter class.  He
enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus
attached his officers and men to him.

The army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of the
mouth of the Rio Grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of
transports to carry it to its new field of operations.  The transports
were all sailing vessels.  The passage was a tedious one, and many of
the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at
the mouth of the Rio Grande to the time of debarkation south of Vera
Cruz. The trip was a comfortless one for officers and men.  The
transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but
limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the
discomfort of all.

The transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of Anton
Lizardo, some sixteen miles south of Vera Cruz, as they arrived, and
there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition
and supplies of all kinds from the North.  With the fleet there was a
little steam propeller dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind I had
ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then
with the army.  At that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there
were were sidewheelers.  This little vessel, going through the fleet so
fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view,
attracted a great deal of attention.  I recollect that Lieutenant Sidney
Smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom I happened to be standing on the
deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, "Why, the
thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances."

Finally on the 7th of March, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve
thousand men, given Scott to invade a country with a population of seven
or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible
natural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commence
the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea.

The debarkation took place inside of the little island of Sacrificios,
some three miles south of Vera Cruz.  The vessels could not get anywhere
near shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters or
surf-boats; General Scott had provided these before leaving the North.
The breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious.  The
men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to
shallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions,
ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and
therefore their landing took several days.  The Mexicans were very kind
to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except
an occasional shot from their nearest fort.  During the debarkation one
shot took off the head of Major Albertis.  No other, I believe, reached
anywhere near the same distance.  On the 9th of March the troops were
landed and the investment of Vera Cruz, from the Gulf of Mexico south of
the city to the Gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected.
The landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore.

Vera Cruz, at the time of which I write and up to 1880, was a walled
city.  The wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the
water again on the north.  There were fortifications at intervals along
the line and at the angles. In front of the city, and on an island half
a mile out in the Gulf, stands San Juan de Ulloa, an enclosed
fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period.
Against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would
prove elements of weakness rather than strength.  After the invading
army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city,
batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of
the line where the troops lay.  These batteries were intrenched and the
approaches sufficiently protected.  If a sortie had been made at any
time by the Mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been
quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's
main line.  No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to
drive our troops away.

The siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of
March, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall
surrounding the city.  Upon this General Morales, who was Governor of
both the city and of San Juan de Ulloa, commenced a correspondence with
General Scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison.
On the 29th Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa were occupied by Scott's
army.  About five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of
artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into
the hands of the victorious force.  The casualties on our side during
the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded.



CHAPTER X.

MARCH TO JALAPA--BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO--PEROTE--PUEBLA--SCOTT AND
TAYLOR.

General Scott had less than twelve thousand men at Vera Cruz. He had
been promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed
that he had, and he was a man of veracity. Twelve thousand was a very
small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an
enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of
largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants.  Then, too, any line of
march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily
defended. In fact, there were at that time but two roads from Vera Cruz
to the City of Mexico that could be taken by an army; one by Jalapa and
Perote, the other by Cordova and Orizaba, the two coming together on the
great plain which extends to the City of Mexico after the range of
mountains is passed.

It was very important to get the army away from Vera Cruz as soon as
possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually
visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not
acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the North, was
arriving very slowly.  It was absolutely necessary to have enough to
supply the army to Jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above
the fevers of the coast.  At that point the country is fertile, and an
army of the size of General Scott's could subsist there for an
indefinite period.  Not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons
for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten
thousand strong.  This force was composed of three divisions, under
Generals Twiggs, Patterson, and Worth. The importance of escaping the
vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got
together to move a division the advance was commenced.  On the 8th of
April, Twiggs's division started for Jalapa.  He was followed very soon
by Patterson, with his division.  General Worth was to bring up the rear
with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry
six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp
and garrison equipage.  It was the 13th of April before this division
left Vera Cruz.

The leading division ran against the enemy at Cerro Gordo, some fifty
miles west, on the road to Jalapa, and went into camp at Plan del Rio,
about three miles from the fortifications. General Patterson reached
Plan del Rio with his division soon after Twiggs arrived.  The two were
then secure against an attack from Santa Anna, who commanded the Mexican
forces.  At all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements
and without molestation, until the 18th of April.  General Scott had
remained at Vera Cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the
12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take
personal supervision.  He at once commenced his preparations for the
capture of the position held by Santa Anna and of the troops holding it.

Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to
fifteen miles east of Jalapa, and Santa Anna had selected this point as
the easiest to defend against an invading army.  The road, said to have
been built by Cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended
at every turn by artillery.  On either side were deep chasms or mountain
walls. A direct attack along the road was an impossibility.  A flank
movement seemed equally impossible.  After the arrival of the
commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to
find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be
reached without a front attack.  These reconnoissances were made under
the supervision of Captain Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenants P. G.
T. Beauregard, Isaac I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, George B.
McClellan, and J. G. Foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who
attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict
for the preservation of the unity of the nation.  The reconnoissance was
completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of
the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month.  This was accomplished
without the knowledge of Santa Anna or his army, and over ground where
he supposed it impossible.  On the same day General Scott issued his
order for the attack on the 18th.

The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of
the Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an
engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took
place.  Under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened
over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could
barely climb them.  Animals could not.  These had been opened under
cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy.  The
engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops
followed. Artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men
engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns
down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on
top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course
of the piece.  In like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the
opposite slopes.  In this way Scott's troops reached their assigned
position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved.
The attack was made, the Mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty
retreat, and those occupying them surrendered.  On the left General
Pillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a
part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. I am not
pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the
portion that I saw.  There were troops engaged on both sides at other
points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here
narrated.

The surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some
three thousand prisoners fell into Scott's hands, also a large amount of
ordnance and ordnance stores.  The prisoners were paroled, the artillery
parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed.  The battle of Buena
Vista was probably very important to the success of General Scott at
Cerro Gordo and in his entire campaign from Vera Cruz to the great
plains reaching to the City of Mexico.  The only army Santa Anna had to
protect his capital and the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz, was the
one he had with him confronting General Taylor. It is not likely that he
would have gone as far north as Monterey to attack the United States
troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further
south.  When Taylor moved to Saltillo and then advanced on to Buena
Vista, Santa Anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army,
hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet General Scott
in the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz.  His attack on Taylor was
disastrous to the Mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched
his army to Cerro Gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles
by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before
Scott got there.  If he had been successful at Buena Vista his troops
would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo.  Had
the battle of Buena Vista not been fought Santa Anna would have had time
to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not
demoralized nor depleted by defeat.

After the battle the victorious army moved on to Jalapa, where it was in
a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the
coast.  Jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there
and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence.  It
was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between
the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the
mountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify
in our front. Worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this
result.  The division marched to Perote on the great plain, not far from
where the road debouches from the mountains.  There is a low, strong
fort on the plain in front of the town, known as the Castle of Perote.
This, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its
armament.

General Scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of Vera
Cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire,
a long delay was the consequence.  The troops were in a healthy climate,
and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line
back to Vera Cruz should be cut off.  It being ascertained that the men
whose time would expire before the City of Mexico could possibly fall
into the hands of the American army, would not remain beyond the term
for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to
discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time
would have compelled them to pass through Vera Cruz during the season of
the vomito.  This reduced Scott's force in the field to about five
thousand men.

Early in May, Worth, with his division, left Perote and marched on to
Puebla.  The roads were wide and the country open except through one
pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the
road runs.  Notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two
bodies, moving a day apart. Nothing occurred on the march of special
note, except that while lying at the town of Amozoque--an easy day's
march east of Puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three
thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away.  A
battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against
them and they soon disappeared.  On the 15th of May we entered the city
of Puebla.

General Worth was in command at Puebla until the latter end of May, when
General Scott arrived.  Here, as well as on the march up, his
restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself.
During his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city,
in vastly superior numbers to his own.  The brigade to which I was
attached changed quarters three different times in about a week,
occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city;
then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east.  On one occasion
General Worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three
days' cooked rations in their haversacks.  He galloped from one command
to another proclaiming the near proximity of Santa Anna with an army
vastly superior to his own.  General Scott arrived upon the scene the
latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of Santa Anna and
his myriads.  There were, of course, bodies of mounted Mexicans hovering
around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies
of troops, if they ventured too far out.  These always withdrew on the
approach of any considerable number of our soldiers.  After the arrival
of General Scott I was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of
wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage.  We had less
than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger.  We procured
full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily
have furnished as much more.

There had been great delay in obtaining the authority of Congress for
the raising of the troops asked for by the administration.  A bill was
before the National Legislature from early in the session of 1846-7,
authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be
attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of February before
it became a law.  Appointments of commissioned officers had then to be
made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole
transported to Mexico.  It was August before General Scott received
reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance.  His moving column, not
even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded
by Generals Twiggs, Worth, Pillow and Quitman.  There was also a cavalry
corps under General Harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and
3d dragoons.  The advance commenced on the 7th of August with Twiggs's
division in front.  The remaining three divisions followed, with an
interval of a day between.  The marches were short, to make
concentration easier in case of attack.

I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting
armies in a foreign land.  The contrast between the two was very marked.
General Taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for
comfort.  He moved about the field in which he was operating to see
through his own eyes the situation.  Often he would be without staff
officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed
order in which they followed.  He was very much given to sit his horse
side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield.
General Scott was the reverse in all these particulars.  He always wore
all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his
lines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in
advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be
expected.  This was done so that all the army might be under arms to
salute their chief as he passed.  On these occasions he wore his dress
uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs.  His staff proper,
besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors,
quartermasters, etc., that could be spared--followed, also in uniform
and in prescribed order.  Orders were prepared with great care and
evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed.

In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted
quite as strongly as in their other characteristics.  General Scott was
precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of
his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third
person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about
without the least embarrassment.  Taylor was not a conversationalist,
but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no
mistaking it.  He knew how to express what he wanted to say in the
fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the
construction of high-sounding sentences.  But with their opposite
characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true,
patriotic and upright in all their dealings.  Both were pleasant to
serve under--Taylor was pleasant to serve with.  Scott saw more through
the eyes of his staff officers than through his own.  His plans were
deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders.  Taylor saw for
himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how
they would read in history.



CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO--BATTLE OF CONTRERAS--ASSAULT AT
CHURUBUSCO--NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY--STORMING
OF CHAPULTEPEC--SAN COSME--EVACUATION OF THE CITY--HALLS OF THE
MONTEZUMAS.

The route followed by the army from Puebla to the City of Mexico was
over Rio Frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest
point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. The pass through
this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and the
advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving Puebla.
The City of Mexico lies west of Rio Frio mountain, on a plain backed by
another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the
north and south.  Between the western base of Rio Frio and the City of
Mexico there are three lakes, Chalco and Xochimilco on the left and
Texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the City of Mexico.
Chalco and Texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the
direct road to the city runs.  Xochimilco is also to the left of the
road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with
Lake Chalco by a narrow channel.  There is a high rocky mound, called El
Penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground
dividing the lakes.  This mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its
base and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable.

Scott's army was rapidly concentrated about Ayotla and other points near
the eastern end of Lake Chalco.  Reconnoissances were made up to within
gun-shot of El Penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south
side of Lake Chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south
and south-west.  A way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of
August troops were in St. Augustin Tlalpam, a town about eleven miles
due south from the plaza of the capital.  Between St. Augustin Tlalpam
and the city lie the hacienda of San Antonio and the village of
Churubusco, and south-west of them is Contreras.  All these points,
except St. Augustin Tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned.
Contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where
volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to San
Antonio.  This made the approach to the city from the south very
difficult.

The brigade to which I was attached--Garland's, of Worth's division--was
sent to confront San Antonio, two or three miles from St. Augustin
Tlalpam, on the road to Churubusco and the City of Mexico.  The ground
on which San Antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surface
of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except
to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water.  To
the south-west is the Pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--over
which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make
but poor progress if confronted by an enemy.  From the position occupied
by Garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against the
defences of San Antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway,
over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the
enemy's artillery and infantry.  If Contreras, some three miles west and
south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the
right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the
city.  Under these circumstances General Scott directed the holding of
the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders.

On the 18th of August, the day of reaching San Augustin Tlalpam,
Garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced
intrenchments of San Antonio, but where his troops were protected by an
artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose
than defense.  General Scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring the
works about Contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get
troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force
occupying that place.  The Pedregal on the north and north-east, and the
mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's
defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural
bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th,
and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy.

This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo, was an engagement in which the
officers of the engineer corps won special distinction.  In fact, in
both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier
for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an
ordinary field.  The very strength of each of these positions was, by
the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting
parties while securing their positions for final attack.  All the troops
with General Scott in the valley of Mexico, except a part of the
division of General Quitman at San Augustin Tlalpam and the brigade of
Garland (Worth's division) at San Antonio, were engaged at the battle of
Contreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their
chief, to reinforce those who were engaged.  The assault was made on the
morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the
advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large
quantities of ordnance and other stores. The brigade commanded by
General Riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the final
assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars.

From the point occupied by Garland's brigade we could see the progress
made at Contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rear
of the enemy opposing us.  The Mexicans all the way back to the city
could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did
not enjoy the sight.  We moved out at once, and found them gone from our
immediate front.  Clarke's brigade of Worth's division now moved west
over the point of the Pedregal, and after having passed to the north
sufficiently to clear San Antonio, turned east and got on the causeway
leading to Churubusco and the City of Mexico.  When he approached
Churubusco his left, under Colonel Hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont at
that place and brought on an engagement.  About an hour after, Garland
was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time
to take part in the engagement.  San Antonio was found evacuated, the
evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing
the stars and stripes waving over Contreras.

The troops that had been engaged at Contreras, and even then on their
way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel
to the one by way of San Antonio and Churubusco.  It was expected by the
commanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently far
to flank the enemy out of his position at Churubusco, before turning
east to reach the San Antonio road, but they did not succeed in this,
and Churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in the
valley of Mexico.  General Scott coming upon the battle-field about this
juncture, ordered two brigades, under Shields, to move north and turn
the right of the enemy.  This Shields did, but not without hard fighting
and heavy loss.  The enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands
prisoners, artillery and small arms.  The balance of the causeway held
by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner.  I
recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their
ground, were deserters from General Taylor's army on the Rio Grande.

Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General Scott in these
various engagements of the 20th of August, 1847, were faultless as I
look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years.  As before stated,
the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and led
the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the
chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all
the precision he could use on an ordinary march.  I mean, up to the
points from which the attack was to commence.  After that point is
reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before
contemplated.  The enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite
three to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession of
defeats this day, that the City of Mexico could have been entered
without much further bloodshed.  In fact, Captain Philip Kearney
--afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadron
of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have
entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded,
as were several of his officers.  He had not heard the call for a halt.

General Franklin Pierce had joined the army in Mexico, at Puebla, a
short time before the advance upon the capital commenced.  He had
consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the
battle of Contreras.  By an unfortunate fall of his horse on the
afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured.  The next day, when his
brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered
against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of
the road from San Augustin Tlalpam to the city, General Pierce attempted
to accompany them.  He was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and
fainted.  This circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust
criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the Presidency.
Whatever General Pierce's qualifications may have been for the
Presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage.  I was not a
supporter of him politically, but I knew him more intimately than I did
any other of the volunteer generals.

General Scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because Mr.
Nicholas P. Trist, the commissioner on the part of the United States to
negotiate a treaty of peace with Mexico, was with the army, and either
he or General Scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty would
be more possible while the Mexican government was in possession of the
capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an
invader.  Be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. The army
took up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city,
as far west as Tacubaya.  Negotiations were at once entered into with
Santa Anna, who was then practically THE GOVERNMENT and the immediate
commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country.  A truce
was signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen its
position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the
armistices, but authorized General Scott to draw supplies for his army
from the city in the meantime.

Negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously between
Mr. Trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of Mexico, until
the 2d of September.  At that time Mr. Trist handed in his ultimatum.
Texas was to be given up absolutely by Mexico, and New Mexico and
California ceded to the United States for a stipulated sum to be
afterwards determined.  I do not suppose Mr. Trist had any discretion
whatever in regard to boundaries. The war was one of conquest, in the
interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private
instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new
States might be carved.  At all events the Mexicans felt so outraged at
the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without
giving notice of the termination of the armistice.  The terms of the
truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city
to bring out supplies for the army.  The first train entering the city
was very severely threatened by a mob. This, however, was apologized for
by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter,
to avoid exciting the Mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their
escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the
citizens in bed.  The circumstance was overlooked and negotiations
continued.  As soon as the news reached General Scott of the second
violation of the armistice, about the 4th of September, he wrote a
vigorous note to President Santa Anna, calling his attention to it, and,
receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end.

General Scott, with Worth's division, was now occupying Tacubaya, a
village some four miles south-west of the City of Mexico, and extending
from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile.
More than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands Molino
del Rey.  The mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several
hundred feet in length.  At the period of which I speak General Scott
supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting
of guns.  This, however, proved to be a mistake.  It was valuable to the
Mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. The building is
flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the
top quite a formidable defence for infantry.  Chapultepec is a mound
springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred
feet, and almost in a direct line between Molino del Rey and the western
part of the city.  It was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and
precipitous sides.

The City of Mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting on
strong stone arches.  One of these aqueducts draws its supply of water
from a mountain stream coming into it at or near Molino del Rey, and
runs north close to the west base of Chapultepec; thence along the
centre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into the
city by the Garita San Cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road
both run east to the city.  The second aqueduct starts from the east
base of Chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to
the city.  This aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broad
road-way, thus leaving a space on each side.  The arches supporting the
aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to those
engaged defensively.  At points on the San Cosme road parapets were
thrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery in
each.  At the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right angles
from north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied by
one gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the San
Cosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back to
Chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made of
sandbags.  The roads leading to garitas (the gates) San Cosme and Belen,
by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched.
Deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads.
Such were the defences of the City of Mexico in September, 1847, on the
routes over which General Scott entered.

Prior to the Mexican war General Scott had been very partial to General
Worth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, for
some reason, Worth had become estranged from his chief.  Scott evidently
took this coldness somewhat to heart.  He did not retaliate, however,
but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate.
It was understood at the time that he gave Worth authority to plan and
execute the battle of Molino del Rey without dictation or interference
from any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations.
The effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold and
indifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile.

The battle of Molino del Rey was fought on the 8th of September.  The
night of the 7th, Worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders,
with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions for
the morrow.  These orders contemplated a movement up to within striking
distance of the Mills before daylight.  The engineers had reconnoitred
the ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information
necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack.

By daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged at
Molino were all at the places designated.  The ground in front of the
Mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit of
Chapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a charge
was made, and soon all was over.  Worth's troops entered the Mills by
every door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to Chapultepec.  Had
this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt Americans and Mexicans
would have gone over the defences of Chapultepec so near together that
the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss.  The
defenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangering
their own men.  This was not done, and five days later more valuable
lives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in our
possession on the 8th.  I do not criticise the failure to capture
Chapultepec at this time.  The result that followed the first assault
could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected
advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and given
the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kept
on without orders.  It is always, however, in order to follow a
retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed.  The loss on our
side at Molino del Rey was severe for the numbers engaged.  It was
especially so among commissioned officers.

I was with the earliest of the troops to enter the Mills.  In passing
through to the north side, looking towards Chapultepec, I happened to
notice that there were armed Mexicans still on top of the building, only
a few feet from many of our men.  Not seeing any stairway or ladder
reaching to the top of the building, I took a few soldiers, and had a
cart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing the
shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could
not back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three
or four feet of the top.  By this I climbed to the roof of the building,
followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me by
some other way.  There were still quite a number of Mexicans on the
roof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, who
had not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied the
building.  They still had their arms, while the soldier before mentioned
was walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had SURROUNDED, all by
himself.  I halted the sentinel, received the swords from the
commissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the
soldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against
the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below.

Molino del Rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with the
exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position and
property, were marched back to their quarters in Tacubaya. The
engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded were
numerous for the number of troops engaged.

During the night of the 11th batteries were established which could play
upon the fortifications of Chapultepec.  The bombardment commenced early
on the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement during
this day than that of the artillery.  General Scott assigned the capture
of Chapultepec to General Pillow, but did not leave the details to his
judgment. Two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each,
composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed.  They were
commanded by Captains McKinzie and Casey respectively.  The assault was
successful, but bloody.

In later years, if not at the time, the battles of Molino del Rey and
Chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary.  When the
assaults upon the garitas of San Cosme and Belen were determined upon,
the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily,
without an engagement, by moving along south of the Mills until west of
them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road above
mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearer
together, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on the
aqueduct road out of range of the guns from Chapultepec.  In like
manner, the troops designated to act against Belen could have kept east
of Chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out of
range of Chapultepec. Molino del Rey and Chapultepec would both have
been necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they
would have been turned.

General Quitman, a volunteer from the State of Mississippi, who stood
well with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the column
acting against Belen.  General Worth commanded the column against San
Cosme.  When Chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the two
aqueduct roads.  I was on the road to San Cosme, and witnessed most that
took place on that route.  When opposition was encountered our troops
sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the
aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time.  We encountered no serious
obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were on
intersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueduct
turns at a right angle.  I have described the defences of this position
before.  There were but three commissioned officers besides myself, that
I can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position was
reached. One of these officers was a Lieutenant Semmes, of the Marine
Corps.  I think Captain Gore, and Lieutenant Judah, of the 4th infantry,
were the others.  Our progress was stopped for the time by the single
piece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupying
the house-tops back from it.

West of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the
south-west angle made by the San Cosme road and the road we were moving
upon. A stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for a
considerable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite a
yard about the house.  I watched my opportunity and skipped across the
road and behind the south wall.  Proceeding cautiously to the west
corner of the enclosure, I peeped around and seeing nobody, continued,
still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached.  I
then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers.  All that were
close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services.
Commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, I watched our
opportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wall
beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. Our men under cover of the
arches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path and
the house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above the
parapets they would fire at it.  Our crossing was thus made practicable
without loss.

When we reached a safe position I instructed my little command again to
carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they were
ordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the San Cosme
road was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving the
gun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them.  When we
reached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, I saw
some United States troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by,
who had come up since my reconnaissance.  This was the company of
Captain Horace Brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry.  I
explained to Brooks briefly what I had discovered and what I was about
to do.  He said, as I knew the ground and he did not, I might go on and
he would follow.  As soon as we got on the road leading to the city the
troops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the
house-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such close
pursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a second
line across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita,
was carried. No reinforcements had yet come up except Brooks's company,
and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a
force.  It was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss.

Worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it.  Later
in the day in reconnoitring I found a church off to the south of the
road, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground back
of the garita San Cosme.  I got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a
mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me.  The road being in
possession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach
the church.  This took us over several ditches breast deep in water and
grown up with water plants.  These ditches, however, were not over eight
or ten feet in width.  The howitzer was taken to pieces and carried by
the men to its destination.  When I knocked for admission a priest came
to the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us.  With the
little Spanish then at my command, I explained to him that he might save
property by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself from
becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, I intended to go
in whether he consented or not.  He began to see his duty in the same
light that I did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if it
gave him special pleasure to do so.  The gun was carried to the belfry
and put together.  We were not more than two or three hundred yards from
San Cosme.  The shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy and
created great confusion.  Why they did not send out a small party and
capture us, I do not know.  We had no infantry or other defences besides
our one gun.

The effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was so
marked that General Worth saw it from his position. (*3) He was so
pleased that he sent a staff officer, Lieutenant Pemberton--later
Lieutenant-General commanding the defences of Vicksburg--to bring me to
him.  He expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in the
church steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, and
ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to
be placed along with the one already rendering so much service.  I could
not tell the General that there was not room enough in the steeple for
another gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statement
as a contradiction from a second lieutenant.  I took the captain with
me, but did not use his gun.

The night of the 13th of September was spent by the troops under General
Worth in the houses near San Cosme, and in line confronting the general
line of the enemy across to Belen.  The troops that I was with were in
the houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engaged
during the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to another
towards the town.  During the night Santa Anna, with his army--except
the deserters--left the city.  He liberated all the convicts confined in
the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injury
before daylight; but several hours after Santa Anna was out of the way,
the city authorities sent a delegation to General Scott to ask--if not
demand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizens
and the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal
affairs.  General Scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, but
gave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would be
protected so long as they behaved themselves properly.

General Quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the
13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position at
Belen that Worth's troops did about San Cosme. After the interview above
related between General Scott and the city council, orders were issued
for the cautious entry of both columns in the morning.  The troops under
Worth were to stop at the Alameda, a park near the west end of the city.
Quitman was to go directly to the Plaza, and take possession of the
Palace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which Congress has its
sessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are all
located, the President resides, and much room is left for museums,
receptions, etc.  This is the building generally designated as the
"Halls of the Montezumas."



CHAPTER XII.

PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT--CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO--THE ARMY
--MEXICAN SOLDIERS--PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

On entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released
convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens.  The streets
were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a "city of the
dead," except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops,
windows, and around corners.  In this firing the lieutenant-colonel of
my regiment, Garland, was badly wounded, Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the
4th infantry, was also wounded mortally.  He died a few days after, and
by his death I was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.(*4)  I had
gone into the battle of Palo Alto in May, 1846, a second lieutenant, and
I entered the city of Mexico sixteen months later with the same rank,
after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and in
a regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever had
present at any one engagement.  My regiment lost four commissioned
officers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the Mexican
war.  The Mexicans were not so discriminating.  They sometimes picked
off my juniors.

General Scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state.  I
wonder that he was not fired upon, but I believe he was not; at all
events he was not hurt.  He took quarters at first in the "Halls of the
Montezumas," and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for the
government of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of
liberated convicts already spoken of--orders which challenge the respect
of all who study them.  Lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the City of
Mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place.  The people began
to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders.
Shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to the
villages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the south
and south-west.

Whether General Scott approved of the Mexican war and the manner in
which it was brought about, I have no means of knowing.  His orders to
troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard
for the perpetuation of his own fame.  On the other hand, General
Taylor's, I think, indicate that he considered the administration
accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself
further than for the faithful performance of his duties.  Both generals
deserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in the
grateful memory of this people to the latest generation.

Earlier in this narrative I have stated that the plain, reached after
passing the mountains east of Perote, extends to the cities of Puebla
and Mexico.  The route travelled by the army before reaching Puebla,
goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south.  This
pass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force.
Again, the highest point of the road-bed between Vera Cruz and the City
of Mexico is over Rio Frio mountain, which also might have been
successfully defended by an inferior against a superior force.  But by
moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of Puebla,
both of these passes would have been avoided.  The road from Perote to
the City of Mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in
our West.  Arriving due north from Puebla, troops could have been
detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with
the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before
reaching the City of Mexico.  It is true this road would have brought
troops in by Guadalupe--a town, church and detached spur of mountain
about two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name
--and at this point Lake Texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was
fortified both at the base and on the sides:  but troops could have
passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the
north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the
south.

It has always seemed to me that this northern route to the City of
Mexico, would have been the better one to have taken.  But my later
experience has taught me two lessons:  first, that things are seen
plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident
critics are generally those who know the least about the matter
criticised.  I know just enough about the Mexican war to approve
heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it.
It is natural that an important city like Puebla should not have been
passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it
should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation
insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy
in intricate mountain defiles.  In this same way the City of Mexico
could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in
the open field.

But General Scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. He invaded
a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the
interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to
him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always on
the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and
conquered the government.  Credit is due to the troops engaged, it is
true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's.

I had now made marches and been in battle under both General Scott and
General Taylor.  The former divided his force of 10,500 men into four
columns, starting a day apart, in moving from Puebla to the capital of
the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as
his own stood ready to resist his coming.  The road was broad and the
country open except in crossing the Rio Frio mountain.  General Taylor
pursued the same course in marching toward an enemy.  He moved even in
smaller bodies.  I never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility
of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession.  I
supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed
over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary
trains.  Later I found the fallacy of this belief.  The rebellion, which
followed as a sequence to the Mexican war, never could have been
suppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the same
time than was the custom under Scott and Taylor.

The victories in Mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior
numbers.  There were two reasons for this.  Both General Scott and
General Taylor had such armies as are not often got together.  At the
battles of Palo Alto and Resaca-de-la-Palma, General Taylor had a small
army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best
of drill and discipline.  Every officer, from the highest to the lowest,
was educated in his profession, not at West Point necessarily, but in
the camp, in garrison, and many of them in Indian wars. The rank and
file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army,
to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war;
but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all
there was in them.  A better army, man for man, probably never faced an
enemy than the one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest two
engagements of the Mexican war.  The volunteers who followed were of
better material, but without drill or discipline at the start.  They
were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated
officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence
they would not have felt otherwise.  They became soldiers themselves
almost at once.  All these conditions we would enjoy again in case of
war.

The Mexican army of that day was hardly an organization.  The private
soldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants when
wanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, and
seldom paid.  He was turned adrift when no longer wanted.  The officers
of the lower grades were but little superior to the men.  With all this
I have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as I have ever
seen made by soldiers.  Now Mexico has a standing army larger than that
of the United States.  They have a military school modelled after West
Point.  Their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave.  The
Mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation.

The Mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we would
imitate in part, but with more regard to truth.  They celebrate the
anniversaries of Chapultepec and Molino del Rey as of very great
victories.  The anniversaries are recognized as national holidays.  At
these two battles, while the United States troops were victorious, it
was at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the Mexicans
suffered.  The Mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well as
any troops ever did.  The trouble seemed to be the lack of experience
among the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit,
without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough.
Their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their theme
when telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sum
of money they forced us to pay in the end.  With us, now twenty years
after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers
--who profess devotion to the nation--engaged in trying to prove that the
Union forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed
around from Donelson to Vicksburg and to Chattanooga; and in the East
from Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from
sheer exhaustion.  There is no difference in the amount of romance in
the two stories.

I would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, nor
those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer;
but I would like to see truthful history written. Such history will do
full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the
American citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from,
or in what ranks he fought.  The justice of the cause which in the end
prevailed, will, I doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen
of the land, in time.  For the present, and so long as there are living
witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who will
not be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy.
As time passes, people, even of the South, will begin to wonder how it
was possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justified
institutions which acknowledged the right of property in man.

After the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government of
Mexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country for
a long time might be necessary. General Scott at once began the
preparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency.
He contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the
occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon the
people.  His plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, and
collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports.  From
the beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either for
the use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation.  This
policy was to be pursued.  There were not troops enough in the valley of
Mexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized army
of the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the Rio
Grande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time,
all by way of Vera Cruz.  Military possession was taken of Cuernavaca,
fifty miles south of the City of Mexico; of Toluca, nearly as far west,
and of Pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles to
the north-east.  Vera Cruz, Jalapa, Orizaba, and Puebla were already in
our possession.

Meanwhile the Mexican government had departed in the person of Santa
Anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the United States
commissioner, Mr. Trist, would find anybody to negotiate with.  A
temporary government, however, was soon established at Queretaro, and
Trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war.  Before terms were
finally agreed upon he was ordered back to Washington, but General Scott
prevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearly
reached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in
making such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions.  The
treaty was finally signed the 2d of February, 1848, and accepted by the
government at Washington.  It is that known as the "Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo," and secured to the United States the Rio Grande as the
boundary of Texas, and the whole territory then included in New Mexico
and Upper California, for the sum of $15,000,000.

Soon after entering the city of Mexico, the opposition of Generals
Pillow, Worth and Colonel Duncan to General Scott became very marked.
Scott claimed that they had demanded of the President his removal.  I do
not know whether this is so or not, but I do know of their unconcealed
hostility to their chief.  At last he placed them in arrest, and
preferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect.  This
act brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding.  He had
asserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him;
that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the
President himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavor
to procure the appointment of Benton:  and the administration now gave
open evidence of its enmity.  About the middle of February orders came
convening a court of inquiry, composed of Brevet Brigadier-General
Towson, the paymaster-general of the army, Brigadier-General Cushing and
Colonel Belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and the
accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from Washington,
relieving Scott of the command of the army in the field and assigning
Major-General William O. Butler of Kentucky to the place.  This order
also released Pillow, Worth and Duncan from arrest.

If a change was to be made the selection of General Butler was agreeable
to every one concerned, so far as I remember to have heard expressions
on the subject.  There were many who regarded the treatment of General
Scott as harsh and unjust.  It is quite possible that the vanity of the
General had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausible
pretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it had
wanted to do from the start.  The court tried the accuser quite as much
as the accused.  It was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet
in Frederick, Maryland.  General Scott left the country, and never after
had more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861.  He
certainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline in
high places.

The efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, made
them both candidates for the Presidency.  General Taylor was nominated
in 1848, and was elected.  Four years later General Scott received the
nomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died with
his defeat.(*5)



CHAPTER XIII.

TREATY OF PEACE--MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS--REGIMENTAL QUARTERMASTER--TRIP TO
POPOCATAPETL--TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO.

The treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by the
commissioners of each side early in February, 1848.  It took a
considerable time for it to reach Washington, receive the approval of
the administration, and be finally ratified by the Senate.  It was
naturally supposed by the army that there would be no more fighting, and
officers and men were of course anxious to get home, but knowing there
must be delay they contented themselves as best they could.  Every
Sunday there was a bull fight for the amusement of those who would pay
their fifty cents.  I attended one of them--just one--not wishing to
leave the country without having witnessed the national sport.  The
sight to me was sickening.  I could not see how human beings could enjoy
the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do on
these occasions.

At these sports there are usually from four to six bulls sacrificed.
The audience occupies seats around the ring in which the exhibition is
given, each seat but the foremost rising higher than the one in front,
so that every one can get a full view of the sport.  When all is ready a
bull is turned into the ring.  Three or four men come in, mounted on the
merest skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that they
could not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of falling
down.  The men are armed with spears having a point as sharp as a
needle.  Other men enter the arena on foot, armed with red flags and
explosives about the size of a musket cartridge.  To each of these
explosives is fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose of
attaching them to the bull by running the needle into the skin.  Before
the animal is turned loose a lot of these explosives are attached to
him.  The pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles is
exasperating; but when the explosions of the cartridges commence the
animal becomes frantic.  As he makes a lunge towards one horseman,
another runs a spear into him.  He turns towards his last tormentor when
a man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull rushes for this and is
allowed to take it on his horns.  The flag drops and covers the eyes of
the animal so that he is at a loss what to do; it is jerked from him and
the torment is renewed.  When the animal is worked into an
uncontrollable frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores
--literally murderers--enter, armed with knives having blades twelve or
eighteen inches long, and sharp.  The trick is to dodge an attack from
the animal and stab him to the heart as he passes. If these efforts fail
the bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by driving a knife
blade into the spinal column just back of the horns.  He is then dragged
out by horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the same
performance is renewed.

On the occasion when I was present one of the bulls was not turned aside
by the attacks in the rear, the presentations of the red flag, etc.,
etc., but kept right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of a
horse threw him and his rider to the ground with great force.  The horse
was killed and the rider lay prostrate as if dead.  The bull was then
lassoed and killed in the manner above described.  Men came in and
carried the dead man off in a litter.  When the slaughtered bull and
horse were dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring.
Conspicuous among the spectators was the man who had been carried out on
a litter but a few minutes before.  He was only dead so far as that
performance went; but the corpse was so lively that it could not forego
the chance of witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren who
might not be so fortunate.  There was a feeling of disgust manifested by
the audience to find that he had come to life again.  I confess that I
felt sorry to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse.  I did not stay
for the conclusion of the performance; but while I did stay, there was
not a bull killed in the prescribed way.

Bull fights are now prohibited in the Federal District--embracing a
territory around the City of Mexico, somewhat larger than the District
of Columbia--and they are not an institution in any part of the country.
During one of my recent visits to Mexico, bull fights were got up in my
honor at Puebla and at Pachuca.  I was not notified in advance so as to
be able to decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases I
civilly declined to attend.

Another amusement of the people of Mexico of that day, and one which
nearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young, priest and
layman, was Monte playing.  Regular feast weeks were held every year at
what was then known as St. Augustin Tlalpam, eleven miles out of town.
There were dealers to suit every class and condition of people.  In many
of the booths tlackos--the copper coin of the country, four of them
making six and a quarter cents of our money--were piled up in great
quantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who could not
bet more than a few pennies at a time.  In other booths silver formed
the bulk of the capital of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changed
if there should be a run of luck against the bank.  In some there was no
coin except gold.  Here the rich were said to bet away their entire
estates in a single day.  All this is stopped now.

For myself, I was kept somewhat busy during the winter of 1847-8.  My
regiment was stationed in Tacubaya.  I was regimental quartermaster and
commissary.  General Scott had been unable to get clothing for the
troops from the North.  The men were becoming--well, they needed
clothing.  Material had to be purchased, such as could be obtained, and
people employed to make it up into "Yankee uniforms."  A quartermaster
in the city was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothing
was so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up.  A regiment
was glad to get a dozen suits at a time.  I had to look after this
matter for the 4th infantry.  Then our regimental fund had run down and
some of the musicians in the band had been without their extra pay for a
number of months.

The regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from the
government, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. There was
authority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as musicians.  So
many could receive the pay of non-commissioned officers of the various
grades, and the remainder the pay of privates.  This would not secure a
band leader, nor good players on certain instruments.  In garrison there
are various ways of keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to give
extra pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys,
subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men.  The
best device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiers
instead of flour.  The ration used to be eighteen ounces per day of
either flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will make one
hundred and forty pounds of bread.  This saving was purchased by the
commissary for the benefit of the fund.  In the emergency the 4th
infantry was laboring under, I rented a bakery in the city, hired
bakers--Mexicans--bought fuel and whatever was necessary, and I also got
a contract from the chief commissary of the army for baking a large
amount of hard bread.  In two months I made more money for the fund than
my pay amounted to during the entire war.  While stationed at Monterey I
had relieved the post fund in the same way.  There, however, was no
profit except in the saving of flour by converting it into bread.

In the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to visit
Popocatapetl, the highest volcano in America, and to take an escort.  I
went with the party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicuous
positions before the country.  Of those who "went south," and attained
high rank, there was Lieutenant Richard Anderson, who commanded a corps
at Spottsylvania; Captain Sibley, a major-general, and, after the war,
for a number of years in the employ of the Khedive of Egypt; Captain
George Crittenden, a rebel general; S. B. Buckner, who surrendered Fort
Donelson; and Mansfield Lovell, who commanded at New Orleans before that
city fell into the hands of the National troops.  Of those who remained
on our side there were Captain Andrew Porter, Lieutenant C. P. Stone and
Lieutenant Z. B. Tower.  There were quite a number of other officers,
whose names I cannot recollect.

At a little village (Ozumba) near the base of Popocatapetl, where we
purposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and two pack mules
with forage for our horses.  High up on the mountain there was a
deserted house of one room, called the Vaqueria, which had been occupied
years before by men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain.  The
pasturage up there was very fine when we saw it, and there were still
some cattle, descendants of the former domestic herd, which had now
become wild.  It was possible to go on horseback as far as the Vaqueria,
though the road was somewhat hazardous in places. Sometimes it was very
narrow with a yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet down to a
roaring mountain torrent below, and almost perpendicular walls on the
other side.  At one of these places one of our mules loaded with two
sacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as big as he was,
struck his load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to the
bottom.  The descent was steep but not perpendicular.  The mule rolled
over and over until the bottom was reached, and we supposed of course
the poor animal was dashed to pieces.  What was our surprise, not long
after we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost mule, cargo and owner
coming up the ascent.  The load had protected the animal from serious
injury; and his owner had gone after him and found a way back to the
path leading up to the hut where we were to stay.

The night at the Vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant I ever knew.
It was very cold and the rain fell in torrents.  A little higher up the
rain ceased and snow began.  The wind blew with great velocity.  The
log-cabin we were in had lost the roof entirely on one side, and on the
other it was hardly better then a sieve.  There was little or no sleep
that night.  As soon as it was light the next morning, we started to
make the ascent to the summit.  The wind continued to blow with violence
and the weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow.
The clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below us,
except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a clear space
between them.  The wind carried the loose snow around the mountain-sides
in such volumes as to make it almost impossible to stand up against it.
We labored on and on, until it became evident that the top could not be
reached before night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded to
return. The descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we got
below the snow line.  At the cabin we mounted our horses, and by night
were at Ozumba.

The fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before drove us
to bed early.  Our beds consisted of a place on the dirt-floor with a
blanket under us.  Soon all were asleep; but long before morning first
one and then another of our party began to cry out with excruciating
pain in the eyes.  Not one escaped it.  By morning the eyes of half the
party were so swollen that they were entirely closed.  The others
suffered pain equally.  The feeling was about what might be expected
from the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat.  We remained in
quarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water. This
relieved us very much, and before night the pain had entirely left.  The
swelling, however, continued, and about half the party still had their
eyes entirely closed; but we concluded to make a start back, those who
could see a little leading the horses of those who could not see at all.
We moved back to the village of Ameca Ameca, some six miles, and stopped
again for the night.  The next morning all were entirely well and free
from pain.  The weather was clear and Popocatapetl stood out in all its
beauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and inviting us to
return.  About half the party were anxious to try the ascent again, and
concluded to do so.  The remainder--I was with the remainder--concluded
that we had got all the pleasure there was to be had out of mountain
climbing, and that we would visit the great caves of Mexico, some ninety
miles from where we then were, on the road to Acapulco.

The party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded in
reaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor they
encountered in their first attempt.  Three of them--Anderson, Stone and
Buckner--wrote accounts of their journey, which were published at the
time.  I made no notes of this excursion, and have read nothing about it
since, but it seems to me that I can see the whole of it as vividly as
if it were but yesterday.  I have been back at Ameca Ameca, and the
village beyond, twice in the last five years.  The scene had not changed
materially from my recollection of it.

The party which I was with moved south down the valley to the town of
Cuantla, some forty miles from Ameca Ameca.  The latter stands on the
plain at the foot of Popocatapetl, at an elevation of about eight
thousand feet above tide water.  The slope down is gradual as the
traveller moves south, but one would not judge that, in going to
Cuantla, descent enough had been made to occasion a material change in
the climate and productions of the soil; but such is the case.  In the
morning we left a temperate climate where the cereals and fruits are
those common to the United States, we halted in the evening in a
tropical climate where the orange and banana, the coffee and the
sugar-cane were flourishing.  We had been travelling, apparently,
on a plain all day, but in the direction of the flow of water.

Soon after the capture of the City of Mexico an armistice had been
agreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of the respective
armies were not to go during its continuance. Our party knew nothing
about these limits.  As we approached Cuantla bugles sounded the
assembly, and soldiers rushed from the guard-house in the edge of the
town towards us.  Our party halted, and I tied a white pocket
handkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of truce, proceeded on
to the town.  Captains Sibley and Porter followed a few hundred yards
behind.  I was detained at the guard-house until a messenger could be
dispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who authorized
that I should be conducted to him.  I had been with the general but a
few minutes when the two officers following announced themselves.  The
Mexican general reminded us that it was a violation of the truce for us
to be there.  However, as we had no special authority from our own
commanding general, and as we knew nothing about the terms of the truce,
we were permitted to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for the
night, with the promise of a guide to put us on the road to Cuernavaca
the next morning.

Cuernavaca is a town west of Guantla.  The country through which we
passed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and productions
and rich in scenery.  At one point, about half-way between the two
places, the road goes over a low pass in the mountains in which there is
a very quaint old town, the inhabitants of which at that day were nearly
all full-blooded Indians.  Very few of them even spoke Spanish.  The
houses were built of stone and generally only one story high.  The
streets were narrow, and had probably been paved before Cortez visited
the country.  They had not been graded, but the paving had been done on
the natural surface.  We had with us one vehicle, a cart, which was
probably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever passed through that
town.

On a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient king; and
it was understood that the inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly,
as well as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to be buried in it.
We ascended the mountain and surveyed the tomb; but it showed no
particular marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or advanced
civilization.  The next day we went into Cuernavaca.

After a day's rest at Cuernavaca our party set out again on the journey
to the great caves of Mexico.  We had proceeded but a few miles when we
were stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the terms of the
existing armistice did not permit us to go further in that direction.
Upon convincing the guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekers
desirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of the country which
we expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda near
by, and directed to remain there until the commanding general of that
department could be communicated with and his decision obtained as to
whether we should be permitted to pursue our journey.  The guard
promised to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply by night.  At
night there was no response from the commanding general, but the captain
of the guard was sure he would have a reply by morning.  Again in the
morning there was no reply.  The second evening the same thing happened,
and finally we learned that the guard had sent no message or messenger
to the department commander.  We determined therefore to go on unless
stopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience.

After a few hours' travel we came to a town where a scene similar to the
one at Cuantia occurred.  The commanding officer sent a guide to conduct
our party around the village and to put us upon our road again.  This
was the last interruption:  that night we rested at a large coffee
plantation, some eight miles from the cave we were on the way to visit.
It must have been a Saturday night; the peons had been paid off, and
spent part of the night in gambling away their scanty week's earnings.
Their coin was principally copper, and I do not believe there was a man
among them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in money.  They
were as much excited, however, as if they had been staking thousands.  I
recollect one poor fellow, who had lost his last tlacko, pulled off his
shirt and, in the most excited manner, put that up on the turn of a
card.  Monte was the game played, the place out of doors, near the
window of the room occupied by the officers of our party.

The next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early hour,
provided with guides, candles and rockets.  We explored to a distance of
about three miles from the entrance, and found a succession of chambers
of great dimensions and of great beauty when lit up with our rockets.
Stalactites and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered.  Some of the
former were many feet in diameter and extended from ceiling to floor;
some of the latter were but a few feet high from the floor; but the
formation is going on constantly, and many centuries hence these
stalagmites will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns.  The
stalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled with
water.  The water percolates through the roof, a drop at a time--often
the drops several minutes apart--and more or less charged with mineral
matter.  Evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the mineral behind.  This
in time makes the immense columns, many of them thousands of tons in
weight, which serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers.  I
recollect that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of such
huge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on either side
of it.  Some of our party became satisfied with their explorations
before we had reached the point to which the guides were accustomed to
take explorers, and started back without guides.  Coming to the large
column spoken of, they followed it entirely around, and commenced
retracing their steps into the bowels of the mountain, without being
aware of the fact.  When the rest of us had completed our explorations,
we started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw the
torches of an approaching party.  We could not conceive who these could
be, for all of us had come in together, and there were none but
ourselves at the entrance when we started in. Very soon we found it was
our friends.  It took them some time to conceive how they had got where
they were.  They were sure they had kept straight on for the mouth of
the cave, and had gone about far enough to have reached it.



CHAPTER XIV.

RETURN OF THE ARMY--MARRIAGE--ORDERED TO THE PACIFIC COAST--CROSSING THE
ISTHMUS--ARRIVAL AT SAN FRANCISCO.

My experience in the Mexican war was of great advantage to me
afterwards.  Besides the many practical lessons it taught, the war
brought nearly all the officers of the regular army together so as to
make them personally acquainted.  It also brought them in contact with
volunteers, many of whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards.
Then, in my particular case, I had been at West Point at about the right
time to meet most of the graduates who were of a suitable age at the
breaking out of the rebellion to be trusted with large commands.
Graduating in 1843, I was at the military academy from one to four years
with all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846--seven classes.
These classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards became
generals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many of them holding
high commands.  All the older officers, who became conspicuous in the
rebellion, I had also served with and known in Mexico:  Lee, J. E.
Johnston, A. S. Johnston, Holmes, Hebert and a number of others on the
Confederate side; McCall, Mansfield, Phil. Kearney and others on the
National side.  The acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to
me in the war of the rebellion--I mean what I learned of the characters
of those to whom I was afterwards opposed.  I do not pretend to say that
all movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference to
the characteristics of the commander against whom they were directed.
But my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected by this
knowledge.  The natural disposition of most people is to clothe a
commander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhuman
abilities.  A large part of the National army, for instance, and most of
the press of the country, clothed General Lee with just such qualities,
but I had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was
just as well that I felt this.

The treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the evacuation of Mexico
by United States troops was ordered.  Early in June the troops in the
City of Mexico began to move out.  Many of them, including the brigade
to which I belonged, were assembled at Jalapa, above the vomito, to
await the arrival of transports at Vera Cruz:  but with all this
precaution my regiment and others were in camp on the sand beach in a
July sun, for about a week before embarking, while the fever raged with
great virulence in Vera Cruz, not two miles away.  I can call to mind
only one person, an officer, who died of the disease.  My regiment was
sent to Pascagoula, Mississippi, to spend the summer.  As soon as it was
settled in camp I obtained a leave of absence for four months and
proceeded to St. Louis.  On the 22d of August, 1848, I was married to
Miss Julia Dent, the lady of whom I have before spoken.  We visited my
parents and relations in Ohio, and, at the end of my leave, proceeded to
my post at Sackett's Harbor, New York.  In April following I was ordered
to Detroit, Michigan, where two years were spent with but few important
incidents.

The present constitution of the State of Michigan was ratified during
this time.  By the terms of one of its provisions, all citizens of the
United States residing within the State at the time of the ratification
became citizens of Michigan also. During my stay in Detroit there was an
election for city officers.  Mr. Zachariah Chandler was the candidate of
the Whigs for the office of Mayor, and was elected, although the city
was then reckoned democratic.  All the officers stationed there at the
time who offered their votes were permitted to cast them.  I did not
offer mine, however, as I did not wish to consider myself a citizen of
Michigan.  This was Mr. Chandler's first entry into politics, a career
he followed ever after with great success, and in which he died enjoying
the friendship, esteem and love of his countrymen.

In the spring of 1851 the garrison at Detroit was transferred to
Sackett's Harbor, and in the following spring the entire 4th infantry
was ordered to the Pacific Coast.  It was decided that Mrs. Grant should
visit my parents at first for a few months, and then remain with her own
family at their St. Louis home until an opportunity offered of sending
for her.  In the month of April the regiment was assembled at Governor's
Island, New York Harbor, and on the 5th of July eight companies sailed
for Aspinwall.  We numbered a little over seven hundred persons,
including the families of officers and soldiers.  Passage was secured
for us on the old steamer Ohio, commanded at the time by Captain
Schenck, of the navy.  It had not been determined, until a day or two
before starting, that the 4th infantry should go by the Ohio;
consequently, a complement of passengers had already been secured.  The
addition of over seven hundred to this list crowded the steamer most
uncomfortably, especially for the tropics in July.

In eight days Aspinwall was reached.  At that time the streets of the
town were eight or ten inches under water, and foot passengers passed
from place to place on raised foot-walks. July is at the height of the
wet season, on the Isthmus.  At intervals the rain would pour down in
streams, followed in not many minutes by a blazing, tropical summer's
sun.  These alternate changes, from rain to sunshine, were continuous in
the afternoons.  I wondered how any person could live many months in
Aspinwall, and wondered still more why any one tried.

In the summer of 1852 the Panama railroad was completed only to the
point where it now crosses the Chagres River.  From there passengers
were carried by boats to Gorgona, at which place they took mules for
Panama, some twenty-five miles further.  Those who travelled over the
Isthmus in those days will remember that boats on the Chagres River were
propelled by natives not inconveniently burdened with clothing.  These
boats carried thirty to forty passengers each.  The crews consisted of
six men to a boat, armed with long poles.  There were planks wide enough
for a man to walk on conveniently, running along the sides of each boat
from end to end.  The men would start from the bow, place one end of
their poles against the river bottom, brace their shoulders against the
other end, and then walk to the stern as rapidly as they could.  In this
way from a mile to a mile and a half an hour could be made, against the
current of the river.

I, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of the public property and
had also to look after the transportation.  A contract had been entered
into with the steamship company in New York for the transportation of
the regiment to California, including the Isthmus transit.  A certain
amount of baggage was allowed per man, and saddle animals were to be
furnished to commissioned officers and to all disabled persons.  The
regiment, with the exception of one company left as guards to the public
property--camp and garrison equipage principally--and the soldiers with
families, took boats, propelled as above described, for Gorgona.  From
this place they marched to Panama, and were soon comfortably on the
steamer anchored in the bay, some three or four miles from the town.  I,
with one company of troops and all the soldiers with families, all the
tents, mess chests and camp kettles, was sent to Cruces, a town a few
miles higher up the Chagres River than Gorgona.  There I found an
impecunious American who had taken the contract to furnish
transportation for the regiment at a stipulated price per hundred pounds
for the freight and so much for each saddle animal.  But when we reached
Cruces there was not a mule, either for pack or saddle, in the place.
The contractor promised that the animals should be on hand in the
morning.  In the morning he said that they were on the way from some
imaginary place, and would arrive in the course of the day.  This went
on until I saw that he could not procure the animals at all at the price
he had promised to furnish them for.  The unusual number of passengers
that had come over on the steamer, and the large amount of freight to
pack, had created an unprecedented demand for mules.  Some of the
passengers paid as high as forty dollars for the use of a mule to ride
twenty-five miles, when the mule would not have sold for ten dollars in
that market at other times. Meanwhile the cholera had broken out, and
men were dying every hour.  To diminish the food for the disease, I
permitted the company detailed with me to proceed to Panama.  The
captain and the doctors accompanied the men, and I was left alone with
the sick and the soldiers who had families.  The regiment at Panama was
also affected with the disease; but there were better accommodations for
the well on the steamer, and a hospital, for those taken with the
disease, on an old hulk anchored a mile off.  There were also hospital
tents on shore on the island of Flamingo, which stands in the bay.

I was about a week at Cruces before transportation began to come in.
About one-third of the people with me died, either at Cruces or on the
way to Panama.  There was no agent of the transportation company at
Cruces to consult, or to take the responsibility of procuring
transportation at a price which would secure it.  I therefore myself
dismissed the contractor and made a new contract with a native, at more
than double the original price.  Thus we finally reached Panama.  The
steamer, however, could not proceed until the cholera abated, and the
regiment was detained still longer.  Altogether, on the Isthmus and on
the Pacific side, we were delayed six weeks.  About one-seventh of those
who left New York harbor with the 4th infantry on the 5th of July, now
lie buried on the Isthmus of Panama or on Flamingo island in Panama Bay.

One amusing circumstance occurred while we were lying at anchor in
Panama Bay.  In the regiment there was a Lieutenant Slaughter who was
very liable to sea-sickness.  It almost made him sick to see the wave of
a table-cloth when the servants were spreading it.  Soon after his
graduation, Slaughter was ordered to California and took passage by a
sailing vessel going around Cape Horn.  The vessel was seven months
making the voyage, and Slaughter was sick every moment of the time,
never more so than while lying at anchor after reaching his place of
destination. On landing in California he found orders which had come by
the Isthmus, notifying him of a mistake in his assignment; he should
have been ordered to the northern lakes.  He started back by the Isthmus
route and was sick all the way.  But when he arrived at the East he was
again ordered to California, this time definitely, and at this date was
making his third trip.  He was as sick as ever, and had been so for more
than a month while lying at anchor in the bay.  I remember him well,
seated with his elbows on the table in front of him, his chin between
his hands, and looking the picture of despair.  At last he broke out, "I
wish I had taken my father's advice; he wanted me to go into the navy;
if I had done so, I should not have had to go to sea so much."  Poor
Slaughter! it was his last sea voyage.  He was killed by Indians in
Oregon.

By the last of August the cholera had so abated that it was deemed safe
to start.  The disease did not break out again on the way to California,
and we reached San Francisco early in September.



CHAPTER XV.

SAN FRANCISCO--EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES--LIFE ON THE PACIFIC COAST
--PROMOTED CAPTAIN--FLUSH TIMES IN CALIFORNIA.

San Francisco at that day was a lively place.  Gold, or placer digging
as it was called, was at its height.  Steamers plied daily between San
Francisco and both Stockton and Sacramento. Passengers and gold from the
southern mines came by the Stockton boat; from the northern mines by
Sacramento.  In the evening when these boats arrived, Long Wharf--there
was but one wharf in San Francisco in 1852--was alive with people
crowding to meet the miners as they came down to sell their "dust" and
to "have a time."  Of these some were runners for hotels, boarding
houses or restaurants; others belonged to a class of impecunious
adventurers, of good manners and good presence, who were ever on the
alert to make the acquaintance of people with some ready means, in the
hope of being asked to take a meal at a restaurant.  Many were young men
of good family, good education and gentlemanly instincts.  Their parents
had been able to support them during their minority, and to give them
good educations, but not to maintain them afterwards.  From 1849 to 1853
there was a rush of people to the Pacific coast, of the class described.
All thought that fortunes were to be picked up, without effort, in the
gold fields on the Pacific.  Some realized more than their most sanguine
expectations; but for one such there were hundreds disappointed, many of
whom now fill unknown graves; others died wrecks of their former selves,
and many, without a vicious instinct, became criminals and outcasts.
Many of the real scenes in early California life exceed in strangeness
and interest any of the mere products of the brain of the novelist.

Those early days in California brought out character.  It was a long way
off then, and the journey was expensive.  The fortunate could go by Cape
Horn or by the Isthmus of Panama; but the mass of pioneers crossed the
plains with their ox-teams.  This took an entire summer.  They were very
lucky when they got through with a yoke of worn-out cattle.  All other
means were exhausted in procuring the outfit on the Missouri River.  The
immigrant, on arriving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land, far
from friends.  Time pressed, for the little means that could be realized
from the sale of what was left of the outfit would not support a man
long at California prices.  Many became discouraged.  Others would take
off their coats and look for a job, no matter what it might be.  These
succeeded as a rule. There were many young men who had studied
professions before they went to California, and who had never done a
day's manual labor in their lives, who took in the situation at once and
went to work to make a start at anything they could get to do.  Some
supplied carpenters and masons with material--carrying plank, brick, or
mortar, as the case might be; others drove stages, drays, or baggage
wagons, until they could do better.  More became discouraged early and
spent their time looking up people who would "treat," or lounging about
restaurants and gambling houses where free lunches were furnished daily.
They were welcomed at these places because they often brought in miners
who proved good customers.

My regiment spent a few weeks at Benicia barracks, and then was ordered
to Fort Vancouver, on the Columbia River, then in Oregon Territory.
During the winter of 1852-3 the territory was divided, all north of the
Columbia River being taken from Oregon to make Washington Territory.

Prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the Pacific coast from
1849 until at least 1853--that it would have been impossible for
officers of the army to exist upon their pay, if it had not been that
authority was given them to purchase from the commissary such supplies
as he kept, at New Orleans wholesale prices.  A cook could not be hired
for the pay of a captain.  The cook could do better.  At Benicia, in
1852, flour was 25 cents per pound; potatoes were 16 cents; beets,
turnips and cabbage, 6 cents; onions, 37 1/2 cents; meat and other
articles in proportion.  In 1853 at Vancouver vegetables were a little
lower.  I with three other officers concluded that we would raise a crop
for ourselves, and by selling the surplus realize something handsome.  I
bought a pair of horses that had crossed the plains that summer and were
very poor.  They recuperated rapidly, however, and proved a good team to
break up the ground with.  I performed all the labor of breaking up the
ground while the other officers planted the potatoes.  Our crop was
enormous.  Luckily for us the Columbia River rose to a great height from
the melting of the snow in the mountains in June, and overflowed and
killed most of our crop.  This saved digging it up, for everybody on the
Pacific coast seemed to have come to the conclusion at the same time
that agriculture would be profitable.  In 1853 more than three-quarters
of the potatoes raised were permitted to rot in the ground, or had to be
thrown away.  The only potatoes we sold were to our own mess.

While I was stationed on the Pacific coast we were free from Indian
wars.  There were quite a number of remnants of tribes in the vicinity
of Portland in Oregon, and of Fort Vancouver in Washington Territory.
They had generally acquired some of the vices of civilization, but none
of the virtues, except in individual cases.  The Hudson's Bay Company
had held the North-west with their trading posts for many years before
the United States was represented on the Pacific coast.  They still
retained posts along the Columbia River and one at Fort Vancouver, when
I was there.  Their treatment of the Indians had brought out the better
qualities of the savages.  Farming had been undertaken by the company to
supply the Indians with bread and vegetables; they raised some cattle
and horses; and they had now taught the Indians to do the labor of the
farm and herd. They always compensated them for their labor, and always
gave them goods of uniform quality and at uniform price.

Before the advent of the American, the medium of exchange between the
Indian and the white man was pelts.  Afterward it was silver coin.  If
an Indian received in the sale of a horse a fifty dollar gold piece, not
an infrequent occurrence, the first thing he did was to exchange it for
American half dollars. These he could count.  He would then commence his
purchases, paying for each article separately, as he got it.  He would
not trust any one to add up the bill and pay it all at once.  At that
day fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the government, were
common on the Pacific coast.  They were called slugs.

The Indians, along the lower Columbia as far as the Cascades and on the
lower Willamette, died off very fast during the year I spent in that
section; for besides acquiring the vices of the white people they had
acquired also their diseases.  The measles and the small-pox were both
amazingly fatal.  In their wild state, before the appearance of the
white man among them, the principal complaints they were subject to were
those produced by long involuntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuit
of game, and over-eating.  Instinct more than reason had taught them a
remedy for these ills.  It was the steam bath.  Something like a
bake-oven was built, large enough to admit a man lying down. Bushes were
stuck in the ground in two rows, about six feet long and some two or
three feet apart; other bushes connected the rows at one end.  The tops
of the bushes were drawn together to interlace, and confined in that
position; the whole was then plastered over with wet clay until every
opening was filled. Just inside the open end of the oven the floor was
scooped out so as to make a hole that would hold a bucket or two of
water. These ovens were always built on the banks of a stream, a big
spring, or pool of water.  When a patient required a bath, a fire was
built near the oven and a pile of stones put upon it. The cavity at the
front was then filled with water.  When the stones were sufficiently
heated, the patient would draw himself into the oven; a blanket would be
thrown over the open end, and hot stones put into the water until the
patient could stand it no longer.  He was then withdrawn from his steam
bath and doused into the cold stream near by.  This treatment may have
answered with the early ailments of the Indians.  With the measles or
small-pox it would kill every time.

During my year on the Columbia River, the small-pox exterminated one
small remnant of a band of Indians entirely, and reduced others
materially.  I do not think there was a case of recovery among them,
until the doctor with the Hudson Bay Company took the matter in hand and
established a hospital.  Nearly every case he treated recovered.  I
never, myself, saw the treatment described in the preceding paragraph,
but have heard it described by persons who have witnessed it.  The
decimation among the Indians I knew of personally, and the hospital,
established for their benefit, was a Hudson's Bay building not a stone's
throw from my own quarters.

The death of Colonel Bliss, of the Adjutant General's department, which
occurred July 5th, 1853, promoted me to the captaincy of a company then
stationed at Humboldt Bay, California.  The notice reached me in
September of the same year, and I very soon started to join my new
command.  There was no way of reaching Humboldt at that time except to
take passage on a San Francisco sailing vessel going after lumber.  Red
wood, a species of cedar, which on the Pacific coast takes the place
filled by white pine in the East, then abounded on the banks of Humboldt
Bay.  There were extensive saw-mills engaged in preparing this lumber
for the San Francisco market, and sailing vessels, used in getting it to
market, furnished the only means of communication between Humboldt and
the balance of the world.

I was obliged to remain in San Francisco for several days before I found
a vessel.  This gave me a good opportunity of comparing the San
Francisco of 1852 with that of 1853.  As before stated, there had been
but one wharf in front of the city in 1852--Long Wharf.  In 1853 the
town had grown out into the bay beyond what was the end of this wharf
when I first saw it.  Streets and houses had been built out on piles
where the year before the largest vessels visiting the port lay at
anchor or tied to the wharf.  There was no filling under the streets or
houses.  San Francisco presented the same general appearance as the year
before; that is, eating, drinking and gambling houses were conspicuous
for their number and publicity.  They were on the first floor, with
doors wide open.  At all hours of the day and night in walking the
streets, the eye was regaled, on every block near the water front, by
the sight of players at faro. Often broken places were found in the
street, large enough to let a man down into the water below.  I have but
little doubt that many of the people who went to the Pacific coast in
the early days of the gold excitement, and have never been heard from
since, or who were heard from for a time and then ceased to write, found
watery graves beneath the houses or streets built over San Francisco
Bay.

Besides the gambling in cards there was gambling on a larger scale in
city lots.  These were sold "On Change," much as stocks are now sold on
Wall Street.  Cash, at time of purchase, was always paid by the broker;
but the purchaser had only to put up his margin.  He was charged at the
rate of two or three per cent. a month on the difference, besides
commissions.  The sand hills, some of them almost inaccessible to
foot-passengers, were surveyed off and mapped into fifty vara lots--a
vara being a Spanish yard.  These were sold at first at very low prices,
but were sold and resold for higher prices until they went up to many
thousands of dollars.  The brokers did a fine business, and so did many
such purchasers as were sharp enough to quit purchasing before the final
crash came.  As the city grew, the sand hills back of the town furnished
material for filling up the bay under the houses and streets, and still
further out. The temporary houses, first built over the water in the
harbor, soon gave way to more solid structures.  The main business part
of the city now is on solid ground, made where vessels of the largest
class lay at anchor in the early days.  I was in San Francisco again in
1854.  Gambling houses had disappeared from public view.  The city had
become staid and orderly.



CHAPTER XVI.

RESIGNATION--PRIVATE LIFE--LIFE AT GALENA--THE COMING CRISIS.

My family, all this while, was at the East.  It consisted now of a wife
and two children.  I saw no chance of supporting them on the Pacific
coast out of my pay as an army officer.  I concluded, therefore, to
resign, and in March applied for a leave of absence until the end of the
July following, tendering my resignation to take effect at the end of
that time.  I left the Pacific coast very much attached to it, and with
the full expectation of making it my future home.  That expectation and
that hope remained uppermost in my mind until the Lieutenant-Generalcy
bill was introduced into Congress in the winter of 1863-4.  The passage
of that bill, and my promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming a
citizen of the further West.

In the late summer of 1854 I rejoined my family, to find in it a son
whom I had never seen, born while I was on the Isthmus of Panama.  I was
now to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle for our
support.  My wife had a farm near St. Louis, to which we went, but I had
no means to stock it.  A house had to be built also.  I worked very
hard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished the
object in a moderate way.  If nothing else could be done I would load a
cord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale.  I managed to
keep along very well until 1858, when I was attacked by fever and ague.
I had suffered very severely and for a long time from this disease,
while a boy in Ohio.  It lasted now over a year, and, while it did not
keep me in the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work I
was able to perform.  In the fall of 1858 I sold out my stock, crops and
farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming.

In the winter I established a partnership with Harry Boggs, a cousin of
Mrs.  Grant, in the real estate agency business.  I spent that winter at
St. Louis myself, but did not take my family into town until the spring.
Our business might have become prosperous if I had been able to wait for
it to grow.  As it was, there was no more than one person could attend
to, and not enough to support two families.  While a citizen of St.
Louis and engaged in the real estate agency business, I was a candidate
for the office of county engineer, an office of respectability and
emolument which would have been very acceptable to me at that time.  The
incumbent was appointed by the county court, which consisted of five
members.  My opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was a
citizen by adoption) and carried off the prize.  I now withdrew from the
co-partnership with Boggs, and, in May, 1860, removed to Galena,
Illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store.

While a citizen of Missouri, my first opportunity for casting a vote at
a Presidential election occurred.  I had been in the army from before
attaining my majority and had thought but little about politics,
although I was a Whig by education and a great admirer of Mr. Clay.  But
the Whig party had ceased to exist before I had an opportunity of
exercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the Know-Nothing party had
taken its place, but was on the wane; and the Republican party was in a
chaotic state and had not yet received a name.  It had no existence in
the Slave States except at points on the borders next to Free States.
In St. Louis City and County, what afterwards became the Republican
party was known as the Free-Soil Democracy, led by the Honorable Frank
P. Blair.  Most of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the army
with Whig proclivities.  They had been on the same side, and, on the
death of their party, many had become Know-Nothings, or members of the
American party. There was a lodge near my new home, and I was invited to
join it.  I accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a meeting
just one week later, and never went to another afterwards.

I have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of the
American party; for I still think native-born citizens of the United
States should have as much protection, as many privileges in their
native country, as those who voluntarily select it for a home.  But all
secret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to any nation, no
matter how pure or how patriotic the motives and principles which first
bring them together.  No political party can or ought to exist when one
of its corner-stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to the
right to worship God "according to the dictate of one's own conscience,"
or according to the creed of any religious denomination whatever.
Nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the State
laws, wherever the two come in conflict this claim must be resisted and
suppressed at whatever cost.

Up to the Mexican war there were a few out and out abolitionists, men
who carried their hostility to slavery into all elections, from those
for a justice of the peace up to the Presidency of the United States.
They were noisy but not numerous.  But the great majority of people at
the North, where slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution,
and looked upon its existence in any part of the country as unfortunate.
They did not hold the States where slavery existed responsible for it;
and believed that protection should be given to the right of property in
slaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of the
institution.  Opposition to slavery was not a creed of either political
party.  In some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to the
Democratic party, and in others to the Whigs.  But with the inauguration
of the Mexican war, in fact with the annexation of Texas, "the
inevitable conflict" commenced.

As the time for the Presidential election of 1856--the first at which I
had the opportunity of voting--approached, party feeling began to run
high.  The Republican party was regarded in the South and the border
States not only as opposed to the extension of slavery, but as favoring
the compulsory abolition of the institution without compensation to the
owners.  The most horrible visions seemed to present themselves to the
minds of people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better.
Many educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe that
emancipation meant social equality.  Treason to the Government was
openly advocated and was not rebuked.  It was evident to my mind that
the election of a Republican President in 1856 meant the secession of
all the Slave States, and rebellion.  Under these circumstances I
preferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent or
postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end of
which no man could foretell.  With a Democrat elected by the unanimous
vote of the Slave States, there could be no pretext for secession for
four years.  I very much hoped that the passions of the people would
subside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if it
was not, I believed the country would be better prepared to receive the
shock and to resist it.  I therefore voted for James Buchanan for
President.  Four years later the Republican party was successful in
electing its candidate to the Presidency.  The civilized world has
learned the consequence.  Four millions of human beings held as chattels
have been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free schools
of the country have been opened to their children.  The nation still
lives, and the people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with the
blacks as ever they were, or as they are with white people.

While living in Galena I was nominally only a clerk supporting myself
and family on a stipulated salary.  In reality my position was
different.  My father had never lived in Galena himself, but had
established my two brothers there, the one next younger than myself in
charge of the business, assisted by the youngest.  When I went there it
was my father's intention to give up all connection with the business
himself, and to establish his three sons in it:  but the brother who had
really built up the business was sinking with consumption, and it was
not thought best to make any change while he was in this condition.  He
lived until September, 1861, when he succumbed to that insidious disease
which always flatters its victims into the belief that they are growing
better up to the close of life.  A more honorable man never transacted
business.  In September, 1861, I was engaged in an employment which
required all my attention elsewhere.

During the eleven months that I lived in Galena prior to the first call
for volunteers, I had been strictly attentive to my business, and had
made but few acquaintances other than customers and people engaged in
the same line with myself.  When the election took place in November,
1860, I had not been a resident of Illinois long enough to gain
citizenship and could not, therefore, vote.  I was really glad of this
at the time, for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for Stephen
A. Douglas, who had no possible chance of election.  The contest was
really between Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Lincoln; between minority rule
and rule by the majority.  I wanted, as between these candidates, to see
Mr. Lincoln elected.  Excitement ran high during the canvass, and
torch-light processions enlivened the scene in the generally quiet
streets of Galena many nights during the campaign.  I did not parade
with either party, but occasionally met with the "wide awakes"
--Republicans--in their rooms, and superintended their drill.  It was
evident, from the time of the Chicago nomination to the close of the
canvass, that the election of the Republican candidate would be the
signal for some of the Southern States to secede.  I still had hopes
that the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of a
Presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slavery
extension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to cool
down; for the Southerners to think well before they took the awful leap
which they had so vehemently threatened.  But I was mistaken.

The Republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial people of
the North-west, and I presume the same order of people throughout the
entire North, felt very serious, but determined, after this event.  It
was very much discussed whether the South would carry out its threat to
secede and set up a separate government, the corner-stone of which
should be, protection to the "Divine" institution of slavery.  For there
were people who believed in the "divinity" of human slavery, as there
are now people who believe Mormonism and Polygamy to be ordained by the
Most High.  We forgive them for entertaining such notions, but forbid
their practice.  It was generally believed that there would be a flurry;
that some of the extreme Southern States would go so far as to pass
ordinances of secession.  But the common impression was that this step
was so plainly suicidal for the South, that the movement would not
spread over much of the territory and would not last long.

Doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them at least,
regarded the confederation of the colonies as an experiment.  Each
colony considered itself a separate government; that the confederation
was for mutual protection against a foreign foe, and the prevention of
strife and war among themselves.  If there had been a desire on the part
of any single State to withdraw from the compact at any time while the
number of States was limited to the original thirteen, I do not suppose
there would have been any to contest the right, no matter how much the
determination might have been regretted. The problem changed on the
ratification of the Constitution by all the colonies; it changed still
more when amendments were added; and if the right of any one State to
withdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of the
Constitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new States, at
least so far as the new States themselves were concerned.  It was never
possessed at all by Florida or the States west of the Mississippi, all
of which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation. Texas and
the territory brought into the Union in consequence of annexation, were
purchased with both blood and treasure; and Texas, with a domain greater
than that of any European state except Russia, was permitted to retain
as state property all the public lands within its borders.  It would
have been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for this
State to withdraw from the Union after all that had been spent and done
to introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred, Texas must
necessarily have gone with the South, both on account of her
institutions and her geographical position. Secession was illogical as
well as impracticable; it was revolution.

Now, the right of revolution is an inherent one.  When people are
oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy to
relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either
by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a
government more acceptable.  But any people or part of a people who
resort to this remedy, stake their lives, their property, and every
claim for protection given by citizenship--on the issue.  Victory, or
the conditions imposed by the conqueror--must be the result.

In the case of the war between the States it would have been the exact
truth if the South had said,--"We do not want to live with you Northern
people any longer; we know our institution of slavery is obnoxious to
you, and, as you are growing numerically stronger than we, it may at
some time in the future be endangered.  So long as you permitted us to
control the government, and with the aid of a few friends at the North
to enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape of
our property, we were willing to live with you.  You have been
submissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if you did not
intend to continue so, and we will remain in the Union no longer."
Instead of this the seceding States cried lustily,--"Let us alone; you
have no constitutional power to interfere with us."  Newspapers and
people at the North reiterated the cry.  Individuals might ignore the
constitution; but the Nation itself must not only obey it, but must
enforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the construction
put upon it by the Southerners themselves.  The fact is the constitution
did not apply to any such contingency as the one existing from 1861 to
1865.  Its framers never dreamed of such a contingency occurring.  If
they had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would have sanctioned
the right of a State or States to withdraw rather than that there should
be war between brothers.

The framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the very best
possible to secure their own liberty and independence, and that also of
their descendants to the latest days.  It is preposterous to suppose
that the people of one generation can lay down the best and only rules
of government for all who are to come after them, and under unforeseen
contingencies.  At the time of the framing of our constitution the only
physical forces that had been subdued and made to serve man and do his
labor, were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe. Rude
machinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to propel
ships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing breeze--but the
application of stream to propel vessels against both wind and current,
and machinery to do all manner of work had not been thought of.  The
instantaneous transmission of messages around the world by means of
electricity would probably at that day have been attributed to
witchcraft or a league with the Devil.  Immaterial circumstances had
changed as greatly as material ones.  We could not and ought not to be
rigidly bound by the rules laid down under circumstances so different
for emergencies so utterly unanticipated.  The fathers themselves would
have been the first to declare that their prerogatives were not
irrevocable.  They would surely have resisted secession could they have
lived to see the shape it assumed.

I travelled through the Northwest considerably during the winter of
1860-1.  We had customers in all the little towns in south-west
Wisconsin, south-east Minnesota and north-east Iowa.  These generally
knew I had been a captain in the regular army and had served through the
Mexican war.  Consequently wherever I stopped at night, some of the
people would come to the public-house where I was, and sit till a late
hour discussing the probabilities of the future.  My own views at that
time were like those officially expressed by Mr. Seward at a later day,
that "the war would be over in ninety days."  I continued to entertain
these views until after the battle of Shiloh.  I believe now that there
would have been no more battles at the West after the capture of Fort
Donelson if all the troops in that region had been under a single
commander who would have followed up that victory.

There is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing sentiment of
the South would have been opposed to secession in 1860 and 1861, if
there had been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased by
threats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had counted for as much as
that of any other.  But there was no calm discussion of the question.
Demagogues who were too old to enter the army if there should be a war,
others who entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that they
did not believe they could be spared from the direction of the affairs
of state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly against
the North; against its aggressions upon the South; its interference with
Southern rights, etc., etc.  They denounced the Northerners as cowards,
poltroons, negro-worshippers; claimed that one Southern man was equal to
five Northern men in battle; that if the South would stand up for its
rights the North would back down.  Mr. Jefferson Davis said in a speech,
delivered at La Grange, Mississippi, before the secession of that State,
that he would agree to drink all the blood spilled south of Mason and
Dixon's line if there should be a war.  The young men who would have the
fighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both in
regard to the aggressiveness of the North and its cowardice.  They, too,
cried out for a separation from such people.  The great bulk of the
legal voters of the South were men who owned no slaves; their homes were
generally in the hills and poor country; their facilities for educating
their children, even up to the point of reading and writing, were very
limited; their interest in the contest was very meagre--what there was,
if they had been capable of seeing it, was with the North; they too
needed emancipation.  Under the old regime they were looked down upon by
those who controlled all the affairs in the interest of slave-owners, as
poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so long as they cast it
according to direction.

I am aware that this last statement may be disputed and individual
testimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum days the ballot
was as untrammelled in the south as in any section of the country; but
in the face of any such contradiction I reassert the statement.  The
shot-gun was not resorted to.  Masked men did not ride over the country
at night intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a class
existed in every State with a sort of divine right to control public
affairs.  If they could not get this control by one means they must by
another.  The end justified the means.  The coercion, if mild, was
complete.

There were two political parties, it is true, in all the States, both
strong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal to the
institution which stood paramount in Southern eyes to all other
institutions in state or nation.  The slave-owners were the minority,
but governed both parties.  Had politics ever divided the slave-holders
and the non-slave-holders, the majority would have been obliged to
yield, or internecine war would have been the consequence.  I do not
know that the Southern people were to blame for this condition of
affairs. There was a time when slavery was not profitable, and the
discussion of the merits of the institution was confined almost
exclusively to the territory where it existed.  The States of Virginia
and Kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own acts, one State
defeating the measure by a tie vote and the other only lacking one.  But
when the institution became profitable, all talk of its abolition ceased
where it existed; and naturally, as human nature is constituted,
arguments were adduced in its support.  The cotton-gin probably had much
to do with the justification of slavery.

The winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of to-day
as one of great excitement.  South Carolina promptly seceded after the
result of the Presidential election was known.  Other Southern States
proposed to follow.  In some of them the Union sentiment was so strong
that it had to be suppressed by force.  Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky and
Missouri, all Slave States, failed to pass ordinances of secession; but
they were all represented in the so-called congress of the so-called
Confederate States.  The Governor and Lieutenant-Governor of Missouri,
in 1861, Jackson and Reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion and
took refuge with the enemy.  The governor soon died, and the
lieutenant-governor assumed his office; issued proclamations as governor
of the State; was recognized as such by the Confederate Government, and
continued his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. The South
claimed the sovereignty of States, but claimed the right to coerce into
their confederation such States as they wanted, that is, all the States
where slavery existed.  They did not seem to think this course
inconsistent.  The fact is, the Southern slave-owners believed that, in
some way, the ownership of slaves conferred a sort of patent of
nobility--a right to govern independent of the interest or wishes of
those who did not hold such property.  They convinced themselves, first,
of the divine origin of the institution and, next, that that particular
institution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators but
themselves.

Meanwhile the Administration of President Buchanan looked helplessly on
and proclaimed that the general government had no power to interfere;
that the Nation had no power to save its own life.  Mr. Buchanan had in
his cabinet two members at least, who were as earnest--to use a mild
term--in the cause of secession as Mr. Davis or any Southern statesman.
One of them, Floyd, the Secretary of War, scattered the army so that
much of it could be captured when hostilities should commence, and
distributed the cannon and small arms from Northern arsenals throughout
the South so as to be on hand when treason wanted them.  The navy was
scattered in like manner.  The President did not prevent his cabinet
preparing for war upon their government, either by destroying its
resources or storing them in the South until a de facto government was
established with Jefferson Davis as its President, and Montgomery,
Alabama, as the Capital.  The secessionists had then to leave the
cabinet.  In their own estimation they were aliens in the country which
had given them birth.  Loyal men were put into their places.  Treason in
the executive branch of the government was estopped.  But the harm had
already been done.  The stable door was locked after the horse had been
stolen.

During all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the Southerners were so
defiant that they would not allow within their borders the expression of
a sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave man indeed who could
stand up and proclaim his loyalty to the Union.  On the other hand men
at the North--prominent men--proclaimed that the government had no power
to coerce the South into submission to the laws of the land; that if the
North undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have to
march over the dead bodies of the speakers.  A portion of the press of
the North was constantly proclaiming similar views. When the time
arrived for the President-elect to go to the capital of the Nation to be
sworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to travel, not only as a
President-elect, but as any private citizen should be allowed to do.
Instead of going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of his
constituents at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stop
on the way and to be smuggled into the capital.  He disappeared from
public view on his journey, and the next the country knew, his arrival
was announced at the capital.  There is little doubt that he would have
been assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout his
journey.



CHAPTER XVII.

OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION--PRESIDING AT A UNION MEETING--MUSTERING
OFFICER OF STATE TROOPS--LYON AT CAMP JACKSON--SERVICES TENDERED TO THE
GOVERNMENT.

The 4th of March, 1861, came, and Abraham Lincoln was sworn to maintain
the Union against all its enemies.  The secession of one State after
another followed, until eleven had gone out.  On the 11th of April Fort
Sumter, a National fort in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, was
fired upon by the Southerners and a few days after was captured.  The
Confederates proclaimed themselves aliens, and thereby debarred
themselves of all right to claim protection under the Constitution of
the United States.  We did not admit the fact that they were aliens, but
all the same, they debarred themselves of the right to expect better
treatment than people of any other foreign state who make war upon an
independent nation.  Upon the firing on Sumter President Lincoln issued
his first call for troops and soon after a proclamation convening
Congress in extra session.  The call was for 75,000 volunteers for
ninety days' service.  If the shot fired at Fort Sumter "was heard
around the world," the call of the President for 75,000 men was heard
throughout the Northern States.  There was not a state in the North of a
million of inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire number
faster than arms could have been supplied to them, if it had been
necessary.

As soon as the news of the call for volunteers reached Galena, posters
were stuck up calling for a meeting of the citizens at the court-house
in the evening.  Business ceased entirely; all was excitement; for a
time there were no party distinctions; all were Union men, determined to
avenge the insult to the national flag.  In the evening the court-house
was packed.  Although a comparative stranger I was called upon to
preside; the sole reason, possibly, was that I had been in the army and
had seen service.  With much embarrassment and some prompting I made out
to announce the object of the meeting.  Speeches were in order, but it
is doubtful whether it would have been safe just then to make other than
patriotic ones.  There was probably no one in the house, however, who
felt like making any other.  The two principal speeches were by B. B.
Howard, the post-master and a Breckinridge Democrat at the November
election the fall before, and John A. Rawlins, an elector on the Douglas
ticket.  E. B. Washburne, with whom I was not acquainted at that time,
came in after the meeting had been organized, and expressed, I
understood afterwards, a little surprise that Galena could not furnish a
presiding officer for such an occasion without taking a stranger.  He
came forward and was introduced, and made a speech appealing to the
patriotism of the meeting.

After the speaking was over volunteers were called for to form a
company.  The quota of Illinois had been fixed at six regiments; and it
was supposed that one company would be as much as would be accepted from
Galena.  The company was raised and the officers and non-commissioned
officers elected before the meeting adjourned.  I declined the captaincy
before the balloting, but announced that I would aid the company in
every way I could and would be found in the service in some position if
there should be a war.  I never went into our leather store after that
meeting, to put up a package or do other business.

The ladies of Galena were quite as patriotic as the men.  They could not
enlist, but they conceived the idea of sending their first company to
the field uniformed.  They came to me to get a description of the United
States uniform for infantry; subscribed and bought the material;
procured tailors to cut out the garments, and the ladies made them up.
In a few days the company was in uniform and ready to report at the
State capital for assignment.  The men all turned out the morning after
their enlistment, and I took charge, divided them into squads and
superintended their drill.  When they were ready to go to Springfield I
went with them and remained there until they were assigned to a
regiment.

There were so many more volunteers than had been called for that the
question whom to accept was quite embarrassing to the governor, Richard
Yates.  The legislature was in session at the time, however, and came to
his relief.  A law was enacted authorizing the governor to accept the
services of ten additional regiments, one from each congressional
district, for one month, to be paid by the State, but pledged to go into
the service of the United States if there should be a further call
during their term.  Even with this relief the governor was still very
much embarrassed.  Before the war was over he was like the President
when he was taken with the varioloid:  "at last he had something he
could give to all who wanted it."

In time the Galena company was mustered into the United States service,
forming a part of the 11th Illinois volunteer infantry.  My duties, I
thought, had ended at Springfield, and I was prepared to start home by
the evening train, leaving at nine o'clock.  Up to that time I do not
think I had been introduced to Governor Yates, or had ever spoken to
him.  I knew him by sight, however, because he was living at the same
hotel and I often saw him at table.  The evening I was to quit the
capital I left the supper room before the governor and was standing at
the front door when he came out.  He spoke to me, calling me by my old
army title "Captain," and said he understood that I was about leaving
the city.  I answered that I was.  He said he would be glad if I would
remain over-night and call at the Executive office the next morning.
I complied with his request, and was asked to go into the
Adjutant-General's office and render such assistance as I could, the
governor saying that my army experience would be of great service there.
I accepted the proposition.

My old army experience I found indeed of very great service.  I was no
clerk, nor had I any capacity to become one.  The only place I ever
found in my life to put a paper so as to find it again was either a side
coat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or secretary more careful than
myself.  But I had been quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in the
field.  The army forms were familiar to me and I could direct how they
should be made out.  There was a clerk in the office of the
Adjutant-General who supplied my deficiencies.  The ease with which the
State of Illinois settled its accounts with the government at the close
of the war is evidence of the efficiency of Mr. Loomis as an accountant
on a large scale.  He remained in the office until that time.

As I have stated, the legislature authorized the governor to accept the
services of ten additional regiments.  I had charge of mustering these
regiments into the State service.  They were assembled at the most
convenient railroad centres in their respective congressional districts.
I detailed officers to muster in a portion of them, but mustered three
in the southern part of the State myself.  One of these was to assemble
at Belleville, some eighteen miles south-east of St. Louis.  When I got
there I found that only one or two companies had arrived. There was no
probability of the regiment coming together under five days.  This gave
me a few idle days which I concluded to spend in St. Louis.

There was a considerable force of State militia at Camp Jackson, on the
outskirts of St. Louis, at the time.  There is but little doubt that it
was the design of Governor Claiborn Jackson to have these troops ready
to seize the United States arsenal and the city of St. Louis.  Why they
did not do so I do not know. There was but a small garrison, two
companies I think, under Captain N. Lyon at the arsenal, and but for the
timely services of the Hon. F. P. Blair, I have little doubt that St.
Louis would have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal with all
its arms and ammunition.

Blair was a leader among the Union men of St. Louis in 1861. There was
no State government in Missouri at the time that would sanction the
raising of troops or commissioned officers to protect United States
property, but Blair had probably procured some form of authority from
the President to raise troops in Missouri and to muster them into the
service of the United States.  At all events, he did raise a regiment
and took command himself as Colonel.  With this force he reported to
Captain Lyon and placed himself and regiment under his orders.  It was
whispered that Lyon thus reinforced intended to break up Camp Jackson
and capture the militia.  I went down to the arsenal in the morning to
see the troops start out.  I had known Lyon for two years at West Point
and in the old army afterwards.  Blair I knew very well by sight.  I had
heard him speak in the canvass of 1858, possibly several times, but I
had never spoken to him.  As the troops marched out of the enclosure
around the arsenal, Blair was on his horse outside forming them into
line preparatory to their march.  I introduced myself to him and had a
few moments' conversation and expressed my sympathy with his purpose.
This was my first personal acquaintance with the Honorable--afterwards
Major-General F. P. Blair.  Camp Jackson surrendered without a fight and
the garrison was marched down to the arsenal as prisoners of war.

Up to this time the enemies of the government in St. Louis had been bold
and defiant, while Union men were quiet but determined.  The enemies had
their head-quarters in a central and public position on Pine Street,
near Fifth--from which the rebel flag was flaunted boldly.  The Union
men had a place of meeting somewhere in the city, I did not know where,
and I doubt whether they dared to enrage the enemies of the government
by placing the national flag outside their head-quarters.  As soon as
the news of the capture of Camp Jackson reached the city the condition
of affairs was changed.  Union men became rampant, aggressive, and, if
you will, intolerant.  They proclaimed their sentiments boldly, and were
impatient at anything like disrespect for the Union.  The secessionists
became quiet but were filled with suppressed rage.  They had been
playing the bully.  The Union men ordered the rebel flag taken down from
the building on Pine Street.  The command was given in tones of
authority and it was taken down, never to be raised again in St. Louis.

I witnessed the scene.  I had heard of the surrender of the camp and
that the garrison was on its way to the arsenal.  I had seen the troops
start out in the morning and had wished them success.  I now determined
to go to the arsenal and await their arrival and congratulate them.  I
stepped on a car standing at the corner of 4th and Pine streets, and saw
a crowd of people standing quietly in front of the head-quarters, who
were there for the purpose of hauling down the flag.  There were squads
of other people at intervals down the street.  They too were quiet but
filled with suppressed rage, and muttered their resentment at the insult
to, what they called, "their" flag.  Before the car I was in had
started, a dapper little fellow--he would be called a dude at this day
--stepped in.  He was in a great state of excitement and used adjectives
freely to express his contempt for the Union and for those who had just
perpetrated such an outrage upon the rights of a free people.  There was
only one other passenger in the car besides myself when this young man
entered.  He evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy when he got
away from the "mud sills" engaged in compelling a "free people" to pull
down a flag they adored.  He turned to me saying:  "Things have come to
a ---- pretty pass when a free people can't choose their own flag.
Where I came from if a man dares to say a word in favor of the Union we
hang him to a limb of the first tree we come to."  I replied that "after
all we were not so intolerant in St. Louis as we might be; I had not
seen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were plenty of
them who ought to be, however."  The young man subsided.  He was so
crestfallen that I believe if I had ordered him to leave the car he
would have gone quietly out, saying to himself:  "More Yankee
oppression."

By nightfall the late defenders of Camp Jackson were all within the
walls of the St. Louis arsenal, prisoners of war.  The next day I left
St. Louis for Mattoon, Illinois, where I was to muster in the regiment
from that congressional district.  This was the 21st Illinois infantry,
the regiment of which I subsequently became colonel.  I mustered one
regiment afterwards, when my services for the State were about closed.

Brigadier-General John Pope was stationed at Springfield, as United
States mustering officer, all the time I was in the State service.  He
was a native of Illinois and well acquainted with most of the prominent
men in the State.  I was a carpet-bagger and knew but few of them.
While I was on duty at Springfield the senators, representatives in
Congress, ax-governors and the State legislators were nearly all at the
State capital.  The only acquaintance I made among them was with the
governor, whom I was serving, and, by chance, with Senator S. A.
Douglas.  The only members of Congress I knew were Washburne and Philip
Foulk.  With the former, though he represented my district and we were
citizens of the same town, I only became acquainted at the meeting when
the first company of Galena volunteers was raised.  Foulk I had known in
St. Louis when I was a citizen of that city.  I had been three years at
West Point with Pope and had served with him a short time during the
Mexican war, under General Taylor.  I saw a good deal of him during my
service with the State.  On one occasion he said to me that I ought to
go into the United States service.  I told him I intended to do so if
there was a war.  He spoke of his acquaintance with the public men of
the State, and said he could get them to recommend me for a position and
that he would do all he could for me.  I declined to receive endorsement
for permission to fight for my country.

Going home for a day or two soon after this conversation with General
Pope, I wrote from Galena the following letter to the Adjutant-General
of the Army.


GALENA, ILLINOIS, May 24, 1861.

COL. L. THOMAS Adjt.  Gen.  U. S. A., Washington, D. C.

SIR:--Having served for fifteen years in the regular army, including
four years at West Point, and feeling it the duty of every one who has
been educated at the Government expense to offer their services for the
support of that Government, I have the honor, very respectfully, to
tender my services, until the close of the war, in such capacity as may
be offered.  I would say, in view of my present age and length of
service, I feel myself competent to command a regiment, if the
President, in his judgment, should see fit to intrust one to me.

Since the first call of the President I have been serving on the staff
of the Governor of this State, rendering such aid as I could in the
organization of our State militia, and am still engaged in that
capacity.  A letter addressed to me at Springfield, Illinois, will reach
me.

I am very respectfully, Your obt. svt., U. S. GRANT.


This letter failed to elicit an answer from the Adjutant-General of the
Army.  I presume it was hardly read by him, and certainly it could not
have been submitted to higher authority. Subsequent to the war General
Badeau having heard of this letter applied to the War Department for a
copy of it.  The letter could not be found and no one recollected ever
having seen it.  I took no copy when it was written.  Long after the
application of General Badeau, General Townsend, who had become
Adjutant-General of the Army, while packing up papers preparatory to the
removal of his office, found this letter in some out-of-the-way place.
It had not been destroyed, but it had not been regularly filed away.

I felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high as the colonelcy of a
regiment, feeling somewhat doubtful whether I would be equal to the
position.  But I had seen nearly every colonel who had been mustered in
from the State of Illinois, and some from Indiana, and felt that if they
could command a regiment properly, and with credit, I could also.

Having but little to do after the muster of the last of the regiments
authorized by the State legislature, I asked and obtained of the
governor leave of absence for a week to visit my parents in Covington,
Kentucky, immediately opposite Cincinnati.  General McClellan had been
made a major-general and had his headquarters at Cincinnati.  In reality
I wanted to see him.  I had known him slightly at West Point, where we
served one year together, and in the Mexican war.  I was in hopes that
when he saw me he would offer me a position on his staff.  I called on
two successive days at his office but failed to see him on either
occasion, and returned to Springfield.



CHAPTER XVIII.

APPOINTED COLONEL OF THE 21ST ILLINOIS--PERSONNEL OF THE REGIMENT
--GENERAL LOGAN--MARCH TO MISSOURI--MOVEMENT AGAINST HARRIS AT FLORIDA,
MO.--GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND--STATIONED AT MEXICO, MO.

While I was absent from the State capital on this occasion the
President's second call for troops was issued.  This time it was for
300,000 men, for three years or the war.  This brought into the United
States service all the regiments then in the State service.  These had
elected their officers from highest to lowest and were accepted with
their organizations as they were, except in two instances.  A Chicago
regiment, the 19th infantry, had elected a very young man to the
colonelcy.  When it came to taking the field the regiment asked to have
another appointed colonel and the one they had previously chosen made
lieutenant-colonel.  The 21st regiment of infantry, mustered in by me at
Mattoon, refused to go into the service with the colonel of their
selection in any position.  While I was still absent Governor Yates
appointed me colonel of this latter regiment.  A few days after I was in
charge of it and in camp on the fair grounds near Springfield.

My regiment was composed in large part of young men of as good social
position as any in their section of the State.  It embraced the sons of
farmers, lawyers, physicians, politicians, merchants, bankers and
ministers, and some men of maturer years who had filled such positions
themselves.  There were also men in it who could be led astray; and the
colonel, elected by the votes of the regiment, had proved to be fully
capable of developing all there was in his men of recklessness.  It was
said that he even went so far at times as to take the guard from their
posts and go with them to the village near by and make a night of it.
When there came a prospect of battle the regiment wanted to have some
one else to lead them.  I found it very hard work for a few days to
bring all the men into anything like subordination; but the great
majority favored discipline, and by the application of a little regular
army punishment all were reduced to as good discipline as one could ask.

The ten regiments which had volunteered in the State service for thirty
days, it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to go into the
National service if called upon within that time. When they volunteered
the government had only called for ninety days' enlistments.  Men were
called now for three years or the war.  They felt that this change of
period released them from the obligation of re-volunteering.  When I was
appointed colonel, the 21st regiment was still in the State service.
About the time they were to be mustered into the United States service,
such of them as would go, two members of Congress from the State,
McClernand and Logan, appeared at the capital and I was introduced to
them.  I had never seen either of them before, but I had read a great
deal about them, and particularly about Logan, in the newspapers.  Both
were democratic members of Congress, and Logan had been elected from the
southern district of the State, where he had a majority of eighteen
thousand over his Republican competitor.  His district had been settled
originally by people from the Southern States, and at the breaking out
of secession they sympathized with the South.  At the first outbreak of
war some of them joined the Southern army; many others were preparing to
do so; others rode over the country at night denouncing the Union, and
made it as necessary to guard railroad bridges over which National
troops had to pass in southern Illinois, as it was in Kentucky or any of
the border slave states.  Logan's popularity in this district was
unbounded.  He knew almost enough of the people in it by their Christian
names, to form an ordinary congressional district.  As he went in
politics, so his district was sure to go.  The Republican papers had
been demanding that he should announce where he stood on the questions
which at that time engrossed the whole of public thought.  Some were
very bitter in their denunciations of his silence.  Logan was not a man
to be coerced into an utterance by threats.  He did, however, come out
in a speech before the adjournment of the special session of Congress
which was convened by the President soon after his inauguration, and
announced his undying loyalty and devotion to the Union. But I had not
happened to see that speech, so that when I first met Logan my
impressions were those formed from reading denunciations of him.
McClernand, on the other hand, had early taken strong grounds for the
maintenance of the Union and had been praised accordingly by the
Republican papers.  The gentlemen who presented these two members of
Congress asked me if I would have any objections to their addressing my
regiment.  I hesitated a little before answering.  It was but a few days
before the time set for mustering into the United States service such of
the men as were willing to volunteer for three years or the war.  I had
some doubt as to the effect a speech from Logan might have; but as he
was with McClernand, whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions of
the day were well known, I gave my consent.  McClernand spoke first; and
Logan followed in a speech which he has hardly equalled since for force
and eloquence.  It breathed a loyalty and devotion to the Union which
inspired my men to such a point that they would have volunteered to
remain in the army as long as an enemy of the country continued to bear
arms against it.  They entered the United States service almost to a
man.

General Logan went to his part of the State and gave his attention to
raising troops.  The very men who at first made it necessary to guard
the roads in southern Illinois became the defenders of the Union.  Logan
entered the service himself as colonel of a regiment and rapidly rose to
the rank of major-general.  His district, which had promised at first to
give much trouble to the government, filled every call made upon it for
troops, without resorting to the draft.  There was no call made when
there were not more volunteers than were asked for. That congressional
district stands credited at the War Department to-day with furnishing
more men for the army than it was called on to supply.

I remained in Springfield with my regiment until the 3d of July, when I
was ordered to Quincy, Illinois.  By that time the regiment was in a
good state of discipline and the officers and men were well up in the
company drill.  There was direct railroad communication between
Springfield and Quincy, but I thought it would be good preparation for
the troops to march there.  We had no transportation for our camp and
garrison equipage, so wagons were hired for the occasion and on the 3d
of July we started.  There was no hurry, but fair marches were made
every day until the Illinois River was crossed.  There I was overtaken
by a dispatch saying that the destination of the regiment had been
changed to Ironton, Missouri, and ordering me to halt where I was and
await the arrival of a steamer which had been dispatched up the Illinois
River to take the regiment to St. Louis.  The boat, when it did come,
grounded on a sand-bar a few miles below where we were in camp.  We
remained there several days waiting to have the boat get off the bar,
but before this occurred news came that an Illinois regiment was
surrounded by rebels at a point on the Hannibal and St. Joe Railroad
some miles west of Palmyra, in Missouri, and I was ordered to proceed
with all dispatch to their relief.  We took the cars and reached Quincy
in a few hours.

When I left Galena for the last time to take command of the 21st
regiment I took with me my oldest son, Frederick D. Grant, then a lad of
eleven years of age.  On receiving the order to take rail for Quincy I
wrote to Mrs. Grant, to relieve what I supposed would be her great
anxiety for one so young going into danger, that I would send Fred home
from Quincy by river.  I received a prompt letter in reply decidedly
disapproving my proposition, and urging that the lad should be allowed
to accompany me.  It came too late.  Fred was already on his way up the
Mississippi bound for Dubuque, Iowa, from which place there was a
railroad to Galena.

My sensations as we approached what I supposed might be "a field of
battle" were anything but agreeable.  I had been in all the engagements
in Mexico that it was possible for one person to be in; but not in
command.  If some one else had been colonel and I had been
lieutenant-colonel I do not think I would have felt any trepidation.
Before we were prepared to cross the Mississippi River at Quincy my
anxiety was relieved; for the men of the besieged regiment came
straggling into town.  I am inclined to think both sides got frightened
and ran away.

I took my regiment to Palmyra and remained there for a few days, until
relieved by the 19th Illinois infantry.  From Palmyra I proceeded to
Salt River, the railroad bridge over which had been destroyed by the
enemy.  Colonel John M. Palmer at that time commanded the 13th Illinois,
which was acting as a guard to workmen who were engaged in rebuilding
this bridge.  Palmer was my senior and commanded the two regiments as
long as we remained together.  The bridge was finished in about two
weeks, and I received orders to move against Colonel Thomas Harris, who
was said to be encamped at the little town of Florida, some twenty-five
miles south of where we then were.

At the time of which I now write we had no transportation and the
country about Salt River was sparsely settled, so that it took some days
to collect teams and drivers enough to move the camp and garrison
equipage of a regiment nearly a thousand strong, together with a week's
supply of provision and some ammunition.  While preparations for the
move were going on I felt quite comfortable; but when we got on the road
and found every house deserted I was anything but easy.  In the
twenty-five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or young,
male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road that crossed
ours.  As soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their horses
could carry them.  I kept my men in the ranks and forbade their entering
any of the deserted houses or taking anything from them.  We halted at
night on the road and proceeded the next morning at an early hour.
Harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near
water. The hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable
height, possibly more than a hundred feet.  As we approached the brow of
the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris' camp, and
possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting
higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat.  I
would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I had
not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept right on.
When we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view I
halted. The place where Harris had been encamped a few days before was
still there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible,
but the troops were gone.  My heart resumed its place.  It occurred to
me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of
him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but it
was one I never forgot afterwards.  From that event to the close of the
war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I
always felt more or less anxiety.  I never forgot that he had as much
reason to fear my forces as I had his.  The lesson was valuable.

Inquiries at the village of Florida divulged the fact that Colonel
Harris, learning of my intended movement, while my transportation was
being collected took time by the forelock and left Florida before I had
started from Salt River.  He had increased the distance between us by
forty miles.  The next day I started back to my old camp at Salt River
bridge.  The citizens living on the line of our march had returned to
their houses after we passed, and finding everything in good order,
nothing carried away, they were at their front doors ready to greet us
now.  They had evidently been led to believe that the National troops
carried death and devastation with them wherever they went.

In a short time after our return to Salt River bridge I was ordered with
my regiment to the town of Mexico.  General Pope was then commanding the
district embracing all of the State of Missouri between the Mississippi
and Missouri rivers, with his headquarters in the village of Mexico.  I
was assigned to the command of a sub-district embracing the troops in
the immediate neighborhood, some three regiments of infantry and a
section of artillery.  There was one regiment encamped by the side of
mine.  I assumed command of the whole and the first night sent the
commander of the other regiment the parole and countersign.  Not wishing
to be outdone in courtesy, he immediately sent me the countersign for
his regiment for the night.  When he was informed that the countersign
sent to him was for use with his regiment as well as mine, it was
difficult to make him understand that this was not an unwarranted
interference of one colonel over another.  No doubt he attributed it for
the time to the presumption of a graduate of West Point over a volunteer
pure and simple.  But the question was soon settled and we had no
further trouble.

My arrival in Mexico had been preceded by that of two or three regiments
in which proper discipline had not been maintained, and the men had been
in the habit of visiting houses without invitation and helping
themselves to food and drink, or demanding them from the occupants.
They carried their muskets while out of camp and made every man they
found take the oath of allegiance to the government.  I at once
published orders prohibiting the soldiers from going into private houses
unless invited by the inhabitants, and from appropriating private
property to their own or to government uses.  The people were no longer
molested or made afraid.  I received the most marked courtesy from the
citizens of Mexico as long as I remained there.

Up to this time my regiment had not been carried in the school of the
soldier beyond the company drill, except that it had received some
training on the march from Springfield to the Illinois River.  There was
now a good opportunity of exercising it in the battalion drill.  While I
was at West Point the tactics used in the army had been Scott's and the
musket the flint lock.  I had never looked at a copy of tactics from the
time of my graduation.  My standing in that branch of studies had been
near the foot of the class.  In the Mexican war in the summer of 1846, I
had been appointed regimental quartermaster and commissary and had not
been at a battalion drill since.  The arms had been changed since then
and Hardee's tactics had been adopted.  I got a copy of tactics and
studied one lesson, intending to confine the exercise of the first day
to the commands I had thus learned.  By pursuing this course from day to
day I thought I would soon get through the volume.

We were encamped just outside of town on the common, among scattering
suburban houses with enclosed gardens, and when I got my regiment in
line and rode to the front I soon saw that if I attempted to follow the
lesson I had studied I would have to clear away some of the houses and
garden fences to make room.  I perceived at once, however, that Hardee's
tactics--a mere translation from the French with Hardee's name attached
--was nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age applied
to Scott's system.  The commands were abbreviated and the movement
expedited.  Under the old tactics almost every change in the order of
march was preceded by a "halt," then came the change, and then the
"forward march."  With the new tactics all these changes could be made
while in motion.  I found no trouble in giving commands that would take
my regiment where I wanted it to go and carry it around all obstacles.
I do not believe that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that
I had never studied the tactics that I used.



CHAPTER XIX.

COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERAL--COMMAND AT IRONTON, MO.--JEFFERSON CITY
--CAPE GIRARDEAU--GENERAL PRENTISS--SEIZURE OF PADUCAH--HEADQUARTERS AT
CAIRO.

I had not been in Mexico many weeks when, reading a St. Louis paper,
I found the President had asked the Illinois delegation in Congress
to recommend some citizens of the State for the position of
brigadier-general, and that they had unanimously recommended me as first
on a list of seven.  I was very much surprised because, as I have said,
my acquaintance with the Congressmen was very limited and I did not know
of anything I had done to inspire such confidence.  The papers of the
next day announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to the
Senate, and a few days after our confirmation was announced.

When appointed brigadier-general I at once thought it proper that one of
my aides should come from the regiment I had been commanding, and so
selected Lieutenant C. B. Lagow.  While living in St. Louis, I had had a
desk in the law office of McClellan, Moody and Hillyer.  Difference in
views between the members of the firm on the questions of the day, and
general hard times in the border cities, had broken up this firm.
Hillyer was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very brilliant.
I asked him to accept a place on my staff.  I also wanted to take one
man from my new home, Galena.  The canvass in the Presidential campaign
the fall before had brought out a young lawyer by the name of John A.
Rawlins, who proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the State.  He
was also a candidate for elector on the Douglas ticket.  When Sumter was
fired upon and the integrity of the Union threatened, there was no man
more ready to serve his country than he.  I wrote at once asking him to
accept the position of assistant adjutant-general with the rank of
captain, on my staff.  He was about entering the service as major of a
new regiment then organizing in the north-western part of the State; but
he threw this up and accepted my offer.

Neither Hillyer nor Lagow proved to have any particular taste or special
qualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the former resigned
during the Vicksburg campaign; the latter I relieved after the battle of
Chattanooga.  Rawlins remained with me as long as he lived, and rose to
the rank of brigadier general and chief-of-staff to the General of the
Army--an office created for him--before the war closed.  He was an able
man, possessed of great firmness, and could say "no" so emphatically to
a request which he thought should not be granted that the person he was
addressing would understand at once that there was no use of pressing
the matter.  General Rawlins was a very useful officer in other ways
than this.  I became very much attached to him.

Shortly after my promotion I was ordered to Ironton, Missouri, to
command a district in that part of the State, and took the 21st
Illinois, my old regiment, with me.  Several other regiments were
ordered to the same destination about the same time.  Ironton is on the
Iron Mountain railroad, about seventy miles south of St. Louis, and
situated among hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains.  When I
reached there, about the 8th of August, Colonel B. Gratz Brown
--afterwards Governor of Missouri and in 1872 Vice-Presidential candidate
--was in command.  Some of his troops were ninety days' men and their
time had expired some time before.  The men had no clothing but what
they had volunteered in, and much of this was so worn that it would
hardly stay on.  General Hardee--the author of the tactics I did not
study--was at Greenville some twenty-five miles further south, it was
said, with five thousand Confederate troops.  Under these circumstances
Colonel Brown's command was very much demoralized.  A squadron of
cavalry could have ridden into the valley and captured the entire force.
Brown himself was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever has
been since.  I relieved him and sent all his men home within a day or
two, to be mustered out of service.

Within ten days after reading Ironton I was prepared to take the
offensive against the enemy at Greenville.  I sent a column east out of
the valley we were in, with orders to swing around to the south and west
and come into the Greenville road ten miles south of Ironton.  Another
column marched on the direct road and went into camp at the point
designated for the two columns to meet. I was to ride out the next
morning and take personal command of the movement.  My experience
against Harris, in northern Missouri, had inspired me with confidence.
But when the evening train came in, it brought General B. M. Prentiss
with orders to take command of the district.  His orders did not relieve
me, but I knew that by law I was senior, and at that time even the
President did not have the authority to assign a junior to command a
senior of the same grade.  I therefore gave General Prentiss the
situation of the troops and the general condition of affairs, and
started for St. Louis the same day.  The movement against the rebels at
Greenville went no further.

From St. Louis I was ordered to Jefferson City, the capital of the
State, to take command.  General Sterling Price, of the Confederate
army, was thought to be threatening the capital, Lexington, Chillicothe
and other comparatively large towns in the central part of Missouri.  I
found a good many troops in Jefferson City, but in the greatest
confusion, and no one person knew where they all were.  Colonel
Mulligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had not been educated as
yet to his new profession and did not know how to maintain discipline.
I found that volunteers had obtained permission from the department
commander, or claimed they had, to raise, some of them, regiments; some
battalions; some companies--the officers to be commissioned according to
the number of men they brought into the service.  There were recruiting
stations all over town, with notices, rudely lettered on boards over the
doors, announcing the arm of service and length of time for which
recruits at that station would be received.  The law required all
volunteers to serve for three years or the war.  But in Jefferson City
in August, 1861, they were recruited for different periods and on
different conditions; some were enlisted for six months, some for a
year, some without any condition as to where they were to serve, others
were not to be sent out of the State.  The recruits were principally men
from regiments stationed there and already in the service, bound for
three years if the war lasted that long.

The city was filled with Union fugitives who had been driven by guerilla
bands to take refuge with the National troops.  They were in a
deplorable condition and must have starved but for the support the
government gave them.  They had generally made their escape with a team
or two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead.  A
little bedding besides their clothing and some food had been thrown into
the wagon.  All else of their worldly goods were abandoned and
appropriated by their former neighbors; for the Union man in Missouri
who staid at home during the rebellion, if he was not immediately under
the protection of the National troops, was at perpetual war with his
neighbors.  I stopped the recruiting service, and disposed the troops
about the outskirts of the city so as to guard all approaches.  Order
was soon restored.

I had been at Jefferson City but a few days when I was directed from
department headquarters to fit out an expedition to Lexington,
Booneville and Chillicothe, in order to take from the banks in those
cities all the funds they had and send them to St. Louis.  The western
army had not yet been supplied with transportation.  It became necessary
therefore to press into the service teams belonging to sympathizers with
the rebellion or to hire those of Union men.  This afforded an
opportunity of giving employment to such of the refugees within our
lines as had teams suitable for our purposes.  They accepted the service
with alacrity.  As fast as troops could be got off they were moved west
some twenty miles or more.  In seven or eight days from my assuming
command at Jefferson City, I had all the troops, except a small
garrison, at an advanced position and expected to join them myself the
next day.

But my campaigns had not yet begun, for while seated at my office door,
with nothing further to do until it was time to start for the front, I
saw an officer of rank approaching, who proved to be Colonel Jefferson
C. Davis.  I had never met him before, but he introduced himself by
handing me an order for him to proceed to Jefferson City and relieve me
of the command.  The orders directed that I should report at department
headquarters at St. Louis without delay, to receive important special
instructions.  It was about an hour before the only regular train of the
day would start.  I therefore turned over to Colonel Davis my orders,
and hurriedly stated to him the progress that had been made to carry out
the department instructions already described.  I had at that time but
one staff officer, doing myself all the detail work usually performed by
an adjutant-general.  In an hour after being relieved from the command I
was on my way to St. Louis, leaving my single staff officer(*6) to
follow the next day with our horses and baggage.

The "important special instructions" which I received the next day,
assigned me to the command of the district of south-east Missouri,
embracing all the territory south of St. Louis, in Missouri, as well as
all southern Illinois.  At first I was to take personal command of a
combined expedition that had been ordered for the capture of Colonel
Jeff. Thompson, a sort of independent or partisan commander who was
disputing with us the possession of south-east Missouri.  Troops had
been ordered to move from Ironton to Cape Girardeau, sixty or seventy
miles to the south-east, on the Mississippi River; while the forces at
Cape Girardeau had been ordered to move to Jacksonville, ten miles out
towards Ironton; and troops at Cairo and Bird's Point, at the junction
of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, were to hold themselves in readiness
to go down the Mississippi to Belmont, eighteen miles below, to be moved
west from there when an officer should come to command them.  I was the
officer who had been selected for this purpose.  Cairo was to become my
headquarters when the expedition terminated.

In pursuance of my orders I established my temporary headquarters at
Cape Girardeau and sent instructions to the commanding officer at
Jackson, to inform me of the approach of General Prentiss from Ironton.
Hired wagons were kept moving night and day to take additional rations
to Jackson, to supply the troops when they started from there.  Neither
General Prentiss nor Colonel Marsh, who commanded at Jackson, knew their
destination.  I drew up all the instructions for the contemplated move,
and kept them in my pocket until I should hear of the junction of our
troops at Jackson.  Two or three days after my arrival at Cape
Girardeau, word came that General Prentiss was approaching that place
(Jackson).  I started at once to meet him there and to give him his
orders.  As I turned the first corner of a street after starting, I saw
a column of cavalry passing the next street in front of me.  I turned
and rode around the block the other way, so as to meet the head of the
column.  I found there General Prentiss himself, with a large escort.
He had halted his troops at Jackson for the night, and had come on
himself to Cape Girardeau, leaving orders for his command to follow him
in the morning.  I gave the General his orders--which stopped him at
Jackson--but he was very much aggrieved at being placed under another
brigadier-general, particularly as he believed himself to be the senior.
He had been a brigadier, in command at Cairo, while I was mustering
officer at Springfield without any rank.  But we were nominated at the
same time for the United States service, and both our commissions bore
date May 17th, 1861.  By virtue of my former army rank I was, by law,
the senior.  General Prentiss failed to get orders to his troops to
remain at Jackson, and the next morning early they were reported as
approaching Cape Girardeau.  I then ordered the General very
peremptorily to countermarch his command and take it back to Jackson.
He obeyed the order, but bade his command adieu when he got them to
Jackson, and went to St. Louis and reported himself.  This broke up the
expedition.  But little harm was done, as Jeff. Thompson moved light and
had no fixed place for even nominal headquarters.  He was as much at
home in Arkansas as he was in Missouri and would keep out of the way of
a superior force.  Prentiss was sent to another part of the State.

General Prentiss made a great mistake on the above occasion, one that he
would not have committed later in the war.  When I came to know him
better, I regretted it much.  In consequence of this occurrence he was
off duty in the field when the principal campaign at the West was going
on, and his juniors received promotion while he was where none could be
obtained.  He would have been next to myself in rank in the district of
south-east Missouri, by virtue of his services in the Mexican war.  He
was a brave and very earnest soldier.  No man in the service was more
sincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling; none
more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it.

On the 4th of September I removed my headquarters to Cairo and found
Colonel Richard Oglesby in command of the post.  We had never met, at
least not to my knowledge.  After my promotion I had ordered my
brigadier-general's uniform from New York, but it had not yet arrived,
so that I was in citizen's dress.  The Colonel had his office full of
people, mostly from the neighboring States of Missouri and Kentucky,
making complaints or asking favors.  He evidently did not catch my name
when I was presented, for on my taking a piece of paper from the table
where he was seated and writing the order assuming command of the
district of south-east Missouri, Colonel Richard J. Oglesby to command
the post at Bird's Point, and handing it to him, he put on an expression
of surprise that looked a little as if he would like to have some one
identify me.  But he surrendered the office without question.

The day after I assumed command at Cairo a man came to me who said he
was a scout of General Fremont.  He reported that he had just come from
Columbus, a point on the Mississippi twenty miles below on the Kentucky
side, and that troops had started from there, or were about to start, to
seize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee.  There was no time for
delay; I reported by telegraph to the department commander the
information I had received, and added that I was taking steps to get off
that night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that important
point.  There was a large number of steamers lying at Cairo and a good
many boatmen were staying in the town.  It was the work of only a few
hours to get the boats manned, with coal aboard and steam up.  Troops
were also designated to go aboard.  The distance from Cairo to Paducah
is about forty-five miles.  I did not wish to get there before daylight
of the 6th, and directed therefore that the boats should lie at anchor
out in the stream until the time to start.  Not having received an
answer to my first dispatch, I again telegraphed to department
headquarters that I should start for Paducah that night unless I
received further orders.  Hearing nothing, we started before midnight
and arrived early the following morning, anticipating the enemy by
probably not over six or eight hours.  It proved very fortunate that the
expedition against Jeff. Thompson had been broken up. Had it not been,
the enemy would have seized Paducah and fortified it, to our very great
annoyance.

When the National troops entered the town the citizens were taken by
surprise.  I never after saw such consternation depicted on the faces of
the people.  Men, women and children came out of their doors looking
pale and frightened at the presence of the invader.  They were expecting
rebel troops that day.  In fact, nearly four thousand men from Columbus
were at that time within ten or fifteen miles of Paducah on their way to
occupy the place.  I had but two regiments and one battery with me, but
the enemy did not know this and returned to Columbus.  I stationed my
troops at the best points to guard the roads leading into the city, left
gunboats to guard the river fronts and by noon was ready to start on my
return to Cairo.  Before leaving, however, I addressed a short printed
proclamation to the citizens of Paducah assuring them of our peaceful
intentions, that we had come among them to protect them against the
enemies of our country, and that all who chose could continue their
usual avocations with assurance of the protection of the government.
This was evidently a relief to them; but the majority would have much
preferred the presence of the other army.  I reinforced Paducah rapidly
from the troops at Cape Girardeau; and a day or two later General C. F.
Smith, a most accomplished soldier, reported at Cairo and was assigned
to the command of the post at the mouth of the Tennessee.  In a short
time it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupy
Smithland, at the mouth of the Cumberland.

The State government of Kentucky at that time was rebel in sentiment,
but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between the North and the
South, and the governor really seemed to think the State had a perfect
right to maintain a neutral position. The rebels already occupied two
towns in the State, Columbus and Hickman, on the Mississippi; and at the
very moment the National troops were entering Paducah from the Ohio
front, General Lloyd Tilghman--a Confederate--with his staff and a small
detachment of men, were getting out in the other direction, while, as I
have already said, nearly four thousand Confederate troops were on
Kentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town. But, in the
estimation of the governor and of those who thought with him, this did
not justify the National authorities in invading the soil of Kentucky.
I informed the legislature of the State of what I was doing, and my
action was approved by the majority of that body.  On my return to Cairo
I found authority from department headquarters for me to take Paducah
"if I felt strong enough," but very soon after I was reprimanded from
the same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and warned
against a repetition of the offence.

Soon after I took command at Cairo, General Fremont entered into
arrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at Camp Jackson
in the month of May.  I received orders to pass them through my lines to
Columbus as they presented themselves with proper credentials.  Quite a
number of these prisoners I had been personally acquainted with before
the war.  Such of them as I had so known were received at my
headquarters as old acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was not
disturbed by their presence.  On one occasion when several were present
in my office my intention to visit Cape Girardeau the next day, to
inspect the troops at that point, was mentioned.  Something transpired
which postponed my trip; but a steamer employed by the government was
passing a point some twenty or more miles above Cairo, the next day,
when a section of rebel artillery with proper escort brought her to.  A
major, one of those who had been at my headquarters the day before, came
at once aboard and after some search made a direct demand for my
delivery.  It was hard to persuade him that I was not there.  This
officer was Major Barrett, of St. Louis.  I had been acquainted with his
family before the war.



CHAPTER XX.

GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND--MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT--BATTLE OF BELMONT
--A NARROW ESCAPE--AFTER THE BATTLE.

From the occupation of Paducah up to the early part of November nothing
important occurred with the troops under my command.  I was reinforced
from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory
for the service which was sure to come.  By the 1st of November I had
not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill and ready to
meet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an
engagement.  They were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almost
in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fight
against.  I asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move against
Columbus.  It could have been taken soon after the occupation of
Paducah; but before November it was so strongly fortified that it would
have required a large force and a long siege to capture it.

In the latter part of October General Fremont took the field in person
and moved from Jefferson City against General Sterling Price, who was
then in the State of Missouri with a considerable command.  About the
first of November I was directed from department headquarters to make a
demonstration on both sides of the Mississippi River with the view of
detaining the rebels at Columbus within their lines.  Before my troops
could be got off, I was notified from the same quarter that there were
some 3,000 of the enemy on the St. Francis River about fifty miles west,
or south-west, from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force against
them.  I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops sufficient to
compete with the reported number of the enemy.  On the 5th word came
from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force
from Columbus to be moved by boats down the Mississippi and up the White
River, in Arkansas, in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed to
prevent this movement if possible.  I accordingly sent a regiment from
Bird's Point under Colonel W. H. L. Wallace to overtake and reinforce
Oglesby, with orders to march to New Madrid, a point some distance below
Columbus, on the Missouri side.  At the same time I directed General C.
F. Smith to move all the troops he could spare from Paducah directly
against Columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town to
await further orders from me.  Then I gathered up all the troops at
Cairo and Fort Holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down the
river on steamers convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself.
My force consisted of a little over 3,000 men and embraced five
regiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry.  We
dropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of Columbus,
debarked a few men on the Kentucky side and established pickets to
connect with the troops from Paducah.

I had no orders which contemplated an attack by the National troops, nor
did I intend anything of the kind when I started out from Cairo; but
after we started I saw that the officers and men were elated at the
prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had
volunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country.  I did not see
how I could maintain discipline, or retain the confidence of my command,
if we should return to Cairo without an effort to do something.
Columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison much
more numerous than the force I had with me.  It would not do, therefore,
to attack that point.  About two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, I
learned that the enemy was crossing troops from Columbus to the west
bank to be dispatched, presumably, after Oglesby.  I knew there was a
small camp of Confederates at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus,
and I speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the Missouri
side, capture Belmont, break up the camp and return.  Accordingly, the
pickets above Columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight the
boats moved out from shore.  In an hour we were debarking on the west
bank of the Mississippi, just out of range of the batteries at Columbus.

The ground on the west shore of the river, opposite Columbus, is low and
in places marshy and cut up with sloughs.  The soil is rich and the
timber large and heavy.  There were some small clearings between Belmont
and the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered with
the native forests.  We landed in front of a cornfield.  When the
debarkation commenced, I took a regiment down the river to post it as a
guard against surprise.  At that time I had no staff officer who could
be trusted with that duty.  In the woods, at a short distance below the
clearing, I found a depression, dry at the time, but which at high water
became a slough or bayou.  I placed the men in the hollow, gave them
their instructions and ordered them to remain there until they were
properly relieved.  These troops, with the gunboats, were to protect our
transports.

Up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions.
From Columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats and transports
loaded with troops.  But the force from Paducah was threatening them
from the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if Columbus
was our object we would separate our troops by a wide river.  They
doubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the east bank,
then embark ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assault
on Columbus before their divided command could be united.

About eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marching
by the flank.  After moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half,
I halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth of
timber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force as
skirmishers.  By this time the enemy discovered that we were moving upon
Belmont and sent out troops to meet us.  Soon after we had started in
line, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced.  This
continued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemy
being forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. Early in
this engagement my horse was shot under me, but I got another from one
of my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river was
reached.

The officers and men engaged at Belmont were then under fire for the
first time.  Veterans could not have behaved better than they did up to
the moment of reaching the rebel camp.  At this point they became
demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward.  The
enemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear ground
on which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty retreat over the river
bank, which protected him from our shots and from view.  This
precipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the National forces to
pick their way without hinderance through the abatis--the only
artificial defence the enemy had.  The moment the camp was reached our
men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up
trophies.  Some of the higher officers were little better than the
privates.  They galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at
every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the Union cause and the
achievements of the command.

All this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours, lay
crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrender
if summoned to do so; but finding that they were not pursued, they
worked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and our
transports.  I saw at the same time two steamers coming from the
Columbus side towards the west shore, above us, black--or gray--with
soldiers from boiler-deck to roof.  Some of my men were engaged in
firing from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out of
range, cheering at every shot.  I tried to get them to turn their guns
upon the loaded steamers above and not so far away.  My efforts were in
vain.  At last I directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps.
This drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of
Columbus.  They had abstained from firing before, probably because they
were afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, until
the camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of their
friends.  About this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were
seen in line up the river between us and our transports.  The alarm
"surrounded" was given.  The guns of the enemy and the report of being
surrounded, brought officers and men completely under control.  At first
some of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be
placed in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do but
surrender.  But when I announced that we had cut our way in and could
cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers and
soldiers.  They formed line rapidly and we started back to our boats,
with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp.
The enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble.
Again the Confederates sought shelter under the river banks.  We could
not stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seen
crossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer our
transports than we were.  It would be prudent to get them behind us; but
we were not again molested on our way to the boats.

From the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried to the
houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation.  I now set the troops
to bringing their wounded to the boats.  After this had gone on for some
little time I rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visit
the guard I had stationed over the approach to our transports.  I knew
the enemy had crossed over from Columbus in considerable numbers and
might be expected to attack us as we were embarking.  This guard would
be encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment, would
be able to hold the enemy for a considerable time.  My surprise was
great to find there was not a single man in the trench.  Riding back to
the boat I found the officer who had commanded the guard and learned
that he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back.  At first
I ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some time
to get the men together and march them back to their position, I
countermanded the order.  Then fearing that the enemy we had seen
crossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, I rode out in
the field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether the
enemy was passing.  The field was grown up with corn so tall and thick
as to cut off the view of even a person on horseback, except directly
along the rows.  Even in that direction, owing to the overhanging blades
of corn, the view was not extensive. I had not gone more than a few
hundred yards when I saw a body of troops marching past me not fifty
yards away.  I looked at them for a moment and then turned my horse
towards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when I thought
myself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could
carry me.  When at the river bank I still had to ride a few hundred
yards to the point where the nearest transport lay.

The cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge of a
dense forest.  Before I got back the enemy had entered this forest and
had opened a brisk fire upon the boats.  Our men, with the exception of
details that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now either
aboard the transports or very near them.  Those who were not aboard soon
got there, and the boats pushed off.  I was the only man of the National
army between the rebels and our transports.  The captain of a boat that
had just pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered the
engineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out for me.
My horse seemed to take in the situation.  There was no path down the
bank and every one acquainted with the Mississippi River knows that its
banks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from the
perpendicular.  My horse put his fore feet over the bank without
hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid down
the bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over
a single gang plank.  I dismounted and went at once to the upper deck.

The Mississippi River was low on the 7th of November, 1861, so that the
banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks of
the steamers.  The rebels were some distance back from the river, so
that their fire was high and did us but little harm.  Our smoke-stack
was riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on the
boats, two of whom were soldiers.  When I first went on deck I entered
the captain's room adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on a
sofa.  I did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on the
deck to observe what was going on.  I had scarcely left when a musket
ball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it
and lodged in the foot.

When the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats returned it
with vigor.  They were well out in the stream and some distance down, so
that they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clear
the banks of the river.  Their position very nearly enfiladed the line
of the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield.  The execution
was very great, as we could see at the time and as I afterwards learned
more positively.  We were very soon out of range and went peacefully on
our way to Cairo, every man feeling that Belmont was a great victory and
that he had contributed his share to it.

Our loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. About 125 of
our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy.  We returned with 175
prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces.  The loss of the
enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing.
We had engaged about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the
transports.  The enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops
brought over from Columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of
Belmont.

The two objects for which the battle of Belmont was fought were fully
accomplished.  The enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from
Columbus.  His losses were very heavy for that period of the war.
Columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin, to
take them home for medical treatment or burial.  I learned later, when I
had moved further south, that Belmont had caused more mourning than
almost any other battle up to that time.  The National troops acquired a
confidence in themselves at Belmont that did not desert them through the
war.

The day after the battle I met some officers from General Polk's
command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at Belmont and also
commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners.  When our men went
to bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they were conducted
below the point where the enemy had engaged our transports.  Some of the
officers expressed a desire to see the field; but the request was
refused with the statement that we had no dead there.

While on the truce-boat I mentioned to an officer, whom I had known both
at West Point and in the Mexican war, that I was in the cornfield near
their troops when they passed; that I had been on horseback and had worn
a soldier's overcoat at the time.  This officer was on General Polk's
staff.  He said both he and the general had seen me and that Polk had
said to his men, "There is a Yankee; you may try your marksmanship on
him if you wish," but nobody fired at me.

Belmont was severely criticised in the North as a wholly unnecessary
battle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from the
beginning.  If it had not been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probably
have been captured or destroyed with his three thousand men.  Then I
should have been culpable indeed.



CHAPTER XXI.

GENERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND--COMMANDING THE DISTRICT OF CAIRO--MOVEMENT
ON FORT HENRY--CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY.

While at Cairo I had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebel
officers of the Columbus garrison.  They seemed to be very fond of
coming up on steamers under flags of truce.  On two or three occasions I
went down in like manner.  When one of their boats was seen coming up
carrying a white flag, a gun would be fired from the lower battery at
Fort Holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to come no
farther.  I would then take a steamer and, with my staff and
occasionally a few other officers, go down to receive the party.  There
were several officers among them whom I had known before, both at West
Point and in Mexico. Seeing these officers who had been educated for the
profession of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a far
more efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the South
possessed over the North at the beginning of the rebellion.  They had
from thirty to forty per cent. of the educated soldiers of the Nation.
They had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers had
to find employment with the troops from their own States.  In this way
what there was of military education and training was distributed
throughout their whole army.  The whole loaf was leavened.

The North had a great number of educated and trained soldiers, but the
bulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally with
their old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months.  In
the Army of the Potomac there was what was known as the "regular
brigade," in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngest
second lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession.  So, too,
with many of the batteries; all the officers, generally four in number
to each, were men educated for their profession.  Some of these went
into battle at the beginning under division commanders who were entirely
without military training.  This state of affairs gave me an idea which
I expressed while at Cairo; that the government ought to disband the
regular army, with the exception of the staff corps, and notify the
disbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the war
lasted except as volunteers.  The register should be kept up, but the
names of all officers who were not in the volunteer service at the
close, should be stricken from it.

On the 9th of November, two days after the battle of Belmont,
Major-General H. W. Halleck superseded General Fremont in command of the
Department of the Missouri.  The limits of his command took in Arkansas
and west Kentucky east to the Cumberland River.  From the battle of
Belmont until early in February, 1862, the troops under my command did
little except prepare for the long struggle which proved to be before
them.

The enemy at this time occupied a line running from the Mississippi
River at Columbus to Bowling Green and Mill Springs, Kentucky.  Each of
these positions was strongly fortified, as were also points on the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers near the Tennessee state line.  The
works on the Tennessee were called Fort Heiman and Fort Henry, and that
on the Cumberland was Fort Donelson.  At these points the two rivers
approached within eleven miles of each other.  The lines of rifle pits
at each place extended back from the water at least two miles, so that
the garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart.  These positions
were of immense importance to the enemy; and of course correspondingly
important for us to possess ourselves of.  With Fort Henry in our hands
we had a navigable stream open to us up to Muscle Shoals, in Alabama.
The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee at Eastport,
Mississippi, and follows close to the banks of the river up to the
shoals.  This road, of vast importance to the enemy, would cease to be
of use to them for through traffic the moment Fort Henry became ours.
Fort Donelson was the gate to Nashville--a place of great military and
political importance--and to a rich country extending far east in
Kentucky.  These two points in our possession the enemy would
necessarily be thrown back to the Memphis and Charleston road, or to the
boundary of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road would be
lost to them for through communication.

The designation of my command had been changed after Halleck's arrival,
from the District of South-east Missouri to the District of Cairo, and
the small district commanded by General C. F. Smith, embracing the
mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, had been added to my
jurisdiction.  Early in January, 1862, I was directed by General
McClellan, through my department commander, to make a reconnoissance in
favor of Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, who commanded the
Department of the Ohio, with headquarters at Louisville, and who was
confronting General S. B. Buckner with a larger Confederate force at
Bowling Green.  It was supposed that Buell was about to make some move
against the enemy, and my demonstration was intended to prevent the
sending of troops from Columbus, Fort Henry or Donelson to Buckner.  I
at once ordered General Smith to send a force up the west bank of the
Tennessee to threaten forts Heiman and Henry; McClernand at the same
time with a force of 6,000 men was sent out into west Kentucky,
threatening Columbus with one column and the Tennessee River with
another. I went with McClernand's command.  The weather was very bad;
snow and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, were
intolerable.  We were out more than a week splashing through the mud,
snow and rain, the men suffering very much.  The object of the
expedition was accomplished.  The enemy did not send reinforcements to
Bowling Green, and General George H. Thomas fought and won the battle of
Mill Springs before we returned.

As a result of this expedition General Smith reported that he thought it
practicable to capture Fort Heiman.  This fort stood on high ground,
completely commanding Fort Henry on the opposite side of the river, and
its possession by us, with the aid of our gunboats, would insure the
capture of Fort Henry.  This report of Smith's confirmed views I had
previously held, that the true line of operations for us was up the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers.  With us there, the enemy would be
compelled to fall back on the east and west entirely out of the State of
Kentucky.  On the 6th of January, before receiving orders for this
expedition, I had asked permission of the general commanding the
department to go to see him at St. Louis.  My object was to lay this
plan of campaign before him.  Now that my views had been confirmed by so
able a general as Smith, I renewed my request to go to St. Louis on what
I deemed important military business.  The leave was granted, but not
graciously.  I had known General Halleck but very slightly in the old
army, not having met him either at West Point or during the Mexican war.
I was received with so little cordiality that I perhaps stated the
object of my visit with less clearness than I might have done, and I had
not uttered many sentences before I was cut short as if my plan was
preposterous.  I returned to Cairo very much crestfallen.

Flag-officer Foote commanded the little fleet of gunboats then in the
neighborhood of Cairo and, though in another branch of the service, was
subject to the command of General Halleck.  He and I consulted freely
upon military matters and he agreed with me perfectly as to the
feasibility of the campaign up the Tennessee.  Notwithstanding the
rebuff I had received from my immediate chief, I therefore, on the 28th
of January, renewed the suggestion by telegraph that "if permitted, I
could take and hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee."  This time I was
backed by Flag-officer Foote, who sent a similar dispatch.  On the 29th
I wrote fully in support of the proposition.  On the 1st of February I
received full instructions from department headquarters to move upon
Fort Henry.  On the 2d the expedition started.

In February, 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up at
Cairo for want of employment, the Mississippi River being closed against
navigation below that point.  There were also many men in the town whose
occupation had been following the river in various capacities, from
captain down to deck hand But there were not enough of either boats or
men to move at one time the 17,000 men I proposed to take with me up the
Tennessee.  I loaded the boats with more than half the force, however,
and sent General McClernand in command.  I followed with one of the
later boats and found McClernand had stopped, very properly, nine miles
below Fort Henry.  Seven gunboats under Flag-officer Foote had
accompanied the advance.  The transports we had with us had to return to
Paducah to bring up a division from there, with General C. F. Smith in
command.

Before sending the boats back I wanted to get the troops as near to the
enemy as I could without coming within range of their guns.  There was a
stream emptying into the Tennessee on the east side, apparently at about
long range distance below the fort.  On account of the narrow water-shed
separating the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers at that point, the stream
must be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there, in
February, it was a torrent.  It would facilitate the investment of Fort
Henry materially if the troops could be landed south of that stream.  To
test whether this could be done I boarded the gunboat Essex and
requested Captain Wm. Porter commanding it, to approach the fort to draw
its fire.  After we had gone some distance past the mouth of the stream
we drew the fire of the fort, which fell much short of us.  In
consequence I had made up my mind to return and bring the troops to the
upper side of the creek, when the enemy opened upon us with a rifled gun
that sent shot far beyond us and beyond the stream.  One shot passed
very near where Captain Porter and I were standing, struck the deck near
the stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so out into the
river.  We immediately turned back, and the troops were debarked below
the mouth of the creek.

When the landing was completed I returned with the transports to Paducah
to hasten up the balance of the troops.  I got back on the 5th with the
advance the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carry
them.  At ten o'clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was not
yet up.  Being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible before
the enemy could reinforce heavily, I issued my orders for an advance at
11 A.M. on the 6th.  I felt sure that all the troops would be up by that
time.

Fort Henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water
battery a direct fire down the stream.  The camp outside the fort was
intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to
Donelson and Dover.  The garrison of the fort and camp was about 2,800,
with strong reinforcements from Donelson halted some miles out.  There
were seventeen heavy guns in the fort.  The river was very high, the
banks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge.
A portion of the ground on which Fort Henry stood was two feet deep in
water.  Below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yards
back from the bank on the east side.  On the west bank Fort Heiman stood
on high ground, completely commanding Fort Henry.  The distance from
Fort Henry to Donelson is but eleven miles.  The two positions were so
important to the enemy, AS HE SAW HIS INTEREST, that it was natural to
suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which
they could be got.  Prompt action on our part was imperative.

The plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment.
The troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack the
fort at close quarters.  General Smith was to land a brigade of his
division on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rear
of Heiman.

At the hour designated the troops and gunboats started.  General Smith
found Fort Heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived.  The
gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, but
the troops which were to invest Fort Henry were delayed for want of
roads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what would
in dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams.  This delay made
no difference in the result.  On our first appearance Tilghman had sent
his entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left to
man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to Dover and
Donelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; and
before any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on Donelson.
He stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solely
to give his troops time to make their escape.

Tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as the
armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there.
Our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards Donelson and picked up
two guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, that
the pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers.

All the gunboats engaged were hit many times.  The damage, however,
beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money, was
slight, except to the Essex.  A shell penetrated the boiler of that
vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding forty-eight men, nineteen
of whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy.  On
several occasions during the war such details were made when the
complement of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty before
them.  After the fall of Fort Henry Captain Phelps, commanding the
iron-clad Carondelet, at my request ascended the Tennessee River and
thoroughly destroyed the bridge of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad.



CHAPTER XXII.

INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON--THE NAVAL OPERATIONS--ATTACK OF THE ENEMY
--ASSAULTING THE WORKS--SURRENDER OF THE FORT.

I informed the department commander of our success at Fort Henry and
that on the 8th I would take Fort Donelson.  But the rain continued to
fall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagon
trains.  Then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed without
the gunboats.  At least it would have been leaving behind a valuable
part of our available force.

On the 7th, the day after the fall of Fort Henry, I took my staff and
the cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to within
about a mile of the outer line of works at Donelson.  I had known
General Pillow in Mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter how
small, I could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was
given to hold.  I said this to the officers of my staff at the time.  I
knew that Floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and I judged that
he would yield to Pillow's pretensions.  I met, as I expected, no
opposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning the
topography of the country on the way and around Fort Donelson, found
that there were two roads available for marching; one leading to the
village of Dover, the other to Donelson.

Fort Donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from Dover.  The
fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land.  On
the east it fronted the Cumberland; to the north it faced Hickman's
creek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because of
the back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, or
rather a ravine, opening into the Cumberland.  This also was filled with
back-water from the river.  The fort stood on high ground, some of it as
much as a hundred feet above the Cumberland.  Strong protection to the
heavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting away
places for them in the bluff.  To the west there was a line of rifle
pits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point.  This
line ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one place
crossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and the
fort.  The ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was very
broken and generally wooded.  The trees outside of the rifle-pits had
been cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so that
their tops lay outwards from the intrenchments.  The limbs had been
trimmed and pointed, and thus formed an abatis in front of the greater
part of the line. Outside of this intrenched line, and extending about
half the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south and
opening into Hickman creek at a point north of the fort.  The entire
side of this ravine next to the works was one long abatis.

General Halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to get
reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from Cairo.
General Hunter sent men freely from Kansas, and a large division under
General Nelson, from Buell's army, was also dispatched.  Orders went out
from the War Department to consolidate fragments of companies that were
being recruited in the Western States so as to make full companies, and
to consolidate companies into regiments.  General Halleck did not
approve or disapprove of my going to Fort Donelson.  He said nothing
whatever to me on the subject.  He informed Buell on the 7th that I
would march against Fort Donelson the next day; but on the 10th he
directed me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly to the land
side, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose.  I
received this dispatch in front of Fort Donelson.

I was very impatient to get to Fort Donelson because I knew the
importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it
rapidly.  I felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would be more effective than
50,000 a month later.  I asked Flag-officer Foote, therefore, to order
his gunboats still about Cairo to proceed up the Cumberland River and
not to wait for those gone to Eastport and  Florence; but the others got
back in time and we started on the 12th.  I had moved McClernand out a
few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible.

Just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me on
transports.  It was a brigade composed of six full regiments commanded
by Colonel Thayer, of Nebraska.  As the gunboats were going around to
Donelson by the Tennessee, Ohio and Cumberland rivers, I directed Thayer
to turn about and go under their convoy.

I started from Fort Henry with 15,000 men, including eight batteries and
part of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction to
detain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon.  That
afternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make the
investment as complete as possible.  General Smith had been directed to
leave a portion of his division behind to guard forts Henry and Heiman.
He left General Lew. Wallace with 2,500 men.  With the remainder of his
division he occupied our left, extending to Hickman creek. McClernand
was on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west from
Dover.  His right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening into
the Cumberland south of the village. The troops were not intrenched, but
the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected
from the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up.  Our
line was generally along the crest of ridges.  The artillery was
protected by being sunk in the ground.  The men who were not serving the
guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back
from the crest.  The greatest suffering was from want of shelter.  It
was midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing and
freezing alternately.  It would not do to allow camp-fires except far
down the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allow
many of the troops to remain there at the same time.  In the march over
from Fort Henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and
overcoats.  There was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering.

During the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of Wallace and Thayer on
the 14th, the National forces, composed of but 15,000 men, without
intrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without conflict
further than what was brought on by ourselves.  Only one gunboat had
arrived.  There was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by the
movement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there was
no actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in front
of McClernand's command.  That general had undertaken to capture a
battery of the enemy which was annoying his men.  Without orders or
authority he sent three regiments to make the assault.  The battery was
in the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole army
present.  Of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss on
our side was great for the number of men engaged.  In this assault
Colonel William Morrison fell badly wounded.  Up to this time the
surgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses
near our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals were
overcrowded. Owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons the
suffering was not so great as it might have been.  The hospital
arrangements at Fort Donelson were as complete as it was possible to
make them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack of
tents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally of
but one or two rooms.

On the return of Captain Walke to Fort Henry on the 10th, I had
requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on his
expedition up the Tennessee, and get possession of the Cumberland as far
up towards Donelson as possible.  He started without delay, taking,
however, only his own gunboat, the Carondelet, towed by the steamer
Alps.  Captain Walke arrived a few miles below Donelson on the 12th, a
little after noon. About the time the advance of troops reached a point
within gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the water
batteries at long range.  On the 13th I informed him of my arrival the
day before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requesting
him at the same time to attack again that day so that I might take
advantage of any diversion.  The attack was made and many shots fell
within the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know.  The
investment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troops
engaged would admit of.

During the night of the 13th Flag-officer Foote arrived with the
iron-clads St. Louis, Louisville and Pittsburg and the wooden gunboats
Tyler and Conestoga, convoying Thayer's brigade.  On the morning of the
14th Thayer was landed.  Wallace, whom I had ordered over from Fort
Henry, also arrived about the same time.  Up to this time he had been
commanding a brigade belonging to the division of General C. F. Smith.
These troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, and
General Lew. Wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed
of the brigade of Colonel Thayer and other reinforcements that arrived
the same day.  This new division was assigned to the centre, giving the
two flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a stronger
line.

The plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, while
the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters and
silence his guns if possible.  Some of the gunboats were to run the
batteries, get above the fort and above the village of Dover.  I had
ordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to the
river above Dover in case they should be needed there.  That position
attained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--and
a very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled to
surrender.

By three in the afternoon of the 14th Flag-officer Foote was ready, and
advanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet.  After coming
in range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but a
constant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bear
upon the fort.  I occupied a position on shore from which I could see
the advancing navy. The leading boat got within a very short distance of
the water battery, not further off I think than two hundred yards, and I
soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visibly
disabled.  Then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed for
the day.  The gunboat which Flag-officer Foote was on, besides having
been hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through near
the waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot,
carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself.  The
tiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, dropped
helplessly back.  Two others had their pilot-houses so injured that they
scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel.

The enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but they
were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the river
entirely out of the control of the men on board.  Of course I only
witnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at the
time over the repulse. Subsequent reports, now published, show that the
enemy telegraphed a great victory to Richmond.  The sun went down on the
night of the 14th of February, 1862, leaving the army confronting Fort
Donelson anything but comforted over the prospects.  The weather had
turned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep up
fires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, many
had thrown away their overcoats and blankets.  Two of the strongest of
our gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility of
rendering any present assistance.  I retired this night not knowing but
that I would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for the
men or build huts under the cover of the hills.

On the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messenger
from Flag-officer Foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see me
on the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before so
much that he could not come himself to me.  I at once made my
preparations for starting.  I directed my adjutant-general to notify
each of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to do
nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders,
but to hold their positions.  From the heavy rains that had fallen for
days and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between
the troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads had
become cut up so as to be hardly passable.  The intense cold of the
night of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid.  This made travel on
horseback even slower than through the mud; but I went as fast as the
roads would allow.

When I reached the fleet I found the flag-ship was anchored out in the
stream.  A small boat, however, awaited my arrival and I was soon on
board with the flag-officer.  He explained to me in short the condition
in which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, and
suggested that I should intrench while he returned to Mound City with
his disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could have
the necessary repairs made and be back in ten days.  I saw the absolute
necessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but I
should be forced to the alternative of going through a siege.  But the
enemy relieved me from this necessity.

When I left the National line to visit Flag-officer Foote I had no idea
that there would be any engagement on land unless I brought it on
myself.  The conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than
they had been for the first two days of the investment.  From the 12th
to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats.  Now we
had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of
troops under General L. Wallace and 2,500 men brought over from Fort
Henry belonging to the division of C. F. Smith.  The enemy, however, had
taken the initiative.  Just as I landed I met Captain Hillyer of my
staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety
of the National troops.  He said the enemy had come out of his lines in
full force and attacked and scattered McClernand's division, which was
in full retreat.  The roads, as I have said, were unfit for making fast
time, but I got to my command as soon as possible.  The attack had been
made on the National right.  I was some four or five miles north of our
left.  The line was about three miles long.  In reaching the point where
the disaster had occurred I had to pass the divisions of Smith and
Wallace.  I saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by
Smith; Wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in
it.  He had, at an opportune time, sent Thayer's brigade to the support
of McClernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his
lines.

I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre.
When I came to the right appearances were different. The enemy had come
out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape.  McClernand's
division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force.
His men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their
cartridge-boxes gave out.  There was abundance of ammunition near by
lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not
all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had
been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly
supplied with ammunition during an engagement.  When the men found
themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who
seemed to have plenty of it.  The division broke and a portion fled, but
most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range
of the fire of the enemy. It must have been about this time that Thayer
pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that
were without ammunition.  At all events the enemy fell back within his
intrenchments and was there when I got on the field.

I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner.  No
officer seemed to be giving any directions.  The soldiers had their
muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand.
I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks,
and haversacks filled with rations.  They seemed to think this indicated
a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the
provisions held out.  I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff,
who was with me, and said:  "Some of our men are pretty badly
demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to
force his way out, but has fallen back:  the one who attacks first now
will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets
ahead of me."  I determined to make the assault at once on our left.  It
was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his
entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on
the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line,
we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis.
I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we
passed:  "Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy
is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so."  This acted
like a charm.  The men only wanted some one to give them a command.  We
rode rapidly to Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to him
and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole
division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very
thin line to contend with.  The general was off in an incredibly short
time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they
were working their way through the abatis intervening between them and
the enemy.  The outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of
the 15th General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the
lines of the enemy.  There was now no doubt but that the Confederates
must surrender or be captured the next day.

There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation,
particularly among the officers of high rank, in Dover during the night
of the 15th.  General Floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of
talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did
not possess the elements of one.  He was further unfitted for command,
for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him
afraid.  As Secretary of War he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the
Constitution of the United States and to uphold the same against all its
enemies.  He had betrayed that trust.  As Secretary of War he was
reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army
the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when
secession occurred. About a year before leaving the Cabinet he had
removed arms from northern to southern arsenals.  He continued in the
Cabinet of President Buchanan until about the 1st of January, 1861,
while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy
made out of United States territory.  Well may he have been afraid to
fall into the hands of National troops.  He would no doubt have been
tried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had he
been captured.  General Pillow, next in command, was conceited, and
prided himself much on his services in the Mexican war.  He telegraphed
to General Johnston, at Nashville, after our men were within the rebel
rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the
Southern troops had had great success all day.  Johnston forwarded the
dispatch to Richmond.  While the authorities at the capital were reading
it Floyd and Pillow were fugitives.

A council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would
be impossible to hold out longer.  General Buckner, who was third in
rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to have
regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the
department, A. S. Johnston, should get back to his headquarters at
Nashville.  Buckner's report shows, however, that he considered Donelson
lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the
sacrifice of the command.  Being assured that Johnston was already in
Nashville, Buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing.
Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, who declined it.  It then
devolved upon Buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position.
Floyd and Pillow took possession of all the river transports at Dover
and before morning both were on their way to Nashville, with the brigade
formerly commanded by Floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000.
Some marched up the east bank of the Cumberland; others went on the
steamers.  During the night Forrest also, with his cavalry and some
other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing
between our right and the river.  They had to ford or swim over the
back-water in the little creek just south of Dover.

Before daylight General Smith brought to me the following letter from
General Buckner:


HEADQUARTERS, FORT DONELSON, February 16, 1862.

SIR:--In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present
situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the Commanding
Officer of the Federal forces the appointment of Commissioners to agree
upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and
in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, Your ob't se'v't, S. B. BUCKNER, Brig.
Gen. C. S. A.

To Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, Com'ding U. S. Forces, Near Fort
Donelson.


To this I responded as follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD, Camp near Donelson, February 16, 1862.

General S. B. BUCKNER, Confederate Army.

SIR:--Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of
Commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received.  No
terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.
I propose to move immediately upon your works.

I am, sir, very respectfully, Your ob't se'v't, U. S. GRANT, Brig. Gen.


To this I received the following reply:


HEADQUARTERS, DOVER, TENNESSEE, February 16, 1862.

To Brig. Gen'l U. S. GRANT, U. S. Army.

SIR:--The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an
unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your
command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the
Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous
terms which you propose.

I am, sir, Your very ob't se'v't, S. B. BUCKNER, Brig. Gen. C. S. A.


General Buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the above
letters, sent word to his different commanders on the line of
rifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to the
surrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify National troops
in their front so that all fighting might be prevented.  White flags
were stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over the
fort.  As soon as the last letter from Buckner was received I mounted my
horse and rode to Dover.  General Wallace, I found, had preceded me an
hour or more.  I presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front,
he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted,
he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of General
Buckner.

I had been at West Point three years with Buckner and afterwards served
with him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted.  In the
course of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me that
if he had been in command I would not have got up to Donelson as easily
as I did.  I told him that if he had been in command I should not have
tried in the way I did:  I had invested their lines with a smaller force
than they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigade
full 5,000 strong, around by water; I had relied very much upon their
commander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works.
I asked General Buckner about what force he had to surrender.  He
replied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all the
sick and weak had been sent to Nashville while we were about Fort Henry;
that Floyd and Pillow had left during the night, taking many men with
them; and that Forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during the
preceding night:  the number of casualties he could not tell; but he
said I would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000.

He asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury his
dead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out.  I gave
directions that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized.  I
have no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but it
familiarized our guards so much with the sight of Confederates passing
to and fro that I have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobserved
and went on.  The most of the men who went in that way no doubt thought
they had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out of
the army.  Some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that they
were tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and I
bade them go.

The actual number of Confederates at Fort Donelson can never be given
with entire accuracy.  The largest number admitted by any writer on the
Southern side, is by Colonel Preston Johnston.  He gives the number at
17,000.  But this must be an underestimate. The commissary general of
prisoners reported having issued rations to 14,623 Fort Donelson
prisoners at Cairo, as they passed that point.  General Pillow reported
the killed and wounded at 2,000; but he had less opportunity of knowing
the actual numbers than the officers of McClernand's division, for most
of the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of that
division, and were buried or cared for by Buckner after the surrender
and when Pillow was a fugitive.  It is known that Floyd and Pillow
escaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than
3,000 men.  Forrest escaped with about 1,000 and others were leaving
singly and in squads all night.  It is probable that the Confederate
force at Donelson, on the 15th of February, 1862, was 21,000 in round
numbers.

On the day Fort Donelson fell I had 27,000 men to confront the
Confederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left,
over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. During the 16th,
after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived.

During the siege General Sherman had been sent to Smithland, at the
mouth of the Cumberland River, to forward reinforcements and supplies to
me.  At that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority of
law to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade.  But every
boat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note of
encouragement from Sherman, asking me to call upon him for any
assistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service at
the front I might send for him and he would waive rank.



CHAPTER XXIII.

PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS--UNOCCUPIED TERRITORY--ADVANCE UPON
NASHVILLE--SITUATION OF THE TROOPS--CONFEDERATE RETREAT--RELIEVED OF THE
COMMAND--RESTORED TO THE COMMAND--GENERAL SMITH.

The news of the fall of Fort Donelson caused great delight all over the
North.  At the South, particularly in Richmond, the effect was
correspondingly depressing.  I was promptly promoted to the grade of
Major-General of Volunteers, and confirmed by the Senate.  All three of
my division commanders were promoted to the same grade and the colonels
who commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals in the volunteer
service.  My chief, who was in St. Louis, telegraphed his
congratulations to General Hunter in Kansas for the services he had
rendered in securing the fall of Fort Donelson by sending reinforcements
so rapidly.  To Washington he telegraphed that the victory was due to
General C. F. Smith; "promote him," he said, "and the whole country will
applaud."  On the 19th there was published at St. Louis a formal order
thanking Flag-officer Foote and myself, and the forces under our
command, for the victories on the Tennessee and the Cumberland.  I
received no other recognition whatever from General Halleck.  But
General Cullum, his chief of staff, who was at Cairo, wrote me a warm
congratulatory letter on his own behalf.  I approved of General Smith's
promotion highly, as I did all the promotions that were made.

My opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of Fort
Donelson the way was opened to the National forces all over the
South-west without much resistance.  If one general who would have taken
the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the
Alleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis and
Vicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going on
rapidly over the North there would soon have been force enough at all
these centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that
might be found near them.  Rapid movements and the acquisition of
rebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so that
reinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could have
been obtained to carry them to their destination.  On the other hand
there were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still at
their homes in the South-western States, who had not gone into the
Confederate army in February, 1862, and who had no particular desire to
go.  If our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them
never would have gone.  Providence ruled differently.  Time was given
the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice
afterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the Ohio
River.

I promptly informed the department commander of our success at Fort
Donelson and that the way was open now to Clarksville and Nashville; and
that unless I received orders to the contrary I should take Clarksville
on the 21st and Nashville about the 1st of March.  Both these places are
on the Cumberland River above Fort Donelson.  As I heard nothing from
headquarters on the subject, General C. F. Smith was sent to Clarksville
at the time designated and found the place evacuated.  The capture of
forts Henry and Donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken from
Columbus to Bowling Green, and it was known that he was falling back
from the eastern point of this line and that Buell was following, or at
least advancing.  I should have sent troops to Nashville at the time I
sent to Clarksville, but my transportation was limited and there were
many prisoners to be forwarded north.

None of the reinforcements from Buell's army arrived until the 24th of
February.  Then General Nelson came up, with orders to report to me with
two brigades, he having sent one brigade to Cairo.  I knew General Buell
was advancing on Nashville from the north, and I was advised by scouts
that the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all the
supplies they could. Nashville was, at that time, one of the best
provisioned posts in the South.  I had no use for reinforcements now,
and thinking Buell would like to have his troops again, I ordered Nelson
to proceed to Nashville without debarking at Fort Donelson.  I sent a
gunboat also as a convoy.  The Cumberland River was very high at the
time; the railroad bridge at Nashville had been burned, and all river
craft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left.  Nashville
is on the west bank of the Cumberland, and Buell was approaching from
the east.  I thought the steamers carrying Nelson's division would be
useful in ferrying the balance of Buell's forces across.  I ordered
Nelson to put himself in communication with Buell as soon as possible,
and if he found him more than two days off from Nashville to return
below the city and await orders.  Buell, however, had already arrived in
person at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, and Mitchell's division of his
command reached there the same day. Nelson immediately took possession
of the city.

After Nelson had gone and before I had learned of Buell's arrival, I
sent word to department headquarters that I should go to Nashville
myself on the 28th if I received no orders to the contrary.  Hearing
nothing, I went as I had informed my superior officer I would do.  On
arriving at Clarksville I saw a fleet of steamers at the shore--the same
that had taken Nelson's division--and troops going aboard.  I landed and
called on the commanding officer, General C. F. Smith.  As soon as he
saw me he showed an order he had just received from Buell in these
words:


NASHVILLE, February 25, 1862.

GENERAL C. F. SMITH, Commanding U. S. Forces, Clarksville.

GENERAL:--The landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to my
intentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold this
side at every hazard.  If the enemy should assume the offensive, and I
am assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is his
intention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only
15,000 men.  I have to request you, therefore, to come forward with all
the available force under your command.  So important do I consider the
occasion that I think it necessary to give this communication all the
force of orders, and I send four boats, the Diana, Woodford, John Rain,
and Autocrat, to bring you up.  In five or six days my force will
probably be sufficient to relieve you.

Very respectfully, your ob't srv't, D. C. BUELL, Brigadier-General
Comd'g.

P. S.--The steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night.


General Smith said this order was nonsense.  But I told him it was
better to obey it.  The General replied, "of course I must obey," and
said his men were embarking as fast as they could.  I went on up to
Nashville and inspected the position taken by Nelson's troops.  I did
not see Buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that I had
been in Nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him.  On my
return to the boat we met.  His troops were still east of the river, and
the steamers that had carried Nelson's division up were mostly at
Clarksville to bring Smith's division.  I said to General Buell my
information was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible.
General Buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelve
miles away.  I said:  "Quite probably; Nashville contained valuable
stores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probably
trying to carry away all he can.  The fighting is doubtless with the
rear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting away
with."  Buell spoke very positively of the danger Nashville was in of an
attack from the enemy.  I said, in the absence of positive information,
I believed my information was correct.  He responded that he "knew."
"Well," I said, "I do not know; but as I came by Clarksville General
Smith's troops were embarking to join you."

Smith's troops were returned the same day.  The enemy were trying to get
away from Nashville and not to return to it.

At this time General Albert Sidney Johnston commanded all the
Confederate troops west of the Alleghany Mountains, with the exception
of those in the extreme south.  On the National side the forces
confronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separate
departments.  Johnston had greatly the advantage in having supreme
command over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon one
point, while the forces similarly situated on the National side, divided
into independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious action
except by orders from Washington.

At the beginning of 1862 Johnston's troops east of the Mississippi
occupied a line extending from Columbus, on his left, to Mill Springs,
on his right.  As we have seen, Columbus, both banks of the Tennessee
River, the west bank of the Cumberland and Bowling Green, all were
strongly fortified.  Mill Springs was intrenched.  The National troops
occupied no territory south of the Ohio, except three small garrisons
along its bank and a force thrown out from Louisville to confront that
at Bowling Green.  Johnston's strength was no doubt numerically inferior
to that of the National troops; but this was compensated for by the
advantage of being sole commander of all the Confederate forces at the
West, and of operating in a country where his friends would take care of
his rear without any detail of soldiers.  But when General George H.
Thomas moved upon the enemy at Mill Springs and totally routed him,
inflicting a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts Henry and
Heiman fell into the hands of the National forces, with their armaments
and about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten the
Confederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a retreat
from Bowling Green on Nashville.  He reached this latter place on the
14th of February, while Donelson was still besieged.  Buell followed
with a portion of the Army of the Ohio, but he had to march and did not
reach the east bank of the Cumberland opposite Nashville until the 24th
of the month, and then with only one division of his army.

The bridge at Nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed or
disabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place against any
National troops that could have been brought against it within ten days
after the arrival of the force from Bowling Green.  Johnston seemed to
lie quietly at Nashville to await the result at Fort Donelson, on which
he had staked the possession of most of the territory embraced in the
States of Kentucky and Tennessee.  It is true, the two generals senior
in rank at Fort Donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, even
claiming great Confederate victories up to the night of the 16th when
they must have been preparing for their individual escape. Johnston made
a fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command to Floyd, who he
must have known was no soldier even if he possessed the elements of one.
Pillow's presence as second was also a mistake.  If these officers had
been forced upon him and designated for that particular command, then he
should have left Nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer,
and with the remainder of his force gone to Donelson himself.  If he had
been captured the result could not have been worse than it was.

Johnston's heart failed him upon the first advance of National troops.
He wrote to Richmond on the 8th of February, "I think the gunboats of
the enemy will probably take Fort Donelson without the necessity of
employing their land force in cooperation."  After the fall of that
place he abandoned Nashville and Chattanooga without an effort to save
either, and fell back into northern Mississippi, where, six weeks later,
he was destined to end his career.

From the time of leaving Cairo I was singularly unfortunate in not
receiving dispatches from General Halleck.  The order of the 10th of
February directing me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly to
the land side, and saying that intrenching tools had been sent for that
purpose, reached me after Donelson was invested.  I received nothing
direct which indicated that the department commander knew we were in
possession of Donelson.  I was reporting regularly to the chief of
staff, who had been sent to Cairo, soon after the troops left there, to
receive all reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to the
St. Louis headquarters.  Cairo was at the southern end of the telegraph
wire.  Another line was started at once from Cairo to Paducah and
Smithland, at the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland respectively.
My dispatches were all sent to Cairo by boat, but many of those
addressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancing
wire and he failed to forward them.  This operator afterwards proved to
be a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went south
taking his dispatches with him.  A telegram from General McClellan to me
of February 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report in
full the situation, was not received at my headquarters until the 3d of
March.

On the 2d of March I received orders dated March 1st to move my command
back to Fort Henry, leaving only a small garrison at Donelson.  From
Fort Henry expeditions were to be sent against Eastport, Mississippi,
and Paris, Tennessee.  We started from Donelson on the 4th, and the same
day I was back on the Tennessee River.  On March 4th I also received the
following dispatch from General Halleck:


MAJ.-GEN. U. S. GRANT, Fort Henry:

You will place Maj.-Gen. C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and
remain yourself at Fort Henry.  Why do you not obey my orders to report
strength and positions of your command?

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.


I was surprised.  This was the first intimation I had received that
General Halleck had called for information as to the strength of my
command.  On the 6th he wrote to me again.  "Your going to Nashville
without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the
utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington,
so much so that I was advised to arrest you on your return."  This was
the first I knew of his objecting to my going to Nashville.  That place
was not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expressly
declared in orders, were "not defined."  Nashville is west of the
Cumberland River, and I had sent troops that had reported to me for duty
to occupy the place.  I turned over the command as directed and then
replied to General Halleck courteously, but asked to be relieved from
further duty under him.

Later I learned that General Halleck had been calling lustily for more
troops, promising that he would do something important if he could only
be sufficiently reinforced.  McClellan asked him what force he then had.
Halleck telegraphed me to supply the information so far as my command
was concerned, but I received none of his dispatches.  At last Halleck
reported to Washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give the
strength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that I had gone
to Nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without his authority,
and that my army was more demoralized by victory than the army at Bull
Run had been by defeat.  General McClellan, on this information, ordered
that I should be relieved from duty and that an investigation should be
made into any charges against me.  He even authorized my arrest.  Thus
in less than two weeks after the victory at Donelson, the two leading
generals in the army were in correspondence as to what disposition
should be made of me, and in less than three weeks I was virtually in
arrest and without a command.

On the 13th of March I was restored to command, and on the 17th Halleck
sent me a copy of an order from the War Department which stated that
accounts of my misbehavior had reached Washington and directed him to
investigate and report the facts.  He forwarded also a copy of a
detailed dispatch from himself to Washington entirely exonerating me;
but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had created
all the trouble.  On the contrary, he wrote to me, "Instead of relieving
you, I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume
immediate command, and lead it to new victories."  In consequence I felt
very grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had set
me right with the government.  I never knew the truth until General
Badeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of my
campaigns.

General Halleck unquestionably deemed General C. F. Smith a much fitter
officer for the command of all the forces in the military district than
I was, and, to render him available for such command, desired his
promotion to antedate mine and those of the other division commanders.
It is probable that the general opinion was that Smith's long services
in the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper person
for such command.  Indeed I was rather inclined to this opinion myself
at that time, and would have served as faithfully under Smith as he had
done under me.  But this did not justify the dispatches which General
Halleck sent to Washington, or his subsequent concealment of them from
me when pretending to explain the action of my superiors.

On receipt of the order restoring me to command I proceeded to Savannah
on the Tennessee, to which point my troops had advanced.  General Smith
was delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his denunciation of the
treatment I had received.  He was on a sick bed at the time, from which
he never came away alive.  His death was a severe loss to our western
army.  His personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment and
professional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the confidence
of those he commanded as well as of those over him.



CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING--INJURED BY A FALL--THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK
AT SHILOH--THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT AT SHILOH--GENERAL SHERMAN--CONDITION
OF THE ARMY--CLOSE OF THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT--THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHT
--RETREAT AND DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

When I reassumed command on the 17th of March I found the army divided,
about half being on the east bank of the Tennessee at Savannah, while
one division was at Crump's landing on the west bank about four miles
higher up, and the remainder at Pittsburg landing, five miles above
Crump's.  The enemy was in force at Corinth, the junction of the two
most important railroads in the Mississippi valley--one connecting
Memphis and the Mississippi River with the East, and the other leading
south to all the cotton states.  Still another railroad connects Corinth
with Jackson, in west Tennessee.  If we obtained possession of Corinth
the enemy would have no railroad for the transportation of armies or
supplies until that running east from Vicksburg was reached.  It was the
great strategic position at the West between the Tennessee and the
Mississippi rivers and between Nashville and Vicksburg.

I at once put all the troops at Savannah in motion for Pittsburg
landing, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at Corinth and collecting
an army there under Johnston.  It was my expectation to march against
that army as soon as Buell, who had been ordered to reinforce me with
the Army of the Ohio, should arrive; and the west bank of the river was
the place to start from.  Pittsburg is only about twenty miles from
Corinth, and Hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mile
or two nearer.  I had not been in command long before I selected Hamburg
as the place to put the Army of the Ohio when it arrived.  The roads
from Pittsburg and Hamburg to Corinth converge some eight miles out.
This disposition of the troops would have given additional roads to
march over when the advance commenced, within supporting distance of
each other.

Before I arrived at Savannah, Sherman, who had joined the Army of the
Tennessee and been placed in command of a division, had made an
expedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighborhood of
Eastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of destroying the railroad
east of Corinth.  The rains had been so heavy for some time before that
the low-lands had become impassable swamps.  Sherman debarked his troops
and started out to accomplish the object of the expedition; but the
river was rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributaries
threatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the boats, and
the expedition had to return without reaching the railroad.  The guns
had to be hauled by hand through the water to get back to the boats.

On the 17th of March the army on the Tennessee River consisted of five
divisions, commanded respectively by Generals C. F. Smith, McClernand,
L. Wallace, Hurlbut and Sherman.  General W. H. L. Wallace was
temporarily in command of Smith's division, General Smith, as I have
said, being confined to his bed. Reinforcements were arriving daily and
as they came up they were organized, first into brigades, then into a
division, and the command given to General Prentiss, who had been
ordered to report to me.  General Buell was on his way from Nashville
with 40,000 veterans.  On the 19th of March he was at Columbia,
Tennessee, eighty-five miles from Pittsburg.  When all reinforcements
should have arrived I expected to take the initiative by marching on
Corinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though this
subject was taken into consideration.  McPherson, my only military
engineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench.  He did so, but
reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment
as it then ran.  The new line, while it would be nearer the river, was
yet too far away from the Tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be
easily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would be
in the hands of the enemy.  The fact is, I regarded the campaign we were
engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would
leave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would
be attacked where he was if he remained.  This view, however, did not
prevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keep
advised of all movements of the enemy.

Johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, and
occasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts.  On the 1st
of April this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing that
an advance of some kind was contemplated.  On the 2d Johnston left
Corinth in force to attack my army.  On the 4th his cavalry dashed down
and captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed some
five miles out from Pittsburg on the Corinth road.  Colonel Buckland
sent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with an
entire regiment, and General Sherman followed Buckland taking the
remainder of a brigade.  The pursuit was kept up for some three miles
beyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and after
nightfall Sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what had
occurred.

At this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us,
along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad.  My apprehension was
much greater for the safety of Crump's landing than it was for
Pittsburg.  I had no apprehension that the enemy could really capture
either place.  But I feared it was possible that he might make a rapid
dash upon Crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of which
were kept at that point, and then retreat before Wallace could be
reinforced.  Lew. Wallace's position I regarded as so well chosen that
he was not removed.

At this time I generally spent the day at Pittsburg and returned to
Savannah in the evening.  I was intending to remove my headquarters to
Pittsburg, but Buell was expected daily and would come in at Savannah.
I remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than I otherwise
should have done, in order to meet him on his arrival.  The skirmishing
in our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of April
that I did not leave Pittsburg each night until an hour when I felt
there would be no further danger before the morning.

On Friday the 4th, the day of Buckland's advance, I was very much
injured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while I was trying to
get to the front where firing had been heard.  The night was one of
impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing was
visible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes of
lightning.  Under these circumstances I had to trust to the horse,
without guidance, to keep the road.  I had not gone far, however, when I
met General W. H. L. Wallace and Colonel (afterwards General) McPherson
coming from the direction of the front.  They said all was quiet so far
as the enemy was concerned.  On the way back to the boat my horse's feet
slipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body.  The
extreme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains of the few
preceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protracted
lameness.  As it was, my ankle was very much injured, so much so that my
boot had to be cut off.  For two or three days after I was unable to
walk except with crutches.

On the 5th General Nelson, with a division of Buell's army, arrived at
Savannah and I ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to be
in a position where he could be ferried over to Crump's landing or
Pittsburg as occasion required.  I had learned that General Buell
himself would be at Savannah the next day, and desired to meet me on his
arrival.  Affairs at Pittsburg landing had been such for several days
that I did not want to be away during the day.  I determined, therefore,
to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet Buell, and thus save
time.  He had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised me
of the fact and I was not aware of it until some time after.  While I
was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction of
Pittsburg landing, and I hastened there, sending a hurried note to Buell
informing him of the reason why I could not meet him at Savannah.  On
the way up the river I directed the dispatch-boat to run in close to
Crump's landing, so that I could communicate with General Lew. Wallace.
I found him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and I
directed him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders he
might receive.  He replied that his troops were already under arms and
prepared to move.

Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that Crump's landing
might not be the point of attack.  On reaching the front, however, about
eight A.M., I found that the attack on Pittsburg was unmistakable, and
that nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports and
stores, was needed at Crump's.  Captain Baxter, a quartermaster on my
staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order General Wallace to
march immediately to Pittsburg by the road nearest the river. Captain
Baxter made a memorandum of this order.  About one P.M., not hearing
from Wallace and being much in need of reinforcements, I sent two more
of my staff, Colonel McPherson and Captain Rowley, to bring him up with
his division.  They reported finding him marching towards Purdy, Bethel,
or some point west from the river, and farther from Pittsburg by several
miles than when he started.  The road from his first position to
Pittsburg landing was direct and near the river.  Between the two points
a bridge had been built across Snake Creek by our troops, at which
Wallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at the
two places to support each other in case of need.  Wallace did not
arrive in time to take part in the first day's fight.  General Wallace
has since claimed that the order delivered to him by Captain Baxter was
simply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which he
marched would have taken him to the road from Pittsburg to Purdy where
it crosses Owl Creek on the right of Sherman; but this is not where I
had ordered him nor where I wanted him to go.

I never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary further
than to direct him to come to Pittsburg landing, without specifying by
what route.  His was one of three veteran divisions that had been in
battle, and its absence was severely felt.  Later in the war General
Wallace would not have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th of
April, 1862.  I presume his idea was that by taking the route he did he
would be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thus
perform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of his
command, as well as to the benefit of his country.

Some two or three miles from Pittsburg landing was a log meeting-house
called Shiloh.  It stood on the ridge which divides the waters of Snake
and Lick creeks, the former emptying into the Tennessee just north of
Pittsburg landing, and the latter south.  This point was the key to our
position and was held by Sherman.  His division was at that time wholly
raw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement; but I thought this
deficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander.
McClernand was on Sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged at
forts Henry and Donelson and were therefore veterans so far as western
troops had become such at that stage of the war.  Next to McClernand
came Prentiss with a raw division, and on the extreme left, Stuart with
one brigade of Sherman's division.  Hurlbut was in rear of Prentiss,
massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset.  The division of
General C. F. Smith was on the right, also in reserve.  General Smith
was still sick in bed at Savannah, but within hearing of our guns.  His
services would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his health
permitted his presence.  The command of his division devolved upon
Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, a most estimable and able officer; a
veteran too, for he had served a year in the Mexican war and had been
with his command at Henry and Donelson.  Wallace was mortally wounded in
the first day's engagement, and with the change of commanders thus
necessarily effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of his
division was much weakened.

The position of our troops made a continuous line from Lick Creek on the
left to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the right, facing nearly
south and possibly a little west.  The water in all these streams was
very high at the time and contributed to protect our flanks.  The enemy
was compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front.  This he did with
great vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the National side, but suffering
much heavier on his own.

The Confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of losses on
their own side that our line of tents soon fell into their hands.  The
ground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timbered
with scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troops
on both sides.  There was also considerable underbrush.  A number of
attempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where Sherman
was posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy loss.  But the
front attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success of
these attempts to get on our flanks, the National troops were compelled,
several times, to take positions to the rear nearer Pittsburg landing.
When the firing ceased at night the National line was all of a mile in
rear of the position it had occupied in the morning.

In one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded by
General Prentiss did not fall back with the others.  This left his
flanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with about 2,200 of
his officers and men.  General Badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th as
about the time this capture took place. He may be right as to the time,
but my recollection is that the hour was later.  General Prentiss
himself gave the hour as half-past five.  I was with him, as I was with
each of the division commanders that day, several times, and my
recollection is that the last time I was with him was about half-past
four, when his division was standing up firmly and the General was as
cool as if expecting victory.  But no matter whether it was four or
later, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in
their camps is without any foundation whatever.  If it had been true, as
currently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people,
that Prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, there
would not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousands
killed and wounded on the Confederate side.

With the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of
Prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from
Snake Creek or its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek or the
Tennessee on the left above Pittsburg.

There was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing and
generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all
points at the same time.  It was a case of Southern dash against
Northern pluck and endurance.  Three of the five divisions engaged on
Sunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received their
arms on the way from their States to the field.  Many of them had
arrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load their
muskets according to the manual.  Their officers were equally ignorant
of their duties. Under these circumstances it is not astonishing that
many of the regiments broke at the first fire.  In two cases, as I now
remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearing
the whistle of the enemy's bullets.  In these cases the colonels were
constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so the
officers and men led out of danger by them.  Better troops never went
upon a battle-field than many of these, officers and men, afterwards
proved themselves to be, who fled panic stricken at the first whistle of
bullets and shell at Shiloh.

During the whole of Sunday I was continuously engaged in passing from
one part of the field to another, giving directions to division
commanders.  In thus moving along the line, however, I never deemed it
important to stay long with Sherman.  Although his troops were then
under fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presence
with them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled them
to render services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best of
veterans.  McClernand was next to Sherman, and the hardest fighting was
in front of these two divisions.  McClernand told me on that day, the
6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him.
A casualty to Sherman that would have taken him from the field that day
would have been a sad one for the troops engaged at Shiloh.  And how
near we came to this! On the 6th Sherman was shot twice, once in the
hand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making a
slight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat.  In addition to
this he had several horses shot during the day.

The nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used in
front; I therefore formed ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers--of
whom there were many.  When there would be enough of them to make a
show, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent
to reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regard
to their companies, regiments or brigades.

On one occasion during the day I rode back as far as the river and met
General Buell, who had just arrived; I do not remember the hour, but at
that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand
stragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most of
whom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, before
they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect
themselves.  This meeting between General Buell and myself was on the
dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and Savannah.  It was
brief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river.
As we left the boat together, Buell's attention was attracted by the men
lying under cover of the river bank.  I saw him berating them and trying
to shame them into joining their regiments.  He even threatened them
with shells from the gunboats near by.  But it was all to no effect.
Most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of those
who saved the battle from which they had deserted.  I have no doubt that
this sight impressed General Buell with the idea that a line of retreat
would be a good thing just then.  If he had come in by the front instead
of through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt
differently.  Could he have come through the Confederate rear, he would
have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own.  The distant
rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to
judge correctly what is going on in front.  Later in the war, while
occupying the country between the Tennessee and the Mississippi, I
learned that the panic in the Confederate lines had not differed much
from that within our own.  Some of the country people estimated the
stragglers from Johnston's army as high as 20,000.  Of course this was
an exaggeration.

The situation at the close of Sunday was as follows:  along the top of
the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at Pittsburg landing,
Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more pieces
of artillery facing south or up the river.  This line of artillery was
on the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the
Tennessee.  Hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of this
artillery, extending west and possibly a little north.  McClernand came
next in the general line, looking more to the west.  His division was
complete in its organization and ready for any duty.  Sherman came next,
his right extending to Snake Creek. His command, like the other two, was
complete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any service
it might be called upon to render.  All three divisions were, as a
matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from
the terrible battle of the day.  The division of W. H. L. Wallace, as
much from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade
commanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its
organization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division.
Prentiss' command was gone as a division, many of its members having
been killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant services
before its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the
defence of Shiloh.

The right of my line rested near the bank of Snake Creek, a short
distance above the bridge which had been built by the troops for the
purpose of connecting Crump's landing and Pittsburg landing.  Sherman
had posted some troops in a log-house and out-buildings which overlooked
both the bridge over which Wallace was expected and the creek above that
point.  In this last position Sherman was frequently attacked before
night, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned it to advance
in order to make room for Lew. Wallace, who came up after dark.

There was, as I have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. The
Tennessee River was very high and there was water to a considerable
depth in the ravine.  Here the enemy made a last desperate effort to
turn our flank, but was repelled.  The gunboats Tyler and Lexington,
Gwin and Shirk commanding, with the artillery under Webster, aided the
army and effectually checked their further progress.  Before any of
Buell's troops had reached the west bank of the Tennessee, firing had
almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the
enemy to advance had absolutely ceased.  There was some artillery firing
from an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but I do not
remember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard.  As
his troops arrived in the dusk General Buell marched several of his
regiments part way down the face of the hill where they fired briskly
for some minutes, but I do not think a single man engaged in this firing
received an injury.  The attack had spent its force.

General Lew. Wallace, with 5,000 effective men, arrived after firing had
ceased for the day, and was placed on the right. Thus night came,
Wallace came, and the advance of Nelson's division came; but none
--unless night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men who
saved Shiloh on that first day against large odds.  Buell's loss on the
6th of April was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36th
Indiana infantry.  The Army of the Tennessee lost on that day at least
7,000 men.  The presence of two or three regiments of Buell's army on
the west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect in
preventing the capture of Pittsburg landing.

So confident was I before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day
would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative,
that I visited each division commander in person before any
reinforcements had reached the field.  I directed them to throw out
heavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, and
push them forward until they found the enemy, following with their
entire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soon
as found.  To Sherman I told the story of the assault at Fort Donelson,
and said that the same tactics would win at Shiloh.  Victory was assured
when Wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support.  I was
glad, however, to see the reinforcements of Buell and credit them with
doing all there was for them to do.

During the night of the 6th the remainder of Nelson's division, Buell's
army crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, forming
the left wing.  Two other divisions, Crittenden's and McCook's, came up
the river from Savannah in the transports and were on the west bank
early on the 7th. Buell commanded them in person.  My command was thus
nearly doubled in numbers and efficiency.

During the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed to
the storm without shelter.  I made my headquarters under a tree a few
hundred yards back from the river bank.  My ankle was so much swollen
from the fall of my horse the Friday night preceding, and the bruise was
so painful, that I could get no rest.

The drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep without
this additional cause.  Some time after midnight, growing restive under
the storm and the continuous pain, I moved back to the log-house under
the bank.  This had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded men
were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated
as the case might require, and everything being done to save life or
alleviate suffering.  The sight was more unendurable than encountering
the enemy's fire, and I returned to my tree in the rain.

The advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps
occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back
from the most advanced position of the Confederates on the day before.
It is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of Buell's
command.  Possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents
during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped
upon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night.

The position of the Union troops on the morning of the 7th was as
follows:  General Lew. Wallace on the right; Sherman on his left; then
McClernand and then Hurlbut.  Nelson, of Buell's army, was on our
extreme left, next to the river.

Crittenden was next in line after Nelson and on his right, McCook
followed and formed the extreme right of Buell's command.  My old
command thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly under
Buell constituted the left wing of the army.  These relative positions
were retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven from
the field.

In a very short time the battle became general all along the line.  This
day everything was favorable to the Union side.  We had now become the
attacking party.  The enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the
day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat.  The last point
held by him was near the road leading from the landing to Corinth, on
the left of Sherman and right of McClernand.  About three o'clock, being
near that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere
else, I gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from
troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward,
going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing.  At
this point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable for
charging, although exposed.  I knew the enemy were ready to break and
only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join their
friends who had started earlier.  After marching to within musket-range
I stopped and let the troops pass.  The command, CHARGE, was given, and
was executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemy
broke. (*7)



CHAPTER XXV.

STRUCK BY A BULLET--PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES
--INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH--GENERAL BUELL--GENERAL JOHNSTON--REMARKS ON
SHILOH.

During this second day of the battle I had been moving from right to
left and back, to see for myself the progress made.  In the early part
of the afternoon, while riding with Colonel McPherson and Major Hawkins,
then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops.  We were
moving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the
river above the landing.  There did not appear to be an enemy to our
right, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from the
edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. The shells and
balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute.  I do not
think it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight.
In the sudden start we made, Major Hawkins lost his hat.  He did not
stop to pick it up.  When we arrived at a perfectly safe position we
halted to take an account of damages.  McPherson's horse was panting as
if ready to drop.  On examination it was found that a ball had struck
him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely
through.  In a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no
sign of injury until we came to a stop.  A ball had struck the metal
scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off;
before the battle was over it had broken off entirely.  There were
three of us:  one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one a
sword-scabbard.  All were thankful that it was no worse.

After the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for
some days previous, the roads were almost impassable.  The enemy
carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made
them still worse for troops following.  I wanted to pursue, but had not
the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days,
lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did (*8) not feel
disposed to positively order Buell, or any part of his command, to
pursue.  Although the senior in rank at the time I had been so only a
few weeks.  Buell was, and had been for some time past, a department
commander, while I commanded only a district.  I did not meet Buell in
person until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but
had I seen him at the moment of the last charge I should have at least
requested him to follow.

I rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that
the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some
ammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their
loads to enable them to get off their guns. About five miles out we
found their field hospital abandoned. An immediate pursuit must have
resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and
probably some guns.

Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West during the war, and
but few in the East equalled it for hard, determined fighting.  I saw an
open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the
Confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with
dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in
any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the
ground.  On our side National and Confederate troops were mingled
together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field
nearly all were Confederates.  On one part, which had evidently not been
ploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, bushes
had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. There was not one
of these left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller ones were all
cut down.

Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of
the army I was then commanding, we were on the defensive.  We were
without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than
half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill
as soldiers.  The officers with them, except the division commanders and
possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally
inexperienced in war.  The result was a Union victory that gave the men
who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after.

The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy
an army and capture a position.  They failed in both, with very heavy
loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and
convinced that the "Yankee" was not an enemy to be despised.

After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division commanders to
let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail
parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the
Confederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers so
buried.  The latter part of these instructions was not carried out by
all; but they were by those sent from Sherman's division, and by some of
the parties sent out by McClernand.  The heaviest loss sustained by the
enemy was in front of these two divisions.

The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should have been
intrenched at Shiloh.  Up to that time the pick and spade had been but
little resorted to at the West.  I had, however, taken this subject
under consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, as
already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably.  Besides
this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill
more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe.
Reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had
been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments of
incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other.
Under all these circumstances I concluded that drill and discipline were
worth more to our men than fortifications.

General Buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much
professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as I ever knew.  I
had been two years at West Point with him, and had served with him
afterwards, in garrison and in the Mexican war, several years more.  He
was not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimate
acquaintances.  He was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence
and respect of all who knew him.  He was a strict disciplinarian, and
perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who
"enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace.  One
system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of
social standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character.
The other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any
other occupation.  General Buell became an object of harsh criticism
later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty.  No one who knew
him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could
be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and
then betray the trust.  When I came into command of the army in 1864, I
requested the Secretary of War to restore General Buell to duty.

After the war, during the summer of 1865, I travelled considerably
through the North, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people.
Every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been
conducted:  who among the generals had failed, how, and why.
Correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every word
dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did not
confirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the war
or the individuals concerned in it.  The opportunity frequently occurred
for me to defend General Buell against what I believed to be most unjust
charges.  On one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very
charge I had so often refuted--of disloyalty.  This brought from General
Buell a very severe retort, which I saw in the New York World some time
before I received the letter itself.  I could very well understand his
grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustained
by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army.  I replied
to him, but not through the press.  I kept no copy of my letter, nor did
I ever see it in print; neither did I receive an answer.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, who commanded the Confederate forces at
the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon of
the first day.  This wound, as I understood afterwards, was not
necessarily fatal, or even dangerous.  But he was a man who would not
abandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger and
consequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by
the loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after
died.  The news was not long in reaching our side and I suppose was
quite an encouragement to the National soldiers.

I had known Johnston slightly in the Mexican war and later as an officer
in the regular army.  He was a man of high character and ability.  His
contemporaries at West Point, and officers generally who came to know
him personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to prove
the most formidable man to meet that the Confederacy would produce.

I once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to
prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his
military ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches of
Johnston I am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer's
qualifications as a soldier.  My judgment now is that he was vacillating
and undecided in his actions.

All the disasters in Kentucky and Tennessee were so discouraging to the
authorities in Richmond that Jefferson Davis wrote an unofficial letter
to Johnston expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, and
saying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship,
but that in the absence of a report he needed facts.  The letter was not
a reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as though
it had been one.  General Johnston raised another army as rapidly as he
could, and fortified or strongly intrenched at Corinth.  He knew the
National troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position.
But he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of his
operations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign which
would restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish still
more.  We have the authority of his son and biographer for saying that
his plan was to attack the forces at Shiloh and crush them; then to
cross the Tennessee and destroy the army of Buell, and push the war
across the Ohio River.  The design was a bold one; but we have the same
authority for saying that in the execution Johnston showed vacillation
and indecision.  He left Corinth on the 2d of April and was not ready to
attack until the 6th.  The distance his army had to march was less than
twenty miles.  Beauregard, his second in command, was opposed to the
attack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the National
troops would attack the Confederates in their intrenchments; second, we
were in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched.
Johnston not only listened to the objection of Beauregard to an attack,
but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th.  On
the evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of his
generals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th.
During this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached,
the battle began by the National troops opening fire on the enemy. This
seemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battle
of Shiloh.  It also seems to me to settle the question as to whether
there was a surprise.

I do not question the personal courage of General Johnston, or his
ability.  But he did not win the distinction predicted for him by many
of his friends.  He did prove that as a general he was over-estimated.

General Beauregard was next in rank to Johnston and succeeded to the
command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the
subsequent retreat on Corinth, as well as in the siege of that place.
His tactics have been severely criticised by Confederate writers, but I
do not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under the
circumstances.  Some of these critics claim that Shiloh was won when
Johnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me would
have been annihilated or captured.  IFS defeated the Confederates at
Shiloh.  There is little doubt that we would have been disgracefully
beaten IF all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlessly
over the enemy and IF all of theirs had taken effect.  Commanding
generals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that
when he was shot Johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a
charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was
neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded
confidence on theirs which has been claimed.  There was, in fact, no
hour during the day when I doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy,
although I was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did not
arrive at an earlier hour.

The description of the battle of Shiloh given by Colonel Wm. Preston
Johnston is very graphic and well told.  The reader will imagine that he
can see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of Union
soldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towards
the Tennessee River, which was a little more than two miles away at the
beginning of the onset. If the reader does not stop to inquire why, with
such Confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting,
the National troops were not all killed, captured or driven into the
river, he will regard the pen picture as perfect.  But I witnessed the
fight from the National side from eight o'clock in the morning until
night closed the contest.  I see but little in the description that I
can recognize.  The Confederate troops fought well and deserve
commendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of April,
without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more than
their just dues.

The reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of the
first day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had been
very heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on the
National side, with the difference that those of the enemy left the
field entirely and were not brought back to their respective commands
for many days.  On the Union side but few of the stragglers fell back
further than the landing on the river, and many of these were in line
for duty on the second day.  The admissions of the highest Confederate
officers engaged at Shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd.
The victory was not to either party until the battle was over.  It was
then a Union victory, in which the Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio
both participated.  But the Army of the Tennessee fought the entire
rebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and night
alone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of Nelson's
division.

The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh, but the particular skill
claimed I could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing to
criticise except the claims put forward for it since.  But the
Confederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in
generalship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the
Union troops engaged at Shiloh as are many Northern writers.  The troops
on both sides were American, and united they need not fear any foreign
foe.  It is possible that the Southern man started in with a little more
dash than his Northern brother; but he was correspondingly less
enduring.

The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men
against ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several
points at once.  This they did with daring and energy, until at night
the rebel troops were worn out.  Our effort during the same time was to
be prepared to resist assaults wherever made.  The object of the
Confederates on the second day was to get away with as much of their
army and material as possible.  Ours then was to drive them from our
front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their
men and material.  We were successful in driving them back, but not so
successful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made.  As
it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much
artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one great
capture of Prentiss, we took more prisoners on Monday than the enemy
gained from us on Sunday.  On the 6th Sherman lost seven pieces of
artillery, McClernand six, Prentiss eight, and Hurlbut two batteries.
On the 7th Sherman captured seven guns, McClernand three and the Army of
the Ohio twenty.

At Shiloh the effective strength of the Union forces on the morning of
the 6th was 33,000 men.  Lew. Wallace brought 5,000 more after
nightfall.  Beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955.
According to the custom of enumeration in the South, this number
probably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard or
nurse, and all commissioned officers--everybody who did not carry a
musket or serve a cannon. With us everybody in the field receiving pay
from the government is counted.  Excluding the troops who fled,
panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time
during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line. On the 7th
Buell brought 20,000 more.  Of his remaining two divisions, Thomas's did
not reach the field during the engagement; Wood's arrived before firing
had ceased, but not in time to be of much service.

Our loss in the two days' fight was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and
2,885 missing.  Of these, 2,103 were in the Army of the Ohio.
Beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728 were killed,
8,012 wounded and 957 missing.  This estimate must be incorrect.  We
buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the
divisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than here reported, and 4,000
was the estimate of the burial parties of the whole field.  Beauregard
reports the Confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total
loss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that
he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th.

The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh, as indeed it
always did both before and subsequently when I was in command.  The
nature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it could
do nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day.  The
country was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the
battle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger from
fire from the gunboats as the foe.  But about sundown, when the National
troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was near
the river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which was
delivered with vigor and effect.  After nightfall, when firing had
entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself,
approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea of
dropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes
during the night.  This was done with effect, as is proved by the
Confederate reports.

Up to the battle of Shiloh I, as well as thousands of other citizens,
believed that the rebellion against the Government would collapse
suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its
armies.  Donelson and Henry were such victories.  An army of more than
21,000 men was captured or destroyed.  Bowling Green, Columbus and
Hickman, Kentucky, fell in consequence, and Clarksville and Nashville,
Tennessee, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into
our hands.  The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, from their mouths to
the head of navigation, were secured.  But when Confederate armies were
collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, from
Memphis to Chattanooga, Knoxville and on to the Atlantic, but assumed
the offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been
lost, then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union except by
complete conquest.  Up to that time it had been the policy of our army,
certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of
the citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their
sentiments, whether Union or Secession.  After this, however, I regarded
it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at
their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support or
supply armies.  Protection was still continued over such supplies as
were within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold;
but such supplies within the reach of Confederate armies I regarded as
much contraband as arms or ordnance stores.  Their destruction was
accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the
destruction of armies.  I continued this policy to the close of the war.
Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished.
Instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the
direction of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners,
if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster
or commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our Northern
depots.  But much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it
could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to
the support of secession and rebellion.

This policy I believe exercised a material influence in hastening the
end.

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg landing, has been perhaps less
understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently
misunderstood, than any other engagement between National and
Confederate troops during the entire rebellion. Correct reports of the
battle have been published, notably by Sherman, Badeau and, in a speech
before a meeting of veterans, by General Prentiss; but all of these
appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after public
opinion had been most erroneously formed.

I myself made no report to General Halleck, further than was contained
in a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that an
engagement had been fought and announcing the result.  A few days
afterwards General Halleck moved his headquarters to Pittsburg landing
and assumed command of the troops in the field.  Although next to him in
rank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, I was
ignored as much as if I had been at the most distant point of territory
within my jurisdiction; and although I was in command of all the troops
engaged at Shiloh I was not permitted to see one of the reports of
General Buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were
published by the War Department long after the event.  For this reason I
never made a full official report of this engagement.



CHAPTER XXVI.

HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD--THE ADVANCE UPON CORINTH
--OCCUPATION OF CORINTH--THE ARMY SEPARATED.

General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of April and
immediately assumed command in the field.  On the 21st General Pope
arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of Island
Number Ten in the Mississippi River.  He went into camp at Hamburg
landing five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck had now three armies:  the
Army of the Ohio, Buell commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Pope
commanding; and the Army of the Tennessee.  His orders divided the
combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing.
Major-General George H. Thomas, who had been in Buell's army, was
transferred with his division to the Army of the Tennessee and given
command of the right wing, composed of all of that army except
McClernand's and Lew. Wallace's divisions. McClernand was assigned to
the command of the reserve, composed of his own and Lew. Wallace's
divisions.  Buell commanded the centre, the Army of the Ohio; and Pope
the left wing, the Army of the Mississippi.  I was named second in
command of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the
right wing and reserve.

Orders were given to all the commanders engaged at Shiloh to send in
their reports without delay to department headquarters.  Those from
officers of the Army of the Tennessee were sent through me; but from the
Army of the Ohio they were sent by General Buell without passing through
my hands.  General Halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report,
but I positively declined on the ground that he had received the reports
of a part of the army engaged at Shiloh without their coming through me.
He admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, but
explained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving the
command, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it to
Washington.

Preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander for
an advance on Corinth.  Owl Creek, on our right, was bridged, and
expeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if our
position was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towards
Corinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were also
constructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by different
routes could reinforce each other.  All commanders were cautioned
against bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that it
would be better to retreat than to fight.  By the 30th of April all
preparations were complete; the country west to the Mobile and Ohio
railroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to Corinth as far as
Monterey twelve miles from Pittsburg. Everywhere small bodies of the
enemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force to
fight battles.

Corinth, Mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from Pittsburg
landing and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, but
probably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. It is about four miles
south of the line dividing the States of Tennessee and Mississippi, and
at the junction of the Mississippi and Chattanooga railroad with the
Mobile and Ohio road which runs from Columbus to Mobile.  From Pittsburg
to Corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevation
that makes high hills to pass over.  In 1862 the greater part of the
country was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses.
Underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines,
but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passing
through with ease.  There are two small creeks running from north of the
town and connecting some four miles south, where they form Bridge Creek
which empties into the Tuscumbia River.  Corinth is on the ridge between
these streams and is a naturally strong defensive position.  The creeks
are insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widens
out in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of an
enemy.  On the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy was
strongly intrenched.

Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and
consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of.  We ought to
have seized it immediately after the fall of Donelson and Nashville,
when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it
should have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops at
Pittsburg landing after the battle of Shiloh.  In fact the arrival of
Pope should not have been awaited.  There was no time from the battle of
Shiloh up to the evacuation of Corinth when the enemy would not have
left if pushed.  The demoralization among the Confederates from their
defeats at Henry and Donelson; their long marches from Bowling Green,
Columbus, and Nashville, and their failure at Shiloh; in fact from
having been driven out of Kentucky and Tennessee, was so great that a
stand for the time would have been impossible.  Beauregard made
strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded.  He
appealed to the people of the South-west for new regiments, and received
a few.  A. S. Johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same
quarter, before the battle of Shiloh, but in a different way.  He had
negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks
and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the
ranks.  The people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were
not willing to part with their negroes.  It is only fair to state that
they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for
the families left at home.

Beauregard, however, was reinforced by Van Dorn immediately after Shiloh
with 17,000 men.  Interior points, less exposed, were also depleted to
add to the strength at Corinth.  With these reinforcements and the new
regiments, Beauregard had, during the month of May, 1862, a large force
on paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men.  We estimated
his strength at 70,000.  Our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. The
defensible nature of the ground at Corinth, and the fortifications, made
50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that number
for an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of.

On the 30th of April the grand army commenced its advance from Shiloh
upon Corinth.  The movement was a siege from the start to the close.
The National troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course
the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for
an advance.  Even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "not
to bring on an engagement." "It is better to retreat than to fight."
The enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simply
observers there were but few engagements that even threatened to become
battles.  All the engagements fought ought to have served to encourage
the enemy.  Roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; a
line was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position.
Cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troops
to concentrate in case of attack.  The National armies were thoroughly
intrenched all the way from the Tennessee River to Corinth.

For myself I was little more than an observer.  Orders were sent direct
to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from
one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me.  My position
was so embarrassing in fact that I made several applications during the
siege to be relieved.

General Halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time,
with the right wing.  Pope being on the extreme left did not see so much
of his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times.  On the 3d
of May he was at Seven Mile Creek with the main body of his command, but
threw forward a division to Farmington, within four miles of Corinth.
His troops had quite a little engagement at Farmington on that day, but
carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy.  There would then
have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to form
a new line well up to the enemy, but Pope was ordered back to conform
with the general line.  On the 8th of May he moved again, taking his
whole force to Farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the
rebel line.  Again he was ordered back.  By the 4th of May the centre
and right wing reached Monterey, twelve miles out.  Their advance was
slow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement.  The
left wing moved up again on the 25th of May and intrenched itself close
to the enemy.  The creek with the marsh before described, separated the
two lines.  Skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained either
line at this point.

Our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right of
the right wing was probably five miles from Corinth and four from the
works in their front.  The creek, which was a formidable obstacle for
either side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on our
right.  Here the enemy occupied two positions.  One of them, as much as
two miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation and
defended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports.  A heavy wood
intervened between this work and the National forces.  In rear to the
south there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of this
clearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied by
infantry.  Sherman's division carried these two positions with some loss
to himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of May,
and on that day the investment of Corinth was complete, or as complete
as it was ever made. Thomas' right now rested west of the Mobile and
Ohio railroad. Pope's left commanded the Memphis and Charleston railroad
east of Corinth.

Some days before I had suggested to the commanding general that I
thought if he would move the Army of the Mississippi at night, by the
rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, Pope would
find no natural obstacle in his front and, I believed, no serious
artificial one.  The ground, or works, occupied by our left could be
held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front.  To
the right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over.  I was
silenced so quickly that I felt that possibly I had suggested an
unmilitary movement.

Later, probably on the 28th of May, General Logan, whose command was
then on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been
evacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into Corinth
with his brigade.  Trains of cars were heard coming in and going out of
Corinth constantly.  Some of the men who had been engaged in various
capacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, by
putting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains were
moving but which trains were loaded and which were empty.  They said
loaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones coming
in.  Subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment.
Beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of Corinth on the
26th of May and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on
the 30th of May General Halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for
battle and announced in orders that there was every indication that our
left was to be attacked that morning.  Corinth had already been
evacuated and the National troops marched on and took possession without
opposition.  Everything had been destroyed or carried away.  The
Confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the
arrival of every train to create the impression among the Yankees that
reinforcements were arriving.  There was not a sick or wounded man left
by the Confederates, nor stores of any kind. Some ammunition had been
blown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few Quaker guns,
logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of
wagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us.

The possession of Corinth by the National troops was of strategic
importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular.  It
was nearly bloodless.  It is a question whether the MORALE of the
Confederate troops engaged at Corinth was not improved by the immunity
with which they were permitted to remove all public property and then
withdraw themselves.  On our side I know officers and men of the Army of
the Tennessee--and I presume the same is true of those of the other
commands--were disappointed at the result.  They could not see how the
mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective
rebel armies existed.  They believed that a well-directed attack would
at least have partially destroyed the army defending Corinth.  For
myself I am satisfied that Corinth could have been captured in a two
days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after
the battle of Shiloh.

General Halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around Corinth
on a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took the
whole National army to do it.  All commanding points two or three miles
to the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified.  It was
expected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits.
They were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men to
fully man them.  It was probably thought that a final battle of the war
would be fought at that point.  These fortifications were never used.
Immediately after the occupation of Corinth by the National troops,
General Pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and General
Buell soon followed.  Buell was the senior of the two generals and
commanded the entire column.  The pursuit was kept up for some thirty
miles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war or
prisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and were
willing captives.  On the 10th of June the pursuing column was all back
at Corinth.  The Army of the Tennessee was not engaged in any of these
movements.

The Confederates were now driven out of West Tennessee, and on the 6th
of June, after a well-contested naval battle, the National forces took
possession of Memphis and held the Mississippi river from its source to
that point.  The railroad from Columbus to Corinth was at once put in
good condition and held by us.  We had garrisons at Donelson,
Clarksville and Nashville, on the Cumberland River, and held the
Tennessee River from its mouth to Eastport.  New Orleans and Baton Rouge
had fallen into the possession of the National forces, so that now the
Confederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication with
Richmond to the single line of road running east from Vicksburg.  To
dispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the first
importance.  The possession of the Mississippi by us from Memphis to
Baton Rouge was also a most important object.  It would be equal to the
amputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy.

After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides
enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion
for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the
rebellion.  In addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell
the effective force.  But the work of depletion commenced.  Buell with
the Army of the Ohio was sent east, following the line of the Memphis
and Charleston railroad.  This he was ordered to repair as he advanced
--only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as
soon as he was out of the way.  If he had been sent directly to
Chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions
along the line of the railroad from Nashville forward, he could have
arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss
of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining Chattanooga.  Bragg
would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession
of middle and east Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone River
and Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; Burnside would
not have been besieged in Knoxville without the power of helping himself
or escaping; the battle of Chattanooga would not have been fought.
These are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable,
which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after Corinth
fell into the possession of the National forces.  The positive results
might have been:  a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or to
any other desired point south of Corinth in the interior of Mississippi.



CHAPTER XXVII.

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS--ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS--ESCAPING JACKSON
--COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS--HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF--RETURN
TO CORINTH--MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG--SURRENDER OF CLARKSVILLE--THE ADVANCE
UPON CHATTANOOGA--SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A MICHIGAN REGIMENT.

My position at Corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command,
became so unbearable that I asked permission of Halleck to remove my
headquarters to Memphis.  I had repeatedly asked, between the fall of
Donelson and the evacuation of Corinth, to be relieved from duty under
Halleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation of
the town.  I then obtained permission to leave the department, but
General Sherman happened to call on me as I was about starting and urged
me so strongly not to think of going, that I concluded to remain.  My
application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to Memphis was,
however, approved, and on the 21st of June I started for that point with
my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company.  There was
a detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles west
to be stationed as a guard to the railroad.  I went under cover of this
escort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to La
Grange with no convoy but the few cavalry men I had with me.

From La Grange to Memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. There were
no troops stationed between these two points, except a small force
guarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad.
Not knowing where this party would be found I halted at La Grange.
General Hurlbut was in command there at the time and had his
headquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious country
house.  The proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, he
invited General Hurlbut and me to dine with him.  I accepted the
invitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was a
thorough Southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession.
After dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with a
recital of the services he was rendering the cause.  He was too old to
be in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but his
means enabled him to be useful in other ways.  In ordinary times the
homestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supply
the slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of Mississippi.  Now
he raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have that
year a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men who
had gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the
"patriotism" of those better off.  The crops around me looked fine, and
I had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to be
gathered the "Yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvest
them for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of the
rebellion instead of its support.  I felt, however, the greatest respect
for the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughly
believed in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible to
conceive.

The 23d of June, 1862, on the road from La Grange to Memphis was very
warm, even for that latitude and season.  With my staff and small escort
I started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twenty
miles of Memphis.  At this point I saw a very comfortable-looking
white-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a little
distance from the road.  I let my staff and escort ride ahead while I
halted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water.  I was invited at
once to dismount and come in.  I found my host very genial and
communicative, and staid longer than I had intended, until the lady of
the house announced dinner and asked me to join them.  The host,
however, was not pressing, so that I declined the invitation and,
mounting my horse, rode on.

About a mile west from where I had been stopping a road comes up from
the southeast, joining that from La Grange to Memphis.  A mile west of
this junction I found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shade
of forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet back
from the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of the
road.  I, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of the
afternoon, and then rode into Memphis.

The gentleman with whom I had stopped twenty miles from Memphis was a
Mr. De Loche, a man loyal to the Union.  He had not pressed me to tarry
longer with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a Dr.
Smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch as
if something had hit him.  Mr. De Loche knew that the rebel General
Jackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry.  His
neighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was Mr. De Loche in
that of the Union.  The exact location of Jackson was entirely unknown
to Mr. De Loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it and
would give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasant
to him after the call of Dr. Smith.

I have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guarding
workmen who were repairing the railroad east of Memphis.  On the day I
entered Memphis, Jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which had
been sent east for the troops so engaged.  The drovers were not enlisted
men and he released them.  A day or two after one of these drovers came
to my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, said
Jackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that he
was six or seven miles south of the Memphis and Charleston railroad when
he learned that I was stopping at the house of Mr. De Loche, and had
ridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with that
from La Grange and Memphis, where he learned that I had passed
three-quarters of an hour before.  He thought it would be useless to
pursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start.
Had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me with
my party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even arms
in our hands with which to defend ourselves.

General Jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at not
capturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among the
soldiers the facts related were learned.  A day or two later Mr. De
Loche called on me in Memphis to apologize for his apparent incivility
in not insisting on my staying for dinner.  He said that his wife
accused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of his
neighbor, he had felt restless until I got away.  I never met General
Jackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at his
very comfortable summer home at Manitou Springs, Colorado.  I reminded
him of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that he
was thankful now he had not captured me.  I certainly was very thankful
too.

My occupation of Memphis as district headquarters did not last long.
The period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel to
me.  Up to that time I had not occupied any place in the South where the
citizens were at home in any great numbers.  Dover was within the
fortifications at Fort Donelson, and, as far as I remember, every
citizen was gone.  There were no people living at Pittsburg landing, and
but very few at Corinth.  Memphis, however, was a populous city, and
there were many of the citizens remaining there who were not only
thoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thought
that even the "Yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if they
could only be induced to make an honest confession.  It took hours of my
time every day to listen to complaints and requests.  The latter were
generally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaints
were not always, or even often, well founded.  Two instances will mark
the general character.  First:  the officer who commanded at Memphis
immediately after the city fell into the hands of the National troops
had ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to the
soldiers.  Army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit.  Second:
at the beginning of the war the Confederate Congress had passed a law
confiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the South, including the
debts of Southerners to Northern men.  In consequence of this law, when
Memphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all the
evidences he could obtain of such debts.

Almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages.  The
gentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own high
standing as a lawyer, a citizen and a Christian.  He was a deacon in the
church which had been defiled by the occupation of Union troops, and by
a Union chaplain filling the pulpit.  He did not use the word "defile,"
but he expressed the idea very clearly.  He asked that the church be
restored to the former congregation.  I told him that no order had been
issued prohibiting the congregation attending the church.  He said of
course the congregation could not hear a Northern clergyman who differed
so radically with them on questions of government.  I told him the
troops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and that
they would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimed
from the pulpit.  This closed the argument on the first point.

Then came the second.  The complainant said that he wanted the papers
restored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal under
protest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the
"Confederate States Government" had been the attorney for a number of
large business houses at the North; that "his government" had
confiscated all debts due "alien enemies," and appointed commissioners,
or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the
"government":  but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had been
permitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officials
knowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollar
received. He said that his "government," when it came in possession of
all its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claims
he had surrendered to the provost-marshal.  His impudence was so sublime
that I was rather amused than indignant.  I told him, however, that if
he would remain in Memphis I did not believe the Confederate government
would ever molest him.  He left, no doubt, as much amazed at my
assurance as I was at the brazenness of his request.

On the 11th of July General Halleck received telegraphic orders
appointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters in
Washington.  His instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field of
duty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety and
interests of his previous command.  I was next in rank, and he
telegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters at
Corinth.  I was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had been
ordered to a different field and did not know whether to move my
headquarters or not.  I telegraphed asking if I was to take my staff
with me, and received word in reply:  "This place will be your
headquarters.  You can judge for yourself."  I left Memphis for my new
field without delay, and reached Corinth on the 15th of the month.
General Halleck remained until the 17th of July; but he was very
uncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what I had been called
to Corinth for.

When General Halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief I
remained in command of the district of West Tennessee.  Practically I
became a department commander, because no one was assigned to that
position over me and I made my reports direct to the general-in-chief;
but I was not assigned to the position of department commander until the
25th of October.  General Halleck while commanding the Department of the
Mississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from Chattanooga
north.  My district only embraced West Tennessee and Kentucky west of
the Cumberland River.  Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, had, as
previously stated, been ordered east towards Chattanooga, with
instructions to repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad as he
advanced.  Troops had been sent north by Halleck along the line of the
Mobile and Ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as Columbus.  Other
troops were stationed on the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee, to Grand
Junction, and still others on the road west to Memphis.

The remainder of the magnificent army of 120,000 men which entered
Corinth on the 30th of May had now become so scattered that I was put
entirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile to
the Union.  One of the first things I had to do was to construct
fortifications at Corinth better suited to the garrison that could be
spared to man them.  The structures that had been built during the
months of May and June were left as monuments to the skill of the
engineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in design
but suited to the command available to defend them.

I disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with the
situation as rapidly as possible.  The forces at Donelson, Clarksville
and Nashville, with those at Corinth and along the railroad eastward, I
regarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west.
The Mobile and Ohio railroad was guarded from Rienzi, south of Corinth,
to Columbus; and the Mississippi Central railroad from Jackson,
Tennessee, to Bolivar.  Grand Junction and La Grange on the Memphis
railroad were abandoned.

South of the Army of the Tennessee, and confronting it, was Van Dorn,
with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five to
forty thousand men, after being reinforced by Price from Missouri.  This
movable force could be thrown against either Corinth, Bolivar or
Memphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be to
weaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was.
Nothing could be gained on the National side by attacking elsewhere,
because the territory already occupied was as much as the force present
could guard.  The most anxious period of the war, to me, was during the
time the Army of the Tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by
the fall of Corinth and Memphis and before I was sufficiently reinforced
to take the offensive.  The enemy also had cavalry operating in our
rear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back to
Columbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all our
supplies. Headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points of
the command except Memphis and the Mississippi below Columbus.  With
these points communication was had by the railroad to Columbus, then
down the river by boat.  To reinforce Memphis would take three or four
days, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would have
taken at least two days.  Memphis therefore was practically isolated
from the balance of the command.  But it was in Sherman's hands.  Then
too the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuable
auxiliary.

During the two months after the departure of General Halleck there was
much fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but these
encounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to be
now almost forgotten except by those engaged in them.  Some of them,
however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded,
were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the Mexican war
which attracted so much of the attention of the public when they
occurred.  About the 23d of July Colonel Ross, commanding at Bolivar,
was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to be
reinforced from Jackson and Corinth.  On the 27th there was skirmishing
on the Hatchie River, eight miles from Bolivar. On the 30th I learned
from Colonel P. H. Sheridan, who had been far to the south, that Bragg
in person was at Rome, Georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by way
of Mobile) to Chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to join
him at Rome.  Price was at this time at Holly Springs, Mississippi, with
a large force, and occupied Grand Junction as an outpost.  I proposed to
the general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informed
that, while I had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troops
WAS NOT TO SCATTER THEM, but hold them ready to reinforce Buell.

The movement of Bragg himself with his wagon trains to Chattanooga
across country, while his troops were transported over a long
round-about road to the same destination, without need of guards except
when in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troops
enjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly.  Buell
was marching through a hostile region and had to have his communications
thoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies.  More men were required
the farther the National troops penetrated into the enemy's country.  I,
with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed Bragg, was purely
on the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force far
inferior to my own.

On the 2d of August I was ordered from Washington to live upon the
country, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so far
as practicable.  I was also directed to "handle rebels within our lines
without gloves," to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes and
from our lines.  I do not recollect having arrested and confined a
citizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion.  I am aware that a
great many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to Joliet,
Illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was my
order.  I had all such released the moment I learned of their arrest;
and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who was
said to be confined by my order.  There were many citizens at home who
deserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity was
afforded to inflict an injury to the National cause.  This class was not
of the kind that were apt to get arrested, and I deemed it better that a
few guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones should
suffer.

On the 14th of August I was ordered to send two more divisions to Buell.
They were sent the same day by way of Decatur.  On the 22d Colonel
Rodney Mason surrendered Clarksville with six companies of his regiment.

Colonel Mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments off
the field at almost the first fire of the rebels at Shiloh.  He was by
nature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at his
action when the battle was over.  He came to me with tears in his eyes
and begged to be allowed to have another trial.  I felt great sympathy
for him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison Clarksville and
Donelson.  He selected Clarksville for his headquarters, no doubt
because he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy.
But when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, his
constitutional weakness overcame him.  He inquired the number of men the
enemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than his
own he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender.
Arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and having
satisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrendered
and informed his subordinate at Donelson of the fact, advising him to do
the same.  The guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved upon
Donelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meet
them and drove them away.

Among other embarrassments, at the time of which I now write, was the
fact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible from
the South and directed me to give every facility toward that end.  Pay
in gold was authorized, and stations on the Mississippi River and on the
railroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would be
received.  This opened to the enemy not only the means of converting
cotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which they
so much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate and
intelligent information in regard to our position and strength.  It was
also demoralizing to the troops.  Citizens obtaining permits from the
treasury department had to be protected within our lines and given
facilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits.
Men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not like
to be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of an
enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who shared
none of their dangers.

On the 30th of August Colonel M. D. Leggett, near Bolivar, with the 20th
and 29th Ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to be
about 4,000 strong.  The enemy was driven away with a loss of more than
one hundred men.  On the 1st of September the bridge guard at Medon was
attacked by guerillas. The guard held the position until reinforced,
when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on the
field dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen
wounded.  On the same day Colonel Dennis, with a force of less than 500
infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy in
strong force, a few miles west of Medon, and drove them away with great
loss.  Our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field.
Afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of the
battlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded.  Our loss, as
reported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded.  On the 2d of
September I was ordered to send more reinforcements to Buell.  Jackson
and Bolivar were yet threatened, but I sent the reinforcements.  On the
4th I received direct orders to send Granger's division also to
Louisville, Kentucky.

General Buell had left Corinth about the 10th of June to march upon
Chattanooga; Bragg, who had superseded Beauregard in command, sent one
division from Tupelo on the 27th of June for the same place.  This gave
Buell about seventeen days' start. If he had not been required to repair
the railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteen
days at the outside, and Chattanooga must have been reached by the
National forces before the rebels could have possibly got there.  The
road between Nashville and Chattanooga could easily have been put in
repair by other troops, so that communication with the North would have
been opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by the
National troops.  If Buell had been permitted to move in the first
instance, with the whole of the Army of the Ohio and that portion of the
Army of the Mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrown
four divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair and
guard it.

Granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of September.  I was at
the station at Corinth when the troops reached that point, and found
General P. H. Sheridan with them.  I expressed surprise at seeing him
and said that I had not expected him to go.  He showed decided
disappointment at the prospect of being detained.  I felt a little
nettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him.

Sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which I had served
eleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the Pacific coast when
the war broke out.  He was promoted to a captaincy in May, 1861, and
before the close of the year managed in some way, I do not know how, to
get East.  He went to Missouri.  Halleck had known him as a very
successful young officer in managing campaigns against the Indians on
the Pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-west
Missouri.  There was no difficulty in getting supplies forward while
Sheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with his
immediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing the
use of public transportation for private purposes.  He asked to be
relieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged and
his request was granted. When General Halleck took the field in April,
1862, Sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff.  During the advance on
Corinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d Michigan cavalry.
Governor Blair, of Michigan, telegraphed General Halleck asking him to
suggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying he
would appoint a good man without reference to his State.  Sheridan was
named; and was so conspicuously efficient that when Corinth was reached
he was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the Army of the
Mississippi.  He was in command at Booneville on the 1st of July with
two small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three times
as numerous as his own.  By very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of
attack he completely routed the enemy.  For this he was made a
brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army about
Corinth.  On this account I was sorry to see him leaving me.  His
departure was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished services
in his new field.

Granger and Sheridan reached Louisville before Buell got there, and on
the night of their arrival Sheridan with his command threw up works
around the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came from
the front.



CHAPTER XXVIII.

ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLE OF IUKA.

At this time, September 4th, I had two divisions of the Army of the
Mississippi stationed at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto and Danville.  There
were at Corinth also Davies' division and two brigades of McArthur's,
besides cavalry and artillery.  This force constituted my left wing, of
which Rosecrans was in command.  General Ord commanded the centre, from
Bethel to Humboldt on the Mobile and Ohio railroad and from Jackson to
Bolivar where the Mississippi Central is crossed by the Hatchie River.
General Sherman commanded on the right at Memphis with two of his
brigades back at Brownsville, at the crossing of the Hatchie River by
the Memphis and Ohio railroad.  This made the most convenient
arrangement I could devise for concentrating all my spare forces upon
any threatened point.  All the troops of the command were within
telegraphic communication of each other, except those under Sherman.  By
bringing a portion of his command to Brownsville, from which point there
was a railroad and telegraph back to Memphis, communication could be had
with that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers.
In case it became necessary to reinforce Corinth, by this arrangement
all the troops at Bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by rail
by the way of Jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troops
from Brownsville could march up to Bolivar to take their place.

On the 7th of September I learned of the advance of Van Dorn and Price,
apparently upon Corinth.  One division was brought from Memphis to
Bolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of the
enemy.  I was much concerned because my first duty, after holding the
territory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcing
of Bragg in Middle Tennessee.  Already the Army of Northern Virginia had
defeated the army under General Pope and was invading Maryland.  In the
Centre General Buell was on his way to Louisville and Bragg marching
parallel to him with a large Confederate force for the Ohio River.

I had been constantly called upon to reinforce Buell until at this time
my entire force numbered less than 50,000 men, of all arms.  This
included everything from Cairo south within my jurisdiction.  If I too
should be driven back, the Ohio River would become the line dividing the
belligerents west of the Alleghanies, while at the East the line was
already farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of
the war.  It is true Nashville was never given up after its first
capture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there would
have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in West
Tennessee had been compelled to fall back.  To say at the end of the
second year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the East was
pushed north of Maryland, a State that had not seceded, and at the West
beyond Kentucky, another State which had been always loyal, would have
been discouraging indeed.  As it was, many loyal people despaired in the
fall of 1862 of ever saving the Union.  The administration at Washington
was much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. But I
believe there was never a day when the President did not think that, in
some way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant.

Up to the 11th of September Rosecrans still had troops on the railroad
east of Corinth, but they had all been ordered in.  By the 12th all were
in except a small force under Colonel Murphy of the 8th Wisconsin.  He
had been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yet
been brought in to Corinth.

On the 13th of September General Sterling Price entered Iuka, a town
about twenty miles east of Corinth on the Memphis and Charleston
railroad.  Colonel Murphy with a few men was guarding the place.  He
made no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy.
I was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troops
into Tennessee to reinforce Bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained to
be.  The authorities at Washington, including the general-in-chief of
the army, were very anxious, as I have said, about affairs both in East
and Middle Tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account
as for any danger threatening my command.  I had not force enough at
Corinth to attack Price even by stripping everything; and there was
danger that before troops could be got from other points he might be far
on his way across the Tennessee.  To prevent this all spare forces at
Bolivar and Jackson were ordered to Corinth, and cars were concentrated
at Jackson for their transportation.  Within twenty-four hours from the
transmission of the order the troops were at their destination, although
there had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward train
getting off the track and stopping all the others.  This gave a
reinforcement of near 8,000 men, General Ord in command.  General
Rosecrans commanded the district of Corinth with a movable force of
about 9,000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be left
behind.  It was known that General Van Dorn was about a four days' march
south of us, with a large force.  It might have been part of his plan to
attack at Corinth, Price coming from the east while he came up from the
south.  My desire was to attack Price before Van Dorn could reach
Corinth or go to his relief.

General Rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at Iuka, where his
command was spread out along the Memphis and Charleston railroad
eastward.  While there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all
the roads and streams in the surrounding country.  He was also
personally familiar with the ground, so that I deferred very much to him
in my plans for the approach.  We had cars enough to transport all of
General Ord's command, which was to go by rail to Burnsville, a point on
the road about seven miles west of Iuka.  From there his troops were to
march by the north side of the railroad and attack Price from the
north-west, while Rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south
of Corinth by way of the Jacinto road.  A small force was to hold the
Jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force
moved on the Fulton road which comes into Iuka further east.  This plan
was suggested by Rosecrans.

Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a formidable
obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of
which, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity.  The
Tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable
obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force.  Ord was on the
north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that
direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have
carried Price's army to the rear of the National forces and isolated it
from all support.  It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iuka
until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable.

On the morning of the 18th of September General Ord moved by rail to
Burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of
the programme.  He was to get as near the enemy as possible during the
day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next
morning.  Rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two
roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters
simultaneously.  Troops enough were left at Jacinto and Rienzi to detain
any cavalry that Van Dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into
Corinth until I could be notified.  There was a telegraph wire along the
railroad, so there would be no delay in communication.  I detained cars
and locomotives enough at Burnsville to transport the whole of Ord's
command at once, and if Van Dorn had moved against Corinth instead of
Iuka I could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or
8,000 before he could have arrived.  I remained at Burnsville with a
detachment of about 900 men from Ord's command and communicated with my
two wings by courier.  Ord met the advance of the enemy soon after
leaving Burnsville.  Quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the
rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer
killed.  He maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight
the next morning.  I was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch
from Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto, twenty-two miles from Iuka,
saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of
his column was not yet up as far as Jacinto.  He said, however, that he
would still be at Iuka by two o'clock the next day.  I did not believe
this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads,
which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are
not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through.  It
might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make
an assault.  I immediately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans' dispatch and
ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound
of guns to the south or south-east.  He was instructed to notify his
officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. During the
19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either
towards the point where Ord was, or to Burnsville where I had remained.

A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rosecrans arrived with the
head of his column at garnets, the point where the Jacinto road to Iuka
leaves the road going east.  He here turned north without sending any
troops to the Fulton road.  While still moving in column up the Jacinto
road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and
driven back upon the main road.  In this short engagement his loss was
considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him.
The wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit
sounds towards either Ord or me.  Neither he nor I nor any one in either
command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field.  After the
engagement Rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result.  This was
brought by a courier.  There was no road between Burnsville and the
position then occupied by Rosecrans and the country was impassable for a
man on horseback.  The courier bearing the message was compelled to move
west nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to Burnsville.
This made it a late hour of the night before I learned of the battle
that had taken place during the afternoon.  I at once notified Ord of
the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning.  The next
morning Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with but
little resistance.  Ord also went in according to orders, without
hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming
from the south-west must be up by that time.  Rosecrans, however, had
put no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of
this neglect and retreated by that road during the night.  Word was soon
brought to me that our troops were in Iuka.  I immediately rode into
town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry.
I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans' command and went on with
him a few miles in person.  He followed only a few miles after I left
him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further.
I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka--but I had so
high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time.



CHAPTER XXIX.

VAN DORN'S MOVEMENTS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE TENNESSEE.

On the 19th of September General Geo. H. Thomas was ordered east to
reinforce Buell.  This threw the army at my command still more on the
defensive.  The Memphis and Charleston railroad was abandoned, except at
Corinth, and small forces were left at Chewalla and Grand Junction.
Soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and Bolivar
became our most advanced position on the Mississippi Central railroad.
Our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were
sent out to watch the movements of the enemy.  We were in a country
where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us and
friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress.  It was easy,
therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move.
We, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then
often returned without it.

On the 22d Bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of Grand
Junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and
artillery.  I reinforced Bolivar, and went to Jackson in person to
superintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might be
made upon.  The troops from Corinth were brought up in time to repel the
threatened movement without a battle.  Our cavalry followed the enemy
south of Davis' mills in Mississippi.

On the 30th I found that Van Dorn was apparently endeavoring to strike
the Mississippi River above Memphis.  At the same time other points
within my command were so threatened that it was impossible to
concentrate a force to drive him away.  There was at this juncture a
large Union force at Helena, Arkansas, which, had it been within my
command, I could have ordered across the river to attack and break up
the Mississippi Central railroad far to the south.  This would not only
have called Van Dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of a
large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids
on the enemy's line of supplies.  Geographical lines between the
commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were
too rigidly adhered to.

Van Dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above Memphis, as had
apparently been his intention.  He was simply covering a deeper design;
one much more important to his cause.  By the 1st of October it was
fully apparent that Corinth was to be attacked with great force and
determination, and that Van Dorn, Lovell, Price, Villepigue and Rust had
joined their strength for this purpose.  There was some skirmishing
outside of Corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d.  The rebels
massed in the north-west angle of the Memphis and Charleston and the
Mobile and Ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at Corinth
and all possible reinforcements.  Any fresh troops for us must come by a
circuitous route.

On the night of the 3d, accordingly, I ordered General McPherson, who
was at Jackson, to join Rosecrans at Corinth with reinforcements picked
up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade.  Hurlbut had been
ordered from Bolivar to march for the same destination; and as Van Dorn
was coming upon Corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in with
the advance of Hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of
the 3d.  On the 4th Van Dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to
capture Rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up.  In that case
the enemy himself could have occupied the defences of Corinth and held
at bay all the Union troops that arrived.  In fact he could have taken
the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their
number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about Corinth
to hold them.  He came near success, some of his troops penetrating the
National lines at least once, but the works that were built after
Halleck's departure enabled Rosecrans to hold his position until the
troops of both McPherson and Hurlbut approached towards the rebel front
and rear.  The enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter:  all
their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed.  The loss on
our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with Van Dorn's.  McPherson
came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy
as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of
Rosecrans just after the repulse.  His approach, as well as that of
Hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. General
Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I had
given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the
moment the enemy was repelled.  He did not do so, and I repeated the
order after the battle.  In the first order he was notified that the
force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great
peril if the enemy was not pursued.

General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took command
of his troops.  This force encountered the head of Van Dorn's retreating
column just as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge some ten miles
out from Corinth.  The bottom land here was swampy and bad for the
operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into.  Ord
attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a
panic.  Many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off
the bridge in their hurried retreat.  Ord followed and met the main
force.  He was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge
and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher
up the stream.  Ord was wounded in this engagement and the command
devolved on Hurlbut.

Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then
took the wrong road.  Moving in the enemy's country he travelled with a
wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war.  His march was
therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his
supplies.  Two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without
anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been
worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly
been.  Even when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the route taken
by the enemy, he would have come upon Van Dorn in a swamp with a stream
in front and Ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading
north and towards Chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as
far as the enemy had moved to get to the Hatchie, he was as far from
battle as when he started.  Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such
force as Van Dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he
might have been in great peril.

I now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and,
after Rosecrans reached Jonesboro, I ordered him to return.  He kept on
to Ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther.  I
thereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to the
general-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter,
but inquired "why not pursue?"  Upon this I ordered Rosecrans back.  Had
he gone much farther he would have met a greater force than Van Dorn had
at Corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the
probabilities are he would have lost his army.

The battle of Corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1,812
wounded and 232 missing.  The enemy lost many more. Rosecrans reported
1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners.  We fought behind breastworks, which
accounts in some degree for the disparity.  Among the killed on our side
was General Hackelman.  General Oglesby was badly, it was for some time
supposed mortally, wounded.  I received a congratulatory letter from the
President, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses.

This battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not
so complete as I had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as I now think
was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at Corinth.  Since
the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to
the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the
North.  The battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety
of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving
reinforcements I suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement
against Vicksburg.

On the 23d of October I learned of Pemberton's being in command at Holly
Springs and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from Alabama and
Texas.  The same day General Rosecrans was relieved from duty with my
command, and shortly after he succeeded Buell in the command of the army
in Middle Tennessee.  I was delighted at the promotion of General
Rosecrans to a separate command, because I still believed that when
independent of an immediate superior the qualities which I, at that
time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves.  As a
subordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and had
determined to relieve him from duty that very day.

At the close of the operations just described my force, in round
numbers, was 48,500.  Of these 4,800 were in Kentucky and Illinois,
7,000 in Memphis, 19,200 from Mound City south, and 17,500 at Corinth.
General McClernand had been authorized from Washington to go north and
organize troops to be used in opening the Mississippi.  These new levies
with other reinforcements now began to come in.

On the 25th of October I was placed in command of the Department of the
Tennessee.  Reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the
2d of November I was prepared to take the initiative.  This was a great
relief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a large
district of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy ready
to give information of our every move.  I have described very
imperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place during
this time.  To describe all would take more space than I can allot to
the purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops who
distinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9)



CHAPTER XXX.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG--EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN--OCCUPATION OF
HOLLY SPRINGS--SHERMAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS DOWN THE
MISSISSIPPI--VAN DORN CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS--COLLECTING FORAGE AND
FOOD.

Vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first high
ground coming close to the river below Memphis.  From there a railroad
runs east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of the
Southern States.  A railroad also starts from the opposite side of the
river, extending west as far as Shreveport, Louisiana.  Vicksburg was
the only channel, at the time of the events of which this chapter
treats, connecting the parts of the Confederacy divided by the
Mississippi.  So long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation
of the river was prevented.  Hence its importance.  Points on the river
between Vicksburg and Port Hudson were held as dependencies; but their
fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place.

The campaign against Vicksburg commenced on the 2d of November as
indicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words:
"I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction, with three divisions
from Corinth and two from Bolivar.  Will leave here [Jackson, Tennessee]
to-morrow, and take command in person.  If found practicable, I will go
to Holly Springs, and, may be, Grenada, completing railroad and
telegraph as I go."

At this time my command was holding the Mobile and Ohio railroad from
about twenty-five miles south of Corinth, north to Columbus, Kentucky;
the Mississippi Central from Bolivar north to its junction with the
Mobile and Ohio; the Memphis and Charleston from Corinth east to Bear
Creek, and the Mississippi River from Cairo to Memphis.  My entire
command was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardly
that if kept on the defensive.  By moving against the enemy and into his
unsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us,
these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large force
for field operations.  My moving force at that time was about 30,000
men, and I estimated the enemy confronting me, under Pemberton, at about
the same number.  General McPherson commanded my left wing and General
C. S. Hamilton the centre, while Sherman was at Memphis with the right
wing.  Pemberton was fortified at the Tallahatchie, but occupied Holly
Springs and Grand Junction on the Mississippi Central railroad.  On the
8th we occupied Grand Junction and La Grange, throwing a considerable
force seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad.  The
road from Bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as the
troops advanced.

Up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that large
bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they always
covered and guarded in all forward movements.  There was delay therefore
in repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to
the front.

By my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from
Washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the
supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under the
chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to take
them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as government
stores.  The stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of the
possibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from the
country itself.

It was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "Freedman's
Bureau" took its origin.  Orders of the government prohibited the
expulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they came
in voluntarily.  Humanity forbade allowing them to starve.  With such an
army of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about Grand
Junction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance.
There was no special authority for feeding them unless they were
employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but only
able-bodied young men were suitable for such work.  This labor would
support but a very limited percentage of them.  The plantations were all
deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children above
ten years of age could be employed in saving these crops.  To do this
work with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under a
competent chief was necessary.  On inquiring for such a man Chaplain
Eaton, now and for many years the very able United States Commissioner
of Education, was suggested.  He proved as efficient in that field as he
has since done in his present one.  I gave him all the assistants and
guards he called for.  We together fixed the prices to be paid for the
negro labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals.  The
cotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers to
receive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half cents
per pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping
the cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. Citizens
remaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of having
their crops saved by freedmen on the same terms.

At once the freedmen became self-sustaining.  The money was not paid to
them directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit.  They
gave me no trouble afterwards.

Later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the Mississippi
River to supply the large number of steamers on that stream.  A good
price was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of government
steamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply with
fuel).  Those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price.  In
this way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all,
old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins,
hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they had
never known before.

At this stage of the campaign against Vicksburg I was very much
disturbed by newspaper rumors that General McClernand was to have a
separate and independent command within mine, to operate against
Vicksburg by way of the Mississippi River.  Two commanders on the same
field are always one too many, and in this case I did not think the
general selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fit
him for so important a position.  I feared for the safety of the troops
intrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops,
to execute so important a trust.  But on the 12th I received a dispatch
from General Halleck saying that I had command of all the troops sent to
my department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where I pleased.
The next day my cavalry was in Holly Springs, and the enemy fell back
south of the Tallahatchie.

Holly Springs I selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war,
all of which at that time came by rail from Columbus, Kentucky, except
the few stores collected about La Grange and Grand Junction.  This was a
long line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in an
enemy's country.  On the 15th of November, while I was still at Holly
Springs, I sent word to Sherman to meet me at Columbus.  We were but
forty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was
for me to take the rail to Columbus and Sherman a steamer for the same
place.  At that meeting, besides talking over my general plans I gave
him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down the
Mississippi Central railroad if he could. Sherman, who was always
prompt, was up by the 29th to Cottage Hill, ten miles north of Oxford.
He brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only four
regiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a small
detachment of cavalry. Further reinforcements he knew were on their way
from the north to Memphis.  About this time General Halleck ordered
troops from Helena, Arkansas (territory west of the Mississippi was not
under my command then) to cut the road in Pemberton's rear.  The
expedition was under Generals Hovey and C. C. Washburn and was
successful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damage
done was very slight and was soon repaired.

The Tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroad
bridge destroyed and Pemberton strongly fortified on the south side.  A
crossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy.  I sent
the cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing.  This
caused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possibly
accelerated by the expedition of Hovey and Washburn.  The enemy was
followed as far south as Oxford by the main body of troops, and some
seventeen miles farther by McPherson's command.  Here the pursuit was
halted to repair the railroad from the Tallahatchie northward, in order
to bring up supplies.  The piles on which the railroad bridge rested had
been left standing.  The work of constructing a roadway for the troops
was but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars.

During the delay at Oxford in repairing railroads I learned that an
expedition down the Mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to have
a competent commander in charge, I ordered Sherman on the 8th of
December back to Memphis to take charge. The following were his orders:

Headquarters 13th Army Corps, Department of the Tennessee. OXFORD,
MISSISSIPPI, December 8,1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Right Wing:

You will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis,
Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command.  On
your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all the troops there,
and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present east of the
Mississippi River, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your
own army.  As soon as possible move with them down the river to the
vicinity of Vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet
under command of Flag-officer Porter proceed to the reduction of that
place in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, may
dictate.

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to
take, will be left entirely with yourself.  The Quartermaster at St.
Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30,000 men;
should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be
authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come
into the port of Memphis.

On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with Admiral
Porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation.

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will
embark, and such plans as may then be matured.  I will hold the forces
here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements
of the enemy may make necessary.

Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient officer,
and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, and
whatever cavalry may be there.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


This idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d of
December I asked Halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy south
of the Yallabusha and move a force from Helena and Memphis on Vicksburg.
On the 5th again I suggested, from Oxford, to Halleck that if the Helena
troops were at my command I though it would be possible to take them and
the Memphis forces south of the mouth of the Yazoo River, and thus
secure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi.  Halleck on the same day,
the 5th of December, directed me not to attempt to hold the country
south of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000 troops at Memphis by
the 20th for the Vicksburg expedition.  I sent Sherman with two
divisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and asked
whether I should command the expedition down the river myself or send
Sherman.  I was authorized to do as I though best for the accomplishment
of the great object in view.  I sent Sherman and so informed General
Halleck.

As stated, my action in sending Sherman back was expedited by a desire
to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct
supervision.  I feared that delay might bring McClernand, who was his
senior and who had authority from the President and Secretary of War to
exercise that particular command,--and independently.  I doubted
McClernand's fitness; and I had good reason to believe that in
forestalling him I was by no means giving offence to those whose
authority to command was above both him and me.

Neither my orders to General Sherman, nor the correspondence between us
or between General Halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my going
further south than the Yallabusha. Pemberton's force in my front was the
main part of the garrison of Vicksburg, as the force with me was the
defence of the territory held by us in West Tennessee and Kentucky.  I
hoped to hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rear
and into Vicksburg.  The further north the enemy could be held the
better.

It was understood, however, between General Sherman and myself that our
movements were to be co-operative; if Pemberton could not be held away
from Vicksburg I was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected
to abandon the railroad north of the Yallabusha.  With that point as a
secondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the Yazoo
until communications could be opened with the Mississippi was
contemplated.

It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman and his command, that
if the enemy should fall back I would follow him even to the gates of
Vicksburg.  I intended in such an event to hold the road to Grenada on
the Yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a new
base of supplies on the Yazoo, or at Vicksburg itself, with Grenada to
fall back upon in case of failure.  It should be remembered that at the
time I speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate
in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies.  A halt
was called at Oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, to
bring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food,
forage and munitions to the front.

On the 18th of December I received orders from Washington to divide my
command into four army corps, with General McClernand to command one of
them and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operate
down the Mississippi.  This interfered with my plans, but probably
resulted in my ultimately taking the command in person.  McClernand was
at that time in Springfield, Illinois.  The order was obeyed without any
delay.  Dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity.

On the 20th General Van Dorn appeared at Holly Springs, my secondary
base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men commanded by
Colonel Murphy, of the 8th Wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all our
munitions of war, food and forage.  The capture was a disgraceful one to
the officer commanding but not to the troops under him.  At the same
time Forrest got on our line of railroad between Jackson, Tennessee, and
Columbus, Kentucky, doing much damage to it.  This cut me off from all
communication with the north for more than a week, and it was more than
two weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtained
in the regular way.  This demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining
so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in
an enemy's country.  I determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign
into the interior with Columbus as a base, and returned to La Grange and
Grand Junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road to
Memphis, making the Mississippi river the line over which to draw
supplies.  Pemberton was falling back at the same time.

The moment I received the news of Van Dorn's success I sent the cavalry
at the front back to drive him from the country.  He had start enough to
move north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack several
small garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad.  All these he
found warned of his coming and prepared to receive him.  Van Dorn did
not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at Holly
Springs, which was larger than all the others attacked by him put
together.  Murphy was also warned of Van Dorn's approach, but made no
preparations to meet him.  He did not even notify his command.

Colonel Murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuated
Iuka on the approach of the enemy.  General Rosecrans denounced him for
the act and desired to have him tried and punished.  I sustained the
colonel at the time because his command was a small one compared with
that of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and I thought he had done
well to get away without falling into their hands.  His leaving large
stores to fall into Price's possession I looked upon as an oversight and
excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. He should,
however, have destroyed them.  This last surrender demonstrated to my
mind that Rosecrans' judgment of Murphy's conduct at Iuka was correct.
The surrender of Holly Springs was most reprehensible and showed either
the disloyalty of Colonel Murphy to the cause which he professed to
serve, or gross cowardice.

After the war was over I read from the diary of a lady who accompanied
General Pemberton in his retreat from the Tallahatchie, that the retreat
was almost a panic.  The roads were bad and it was difficult to move the
artillery and trains.  Why there should have been a panic I do not see.
No expedition had yet started down the Mississippi River.  Had I known
the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central
Mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, I would have been in
pursuit of Pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my
rear.

After sending cavalry to drive Van Dorn away, my next order was to
dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect and
bring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen miles
east and west of the road from our front back to Grand Junction, leaving
two months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken.
I was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded.  It
showed that we could have subsisted off the country for two months
instead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated.  This
taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaign
when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days'
rations by the commissary.  Our loss of supplies was great at Holly
Springs, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from the
country and by the lesson taught.

The news of the capture of Holly Springs and the destruction of our
supplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in Oxford.
They came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, to
ask what I was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat.
I told them that I was not disturbed; that I had already sent troops and
wagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteen
miles on each side of the road.  Countenances soon changed, and so did
the inquiry.  The next was, "What are WE to do?"  My response was that
we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resources
while visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enough
to destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected that
men, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty.  I
advised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist in
eating up what we left.



CHAPTER XXXI.

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS--GENERAL M'CLERNAND IN COMMAND
--ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG'S POINT--OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG
--FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG--THE CANAL--LAKE PROVIDENCE
--OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS.

This interruption in my communications north--I was really cut off from
communication with a great part of my own command during this time
--resulted in Sherman's moving from Memphis before McClernand could
arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach McClernand.  Pemberton
got back to Vicksburg before Sherman got there.  The rebel positions
were on a bluff on the Yazoo River, some miles above its mouth.  The
waters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving
only narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and the
high bluffs.  These were fortified and defended at all points.  The
rebel position was impregnable against any force that could be brought
against its front.  Sherman could not use one-fourth of his force.  His
efforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, were
necessarily unavailing.

Sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but I had no opportunity of
communicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraph
to my rear on the 20th.  He did not know but what I was in the rear of
the enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for the
troops with me.  I had, before he started from Memphis, directed him to
take with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of the
Yazoo, not knowing but that I might want them to supply me after cutting
loose from my base at Grenada.

On the 23d I removed my headquarters back to Holly Springs.  The troops
were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, finding
supplies abundant and no enemy following.  The road was not damaged
south of Holly Springs by Van Dorn, at least not to an extent to cause
any delay.  As I had resolved to move headquarters to Memphis, and to
repair the road to that point, I remained at Holly Springs until this
work was completed.

On the 10th of January, the work on the road from Holly Springs to Grand
Junction and thence to Memphis being completed, I moved my headquarters
to the latter place.  During the campaign here described, the losses
(mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with their
Holly Springs capture, which they could not hold.

When Sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20,000 men,
taken from Memphis, and was reinforced by 12,000 more at Helena,
Arkansas.  The troops on the west bank of the river had previously been
assigned to my command.  McClernand having received the orders for his
assignment reached the mouth of the Yazoo on the 2d of January, and
immediately assumed command of all the troops with Sherman, being a part
of his own corps, the 13th, and all of Sherman's, the 15th.  Sherman,
and Admiral Porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the Yazoo. After
consultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could render
service to the cause where they were, and learning that I had withdrawn
from the interior of Mississippi, they determined to return to the
Arkansas River and to attack Arkansas Post, about fifty miles up that
stream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men.  Sherman had
learned of the existence of this force through a man who had been
captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other
supplies intended for his command.  The man had made his escape.
McClernand approved this move reluctantly, as Sherman says.  No obstacle
was encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range of
the fort.  After three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made
by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in
taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns.  I was at first disposed to
disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no
especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was
understood I regarded it as very important.  Five thousand Confederate
troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of
property while navigating the Mississippi.

Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post and the capture of the
garrison, McClernand returned with his entire force to Napoleon, at the
mouth of the Arkansas River.  From here I received messages from both
Sherman and Admiral Porter, urging me to come and take command in
person, and expressing their distrust of McClernand's ability and
fitness for so important and intricate an expedition.

On the 17th I visited McClernand and his command at Napoleon. It was
here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustful
of McClernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all they
could to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness.  It
would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into
such danger.  By this time I had received authority to relieve
McClernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the river
expedition, or to assume command in person.  I felt great embarrassment
about McClernand.  He was the senior major-general after myself within
the department.  It would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assign
a junior over him.  Nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the
command myself.  I would have been glad to put Sherman in command, to
give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the December
before; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he was
junior to McClernand.  Sherman's failure needs no apology.

On the 20th I ordered General McClernand with the entire command, to
Young's Point and Milliken's Bend, while I returned to Memphis to make
all the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind me
secure.  General Hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command.  The
Memphis and Charleston railroad was held, while the Mississippi Central
was given up.  Columbus was the only point between Cairo and Memphis, on
the river, left with a garrison.  All the troops and guns from the posts
on the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front.

On the 29th of January I arrived at Young's Point and assumed command
the following day.  General McClernand took exception in a most
characteristic way--for him.  His correspondence with me on the subject
was more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. It was highly
insubordinate, but I overlooked it, as I believed, for the good of the
service.  General McClernand was a politician of very considerable
prominence in his State; he was a member of Congress when the secession
war broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished all
the opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving
the Union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the Union at
all hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of
where he stood in the contest before the country.  He also gave up his
seat in Congress to take the field in defence of the principles he had
proclaimed.

The real work of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg now began.  The
problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the
river from which the troops could operate against Vicksburg.  The
Mississippi River, from Cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valley
of many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty up
to two or more hundred feet above the river.  On the west side the
highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest
water.  Through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way,
varying in direction to all points of the compass.  At places it runs to
the very foot of the bluffs. After leaving Memphis, there are no such
highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until Vicksburg
is reached.

The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high
water--many of them navigable for steamers.  All of them would be,
except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it
impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length.
Marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible;
navigating it proved equally impracticable.  The strategical way
according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis;
establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses
could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of
railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yallabusha, or to Jackson,
Mississippi.  At this time the North had become very much discouraged.
Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure.  The
elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the
prosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and the
last dollar.  Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater
part of the North, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our
ranks.  It was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement
as long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by many
of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as a
defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the
power to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing left to be
done but to go FORWARD TO A DECISIVE VICTORY.  This was in my mind from
the moment I took command in person at Young's Point.

The winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in the
Mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. To get dry land,
or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took many
miles of river front.  We had to occupy the levees and the ground
immediately behind.  This was so limited that one corps, the 17th, under
General McPherson, was at Lake Providence, seventy miles above
Vicksburg.

It was in January the troops took their position opposite Vicksburg.
The water was very high and the rains were incessant.  There seemed no
possibility of a land movement before the end of March or later, and it
would not do to lie idle all this time.  The effect would be
demoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health.  Friends in
the North would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in the
same section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation of
the cause and those engaged in it.

I always admired the South, as bad as I thought their cause, for the
boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, by
press or by individuals, within their control.  War at all times,
whether a civil war between sections of a common country or between
nations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor.  But, once entered
into, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within their
ranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section or
nation.

Vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to the
river's edge, below that on which Memphis stands.  The bluff, or high
land, follows the left bank of the Yazoo for some distance and continues
in a southerly direction to the Mississippi River, thence it runs along
the Mississippi to Warrenton, six miles below.  The Yazoo River leaves
the high land a short distance below Haines' Bluff and empties into the
Mississippi nine miles above Vicksburg.  Vicksburg is built on this high
land where the Mississippi washes the base of the hill.  Haines' Bluff,
eleven miles from Vicksburg, on the Yazoo River, was strongly fortified.
The whole distance from there to Vicksburg and thence to Warrenton was
also intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits
connecting them.

From Young's Point the Mississippi turns in a north-easterly direction
to a point just above the city, when it again turns and runs
south-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade,
exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before they
were in range of the upper batteries.  Since then the river has made a
cut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island.
North of the Yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with
bayous, and much overflowed.  A front attack was therefore impossible,
and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. The problem then
became, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the Mississippi
without an apparent retreat.  Then commenced a series of experiments to
consume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and
of the public generally.  I, myself, never felt great confidence that
any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. Nevertheless
I was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did.

In 1862 General Thomas Williams had come up from New Orleans and cut a
ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across from
Young's Point to the river below.  The distance across was a little over
a mile.  It was Williams' expectation that when the river rose it would
cut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy from
both ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the rise
without doing any execution in the way of cutting.  Mr. Lincoln had
navigated the Mississippi in his younger days and understood well its
tendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time.  He set
much store accordingly by this canal.  General McClernand had been,
therefore, directed before I went to Young's Point to push the work of
widening and deepening this canal.  After my arrival the work was
diligently pushed with about 4,000 men--as many as could be used to
advantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a
dam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out
until the excavation was completed.  This was on the 8th of March.

Even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable for
steamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us.  It runs in a
direction almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite
side, or east bank, of the river.  As soon as the enemy discovered what
we were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughout
its length.  This battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number,
which were doing the work of thousands of men.  Had the canal been
completed it might have proven of some use in running transports
through, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet have
to run batteries, though for a much shorter distance.

While this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, trying
to find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of the
river, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding the
batteries.

On the 30th of January, the day after my arrival at the front, I ordered
General McPherson, stationed with his corps at Lake Providence, to cut
the levee at that point.  If successful in opening a channel for
navigation by this route, it would carry us to the Mississippi River
through the mouth of the Red River, just above Port Hudson and four
hundred miles below Vicksburg by the river.

Lake Providence is a part of the old bed of the Mississippi, about a
mile from the present channel.  It is six miles long and has its outlet
through Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Tensas, Washita and Red
Rivers.  The last three are navigable streams at all seasons.  Bayous
Baxter and Macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered with
dense forests overhanging the channel.  They were also filled with
fallen timber, the accumulation of years.  The land along the
Mississippi River, from Memphis down, is in all instances highest next
to the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form the
boundary of the valley through which it winds.  Bayou Baxter, as it
reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in a
cypress swamp before it reaches the Macon.  There was about two feet of
water in this swamp at the time.  To get through it, even with vessels
of the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy
timber wide enough to make a passage way.  As the trees would have to be
cut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of great
magnitude.

On the 4th of February I visited General McPherson, and remained with
him several days.  The work had not progressed so far as to admit the
water from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded in
drawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity,
from the river into the lake.  With this we were able to explore the
lake and bayou as far as cleared.  I saw then that there was scarcely a
chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops
through an enemy's country.  The distance from Lake Providence to the
point where vessels going by that route would enter the Mississippi
again, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river.  The
distance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through which
this new route would carry us.  The enemy held Port Hudson, below where
the Red River debouches, and all the Mississippi above to Vicksburg.
The Red River, Washita and Tensas were, as has been said, all navigable
streams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct
our passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters.  I let the
work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men.
Then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better
prospect of success.  This work was abandoned after the canal proved a
failure.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson of my staff was sent to Helena, Arkansas, to
examine and open a way through Moon Lake and the Yazoo Pass if possible.
Formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the Mississippi River
into Moon Lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through Yazoo Pass
to Coldwater, along the latter to the Tallahatchie, which joins the
Yallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below Moon Lake and forms
the Yazoo River.  These were formerly navigated by steamers trading with
the rich plantations along their banks; but the State of Mississippi had
built a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving the
only entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of the
mouth of the Yazoo several hundreds of miles below.

On the 2d of February this dam, or levee, was cut.  The river being high
the rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short time
the entire obstruction was washed away. The bayous were soon filled and
much of the country was overflowed. This pass leaves the Mississippi
River but a few miles below Helena. On the 24th General Ross, with his
brigade of about 4,500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way.
The rebels had obstructed the navigation of Yazoo Pass and the Coldwater
by felling trees into them.  Much of the timber in this region being of
greater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, their
removal was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished,
and on the 11th of March Ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboats
under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, confronting a
fortification at Greenwood, where the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha unite
and the Yazoo begins.  The bends of the rivers are such at this point as
to almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of the
river.  This island was fortified and manned.  It was named Fort
Pemberton after the commander at Vicksburg.  No land approach was
accessible.  The troops, therefore, could render no assistance towards
an assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece of
ground which was discovered above water.  The gunboats, however,
attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of March.  Both efforts were
failures and were not renewed.  One gunboat was disabled and we lost six
men killed and twenty-five wounded. The loss of the enemy was less.

Fort Pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that a
rise of two feet would drive the enemy out.  In hope of enlisting the
elements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time,
a second cut was made in the Mississippi levee, this time directly
opposite Helena, or six miles above the former cut.  It did not
accomplish the desired result, and Ross, with his fleet, started back.
On the 22d he met Quinby with a brigade at Yazoo Pass.  Quinby was the
senior of Ross, and assumed command.  He was not satisfied with
returning to his former position without seeing for himself whether
anything could be accomplished.  Accordingly Fort Pemberton was
revisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this time
without an attack.  Quinby, with his command, returned with but little
delay.  In the meantime I was much exercised for the safety of Ross, not
knowing that Quinby had been able to join him.  Reinforcements were of
no use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain on
board of their transports.  Relief had to come from another quarter.  So
I determined to get into the Yazoo below Fort Pemberton.

Steel's Bayou empties into the Yazoo River between Haines' Bluff and its
mouth.  It is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavy
growth of timber, but it is deep.  It approaches to within one mile of
the Mississippi at Eagle Bend, thirty miles above Young's Point.
Steel's Bayou connects with Black Bayou, Black Bayou with Deer Creek,
Deer Creek with Rolling Fork, Rolling Fork with the Big Sunflower River,
and the Big Sunflower with the Yazoo River about ten miles above Haines'
Bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by the
winding of the river.  All these waterways are of about the same nature
so far as navigation is concerned, until the Sunflower is reached; this
affords free navigation.

Admiral Porter explored this waterway as far as Deer Creek on the 14th
of March, and reported it navigable.  On the next day he started with
five gunboats and four mortar-boats.  I went with him for some distance.
The heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did also
the short turns in so narrow a stream.  The gunboats, however, ploughed
their way through without other damage than to their appearance.  The
transports did not fare so well although they followed behind. The road
was somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats.  In the evening I
returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. Sherman went in
person on the 16th, taking with him Stuart's division of the 15th corps.
They took large river transports to Eagle Bend on the Mississippi, where
they debarked and marched across to Steel's Bayou, where they
re-embarked on the transports.  The river steamers, with their tall
smokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded that
the gunboats got far ahead.  Porter, with his fleet, got within a few
hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free from
the obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when he
encountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed by
obstructions in his front.  He could do nothing with gunboats against
sharpshooters.  The rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4,000
men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet.

Sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out Black
Bayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind.  On the
night of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had been
attacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril.  Sherman at once
returned through Black Bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met a
steamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up.  They
tried to force their way through Black Bayou with their steamer, but,
finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot.
It was night when they landed, and intensely dark.  There was but a
narrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrush
or cane.  The troops lighted their way through this with candles carried
in their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an open
plantation.  Here the troops rested until morning.  They made twenty-one
miles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time to
rescue the fleet.  Porter had fully made up his mind to blow up the
gunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy.  More
welcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on this
occasion.  The vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvous
on the Mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to get
in rear of Vicksburg.



CHAPTER XXXII.

THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--CRITICISMS OF THE  NORTHERN PRESS
--RUNNING THE BATTERIES--LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA--DISPOSITION OF THE
TROOPS.

The original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of March.  The
effort to make a waterway through Lake Providence and the connecting
bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time.

At Milliken's Bend, and also at Young's Point, bayous or channels start,
which connecting with other bayous passing Richmond, Louisiana, enter
the Mississippi at Carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above Grand
Gulf.  The Mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from these
bayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these
points, is carried through these same channels to the river below.  In
case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find its
outlet through the same channels.  The dredges and laborers from the
canal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, I
determined to open these other channels, if possible.  If successful the
effort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for our
transports.  There was a good road back of the levees, along these
bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever
the water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather.
Accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching a
base heretofore described, this new one was undertaken.

As early as the 4th of February I had written to Halleck about this
route, stating that I thought it much more practicable than the other
undertaking (the Lake Providence route), and that it would have been
accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got
all over the country.

The upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, further
than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber for
a distance of several miles from their source.  It was necessary,
therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river.
This work was continued until the waters of the river began to recede
and the road to Richmond, Louisiana, emerged from the water.  One small
steamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no further
use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. Beyond this it
was no more successful than the other experiments with which the winter
was whiled away.  All these failures would have been very discouraging
if I had expected much from the efforts; but I had not.  From the first
the most I hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be used
below Vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteries
defending that city.

This long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water,
unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about
Vicksburg.  The river was higher than its natural banks from December,
1862, to the following April.  The war had suspended peaceful pursuits
in the South, further than the production of army supplies, and in
consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the
whole country was covered with water.  Troops could scarcely find dry
ground on which to pitch their tents.  Malarial fevers broke out among
the men.  Measles and small-pox also attacked them.  The hospital
arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the
loss of life was much less than might have been expected.  Visitors to
the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; Northern papers came
back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated.  Because I would
not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle,
incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for
my removal.  They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple
removal, but named who my successor should be. McClernand, Fremont,
Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in this connection.  I took no
steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as I
understood it, to the best of my ability.  Every one has his
superstitions.  One of mine is that in positions of great responsibility
every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned
by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to
change his position.  While at Cairo I had watched with very great
interest the operations of the Army of the Potomac, looking upon that as
the main field of the war.  I had no idea, myself, of ever having any
large command, nor did I suppose that I was equal to one; but I had the
vanity to think that as a cavalry officer I might succeed very well in
the command of a brigade. On one occasion, in talking about this to my
staff officers, all of whom were civilians without any military
education whatever, I said that I would give anything if I were
commanding a brigade of cavalry in the Army of the Potomac and I
believed I could do some good.  Captain Hillyer spoke up and suggested
that I make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry.
I then told him that I would cut my right arm off first, and mentioned
this superstition.

In time of war the President, being by the Constitution
Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is responsible for the
selection of commanders.  He should not be embarrassed in making his
selections.  I having been selected, my responsibility ended with my
doing the best I knew how.  If I had sought the place, or obtained it
through personal or political influence, my belief is that I would have
feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably
have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors.  Persons obtaining
important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep
a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are
shown in case of disaster.  Somebody must be responsible for their
failures.

With all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both President Lincoln
and General Halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign.  I had never
met Mr.  Lincoln, but his support was constant.

At last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsula
behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; the
troops were all concentrated from distant points at Milliken's Bend
preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and
discouraging labors with success.

I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a
point below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the
possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted
to for the purpose of giving us a different base.  This could not be
undertaken until the waters receded.  I did not therefore communicate
this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to
make preparations for the start.  My recollection is that Admiral Porter
was the first one to whom I mentioned it.  The co-operation of the navy
was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of
such an enterprise.  I had no more authority to command Porter than he
had to command me.  It was necessary to have part of his fleet below
Vicksburg if the troops went there.  Steamers to use as ferries were
also essential.  The navy was the only escort and protection for these
steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles
of batteries. Porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he
had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run
the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than
soldiers.  I was glad to accept his proposition, not only because I
admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the
enemy a little longer our designs. Porter's fleet was on the east side
of the river above the mouth of the Yazoo, entirely concealed from the
enemy by the dense forests that intervened.  Even spies could not get
near him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands.
Suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused.  Our river guards
discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up the
river near the east shore, from the direction of Vicksburg, towards the
fleet.  On overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not much
larger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a
flag of truce in case of discovery.  The boat, crew and passengers were
brought ashore to me.  The chief personage aboard proved to be Jacob
Thompson, Secretary of the Interior under the administration of
President Buchanan.  After a pleasant conversation of half an hour or
more I allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return to
Vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in my
mind as to the good faith of Mr. Thompson and his flag.

Admiral Porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for their
hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries.  The great essential was to
protect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the fires
under the boilers from view.  This he accomplished by loading the
steamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to the
deck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the
boilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain.  The hay and grain would
be wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by
the muddy roads over which we expected to march.

Before this I had been collecting, from St. Louis and Chicago, yawls and
barges to be used as ferries when we got below.  By the 16th of April
Porter was ready to start on his perilous trip.  The advance, flagship
Benton, Porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed at
intervals of a few minutes by the Lafayette with a captured steamer, the
Price, lashed to her side, the Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburgh and
Carondelet--all of these being naval vessels.  Next came the transports
--Forest Queen, Silver Wave and Henry Clay, each towing barges loaded
with coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers when
below the batteries.  The gunboat Tuscumbia brought up the rear.  Soon
after the start a battery between Vicksburg and Warrenton opened fire
across the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and
then by batteries all along the line.  The gunboats ran up close under
the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probably
without much effect.  They were under fire for more than two hours and
every vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to the
gunboats.  The transports did not fare so well.  The Henry Clay was
disabled and deserted by her crew. Soon after a shell burst in the
cotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned her
to the water's edge.  The burning mass, however, floated down to
Carthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow.

The enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready to
light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing
houses on the point of land opposite the city on the Louisiana side.
The sight was magnificent, but terrible.  I witnessed it from the deck
of a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as low
down as it was prudent to go.  My mind was much relieved when I learned
that no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any,
wounded.  During the running of the batteries men were stationed in the
holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes that
might be made in the hulls.  All damage was afterwards soon repaired
under the direction of Admiral Porter.

The experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however,
during the war.  Admiral Farragut had run the batteries at Port Hudson
with the flagship Hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from below
Vicksburg.  The 13th of February Admiral Porter had sent the gunboat
Indianola, Lieutenant-Commander George Brown commanding, below.  She met
Colonel Ellet of the Marine brigade below Natchez on a captured steamer.
Two of the Colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing
the greatest consternation among the people along the Mississippi from
Vicksburg (*10) to the Red River.

The Indianola remained about the mouth of the Red River some days, and
then started up the Mississippi.  The Confederates soon raised the Queen
of the West, (*11) and repaired her.  With this vessel and the ram Webb,
which they had had for some time in the Red River, and two other
steamers, they followed the Indianola. The latter was encumbered with
barges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speed
against the rapid current of the Mississippi.  The Confederate fleet
overtook her just above Grand Gulf, and attacked her after dark on the
24th of February.  The Indianola was superior to all the others in
armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away,
but for her encumbrance.  As it was she fought them for an hour and a
half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram and
other vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking
condition.  The armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore.
Officers and crew then surrendered.

I had started McClernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th of
March, by way of Richmond, Louisiana, to New Carthage, hoping that he
might capture Grand Gulf before the balance of the troops could get
there; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet.  Some
miles from New Carthage the levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in several
places, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles.  Boats were
collected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot
from such material as could be collected, to transport the troops across
the overflowed interval.  By the 6th of April McClernand had reached New
Carthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried through
the woods by these boats.  On the 17th I visited New Carthage in person,
and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were
doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised.  The water
was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use
boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over.  McClernand had
already found a new route from Smith's plantation where the crevasse
occurred, to Perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below New
Carthage.  This increased the march from Milliken's Bend from
twenty-seven to nearly forty miles.  Four bridges had to be built across
bayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about two
thousand feet of bridging in all.  The river falling made the current in
these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and
permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "Yankee
soldier" was equal to any emergency.  The bridges were soon built of
such material as could be found near by, and so substantial were they
that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with
artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun
(a thirty-two pounder).  This, if my memory serves me correctly, broke
through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across the
peninsula. These bridges were all built by McClernand's command, under
the supervision of Lieutenant Hains of the Engineer Corps.

I returned to Milliken's Bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20th
issued the following final order for the movement of troops:


HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, MILLIKEN'S BEND, LOUISIANA,
April 20, 1863.

Special Orders, No. 110. *         *         *         *         * *
* VIII.  The following orders are published for the information and
guidance of the "Army in the Field," in its present movement to obtain a
foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi River, from which Vicksburg
can be approached by practicable roads.

First.--The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A. McClernand
commanding, will constitute the right wing.

Second.--The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Sherman
commanding, will constitute the left wing.

Third.--The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B. McPherson
commanding, will constitute the centre.

Fourth.--The order of march to New Carthage will be from right to left.

Fifth.--Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or,
an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may
require.  When the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will
remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander,
unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency.

Sixth.--Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can
be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage.

Seventh.--In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each
company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each
regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters;
and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commanders
having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for,
are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not
to exceed the number allowed by General Orders No. 160, A. G. O., series
of 1862.

Eighth.--All the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate
charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will
constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorized
camp equipage of the army.

Ninth.--As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the Seventeenth
army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in
like manner by the Fifteenth army corps.

Tenth.--Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps
commanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New Carthage.

Eleventh.--General hospitals will be established by the medical director
between Duckport and Milliken's Bend.  All sick and disabled soldiers
will be left in these hospitals.  Surgeons in charge of hospitals will
report convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty.  Each corps
commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain
behind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps;
officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into
squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to;
and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command
them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates.  The force so
organized will constitute the guard of the line from Duckport to
Milliken's Bend.  They will furnish all the guards and details required
for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the
camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats.

Twelfth.--The movement of troops from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage
will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply
of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previous
orders.

Thirteenth.--Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the
beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but
wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military
purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without
proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited.  All
such irregularities must be summarily punished.

Fourteenth.--Brigadier-General J. C.  Sullivan is appointed to the
command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from
here to New Carthage.  His particular attention is called to General
Orders, No. 69, from Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, of date
March 20, 1863.

By order of MAJOR-GENERAL U. S.  GRANT.


McClernand was already below on the Mississippi.  Two of McPherson's
divisions were put upon the march immediately.  The third had not yet
arrived from Lake Providence; it was on its way to Milliken's Bend and
was to follow on arrival.

Sherman was to follow McPherson.  Two of his divisions were at Duckport
and Young's Point, and the third under Steele was under orders to return
from Greenville, Mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebel
battery that had been annoying our transports.

It had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagon
train over the single narrow and almost impassable road between
Milliken's Bend and Perkins' plantation.  Accordingly six more steamers
were protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded with
supplies.  They took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations.  On
the night of the 22d of April they ran the batteries, five getting
through more or less disabled while one was sunk.  About half the barges
got through with their needed freight.

When it was first proposed to run the blockade at Vicksburg with river
steamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing to
accompany their vessels, and but one crew. Volunteers were called for
from the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigating
the western rivers. Captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-hands
enough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels we
were moving through this dangerous ordeal.  Most of them were from
Logan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part of
Illinois and from Missouri.  All but two of the steamers were commanded
by volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned.  In this
instance, as in all others during the war, I found that volunteers could
be found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every
call for aid whether mechanical or professional.  Colonel W. S. Oliver
was master of transportation on this occasion by special detail.



CHAPTER XXXIII.

ATTACK ON GRAND GULF--OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG.

On the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at Perkins'
plantation.  Reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whether
there was high land on the east shore of the river where we might land
above Grand Gulf.  There was none practicable. Accordingly the troops
were set in motion for Hard Times, twenty-two miles farther down the
river and nearly opposite Grand Gulf.  The loss of two steamers and six
barges reduced our transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved
by water. Some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their
machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those less
severely injured.  All the troops, therefore, except what could be
transported in one trip, had to march.  The road lay west of Lake St.
Joseph.  Three large bayous had to be crossed.  They were rapidly
bridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12)

On the 27th McClernand's corps was all at Hard Times, and McPherson's
was following closely.  I had determined to make the attempt to effect a
landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible.  Accordingly,
on the morning of the 29th, McClernand was directed to embark all the
troops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry.  About
10,000 men were so embarked.  The plan was to have the navy silence the
guns at Grand Gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark
in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy and
carry the works by storm.  The following order was issued:

PERKINS PLANTATION, LA., April 27,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. MCCLERNAND, Commanding 13th A. C.

Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as
there is transportation for.  Have put aboard the artillery and every
article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold
them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's
warning.

All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send
to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you see, by special orders
of this date, General McPherson is ordered to send one division.

The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all
the batteries commanding the river.  Your corps will be on the river,
ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the
promontory first brought to view passing down the river.  Once on shore,
have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the
ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points,
but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself.  The
first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain
themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops
collected for a forward movement.

Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated
to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be
below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced.

It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out
of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past Grand
Gulf and land at Rodney.  In case this should prove the plan, a signal
will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start
with this view.  Or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but
not the men.  In this case, then, the transports would have to be
brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to
below Grand Gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place.
There will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the
transports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf; one, that
the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the
transports can run by with the troops on board.

Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to
run the blockade.

If not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in
their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


At 8 o'clock A.M., 29th, Porter made the attack with his entire strength
present, eight gunboats.  For nearly five and a half hours the attack
was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy.  All this time
McClernand's 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the
stream ready to attempt a landing if signalled.  I occupied a tug from
which I could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within range
of the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was not
calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being
assailed themselves.  About half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeing
their efforts were entirely unavailing.  The enemy ceased firing as soon
as we withdrew.  I immediately signalled the Admiral and went aboard his
ship.  The navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six
wounded.  A large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship,
and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side
and exploded between decks where the men were working their guns.  The
sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as I boarded the
ship was sickening.

Grand Gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot of
it.  It is as defensible upon its front as Vicksburg and, at that time,
would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack.  I
therefore requested Porter to run the batteries with his fleet that
night, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would be
wanted below.

There is a long tongue of land from the Louisiana side extending towards
Grand Gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three miles
above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about the
same distance below.  The land was so low and wet that it would not have
been practicable to march an army across but for a levee.  I had had
this explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain if
there was a possible point of debarkation north of Rodney.  It was found
that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon.

Porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in the
plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports.  I had
intended to make this request, but he anticipated me.  At dusk, when
concealed from the view of the enemy at Grand Gulf, McClernand landed
his command on the west bank.  The navy and transports ran the batteries
successfully. The troops marched across the point of land under cover of
night, unobserved.  By the time it was light the enemy saw our whole
fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving
down the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, with
National troops.

When the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected that
we would have to go to Rodney, about nine miles below, to find a
landing; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that a
good landing would be found at Bruinsburg, a few miles above Rodney,
from which point there was a good road leading to Port Gibson some
twelve miles in the interior.  The information was found correct, and
our landing was effected without opposition.

Sherman had not left his position above Vicksburg yet.  On the morning
of the 27th I ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps up
the Yazoo and threatening an attack on Haines' Bluff.

My object was to compel Pemberton to keep as much force about Vicksburg
as I could, until I could secure a good footing on high land east of the
river.  The move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned,
created great confusion about Vicksburg and doubts about our real
design.  Sherman moved the day of our attack on Grand Gulf, the 29th,
with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which Porter had
left above Vicksburg.

He debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack
the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at Haines' Bluff.
This move was made without a single casualty in either branch of the
service.  On the first of May Sherman received orders from me (sent from
Hard Times the evening of the 29th of April) to withdraw from the front
of Haines' Bluff and follow McPherson with two divisions as fast as he
could.

I had established a depot of supplies at Perkins' plantation. Now that
all our gunboats were below Grand Gulf it was possible that the enemy
might fit out boats in the Big Black with improvised armament and
attempt to destroy these supplies. McPherson was at Hard Times with a
portion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of his
command.  The night of the 29th I directed him to arm one of the
transports with artillery and send it up to Perkins' plantation as a
guard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved there
and put in position.

The embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at De Shroon's, Louisiana,
six miles above Bruinsburg, Mississippi.  Early on the morning of 30th
of April McClernand's corps and one division of McPherson's corps were
speedily landed.

When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled
since.  Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders
demoralized by any of our previous moves.  I was now in the enemy's
country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me
and my base of supplies.  But I was on dry ground on the same side of
the river with the enemy.  All the campaigns, labors, hardships and
exposures from the month of December previous to this time that had been
made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object.

I had with me the 13th corps, General McClernand commanding, and two
brigades of Logan's division of the 17th corps, General McPherson
commanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the
campaign with.  These were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade of
Logan's division and Crocker's division of the 17th corps.  On the 7th
of May I was further reinforced by Sherman with two divisions of his,
the 15th corps.  My total force was then about thirty-three thousand
men.

The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Haines' Bluff and Jackson with a force of
nearly sixty thousand men.  Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicksburg and
is connected with it by a railroad.  My first problem was to capture
Grand Gulf to use as a base.

Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground.  The bottom at that point is
higher than most of the low land in the valley of the Mississippi, and a
good road leads to the bluff.  It was natural to expect the garrison
from Grand Gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, our
reaching this solid base.  Bayou Pierre enters the Mississippi just
above Bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at the
time, in order to intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson, the
nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon.  This more than
doubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back of
Bruinsburg.  No time was to be lost in securing this foothold. Our
transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river
at one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and one
division of the 17th was effected during the day, April 30th, and early
evening.  McClernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days'
rations (to last five) could be issued to his men.  The bluffs were
reached an hour before sunset and McClernand was pushed on, hoping to
reach Port Gibson and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre before
the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an
enemy is always difficult.  Port Gibson, too, is the starting point of
roads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg and Jackson.

McClernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of Port Gibson
at Thompson's plantation.  There was some firing during the night, but
nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight.  The enemy had
taken a strong natural position with most of the Grand Gulf garrison,
numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under General Bowen.  His
hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under Loring could
reach him from Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to render much
assistance south of Port Gibson.  Two brigades of McPherson's corps
followed McClernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued,
and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13th
corps could be got out of the way.

The country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the
roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from
one ridge to another.  Where there are no clearings the sides of the
hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with
undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes,
almost impenetrable.  This makes it easy for an inferior force to delay,
if not defeat, a far superior one.

Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port Gibson
divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two
at the widest point.  These roads unite just outside the town.  This
made it necessary for McClernand to divide his force.  It was not only
divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above
described.  One flank could not reinforce the other except by marching
back to the junction of the roads.  McClernand put the divisions of
Hovey, Carr and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch and Osterhaus on
the left.  I was on the field by ten A.M., and inspected both flanks in
person.  On the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least
not repulsing our advance.  On the left, however, Osterhaus was not
faring so well.  He had been repulsed with some loss.  As soon as the
road could be cleared of McClernand's troops I ordered up McPherson, who
was close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of Logan's
division.  This was about noon.  I ordered him to send one brigade
(General John E. Smith's was selected) to support Osterhaus, and to move
to the left and flank the enemy out of his position.  This movement
carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, when
Smith's troops were seen well through the ravine, Osterhaus was directed
to renew his front attack.  It was successful and unattended by heavy
loss.  The enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left
followed before sunset.  While the movement to our left was going on,
McClernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests for
reinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed.  I
had been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging all
the men he had.  We followed up our victory until night overtook us
about two miles from Port Gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for
the night.



CHAPTER XXXIV.

CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON--GRIERSON'S RAID--OCCUPATION OF GRAND GULF
--MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK--BATTLE OF RAYMOND.

We started next morning for Port Gibson as soon as it was light enough
to see the road.  We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to find
that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the
bridge, which he had burned.  The troops were set to work at once to
construct a bridge across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre.  At this
time the water was high and the current rapid.  What might be called a
raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden
buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole
army over safely.  Colonel J. H. Wilson, a member of my staff, planned
and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water
and working as hard as any one engaged.  Officers and men generally
joined in this work.  When it was finished the army crossed and marched
eight miles beyond to the North Fork that day.  One brigade of Logan's
division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel
battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent
our repairing the burnt railroad bridge.  Two of his brigades were sent
up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the North Fork to repair the
bridge there.  The enemy soon left when he found we were building a
bridge elsewhere.  Before leaving Port Gibson we were reinforced by
Crocker's division, McPherson's corps, which had crossed the Mississippi
at Bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days'
rations.  McPherson still had one division west of the Mississippi
River, guarding the road from Milliken's Bend to the river below until
Sherman's command should relieve it.

On leaving Bruinsburg for the front I left my son Frederick, who had
joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, and
hoped to get away without him until after Grand Gulf should fall into
our hands; but on waking up he learned that I had gone, and being guided
by the sound of the battle raging at Thompson's Hill--called the Battle
of Port Gibson--found his way to where I was.  He had no horse to ride
at the time, and I had no facilities for even preparing a meal.  He,
therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached Grand Gulf.
Mr. C. A. Dana, then an officer of the War Department, accompanied me on
the Vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege.  He was in
the same situation as Fred so far as transportation and mess
arrangements were concerned.  The first time I call to mind seeing
either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous
horses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles and
bridles.

Our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly
equipped.

My son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no
anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home.  He looked out
for himself and was in every battle of the campaign.  His age, then not
quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain a
recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years.

When the movement from Bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon
train.  The train still west of the Mississippi was carried around with
proper escort, by a circuitous route from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times
seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the
battle of Port Gibson. My own horses, headquarters' transportation,
servants, mess chest, and everything except what I had on, was with this
train. General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburg
which I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than
stirrups.  I had no other for nearly a week.

It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. Provisions could
be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on
the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting.  I directed,
therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft
animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be
collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition.  Quite a train
was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was.  In it could
be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of
cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with
plough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons,
with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that
could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for
use or pleasure.  The making out of provision returns was stopped for
the time.  No formalities were to retard our progress until a position
was secured when the time could be spared to observe them.

It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of the
complete success of Colonel Grierson, who was making a raid through
central Mississippi.  He had started from La Grange April 17th with
three regiments of about 1,700 men.  On the 21st he had detached Colonel
Hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus and
Macon and then return to La Grange.  Hatch had a sharp fight with the
enemy at Columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at
Okalona and Tupelo, and arriving in La Grange April 26.  Grierson
continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the Vicksburg and
Meridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving at
Baton Rouge May 2d.  This raid was of great importance, for Grierson had
attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against
Vicksburg.

During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the North Fork was
repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning.
Before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from
a commanding position; but they were soon driven off.  It was evident
that the enemy was covering a retreat from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg.
Every commanding position from this (Grindstone) crossing to Hankinson's
ferry over the Big Black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our
progress. McPherson, however, reached Hankinson's ferry before night,
seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and
several miles north on the road to Vicksburg.  When the junction of the
road going to Vicksburg with the road from Grand Gulf to Raymond and
Jackson was reached, Logan with his division was turned to the left
towards Grand Gulf.  I went with him a short distance from this
junction.  McPherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the
battle of Port Gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle;
but the road Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right
flank, and they soon gave way.  McPherson was ordered to hold
Hankinson's ferry and the road back to Willow Springs with one division;
McClernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to
guard the line back down the bayou.  I did not want to take the chances
of having an enemy lurking in our rear.

On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf, where the road comes into
the one from Vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, I
learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on
their way to Vicksburg.  I left Logan to make the proper disposition of
his troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort of
about twenty cavalry.  Admiral Porter had already arrived with his
fleet.  The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place.

When I reached Grand Gulf May 3d I had not been with my baggage since
the 27th of April and consequently had had no change of underclothing,
no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters,
and no tent to cover me.  The first thing I did was to get a bath,
borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and
get a good meal on the flag-ship.  Then I wrote letters to the
general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be
telegraphed from Cairo, orders to General Sullivan commanding above
Vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders.  About twelve
o'clock at night I was through my work and started for Hankinson's
ferry, arriving there before daylight.  While at Grand Gulf I heard from
Banks, who was on the Red River, and who said that he could not be at
Port Hudson before the 10th of May and then with only 15,000 men.  Up to
this time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf, as a base of
supplies, detach McClernand's corps to Banks and co-operate with him in
the reduction of Port Hudson.

The news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the
one intended.  To wait for his co-operation would have detained me at
least a month.  The reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand
men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high
points close to the river for over three hundred miles.  The enemy would
have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than
Banks could have brought. I therefore determined to move independently
of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of
Vicksburg and invest or capture the city.

Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at
Washington were notified.  I knew well that Halleck's caution would lead
him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any
chance of success.  The time it would take to communicate with
Washington and get a reply would be so great that I could not be
interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was
practicable.  Even Sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies
other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four
States of the Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine
at this time, wrote me from Hankinson's ferry, advising me of the
impossibility of supplying our army over a single road.  He urged me to
"stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and
then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as
life."  To this I replied:  "I do not calculate upon the possibility of
supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf.  I know it will be
impossible without constructing additional roads.  What I do expect is
to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make
the country furnish the balance."  We started from Bruinsburg with an
average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own
supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time.  A delay
would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify.

McClernand's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as they
were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them
three days' rations in haversacks.  Beef, mutton, poultry and forage
were found in abundance.  Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was
also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be
obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men.  Every plantation,
however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for
the owners and their slaves.  All these were kept running while we were
stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at
all plantations covered by the troops.  But the product was taken by the
troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to
go without bread until a new base was established on the Yazoo above
Vicksburg.

While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I ordered
reconnoissances made by McClernand and McPherson, with the view of
leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black and
attack the city at once.

On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf and crossed his command that
night and the next day.  Three days' rations had been brought up from
Grand Gulf for the advanced troops and were issued.  Orders were given
for a forward movement the next day.  Sherman was directed to order up
Blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from Milliken's Bend
to Hard Times with two brigades.

The quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered to send two hundred
wagons with Blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread,
coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat.

On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Memphis, was ordered to send
four regiments from his command to Milliken's Bend to relieve Blair's
division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send Lauman's division in
addition, the latter to join the army in the field.  The four regiments
were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no
delay.

During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north of the
Big Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson, via Rocky
Springs, Utica and Raymond.  That night he and McClernand were both at
Rocky Springs ten miles from Hankinson's ferry.  McPherson remained
there during the 8th, while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Sherman
marched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's ferry.  The 9th, McPherson moved
to a point within a few miles west of Utica; McClernand and Sherman
remained where they were.  On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica, Sherman
to Big Sandy; McClernand was still at Big Sandy.  The 11th, McClernand
was at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn; McPherson five miles advanced
from Utica. May 12th, McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman at
Fourteen Mile Creek; McPherson at Raymond after a battle.

After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's ferry Vicksburg
could have been approached and besieged by the south side.  It is not
probable, however, that Pemberton would have permitted a close
besiegement.  The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to
hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the
Big Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point.  It
was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, and
approach from that direction.  Accordingly, McPherson's troops that had
crossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jackson
commenced.

As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads
generally confined to the tops of the hills.  The troops were moved one
(sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel
to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it.  McClernand's
corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the
crossings.  Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with
the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by McClernand and
Sherman with slight loss.  McPherson was to the right of Sherman,
extending to Raymond.  The cavalry was used in this advance in
reconnoitring to find the roads:  to cover our advances and to find the
most practicable routes from one command to another so they could
support each other in case of an attack.  In making this move I
estimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteen
thousand men, with smaller forces at Haines' Bluff and Jackson.  It
would not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at
one place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him
in detail.  This was done with success, but I found afterwards that I
had entirely under-estimated Pemberton's strength.

Up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition.
My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad
and about seven miles south of it.  The right was at Raymond eighteen
miles from Jackson, McPherson commanding; Sherman in the centre on
Fourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across; McClernand to the left,
also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within two
miles of Edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a
considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack.
McClernand's left was on the Big Black.  In all our moves, up to this
time, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries had
been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear.

McPherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries
under General Gregg, about two miles out of Raymond. This was about two
P.M.  Logan was in advance with one of his brigades.  He deployed and
moved up to engage the enemy. McPherson ordered the road in rear to be
cleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan's division, and Crocker's,
which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch.  The
order was obeyed with alacrity.  Logan got his division in position for
assault before Crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying
the enemy's position easily, sending Gregg flying from the field not to
appear against our front again until we met at Jackson.

In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing
--nearly or quite all from Logan's division.  The enemy's loss was 100
killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners.

I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commanders
as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher
command.  Crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he
volunteered.  His weak condition never put him on the sick report when
there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet.
He died not long after the close of the rebellion.



CHAPTER XXXV.

MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON--FALL OF JACKSON--INTERCEPTING THE ENEMY
--BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL.

When the news reached me of McPherson's victory at Raymond about sundown
my position was with Sherman.  I decided at once to turn the whole
column towards Jackson and capture that place without delay.

Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18,000 men; in
fact, as I learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000.  A force was also
collecting on my right, at Jackson, the point where all the railroads
communicating with Vicksburg connect. All the enemy's supplies of men
and stores would come by that point.  As I hoped in the end to besiege
Vicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid.  I therefore
determined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any force
in that direction and then turn upon Pemberton.  But by moving against
Jackson, I uncovered my own communication.  So I finally decided to have
none--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force
eastward.  I then had no fears for my communications, and if I moved
quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in
the rear.

Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on
the 13th were annulled by new ones.  McPherson was ordered at daylight
to move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson; Sherman was notified of my
determination to capture Jackson and work from there westward.  He was
ordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond.
McClernand was ordered to march with three divisions by Dillon's to
Raymond.  One was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black.

On the 10th I had received a letter from Banks, on the Red River, asking
reinforcements.  Porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his
fleet on the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position and
declining to send any troops.  I looked upon side movements as long as
the enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg as a waste of time and
material.

General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13th
from Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the Confederate
troops in Mississippi.  I knew he was expecting reinforcements from the
south and east. On the 6th I had written to General Halleck:
"Information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are
bringing forces from Tullahoma."

Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each
other, as far as the nature of the country would admit.  Reconnoissances
were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint
themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case
a union became necessary.

McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th and
immediately set to work destroying the railroad.  Sherman's advance
reached Raymond before the last of McPherson's command had got out of
the town.  McClernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at Edward's
station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for
the night in good order.  On the night of the 13th, McPherson was
ordered to march at early dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away.
Sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road
from Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on and
does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed
the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city.
McClernand was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton,
one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs following Sherman's
line, and a third to Raymond.  He was also directed to send his siege
guns, four in number with the troops going by Mississippi Springs.
McClernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. With one
division at Clinton he was in position to reinforce McPherson, at
Jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond Mississippi
Springs was equally available to reinforce Sherman; the one at Raymond
could take either road. He still had two other divisions farther back
now that Blair had come up, available within a day at Jackson.  If this
last command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already one
day's march from there on their way to Vicksburg and on three different
roads leading to the latter city.  But the most important consideration
in my mind was to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should come
out to attack my rear. This I expected him to do; as shown further on,
he was directed by Johnston to make this very move.

I notified General Halleck that I should attack the State capital on the
14th.  A courier carried the dispatch to Grand Gulf through an
unprotected country.

Sherman and McPherson communicated with each other during the night and
arranged to reach Jackson at about the same hour.  It rained in torrents
during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th.
The roads were intolerable, and in some places on Sherman's line, where
the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water.
But the troops never murmured.  By nine o'clock Crocker, of McPherson's
corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and
speedily drove them in upon the main body.  They were outside of the
intrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that had
been driven out of Raymond.  Johnston had been reinforced; during the
night by Georgia and South Carolina regiments, so that his force
amounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more.

Sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the
town, but speedily drove them in.  He was now on the south and
south-west of Jackson confronting the Confederates behind their
breastworks, while McPherson's right was nearly two miles north,
occupying a line running north and south across the Vicksburg railroad.
Artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an
assault. McPherson brought up Logan's division while he deployed
Crocker's for the assault.  Sherman made similar dispositions on the
right.  By eleven A.M. both were ready to attack.  Crocker moved his
division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line.  These troops at
once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body,
when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole division
charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main
line.  This stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of
his main fortifications. McPherson followed up with his command until
within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he
halted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine the
next move.  It was now about noon.

While this was going on Sherman was confronting a rebel battery which
enfiladed the road on which he was marching--the Mississippi Springs
road--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had to
pass.  By detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemy
flanked and speedily driven within the main line.  This brought our
whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous
on the north, west and south sides from the Pearl River north of the
city to the same river south.  I was with Sherman.  He was confronted by
a force sufficient to hold us back.  Appearances did not justify an
assault where we were.  I had directed Sherman to send a force to the
right, and to reconnoitre as far as to the Pearl River.  This force,
Tuttle's division, not returning I rode to the right with my staff, and
soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line.  Tuttle's
movement or McPherson's pressure had no doubt led Johnston to order a
retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was
getting away.  Tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines
without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confronting
Sherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery.  I rode
immediately to the State House, where I was soon followed by Sherman.
About the same time McPherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his
front, and advanced Crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they
could not move their guns or destroy them.  He captured seven guns and,
moving on, hoisted the National flag over the rebel capital of
Mississippi.  Stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat,
but was too late or not expeditious enough.

Our loss in this engagement was:  McPherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded;
Sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing.  The enemy lost 845
killed, wounded and captured.  Seventeen guns fell into our hands, and
the enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a large
amount of commissary stores.

On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined McClernand's 4th
division.  He had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the
only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign.

I slept that night in the room that Johnston was said to have occupied
the night before.

About four in the afternoon I sent for the corps commanders and directed
the dispositions to be made of their troops.  Sherman was to remain in
Jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, and
manufacturing city of military supplies. He did the work most
effectually.  Sherman and I went together into a manufactory which had
not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of Yankee
troops.  Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either
the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls.  We looked on
for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the
looms, with "C. S. A."  woven in each bolt.  There was an immense amount
of cotton, in bales, stacked outside.  Finally I told Sherman I thought
they had done work enough.  The operatives were told they could leave
and take with them what cloth they could carry.  In a few minutes cotton
and factory were in a blaze. The proprietor visited Washington while I
was President to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was
private.  He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his
property had been destroyed by National troops, so that he might use it
with Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim.  I
declined.

On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch to
Pemberton at Edward's station:  "I have lately arrived, and learn that
Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton.  It
is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced.  If
practicable, come up in his rear at once.  To beat such a detachment
would be of immense value.  All the troops you can quickly assemble
should be brought.  Time is all-important."  This dispatch was sent in
triplicate, by different messengers.  One of the messengers happened to
be a loyal man who had been expelled from Memphis some months before by
Hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was a
good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to
those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but Hurlbut and the
expelled man understood each other.  He delivered his copy of Johnston's
dispatch to McPherson who forwarded it to me.

Receiving this dispatch on the 14th I ordered McPherson to move promptly
in the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston could
reach the road.  Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson.  I also
informed McClernand of the capture of Jackson and sent him the following
order:  "It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and
cross the Big Black, and beat us into Vicksburg.  We must not allow them
to do this.  Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and make all
dispatch in getting there.  Move troops by the most direct road from
wherever they may be on the receipt of this order."

And to Blair I wrote:  "Their design is evidently to cross the Big Black
and pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers.  We
must beat them.  Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all the
trains with you.  Smith's division, and any other troops now with you,
will go to the same place.  If practicable, take parallel roads, so as
to divide your troops and train."

Johnston stopped on the Canton road only six miles north of Jackson, the
night of the 14th.  He sent from there to Pemberton dispatches
announcing the loss of Jackson, and the following order:

"As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the
rest of the army.  I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be
able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy.  Can Grant supply himself
from the Mississippi?  Can you not cut him off from it, and above all,
should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him."

The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of
the country.  McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near the
railroad.  McClernand's command was, one division (Hovey's) on the road
McPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles.  One (Osterhaus)
was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near
Champion's Hill; one (Carr's) had to pass over the same road with
Osterhaus, but being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detained
by it; the fourth (Smith's) with Blair's division, was near Auburn with
a different road to pass over.  McClernand faced about and moved
promptly.  His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past nine in
the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men.

The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton; Carr and Osterhaus were about
three miles south, but abreast, facing west; Smith was north of Raymond
with Blair in his rear.

McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock,
and by four reached Hovey and went into camp; Crocker bivouacked just in
Hovey's rear on the Clinton road.  Sherman with two divisions, was in
Jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military
factories.  I rode in person out to Clinton.  On my arrival I ordered
McClernand to move early in the morning on Edward's station, cautioning
him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt
very certain of success.

I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of
his superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton.  This,
indeed, I knew he could not do; but I felt sure he would make the
attempt to reach that point.  It turned out, however, that he had
decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently
determined to move south from Edward's station and get between me and my
base.  I, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week
before.  On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edward's
station, but the rains had swollen Baker's Creek, which he had to cross
so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away.
This brought him back to the Jackson road, on which there was a good
bridge over Baker's Creek.  Some of his troops were marching until
midnight to get there.  Receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of
his order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a
dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be
expected.

About five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed
on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, were brought to me.  They
reported that they had passed through Pemberton's army in the night, and
that it was still marching east. They reported him to have eighty
regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five
thousand men.

I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order to
complete his work; but getting the above information I sent him orders
to move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division with an
ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander
to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear.  Within
an hour after receiving this order Steele's division was on the road.
At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to move
with all speed to Edward's station.  McClernand was directed to embrace
Blair in his command for the present.  Blair's division was a part of
the 15th army corps (Sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its
corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about
and were moving west. The 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our
extreme right.  McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the way
of the troops, and to follow Hovey's division as closely as possible.
McClernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at Edward's
station, over which to march his troops.  Hovey's division of his corps
had the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north.
McClernand was directed to move Blair's and A. J. Smith's divisions by
the southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and Carr by the middle
road.  Orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to
feel for the enemy.

Smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter
the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on the
middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found
the enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line.  About the
same time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon
road from Jackson to Vicksburg.  McPherson was hastening up to join
Hovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey's trains occupying the roads.  I was
still back at Clinton.  McPherson sent me word of the situation, and
expressed the wish that I was up.  By half-past seven I was on the road
and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in
front of troops off the road.  When I arrived Hovey's skirmishing
amounted almost to a battle.

McClernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance
to march to reach the enemy's position than McPherson.  I sent him word
by a staff officer to push forward and attack.  These orders were
repeated several times without apparently expediting McClernand's
advance.

Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us,
whether taken by accident or design, was well selected.  It is one of
the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in
range.  On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a
ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek.
It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it
difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended.  The ridge
occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns
westerly.  The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge.
The Bolton and Edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south at
this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile;
then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's Creek,
nearly a mile away.  On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual
and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek.  There was, when we
were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road.

From Raymond there is a direct road to Edward's station, some three
miles west of Champion's Hill.  There is one also to Bolton.  From this
latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half
miles before reaching Bolton and leads direct to the same station.  It
was along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand's corps,
and Blair of Sherman's, temporarily under McClernand, were moving.
Hovey of McClernand's command was with McPherson, farther north on the
road from Bolton direct to Edward's station.  The middle road comes into
the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and
descends to Baker's Creek; the southern road is still several miles
south and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edward's
station.  Pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east.
Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed
parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left.

By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested
battle.  Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him,
had captured a battery of the enemy.  But he was not able to hold his
position and had to abandon the artillery.  McPherson brought up his
troops as fast as possible, Logan in front, and posted them on the right
of Hovey and across the flank of the enemy.  Logan reinforced Hovey with
one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west
to make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads
would admit.  Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on
me for more reinforcements.  I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up,
to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteries
to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they
did good execution.

From Logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over
open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them.  He
did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the
belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance.
Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey where we were the most
heavily pressed; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff by our
right around, until I came up with Logan himself.  I found him near the
road leading down to Baker's Creek.  He was actually in command of the
only road over which the enemy could retreat; Hovey, reinforced by two
brigades from McPherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; Crocker,
with two brigades, covered their left flank; McClernand two hours
before, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with two
divisions, and the two divisions, Blair's and A. J. Smith's, were
confronting the rebel right; Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur's
division of the 17th corps (McPherson's), had crossed the river at Grand
Gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank.  Neither
Logan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy.  Just at
this juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for more
reinforcements.  There were none to spare.  I then gave an order to move
McPherson's command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncovered
the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the
enemy.

During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from
Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up with
two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one
about the time the road was opened to the rear.  The enemy fled
precipitately.  This was between three and four o'clock.  I rode
forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north
road, and found the skirmishers of Carr's division just coming in.
Osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers
advanced in like manner.  Hovey's division, and McPherson's two
divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not
in the best condition to follow the retreating foe.  I sent orders to
Osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, I
explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as
the Big Black, and to cross it if he could; Osterhaus to follow him.
The pursuit was continued until after dark.

The battle of Champion's Hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting,
preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose
to the dignity of battle.  Every man of Hovey's division and of
McPherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle.  No other part
of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before.
Osterhaus's and A. J. Smith's divisions had encountered the rebel
advanced pickets as early as half-past seven.  Their positions were
admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line.  McClernand, with two
divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon
and in easy hearing.  I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully
competent to explain to him the situation.  These traversed the wood
separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he
did not come.  It is true, in front of McClernand there was a small
force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine
obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my
staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or
been cut off.  Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to
his corps, to join on to his right flank.  Hovey was bearing the brunt
of the battle at the time.  To obey the order he would have had to pull
out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand had
to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground.
Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediate
superior.

We had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged.  This
excludes those that did not get up, all of McClernand's command except
Hovey.  Our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing.  Hovey
alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of his
division.

Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known the
ground as I did afterwards, I cannot see how Pemberton could have
escaped with any organized force.  As it was he lost over three thousand
killed and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and in
pursuit.  Loring's division, which was the right of Pemberton's line,
was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into Vicksburg.
Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River.  His
troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the
general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to
their homes.  Logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns.
Hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500
sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200.

McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their
cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded.  The pursuit
was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road.  The night
of the 16th of May found McPherson's command bivouacked from two to six
miles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to Vicksburg.
Carr and Osterhaus were at Edward's station, and Blair was about three
miles south-east; Hovey remained on the field where his troops had
fought so bravely and bled so freely.  Much war material abandoned by
the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of
artillery.  I pushed through the advancing column with my staff and kept
in advance until after night. Finding ourselves alone we stopped and
took possession of a vacant house.  As no troops came up we moved back a
mile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac
on the road.  We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which
had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with wounded
and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left.

While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the
thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the
battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do
as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend.



CHAPTER XXXVI.

BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK--INVESTMENT OF
VICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS.

We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton,
without a possibility of a junction of their forces.  Pemberton might
have made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there and,
by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to
Johnston.  But this would have given us Vicksburg.  It would have been
his proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had he
been in Pemberton's place.  In fact it would have been in conformity
with Johnston's orders to Pemberton.

Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th
and reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting.  His rear guard
did not get in until two A.M. the 17th, but renewed their march by
daylight.  He paroled his prisoners at Jackson, and was forced to leave
his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants.  At Bolton he was
informed of our victory.  He was directed to commence the march early
next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to Bridgeport on the
Big Black River, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to
find the enemy.  Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon
train as early as possible.

This movement brought Sherman's corps together, and at a point where I
hoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected and Sherman's corps
used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a
crossing for the remainder of the army.  I informed him that I would
endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river.

The advance division, Carr's (McClernand's corps), resumed the pursuit
at half-past three A.M. on the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus,
McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps.  As I expected, the enemy
was found in position on the Big Black.  The point was only six miles
from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at
an early hour.  Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed
close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes
overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation.  A
bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which,
however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages.  When
the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land
into an island.  The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had
felled into the ditch.  At this time there was a foot or two of water in
it. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this
bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing
dirt over them.  The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west
of the river.  At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of
uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men.  Carr's
division was deployed on our right, Lawler's brigade forming his extreme
right and reaching through these woods to the river above.  Osterhaus'
division was deployed to the left of Carr and covered the enemy's entire
front.  McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to
come in wherever he could be of assistance.

While the troops were standing as here described an officer from Banks'
staff came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, dated
the 11th of May.  It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks to
be forwarded to me.  It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf and to
co-operate from there with Banks against Port Hudson, and then to return
with our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg.  I told the officer that
the order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it now if he
knew our position.  The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to
obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when I
heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that
direction, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the
enemy.  I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the
charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; I
think not even to this day.

The assault was successful.  But little resistance was made. The enemy
fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and
leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands.  Many
tried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some were
drowned in the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners.
Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing.  The enemy probably
lost but few men except those captured and drowned.  But for the
successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little
doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent
his occupying his defences around Vicksburg.

As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to
be built.  It was but little after nine o'clock A.M. when the capture
took place.  As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for
the construction of three bridges.  One was taken charge of by
Lieutenant Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPherson
himself and one by General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligent
volunteer officer.  My recollection is that Hains built a raft bridge;
McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons;
and that Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting
only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops
interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from
their stumps.  A bridge was then made with these trees to support the
roadway.  Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever
found, for this purpose.  By eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th
all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing.

Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found Blair with
the pontoon train already there.  A few of the enemy were intrenched on
the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered.
Two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following
morning.

On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the troops
and as soon as possible joined Sherman.  My first anxiety was to secure
a base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg.  Sherman's line
of march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy
the December before when he was repulsed.  Sherman was equally anxious
with myself.  Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and
well up with the advanced skirmishers.  There were some detached works
along the crest of the hill.  These were still occupied by the enemy, or
else the garrison from Haines' Bluff had not all got past on their way
to Vicksburg.  At all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick
and fast for a short time.  In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure of
looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before on
the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action.
He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive
assurance of success.  This, however, he said was the end of one of the
greatest campaigns in history and I ought to make a report of it at
once.  Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what
might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was
a complete and successful campaign.  I do not claim to quote Sherman's
language; but the substance only.  My reason for mentioning this
incident will appear further on.

McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson and
Vicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear.  He arrived at
night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp.  McClernand moved
by the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned to
the left and put his troops on the road from Baldwin's ferry to
Vicksburg.  This brought him south of McPherson.  I now had my three
corps up the works built for the defence of Vicksburg, on three roads
--one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city.
By the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited
number of troops would allow.  Sherman was on the right, and covered the
high ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as far south-east as his
troops would extend.  McPherson joined on to his left, and occupied
ground on both sides of the Jackson road.  McClernand took up the ground
to his left and extended as far towards Warrenton as he could, keeping a
continuous line.

On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were
getting into better position.  The enemy had been much demoralized by
his defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed he
would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at two
o'clock I ordered an assault.  It resulted in securing more advanced
positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire
of the enemy.

The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making
roads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River or Chickasaw Bayou.  Most of
the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations
issued by the commissary.  They had an abundance of food, however, but
began to feel the want of bread.  I remember that in passing around to
the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in
rather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, "Hard tack."  In a
moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "Hard tack! Hard tack!"
I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the
arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with
everything they needed.  The cry was instantly changed to cheers.  By
the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them.
The bread and coffee were highly appreciated.

I now determined on a second assault.  Johnston was in my rear, only
fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I
had with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of his
coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat my
anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent
the capture of the city.  The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save
sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and
would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State.  But
the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry
the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the
trenches if they had not been allowed to try.

The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten
o'clock A.M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in
position.  All the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all
might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant,
and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the
very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them;
but at no place were we able to enter.  General McClernand reported that
he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted
reinforcements.  I occupied a position from which I believed I could see
as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the
success he reported.  But his request for reinforcements being repeated
I could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby's division of the 17th corps.
Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a
diversion in favor of McClernand.  This last attack only served to
increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever.  As soon as
it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been
obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus
ended the last assault upon Vicksburg.



CHAPTER XXXVII

SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

I now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy," as it
were, and to incur no more losses.  The experience of the 22d convinced
officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the
defences and approaches with a will.  With the navy holding the river,
the investment of Vicksburg was complete.  As long as we could hold our
position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of
war to what they had on hand.  These could not last always.

The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th.  On the 18th
of May the army was in rear of Vicksburg.  On the 19th, just twenty days
after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had
been made:  five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) had
been fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State had
fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful
for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one
hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but
five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousand
prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been
killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces
had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from
Vicksburg to Port Hudson, had become ours.  The Union force that had
crossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than forty-three
thousand men. One division of these, Blair's, only arrived in time to
take part in the battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged there;
and one brigade, Ransom's of McPherson's corps, reached the field after
the battle.  The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the
roads between these places, over sixty thousand men.  They were in their
own country, where no rear guards were necessary.  The country is
admirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive
campaign.  All their troops had to be met.  We were fortunate, to say
the least, in meeting them in detail:  at Port Gibson seven or eight
thousand; at Raymond, five thousand; at Jackson, from eight to eleven
thousand; at Champion's Hill, twenty-five thousand; at the Big Black,
four thousand.  A part of those met at Jackson were all that was left of
those encountered at Raymond.  They were beaten in detail by a force
smaller than their own, upon their own ground.  Our loss up to this time
was:

                             KILLED  WOUNDED  MISSING

 Port Gibson.....              131     719      25
 South Fork Bayou Pierre.....   ..       1      ..
 Skirmishes, May 3 .....         1       9      ..
 Fourteen Mile Creek.....        6      24      ..
 Raymond...............         66     339      39
 Jackson.....                   42     251       7
 Champion's Hill.....          410   1,844     187
 Big Black.....                 39     237       3
 Bridgeport.....                ..       1      ..
 Total.....                    695   3,425     259


Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty.  Not
half of them were disabled for any length of time.

After the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siege
began.  Sherman occupied the right starting from the river above
Vicksburg, McPherson the centre (McArthur's division now with him) and
McClernand the left, holding the road south to Warrenton.  Lauman's
division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the
line.

In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been
completed from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear of
the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition;
ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be
encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up.  The troops
had been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up to
this time.  All was now ready for the pick and spade.  Prentiss and
Hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared.
Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black,
and to observe Johnston.  I knew that Johnston was receiving
reinforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee.
Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would make
the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of
losing ground elsewhere.

My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haines' Bluff
to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton.  The line of the enemy was about
seven.  In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson, in
our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line
of defence facing the other way.  I had not troops enough under my
command to man these.  General Halleck appreciated the situation and,
without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possible
dispatch.

The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defence.  On the north it is
about two hundred feet above the Mississippi River at the highest point
and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up
with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a
dense forest.  Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was
in cultivation.  But here, too, it was cut up by ravines and small
streams.  The enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge from
the river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the
Jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a
southwesterly direction to the river.  Deep ravines of the description
given lay in front of these defences.  As there is a succession of
gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was
necessarily very irregular.  To follow each of these spurs with
intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have
lengthened their line very much. Generally therefore, or in many places,
their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to
the head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generally
open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this
outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely.

The work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy as
his was against us, was very great.  The problem was also complicated by
our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible.  We had but
four engineer officers with us. Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps,
was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him.
His health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Comstock,
also of the Engineer Corps.  To provide assistants on such a long line I
directed that all officers who had graduated at West Point, where they
had necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition to
their other duties assist in the work.

The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates.  The
chief commissary, now the Commissary-General of the Army, begged off,
however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good
for unless he would do for a sap-roller.  As soldiers require rations
while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and
as we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I let
him off.  The general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twenty
pounds, and is not tall.

We had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none
at the West to draw from.  Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a
battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the field
artillery used in the campaign, the siege began.  The first thing to do
was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding
positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the
enemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and
covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route.  The
enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries.
Probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was
kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready
to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works.

In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy.
It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than
the ordinary parapet.  To give additional protection sand bags,
bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough
apart to make loop-holes for musketry.  On top of these, logs were put.
By these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty,
without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters.  The enemy used in their
defence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over
our men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do not
remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of
these shells. When they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound was
terrible.  In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well.  Their
use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any
corresponding advantage to those using them.

The enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because
we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it
freely.  Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men
behind.

There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in
front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the
toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve
pound shells and binding them with strong iron bands.  These answered as
cochorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the
trenches of the enemy.

The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by
the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were
paid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made.
The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced
position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the
batteries were advanced.  By the 30th of June there were two hundred and
twenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of
heavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy.  We were now
as strong for defence against the garrison of Vicksburg as they were
against us; but I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receiving
constant reinforcements from the east. He had at this time a larger
force than I had had at any time prior to the battle of Champion's Hill.

As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburg
reached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in.  Some came to
gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through
the terrible ordeal; members of the Christian and Sanitary Associations
came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded.  Often those
coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry.
They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated.  Many of the
soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without bread
during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon,
almost took away their appetite.  But the intention was good.

Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois, with most of
the State officers.  I naturally wanted to show them what there was of
most interest.  In Sherman's front the ground was the most broken and
most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure.  I therefore took
them to Sherman's headquarters and presented them.  Before starting out
to look at the lines--possibly while Sherman's horse was being saddled
--there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which
the North had been so imperfectly informed.  There was a little knot
around Sherman and another around me, and I heard Sherman repeating, in
the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked
down from Walnut Hills upon the land below on the 18th of May, adding:
"Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; I
opposed it. I wrote him a letter about it."  But for this speech it is
not likely that Sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of.  His
untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him to
a full share of all the credit due for its success.  He could not have
done more if the plan had been his own. (*13)

On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up the Yazoo to drive out a
force of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and the Yazoo.
The country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage.
Blair was instructed to take all of it.  The cattle were to be driven in
for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our
troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the
roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible.  Blair went forty-five
miles and was gone almost a week.  His work was effectually done.  I
requested Porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floating
nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which
proved very useful, up to Haines' Bluff to hold it until reinforcements
could be sent.

On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks, asking me to reinforce
him with ten thousand men at Port Hudson.  Of course I could not comply
with his request, nor did I think he needed them.  He was in no danger
of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army
organizing in his rear to raise the siege.

On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut's command arrived, General
Kimball commanding.  It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-east
of Haines' Bluff and about midway between the Big Black and the Yazoo.
A brigade of Blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on
Blair's return from the Yazoo, been sent to the same place with
instructions to watch the crossings of the Big Black River, to destroy
the roads in his (Blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies.

On the 7th of June our little force of colored and white troops across
the Mississippi, at Milliken's Bend, were attacked by about 3,000 men
from Richard Taylor's trans-Mississippi command.  With the aid of the
gunboats they were speedily repelled.  I sent Mower's brigade over with
instructions to drive the enemy beyond the Tensas Bayou; and we had no
further trouble in that quarter during the siege.  This was the first
important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire.
These men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of
the siege, but they behaved well.

On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Hurlbut's command, under
General Sooy Smith.  It was sent immediately to Haines' Bluff, and
General C. C. Washburn was assigned to the general command at that
point.

On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of the
Missouri under General Herron, which was placed on our left. This cut
off the last possible chance of communication between Pemberton and
Johnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up on McClernand's left while
Herron intrenched from Lauman to the water's edge.  At this point the
water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land.  Through this
opening no doubt the Confederate commanders had been able to get
messengers under cover of night.

On the 14th General Parke arrived with two divisions of Burnside's
corps, and was immediately dispatched to Haines' Bluff.  These latter
troops--Herron's and Parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken of
sent by Halleck in anticipation of their being needed.  They arrived
none too soon.

I now had about seventy-one thousand men.  More than half were disposed
across the peninsula, between the Yazoo at Haines' Bluff and the Big
Black, with the division of Osterhaus watching the crossings of the
latter river farther south and west from the crossing of the Jackson
road to Baldwin's ferry and below.

There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg, along which and their
immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced;
but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected.

On the 17th I received a letter from General Sherman and one on the 18th
from General McPherson, saying that their respective commands had
complained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published by
General McClernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to the
other troops engaged in the campaign.  This order had been sent North
and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps.  The
order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside
of McClernand's command until brought in this way.  I at once wrote to
McClernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order.  He did so,
and I at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and
ordered him back to Springfield, Illinois.  The publication of his order
in the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine.



CHAPTER XXXVIII.

JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES' BLUFF--EXPLOSION OF THE
MINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT--THE FLAG
OF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER--ACCEPTING
THE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.

On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston had
crossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, to
raise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence between
Johnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburg
had by this time passed from Johnston's mind.  I immediately ordered
Sherman to the command of all the forces from Haines' Bluff to the Big
Black River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg.
Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to hold
themselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman.  Haines' Bluff had been
strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from
there to the Big Black at the railroad crossing batteries had been
constructed.  The work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not
already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them.

We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were also
looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston.
But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantially
protected as they were against us.  Where we were looking east and north
we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive.  Johnston evidently
took in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making an
assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides
without accomplishing any result.  We were strong enough to have taken
the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk
of losing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at
the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston.

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward our
position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing.  At three
points on the Jackson road, in front of Leggett's brigade, a sap was run
up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it undermined
and the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in
reaching our mine.  At this particular point the hill on which the rebel
work stands rises abruptly.  Our sap ran close up to the outside of the
enemy's parapet.  In fact this parapet was also our protection.  The
soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this
barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiers
for the tobacco of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw over
hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned
them.

Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently
when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it.
This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy
it.  On the 25th of June at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was
exploded.  A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to
open with the explosion.  The effect was to blow the top of the hill off
and make a crater where it stood.  The breach was not sufficient to
enable us to pass a column of attack through.  In fact, the enemy having
failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most
of the men guarding that point were placed.  There were a few men,
however, left at the advance line, and others working in the
countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours.  All that were
there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side,
still alive.  I remember one colored man, who had been under ground at
work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side.  He was
not much hurt, but terribly frightened.  Some one asked him how high he
had gone up.  "Dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his
reply.  General Logan commanded at this point and took this colored man
to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege.

As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two
regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had
been placed for the express purpose.  The enemy made a desperate effort
to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line.  From
here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution.  The
compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect.  The
enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the
contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to
be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation.  During
the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against
the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of
their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their
grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of
which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our
ranks.  We found it impossible to continue this work.  Another mine was
consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroying
an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its
occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood.  No attempt to
charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us.
Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded.  The
enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the
first.  We lost none in the second.

From this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position
nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined to
explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at
different points and assault immediately after.  We were up now at three
different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet
of the enemy divided us.

At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informed
me that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order
to relieve the garrison at Vicksburg.  I knew the garrison would make no
formidable effort to relieve itself.  The picket lines were so close to
each other--where there was space enough between the lines to post
pickets--that the men could converse.  On the 21st of June I was
informed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, by
crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he had
employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been
canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "Yankees" to
cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because
their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and
had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be
finished in a week to carry them all over.  The rebel pickets also said
that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build
these boats with.  Afterwards this story was verified:  on entering the
city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats.

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt
abortive.  Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified, so
that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on
the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if
the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee
crossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side.  Had the attempt been made
the garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on
the Louisiana side.  General Richard Taylor was expected on the west
bank to co-operate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, nor
could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service.  The
Mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth,
except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson.  We had
nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence to
opposite Bruinsburg.  The roads west were not of a character to draw
supplies over for any considerable force.

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a
number of places.  At ten points we could move under cover to within
from five to one hundred yards of the enemy.  Orders were given to make
all preparations for assault on the 6th of July.  The debouches were
ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to
be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast.  Plank, and
bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to
enable the troops to cross the ditches.

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and the
Big Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of the
month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to
cut his way out.  Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached
him.

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the
following letter to each of his four division commanders:

"Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it
will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place.  I see no
prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable
obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to
inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your
troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues
necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation."

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically
did the same.  They expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate
would fail.  Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnston
suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the
garrison with their arms.  Johnston replied that it would be a
confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton to
use his name in making such an arrangement.

On the 3d about ten o'clock A.M. white flags appeared on a portion of
the rebel works.  Hostilities along that part of the line ceased at
once.  Soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a
white flag.  They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, and
Colonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the following
letter to me:

"I have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view to
arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg.  To this end, if
agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like
number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may
find convenient.  I make this proposition to save the further effusion
of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling
myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period.
This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by
Major-General John S. Bowen."

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these
white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the
command.  The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard
fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate,
exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the
gibes of many Northern papers that came to them saying all their
suffering was in vain, that Vicksburg would never be taken, were at last
at an end and the Union sure to be saved.

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see me.  I had
been a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri, and knew him well and favorably
before the war; but his request was refused.  He then suggested that I
should meet Pemberton.  To this I sent a verbal message saying that, if
Pemberton desired it, I would meet him in front of McPherson's corps at
three o'clock that afternoon.  I also sent the following written reply
to Pemberton's letter:

"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for
several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation
through commissioners, to be appointed, etc.  The useless effusion of
blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you
may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison.
Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in
Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can
assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war.
I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange
the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those
indicated above."

At three o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal
message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of
the morning.  Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith, and
several officers of my staff, accompanied me. Our place of meeting was
on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines.  Near by
stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event.  It
was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb
had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies.  Since then the same
tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as
"The True Cross."

Pemberton and I had served in the same division during part of the
Mexican War.  I knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an old
acquaintance.  He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army if
it surrendered.  My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his
letter.  Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "The conference might
as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave.  I said, "Very well."
General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be
consummated. His manner and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking,
showed this.  He now proposed that he and one of our generals should
have a conference.  I had no objection to this, as nothing could be made
binding upon me that they might propose. Smith and Bowen accordingly had
a conference, during which Pemberton and I, moving a short distance away
towards the enemy's lines were in conversation.  After a while Bowen
suggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out with
the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery.  This
was promptly and unceremoniously rejected.  The interview here ended, I
agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock
that night.

Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence with
Pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of
both army and navy.  It was agreed on my paging with Pemberton that they
should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased.

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and division
commanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg.  Half the
army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston.  I
informed them of the contents of Pemberton's letters, of my reply and
the substance of the interview, and that I was ready to hear any
suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own
hands.  This was the nearest approach to a "council of war" I ever held.
Against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council I sent
the following letter:

"In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the
following proposition for the surrender of the City of Vicksburg, public
stores, etc.  On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one
division as a guard, and take possession at eight A.M. to-morrow.  As
soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and
men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking
with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry
officers one horse each.  The rank and file will be allowed all their
clothing, but no other property.  If these conditions are accepted, any
amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores
you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing
them.  Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one,
will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along.
The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and
soldiers as fast as they become able to travel.  The paroles for these
latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized
to sign the roll of prisoners."

By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either
army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either Aiken's
landing below Dutch Gap on the James River, or to Vicksburg, there to be
exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged.  There was a
Confederate commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange.
I did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to
perform the functions of his office.  Had I insisted upon an
unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand men
to transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the
Mississippi.  Thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by
rail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by steamer to Aiken's--all
at very great expense.  At Aiken's they would have had to be paroled,
because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give in
exchange.  Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose
homes were in the South-west; I knew many of them were tired of the war
and would get home just as soon as they could.  A large number of them
had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested to
be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and
they could go to their homes.

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of
this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post.
In the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor
and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I have
to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will
perfect the agreement between us.  At ten o'clock A.M. to-morrow, I
propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender
the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors
and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines.  After which you
will take possession.  Officers to retain their side-arms and personal
property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected."

This was received after midnight.  My reply was as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d
July.  The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full.  It
will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed
by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will
necessarily take some time.  Again, I can make no stipulations with
regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property.  While I
do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot
consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The
property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as
stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be
allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one
horse each.  If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march
to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten
o'clock A.M., and then return to the inside and there remain as
prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it.
Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by
nine o'clock A.M. I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall
act accordingly.  Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be
displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have
been notified, from firing upon your men."

Pemberton promptly accepted these terms.

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between
the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close
together.  All rebels were known as "Johnnies," all Union troops as
"Yanks."  Often "Johnny" would call:  "Well, Yank, when are you coming
into town?"  The reply was sometimes: "We propose to celebrate the 4th
of July there."  Sometimes it would be:  "We always treat our prisoners
with kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "We are holding you as
prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves."  The garrison, from
the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the
fourth.  They knew from the temper of their men it would be successful
when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender.
Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them.

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of
the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "Yankee"
boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the best
receipt for cooking a rabbit was "First ketch your rabbit."  The paper
at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of
wall paper.  The last number was issued on the fourth and announced that
we had "caught our rabbit."

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the third
with a two-fold purpose:  first, to avoid an assault, which he knew
would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on
the great national holiday, the anniversary of the Declaration of
American Independence. Holding out for better terms as he did he
defeated his aim in the latter particular.

At the appointed hour the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of their
works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in good
order.  Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering.
Logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the
first to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his division
was soon floating over the court-house.  Our soldiers were no sooner
inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize.  Our men had
had full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close.  The
enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last.  I myself saw
our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy
they had so recently been engaged in starving out.  It was accepted with
avidity and with thanks.

Pemberton says in his report:

"If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day for
surrender, the answer is obvious.  I believed that upon that day I
should obtain better terms.  Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knew
they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of July
into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their
national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from
them at any other time."

This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he
did for surrendering.  But it must be recollected that his first letter
asking terms was received about 10 o'clock A.M., July 3d.  It then could
hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a
surrender.  He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of
raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he
could.  He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was
expected on the fourth.  In our interview he told me he had rations
enough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks.  It was
this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to
draw rations for his men from his own supplies.

On the 4th of July General Holmes, with an army of eight or nine
thousand men belonging to the trans-Mississippi department, made an
attack upon Helena, Arkansas.  He was totally defeated by General
Prentiss, who was holding Helena with less than forty-two hundred
soldiers.  Holmes reported his loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed;
but as Prentiss buried 400, Holmes evidently understated his losses.
The Union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40
missing.  This was the last effort on the part of the Confederacy to
raise the siege of Vicksburg.

On the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Sherman
and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston,
drive him out of the State and destroy his army if he could.  Steele and
Ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman as
soon as the surrender took place.  Of this Sherman was notified.

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange
congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time I
found that many of the citizens had been living under ground.  The
ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black,
are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity.  Where roads and
streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well
as if composed of stone.  The magazines of the enemy were made by
running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep
cuts.  Many citizens secured places of safety for their families by
carving out rooms in these embankments.  A door-way in these cases would
be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street,
and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved
out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way.  In some
instances I saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with
a door-way in the clay wall separating them.  Some of these were
carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration.  In these the
occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were
dropped into the city night and dav without intermission.

I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not
move into the town until the sixth.  On the afternoon of the fourth I
sent Captain Wm. M. Dunn of my staff to Cairo, the nearest point where
the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief.
It was as follows:

"The enemy surrendered this morning.  The only terms allowed is their
parole as prisoners of war.  This I regard as a great advantage to us at
this moment.  It saves, probably, several days in the capture, and
leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service.  Sherman, with
a large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from the
State.  I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the 9th
army corps to Burnside."

This news, with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day, lifted a
great load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet and
the loyal people all over the North.  The fate of the Confederacy was
sealed when Vicksburg fell.  Much hard fighting was to be done
afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the MORALE
was with the supporters of the Union ever after.

I at the same time wrote to General Banks informing him of the fall and
sending him a copy of the terms; also saying I would send him all the
troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy
now had on the Mississippi River. General Banks had a number of copies
of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a
copy fell into the hands of General Gardner, who was then in command of
Port Hudson.  Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the
National forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of
Vicksburg and telling how the information reached him.  He added that if
this was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer.  General Banks
gave him assurances that Vicksburg had been surrendered, and General
Gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of July.  Port Hudson
with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores
fell into the hands of the Union forces:  from that day to the close of
the rebellion the Mississippi River, from its source to its mouth,
remained in the control of the National troops.

Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could be
paroled.  The paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for
each, Federals and Confederates), and signed by the commanding officers
of the companies or regiments.  Duplicates were also made for each
soldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the
soldier signing and one to be retained by us.  Several hundred refused
to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as prisoners
to being sent back to fight again.  Others again kept out of the way,
hoping to escape either alternative.

Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their
paroles, but I declined.  It also leaked out that many of the men who
had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as
soon as they got out of our lines.  Pemberton hearing this, again
appealed to me to assist him.  He wanted arms for a battalion, to act as
guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of
instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged.  This
request was also declined.  It was precisely what I expected and hoped
that they would do.  I told him, however, that I would see that they
marched beyond our lines in good order.  By the eleventh, just one week
after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the Confederate
garrison marched out.  Many deserted, and fewer of them were ever
returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had
the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the James
River to be paroled.

As soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were
established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the
river below.  The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps
behind the intrenchments.  No restraint was put upon them, except by
their own commanders.  They were rationed about as our own men, and from
our supplies.  The men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been
fighting for the same cause.  When they passed out of the works they had
so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late
antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give
pain.  Really, I believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the
breasts of most of the Union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their
late antagonists.

The day before the departure the following order was issued:

"Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow.  They will be
authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there to
Edward's Ferry, (*14) and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands to
be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive
remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have
passed."



CHAPTER XXXIX.

RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS--PROPOSED MOVEMENT UPON
MOBILE--A PAINFUL ACCIDENT--ORDERED TO REPORT AT CAIRO.

The capture of Vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnance
stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave new
spirit to the loyal people of the North.  New hopes for the final
success of the cause of the Union were inspired.  The victory gained at
Gettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes.  Now the
Mississippi River was entirely in the possession of the National troops;
for the fall of Vicksburg gave us Port Hudson at once.  The army of
northern Virginia was driven out of Pennsylvania and forced back to
about the same ground it occupied in 1861.  The Army of the Tennessee
united with the Army of the Gulf, dividing the Confederate States
completely.

The first dispatch I received from the government after the fall of
Vicksburg was in these words:

"I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg, without actual
delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the
cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will
immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case
elsewhere.  If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will
detain them until further orders."

Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands
of Major Watts, Confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners.

At Vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon
about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition.  The small-arms
of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours.  Up to this time our
troops at the West had been limited to the old United States flint-lock
muskets changed into percussion, or the Belgian musket imported early in
the war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed
at--and a few new and improved arms.  These were of many different
calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition
during an engagement.  The enemy had generally new arms which had run
the blockade and were of uniform caliber.  After the surrender I
authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior
muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them
with the latter.  A large number of arms turned in to the Ordnance
Department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by the
Union army in the capture of Vicksburg.

In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of officers,
dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention.  Neither
have I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve.
Suffice it to say, the close of the siege of Vicksburg found us with an
army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of
officers and men.  A military education was acquired which no other
school could have given. Men who thought a company was quite enough for
them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good
regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were
equal to the command of a division, and one, Ransom, would have been
equal to the command of a corps at least. Logan and Crocker ended the
campaign fitted to command independent armies.

General F. P. Blair joined me at Milliken's Bend a full-fledged general,
without having served in a lower grade.  He commanded a division in the
campaign.  I had known Blair in Missouri, where I had voted against him
in 1858 when he ran for Congress.  I knew him as a frank, positive and
generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader.
I dreaded his coming; I knew from experience that it was more difficult
to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command
one army officered intelligently and with subordination.  It affords me
the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in
respect to his character.  There was no man braver than he, nor was
there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more
unquestioning alacrity.  He was one man as a soldier, another as a
politician.

The navy under Porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign.
Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully
made with twice the number of men engaged.  It could not have been made
at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such
assistance.  The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of
the service.  There never was a request made, that I am aware of, either
of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly
complied with.

The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances.
The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war.
Voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted
to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made
its execution impossible.  A forward movement to a decisive victory was
necessary.  Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite with
Banks against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and, with that base
and Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against
Vicksburg.  Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after running its batteries and
fighting a battle, I received a letter from Banks informing me that he
could not be at Port Hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen
thousand men.  The time was worth more than the reinforcements; I
therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country.

With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid
movements were essential to success.  Jackson was captured the day after
a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large
reinforcements were expected.  A rapid movement west was made; the
garrison of Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and
driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged.  It
looks now as though Providence had directed the course of the campaign
while the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree.

Upon the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg there were three things
that required immediate attention.  The first was to send a force to
drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the State.  The second was to
send reinforcements to Banks near Port Hudson, if necessary, to complete
the triumph of opening the Mississippi from its source to its mouth to
the free navigation of vessels bearing the Stars and Stripes.  The third
was to inform the authorities at Washington and the North of the good
news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in
the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart.

Soon after negotiations were opened with General Pemberton for the
surrender of the city, I notified Sherman, whose troops extended from
Haines' Bluff on the left to the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson
road over the Big Black on the right, and directed him to hold his
command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the State as
soon as Vicksburg surrendered.  Steele and Ord were directed to be in
readiness to join Sherman in his move against General Johnston, and
Sherman was advised of this also.  Sherman moved promptly, crossing the
Big Black at three different points with as many columns, all
concentrating at Bolton, twenty miles west of Jackson.

Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg almost as soon as it
occurred, and immediately fell back on Jackson.  On the 8th of July
Sherman was within ten miles of Jackson and on the 11th was close up to
the defences of the city and shelling the town.  The siege was kept up
until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had
evacuated during the night.  The weather was very hot, the roads dusty
and the water bad. Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so
much the start that pursuit was useless; but Sherman sent one division,
Steele's, to Brandon, fourteen miles east of Jackson.

The National loss in the second capture of Jackson was less than one
thousand men, killed, wounded and missing.  The Confederate loss was
probably less, except in captured.  More than this number fell into our
hands as prisoners.

Medicines and food were left for the Confederate wounded and sick who
had to be left behind.  A large amount of rations was issued to the
families that remained in Jackson.  Medicine and food were also sent to
Raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as I
thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the
articles we had taken while marching through the country.  I wrote to
Sherman: "Impress upon the men the importance of going through the State
in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely
necessary for their subsistence while travelling. They should try to
create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people."
Provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the
people, from Bruinsburg to Jackson and back to Vicksburg, whose
resources had been taken for the supply of our army.  Very large
quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued.

Sherman was ordered back to Vicksburg, and his troops took much the same
position they had occupied before--from the Big Black to Haines' Bluff.
Having cleaned up about Vicksburg and captured or routed all regular
Confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, I
felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more
before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while
important points might be captured without bloodshed.  I suggested to
the General-in-chief the idea of a campaign against Mobile, starting
from Lake Pontchartrain.  Halleck preferred another course.  The
possession of the trans-Mississippi by the Union forces seemed to
possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the
Mississippi.  I am well aware that the President was very anxious to
have a foothold in Texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign
governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the
war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the
Confederate States.  This, however, could have been easily done without
wasting troops in western Louisiana and eastern Texas, by sending a
garrison at once to Brownsville on the Rio Grande.

Halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against Mobile, so that I
was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as
I had been a year before in west Tennessee.  It would have been an easy
thing to capture Mobile at the time I proposed to go there.  Having that
as a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interior
to operate against General Bragg's army.  This would necessarily have
compelled Bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear.  If he
had not done this the troops from Mobile could have inflicted
inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and
Lee's were yet receiving their supplies.  I was so much impressed with
this idea that I renewed my request later in July and again about the
1st of August, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking
only the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at
or near Mobile.  I also asked for a leave of absence to visit New
Orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against Mobile should be
approved. Both requests were refused.  So far as my experience with
General Halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor
than to grant one.  But I did not regard this as a favor. It was simply
in line of duty, though out of my department.

The General-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of an
army, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as had
been the case the year before after the fall of Corinth when the army
was sent where it would do the least good.  By orders, I sent to Banks a
force of 4,000 men; returned the 9th corps to Kentucky and, when
transportation had been collected, started a division of 5,000 men to
Schofield in Missouri where Price was raiding the State.  I also
detached a brigade under Ransom to Natchez, to garrison that place
permanently.  This latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when
Ransom arrived there.  The enemy happened to have a large number, about
5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from Texas to feed the
Eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had
probably come through Texas from the Rio Grande and which were on the
way to Lee's and other armies in the East.

The troops that were left with me around Vicksburg were very busily and
unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands and
small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and in
destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads.  The
guerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, and
therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops.

The country back of Vicksburg was filled with deserters from Pemberton's
army and, it was reported, many from Johnston's also.  The men
determined not to fight again while the war lasted.  Those who lived
beyond the reach of the Confederate army wanted to get to their homes.
Those who did not, wanted to get North where they could work for their
support till the war was over.  Besides all this there was quite a peace
feeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part of
Mississippi, but this feeling soon subsided.  It is not probable that
Pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where he
proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition.

On the 7th of August I further depleted my army by sending the 13th
corps, General Ord commanding, to Banks.  Besides this I received orders
to co-operate with the latter general in movements west of the
Mississippi.  Having received this order I went to New Orleans to confer
with Banks about the proposed movement.  All these movements came to
naught.

During this visit I reviewed Banks' army a short distance above
Carrollton.  The horse I rode was vicious and but little used, and on my
return to New Orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in the
street, fell, probably on me.  I was rendered insensible, and when I
regained consciousness I found myself in a hotel near by with several
doctors attending me.  My leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh,
and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along the
body up to the arm-pit.  The pain was almost beyond endurance.  I lay at
the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in
bed.  I had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and was
carried to it on a litter.  I was then taken to Vicksburg, where I
remained unable to move for some time afterwards.

While I was absent General Sherman declined to assume command because,
he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be made
in my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could.  No orders
were issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except upon
consultation with and approval of Sherman.

On the 13th of September, while I was still in New Orleans, Halleck
telegraphed to me to send all available forces to Memphis and thence to
Tuscumbia, to co-operate with Rosecrans for the relief of Chattanooga.
On the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to
Rosecrans.  This was received on the 27th.  I was still confined to my
bed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but I at once ordered
Sherman to send one division to Memphis as fast as transports could be
provided.  The division of McPherson's corps, which had got off and was
on the way to join Steele in Arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise,
to report to Hurlbut at Memphis.  Hurlbut was directed to forward these
two divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also to
send any other troops that might be returning there.  Halleck suggested
that some good man, like Sherman or McPherson, should be sent to Memphis
to take charge of the troops going east. On this I sent Sherman, as
being, I thought, the most suitable person for an independent command,
and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one.  He
was directed to take with him another division of his corps.  This left
one back, but having one of McPherson's divisions he had still the
equivalent.

Before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of Chickamauga had
been fought and Rosecrans forced back into Chattanooga. The
administration as well as the General-in-chief was nearly frantic at the
situation of affairs there.  Mr. Charles A. Dana, an officer of the War
Department, was sent to Rosecrans' headquarters.  I do not know what his
instructions were, but he was still in Chattanooga when I arrived there
at a later period.

It seems that Halleck suggested that I should go to Nashville as soon as
able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the
west. I received the following dispatch dated October 3d:  "It is the
wish of the Secretary of War that as soon as General Grant is able he
will come to Cairo and report by telegraph."  I was still very lame, but
started without delay.  Arriving at Columbus on the 16th I reported by
telegraph:  "Your dispatch from Cairo of the 3d directing me to report
from Cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th.  Left the same day with
staff and headquarters and am here en route for Cairo."

END OF VOLUME I.





PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

VOLUME II.

CONTENTS.


CHAPTER XL. FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS
--COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS
--ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLI. ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF
SUPPLIES--BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

CHAPTER XLII. CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL
BURNSIDE'S SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'S
POSITION--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

CHAPTER XLIII. PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF
THE ENEMY--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN
--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

CHAPTER XLIV. BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF
THE ENEMY--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON
CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLV. THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE
--VISITING KNOXVILLE--CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

CHAPTER XLVI. OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE
--COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES--FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

CHAPTER XLVII. THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN
ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT FORT
PILLOW--GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN INCIDENT OF THE
WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER XLVIII. COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S
POSITION--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

CHAPTER XLIX. SHERMAN S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF
GENERAL MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

CHAPTER L. GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE
RAPIDAN--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

CHAPTER LI. AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY
THE LEFT FLANK.

CHAPTER LII. BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OF
WARREN'S AND WRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM
BUTLER AND SHERIDAN.

CHAPTER LIII. HANCOCK'S ASSAULT--LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS
RECOMMENDED--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK--REDUCING THE
ARTILLERY.

CHAPTER LIV. MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN
INCIDENT OF THE MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY
--POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY.

CHAPTER LV. ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OF
COLD HARBOR--CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE RETROSPECTIVE.

CHAPTER LVI. LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES
--GENERAL LEE--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG
--THE INVESTMENT OF PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LVII. RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON
RAILROAD--EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS BEFORE
PETERSBURG--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG--CAMPAIGN IN THE
SHENANDOAH VALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

CHAPTER LVIII. SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY
IN THE SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN
FOR THE WINTER.

CHAPTER LIX. THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR
ANECDOTES--THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF
SAVANNAH.

CHAPTER LX. THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

CHAPTER LXI. EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE
OF THE EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF FORT
FISHER.

CHAPTER LXII. SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG
--CANBY ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS
--CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.

CHAPTER LXIII. ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE
COMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG
--SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE--PARKE
RECAPTURES THE LINE--THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD.

CHAPTER LXIV. INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--PARKE
AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LXV. THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN
PETERSBURG--THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT TO
SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

CHAPTER LXVI. BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE
--CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

CHAPTER LXVII. NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT
MCLEAN'S HOUSE--THE TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH
LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.

CHAPTER LXVIII. MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE
NORTH AND SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT
WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S
POLICY.

CHAPTER LXIX. SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN
--CAPTURE OF MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
--GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

CHAPTER LXX. THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF
LINCOLN'S ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF
LINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX




CHAPTER XL.

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS--COMMANDING
MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS--ARRIVAL AT
CHATTANOOGA.

The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo, announcing my
arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to
proceed immediately to the Galt House, Louisville, where I would meet an
officer of the War Department with my instructions.  I left Cairo within
an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via
Indianapolis. Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot
at Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the
Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me.

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent
conversations over the wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee.
Occasionally at night he would order the wires between the War
Department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a
conversation for an hour or two.  On this occasion the Secretary was
accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though he
and my father had been old acquaintances.  Mr. Stanton dismissed the
special train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied me
to Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I
left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatches
that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of
troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretary
handed me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them.  The
two were identical in all but one particular.  Both created the
"Military Division of Mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of
the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all
the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north of
Banks's command in the south-west.  One order left the department
commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned
Thomas to his place.  I accepted the latter.  We reached Louisville
after night and, if I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain.  The
Secretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that
occasion from which he never expected to recover.  He never did.

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the military news
at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of
some of the campaigns.  By the evening of the day after our arrival all
matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spend
the evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself having
relatives living in Louisville.  In the course of the evening Mr.
Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga,
informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, and
advising peremptory orders against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the
government the propriety of a movement against Mobile.  General
Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large and
well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting
him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on
the defensive.  But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's army was
largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being
reinforced to raise the siege.  I frequently wrote General Halleck
suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg.  By so doing he
would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay
Chattanooga open to capture.  General Halleck strongly approved the
suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered
Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to
comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war,
had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two
decisive battles at the same time."  If true, the maxim was not
applicable in this case.  It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive
battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them.  I,
however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn
from Rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory
were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was
over, when these troops could be returned.  Rosecrans was ordered to
move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege.
Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards
Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to
return.

It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the
movement against Mobile.  I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland
was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but
also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line
over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly
being strengthened.  Mobile was important to the enemy, and in the
absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than
artillery.  If threatened by land and from the water at the same time
the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its
defence.  Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg.  My judgment
was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over
other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the
most service.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble and
required assistance.  The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to
give this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile.
It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent
from every available point.

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee
River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and
intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and
the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated.  But he pushed
on, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops from
Mississippi began to join him.  Then Bragg took the initiative.
Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army
together at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before
the main battle was brought on.  The battle was fought on the 19th and
20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss
in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured.
The corps under Major-General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while
Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas
returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order.  Bragg
followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlooking
Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, which
Rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the
river road as far back as Bridgeport.  The National troops were now
strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee River
behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and
west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain,
and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large part of the way, in front of
their line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all
the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to
Rosecrans.  Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his
way, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison of
Vicksburg.

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster.  It would
not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to
us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery
still left with the Army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of that
army itself, either by capture or demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The
railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the
government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the
south side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout and
Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river
and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the
Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport.  The distance between
these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the
position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a
circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country,
increasing the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten
thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw
a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick.
The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time,
with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the
country.  The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the
cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the
condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." Indeed,
the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with
a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard
bread and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF."

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without
sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season.
What they had was well worn.  The fuel within the Federal lines was
exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it
from the opposite bank, where it was abundant.  The only way of
supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees
on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream,
form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing
on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. It
would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps.

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of
the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if
followed by the enemy.

On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me. Finding
that I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person
he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was,
and bidding them find me and send me to him at once.  About eleven
o'clock I returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house,
every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparently
partaking of his impatience to see me.  I hastened to the room of the
Secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown.
Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch.  I
immediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of
the Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans.  I then
telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the
command of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must hold
Chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that I would
be at the front as soon as possible.  A prompt reply was received from
Thomas, saying, "We will hold the town till we starve."  I appreciated
the force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of
affairs which prompted it.  It looked, indeed, as if but two courses
were open:  one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff, and
proceeded as far as Nashville.  At that time it was not prudent to
travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville until the
next morning.  Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, Military
Governor of Tennessee.  He delivered a speech of welcome.  His composure
showed that it was by no means his maiden effort.  It was long, and I
was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be
expected from me in response.  I was relieved, however, the people
assembled having apparently heard enough.  At all events they commenced
a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of
it, was a great relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville,
that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that
they could be held with the least number of men; to Admiral Porter at
Cairo, that Sherman's advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, that
rations were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying
his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to
Thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the
wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport.

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching
Stevenson Alabama, after dark.  Rosecrans was there on his way north.
He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described
very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent
suggestions as to what should be done.  My only wonder was that he had
not carried them out.  We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stopped
for the night.  From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper and
over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain, and the
roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from
wash-outs on the mountain sides.  I had been on crutches since the time
of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where it
was not safe to cross on horseback.  The roads were strewn with the
debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules
and horses.  At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there
was a halt.  General O. O. Howard had his headquarters there.  From this
point I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred
rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms.  We stopped for
the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on.  The
next day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark.  I went directly
to General Thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until
I could establish my own.

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their
respects and to talk about the condition of affairs.  They pointed out
on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans
had contemplated falling back upon.  If any of them had approved the
move they did not say so to me.  I found General W. F. Smith occupying
the position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland.  I had
known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having
met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time.  He explained the
situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly
that I could see it without an inspection.  I found that he had
established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old
engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north
side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons
and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there
already.  He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing
the boats for a third bridge.  In addition to this he had far under way
a steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever we
might get possession of the river.  This boat consisted of a scow, made
of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel
attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or
factory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Halleck of my
arrival, and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command of
the Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field.  The request was
at once complied with.



CHAPTER XLI.

ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES--BATTLE
OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection,
taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my
personal staff.  We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving
to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at
Brown's Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by
the enemy.  Here we left our horses back from the river and approached
the water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on the
opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within
easy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our
presence.  They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers.
But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as
prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would
be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence.

That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport--a
cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it.  They had been so
long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a
line over which food might reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runs
nearly due west.  It is at the northern end of a valley five or six
miles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs.  To the east of
the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet
above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more
before reaching the Tennessee.  On the west of the valley is Lookout
Mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water.  Just below the town
the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of Lookout
Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river.  The
Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the mountain
stands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the South
Chickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and west
of that, Raccoon Mountains.  Lookout Mountain, at its northern end,
rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a
gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a
palisade thirty or more feet in height.  On the gently sloping ground,
between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse,
which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east.

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of
Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south,
thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountain
was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in
Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending
down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it
useless to us.  In addition to this there was an intrenched line in
Chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout
Mountain, to make the investment complete.  Besides the fortifications
on Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with
occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front.  The enemy's
pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the
pickets of the two armies could converse.  At one point they were
separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley
and town, and from which both sides drew water.  The Union lines were
shorter than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to
the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below.  Practically,
the Army of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had stopped with his
cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition
and medical supplies.  The Union army was short of both, not having
ammunition enough for a day's fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered
parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals
Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the
Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans.  It would have been folly to send them
to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there.  They were
consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to
them.  Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at
Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move
which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the
manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should
have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he
was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following
details were made:  General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was
ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up by
Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry.  General Palmer, with a
division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move
down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite
Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had
passed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under
General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, under
General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of
night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout,
down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive
away the pickets at that point.  Smith was to march with the remainder
of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river
to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge
as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his
eastward march.  At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen
moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave
and well-equipped men.  Smith started enough in advance to be near the
river when Hazen should arrive.  There are a number of detached spurs of
hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road
parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout.
It was over this road Smith marched.  At five o'clock Hazen landed at
Brown's Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it.  By
seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in
possession of a height commanding the ferry.  This was speedily
fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge.  By ten o'clock
the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout valley, was
fortified and connected with the rest of the army.  The two bridges over
the Tennessee River--a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at
Brown's Ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the
fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete.  Hooker
found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th
emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie.  Howard marched on to Brown's
Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped
three miles south.  The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now
cut off, and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport.
Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through a
narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to
increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem
it.  To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled
up by ropes from the shore.  But there is no difficulty in navigating
the stream from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry.  The latter point is only
eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road,
which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side
of the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the river
opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and
abundance of forage, clothing and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good
supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so
long deprived of.  Hooker had brought with him from the east a full
supply of land transportation.  His animals had not been subjected to
hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition.  In
five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport
and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops
were receiving full rations.  It is hard for any one not an eye-witness
to realize the relief this brought.  The men were soon reclothed and
also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a
cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks.  Neither
officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed.  The weak
and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at
once.  I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume
it must have been correspondingly depressing.  Mr. Davis had visited
Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to
be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report.  "These
dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's
speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage.  Possessed
of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements
must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a
question of time."  But the dispositions were not "faithfully
sustained," and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to
"sustain" them now rejoice that they were not.  There was no time during
the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South was
more to be benefited by its defeat than the North.  The latter had the
people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and
prosperous nation.  The former was burdened with an institution
abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which
degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class.
With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have
extended their territory.  The labor of the country was not skilled, nor
allowed to become so.  The whites could not toil without becoming
degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash."  The
system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people
poor.  The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small
slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor.  Soon the
slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy
with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them.  The
war was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood
and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of
supplies.  He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover
the line from us.  His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal to
Hooker's command in the valley below.  From Missionary Ridge he had to
march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach
Lookout Valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made
on Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps.  When the battle
commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry.  He had three
miles to march to reach Geary.  On his way he was fired upon by rebel
troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road
was commanded.  Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and
captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many
prisoners.  Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to
reinforce Geary.  Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for about
three hours against a vastly superior force.  The night was so dark that
the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of
the flashes of their muskets.  In the darkness and uproar Hooker's
teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams.  The mules also
became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded
directly towards the enemy.  The latter, no doubt, took this for a
charge, and stampeded in turn.  By four o'clock in the morning the
battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward
disturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and
four or five wounded.  The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry,
captured.  In the night engagement of the 28th-9th Hooker lost 416
killed and wounded.  I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops
buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a
hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our
supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation
of the pickets of the two armies.  As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek
comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of
the town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly,
and enters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain.  This
creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two
lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from
the same stream.  As I would be under short-range fire and in an open
country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed
some distance to the rear.  I rode from our right around to our left.
When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the
call, "Turn out the guard for the commanding general."  I replied,
"Never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their
tents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek,
were the guards of the Confederate pickets.  The sentinel on their post
called out in like manner, "Turn out the guard for the commanding
general," and, I believe, added, "General Grant."  Their line in a
moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I
returned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the
two armies.  At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the
stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing
water for their camps.  General Longstreet's corps was stationed there
at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform.
Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced
conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to.  He was very
polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to General
Longstreet's corps.  I asked him a few questions--but not with a view of
gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and I rode
off.



CHAPTER XLII.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL BURNSIDE'S
SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'S POSITION
--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now
began to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in
about as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been,
only he was not yet besieged.  He was a hundred miles from the nearest
possible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much farther
from any railroad we had possession of.  The roads back were over
mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been
exhausted.  His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses
lined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky.
East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but
it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small
rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice.

Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October.
His instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to
bring up supplies.  The distance was about three hundred and thirty
miles through a hostile country.  His entire command could not have
maintained the road if it had been completed.  The bridges had all been
destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done.  A hostile community
lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or
less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West.  Often Sherman's
work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance
away.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River at
Eastport, Mississippi.  Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have to
supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent from
St. Louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at
Eastport.  These he got.  I now ordered him to discontinue his work of
repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson,
Alabama, without delay.  This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger,
who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over Muscle
Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th.  In this Sherman was
notified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, East
Tennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troops
were in the best position to beat them there.  Sherman, with his
characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and
pushed on at once.  On the 1st of November he crossed the Tennessee at
Eastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of
column, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair
bringing up the rear.

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and
trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville.  All
indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying
Burnside's command in East Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the
same route.  A single track could not do this.  I gave, therefore, an
order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command, of about eight
thousand men, at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange
his troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards Nashville, and
to rebuild that road.  The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a
broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of
considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed.  All the
bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and
twisted by the enemy.  All the cars and locomotives not carried off had
been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them.  All
bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur,
and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the
Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite.  The rebuilding of this road
would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the
army.  From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river
supplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced
railroad builder.  He had no tools to work with except those of the
pioneers--axes, picks, and spades.  With these he was able to intrench
his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the
enemy.  As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed
back to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men
was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country.  He
had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all
they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could
be found.  Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along
the line of the army.  When these were not near enough to the troops for
protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road.
Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved
up in like manner.  Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the
tools necessary in railroad and bridge building.  Axemen were put to
work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives
when the road should be completed.  Car-builders were set to work
repairing the locomotives and cars.  Thus every branch of railroad
building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with
food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or
laborer except what the command itself furnished.  But rails and cars
the men could not make without material, and there was not enough
rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full
capacity.  There were no rails except those in use.  To supply these
deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at
Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten.
I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and
on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives
and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston to
Nashville.  The military manager of railroads also was directed to
furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material.
General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after
receiving his orders.  The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred
and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of
road repaired was one hundred and two miles.

The enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against
Burnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland.
Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington,
and, on account of our helpless condition at Chattanooga, caused me much
uneasiness.  Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do
something for Burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of
holding East Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for the
protection of the loyal people in that section, etc.  We had not at
Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a
supply train.  Reinforcements could not help Burnside, because he had
neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed,
bread and meat for the men he had.  There was no relief possible for him
except by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about
Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen
thousand troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go
against Burnside.  The situation seemed desperate, and was more
aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up.
The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the
safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than
ever, urging that something should be done for his relief.  On the 7th,
before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered
Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the
return of the troops that had gone up the valley.  I directed him to
take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to
move the necessary artillery.  But he persisted in the declaration that
he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he
could possibly comply with the order.  Nothing was left to be done but
to answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman forward,
although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage
Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be
relieved.  All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence
in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out.
He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held
south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his
base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when
the battle should begin.  Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon;
but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's
suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted.  On the 14th
I telegraphed him:

"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport.  His whole force will be
ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest.  If you can hold
Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back
can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to
force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and
Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes
by every available road, to get to his supplies.  Sherman would have
been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him some
thirty miles up that river to cross."

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as
follows:

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received.  Being there, you can tell
better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct.  With your
showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the
most productive part of your possessions.  Every arrangement is now made
to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth
of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives.  Thomas will attack on his
left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary
Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland
and Dalton.  Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry
Lookout Mountain.  The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on
his left flank.  This favors us.  To further confirm this, Sherman's
advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton.  The
remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from
Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and
leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.
Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport.  The rear will only
reach there on the 16th.  This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest
day for making the combined movement as desired.  Inform me if you think
you can sustain yourself until this time.  I can hardly conceive of the
enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky.  If they
should, however, a new problem would be left for solution.  Thomas has
ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will
ascertain if they have started, and inform you.  It will be entirely out
of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be
spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from
here?"

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th.
That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable
he was directed to remain there awaiting orders.  He was in a position
threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought
back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon,
Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that
evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival
(*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be
engaged were so far away.  The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no
special advantage to us now.  Hooker was instructed to send Howard's
corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on
the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the
remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards
appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower
palisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank,
form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so
as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him
either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his
base at Chickamauga Station.  Hooker was to perform like service on our
right.  His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley
in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to
Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there
across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to
Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear
on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also.  Thomas, with
the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault
while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown's
Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of
Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of
sight of the enemy on the ridge.  There are two streams called
Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chattanooga--North
Chickamauga, taking its rise in Tennessee, flowing south, and emptying
into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the South
Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, and
empties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town.
There were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga
River, their presence there being unknown to the enemy.

At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two
o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each
boat.  A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chickamauga,
capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two
banks of the river.  The rest were to land on the south side of the
Tennessee, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a
sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side
to ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on the
south side intrenched themselves.  Thomas was to move out from his lines
facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against an
attack down the valley.  Lookout Valley being of no present value to us,
and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge,
Hooker's orders were changed.  His revised orders brought him to
Chattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee.  He was
then to move out to the right to Rossville.

Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us so
long as Chattanooga was besieged.  It was the key to our line for
supplying the army.  But it was not essential after the enemy was
dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was
begun.  Hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past
Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge.  By
crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come into
Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the
valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation.  Orders were
accordingly given to march by this route.  But days before the battle
began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action
were all considered.  The passage over the mountain was a difficult one
to make in the face of an enemy.  It might consume so much time as to
lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they
were more wanted.  After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the
same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be
crossed.  I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout
Mountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge.  By
marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream,
and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named
time; when in this new position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behind
him, and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestionably cause the
evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Lookout
Mountain.  Hooker's order was changed accordingly.  As explained
elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood
in the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the
passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all
the troops together against Missionary Ridge.

The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomas
and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed
them the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out
generally what he was expected to do.  I, as well as the authorities in
Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety.
Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this
anxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troops
were up.  As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman
started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I
believe, from Kelly's Ferry.  Sherman had left Bridgeport the night
of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the
above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back
the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the
importance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season
would admit of.  By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with the
head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division
(Ewing's) was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that
Lookout was to be taken from the south.  Sherman received his orders at
the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the
following morning.  News had been received that the battle had been
commenced at Knoxville.  Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic
communications.  The President, the Secretary of War, and General
Halleck, were in an agony of suspense.  My suspense was also great, but
more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve
the situation.  It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the
next day.  I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the
assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that
date.  But the elements were against us.  It rained all the 20th and
21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the
pontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at
this time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville
--about Maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the
North.  A dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened
from the east.  The following was sent in reply:

"If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our
attack on Bragg will commence in the morning.  If successful, such a
move will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold
out.  Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not cause
alarm.  He would find the country so bare that he would lose his
transportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet
such a force before he got through, that he could not return."

Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as
his troops could be got up.  The crossing had to be effected in full
view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain.  Once over, however,
the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side,
and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain
or Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the
bank of the river.  But when Sherman's advance reached a point opposite
the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had been
concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march
to join the troops on the south side.  His crossing was in full view
both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy of
course supposed these troops to be Sherman's.  This enabled Sherman to
get to his assigned position without discovery.



CHAPTER XLIII.

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY
--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN
--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so
heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's
Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of
a battle raging at Knoxville; of Willcox being threatened by a force
from the east--a letter was received from Bragg which contained these
words:  "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I
deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early
withdrawal." Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to
deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was.  On the
22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving
our front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforce
Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to follow but was
recalled.  The object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to
detain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be
returned to Chattanooga.

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed,
one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North
Chickamauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited out
of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the
Tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in
Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his
relief.  I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the
Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.

The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made very
strong for defence during the months it had been besieged.  The line was
about a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a small
stream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the
Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on
the left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right.  All commanding points on
the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery.  The
important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified
and supplied with a proper armament.  Among the elevations so fortified
was one to the east of the town, named Fort Wood.  It owed its
importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and
Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was.  Fort
Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach
the nearer points of the enemy's line.  On the morning of the 23d
Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of two
divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood,
and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right,
Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek.  Palmer, commanding
the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest.
He supported Sheridan with one division (Baird's), while his other
division under Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be
moved to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre.  The
picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other.  At two
o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance.  By this time the
clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position
all that was going on.  The signal for advance was given by a booming of
cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line.  The rebel pickets
were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and
detached heights between the main ridge and our lines.  These too were
carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their
advance guards.  But it was not without loss on both sides. This
movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we
occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to
this time.  The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other
way.  During the following night they were made strong.  We lost in this
preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the
enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were
captured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from
Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the
fighting for the first day.

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been
assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have
rested more easily.  But we were doing the best we could for him and the
cause.

By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move,
though one division (Osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at
Brown's Ferry.  The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it
impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to
cross; but I was determined to move that night even without this
division.  Orders were sent to Osterhaus accordingly to report to
Hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the
24th.  Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were again
changed, but this time only back to those first given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of the
Military Division.  To him were given the general direction of moving
troops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they
reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his
office of chief engineer.  During the night General Morgan L. Smith's
division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the
brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning
the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the
river.  During this night also General J. M. Brannan, chief of
artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of the
Cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to
command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the
point where the south end of the bridge was to rest.  He had to use
Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas having none.

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out
from the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each
loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men.  The boats with their
precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid
attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the
enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few
boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the
picket guard known to be at that point.  The guard were surprised, and
twenty of their number captured.  The remainder of the troops effected a
landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good
results.  The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north
side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the
purpose.  A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist.  The
rest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E.
Smith.  The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their
position.  By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well
covered by the works they had built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and
cavalry, was now begun.  The ferrying over the infantry was continued
with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast
as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge.  By a little
past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South
Chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades
below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the
Tennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge.  By
one o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the
course of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next to the right and a little
to the rear; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to
the rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the
right if an enemy should come from that direction.  A good skirmish line
preceded each of these columns.  Soon the foot of the hill was reached;
the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports.
By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without
having sustained much loss.  A brigade from each division was now
brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand.
The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the
hill was gained.  There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and
the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary
Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley.  But now the
enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with
their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail.  Later in the
day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and
Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained.

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was
completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges
and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga
Station.  All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee.
During the afternoon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and
carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th,
there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his
position.  Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and a
junction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him.  With two or
three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks
of the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid.
He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end,
and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving
himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway
put upon it.  Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between
them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker
was engaged on the west.  He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the
15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps, Army of the
Potomac; and Cruft's, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland.  Geary was on
the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown's
Ferry.  These troops were all west of Lookout Creek.  The enemy had the
east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three
brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked.  These
brigades occupied the summit of the mountain.  General Carter L.
Stevenson was in command of the whole.  Why any troops, except artillery
with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not
see.  A hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for
more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men
from the position Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged,
heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance
with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force.  Farther up, the
ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation.  On the east
side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging
up it, connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division,
supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a
crossing.  The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge
over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to move
up to the bridge and cross it.  The bridge was seized by Gross's brigade
after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it.  This attracted
the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed.  A heavy
mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the
mountain.  He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the
picket of over forty men on guard near by.  He then commenced ascending
the mountain directly in his front.  By this time the enemy was seen
coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into
their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge.  By eleven
o'clock the bridge was complete.  Osterhaus was up, and after some sharp
skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed
and captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was pushing
up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his
front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain.  The enemy,
seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by
Cruft and Osterhaus.  Soon these were up abreast of Geary, and the whole
command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance.  By noon Geary
had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his
right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong
fortifications in his front.  The rest of the command coming up, a line
was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of
Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob.  Hooker's advance now made
our line a continuous one.  It was in full view, extending from the
Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the
base of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to
Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more,
across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope
of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade.  The day was
hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at
moments when the clouds would rise.  But the sound of his artillery and
musketry was heard incessantly.  The enemy on his front was partially
fortified, but was soon driven out of his works.  During the afternoon
the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide
whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and
made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time.  At
four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable.  By a little
after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops
was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him.  These troops had to cross
Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it,
and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and was
assigned to his left.  I now telegraphed to Washington:  "The fight
to-day progressed favorably.  Sherman carried the end of Missionary
Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga
Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and
now hold the eastern slope and a point high up.  Hooker reports two
thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into
our hands from Missionary Ridge."  The next day the President replied:
"Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here.  Well
done. Many thanks to all.  Remember Burnside."  And Halleck also
telegraphed: "I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans.
I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may
prove fatal.  I know you will do all in your power to relieve him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been
sent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were
deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of
citizens.  On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with
Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain
to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hour
in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.



CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY
--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA.

At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders
for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside.
Sherman was directed to attack at daylight.  Hooker was ordered to move
at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he
still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and
operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.
Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge.  As I
was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders
from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was
in full view from the top of Orchard Knob.  It remained so all day.
Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff
officers--could be seen coming and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost
disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over
which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a
railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills.  The problem now was
to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point; and back
farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification
commanding the first.  Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to
see, and by sunrise his command was in motion.  Three brigades held the
hill already gained.  Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of
Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades
of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade was between the
two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured.  The ridge is
steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops
were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west
side.  The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the
rebel works.  Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy
off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by
rail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located.  The
enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the
position we had gained, but without success.  The contest lasted for two
hours.  Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in
this assault.  Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores,
and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to
strengthen his right.  From the position I occupied I could see column
after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman.  Every
Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was
concentrated upon him.  J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the
west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command, over open
ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry,
and reached the very parapet of the enemy.  He lay here for a time, but
the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was
compelled to fall back, followed by the foe.  A few hundred yards
brought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed,
when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his
intrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the
position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce
him.  Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard
Knob.  It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of
the enemy to reach its position.  Bragg at once commenced massing in the
same direction.  This was what I wanted.  But it had now got to be late
in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing
the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass
in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected
he would.  In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga
Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him.  Hooker
was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance
and the destruction above named.  He was detained four hours crossing
Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected
from his forces.  His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was
to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge.  But Sherman's
condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could
not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early
morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed
Thomas to order the charge at once (*16). I watched eagerly to see the
effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any
charge being made.  The centre of the line which was to make the charge
was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an
intervening forest.  Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay,
I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders
who was to make the charge, standing talking to him.  I spoke to General
Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before.  He
replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but
that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice.  I told him
to make the charge at once.  He was off in a moment, and in an
incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were
driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge.  The
Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front
of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our
men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so
rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went
over the first line of works almost at the same time.  Many rebels were
captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher
up the hill.  Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued.
The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the
enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men.  In fact, on that
occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position.
Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops
went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus
effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the
24th (*17) for this charge.

I watched their progress with intense interest.  The fire along the
rebel line was terrific.  Cannon and musket balls filled the air:  but
the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended.  The
pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were
seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front
of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions.  The retreat of the enemy along
most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and
his officers lost all control over their men.  Many were captured, and
thousands threw away their arms in their flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a
point above where the enemy crossed.  He met some resistance from troops
occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to cover
the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains.  It was
now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed
his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the
attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right
and left to surround the position.  The enemy discovered the movement
before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat,
leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands.  To
Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation,
are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and
small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way
would not have been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas
with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making the
assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the
entire field could be observed.  The moment the troops were seen going
over the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join his
command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front.  General Thomas left
about the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already in
pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge.  Wood, who commanded the
division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in
the charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit.  To the left, in
Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the
resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer.  I ordered
Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so much
excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy
had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got
well out of the way.  The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing
everything to their left giving way, fled also.  Sherman, however, was
not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he
received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he
directed his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland,
to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and to
move forward to Chickamauga Station.  He ordered Howard to move up the
stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during
the night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning.  Morgan L.
Smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still
held.  Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies.
The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow Howard at daylight
in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction
of the bridge at that point.  He got his troops over, with the exception
of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock.
Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed,
he pushed on with the remainder of his command.  At Rossville he came
upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a
retreat along the ridge.  This threw them on Palmer.  They could make
but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many
of them as could do so escaped.  Many, however, were captured.  Hooker's
position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, extending east
of the ridge.  Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated,
and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold
out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him
that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the
relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was
directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga
loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition.  Granger's corps was
to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the
Holston, and up that to Knoxville accompanied by the boat.  In addition
to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds
of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in
haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from
the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland
participated.  In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and
the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the
organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders,
during the battle.  Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the
12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps,
Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army of the
Cumberland.  Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's corps
from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's division of the
Army of the Cumberland.  There was no jealousy--hardly rivalry.  Indeed,
I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of
this intermingling of commands.  All saw a defiant foe surrounding them,
and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him,
and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was
accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the
advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily
than was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes:
first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty
thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve
of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of
his impregnable position.

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary
Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and
believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between
Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the
campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general.  I
had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very
well.  We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my
graduation, for a time in the same regiment.  Then we served together in
the Mexican War.  I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally
subsequently.  I could well understand how there might be an
irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally
and otherwise.  He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of
an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious.  A man of the
highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army
he was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the
lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as
a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest
neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg.
On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded
by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and
at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary.  He was
first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other
duty.  As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the
quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted.  As quartermaster he
declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his
reasons for so doing.  As company commander he responded to this, urging
that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and
that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it.  As quartermaster
he still persisted that he was right.  In this condition of affairs
Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post.
The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed:
"My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army,
and now you are quarrelling with yourself!"

Longstreet was an entirely different man.  He was brave, honest,
intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just
and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he
had the courage to maintain.  He was never on the lookout to detect a
slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reason
stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military
genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one
stone."  On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of
the Union army by means of his SUPERIOR MILITARY GENIUS.

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his military
capacity.  He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of
his nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals have
said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga
were as fought.  Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did;
Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep
across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near
Rossville.  When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the
Cumberland was to assault in the centre.  Before Sherman arrived,
however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to
Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River.  The waters in the
river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's
Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing
troops upon it.  For this reason Hooker's orders were changed by
telegraph back to what they were originally.------

NOTE.--From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of
the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by
General Grant, after his great illness in April, and the present
arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and
18th of July, 1885.



CHAPTER XLV.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE--VISITING
KNOXVILLE-CIPHER CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any doubt, I
immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the
situation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious.
Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for sending troops to the
relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securing
Chattanooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built and
fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run.
General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with
rations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of
the Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops.
General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand
men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under no
circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps.  With the
provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it
was supposed he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away, after
which event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for
Burnside's army and his own also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the
27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas,
verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me;
advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the
situation.  I was not right sure but that Bragg's troops might be over
their stampede by the time they reached Dalton.  In that case Bragg
might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence
towards Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon
Burnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreat
was most earnest.  The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and
small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving
like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division,
which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat.

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer's division took
the road to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chickamauga
Station toward the same point.  As soon as I saw the situation at
Ringgold I sent a staff officer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of
the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start Granger
at once.  Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the
relief of Burnside I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold
through the day to prepare for the return of our troops.

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East
Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles south-east
from Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had left
behind at Chattanooga Creek got up.  His men were attacking Cleburne's
division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as
to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorge
which presents itself at that point.  Just beyond the gorge the valley
is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great
many times in the course of the first mile.  This attack was
unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily.  Hooker captured,
however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead
were left upon the field.

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the
neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the
mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not
to make any wanton destruction.

At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with his
troops, where he found Palmer had preceded him.  Palmer had picked up
many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route.  I went back in
the evening to Graysville with Sherman, remained there over night and
did not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th.  I
then found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a
full day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of
Knoxville.  Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the month
Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve
days and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet, but if
not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender
or attempt to retreat.  To effect a retreat would have been an
impossibility.  He was already very low in ammunition, and with an army
pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to
go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I
sent word to General Sherman of the situation and directed him to march
to the relief of Knoxville.  I also gave him the problem that we had to
solve--that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and
that he must be relieved within that time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville,
having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to
Cleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these
troops had not yet returned to camp.  I was very loath to send Sherman,
because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard
fighting at Chattanooga. But I had become satisfied that Burnside would
not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's movements.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, near
Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked
rations in their haversacks.  Expecting to be back in their tents by
that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them
neither overcoats nor blankets. The weather was already cold, and at
night they must have suffered more or less.  The two days' rations had
already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country
which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was but
little probability of finding much food.  They did, however, succeed in
capturing some flour.  They also found a good deal of bran in some of
the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways
they eked out an existence until they could reach Knoxville.

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps being
taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if
it became necessary, that I determined to send a message to him.  I
therefore sent a member of my staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into
Knoxville if he could report to Burnside the situation fully, and give
him all the encouragement possible.  Mr. Charles A. Dana was at
Chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed
command.  Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and did
accompany him.  I put the information of what was being done for the
relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other
it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the
hands of General Longstreet.  They made the trip safely; General
Longstreet did learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reaching
there, and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if
it had been necessary.

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch scows
and flats as they floated down.  On these, by previous arrangements with
the loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with
forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of
the Union troops.  They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east
side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived
Burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all these engagements
amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing.  We captured
6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for
their total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and
caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms.  The enemy's loss in arms
was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a
great many that were found abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men.  Bragg had
about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable.
It was his own fault that he did not have more men present.  He had sent
Longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over
twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and
depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command.
He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by
way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full
rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements
were coming to me.  Knoxville was of no earthly use to him while
Chattanooga was in our hands.  If he should capture Chattanooga,
Knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a
struggle.  I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on
the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division to
reinforce Longstreet.  He also started another division a day later, but
our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it
back.  It had got so far, however, that it could not return to
Chattanooga in time to be of service there.  It is possible this latter
blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what
was going on on our side.  Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to
the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in full view of
Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack.
They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of
the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault.  Bragg knew
it was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of
view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the
Tennessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was
therefore in danger.  But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet,
cannot be accounted for in any way I know of.  If he had captured
Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle.  It
would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from
Chattanooga safely.  It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the
besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen
ground and nearly annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we
were the attacking party.  The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:
but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of
them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands
who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report.  There
was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the
soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away
if they could.  Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year
with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much
the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the
North the fall and winter before.  If the same license had been allowed
the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North,
Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the
preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been such that
I thought him eminently entitled to promotion.  I was aware that he had
previously been named by the President for promotion to the grade of
major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination.  I was
not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly
recommended him for a major-generalcy.  My recommendation was heeded and
the appointment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the
authorities at Washington--the President and Secretary of War--of the
fact, which caused great rejoicing there.  The President especially was
rejoiced that Knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further
bloodshed.  The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of East
Tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for
several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve
the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops
by the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly,
to "remember Burnside," "do something for Burnside," and other appeals
of like tenor.  He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our
victory at Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be
out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered:  and his
anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven
from the field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty
miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would
leave the State.  The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a
short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter
off East Tennessee. Foster now relieved Burnside.  Sherman made
disposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with
instructions.  I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the
20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my
entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington.
While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphic
communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my
command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20)
so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which
they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies
so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the
appearance of the first good weather in the spring.  I expected to
retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign
against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made
against Mobile from the Gulf.  I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy
that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by way
of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west.  I
was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my
expectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in our
possession:  if not, to Savannah; and in this manner to get possession
of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy.
But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap until
their animals had nearly all starved.  I now determined to go myself to
see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring,
and if not to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter
part of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of
the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there,
and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch
with the Tennessee.  From that point the railroad had been repaired up
to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains.  I went by rail
therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days.  General John
G. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio.  It was an
intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every
morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from
there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I could
reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of
broken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip
to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge.  The road had been cut up to as
great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that
condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to
Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless
one, and very disagreeable.

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennessee
and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal.  They would
collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me,
generally hearing of my approach before we arrived.  The people
naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in
the party.  I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director
was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior.  The crowds
would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of
quietly dismounting and getting into the house.  It also gave me an
opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another
about their general.  Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to
the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his
being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were
all in after a hard day's ride.  I was back in Nashville by the 13th of
January, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person
along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the
cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly.
Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had
taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and
determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone,
should have the ciphers.  The operators possessed of the ciphers, as
well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders
whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the War
Department through General Stager all the dispatches which they received
or forwarded.

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville,
because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to
be forwarded from there.  As I have said, it was necessary for me also
to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this
cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War
Department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along
the line of wires over which they were transmitted.  Accordingly I
ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B.
Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise and
discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the
operator at my headquarters could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain
Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War
Department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any
one else.  I told him I would see whether he would or not.  He said that
if he did he would be punished.  I told him if he did not he most
certainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that punishment was certain
if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even
if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his
disobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded.  When I
returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion.  The operator had
been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved.  I informed
the Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of the
telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only
obeyed my orders.  It was absolutely necessary for me to have the
cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had
not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished
anybody, or words to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference
between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was
over, when we had another little spat.  Owing to his natural disposition
to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything
whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while
issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out
of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it.  This was
done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from
me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined
them and given his approval.  He never disturbed himself, either, in
examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that
orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days
before he would sanction them.  I remonstrated against this in writing,
and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of
General-in-Chief of the Army.  But he soon lapsed again and took control
much as before.

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside that he
should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnside
assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, and
which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of
Longstreet without availing himself of this offer.  As before stated
Sherman's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee, near
Chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats
or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps
by the end of that time.  The weather was now cold and they were
suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had
it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into
service.  Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent,
marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River.



CHAPTER XLVI.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE--COMMISSIONED
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--FIRST
INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his
forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville; Sherman
suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limits
of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the
purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the
east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our
boats.  He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the
same thing on the west shore.  Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut
commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collected
and sent to Vicksburg.  He then went to Vicksburg and out to where
McPherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as
to give him about 20,000 men in all.

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with his
headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable
force of cavalry scattered west of him.  He determined, therefore, to
move directly upon Meridian.

I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman's
department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis.
Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith so
as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against
Forrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis.  Smith was
ordered to move about the 1st of February.

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with
his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and
strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could
gather.  When these scouts returned it was through them that he got the
information of General Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength and
disposition of his command.

Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly
well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective.
Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest, but not equal, man to
man, for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest's men had
had.  The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and
followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an
extent that can hardly be counted by percentage.  The difference in
result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat.  This
same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and
for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neither
army could present a more effective officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition,
meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and
with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson,
Mississippi.  This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on
the 8th, and Morton on the 9th.  Up to this time he moved in two columns
to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the
march. Here, however, there were indications of the concentration of
Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close
together.  He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy
who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by
the way, Sherman himself came near being picked up.

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated
toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian in
thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for
the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest
before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a
superiority of numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on
his return trip to Vicksburg.  There he learned that Smith, while
waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River,
instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the
11th.  Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest's
favor.

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movement
with him against Shreveport, subject to my approval.  I disapproved of
Sherman's going himself, because I had other important work for him to
do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks,
though their time to remain absent must be limited.  We must have them
for the spring campaign.  The trans-Mississippi movement proved
abortive.

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and
siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he
had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtained
permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time, to see
him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival.  While I was
permitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any one
else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to
communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with Washington,
just as though I had remained at Nashville.

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again
to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part
of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi.  I
directed Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a
threatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again
relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as
possible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent two
divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against
Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee.  Seeing
that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at
least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already to
the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in
command in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his
department and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received.  My
object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of the
preparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the
Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him
(*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep
Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in East
Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped
army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for
their cause.  I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view,
countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if
possible; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he had
not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how
important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with
Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger.  Then again on
the 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not start
the next day.  He finally got off on the 22d or 23d.  The enemy fell
back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as
strong and farther to the rear.  Thomas reported that he could not go
any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly
starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired.  He soon
fell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason.  He could not carry
supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies still
left in the country.  Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving
towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding
from theirs.  On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's
success, which eased my mind very much.  The next day, the 3d, I was
ordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had
passed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February.  My
nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmed
the next day (the 2d).  I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive
my commission, and started the day following that.  The commission was
handed to me on the 9th.  It was delivered to me at the Executive
Mansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest
son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating,
however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had
drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public,
and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of
reply.  The President said:

"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its
reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great
struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you
lieutenant-general in the Army of the United States.  With this high
honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility.  As the
country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you.  I
scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes
my own hearty personal concurrence."

To this I replied:  "Mr. President, I accept the commission, with
gratitude for the high honor conferred.  With the aid of the noble
armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it
will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations.  I feel
the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know
that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to
the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at
Brandy Station; then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once to
make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving
general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring
campaign.

It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if I
was made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington and saw the
situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding
general to be.  No one else could, probably, resist the pressure that
would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and
pursue others.  I determined, therefore, before I started back to have
Sherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command
of the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These
changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation.  My
commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March,
1864.  On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Meade,
commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his headquarters at Brandy
Station, north of the Rapidan.  I had known General Meade slightly in
the Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit.  I was a
stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except
the officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war.
There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army
before my promotion.  One was the consolidation of five corps into
three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands.
Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change
not yet ordered.  He said to me that I might want an officer who had
served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take his
place.  If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change.  He
urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole
nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the
way of selecting the right men for all positions.  For himself, he would
serve to the best of his ability wherever placed.  I assured him that I
had no thought of substituting any one for him.  As to Sherman, he could
not be spared from the West.

This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did
his great victory at Gettysburg the July before.  It is men who wait to
be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the
most efficient service.

Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him.  He
was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking
command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of the
Potomac--except from the authorities at Washington.  All other general
officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands
so far as any one present with them was concerned.  I tried to make
General Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been
if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command.  I
therefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomac
to Meade to have them executed.  To avoid the necessity of having to
give orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless there
were reasons for locating them elsewhere.  This sometimes happened, and
I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected.  On the
11th I returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders were
published by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies.
I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command in
the West and to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join me in
Nashville.

Sherman assumed command of the military division of the Mississippi on
the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati.  I had
Sherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that we
could talk over the matters about which I wanted to see him, without
losing any more time from my new command than was necessary.  The first
point which I wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation
of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. There
were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great
importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--the
restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important
commands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont in the East, and Buell,
McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the West.

Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the
general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisable
for the command under me--now Sherman's.  General J. E. Johnston was
defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largest
part of which was stationed at Dalton, about 38 miles south of
Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Cleveland
with the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta.

There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of
the armies of the military division of the Mississippi.  Johnston's army
was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta,
the second.  At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the
approaching campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was
expected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he
had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the
armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the
Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by land
while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its
ability. (*22) The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack Johnston and
destroy his army if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with
his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at
least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west,
and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points
on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in
the possession of the enemy.  This would cut the Confederacy in two
again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had done
before.  Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and
circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which
was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded
throughout all lands.

In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important
commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had been
removed in the West while I looked out for the rest.  I directed,
however, that he should make no assignment until I could speak to the
Secretary of War about the matter.  I shortly after recommended to the
Secretary the assignment of General Buell to duty.  I received the
assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the
Secretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the
latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept
the assignment offered.  I understood afterwards that he refused to
serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both.
Both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army.  Sherman
ranked him as a brigadier-general.  All of them ranked me in the old
army, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers.  The worst excuse a
soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the
commander he is ordered to report to.

On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up my
headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, a few miles south of the
headquarters of the Army of the Potomac.

Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, I
never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive my
commission as lieutenant-general.  I knew him, however, very well and
favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West who
had known him all their lives.  I had also read the remarkable series of
debates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they were
rival candidates for the United States Senate.  I was then a resident of
Missouri, and by no means a "Lincoln man" in that contest; but I
recognized then his great ability.

In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he had
never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be
conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them:  but that
procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the
people at the North and Congress, WHICH WAS ALWAYS WITH HIM, forced him
into issuing his series of "Military Orders"--one, two, three, etc.  He
did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them
were.  All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the
responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed,
pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering
such assistance.  Assuring him that I would do the best I could with the
means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War
Department, our first interview ended.

The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knew
him better.

While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held
conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being
otherwise used.  He and General Halleck both cautioned me against giving
the President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted,
so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be
sure to get from him all he knew.  I should have said that in our
interview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposed
to do.  But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted
me to hear and then do as I pleased about.  He brought out a map of
Virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the
Federal and Confederate armies up to that time.  He pointed out on the
map two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the
army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these
streams.  We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and the
tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out.  I listened
respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect
Lee's flanks while he was shutting us up.

I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to the
Secretary of War or to General Halleck.

March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and the
work of preparing for an early campaign commenced.



CHAPTER XLVII.

THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO
COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT FORT PILLOW--GENERAL
BANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS
CAMPAIGN.

When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this:
the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth; the line
of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north of
that river.  A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were
held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande.
East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the
line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the
State of Tennessee.  West Virginia was in our hands; and that part of
old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also
held.  On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia;
Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly
and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in South
Carolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola
in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent,
was still in the hands of the enemy.

Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of
the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the
Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force about
Chattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but the
commanders all reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders.  This
arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of
communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these
different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden
or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without
awaiting the orders of the division commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the same
relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war
began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals.  It
is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia
and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been
gained by either side.  Battles had been fought of as great severity as
had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and
Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in
Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the
National army, sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance,
I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press if
not by the Southern generals.  The Northern press, as a whole, did not
discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success
and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in
their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming
success of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express
dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were
not more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines of
communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan.  The Army of
Northern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river,
was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general
in the Confederate army.  The country back to the James River is cut up
with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except
where bridged.  The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow,
and very bad after the least rain.  Such an enemy was not, of course,
unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the
way back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position
they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through
such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible.  System and
discipline were both essential to its accomplishment.

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four
of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military
division.  The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no
territorial limits.  There were thus seventeen distinct commanders.
Before this time these various armies had acted separately and
independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of
depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively
engaged.  I determined to stop this.  To this end I regarded the Army of
the Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the line
described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing;
the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and all
the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy.  Some of these latter
were occupying positions from which they could not render service
proportionate to their numerical strength.  All such were depleted to
the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against
blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were
abandoned altogether.  In this way ten thousand men were added to the
Army of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore in
command.  It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave his
department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active
service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so.
Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands,
were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of
the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest
moment the roads would permit was the problem.

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of
it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General
Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland.  This was an
admirable position for such a reinforcement.  The corps could be brought
at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it
could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North
Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction.  In fact
Burnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intended
for such an expedition up to the last moment.

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against
the Confederate armies in the field.  There were but two such, as we
have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north.  The Army of
Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south
bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second,
under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to
Sherman who was still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies the
Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to
feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond
to Tennessee.  Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the
West with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what
we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee.  We could not abandon any
territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the
Northern States open to invasion.  But as the Army of the Potomac was
the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it
was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the
James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as
when remaining at them.  Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to
guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and
with a greater force.  Little expeditions could not so well be sent out
to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a
storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances.  Accordingly I arranged
for a simultaneous movement all along the line.  Sherman was to move
from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective
points. (*23)  Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the
mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective.  Either the enemy
would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see
them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so
much needed, fall into our hands.  Sigel was in command in the Valley of
Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an
invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining
near Harper's Ferry.  Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of
stores on which Lee relied.  Butler was to advance by the James River,
having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This was
the first time I had ever met him.  Before giving him any order as to
the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views.
They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct
(*24), in writing, before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general
shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not
yet been confirmed.  I found a decided prejudice against his
confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his
services had been such that he should be rewarded.  My wishes were now
reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of
the corps under General Butler.  I was not long in finding out that the
objections to Smith's promotion were well founded.

In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my
dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the
cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of
accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader.  I
said I wanted the very best man in the army for that command.  Halleck
was present and spoke up, saying: "How would Sheridan do?"  I replied:
"The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted.
Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned
to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac.  This
relieved General Alfred Pleasonton.  It was not a reflection on that
officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient
as any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the
troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile
to be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the
Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left.
Each plan presented advantages. (*25)  If by his right--my left--the
Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling
distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the
James River.  But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army
north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in
following.  A movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but
all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition
we started with.  All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned
when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was
considered.  The country over which we would have to pass was so
exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry
everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle.
In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern
border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union
City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks
of the Ohio.  While he was able to enter the city he failed to capture
the forts or any part of the garrison.  On the first intelligence of
Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against
him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.
Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got
my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort
Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the
Mississippi River.  The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored
troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry.  These troops
fought bravely, but were overpowered.  I will leave Forrest in his
dispatches to tell what he did with them.

"The river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for
two hundred yards.  The approximate loss was upward of five hundred
killed, but few of the officers escaping.  My loss was about twenty
killed.  It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern
people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners."  Subsequently
Forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks
humanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy.  I had said to Halleck that
Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold.  It
would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's
command.  If success attended our arms both places, and others too,
would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by
Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the
Executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my
views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the
garrison at Plymouth.  I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but
directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards.  This was essential
because New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my
promotion to general command.  I had opposed the movement strenuously,
but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time.  By
direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten
thousand men from Sherman's command.  This reinforcement was wanted back
badly before the forward movement commenced.  But Banks had got so far
that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and
turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas,
to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas.  Orders were given
accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended
in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged
and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the
general plan.  But the expedition was a failure.  Banks did not get back
in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smith
returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun.
The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number
required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf,
were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his
expedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible
except for the conduct of it.  I make no criticism on this point.  He
opposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in
fixing a day for the great move.  On that day Burnside left Annapolis to
occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock.  Meade
was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance.
On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the
4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and
get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from
there to accomplish the task given him.  He was also notified that
reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would be
forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at
Richmond.  The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready
to advance on the 5th.  Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to move
in conjunction with the others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidan
to the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated by
moving the army there on transports.  Richmond was fortified and
intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than
equal to five outside besieging or assaulting.  To get possession of
Lee's army was the first great object.  With the capture of his army
Richmond would necessarily follow.  It was better to fight him outside
of his stronghold than in it.  If the Army of the Potomac had been moved
bodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his
forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to reinforce
it, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then, too, I ordered a
move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the James
River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the
4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with
the Secretary of War and President.  On the last occasion, a few days
before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my
part in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long
time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in
the rear of the Army of the Potomac.  On my return to the field on this
occasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud of
dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on
a charge.  Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries
made as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station,
and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full
speed in pursuit of Federal cavalry.  Had he seen our train coming, no
doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train.  I
was on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally,
and somewhat intimately.  He is a different man entirely from what I had
supposed.  He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could
endure any amount of physical exercise.  He is able, and thoroughly
honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who
could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of
an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he
did without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with the
President before reaching the James River.  He had of course become
acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all
along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war.  I
explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops
to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent
incursions into the Northern States.  These troops could perform this
service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by
advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them
back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion.  His answer was:
"Oh, yes!  I see that.  As we say out West, if a man can't skin he must
hold a leg while somebody else does."

There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign of
which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression
further on I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B.
Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some
distance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I think, to
Spottsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as
a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of
writing a history of the war when it was over.  He assured me--and I
have no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present as
a correspondent of the press.  I expressed an entire willingness to have
him (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as
a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the
information he could give.  We received Richmond papers with about as
much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers
were received with equal regularity by the Confederates.  It was
desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies
of the enemy within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters,
and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so.  At all events
he was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with some
paper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either
expressed or implied.  He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as
to the character of his mission.  I never saw the man from the day of
our introduction to the present that I recollect.  He accompanied us,
however, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th of
May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at
my headquarters.  A short time before midnight I gave him verbal
instructions for the night.  Three days later I read in a Richmond paper
a verbatim report of these instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the
second, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my tent
for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers.  Both
his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the
tent, thinking our conversation should be private.  There was a stump a
little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire.
One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man
seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the
conversation between Meade and myself.  He called the attention of
Colonel Rowley to it.  The latter immediately took the man by the
shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he
was doing there.  The man proved to be Swinton, the "historian," and his
replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was
warned against further eaves-dropping.

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor.  General Meade came
to my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton,
who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him
to be shot that afternoon.  I promptly ordered the prisoner to be
released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to
return again on pain of punishment.



CHAPTER XLVIII.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION
--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single
object.  They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible
over such a vast field.  Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was
the main end to which all were working.  Johnston, with Atlanta, was an
important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at,
and was therefore almost an independent objective.  It was of less
importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would not
produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as
would the possession of Richmond, Lee and his army.  All other troops
were employed exclusively in support of these two movements.  This was
the plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, the
method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor
detached but co-operative columns.

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do
on the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans
whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand
with Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile.

Sigel's record is almost equally brief.  He moved out, it is true,
according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work
being done in the valley I received instead the following announcement
from Halleck:  "Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg.  He will do
nothing but run; never did anything else."  The enemy had intercepted
him about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six
guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand.

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two columns.
Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other
proved more fortunate.  Under Crook and Averell his western column
advanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, and
with more happy results. They reached the Virginia and Tennessee
Railroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up
several miles of road and burning the bridge over New River.  Having
accomplished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs and
there awaited further orders.

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalry
and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River.
His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if
threatening the rear of Lee's army.  At midnight they turned back, and
Butler by daylight was far up the James River.  He seized City Point and
Bermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much
to the surprise of the enemy.

This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my
instructions to Butler.  He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as
his objective point.  I had given him to understand that I should aim to
fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but should
Lee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of the
armies of the Potomac and the James on the James River.  He was directed
to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at
as early a date as possible.

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, and
on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the Weldon
Railroad.  He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between
Petersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latter
efforts.  He made no great effort to establish himself on that road and
neglected to attack Petersburg, which was almost defenceless.  About the
11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff,
about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond.  In the mean time
Beauregard had been gathering reinforcements.  On the 16th he attacked
Butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very
materially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinct
factor in the campaign.  I afterward ordered a portion of it to join the
Army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man his
works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a
threatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital.

The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, the
James and Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a
large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single
intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent
of territory which it thoroughly protected.  His right was protected by
the James River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by their
junction--the two streams uniting near by.  The bends of the two streams
shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it
increased the area which the line inclosed.

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer,
General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James to
inspect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safely
make an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine,
now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his
position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his
troops and having them brought round by water to White House to join me
and reinforce the Army of the Potomac.  General Barnard reported the
position very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do the
latter with great security; but that General Butler could not move from
where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. He said that the
general occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers which
was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it
for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could
do nothing offensively.  I then asked him why Butler could not move out
from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to
the rear and on the south side of Richmond.  He replied that it was
impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across
the neck of land that General Butler had.  He then took out his pencil
and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like
a bottle and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neck
represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line
immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if
Butler was in a bottle.  He was perfectly safe against an attack; but,
as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a
small force could hold the cork in its place.  This struck me as being
very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty
sketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent
report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never
thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--as
this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler and, I
know, very much to my own.  I found afterwards that this was mentioned
in the notes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown to
me, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though
against my wishes.

I make this statement here because, although I have often made it
before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it
will correct history; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may
have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly
serving their country during the trying period of the war for the
preservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his very
earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally
to the suppression of the rebellion.

The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of
in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so
intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in
which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged.

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great Atlanta campaign,
which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements
preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, I
will briefly mention Sheridan's first raid upon Lee's communications
which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not
specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant
execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign.
By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectly
observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when I
shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapidan.

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and when we
were moving on Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose
from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army and
attack his cavalry:  to cut the two roads--one running west through
Gordonsville, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and,
when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to
the James River and draw these from Butler's supplies.  This move took
him past the entire rear of Lee's army.  These orders were also given in
writing through Meade.

The object of this move was three-fold.  First, if successfully
executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of
supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own
use supplies in store in the rear and coming up.  Second, he would draw
the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear
and trains than by remaining with the army.  Third, his absence would
save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from
Fredericksburg, which had now become our base.  He started at daylight
the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected.  It was
sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac.

The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond.  Before night Stuart,
commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command.
But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a
station on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union
prisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road and used and
destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores.

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards Richmond, abandoned
the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an
exhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at Yellow
Tavern, only about six miles north of the city.  Sheridan destroyed the
railroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in
Stuart's front.  A severe engagement ensued in which the losses were
heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally
wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured.

Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and could, no
doubt, have passed through the inner ones.  But having no supports near
he could not have remained.  After caring for his wounded he struck for
the James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to rest
his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them.

He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in the
morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville.  He
then turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by Meadow
Bridge.  He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry,
reorganized, occupying the opposite side.  The panic created by his
first entrance within the outer works of Richmond having subsided troops
were sent out to attack his rear.

He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could
have extricated themselves.  The defences of Richmond, manned, were to
the right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and
the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Richmond.  This
force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while
Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily
built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced
a crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemy
was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in
bridge building.

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chickahominy.  On
the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the
James River at Haxall's Landing.  He at once put himself into
communication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies he
wanted to be furnished.

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did not
know where either this or Lee's army was now.  Great caution therefore
had to be exercised in getting back.  On the 17th, after resting his
command for three days, he started on his return.  He moved by the way
of White House.  The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by the
enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed
over it.  On the 22d he was at Aylett's on the Matapony, where he
learned the position of the two armies.  On the 24th he joined us on the
march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield.

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army:
encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all;
recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many of
the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war;
destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance
by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks.



CHAPTER XLIX.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF GENERAL
MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to Washington, as
already stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties of
his new command.  His military division was now composed of four
departments and embraced all the territory west of the Alleghany
Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State of
Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi.  The most easterly of these was the
Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next was the
Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding; the third the
Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding; and General
Steele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas.
The last-named department was so far away that Sherman could not
communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign,
and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that
of the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was in
command.

The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, were
to be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when the season should be
far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition
for the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which
was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign.  McPherson lay at
Huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of
Tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with over
sixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga;
and Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville. With
these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all,
Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a
view of destroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta. He visited
each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it
was found to be, speaking generally, good.

One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting,
before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies
forward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement.  He
found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track
railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time,
were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without
bringing forward any surplus of any kind.  He found, however, that
trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the
cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front.  He at
once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses,
and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and
used the road exclusively for transporting supplies.  In this way he was
able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for
the move, the 4th of May.

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly
one-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is
mountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some
of them of considerable volume.  Dalton is on ground where water drains
towards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from
there and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which all
the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering
into them.  Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during
the entire winter.  The best positions for defence had been selected all
the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so
that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would
have another to fall into in his rear.  His position at Dalton was so
very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped,
to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further.  With a
less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt
that he would have succeeded.

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days
in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton.
Thomas was to move out to Ringgold.  It had been Sherman's intention to
cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and
move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running
from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point
Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that
McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the
latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the
army.  In this he was disappointed.  Two of McPherson's veteran
divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to
have a furlough.  This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not
back.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, the
winter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this
with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so
as to be prepared for this very campaign.  It is hardly necessary to say
they were not returned.  That department continued to absorb troops to
no purpose to the end of the war.  This left McPherson so weak that the
part of the plan above indicated had to be changed.  He was therefore
brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of
Thomas--the two coming together about Dalton.  The three armies were
abreast, all ready to start promptly on time.

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was
useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it
by regular approaches was impracticable.  There was a narrowing up in
the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which
a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran.  Besides, the stream had been
dammed so that the valley was a lake.  Through this gorge the troops
would have to pass.  McPherson was therefore sent around by the right,
to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.
This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided to
abandon his position at Dalton.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our cavalry
having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's
rear.  Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing.  The pursuit was
continued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little
fighting, except that Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston's
army and engaged it.  Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of
bringing up his railroad trains.  He was depending upon the railroad for
all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed
as Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt.  This work was pushed
forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons
would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many
bridges to be rebuilt.

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the
enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there.
It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting
--some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important
battles--neither were single positions gained in a day.  On the
contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about Atlanta more than a month
was consumed.

It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the rear of
Sherman's army and the pursuit renewed.  This pursuit brought him up to
the vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very strongly intrenched, and
naturally a very defensible position. An assault upon it was not thought
of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it.  This was
done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of Dallas, to
reach the rear of the enemy.  Before reaching there, however, they found
the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for
about a week at a place called New Hope Church.  On the left our troops
also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get.
They kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad.
This was the case more particularly with the cavalry.  By the 4th of
June Johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew
off and Allatoona was left in our possession.

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for
occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary
base of supplies.  The railroad was finished up to that point, the
intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got
in readiness for a further advance. The rains, however, were falling in
such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads
which they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his
new position.

While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it,
bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on
furlough.

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where strong
intrenchments awaited him.  At this latter place our troops made an
assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close
to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss.  But during the
progress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the
cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear.
These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found
that Johnston had evacuated the place.  He was pursued at once.  Sherman
had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong
guard in his intrenchments.  He had intended, moving out with twenty
days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again
at the Chattahoochee River.  Johnston frustrated this plan by himself
starting back as above stated.  This time he fell back to the
Chattahoochee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easy
possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him.  The
enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by
flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the
river.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tactics
prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began.  Johnston
was now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him.

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much
favor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond, or of the
people of that section of the South in which he was commanding.  The
very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such
circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they
would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted.

For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anything
that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did
finally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extent
that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a
separation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle
about a mile and a half outside of the city.  In addition to this, there
were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege
could be commenced.

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was
about to assume the offensive.  On the 20th he came out and attacked the
Army of the Cumberland most furiously.  Hooker's corps, and Newton's and
Johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest,
which lasted more than an hour; but the Confederates were then forced to
fall back inside their main lines.  The losses were quite heavy on both
sides.  On this day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, was
very badly wounded.  During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines,
and our troops were advanced.  The investment had not been relinquished
for a moment during the day.

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by our left
flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of
him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the
22d.  At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates,
our troops being somewhat surprised.  While our troops were advancing
they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped.  But they had
become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by
an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order
and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their
antagonist was.  The field of battle continued to expand until it
embraced about seven miles of ground.  Finally, however, and before
night, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26).

It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one column
to another, was instantly killed.  In his death the army lost one of its
ablest, purest and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east
of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta. He was successful
in this, and returned about the time of the battle.  Rousseau had also
come up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed
the Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally,
when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of
Sherman, and reported to him about this time.

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta,
although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of September.
Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position.
The work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very
long.  Our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they
struck the road between Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were strongly
fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as close
up to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the
smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to
move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of
Atlanta.

On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced.  On the 28th the
enemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding, with great
vigor.  Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled
to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the
enemy.  These assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon,
and resumed once or twice still later in the day.  The enemy's losses in
these unsuccessful assaults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the town.
This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate lines,
extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and
west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line
being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there.

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the
railroads to the south, about Macon.  He was then to go east and, if
possible, release our prisoners about Andersonville. There were painful
stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners
had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which
they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed.  Great sympathy
was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned
loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them.  But the
attempt proved a failure.  McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was
first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted
a good deal of damage upon the enemy.  He had also taken some prisoners;
but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was
obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what
men he had left.  He had lost several hundred men out of his small
command.  On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little
brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all but
himself as lost.  I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of
Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received.  The rumor was
confirmed there, also, from other sources.  A few days after Colonel
Adams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment and
confirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less than
a thousand men.

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was
impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions.  He
covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of
about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this
detachment to the commanding Confederate.  In this raid, however, much
damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars,
locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc.

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our
right, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failed
utterly.  General Palmer was charged with being the cause of this
failure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and General
Schofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a question seems
to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right to
command him.  If he did raise this question while an action was going
on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible.

About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of Resaca and
destroyed it nearly up to Dalton.  This cut Sherman off from
communication with the North for several days.  Sherman responded to
this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs.

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Macon
road about Jonesboro.  He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around
the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his former
position on our left by the 22d.  These little affairs, however,
contributed but very little to the grand result.  They annoyed, it is
true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition
is soon repaired.

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for
a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some
point in the enemy's rear.  Sherman commenced this last movement on the
25th of August, and on the 1st of September was well up towards the
railroad twenty miles south of Atlanta.  Here he found Hardee
intrenched, ready to meet him.  A battle ensued, but he was unable to
drive Hardee away before night set in.  Under cover of the night,
however, Hardee left of his own accord.  That night Hood blew up his
military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and
decamped.

The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was commanding
north of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and notified
Sherman.  Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to
reach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the left
to Atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for
some distance to the right.

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most
memorable in history.  There was but little if anything in the whole
campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to
criticise severely.  It was creditable alike to the general who
commanded and the army which had executed it. Sherman had on this
campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose
alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command.

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy
a little rest after their arduous campaign.  The city of Atlanta was
turned into a military base.  The citizens were all compelled to leave.
Sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of
sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the
field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting
the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and
for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices.  He limited the
number of these traders to one for each of his three armies.

The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously, and set
the country all aglow.  This was the first great political campaign for
the Republicans in their canvass of 1864.  It was followed later by
Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns
probably had more effect in settling the election of the following
November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading
with banners and bands of music in the North.




CHAPTER L.

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE RAPIDAN
--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out from
its position north Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign,
destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and the
army defending it.  This was not to be accomplished, however, without as
desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be
consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season.  The losses
inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now
confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period
of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness,
captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress
accomplishing the final end.  It is true the Confederates had, so far,
held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object.  But
previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture
Philadelphia, New York, and the National Capital, and had made several
attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making
their boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal
North. They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one
occasion.  So here was a stand-off.  The campaign now begun was destined
to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any
previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year,
and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the
beginning in that time.  We had to have hard fighting to achieve this.
The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any
decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip.

Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in
wagons.  Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as
wanted.  Three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds
of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier.

The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan to the
crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous
streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay.  The crossings of
these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water,
and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of
troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition.  The country
roads were narrow and poor. Most of the country is covered with a dense
forest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy,
almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads.  All
bridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came to
them.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry
corps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren,
(*27) John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan.  The artillery was commanded by
General Henry J. Hunt.  This arm was in such abundance that the fourth
of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were
destined to pass through.  The surplus was much in the way, taking up as
it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the
forage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right,
and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one division of
cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson.  General Sedgwick followed Warren
with the 6th corps.  Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the right
of Lee's line.  Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road,
farther east, directly upon Ely's Ford, six miles below Germania,
preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery.
Torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the
time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and
getting into our rear.  The cavalry seized the two crossings before
daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six
o'clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the
infantry and artillery.  This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee.  The
fact that the movement was unopposed proves this.

Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton, guarding the
railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case our
crossing the Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed, however,
to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a
dispatch was sent to him a little after one P.M. giving the information
that our crossing had been successful.

The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing,
particularly on the south side of the river.  The battle-field from the
crossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from the Wilderness
toward Spottsylvania was of the same character. There were some
clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field;
but generally the country was covered with a dense forest.  The roads
were narrow and bad.  All the conditions were favorable for defensive
operations.

There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running from Orange
Court House to the battle-field.  The most southerly of these roads is
known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the northern one as the
Orange Turnpike.  There are also roads from east of the battle-field
running to Spottsylvania Court House, one from Chancellorsville,
branching at Aldrich's; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church,
Alsop's, thence by the Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goes
by Gates's, thence to Spottsylvania.  The Brock Road runs from Germania
Ford through the battle-field and on to the Court House.  As
Spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads,
some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the
farms with roads going there.

Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House.  From there to
Fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running
nearly parallel to the Wilderness.  This gave him unusual facilities,
for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right.  These
roads strike the road from Germania Ford in the Wilderness.

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed
forward, Wilson's division by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's store, on
the Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left towards Chancellorsville.
Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took
position there and intrenched.  Sedgwick followed Warren.  He was across
the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by
sundown.  Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren and
camped about six miles east of him.  Before night all the troops, and by
the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons,
were safely on the south side of the river.

There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster's
corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train that
would have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, stretched along in
single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving,
we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve
days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition.  To overcome all
difficulties, the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked
on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of
the brigade.  At a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon
belonged could be told.  The wagons were also marked to note the
contents:  if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage,
whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice,
sugar, coffee or whatever it might be.  Empty wagons were never allowed
to follow the army or stay in camp.  As soon as a wagon was empty it
would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same
article that had been taken from it.  Empty trains were obliged to leave
the road free for loaded ones.  Arriving near the army they would be
parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to.  Issues,
except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases.  By this system
the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed
with.  They consumed theirs at the depots.

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion,
and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance of
Sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and
night in a deserted house near the river.

Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the
baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible.
Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper to
Germania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by
the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence I had never
witnessed before.

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very
early hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the Army of the
Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in
the afternoon by what route we would confront his army.  This I judge
from the fact that at 1.15 P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren had
reached Old Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signals
which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy
their intrenchments at Mine Run.

Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman, Butler
and Crook had moved according to programme.

On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill,
Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to
attack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet to follow on the
same road.  Longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--at
Gordonsville, twenty or more miles away.  Ewell was ordered by the
Orange Pike.  He was near by and arrived some four miles east of Mine
Run before bivouacking for the night.

My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance on the
morning of the 5th.  Warren was to move to Parker's store, and Wilson's
cavalry--then at Parker's store--to move on to Craig's meeting-house.
Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in on his right.  The Army of the
Potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the
south, except when facing the enemy.  Hancock was to move south-westward
to join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church.

At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's store, Warren discovered the
enemy.  He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and
prepare to meet and attack him.  Wright, with his division of Sedgwick's
corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren's
right, and Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps, was
ordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get on his left.  This was
the speediest way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy on
both the Orange plank and turnpike roads.

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the Army
of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan.  By making a night march,
although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river,
he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the
5th.  Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, four
miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the
road.  I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in
position.  Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command, and was
his senior in rank.  Getting information of the proximity of the enemy,
I informed Meade, and without waiting to see Burnside, at once moved
forward my headquarters to where Meade was.

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the
initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if
we were not intrenched ourselves.  Warren had not yet reached the point
where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by.  Neither
party had any advantage of position.  Warren was, therefore, ordered to
attack as soon as he could prepare for it.  At nine o'clock Hancock was
ordered to come up to the support of Getty.  He himself arrived at
Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear.
Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved.
About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not
decisive results.  Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in a
precarious condition for a time.  Wilson, with his division of cavalry,
was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army.  At two
o'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered
to join Getty and attack the enemy.  But the heavy timber and narrow
roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as
he generally did when receiving such orders.  At four o'clock he again
received his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders from
Meade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not.
He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards.

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and Mott,
and later two brigades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty.
This was timely and saved Getty.  During the battle Getty and Carroll
were wounded, but remained on the field.  One of Birney's most gallant
brigade commanders--Alexander Hays--was killed.

I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served with
him through the Mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment.
He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever
ordered.  With him it was "Come, boys," not "Go."

Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent
to reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the intervening
forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not
get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they
were without getting into position.

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's division of cavalry to Todd's
Tavern in search of Wilson.  This was fortunate.  He found Wilson
engaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported by
infantry, and falling back before it.  Together they were strong enough
to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive.
They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close to
it.  Neither side made any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were given for
the following morning.  We knew Longstreet with 12,000 men was on his
way to join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and might arrive during
the night.  I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative
in the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30
o'clock.  Meade asked to have the hour changed to six.  Deferring to his
wishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five was
fixed as the hour to move.

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworth
with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line
perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock.  He was
directed to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left.

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in
between Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in
position to do so.  Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in their
front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take
advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter.  Burnside
was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to
swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army.  Hancock
was informed of all the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--was
sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July.

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his
right until Longstreet got up.  This is evident from the fact that
notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both
for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before
Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right.  His
purpose was evident, but he failed.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time
that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road,
thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded
by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by
which Longstreet was expected.  This disposition was made in time to
attack as ordered.  Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road,
and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for about
an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if
the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen
the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been
taken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made another
stand outside of his Richmond defences.

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not
able to accomplish much.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock's
left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left
and rear.  He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brock
roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them at both places.  Later he
was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed.

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking the
enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position
guarding the entrance to the Brock Road.  Another incident happened
during the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column.
Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the
direction of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's brigade was detached to meet
this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred
convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had
advanced upon, to join their respective commands.  At 6.50 o'clock A.M.,
Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was ordered
to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with the
remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order.  The
difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnside
from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the
sixth.

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or
more.  He maintained this position until, along in the afternoon,
Longstreet came upon him.  The retreating column of Hill meeting
reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and
returned with them.  They were enabled, from the density of the forest,
to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being
discovered.  Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to the
advance, they swept it away almost instantly.  The enemy followed up his
advantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in great
confusion.  Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but
after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had
held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched.  In this engagement
the intrepid Wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally
wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy.  The enemy followed up,
but made no immediate attack.

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriously
wounded in this engagement.  Longstreet had to leave the field, not to
resume command for many weeks.  His loss was a severe one to Lee, and
compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions,
which had fallen to our lot during the day.

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his right
in person.  He was not able, however, to rally his men to attack
Hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of
reforming.  Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants
that might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's commands.  This brigade
having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by
Hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to
right.  A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it
broke and disappeared without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury.  Burnside had not
yet been able to get up to render any assistance.  But it was now only
about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock's
right.

At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left.  His line moved up to
within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status was
maintained for about half an hour.  Then a part of Mott's division and
Ward's brigade of Birney's division gave way and retired in disorder.
The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed through
our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on
fire.  But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but
temporary.  Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with
his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss.  Fighting
had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line,
at other times only in places. The ground fought over had varied in
width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile.  The killed, and many of
the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was
impossible to reach them.  The woods were set on fire by the bursting
shells, and the conflagration raged.  The wounded who had not strength
to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death.  Finally
the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places.  Being
constructed of wood, they burned with great fury.  But the battle still
raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to
remain longer.

Lee was now in distress.  His men were in confusion, and his personal
efforts failed to restore order.  These facts, however, were learned
subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no
doubt gained a decisive success.  His troops were withdrawn now, but I
revoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, for
Hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and
did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some
distance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during all
this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the
enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken
up except one at Germania Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left.  This
left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from
all present base of supplies.  Sedgwick had refused his right and
intrenched it for protection against attack.  But late in the afternoon
of the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and got
in upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and
created considerable confusion.  Early captured several hundred
prisoners, among them two general officers.  The defence, however, was
vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much
confusion as our troops, engaged, were.  Early says in his Memoirs that
if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought
fresh troops to his great discomfort.  Many officers, who had not been
attacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even after
Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news
of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was
pushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments.
On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry from
Catharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets and skirmishers were sent
along our entire front to find the position of the enemy.  Some went as
far as a mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed no
disposition to come out of his Works.  There was no battle during the
day, and but little firing except in Warren's front; he being directed
about noon to make a reconnoissance in force.  This drew some sharp
firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back.
This ended the Battle of the Wilderness.



CHAPTER LI.

AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT
FLANK.

More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than
that of the 5th and 6th of May.  Our victory consisted in having
successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an
enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. We gained an
advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up,
must have proven very decisive.  In the evening the enemy gained an
advantage; but was speedily repulsed.  As we stood at the close, the two
armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as
when the river divided them.  But the fact of having safely crossed was
a victory.

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe.  Those of the
Confederates must have been even more so; but I have no means of
speaking with accuracy upon this point.  The Germania Ford bridge was
transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of the
wounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with
all movements of the Army of the Potomac:  first, in every change of
position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not,
the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves.  For this
purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be
found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the
timber.  Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to
stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them.  It was
wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of
considerable strength.  When a halt was made with the view of assaulting
the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their
positions changed under the direction of engineer officers.  The second
was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps.  Nothing could be
more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave
and intelligent men.  Insulated wires--insulated so that they would
transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were wound
upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel.
Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel.  The pack-saddle on
which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed
crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its
wire, would revolve freely.  There was a wagon, supplied with a
telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division,
each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters.  There were wagons
also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent
pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up
when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them.  The
mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the
command they were assigned to.  The operators were also assigned to
particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders.

The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men
connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their
wires.  A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of
the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a
line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and
uncoil it as the mule was led off.  When he had walked the length of the
wire the whole of it would be on the ground.  This would be done in rear
of every brigade at the same time.  The ends of all the wires would then
be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army.  The
men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once
raising the wires with their telegraph poles. This was done by making a
loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a
perpendicular position.  At intervals the wire would be attached to
trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient
at a place. In the absence of such a support two poles would have to be
used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in
its place.  While this was being done the telegraph wagons would take
their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be
established, and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minutes
longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil,
telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters
of the army.  No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march.  The men composing this corps
were assigned to specified commands.  When movements were made, they
would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of
ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would
climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote,
by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often
the movements of the enemy.  They would also take off the signals of the
enemy and transmit them.  It would sometimes take too long a time to
make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any
benefit from them.  But sometimes they gave useful information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcing
that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler
had reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th.  I
had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Lee
might move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position
at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's Tavern with one,
and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania
road with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House.  If this move is
made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny
River.

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock
where he is until Warren passes him.  He could then follow and become
the right of the new line.  Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church.
Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to his
destination.  Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection
of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow
Sedgwick to his place of destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops
move, and then move off quietly.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack
on Hancock this afternoon.  In case they do we must be prepared to
resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole
force.  Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd's
Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were
to go by that route at night.  Soon after dark Warren withdrew from the
front of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick.  Warren's march
carried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's command lay on
the Brock Road.  With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded
the troops.  Meade with his staff accompanied me.  The greatest
enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by.  No doubt it
was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated to
them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the
battle just fought.  The cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have
taken it for a night attack.  At all events it drew from him a furious
fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.

Meade and I rode in advance.  We had passed but a little way beyond our
left when the road forked.  We looked to see, if we could, which road
Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day.  It seemed to be the
right-hand one, and accordingly we took it.  We had not gone far,
however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of
the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into
the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a
rapid gallop and all alone.  In a few minutes he returned and reported
that Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into
his lines in a short distance.  We returned to the forks of the road,
left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren's column
when it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern,
where we arrived after midnight.

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold:  first, I did not
want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler
before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and
Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field.  But
Lee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania.  Our wagon trains had been
ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the
movement commenced.  Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army
of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government.
Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps--now commanded by Anderson--to
move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania.  But the woods being
still on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly
on to his destination that night.  By this accident Lee got possession
of Spottsylvania.  It is impossible to say now what would have been the
result if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that
we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital.
My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to
see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would
have had the shorter line.  Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we
came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from
the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond.  The first failure was
caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps on
the morning of the 6th, as before described:  the second, when fires
caused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of
the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th.
But accident often decides the fate of battle.

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of
the 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field his
at the close.  He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvania
and holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee's troops would have
to cross to get to Spottsylvania.  But Meade changed Sheridan's orders
to Merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at Todd's Tavern,
and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up.  Wilson,
who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry;
but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had not
been detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but for
the unfortunate change in Merritt's orders.  Had he been permitted to
execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with
two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had
to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren to
reinforce Wilson and hold the town.

Anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not
already made--immediately across Warren's front. Warren was not aware of
his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt had
engaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed.  He
soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made
a second attack, this time with his whole corps.  This time he succeeded
in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he
intrenched.  His right and left divisions--the former Crawford's, the
latter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cutler--drove the enemy back some
distance.

At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church.
I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to his
support.  To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney Branch Church, was
ordered to Warren's support.  Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, was
notified of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to
come up.  Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on our
extreme left, received the same instructions.  Sedgwick was slow in
getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never
at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night
before the combined forces were ready to attack.  Even then all of
Sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement.  Warren led the last
assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed.

Warren's difficulty was twofold:  when he received an order to do
anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the
army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him.  His ideas
were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him
orders had thought of others at the time he had of him.  In like manner,
when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent
instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division,
holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements
in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an
order without his presence.  His difficulty was constitutional and
beyond his control.  He was an officer of superior ability, quick
perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be
done with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill's corps--now commanded by Early--to move by the
very road we had marched upon.  This shows that even early in the
morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but
still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg.
Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond he had possession of
Spottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson was in possession of
Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however.  Early only found
that he had been following us when he ran against Hancock at Todd's
Tavern.  His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field of
Spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept Early back and
forced him to move by another route.

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it
would have put Hancock in the lead.  It would also have given us an hour
or earlier start.  It took all that time for Warren to get the head of
his column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out of
their line confronting the enemy.  This hour, and Hancock's capacity to
use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to
crush Anderson before he could be reinforced.  But the movement made was
tactical.  It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the
enemy.  Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the
right passed.  If an attack had been made by the enemy he would have
found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and
6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed.
By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still
passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by
it would have been very much exposed.  Then, too, I had not yet learned
the special qualifications of the different corps commanders.  At that
time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed
Meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from
the field.  As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able
man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and
importance of the duty he had to perform.



CHAPTER LII.

BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OF WARREN'S AND
WRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM BUTLER AND
SHERIDAN.

The Mattapony River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the Ta, the Po
and the Ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four.  It
takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the Wilderness
Tavern.  The Po rises south-west of the place, but farther away.
Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they
are but a few miles apart.  The Brock Road reaches Spottsylvania without
crossing either of these streams. Lee's army coming up by the Catharpin
Road, had to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge.  Warren and Hancock came by
the Brock Road.  Sedgwick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Furnace. Burnside
coming by Aldrich's to Gates's house, had to cross the Ny near the
enemy.  He found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by
a brigade of Willcox's division, and the stream was crossed.  This
brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming
up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it.

About the time I received the news of this attack, word came from
Hancock that Early had left his front.  He had been forced over to the
Catharpin Road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and again at Wooden Bridge.
These are the bridges Sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy
on the 8th, while one division should occupy Spottsylvania.  These
movements of the enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make the
attempt to get to, or towards, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies.  I
made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and Richmond
if he should try to execute this design.  If he had any such intention
it was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south of the Ny.

The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt
banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time we
were there--and difficult to cross except where bridged.  The country
about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings.  It
was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an
offensive one.

By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows:  Lee
occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosing
the town.  Anderson was on his left extending to the Po, Ewell came
next, then Early.  Warren occupied our right, covering the Brock and
other roads converging at Spottsylvania; Sedgwick was to his left and
Burnside on our extreme left.  Hancock was yet back at Todd's Tavern,
but as soon as it was known that Early had left Hancock's front the
latter was ordered up to Warren's right.  He formed a line with three
divisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the afternoon, and was
ordered to cross the Po and get on the enemy's flank.  The fourth
division of Hancock's corps, Mott commanding, was left at Todd's when
the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and
placed to the left of Sedgwick's--now Wright's--6th corps.  In the
morning General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his
intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters.  His loss was a severe one to the
Army of the Potomac and to the Nation.  General H. G. Wright succeeded
him in the command of his corps.

Hancock was now, nine P.M. of the 9th of May, across the left flank of
Lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of
Meade's army, by the Po River.  But for the lateness of the hour and the
darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again
at Wooden Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both
friend and foe.

The Po at the points where Hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east.
Just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--it
turns due south, and after passing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes a
more easterly direction.  During the night this corps built three
bridges over the Po; but these were in rear.

The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced Lee to reinforce his left
during the night.  Accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when Hancock
renewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, he found himself
confronted by some of Early's command, which had been brought from the
extreme right of the enemy during the night.  He succeeded in effecting
a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched
in his front, no more were crossed.

Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view
of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be
gained.  The enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground
overlooking the river, and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery.
Anderson's left rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore, for
Hancock to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of
the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate him
from it.  The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the
enemy to unite with the main body.  The idea of crossing was therefore
abandoned.

Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of
Hancock's, and I determined to take advantage of it.  Accordingly in the
morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre
by Warren's and Wright's corps, Hancock to command all the attacking
force.  Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Po.
Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as a
reserve.  Barlow's division was left south of the stream, and Mott of
the same corps was still to the left of Wright's corps.  Burnside was
ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity
presented, to attack with vigor.  The enemy seeing Barlow's division
isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury.
Barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerable
loss to himself.  But the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault.
Birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings
built by our troops, and covered the crossings.  The second assault was
repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and Barlow was withdrawn
without further molestation. General T. G. Stevenson was killed in this
move.

Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to take place, there was a
ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost
impenetrable by man.  The slopes on both sides were also covered with a
heavy growth of timber.  Warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front
twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions.  He
was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the
ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault.

Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced
position from the one he started from.  He then organized a storming
party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned Colonel Emory Upton,
of the 121st New York Volunteers, to the command of it.  About four
o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, Warren's and Wright's
corps, with Mott's division of Hancock's corps, to move simultaneously.
The movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles
began.  The battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but
little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made.  Meade
and I occupied the best position we could get, in rear of Warren.

Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being among the
killed.  He was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby
enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of
the enemy.  To the left our success was decided, but the advantage was
lost by the feeble action of Mott.  Upton with his assaulting party
pushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments.  Turning to the
right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners.
Mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly.  So much time was
lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to
reinforce, that I ordered Upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of
his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained
that I withdrew the order.  To relieve them, I ordered a renewal of the
assault.  By this time Hancock, who had gone with Birney's division to
relieve Barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him.  His corps
was now joined with Warren's and Wright's in this last assault.  It was
gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the
enemy; but they were not able to hold them.  At night they were
withdrawn.  Upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had
captured he was obliged to abandon.  Upton had gained an important
advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him
lost it to us.  Before leaving Washington I had been authorized to
promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry.  By this
authority I conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon Upton on the
spot, and this act was confirmed by the President.  Upton had been badly
wounded in this fight.

Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of
Spottsylvania Court House, completely turning Lee's right.  He was not
aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and I, being
with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the
time.  He had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost
without loss.  Burnside's position now separated him widely from
Wright's corps, the corps nearest to him.  At night he was ordered to
join on to this.  This brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an
important advantage.  I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I do
to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me
his position.

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow
up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on Barlow.
Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire
corps against two brigades.  Barlow took up his bridges in the presence
of this force.

On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by
Mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in
the enemy's line.

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck:


NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 11, 1864--8.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.

We have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting.  The result up to
this time is much in our favor.  But our losses have been heavy as well
as those of the enemy.  We have lost to this time eleven general
officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men.
I think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four
thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except
a few stragglers.  I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons
for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it
out on this line if it takes all summer.

The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men,
and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great
numbers.  My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use them
as an escort to our supply trains.  If it is more convenient to send
them out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain or
Fredericksburg, send them so.

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the
mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by
keeping them intrenched in every position they take.

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army
being detached for the defence of Richmond.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


And also, I received information, through the War Department, from
General Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the railroad south
of Petersburg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and had whipped
Hill, killing, wounding and capturing many.  Also that he was
intrenched, and could maintain himself.  On this same day came news from
Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad
and telegraph between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations,
and most of the medical stores for his army.

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army
of the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his
cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the
manner I have already described.



CHAPTER LIII.

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT-LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED
--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK-REDUCING THE ARTILLERY.

In the reconnoissance made by Mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered
at the right centre. I determined that an assault should be made at that
point. (*28) Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to move
his command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, to
Wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next
morning.  The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was
difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he
was to halt.  It took most of the night to get the men in position for
their advance in the morning.  The men got but little rest.  Burnside
was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour.
I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of
pushing forward vigorously.  Hancock was notified of this.  Warren and
Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the
assault if circumstances made it advisable.  I occupied a central
position most convenient for receiving information from all points.
Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to his
right.  Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve.

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half
an hour.

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was
ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the
enemy's intrenchments.  In front of Birney there was also a marsh to
cross.  But, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed
on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five
hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a
rush went up to and over the breastworks.  Barlow and Birney entered
almost simultaneously.  Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took
place.  The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but
used their guns as clubs.  The hand conflict was soon over.  Hancock's
corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a
brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and
ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors.  Hancock,
as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the
enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines.  About six
o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside,
on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of
the enemy.  Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was
not able to remain there.  However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the
enemy; but not without loss in return.

This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leave
us in full possession of.  He made the most strenuous efforts to regain
the position he had lost.  Troops were brought up from his left and
attacked Hancock furiously.  Hancock was forced to fall back:  but he
did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss,
until behind the breastworks he had captured.  These he turned, facing
them the other way, and continued to hold.  Wright was ordered up to
reinforce Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock.  He was wounded soon
after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps,
although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning.  At
eight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his
dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with
emphasis.  At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to relieve
Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placed
batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy,
firing over the heads of his own troops.

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but
negatively a great deal.  He kept Lee from reinforcing his centre from
that quarter.  If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had been as prompt
as Wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been
obtained.

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line.
Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging
our troops from their new position.  His losses must have been fearful.
Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet.  In one
place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by
musket balls.  All the trees between the lines were very much cut to
pieces by artillery and musketry.  It was three o'clock next morning
before the fighting ceased.  Some of our troops had then been twenty
hours under fire.  In this engagement we did not lose a single
organization, not even a company.  The enemy lost one division with its
commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses
elsewhere.(*30)  Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company
was captured.  At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one,
and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it.

Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler's division sent to
Wright, and Griffin's to Hancock.  Meade ordered his chief of staff,
General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the remaining division, and
authorized him to give it orders in his name.

During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing
continuously.  About the centre stood a house which proved to be
occupied by an old lady and her daughter.  She showed such unmistakable
signs of being strongly Union that I stopped.  She said she had not seen
a Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon
it again.  She said her husband and son, being, Union men, had had to
leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, if
alive.  She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued
to her, and promised to find out if I could where the husband and son
were.

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing
between Mott's division and the enemy.  I was afraid that Lee might be
moving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. The
indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only
taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured.
Our dead were buried this day.  Mott's division was reduced to a
brigade, and assigned to Birney's division.

During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and Meade
(*31) for promotion to the grade of Major-General in the regular army;
Hancock for Brigadier-General; Wright, Gibbon and Humphreys to be
Major-Generals of Volunteers; and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers.
Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be
confirmed by the Senate on the nomination of the President.

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear to the
left of Burnside.  The night was very dark and it rained heavily, the
roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road
a part of the way, to get through.  It was midnight before they got to
the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could
be organized to advance to their position in line.  They gained their
position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in
Wright's front.  Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which we
wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield.  Upton first drove
the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn.  Ayres coming to his support
with his brigade (of Griffin's division, Warren's corps), the position
was secured and fortified.  There was no more battle during the 14th.
This brought our line east of the Court House and running north and
south and facing west.

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new front.
This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him.  He was brought to
the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might
be wanted.

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill.  The former reported the
capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and
that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on
the Danville road:  and the latter, the destruction of a depot of
supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge
on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.  The next day news came from
Sherman and Sheridan.  Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton,
Georgia, and was following him south.  The report from Sheridan embraced
his operations up to his passing the outer defences of Richmond.  The
prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph
were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in
every direction from the rebel capital.  Temporarily that city was cut
off from all communication with the outside except by courier.  This
condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.

I wrote Halleck:


NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of
it clearing up.  The roads have now become so impassable that ambulances
with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg.  All
offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four
hours of dry weather.  The army is in the best of spirits, and feel the
greatest confidence of ultimate success. *        *        *        *
*        * You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the
elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner
due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th.
But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night march back to
their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the
morning.  Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the
assault was unsuccessful.  On this day (18th) the news was almost as
discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital.
As stated above, Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful
assault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly,
and was retreating down the valley.  Not two hours before, I had sent
the inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to stop
supplies coming from there to Lee.  I asked at once that Sigel might be
relieved, and some one else put in his place. Hunter's name was
suggested, and I heartily approved.  Further news from Butler reported
him driven from Drury's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg
road.  Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in
his place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion.  All this
news was very discouraging.  All of it must have been known by the enemy
before it was by me.  In fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have
been known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair, and his
anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed
discomfiture, But this was no time for repining.  I immediately gave
orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards Richmond, to
commence on the night of the 19th.  I also asked Halleck to secure the
cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from
Fredericksburg to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock.

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousand
raw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived.  They
had not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were on our
right.  This corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to
move in any direction.  Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part,
and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved Ewell's corps about five
o'clock in the afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us in
that quarter.  Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been
halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade of
Warren's corps.  Tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they
maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of
veterans.

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to
do it without waiting to make dispositions.  Birney was thrown to
Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve; and
Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss.

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut
him off from his intrenchments.  But his efforts were so feeble that
under the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a few
hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded.  The army being
engaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by our
left flank that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I
naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains.  The
withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from
Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies.
This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by General
Ferrero, belonging to Burnside's corps.  Ferrero was therefore promptly
notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and
be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to
do so towards Fredericksburg.  The enemy did detach as expected, and
captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few
days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be.
Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the
Confederate capital when it was in danger.  Butler being driven back,
most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed in
North Carolina; and Sigel's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek,
whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more
artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time.  It
occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing
up forage.  Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action,
but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used.  Before
leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences of
Washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and
caissons.  This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more
than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than
could be advantageously used.  In fact, before reaching the James River
I again reduced the artillery with the army largely.

I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to
Richmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor to
attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which
case the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had time
to intrench.  So I issued the following orders:


NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., VA., May 18, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and Burnside
from the position they now hold, and put Burnside to the left of Wright.
Wright and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy
as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general
engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and
intrench.  Hancock should march and take up a position as if in support
of the two left corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he
will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can
be given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the
Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever
force he can find him.  If the enemy make a general move to meet this,
they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and
attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench.

Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus
artillery to conform to this movement.

U. S. GRANT.


On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders
were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night.



CHAPTER LIV.

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN INCIDENT OF THE
MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY--POSITION OF THE
NATIONAL ARMY.

We were now to operate in a different country from any we had before
seen in Virginia.  The roads were wide and good, and the country well
cultivated.  No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black
man having been sent away.  The country, however, was new to us, and we
had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where
they led to.  Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty
of supplying the place of both maps and guides.  By reconnoitring they
were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps.
Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction
which would not separate the army too widely.

Hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney's Station, on
the Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green and
Milford.  He was at Milford by the night of the 21st.  Here he met a
detachment of Pickett's division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee.
They were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured.  Warren
followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guiney's Station that
night without molestation.  Burnside and Wright were retained at
Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to
hold Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start enough
to interpose between him and Richmond.

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by
attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the Telegraph
Road and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even Hancock's alone,
before reinforcements could come up.  But he did not avail himself of
either opportunity.  He seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but
moved by his interior line--the Telegraph Road--to make sure of keeping
between his capital and the Army of the Potomac.  He never again had
such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow.

The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by
Wright, 6th corps.  Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road; but finding
Stanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to
the road taken by Hancock and Warren without an attempt to dislodge the
enemy.  The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near the 6th corps,
at Guiney's Station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock.
There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's corps as they moved
out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed.  The object probably was
only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the
rear of the Confederates.

By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's Station.
Hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for
several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time.  They
were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d.  But Warren was
pushed to Harris's Store, directly west of Milford, and connected with
it by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church.  Wright's
corps was still back at Guiney's Station.

I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next
day:


NEW BETHEL, VA., May 22, 1864

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at
five A.M. to-morrow.  At that hour each command will send out cavalry
and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain,
if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and
6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to
Beaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads
reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can be
found.

The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford.  The 9th corps will be
directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge.  The map only shows
two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of
plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give
one for each corps.

The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. The
trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.

Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to Jericho Ford, Wright's
following.  Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by
five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters.
The men had to wade in water up to their waists.  As soon as enough
troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery
and the rest of the troops crossed.  The line formed was almost
perpendicular to the course of the river--Crawford on the left, next to
the river, Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right.  Lee was
found intrenched along the front of their line.  The whole of Hill's
corps was sent against Warren's right before it had got in position.  A
brigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but
assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches
with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners
left in our hands. By night Wright's corps was up ready to reinforce
Warren.

On the 23d Hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans
the North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg Railroad
crosses.  It was near night when the troops arrived. They found the
bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side.  Hancock sent
two brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to the right and left, and when
properly disposed they charged simultaneously.  The bridge was carried
quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved
into the river, and some of them were drowned.  Several hundred
prisoners were captured.  The hour was so late that Hancock did not
cross until next morning.

Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those
described above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midway
between Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford.  The hour of its arrival was
too late to cross that night.

On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river
without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad in
rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible.  Wright's
corps crossed at Jericho early the same day, and took position to the
right of Warren's corps, extending south of the Virginia Central
Railroad.  This road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear
(west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them
over the burning ties.  It was found, however, that Burnside's corps
could not cross at Ox Ford.  Lee had taken a position with his centre on
the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making
an acute angle where it overlooked the river.

Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's line was accurately
known, I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Ford
by the south side of the river.  They found the enemy too strong to
justify a serious attack.  A third ford was found between Ox Ford and
Jericho.  Burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and
to send one division to Hancock.  Crittenden was crossed by this
newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with
Crawford's left.  Potter joined Hancock by way of the wooden bridge.
Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of Hill's corps on his
crossing the river, and lost heavily.  When joined to Warren's corps he
was no further molested.  Burnside still guarded Ox Ford from the north
side.

Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna.  Our lines covered
his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a
single division.  To get from one wing to the other the river would have
to be crossed twice.  Lee could reinforce any part of his line from all
points of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of it
wherever he might choose to assault.  We were, for the time, practically
two armies besieging.

Lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. About this
time the very troops whose coming I had predicted, had arrived or were
coming in.  Pickett with a full division from Richmond was up; Hoke from
North Carolina had come with a brigade; and Breckinridge was there:  in
all probably not less than fifteen thousand men.  But he did not attempt
to drive us from the field.

On the 22d or 23d I received dispatches from Washington saying that
Sherman had taken Kingston, crossed the Etowah River and was advancing
into Georgia.

I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting
for Burnside's corps to pass.  Meade and his staff, besides my own
staff, were with me.  The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, and an
elderly lady, were present.  Burnside seeing us, came up on the porch,
his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked.  He touched his hat
politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never
seen so many "live Yankees" before in their lives.  The elderly lady
spoke up promptly saying, "Oh yes, I have; many more."  "Where?" said
Burnside. "In Richmond."  Prisoners, of course, was understood.

I read my dispatch aloud, when it was received.  This threw the younger
lady into tears. I found the information she had received (and I suppose
it was the information generally in circulation through the South) was
that Lee was driving us from the State in the most demoralized condition
and that in the South-west our troops were but little better than
prisoners of war.  Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that
a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news
from Sherman was true.  I assured her that there was no doubt about it.
I left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops
should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in
hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also.  But I
presume he was in the Confederate army.

On the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had relieved
Sigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Ridge to
Charlottesville and go as far as Lynchburg if possible, living upon the
country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went.  After doing
this he could find his way back to his base, or join me.

On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back on Richmond.
This proved not to be true.  But we could do nothing where we were
unless Lee would assume the offensive. I determined, therefore, to draw
out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him
and Richmond.  I had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this;
but I did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the
James River high up.  Sheridan was now again with the Army of the
Potomac.

On the 26th I informed the government at Washington of the position of
the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the
move I proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies
should be shifted to White House, on the Pamunkey.  The wagon train and
guards moved directly from Port Royal to White House.  Supplies moved
around by water, guarded by the navy.  Orders had previously been sent,
through Halleck, for Butler to send Smith's corps to White House.  This
order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be
landed on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joined
the Army of the Potomac.

It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac
from its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy.
To accomplish it, I issued the following order:


QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 25, 1864.

MAJOR GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and
artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow.
Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road to
Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact.
Send with it Wright's best division or division under his ablest
commander.  Have their places filled up in the line so if possible the
enemy will not notice their withdrawal.  Send the cavalry to-morrow
afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and
seize, if they can, Littlepage's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remain
on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and
artillery all pass.  As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the
division which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make a forced
march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede their march.
At the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the
5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for
the same place.  The two divisions of the 9th corps not now with
Hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will
be handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their
road to follow the 5th and 6th corps.  Hancock should hold his command
in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. To-morrow it
will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get
all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will
have to take.  As soon as the troops reach Hanover Town they should get
possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood.  I think
it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's
left, to-morrow afternoon, also.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by
our right south to Little River.  Here he manoeuvred to give the
impression that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's army.

Under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of
the river, Lee being completely deceived by Wilson's feint.  On the
afternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's and Torbert's
cavalry to Taylor's and Littlepage's fords towards Hanover.  As soon as
it was dark both divisions moved quietly to Hanover Ferry, leaving small
guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be
attempted in the morning.  Sheridan was followed by a division of
infantry under General Russell.  On the morning of the 27th the crossing
was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty,
taken prisoners.  Thus a position was secured south of the Pamunkey.

Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to Hanover
Town.  Here Barringer's, formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was
encountered, but it was speedily driven away.

Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the rear of Burnside's and
Hancock's corps.  When out of the way these latter corps followed,
leaving pickets confronting the enemy.  Wilson's cavalry followed last,
watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking up
the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard.

Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move.  The one nearest to
and north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, followed
by Hancock.  Warren, followed by Burnside, moved by a road farther
north, and longer.  The trains moved by a road still farther north, and
had to travel a still greater distance.  All the troops that had crossed
the Pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest
of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the
crossing that had been secured for them.

Lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from North Anna; for on
the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond: "Enemy crossed to
north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at Hanover Town."  The
troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th.

The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over.  The
streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into
swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush.  The
banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to
approach except where there were roads and bridges.

Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Richmond.  There are two roads
leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the
Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central Railroad, the
second going by New and Old Cold Harbor.  A few miles out from Hanover
Town there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Richmond.  New
Cold Harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the
roads back to White House (where our supplies came from), and the roads
south-east over which we would have to pass to get to the James River
below the Richmond defences.

On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all
had crossed except Burnside's corps.  This was left on the north side
temporarily to guard the large wagon train.  A line was at once formed
extending south from the river, Wright's corps on the right, Hancock's
in the centre, and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he
should come.

At the same time Sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards
Mechanicsville to find Lee's position.  At Hawes' Shop, just where the
middle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he encountered the
Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched.  Gregg attacked
with his division, but was unable to move the enemy.  In the evening
Custer came up with a brigade. The attack was now renewed, the cavalry
dismounting and charging as infantry.  This time the assault was
successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men.  But our
troops had to bury the dead, and found that more Confederate than Union
soldiers had been killed.  The position was easily held, because our
infantry was near.

On the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of
Lee.  Wright's corps pushed to Hanover Court House.  Hancock's corps
pushed toward Totopotomoy Creek; Warren's corps to the left on the Shady
Grove Church Road, while Burnside was held in reserve. Our advance was
pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting.  There
was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and Sheridan
was sent to meet it.

On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopotomoy, where he found the enemy
strongly fortified.  Wright was moved to the right of Hancock's corps,
and Burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the
left of Hancock.  Warren moved up near Huntley Corners on the Shady
Grove Church Road.  There was some skirmishing along the centre, and in
the evening Early attacked Warren with some vigor, driving him back at
first, and threatening to turn our left flank.  As the best means of
reinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered to attack in his front.  He
carried and held the rifle-pits.  While this was going on Warren got his
men up, repulsed Early, and drove him more than a mile.

On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the pontoons in Washington
to be sent to City Point.

In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with his corps
at White House.  I notified Meade, in writing, as follows:


NEAR HAWES' SHOP, VA., 6.40 P.M., May 30, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

General Smith will debark his force at the White House tonight and start
up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 A.M.
in the morning.  It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of
Smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the
purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back
before we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to be notified to watch the
enemy's movements well out towards Cold Harbor, and also on the
Mechanicsville road.  Wright should be got well massed on Hancock's
right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the
latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the Totopotomoy if
necessary.

I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if
not a whole brigade, at 5 A.M. in the morning, to communicate with Smith
and to return with him.  I will send orders for Smith by the messenger
you send to Sheridan with his orders.

U. S. GRANT.


I also notified Smith of his danger, and the precautions that would be
taken to protect him.

The night of the 30th Lee's position was substantially from Atlee's
Station on the Virginia Central Railroad south and east to the vicinity
of Cold Harbor.  Ours was:  The left of Warren's corps was on the Shady
Grove Road, extending to the Mechanicsville Road and about three miles
south of the Totopotomoy.  Burnside to his right, then Hancock, and
Wright on the extreme right, extending towards Hanover Court House, six
miles south-east of it.  Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was
watching our left front towards Cold Harbor.  Wilson with his division
on our right was sent to get on the Virginia Central Railroad and
destroy it as far back as possible.  He got possession of Hanover Court
House the next day after a skirmish with Young's cavalry brigade.  The
enemy attacked Sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and
the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance
towards Cold Harbor.



CHAPTER LV.

ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR
--CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE--RETROSPECTIVE.

On the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor.  He found it
intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry.  A hard fight ensued
but the place was carried.  The enemy well knew the importance of Cold
Harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it.  He
returned with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdrawing
without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the
time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at
all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him.  He speedily
turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in
position for defence.  Night came on before the enemy was ready for
assault.

Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to
Cold Harbor passing by the rear of the army.  It was expected to arrive
by daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, so
that it was nine o'clock the 1st of June before it reached its
destination.  Before the arrival of Wright the enemy had made two
assaults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the
enemy.  Wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on Cold
Harbor.

Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to march
directly to Cold Harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the
1st of June; but by some blunder the order which reached Smith directed
him to Newcastle instead of Cold Harbor.  Through this blunder Smith did
not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then
with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march.  He landed
twelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's command, but a division
was left at White House temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks
in their long march.

Before the removal of Wright's corps from our right, after dark on the
31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so close together at
that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by
the other.  Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Lee
evidently divined that he had gone to our left.  At all events, soon
after light on the 1st of June Anderson, who commanded the corps on
Lee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front.  Warren was ordered to
attack him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out
and get on his front.  Warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost
so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clock
he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides
his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with.  He
seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves
while their defenders are fighting in their front.  Wright reconnoitred
some distance to his front:  but the enemy finding Old Cold Harbor
already taken had halted and fortified some distance west.

By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith were ready to make an
assault.  In front of both the ground was clear for several hundred
yards and then became wooded.  Both charged across this open space and
into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the
enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners.

While this was going on, the enemy charged Warren three separate times
with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss.  There was no officer
more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than Warren when the enemy
forced him to it.  There was also an attack upon Hancock's and
Burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only
intended to relieve Anderson who was being pressed by Wright and Smith.

During the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of
dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without
effecting their object.

Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to
the left of Wright.  I expected to take the offensive on the morning of
the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and
the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column only
reached Old Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 A.M.
Preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take
place until the next morning.  Warren's corps was moved to the left to
connect with Smith:  Hancock's corps was got into position to the left
of Wright's, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. While
Warren and Burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several
times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners.  The
attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been.  I
was so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corps
commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they
occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for
the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover.

On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia Central
Railroad, having damaged it considerably.  But, like ourselves, the
rebels had become experts in repairing such damage.  Sherman, in his
memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to Atlanta that well
illustrates this point.  The rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn
bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at
hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had
been burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels.
One of them said, "No use, boys, Old Sherman carries duplicate tunnels
with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better
save your powder."

Sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the Chickahominy, to
find crossings and the condition of the roads.  He reported favorably.

During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to
ours.  His lines extended now from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor.
Mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy, with a
division of cavalry guarding our right.  An assault was ordered for the
3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith; but
Warren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to
attack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce more
threatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable
opportunity should present itself.

The corps commanders were to select the points in their respective
fronts where they would make their assaults.  The move was to commence
at half-past four in the morning.  Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbon
forward at the appointed hour, with Birney as a reserve.  Barlow pushed
forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and
musketry, through thickets and swamps.  Notwithstanding all the
resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he
carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where
the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for
troops as if it had been made for that purpose.  Three pieces of
artillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners.  The
guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using
them.  No (*33) assistance coming to him, he (Barlow) intrenched under
fire and continued to hold his place.  Gibbon was not so fortunate in
his front.  He found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with
deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross.  But his men struggled on
until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy.
Gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and
here he intrenched and held fast.

Wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in
their front, but accomplished nothing more.  Smith's corps also gained
the outer rifle-pits in its front.  The ground over which this corps
(18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were
made.  An open plain intervened between the contending forces at this
point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire.  Smith,
however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep
to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire,
put Martindale's division in it, and with Brooks supporting him on the
left and Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer--probably
picket--rifle-pits.  Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained
ground--which brought the whole army on one line.

This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate:
but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce
him to take the offensive.  In fact, nowhere after the battle of the
Wilderness did Lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behind
him.

Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning.  At
eleven o'clock I started to visit all the corps commanders to see for
myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the
practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts.

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to
make any further assault promise success.  Wright thought he could gain
the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of
Hancock's and Smith's corps.  Smith thought a lodgment possible, but was
not sanguine:  Burnside thought something could be done in his front,
but Warren differed.  I concluded, therefore to make no more assaults,
and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all
offensive action should cease.


COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864.-12.30 P.M. MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding A. P.

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an
assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for
the present.  Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them.
Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if
practicable.

Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made
to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition
under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army
now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg.  To do
this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the
intrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there.

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should
break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist
an assault.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now
held.  By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us.

During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of
their wounded, and without burying their dead.  These we were able to
care for.  But there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of
the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be
cared for without a cessation of hostilities.

So I wrote the following:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 5, 1864.

GENERAL R.  E. LEE, Commanding Confederate Army.

It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both
armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied
respectively by the two armies.  Humanity would dictate that some
provision should be made to provide against such hardships.  I would
propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either
party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish
lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded,
without being fired upon by the other party.  Any other method, equally
fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will
be accepted by me.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to
misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished
to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent.  I answered
this immediately by saying:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

Your communication of yesterday's date is received.  I will send
immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the
lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to
do the same.  I propose that the time for doing this be between the
hours of 12 M. and 3 P.M. to-day.  I will direct all parties going out
to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead
or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead
and removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but when either party
desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and he
had directed that any parties I may have sent out, as mentioned in my
letter, to be turned back.  I answered:


COLD HARBOR, VA, June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE. Commanding Army, N. Va.

The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention,
between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities
for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours.  Permit me to say
that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and
the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to
send out on the same duty without further application.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence
brought it to the 7th of June--forty-eight hours after it commenced
--before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field.
In the meantime all but two of the wounded had died.  And I wrote to
Lee:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 7, 1864. 10.30 A.M.

GEN. R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

I regret that your note of seven P.M. yesterday should have been
received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered,
after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and
wounded had expired; 10.45 P.M. was the hour at which it was received at
corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my
headquarters.  As a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of
this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of
collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected.  Two officers
and six men of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts., who were out in
search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were
captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of
understanding.  I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned
the fact, I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must
be returned to their commands.  These officers and men having been
carelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determined
whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will
be sent by some other route.

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded
men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, I remain,
&c.,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever
made.  I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May,
1863, at Vicksburg.  At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to
compensate for the heavy loss we sustained.  Indeed, the advantages
other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side.
Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a
wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities
generally of the Army of the Potomac.  They no longer wanted to fight
them "one Confederate to five Yanks."  Indeed, they seemed to have given
up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open
field.  They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the
Army of the Potomac.  This charge seemed to revive their hopes
temporarily; but it was of short duration.  The effect upon the Army of
the Potomac was the reverse.  When we reached the James River, however,
all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg.  We were in a
Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season.  The Army of the
Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of
Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks.  They had driven a portion of
that army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked
them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf.  They had attacked another
portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in
the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great
loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and
small arms:  they had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi,
with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures.  Only a few
days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first
at Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him
a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from
returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition.  The Army of the
Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist
under any circumstances.  There was no telling how long a regular siege
might last.  As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in
a Southern climate.  There was no telling what the casualties might be
among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface
water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun.  If
Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved
the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of
the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and
officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the
assault.  The only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so
great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches
after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out.  Had the assault
not been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the
siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would
have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort.



CHAPTER LVI.

LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES--GENERAL LEE
--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG--THE INVESTMENT OF
PETERSBURG.

Lee's position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps of
the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the
face of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left flank move
carry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River. (*34)
Preparations for this were promptly commenced. The move was a hazardous
one to make:  the Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavily
timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of
Lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to
travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened
between me and Butler, by the roads I should have to travel, with both
the James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the Army of
the Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from
the enemy at the widest place.  Lee, if he did not choose to follow me,
might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the
Chickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him before
the army with me could come to his relief.  Then too he might spare
troops enough to send against Hunter who was approaching Lynchburg,
living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition
further than what he carried with him.

But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing my
danger as I saw it.  Besides we had armies on both sides of the James
River and not far from the Confederate capital.  I knew that its safety
would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of the so-called Confederate
government, if it was not with the military commanders.  But I took all
the precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers.

Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with Hunter and to
break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal, on the
7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him (*35).
Hunter was also informed by way of Washington and the Valley that
Sheridan was on the way to meet him.  The canal and Central Road, and
the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy,
furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the
Army of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond.  Before Sheridan
got off on the 7th news was received from Hunter reporting his advance
to Staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on
the 5th, in which the Confederate commander, W. S. Jones, was killed.
On the 4th of June the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, Burnside
on our right was moved up between Warren and Smith.  On the 5th Birney
returned to Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy,
and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor.  Wright was directed to send
two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to
Bottom's Bridge.  The cavalry extended still farther east to Jones's
Bridge.

On the 7th Abercrombie--who was in command at White House, and who had
been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the
start--was ordered to take up the iron from the York River Railroad and
put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to City Point.

On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank
overlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move.

On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops
arriving at White House, without debarking from their transports, to
report to Butler.  Halleck was at this time instructed to send all
reinforcements to City Point.

On the 11th I wrote:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11, 1864.

MAJOR-GEN. B. F. BUTLER, Commanding Department of Va. and N. C.

The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James River
will commence after dark to-morrow night.  Col. Comstock, of my staff,
was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position
secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his
force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we
should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to
reach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred.  Colonel Comstock has
not yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I
would wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being so short in
which to get word to you, I must do the best I can.  Colonel Dent goes
to the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps.  The corps will leave
its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as
possible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where it
should reach by ten A.M. the following morning.  This corps numbers now
15,300 men.  They take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these
latter marching with the balance of the army to the James River.  The
remainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and at
Jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below
City Point.

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should
be sent to you.  I am not advised of the number that may have gone, but
suppose you have received from six to ten thousand.  General Smith will
also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of Richmond.

The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless
detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strong
enough.

I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer
and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all
the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival.  If there
is a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have
it laid.

Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you deem it
practicable from the force you have to seize and hold Petersburg, you
may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present
lines.  I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless it is held,
nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of
confidence of success.  If you should go there, I think troops should
take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon
supplies being sent after the place is secured.  If Colonel Dent should
not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the
18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.--On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White House.
The distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to
enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of
navigation on the Chickahominy will be avoided.

U. S. GRANT.


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of
ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march the
army has not yet returned.  It is now getting so late, however, that all
preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting
longer.

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th
corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and
artillery accompanying the balance of the army to Cole's Landing or
Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest until
they reach the latter point.

The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long Bridge
Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy.

The other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one
of them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's Bridge.  After the
crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach
about Fort Powhattan.  Of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no
opposition to our advance.  The 5th corps, after securing the passage of
the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which
crosses the same bridge with themselves.  The wagon trains should be
kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made
lower down than Jones's they should take it.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.--In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and the
uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the
direction of the 18th corps may be changed to White House.  They should
be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded
without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go
together.

U. S. GRANT.


About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers of the
11th) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving east.  This,
with the news of Hunter's successful engagement near Staunton, was no
doubt known to Lee before it was to me. Then Sheridan leaving with two
divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to Lee's
communications and supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent after
Sheridan, and Early with Ewell's entire corps was sent to the Valley.
Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to
draw them were in our hands.  People from outside began to pour into
Richmond to help eat up the little on hand.  Consternation reigned
there.

On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House, not to
stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for City Point,
leaving his trains and artillery to move by land.

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a crossing
by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their
horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets.  A pontoon bridge was
speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed
and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that
might be made from the other side.  Warren followed the cavalry, and by
the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over.  Hancock followed
Warren.  Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright.
Ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by Window
Shades and Cole's Ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry.

It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These might
run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be
sunk or captured by our navy.  General Butler had, in advance, loaded
some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel
in an emergency.  On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as high
up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the
enemy.

As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy it marched out and
joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the army
passed.  No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however,
but Warren and Wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their
front.  By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles City
Court House on the James River.  Burnside's and Wright's corps were on
the Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and the
cavalry still covering the army.  The material for a pontoon bridge was
already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately,
under the superintendence of Brigadier-General Benham, commanding the
engineer brigade.  On the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced,
Hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats.

When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac,
including Burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of May
when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men.
During the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were
received.  At the crossing of the James River June 14th-15th the army
numbered about 115,000.  Besides the ordinary losses incident to a
campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about
one-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men were
discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* In
estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned
officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in
field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all.  Operating
in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base,
large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only
to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads
leading to our flanks and rear.  We were also operating in a country
unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads
accurately.

The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially.
In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account,
never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of
the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines.  Generally the
latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one
field.  Officers and details of enlisted men are not included.  In the
Northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected
with the army and drawing pay.

Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than 80,000 men
at the start.  His reinforcements were about equal to ours during the
campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back.  He was on
the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every
obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was
familiar to him and his army.  The citizens were all friendly to him and
his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our
every move.  Rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a
railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. All
circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers.

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all these
contests, was a very highly estimated man in the Confederate army and
States, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the
people and press of the Northern States.  His praise was sounded
throughout the entire North after every action he was engaged in:  the
number of his forces was always lowered and that of the National forces
exaggerated.  He was a large, austere man, and I judge difficult of
approach to his subordinates.  To be extolled by the entire press of the
South after every engagement, and by a portion of the press North with
equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his
troops and to make him feared by his antagonists.  It was not an
uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers,
"Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet."  There were good and true
officers who believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia was superior
to the Army of the Potomac man to man.  I do not believe so, except as
the advantages spoken of above made them so.  Before the end I believe
the difference was the other way.  The Army of Northern Virginia became
despondent and saw the end.  It did not please them.  The National army
saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it.

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th of
June.  Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon
bridges and crossing the river.  As already stated, I had previously
ordered General Butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried
up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the
channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and
prevent Confederate gunboats from coming down the river.  Butler had had
these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before
my arrival.  I ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn
over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in
ferrying the troops across.

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to see
General Butler for the purpose of directing a movement against
Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomac were crossing.

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way of White
House, thence on steamers to City Point for the purpose of giving
General Butler more troops with which to accomplish this result.
General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his troops reinforced, as
far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army of
the James.  He gave Smith about six thousand reinforcements, including
some twenty-five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-five
hundred colored infantry under Hinks.

The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was
about six miles, and the Confederate advance line of works was but two
miles outside of Petersburg.  Smith was to move under cover of night, up
close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after
daylight.  I believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg could
have been easily captured at that time.  It only had about 2,500 men in
the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and
employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency.  Smith
started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force
intrenched between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg.
This position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so
much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from
there.  While there I informed General Butler that Hancock's corps would
cross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case the
latter was successful, and that I could reinforce there more rapidly
than Lee could reinforce from his position.

I returned down the river to where the troops of the Army of the Potomac
now were, communicated to General Meade, in writing, the directions I
had given to General Butler and directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock's
corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to
Petersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until they
could hear from Smith.  I also informed General Meade that I had ordered
rations from Bermuda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired him to
issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely
necessary.  The rations did not reach him, however, and Hancock, while
he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten
in the hope of receiving them.  He then moved without them, and on the
road received a note from General W. F. Smith, asking him to come on.
This seems to be the first information that General Hancock had received
of the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything particular
was expected of him.  Otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock
in the afternoon.

Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the
15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in
reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works.  The enemy's line
consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits
connecting them.  To the east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattox
back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of
several miles, probably three.  If they had been properly manned they
could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at
least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of Richmond.

Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success.  By nine
o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of
course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them contained
artillery, which fell into our hands. Hancock came up and proposed to
take any part assigned to him; and Smith asked him to relieve his men
who were in the trenches.

Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and captured
another redan.  Meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock,
who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on
account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at
Gettysburg.  During the day Meade assaulted and carried one more redan
to his right and two to his left.  In all this we lost very heavily.
The works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which
fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the
effort to repel these assaults.

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond, had
received no reinforcements, except Hoke's division from Drury's
Bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he had
urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did,
that Petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek.

During the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; and
at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied
in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by
Potter during the day.  During the night, however, Beauregard fell back
to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying
it.  Our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned,
and found that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of the
enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them.

Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, was wounded on the 18th.
He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in
the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously
been engaged.  He had several times been recommended for a
brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct.  On this
occasion, however, I promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of
my order to the War Department, asking that my act might be confirmed
and Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without any
delay.  This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer
received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had
served so faithfully and so well.

If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him,
that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been
upon the ground around Petersburg as early as four o'clock in the
afternoon of the 15th.  The days were long and it would have given him
considerable time before night.  I do not think there is any doubt that
Petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at
least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been
established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy.
This would have given us control of both the Weldon and South Side
railroads.  This would also have saved an immense amount of hard
fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have
given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued.

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the
rest which they had so long needed.  They remained quiet, except that
there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when General
Meade ordered an advance towards the Weldon Railroad.  We were very
anxious to get to that road, and even round to the South Side Railroad
if possible.

Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded by Birney, to the left, with
a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own
line.  General Wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farther
south, to march directly for the Weldon road.  The enemy passed in
between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious
results to the National troops, who were then withdrawn from their
advanced position.

The Army of the Potomac was given the investment of Petersburg, while
the Army of the James held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground we
possessed north of the James River.  The 9th corps, Burnside's, was
placed upon the right at Petersburg; the 5th, Warren's, next; the 2d,
Birney's, next; then the 6th, Wright's, broken off to the left and
south.  Thus began the siege of Petersburg.



CHAPTER LVII.

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON RAILROAD
--EARLY 'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG
--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG--CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH
VALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

On the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had as already indicated
sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he
could of the Virginia Central Railroad.  General Hunter had been
operating up the Shenandoah Valley with some success, having fought a
battle near Staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besides
killing and wounding a good many men.  After the battle he formed a
junction at Staunton with Averell and Crook, who had come up from the
Kanawha, or Gauley River.  It was supposed, therefore, that General
Hunter would be about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan
could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do.

I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should meet him
about Charlottesville, join and return with him to the Army of the
Potomac.  Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the valley, started
Breckinridge out for its defence at once. Learning later of Sheridan's
going with two divisions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions of
cavalry, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's.

Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Anna to get out west, and
learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same
stream almost as soon as they had started. He pushed on to get to
Trevilian Station to commence his destruction at that point.  On the
night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of
Trevilian, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevilian Station
and Hampton but a few miles away.

During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping, no
doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him.  Sheridan, however, by a
counter move sent Custer on a rapid march to get between the two
divisions of the enemy and into their rear. This he did successfully, so
that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at
the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some
confusion.  The losses were probably very light on both sides in killed
and wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and
sent them to City Point.

During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevilian Station, and
the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west.  There
was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of
destruction went on.  In the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken
possession of the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to go
north when he left Trevilian.  Sheridan learned, however, from some of
the prisoners he had captured here, that General Hunter was about
Lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to
Charlottesville with a view to meet him.

Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way
north and farther east, coming around by the north side of White House,
and arriving there on the 21st.  Here he found an abundance of forage
for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting.  He had
been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital
which he had established near Trevilian, and these necessarily fell into
the hands of the enemy.

White House up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops
were all on the James River, it was no longer wanted as a store of
supplies.  Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he
did on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train
with him.  All these were over the James River by the 26th of the month,
and Sheridan ready to follow.

In the meantime Meade had sent Wilson's division on a raid to destroy
the Weldon and South Side roads.  Now that Sheridan was safe and Hampton
free to return to Richmond with his cavalry, Wilson's position became
precarious.  Meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over the
river to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson.  Wilson got back,
though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage
done was soon repaired.

After these events comparative quiet reigned about Petersburg until late
in July.  The time, however, was spent in strengthening the
intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a
sudden attack.  In the meantime I had to look after other portions of my
command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as I
could have wished.

General Hunter who had been appointed to succeed Sigel in the Shenandoah
Valley immediately took up the offensive.  He met the enemy on the 5th
of June at Piedmont, and defeated him.  On the 8th he formed a junction
with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on
Lynchburg, via Lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th.  Up
to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of
taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through
a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured Lynchburg. The
destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very
great.  To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent
Early with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter.
After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a
want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place.
Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for
his return but by the way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up
the Ohio River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad.  A long time was consumed in making this movement.
Meantime the valley was left open to Early's troops, and others in that
quarter; and Washington also was uncovered. Early took advantage of this
condition of affairs and moved on Washington.

In the absence of Hunter, General Lew Wallace, with headquarters at
Baltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah lay.  His
surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in
number.  Most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to
our veterans and to the veterans which Early had with him; but the
situation of Washington was precarious, and Wallace moved with
commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the Monocacy.  He could
hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and
delay him until Washington could be put into a state of preparation for
his reception.  I had previously ordered General Meade to send a
division to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of
Washington, and he had sent Ricketts's division of the 6th corps
(Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of July.  Finding that
Wallace had gone to the front with his command, Ricketts immediately
took the cars and followed him to the Monocacy with his entire division.
They met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but
they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took
place.  The next morning Early started on his march to the capital of
the Nation, arriving before it on the 11th.

Learning of the gravity of the situation I had directed General Meade to
also order Wright with the rest of his corps directly to Washington for
the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that
Early arrived before it.  The 19th corps, which had been stationed in
Louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about
Richmond, had about this time arrived at Fortress Monroe, on their way
to join us. I diverted them from that point to Washington, which place
they reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th.  The 19th
corps was commanded by Major-General Emory.

Early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following
morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments,
which were very strong, fully manned.  He at once commenced to retreat,
Wright following.  There is no telling how much this result was
contributed to by General Lew Wallace's leading what might well be
considered almost a forlorn hope.  If Early had been but one day earlier
he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the
reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle
amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion,
by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause
than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render
by means of a victory.

Farther west also the troubles were threatening.  Some time before,
Forrest had met Sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in Mississippi
and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him.
This left Forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the
roads in rear of Sherman who was then advancing.  Sherman was abundantly
able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his
military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my
place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear.  Two
divisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to Banks in Louisiana some
months before.  Sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack
Forrest.  Smith met and defeated him very badly.  I then directed that
Smith should hang to Forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all
means his getting upon the Memphis and Nashville Railroad.  Sherman had
anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance;
but receiving my directions for this order to Smith, he repeated it.

On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a mine from
about the centre of his front under the Confederate works confronting
him.  He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasants, of the
Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners,
and who was himself a practical miner.  Burnside had submitted the
scheme to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of
keeping the men occupied.  His position was very favorable for carrying
on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its
completion.  The position of the two lines at that point were only about
a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening.  In
the bottom of this ravine the work commenced.  The position was
unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was
re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to
the right and left.  Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of
the Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable
that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point.
The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the mine was finished ready
for charging; but I had this work of charging deferred until we were
ready for it.

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that there was
great consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make an
attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he
might detach troops to go to Georgia where the army Sherman was
operating against was said to be in great trouble.  I put the army
commanders, Meade and Butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not
made.

I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of
offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object
that Lee had had.  Wright's and Emory's corps were in Washington, and
with this reduction of my force Lee might very readily have spared some
troops from the defences to send West.  I had other objects in view,
however, besides keeping Lee where he was.  The mine was constructed and
ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry
Petersburg if I could.  It was the object, therefore, to get as many of
Lee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible.
Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with Hancock's corps
and Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom,
where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was to
let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Army
of the James, get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of
the Virginia Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was
to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back
when they should have got through with their work.  We were successful
in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the James as I
expected.  The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the
30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion.  I gave Meade minute
orders (*38) on the 24th directing how I wanted the assault conducted,
which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of
the troops that were to be engaged.

Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, were
all that I can see now was necessary.  The only further precaution which
he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to
have different men to execute them.

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it
entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works,
and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under
their lines.  Eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder
each to charge them.  All was ready by the time I had prescribed; and on
the 29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back near the James River
with their troops.  Under cover of night they started to recross the
bridge at Deep Bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines
in front of the mine.

Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of
men and concentrate the balance on the right next to Burnside's corps,
while Ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under Meade, was
to form in the rear of Burnside to support him when he went in.  All
were to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as to
leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment
the mine had been sprung and Burnside had taken possession.  Burnside's
corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the
hill, supported on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's corps.

Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making
ready was concerned.  Burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever
to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for
his troops to get over in the best way they could.  The four divisions
of his corps were commanded by Generals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie and
Ferrero.  The last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it to
make the assault.  Meade interfered with this.  Burnside then took
Ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been.  In
fact, Potter and Willcox were the only division commanders Burnside had
who were equal to the occasion.  Ledlie besides being otherwise
inefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common among
soldiers.

There was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not
go off until about five o'clock in the morning.  When it did explode it
was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like
a hundred feet in length.  Instantly one hundred and ten cannon and
fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions
covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to
enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing.  Ledlie's division marched
into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men
stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their
commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they
started.  There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but
some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying
the rifle-pits as I expected they would do.

There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were well aware,
about a rumored mine that we were going to explode.  They knew we were
mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though
Beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to
the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that
our men were at work.  We had learned through deserters who had come in
that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our
side.  They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; that
they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what
moment they might expect an eruption.  I somewhat based my calculations
upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded
the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that
our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen
themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true
situation.  It was just as I expected it would be.  We could see the men
running without any apparent object except to get away. It was half an
hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our
men in the crater.  It was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to
play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements
from his right to join in expelling our troops.

The effort was a stupendous failure.  It cost us about four thousand
men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part
of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander
who was sent to lead the assault.

After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that
most of that part of Lee's army which had been drawn north of the James
River were still there, I gave Meade directions to send a corps of
infantry and the cavalry next morning, before Lee could get his forces
back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon Railroad.  But
misfortunes never come singly.  I learned during that same afternoon
that Wright's pursuit of Early was feeble because of the constant and
contrary orders he had been receiving from Washington, while I was cut
off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across
Chesapeake Bay being broken.  Early, however, was not aware of the fact
that Wright was not pursuing until he had reached Strasburg.  Finding
that he was not pursued he turned back to Winchester, where Crook was
stationed with a small force, and drove him out.  He then pushed north
until he had reached the Potomac, then he sent McCausland across to
Chambersburg, Pa., to destroy that town.  Chambersburg was a purely
defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet
McCausland, under Early's orders, burned the place and left about three
hundred families houseless.  This occurred on the 30th of July.  I
rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the Weldon
Railroad, and directed them to embark for Washington City.  After
burning Chambersburg McCausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry,
towards Cumberland.  They were met and defeated by General Kelley and
driven into Virginia.

The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because it
was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about
Richmond.  It was well known that they would make a desperate struggle
to maintain it.  It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us
heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the
incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of
interference from Washington.

It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to
keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right
and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally
speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the
whereabouts of the enemy was lost. They were left, therefore, free to
supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they
could carry away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania.  I determined
to put a stop to this.  I started Sheridan at once for that field of
operation, and on the following day sent another division of his
cavalry.

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, but
Mr. Stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so
important a command.  On the 1st of August when I sent reinforcements
for the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders:


CITY POINT, VA.,

August 1, 1864, 11.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington D. C.

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is
being expelled from the border.  Unless General Hunter is in the field
in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the
field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow
him to the death.  Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also.  Once
started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession
of the Virginia Central Railroad.  If General Hunter is in the field,
give Sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. All
the cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course of
to-morrow.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


The President in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine
directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the
field, operating against Early, and sent me the following very
characteristic dispatch:


OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
August 3, 1864.

Cypher. 6 P.M.,

LT. GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Va.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put in
command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself
south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy
goes, let our troops go also."  This, I think, is exactly right, as to
how our forces should move.  But please look over the despatches you may
have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover,
if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of
"putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the
death" in any direction.  I repeat to you it will neither be done nor
attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.

A. LINCOLN.


I replied to this that "I would start in two hours for Washington," and
soon got off, going directly to the Monocacy without stopping at
Washington on my way.  I found General Hunter's army encamped there,
scattered over the fields along the banks of the Monocacy, with many
hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at
that point.  I asked the general where the enemy was.  He replied that
he did not know.  He said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed with
orders from Washington moving him first to the right and then to the
left that he had lost all trace of the enemy.

I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy was, and
at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to
push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's Ferry, in the
Shenandoah Valley.  The cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but
all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that
way.  I knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that,
no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very
short time be found in front of our troops moving south.

I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions. (*39)  I told him that
Sheridan was in Washington, and still another division was on its way;
and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at
any point that would suit him best, Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere,
and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field.  The general
replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely.  He
said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the
position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there.  He
did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a
patriotism that was none too common in the army.  There were not many
major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a
department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular
reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed.  I
told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come
to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there.

Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the
troops were all off.  I went to the station and remained there until he
arrived.  Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Union
people, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at the
Monocacy when Sheridan arrived.  I hastily told Sheridan what had been
done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the
written instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter and
directed to that officer.

Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being
cavalry.  Early had about the same number, but the superior ability of
the National commander over the Confederate commander was so great that
all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than
counterbalanced by this circumstance.  As I had predicted, Early was
soon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and
Maryland were speedily freed from the invaders.  The importance of the
valley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but
not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out
from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces
about his capital.  I therefore gave orders for another move to the
north side of the James River, to threaten Richmond.  Hancock's corps,
part of the 10th corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalry
were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the
13th-14th of August.  A threatening position was maintained for a number
of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard
fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything
like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present
themselves which would insure great success. General Meade was left in
command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and
was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and
himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an
effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side.  There was
no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no
more reinforcements were sent to the valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements
being sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had
made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to
the valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven
hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having
contributed to our list of captures.  I also informed him that but one
division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to prevent
the going of any more.

To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now near
Atlanta, wanted reinforcements.  He was perfectly willing to take the
raw troops then being raised in the North-west, saying that he could
teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would
learn in a week in a camp of instruction.  I therefore asked that all
troops in camps of instruction in the North-west be sent to him.
Sherman also wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving out
against him.  I informed him of what I had done and assured him that I
would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and
that up to that time none had gone.  I also informed him that his real
danger was from Kirby Smith, who commanded the trans-Mississippi
Department.  If Smith should escape Steele, and get across the
Mississippi River, he might move against him.  I had, therefore, asked
to have an expedition ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile in
case Kirby Smith should get across.  This would have a tendency to draw
him to the defence of that place, instead of going against Sherman.

Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed me that
there was an organized scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft,
and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the
field to put it down.  He also advised taking in sail, and not going too
fast.

The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River on the
night of the 20th.  Before they were withdrawn, however, and while most
of Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren had been sent with
most of the 5th corps to capture the Weldon Railroad.  He took up his
line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the
troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of
the line which he had vacated by moving out.  From our left, near the
old line, it was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad.  A division
was ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren,
while a division was brought back from the north side of the James River
to take its place.

This road was very important to the enemy.  The limits from which his
supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knew
that he must fight desperately to protect it.  Warren carried the road,
though with heavy loss on both sides.  He fortified his new position,
and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to
connect with his new one.  Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge
Warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss.

As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops
were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon Railroad; and with
such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of
about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that
source.  It was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon
Railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he
made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very
heavy losses to him as compared with ours.

On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the James were
withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to destroy the Weldon
Railroad.  They were attacked on the 25th at Reams's Station, and after
desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of
artillery.  But the Weldon Railroad never went out of our possession
from the 18th of August to the close of the war.



CHAPTER LVIII.

SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE
SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE
WINTER.

We had our troops on the Weldon Railroad contending against a large
force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could
afford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman just getting through
to Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and
detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of
him; Washington threatened but a short time before, and now Early being
strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt.  It
kept me pretty active in looking after all these points.

On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced on Early up the Shenandoah
Valley, Early falling back to Strasburg.  On the 12th I learned that Lee
had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a
considerable cavalry force to strengthen Early.  It was important that
Sheridan should be informed of this, so I sent the information to
Washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to
get the message to Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information.
The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy
and reached Sheridan just in time. The officer went through by way of
Snicker's Gap, escorted by some cavalry.  He found Sheridan just making
his preparations to attack Early in his chosen position.  Now, however,
he was thrown back on the defensive.

On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in the
Shenandoah Valley.  My purpose was to have him attack Early, or drive
him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for Lee's
army.  I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washington
to Sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such
orders as Halleck's caution (and that of the Secretary of War) would
suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to
mine.  I therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directly
through to Charlestown, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and waited
there to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to
inform him where to meet me.

When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the positions
of his army and that of the enemy.  He at once drew one out of his side
pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies.
He said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out
how) against the Confederates, and that he could "whip them."  Before
starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had
brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his
views and so confident of success, I said nothing about this and did not
take it out of my pocket.

Sheridan's wagon trains were kept at Harper's Ferry, where all of his
stores were.  By keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not
have to be hauled to them.  As supplies of ammunition, provisions and
rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the
stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester.
Knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would
have to bring up wagons trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him if he
could be ready to get off by the following Tuesday.  This was on Friday.
"O Yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on Monday."  I told
him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan;
and I immediately started to return to the army about Richmond.  After
visiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Point
on the 19th.

On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett, President
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.  He seemed very anxious to know when
workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put
it in shape for running.  It was a large piece of property to have
standing idle.  I told him I could not answer then positively but would
try and inform him before a great while.  On my return Mr. Garrett met
me again with the same and I told him I thought that by the Wednesday he
might send his workmen out on his road.  I gave him no further
information however, and he had no suspicion of how I expected to have
the road cleared for his workmen.

Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon.  He met Early at the
crossing of Opequon Creek, a most decisive victory--one which the
country.  Early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship
and made the victory easy.  He had sent G. T. Anderson's division east
of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's Ferry; and about the time I
arrived there he started other divisions (leaving but two in their
camps) to march to Martinsburg for the purpose destroying the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad at that point.  Early here learned that I had been
with Sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started
back as soon as he got the information.  But his forces were separated
and, as I have said, he was very badly defeated.  He fell back to
Fisher's Hill, Sheridan following.

The valley is narrow at that point, and Early made another stand there,
behind works which extended across.  But Sheridan turned both his flanks
and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit.
The pursuit was continued up the valley to Mount Jackson and New Market.
Sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns.  The
houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with
Early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters.  Finally,
on the 25th, Early turned from the valley eastward, leaving Sheridan at
Harrisonburg in undisputed possession.

Now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished.
Sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle,
and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops;
and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy.  What he could
not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to
come back there.  I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victory
and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being
aimed at the enemy around Petersburg.  I also notified the other
commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of
his victory.

I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to
have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and
have a bad effect on the November elections. The convention which had
met and made its nomination of the Democratic candidate for the
presidency had declared the war a failure.  Treason was talked as boldly
in Chicago at that convention as ever been in Charleston.  It was a
question whether the government would then have had the power to make
arrests and punish those who talked treason.  But this decisive victory
was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass.

Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in
Washington, and the President became very much frightened about him.  He
was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of General
Cass was said to have been, in one of our Indian wars, when he was an
officer of army.  Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely that the
first thing he knew he found himself in front, and the Indians pursuing
him.  The President was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other side
of Early and that Early was in behind him.  He was afraid that Sheridan
was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from
Richmond to enable Early to beat him.  I replied to the President that I
had taken steps to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, by
attacking the former where he was.

On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his position, I sent Ord with
the 18th corps and Birney with the 10th corps to make an advance on
Richmond, to threaten it.  Ord moved with the left wing up to Chaffin's
Bluff; Birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while Kautz
with the cavalry took the Darby road, still farther to the north.  They
got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise
the enemy.  In that, however, they were unsuccessful.

The enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. Stannard's
division of the 18th corps with General Burnham's brigade leading, tried
an assault against Fort Harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a
good many prisoners. Burnham was killed in the assault.  Colonel Stevens
who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the
same way.  Some works to the right and left were also carried with the
guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners.  Birney's troops
to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were
unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line.

Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison into the
new line and extending it to the river.  This brought us pretty close to
the enemy on the north side of the James, and the two opposing lines
maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege.

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed.
Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved
upon General Heckman, and later General Weitzel was assigned to the
command of the 18th corps.  During the night Lee reinforced his troops
about Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort Harrison, by eight
additional brigades from Petersburg, and attempted to retake the works
which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them.  All
their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy
loss.  In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a gallant
officer who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm. Our casualties
during these operations amounted to 394 killed, I,554 wounded and 324
missing.

Whilst this was going on General Meade was instructed to keep up an
appearance of moving troops to our extreme left.  Parke and Warren were
kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their
enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other
intrenchments.  The object of this was to prevent reinforcements from
going to the north side of the river.  Meade was instructed to watch the
enemy closely and, if Lee weakened his lines, to make an attack.

On the 30th these troops moved out, under Warren, and captured an
advanced intrenched camp at Peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the
main line.  Our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of
carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and
lost a large number of men, mostly captured.  The number of killed and
wounded was not large.  The next day our troops advanced again and
established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of
the enemy.  This advanced Warren's position on the Weldon Railroad very
considerably.

Sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the
productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies
the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again
entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be
sent where it could be of more use.  I approved of his suggestion, and
ordered him to send Wright's corps back to the James River.  I further
directed him to repair the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley towards the
advanced position which we would hold with a small force.  The troops
were to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order to watch
the east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into
the rear of Sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction.

The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate army that,
contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike,
and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed.
Reinforcements were sent therefore to Early, and this before any of our
troops had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan at
Harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there.

On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the valley,
taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle
before him, Early following.  At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned his
cavalry back on that of Early, which, under the lead of Rosser, was
pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns
and a large number of prisoners.  Sheridan lost only about sixty men.
His cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles.  On the 10th
of October the march down the valley was again resumed, Early again
following.

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if
afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back
again and cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central Railroad.  But
this order had to go through Washington where it was intercepted; and
when Sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what I wanted
him to do it was something entirely different.  Halleck informed
Sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a
base from which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville; that he
should fortify this position and provision it.

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and I was impelled to
telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows:


CITY POINT, VA., October 14, 1864.--12.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va.

What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad and
canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself
ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. If you make the
enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those
thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction.
If you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here
all the force you can.  I deem a good cavalry force necessary for your
offensive, as well as defensive operations.  You need not therefore send
here more than one division of cavalry.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


Sheridan having been summoned to Washington City, started on the 15th
leaving Wright in command.  His army was then at Cedar Creek, some
twenty miles south of Winchester.  The next morning while at Front
Royal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright, saying that a dispatch
from Longstreet to Early had been intercepted.  It directed the latter
to be ready to move and to crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet,
arrived.  On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry up
the valley to join Wright.

On the 18th of October Early was ready to move, and during the night
succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which
fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing
eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners.  The
right under General Getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling
back to Middletown where it took a position and made a stand.  The
cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to Winchester and
held them for the use of our troops in falling back, General Wright
having ordered a retreat back to that place.

Sheridan having left Washington on the 18th, reached Winchester that
night.  The following morning he started to join his command.  He had
scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from
the front and also heard heavy firing to the south.  He immediately
ordered the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across the valley to
stop the stragglers.  Leaving members of his staff to take care of
Winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort
directly for the scene of battle.  As he met the fugitives he ordered
them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way.
His presence soon restored confidence.  Finding themselves worse
frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back.  Many of those who
had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant
soldiers before night.

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and Custer still holding
their ground firmly between the Confederates and our retreating troops.
Everything in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once proceeded to
intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy.  This
was made with vigor, and was directed principally against Emory's corps,
which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack.  By one
o'clock the attack was repulsed.  Early was so badly damaged that he
seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench
himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained.  He
thought, no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to leave him
unmolested; but in this he was mistaken.

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced.  He sent his
cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear.  The
contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke,
and disintegration along the whole line soon followed.  Early tried to
rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give
way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand.  Our
cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the Confederates,
captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been
lost in the morning.  This victory pretty much closed the campaigning in
the Valley of Virginia.  All the Confederate troops were sent back to
Richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little
cavalry.  Wright's corps was ordered back to the Army of the Potomac,
and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley.  Early had lost
more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than Sheridan had
commanded from first to last.

On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B. Hayes, who
succeeded me as President of the United States, bore a very honorable
part.  His conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as
well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere
personal daring.  This might well have been expected of one who could
write at the time he is said to have done so:  "Any officer fit for duty
who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in
Congress, ought to be scalped."  Having entered the army as a Major of
Volunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained by
meritorious service the rank of Brevet Major-General before its close.

On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry
on the 7th of October, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed,
wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery.  This was
followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was
repulsed with severe slaughter.  On the 13th a reconnoissance was sent
out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new
works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us.

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt to get possession of the
South Side Railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th.  The
attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not
getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for.  Seeing the
impossibility of its accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw,
and they were all back in their former positions the next day.

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of
the James River in order to support this move, by detaining there the
Confederate troops who were on that side. He succeeded in this, but
failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before
turning in on the Darby road and by reason of simply coming up against
their lines in place.

This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of course
there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle
was fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It would prolong this
work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day
around Petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not
interest the general reader if given.  All these details can be found by
the military student in a series of books published by the Scribners,
Badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the
War Department, including both the National and Confederate reports.

In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from the
command of the 2d corps by the Secretary of War and ordered to
Washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be
designated the 1st corps.  It was expected that this would give him a
large command to co-operate with in the spring.  It was my expectation,
at the time, that in the final operations Hancock should move either up
the valley, or else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; the idea being
to make the spring campaign the close of the war.  I expected, with
Sherman coming up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and around
Richmond, and Thomas's command in Tennessee with depots of supplies
established in the eastern part of that State, to move from the
direction of Washington or the valley towards Lynchburg.  We would then
have Lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely,
making it impossible for him to support his army.

General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, was
assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock.



CHAPTER LIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR ANECDOTES--THE
MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

Let us now return to the operations in the military division of the
Mississippi, and accompany Sherman in his march to the sea.

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very
materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east
to west.

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis visited Palmetto and
Macon and made speeches at each place.  He spoke at Palmetto on the 20th
of September, and at Macon on the 22d. Inasmuch as he had relieved
Johnston and appointed Hood, and Hood had immediately taken the
initiative, it is natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointed
with General Johnston's policy.  My own judgment is that Johnston acted
very wisely:  he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as
he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost.
As Sherman advanced, as I have show, his army became spread out, until,
if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in
detail.  I know that both Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard of
the change.  Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not
destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the
enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of
defeat.

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Georgia, and
General Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their
loyalty to the Southern cause was doubtful.  So far as General Johnston
is concerned, I think Davis did him a great injustice in this
particular.  I had know the general before the war and strongly believed
it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the
purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused.  There, as I have said,
I think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by
the whole South--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to
enable them to gain recognition in the end.  The North was already
growing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with this
difference.  In the North the people governed, and could stop
hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies.  The South was a
military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to
back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what
extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the
soldiers themselves.  Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to the
people of Georgia and that portion of the South to come to their relief.
He tried to assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly
digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut
them off from supplies from the North; and that with a force in front,
and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a
hostile people.  Papers containing reports of these speeches immediately
reached the Northern States, and they were republished.  Of course, that
caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with
Sherman.

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta he moved to the south-west
and was followed by a portion of Sherman's army.  He soon appeared upon
the railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying
the road.  At the same time also the work was begun in Tennessee and
Kentucky which Mr. Davis had assured his hearers at Palmetto and Macon
would take place.  He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry general
in the South) north for this purpose; and Forrest and Wheeler carried
out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up
a garrison.  Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of
capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports,
something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for.
Hood's army had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdrawing the
Georgia State troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops
for the use of the people and for the use of the army.  This not only
depleted Hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in
gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its
subsequent march.  Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go
himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly
demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be
impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any force
whatever with which to take the offensive.  Had that plan been adhered
to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and Mr. Davis's
prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or
else Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which
Mr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than
Napoleon's retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman. He took
advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation
possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to
break his communications.  Something else had to be done:  and to
Sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning
upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that
something else should be.

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows:


CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 10, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be
made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced.  We
want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war.  If we
give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant.  Now
that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but it
will be the best move to transfer Canby's troops to act upon Savannah,
whilst you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, in
this matter.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


Sherman replied promptly:

"If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, or
Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give
up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other.  * * * If you can
manage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or the
Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of
Georgia."

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a
letter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T.  SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Division of the
Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porter
will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I
can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough
for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of
recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly.  My
lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the
James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and
south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road.  This line is very strongly
fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its
great length takes many in the aggregate.  I propose, when I do move, to
extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or
Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville
Road cut.  At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of
from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher,
and hold that point.  At the same time a large naval fleet will be
assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did
at Mobile.  This will give us the same control of the harbor of
Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do
with the forces at your command, I do not see. The difficulties of
supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where
you are, I plainly see.  If it had not been for Price's movements Canby
would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile.  From your command
on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken.  With these
forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to
Mobile and the other half to Savannah.  You could then move as proposed
in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally.
Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new
base of supplies.  My object now in sending a staff officer is not so
much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans
matured by the time everything can be got ready.  It will probably be
the 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will be
executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and I
will approve them. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


This reached Sherman on September 20th.

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that Hood's
troops were in his rear.  He had provided against this by sending a
division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was in
the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the direction
from which he had come to reach the railroad.  At the same time Sherman
and Hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners,
the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged
between hostile commanders in the field.  On the 27th of September I
telegraphed Sherman as follows:


CITY POINT, VA., September 27, 1864--10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western States to
be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you.  * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga, and afterwards to
Nashville, with another division (Morgan's) of the advanced army.
Sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should
take place against Milledgeville and then to Savannah.  His expectation
at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his
supplies.  Hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so
that he could make two miles to Sherman's one.  He depended upon the
country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, Mobile
had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's army.  It had
been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first suggested to the
then commander-in-chief that the troops in Louisiana, instead of
frittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should move
against Mobile.  I recommended this from time to time until I came into
command of the army, the last of March 1864.  Having the power in my own
hands, I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops,
in the department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move
against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies
operating in the field.  Before I came into command, these troops had
been scattered over the trans-Mississippi department in such a way that
they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in
the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused Mobile
to be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army to find his
next base of supplies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longer
existed.

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly
wounded, had to leave the army about the first of October. He was in
command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one.
Sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right
commanded by General O. O. Howard and the left by General Slocum.
General Dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings.
Howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and Slocum's the 14th
and 20th corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Williams.
Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the right
wing.  About this time they left to take part in the presidential
election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhaus
and Ransom.  I have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest
solicitation of the War Department. General Blair got back in time to
resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the
sea and back to the grand review at Washington.  General Logan did not
return to his command until after it reached Savannah.

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard from
that portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with the Western
Army, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, with which army
General Logan had served from the battle of Belmont to the fall of
Atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel
commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army
corps, until upon the death of McPherson the command of the entire Army
of the Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested
battle.  He conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in
that engagement; and I can bear testimony, from personal observation,
that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which
he had occupied as a soldier.  I will not pretend to question the motive
which actuated Sherman in taking an officer from another army to
supersede General Logan.  I have no doubt, whatever, that he did this
for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was
more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should
not be aggrieved; though I doubt whether he had an officer with him who
could have filled the place as Logan would have done.  Differences of
opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war,
and of judgment as to men's fitness.  The officer who has the command,
however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under
him, unless he is very manifestly wrong.

Sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand
effective men.  All weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those
remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had
sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any
European soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the
machine thought. European armies know very little what they are fighting
for, and care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops, there were
two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand
men.  Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of
Forrest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr.
Davis had promised they should.  This part of Mr. Davis's military plan
was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have
done, according to my judgment. I say this because I have criticised his
military judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in the
appointment of Hood.  I am aware, however, that there was high feeling
existing at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I regarded
as one of his ablest lieutenants.

On the 5th of October the railroad back from Atlanta was again very
badly broken, Hood having got on the track with his army. Sherman saw
after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles.  The defence
of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold
points between their intrenched positions against Hood's whole army; in
fact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenched
positions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located at
them. Allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men
under the command of General Corse, one of the very able and efficient
volunteer officers produced by the war.  He, with a small force, was cut
off from the remainder of the National army and was attacked with great
vigor by many times his own number. Sherman from his high position could
see the battle raging, with the Confederate troops between him and his
subordinate.  He sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but
the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching Corse, would be
so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead.  Corse was
a man who would never surrender.  From a high position some of Sherman's
signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block
house at Allatoona.  It was from Corse.  He had been shot through the
face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his
determination to hold his post at all hazards.  It was at this point
probably, that Sherman first realized that with the forces at his
disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the North
would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to
operate offensively beyond Atlanta.  He proposed, therefore, to destroy
the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the
latter place garrisoned.  Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was
necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road
until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small
rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to
return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move
light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on
the field.

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for
the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving
south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky.
I, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did.
On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely
to move according to the plan he had proposed:  that is, cutting loose
from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga.
To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered
Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to
report to him.  In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with two
divisions of Sherman's army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving
the enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas and,
under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive
there long before Hood could reach Nashville.

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in
the  North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped.
Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at
Chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at
Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro, and Florence.  There were
already with him in Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers,
and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other
departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville,
for its defence.  Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted
cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field.  Thomas had at this
time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements
here above enumerated.  These reinforcements gave him  altogether about
seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new
levies already spoken of.

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede Hood
in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which
Hood and Sherman were, or might be, operating.  He made the most frantic
appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way:  by
sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of
the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to
cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. But
it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying
supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped
that his own possessions might escape.

Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur, Alabama, where
he remained until the 29th of October, but without making an attack on
the garrison of that place.

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats, from Muscle Shoals east;
and, also, below the second shoals out to the Ohio River.  These, with
the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river
at any point where Hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it
impossible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where it was
navigable.  But Muscle Shoals is not navigable, and below them again is
another shoal which also obstructs navigation.  Hood therefore moved
down to a point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over and
remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and
ammunition. All of these had to come from a considerable distance south,
because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with
small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had
long since been exhausted.  On the 1st of November I suggested to
Sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying
Hood before he started on his campaign.

On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved definitely his making his
proposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tender
mercy of Thomas and the troops in his command.  Sherman fixed the 10th
of November as the day of starting.

Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the 15th the
real march to the sea commenced.  The right wing, under Howard, and the
cavalry went to Jonesboro, Milledgeville, then the capital of Georgia,
being Sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to Savannah.  The
left wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads much farther east than
those taken by the right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened
Augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and
meet the right wing at Milledgeville.

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military
purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day to
superintend the work, and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders
for this campaign were perfect.  Before starting, he had sent back all
sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy,
well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect.
His artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carried
with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun.  Small rations were
taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid
movement.  The army was expected to live on the country, and to always
keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay
of a few days.

The troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance
along the line of railroads, which they destroyed.  The method adopted
to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and
culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and
bend the rails.  Soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one
side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails
and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time.  The
ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were
loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps.  When a
sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be
set on fire.  This would heat the rails very much more in the middle,
that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that
they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to
increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of
the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it
around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of
Georgia. All this work was going on at the same time, there being a
sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logs
and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would
bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last
bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain
place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed.

The organization for supplying the army was very complete.  Each brigade
furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the
command to which they belonged.  Strict injunctions were issued against
pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but
everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken.  The
supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster,
and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same
as if they had been purchased.  The captures consisted largely of
cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and
occasionally coffee or other small rations.

The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in
collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands,
was marvellous.  When they started out in the morning, they were always
on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being
mounted on a horse or mule. These would be turned in for the general use
of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return
again in the evening mounted.

Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance;
indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the
romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded,
and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of
the foundation is left.  I suspect that most of them consist chiefly of
the fiction added to make the stories better.  In one instance it was
reported that a few men of Sherman's army passed a house where they
discovered some chickens under the dwelling.  They immediately proceeded
to capture them, to add to the army's supplies.  The lady of the house,
who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared,
saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other
parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had.
The soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens
again they were tempted and one of them replied:  "The rebellion must be
suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy," and
proceeded to appropriate the last one.

Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. The South,
prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who
took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts.
Orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with.  On
one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its
mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a
strong appeal to him to spare it. The soldier replied, "Madam, our
orders are to kill every bloodhound."  "But this is not a bloodhound,"
said the lady.  "Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if
we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it.

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would
seem to imply, I do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging
considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any
supplies except such as the country afforded.

On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached Milledgeville. The right
wing was not far off:  but proceeded on its way towards Savannah
destroying the road as it went.  The troops at Milledgeville remained
over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes,
etc., before resuming its march.

The governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this, now
fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the State and all the
State officers.  The governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry away
even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the State to
fall into our hands.  The only military force that was opposed to
Sherman's forward march was the Georgia militia, a division under the
command of General G. W. Smith, and a battalion under Harry Wayne.
Neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to
even retard the progress of Sherman's army.

The people at the South became so frantic at this time at the successful
invasion of Georgia that they took the cadets from the military college
and added them to the ranks of the militia.  They even liberated the
State convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the
army.  I have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed
to Sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other
Southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as
could be found in every community, North and South--who took advantage
of their country being invaded to commit crime.  They were in but little
danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected.

The Southern papers in commenting upon Sherman's movements pictured him
as in the most deplorable condition:  stating that his men were
starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without
object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection
of our navy.  These papers got to the North and had more or less effect
upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons
particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with Sherman.
Mr. Lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if I
could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would
comfort them.  I told him there was not the slightest occasion for
alarm; that with 60,000 such men as Sherman had with him, such a
commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country.
He might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started
out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get
to his chosen destination:  and even if worst came to worst he could
return North.  I heard afterwards of Mr. Lincoln's saying, to those who
would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of Sherman's
army, that Sherman was all right:  "Grant says they are safe with such a
general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can
crawl back by the hole they went in at."

While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the State House, organized a
legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the
legislative body belonging to the State of Georgia. The debates were
exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the South was in at
that time, particularly the State of Georgia.  They went so far as to
repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of
secession.

The next day (24th) Sherman continued his march, going by the way of
Waynesboro and Louisville, Millen being the next objective and where the
two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet.  The left wing
moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off
so as to make it look as though Augusta was the point they were aiming
for.  They moved on all the roads they could find leading in that
direction.  The cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of
surprising Millen before the Union prisoners could be carried away; but
they failed in this.

The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was about one hundred miles.
At this point Wheeler, who had been ordered from Tennessee, arrived and
swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting Sherman.
Hardee, a native of Georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him.
It was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with
which to intercept Sherman's march.  He did succeed in raising some
troops, and with these and those under the command of Wheeler and Wayne,
had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention.
Our cavalry and Wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which
Wheeler was driven towards Augusta, thus giving the idea that Sherman
was probably making for that point.

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and the march was resumed the
following day for Savannah, the final objective. Bragg had now been sent
to Augusta with some troops.  Wade Hampton was there also trying to
raise cavalry sufficient to destroy Sherman's army.  If he ever raised a
force it was too late to do the work expected of it.  Hardee's whole
force probably numbered less than ten thousand men.

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but
very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing.  This
answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was an
addition to the soldier's rations.  No further resistance worthy of note
was met with, until within a few miles of Savannah.  This place was
found to be intrenched and garrisoned.  Sherman proceeded at once on his
arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed
torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or
beast. One of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the
animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly
that it had to be amputated.  Sherman at once ordered his prisoners to
the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode
the torpedoes or dig them up.  No further explosion took place.

On the 10th of December the siege of Savannah commenced. Sherman then,
before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the
place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet,
which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts
of the enemy would permit. In marching to the coast he encountered Fort
McAllister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he
might find on shipboard could be made available.  Fort McAllister was
soon captured by an assault made by General Hazen's division.
Communication was then established with the fleet.  The capture of
Savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of
life.  The garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by
crossing the river and moving eastward.

When Sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a
steamer, which I had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails
for his army, also supplies which I supposed he would be in need of.
General J. G. Foster, who commanded all the troops south of North
Carolina on the Atlantic sea-board, visited General Sherman before he
had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining
what assistance he could be to him.  Foster returned immediately to his
own headquarters at Hilton Head, for the purpose of sending Sherman
siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of
clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be
found outside.  The mail on the steamer which I sent down, had been
collected by Colonel A. H. Markland of the Post Office Department, who
went in charge of it.  On this same vessel I sent an officer of my staff
(Lieutenant Dunn) with the following letter to General Sherman:


CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 3, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T.  SHERMAN, Commanding Armies near Savannah, Ga.

The little information gleaned from the Southern press, indicating no
great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails (which had
been previously collected at Baltimore by Colonel Markland, Special
Agent of the Post Office Department) to be sent as far as the blockading
squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on
the coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from
congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has been
struck.  I have never had a fear, however, for the result.

Since you left Atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. The
enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detaching
against you.  I think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve
or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry.  Bragg has gone from Wilmington.
I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that
place.  Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are
making to blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do
not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition
off.  I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will
not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions for
future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your
views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With your
veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes from
east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta.  The
condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding
any other port to the east of Savannah and Branchville.  If Wilmington
falls, a force from there can co-operate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with Hood close upon
him.  Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the
main one leading to Chattanooga.  Part of this falling back was
undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been.  It did not look so,
however, to me.  In my opinion, Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry.
In cavalry, Hood has the advantage in morale and numbers.  I hope yet
that Hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed.  The general news you
will learn from the papers better than I could give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is
likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run down the
coast to see you.  If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go with
me.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General


I quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the
events of that period.

Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah to complete its investment
and insure the surrender of the garrison.  The country about Savannah is
low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to
the river below; and assaults could not be made except along a
comparatively narrow causeway. For this reason assaults must have
resulted in serious destruction of life to the Union troops, with the
chance of failing altogether. Sherman therefore decided upon a complete
investment of the place.  When he believed this investment completed, he
summoned the garrison to surrender.  General Hardee, who was in command,
replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as
Sherman had described.  He said he was in full communication with his
department and was receiving supplies constantly.

Hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the
west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south.
On the South Carolina side the country was all rice fields, through
which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that Hardee had
no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated
plank road starting from the west bank of the river.  Sherman, receiving
this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where General
Foster had troops stationed under General Hatch, for the purpose of
making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of the
numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of South
Carolina, to the plank road which General Hardee still possessed, and
thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if
not of communication.

While arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the
plan had been commenced, Sherman received information through one of his
staff officers that the enemy had evacuated Savannah the night before.
This was the night of the 21st of December.  Before evacuating the place
Hardee had blown up the navy yard.  Some iron-clads had been destroyed,
as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he
left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton,
railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several
thousand stands of small arms.

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of Savannah, which
Sherman relates in his Memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition.
Savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. Shortly
after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing
up serenely, not doubting but the Confederates were still in possession.
It was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until
he had tied up and gone to the Custom House, where he found a new
occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his
vessel and cargo than he had expected.

As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman's march to
the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, I
want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised
between General Sherman and myself. Circumstances made the plan on which
Sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he
necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of
success: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad
back to Chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as
he did, from Atlanta forward.  His suggestions were finally approved,
although they did not immediately find favor in Washington.  Even when
it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the
propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the
President, induced no doubt by his advisers.  This went so far as to
move the President to ask me to suspend Sherman's march for a day or two
until I could think the matter over.  My recollection is, though I find
no record to show it, that out of deference to the President's wish I
did send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else
the connections between us were already cut so that I could not do so.
However this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from
Atlanta to Savannah is easily answered:  it was clearly Sherman, and to
him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution.  It was hardly
possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a
new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success.
(*40)

I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to
me.  My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as
I learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed
to the authorities at Washington to stop it.



CHAPTER LX.

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

As we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River between
Muscle Shoals and the lower shoals at the end of October, 1864.  Thomas
sent Schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigades
of Wilson's cavalry to Pulaski to watch him.  On the 17th of November
Hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, thereby
turning his position.  Hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded
respectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart and Cheatham.  These, with his
cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. Schofield had, of all
arms, about thirty thousand.  Thomas's orders were, therefore, for
Schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle
if he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance on
Nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the
enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself.  As
soon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood's, he sent his trains to the
rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to
Columbia.  At Columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle.  From
this place Schofield then retreated to Franklin.  He had sent his wagons
in advance, and Stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect
them.  Cheatham's corps of Hood's army pursued the wagon train and went
into camp at Spring Hill, for the night of the 29th.

Schofield retreating from Columbia on the 29th, passed Spring Hill,
where Cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation,
though within half a mile of where the Confederates were encamped.  On
the morning of the 30th he had arrived at Franklin.

Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an attack the
same day.  The fight was very desperate and sanguinary.  The Confederate
generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them
was of unusual proportions.  This fighting continued with great severity
until long after the night closed in, when the Confederates drew off.
General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union troops, and
whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but
maintained his position.

The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was 1,750
buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702
prisoners besides.  Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189
killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing.

Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it seemed
to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there.
He simply ordered Schofield to continue his retreat to Nashville, which
the latter did during that night and the next day.

Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive Hood.
The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at
Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and Chattanooga.  Thomas had
previously given up Decatur and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith's two
divisions just returned from Missouri.  He also had Steedman's division
and R. S. Granger's, which he had drawn from the front.  His
quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized
and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, General J. L.
Donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general
supervision of General Z. B. Tower, of the United States Engineers.

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that place almost
without interference.  Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so
that he would have been safe against the attack of Hood.  He had troops
enough even to annihilate him in the open field.  To me his delay was
unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so
that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy
strongly posted behind fortifications.  It is true the weather was very
bad.  The rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground
was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move.
But I was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas
and manage to get north of the Cumberland River.  If he did this, I
apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was
afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head him off
if he got there, General Thomas's movements being always so deliberate
and so slow, though effective in defence.

I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from City
Point(*41) to make the attack at once.  The country was alarmed, the
administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing would
take place which I have just described that is, Hood would get north.
It was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from Thomas
saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he
was making preparations, etc.  At last I had to say to General Thomas
that I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly.  He
replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could.

General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and knowing
him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave him an order to
proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas.  I directed him, however, not to
deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomas
had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by
telegraph.  After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I
became restless, and concluded to go myself.  I went as far as
Washington City, when a dispatch was received from General Thomas
announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of
his movement.  I concluded to wait until that time. He did move, and was
successful from the start.  This was on the 15th of December.  General
Logan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, and
telegraphed the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther himself.

The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the Union
troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat.  The next
day the battle was renewed.  After a successful assault upon Hood's men
in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken,
leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on
the field, besides the wounded that were captured.  Our cavalry had
fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that
they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy
retreated.  They sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to
get to Franklin ahead of Hood's broken army by the Granny White Road,
but too much time was consumed in getting started.  They had got but a
few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's
cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which
they were advancing. Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and
fighting on foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and driven
in great disorder.  Our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed the
pursuit on the following morning.  They were too late.  The enemy
already had possession of Franklin, and was beyond them. It now became a
chase in which the Confederates had the lead.

Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of Columbia,
where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as
all other bridges over Duck River.  The heavy rains of a few days before
had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges.
Unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or
otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to
Franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward
Chattanooga.  There was, consequently, a delay of some four days in
building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge.  Of
course Hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit was
useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming
upon him again.



CHAPTER LXI.

EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE OF THE
EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER.

Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the mouth of
Cape Fear River and below the City of Wilmington.  This port was of
immense importance to the Confederates, because it formed their
principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in
from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce
at home.  It was equally important to us to get possession of it, not
only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure
a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments,
particularly the British Government, were constantly threatening that
unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease
to recognize any blockade.  For these reasons I determined, with the
concurrence of the Navy Department, in December, to send an expedition
against Fort Fisher for the purpose of capturing it.

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, I will
mention a circumstance that took place at Fort Fisher after its fall.
Two English blockade runners came in at night.  Their commanders, not
supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet
and got into the river unobserved.  They then signalled the fort,
announcing their arrival.  There was a colored man in the fort who had
been there before and who understood these signals.  He informed General
Terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and Terry did as
he advised.  The vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious
that they were falling into the hands of the Union forces.  Even after
they were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversation
for some little time before suspecting that the Union troops were
occupying the fort.  They were finally informed that their vessels and
cargoes were prizes.

I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, to go with the
expedition, but gave instructions through General Butler.  He commanded
the department within whose geographical limits Fort Fisher was
situated, as well as Beaufort and other points on that coast held by our
troops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the
expedition against Fort Fisher.

General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with
powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it
would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter.  Admiral
Porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with
the idea, and it was not disapproved of in Washington; the navy was
therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose.  I
had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself;
but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities
at Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I permitted it.  The
steamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina, and was there loaded with
powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of
Fort Fisher.

General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was
all ready to sail by the 9th of December (1864).  Very heavy storms
prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, and
prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th.  His advance
arrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th.  The naval force had been already
assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into Beaufort
for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully
prepared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but Butler, who
had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself
out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into Beaufort to
replenish.  Another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost
before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate.

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat as
near to the fort as it was safe to run.  She was then propelled by her
own machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore.  There
the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time,
was set and she was abandoned.  Everybody left, and even the vessels put
out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them.  At two
o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no more
effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a
boiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have done.  Indeed when the
troops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was the
bursting of a boiler in one of the Yankee gunboats.

Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of Cape Fear
River.  The soil is sandy.  Back a little the peninsula is very heavily
wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps.  The fort ran across this
peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea
coast about thirteen hundred yards.  The fort had an armament of 21 guns
and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front.  At that
time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light
battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men
with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula.
General Whiting of the Confederate army was in command, and General
Bragg was in command of the force at Wilmington.  Both commenced calling
for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing.  The Governor
of North Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet
and shoot a gun, to join them.  In this way they got two or three
hundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and Hoke's division, five or
six thousand strong, was sent down from Richmond.  A few of these troops
arrived the very day that Butler was ready to advance.

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric
circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearest
the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels
could fire between them.  Porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred
and fifteen shells per minute.  The damage done to the fort by these
shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the
fort.  But the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the
men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek
shelter in the bomb-proofs.

On the next day part of Butler's troops under General Adelbert Ames
effected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty.  This
was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose,
and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet.  They
formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and
part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so.  Curtis pushed
forward and came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison at
what was called the Flag Pond Battery.  Weitzel accompanied him to
within a half a mile of the works.  Here he saw that the fort had not
been injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against an assault.
Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves.
These prisoners reported to Butler that sixteen hundred of Hoke's
division of six thousand from Richmond had already arrived and the rest
would soon be in his rear.

Upon these reports Butler determined to withdraw his troops from the
peninsula and return to the fleet.  At that time there had not been a
man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet.
Curtis had got within a few yards of the works.  Some of his men had
snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a
horse from the inside of the stockade.  At night Butler informed Porter
of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his
purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for Hampton Roads.
Porter represented to him that he had sent to Beaufort for more
ammunition.  He could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would
keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty
yards of the fort, and he begged that Butler would leave some brave
fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken
the horse from the fort.

Butler was unchangeable.  He got all his troops aboard, except Curtis's
brigade, and started back.  In doing this, Butler made a fearful
mistake.  My instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command
of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a
landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be
effected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, a
regular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard against
interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in
as soon as they could be got on shore.  But General Butler seems to have
lost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at Fort Monroe
on the 28th.

I telegraphed to the President as follows:


CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure.  Many
of the troops are back here.  Delays and free talk of the object of the
expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to Wilmington to defeat it.
After the expedition sailed from Fort Monroe, three days of fine weather
were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect
himself. Who is to blame will, I hope, be known.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


Porter sent dispatches to the Navy Department in which he complained
bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was
nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back
again to cooperate, but with a different commander.  As soon as I heard
this I sent a messenger to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on.
I assured him that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment,
and that I would send the same troops back with a different commander,
with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received.
I told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the
additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on
their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part.  I selected A.
H. Terry to command.

It was the 6th of January before the transports could be got ready and
the troops aboard.  They sailed from Fortress Monroe on that day.  The
object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a
secret to all except a few in the Navy Department and in the army to
whom it was necessary to impart the information.  General Terry had not
the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do.  He
simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with
him, which were to be opened when out at sea.

He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have entire
harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would
require the best efforts of both arms of service. They arrived off
Beaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at
Forth Fisher until the 13th.  The navy prepared itself for attack about
as before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this time
five miles away.  Only iron-clads fired at first; the object being to
draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions.
This object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and
fast.  Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident
signs of being much injured.

Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and
at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the
fort with a respectable abatis in front of his line. His artillery was
all landed on that day, the 14th.  Again Curtis's brigade of Ame's
division had the lead. By noon they had carried an unfinished work less
than a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other
way.

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an assault on the following day.
The two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate
with each other from time to time as they might have occasion.  At day
light the fleet commenced its firing.  The time agreed upon for the
assault was the middle of the afternoon, and Ames who commanded the
assaulting column moved at 3.30.  Porter landed a force of sailors and
marines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with Ames's
assault.  They were under Commander Breese of the navy.  These sailors
and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards
of the fort before the assault.  The signal was given and the assault
was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly
handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number.

Curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, some
of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach
the fort.  Many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon
reached the palisades.  These they cut away, and pushed on through.  The
other troops then came up, Pennypacker's following Curtis, and Bell, who
commanded the 3d brigade of Ames's division, following Pennypacker.  But
the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained.

The works were very extensive.  The large parapet around the work would
have been but very little protection to those inside except when they
were close up under it.  Traverses had, therefore, been run until really
the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one.  The
rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven
from these traverses one by one.  The fight continued till long after
night.  Our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10
o'clock at night the place was carried.  During this engagement the
sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered
the best service they could by reinforcing Terry's northern line--thus
enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of Ames.  The fleet
kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still
occupied by the enemy.  By means of signals they could be informed where
to direct their shots.

During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell on the
opposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two extensive works on
Smith's Island in the river.

Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full
supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners.  In addition to these,
there were about 700 dead and wounded left there.  We had lost 110
killed and 536 wounded.

In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade commanders, was
killed, and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were badly wounded.

Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah, arrived off
Fort Fisher soon after it fell.  When he heard the good news he promoted
all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous
gallantry.  Terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been
confirmed.  This confirmed him; and soon after I recommended him for a
brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for
this victory.



CHAPTER LXII.

SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY ORDERED TO
MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS--CAPTURE OF
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.

When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the North,
distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him.  Among
others who went was the Secretary of War, who seemed much pleased at the
result of his campaign.  Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of New
York, who was with Mr. Stanton's party, was put in charge of the public
property that had been abandoned and captured.  Savannah was then turned
over to General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his
own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future.
I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac (General Barnard)
with letters to General Sherman.  He remained some time with the
general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which
contained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done in
co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march
northward.

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea originally
of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North
Carolina.  The season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except
such an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such a
move.  I had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to
carry Sherman and his army around to the James River by water, and so
informed him.  On receiving this letter he went to work immediately to
prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to
collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north
through the Carolinas.  I was only too happy to approve this; for if
successful, it promised every advantage.  His march through Georgia had
thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and had
completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of
it.  If North and South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as
capacity for feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison
at Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies,
to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and, although that
section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of
both forage and food.  I approved Sherman's suggestion therefore at
once.

The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the
wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance.  Sherman
would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions
than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the
sea.  Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the
enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their
previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now
become of such vast importance to the very existence of the Confederate
army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to
save it.

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start
with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that part
of the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, and General Foster,
commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the
sea coast, which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of
Charleston.

This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast,
in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward
progress.  He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he
would like to have done in support of his movement farther north.  This
letter was brought to City Point by General Barnard at a time when I
happened to be going to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of
January.  I cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operate
with Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by
giving my reply to this letter.


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 21,
1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Div. of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at City
Point, and read with interest.  Not having them with me, however, I
cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of
recommendation.  As I arrived here at one P.M., and must leave at six
P.M., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretary
and General Halleck, I must be brief.  Before your last request to have
Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered
Schofield to Annapolis, Md., with his corps.  The advance (six thousand)
will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly
as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati.  The corps
numbers over twenty-one thousand men.  I was induced to do this because
I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring.  His
pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would
never do to conduct one of your campaigns.  The command of the advance
of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far
behind.  When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had
reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from
whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He is
possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is
not good on a pursuit.  He also reported his troops fagged, and that it
was necessary to equip up.  This report and a determination to give the
enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selma
under an energetic leader.  He has been telegraphed to, to know whether
he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select.
No reply is yet received.  Canby has been ordered to act offensively
from the sea-coast to the interior, towards Montgomery and Selma.
Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his
troops will be sent to Canby.  Without further reinforcements Canby will
have a moving column of twenty thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured.  We have a force there of
eight thousand effective.  At New Bern about half the number.  It is
rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen.  I am
inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy
were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th
Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there.  If not, he will be
sent to New Bern.  In either event, all the surplus forces at the two
points will move to the interior toward Goldsboro' in co-operation with
your movements.  From either point, railroad communications can be run
out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of
those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south.
Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington is
not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about
two thousand.

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication
with them.  They will be so instructed.  From about Richmond I will
watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to
evacuate, will pitch in.  In the meantime, should you be brought to a
halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to
your support, from the troops about Richmond.

To resume:  Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf.
A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful.  A force of
twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from New Bern
or Wilmington, or both.  You can call for reinforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will return
with any message you may have for me.  If there is anything I can do for
you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the
sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving him the
news of the battle of Nashville.  He was much pleased at the result,
although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at Thomas for
permitting Hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole State
of Tennessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there.  He, however,
as I had done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to Sherman and
his army passed by Congress were approved.

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up,
commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river,
and taking up all obstructions.  He had then intrenched the city, so
that it could be held by a small garrison.  By the middle of January all
his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his
movement with.

He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going along by
the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east,
threatening Charleston.  He commenced the advance by moving his right
wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to Pocotaligo by water.  This
column, in moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was not
determined at first that they would have a force visit Charleston.
South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the South
for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of
the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, that there
was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and also largely
entertained by people of the South, that the State of South Carolina,
and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a
heavy hand laid upon them.  In fact, nothing but the decisive results
that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from
condemning the movement, because Charleston had been left out.  To pass
into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the
city, and its possession by the navy and Foster's troops.  It is so
situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have
held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out.
Sherman therefore passed it by.

By the first of February all preparations were completed for the final
march, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective;
Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, or
neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be
determined upon.  The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the left from
about Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns taking a pretty
direct route for Columbia.  The cavalry, however, were to threaten
Charleston on the right, and Augusta on the left.

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which Sherman had
received before starting out on his march.  We already had New Bern and
had soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that of Fort Fisher; as did
other points on the sea coast, where the National troops were now in
readiness to co-operate with Sherman's advance when he had passed
Fayetteville.

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New Orleans, to
move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose of
destroying roads, machine shops, etc.  On the 8th of February I ordered
Sheridan, who was in the Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon as
the weather would permit and strike the canal west of Richmond at or
about Lynchburg; and on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as
soon as the roads would permit, saying:  "As soon as it is possible to
travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg
with a cavalry force alone.  From there you could destroy the railroad
and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the
rebellion. * * * This additional raid, with one starting from East
Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry;
one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from Mobile
Bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter
pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery; and Sherman with a large
army eating out the vitals of South Carolina--is all that will be wanted
to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon.  I would advise you to
overcome great obstacles to accomplish this.  Charleston was evacuated
on Tuesday last."

On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received his
orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was extremely anxious to
hear of his being in Alabama.  I notified him, also, that I had sent
Grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient
officer.  I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi,
and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and
capacity whom it would be difficult to get by.  I still further informed
him that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into
Mississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter.
This force did not get off however.

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's march,
the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the West from leaving
there.  But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time.  I had
some time before depleted Thomas's army to reinforce Canby, for the
reason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been
ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do
something.  Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his
movements.  I ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a
detachment under another officer.  General Granger had got down to New
Orleans, in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put
him in command of troops.  In spite of this he asked the War Department
to assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in
that quarter, I said to Canby:  "I am in receipt of a dispatch * * *
informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps
and material to build seventy miles of railroad.  I have directed that
none be sent.  Thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you
that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain
the force the enemy had in the West.  If there had been any idea of
repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the North,
where we already had the troops.  I expected your movements to be
co-operative with Sherman's last.  This has now entirely failed.  I
wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the
country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them.
Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--to
Montgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and
everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this,
take such positions as can be supplied by water.  By this means alone
you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior
can be kept broken."

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any
service in the direction for which they were designed.

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee's troops
and Wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all;
but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as I was sure would be
the case, to retard Sherman's movements. Everything possible was being
done to raise troops in the South.  Lee dispatched against Sherman the
troops which had been sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including
those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood,
amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured,
to fourteen thousand men.  After Thomas's victory at Nashville what
remained, of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly
as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally,
General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the South
though not in favor with the administration (or at least with Mr.
Davis), was put in command of all the troops in North and South
Carolina.

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January, but before
sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him down the coast to
see the situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions after
being on the ground than I could very well have given without.  We soon
returned, and the troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River.  Both New
Bern and Wilmington are connected with Raleigh by railroads which unite
at Goldsboro.  Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the
mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to secure the
Wilmington and Charlotteville Railroad.  This column took their pontoon
bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of
the city of Wilmington.  A large body was sent by the north side to
co-operate with them.  They succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of
February.  I took the precaution to provide for Sherman's army, in case
he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching
North Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was
liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march.  I
also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now
that we were not operating the roads in Virginia.  The gauge of the
North Carolina railroads being the same as the Virginia railroads had
been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there
without any change.

On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to Thomas to
move south to Alabama and Georgia.  (I had previously reduced his force
by sending a portion of it to Terry.)  I directed in lieu of this
movement, that he should send Stoneman through East Tennessee, and push
him well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support of Sherman.
Thomas did not get Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when I
had supposed he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of his
being in Louisville, Kentucky.  I immediately changed the order, and
directed Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg.  Finally, however, on the
12th of March, he did push down through the north-western end of South
Carolina, creating some consternation.  I also ordered Thomas to send
the 4th corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap and to destroy no more roads east
of that.  I also directed him to concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with
a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward
Lynchburg.

Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah. Sherman's
march was without much incident until he entered Columbia, on the 17th
of February.  He was detained in his progress by having to repair and
corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges.  There was constant
skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this
did not retard the advance of the infantry.  Four days, also, were lost
in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south
of Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the
destruction of the bridges on the line of the road.  A formidable river
had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of a small
garrison under General Wade Hampton.  There was but little delay,
however, further than that caused by high water in the stream.  Hampton
left as Sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire.

There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions
of the question as to who set Columbia on fire. Sherman denies it on the
part of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the part of the
Confederates.  One thing is certain:  as soon as our troops took
possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best
of their ability with the limited means at hand.  In any case, the
example set by the Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg,
Pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of
the act of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible
for the conflict then raging, not imperative.

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took
possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the National
forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the
protection of property, etc.  Sherman paid no attention at all to the
overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any
conditions whatever with its citizens.  He then, however, co-operated
with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people
who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes.  When he
left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be
distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement
could be made for their future supplies.  He remained in Columbia until
the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be
useful to the enemy were destroyed.  While at Columbia, Sherman learned
for the first time that what remained of Hood's army was confronting
him, under the command of General Beauregard.

Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster garrisoned
the place.  Wilmington was captured on the 22d. Columbia and Cheraw
farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy
people of Charleston and Augusta had sent much of their valuable
property to these two points to be stored.  Among the goods sent there
were valuable carpets, tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture.
I am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops.
There was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery,
small-arms and fixed ammunition.  These, of course were among the
articles destroyed.  While here, Sherman also learned of Johnston's
restoration to command.  The latter was given, as already stated, all
troops in North and South Carolina.  After the completion of the
destruction of public property about Columbia, Sherman proceeded on his
march and reached Cheraw without any special opposition and without
incident to relate. The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed
on the way.  Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw; and, finally, on
the 6th of March crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced straight
for Fayetteville.  Hardee and Hampton were there, and barely escaped.
Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March.  He had dispatched
scouts from Cheraw with letters to General Terry, at Wilmington, asking
him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and other
articles which he enumerated.  The scouts got through successfully, and
a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman had
asked as were in store at Wilmington; unfortunately, however, those
stores did not contain clothing.

Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayetteville for Goldsboro.
The march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he was
approaching Lee's army and nearing the country that still remained open
to the enemy.  Besides, he was confronting all that he had had to
confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the
garrisons along the road and by what remained of Hood's army.  Frantic
appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the
ranks of our foe.  I presume, however, that Johnston did not have in all
over 35,000 or 40,000 men.  The people had grown tired of the war, and
desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous than the
voluntary accessions.

There was some fighting at Averysboro on the 16th between Johnston's
troops and Sherman's, with some loss; and at Bentonville on the 19th and
21st of March, but Johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning
of the 22d.  Sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed,
wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred.  Sherman's troops at
last reached Goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac;
and there his men were destined to have a long rest.  Schofield was
there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to Wilmington.

Sherman was no longer in danger.  He had Johnston confronting him; but
with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale.  He
had Lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but I was
holding Lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and
gotten down to reinforce Johnston, Sherman, with the reinforcements he
now had from Schofield and Terry, would have been able to hold the
Confederates at bay for an indefinite period.  He was near the sea-shore
with his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors.  He had a
railroad to both Wilmington and New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughly
protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and
deepen as they approach the sea.  Then, too, Sherman knew that if Lee
should escape me I would be on his heels, and he and Johnson together
would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand.  With
the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether Lee's army would have
amounted to much as an army when it reached North Carolina.  Johnston's
army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an
offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on
duty.  The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were, like their
brethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave
that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and
dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it.



CHAPTER LXIII.

ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS
--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN DESTROYS
THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE--PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE
--THE LINE OF BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD.

On the last of January, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-called
Confederate States presented themselves on our lines around Petersburg,
and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at City Point.  They
proved to be Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy,
Judge Campbell, Assistant-Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunt, formerly
United States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate.

It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at once
conducted them to the steam Mary Martin, a Hudson River boat which was
very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers.  I at once
communicated by telegraph with Washington and informed the Secretary of
War and the President of the arrival of these commissioners and that
their object was to negotiate terms of peace between he United States
and, as they termed it, the Confederate Government.  I was instructed to
retain them at City Point, until the President, or some one whom he
would designate, should come to meet them.  They remained several days
as guests on board the boat.  I saw them quite frequently, though I have
no recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on the
subject of their mission.  It was something I had nothing to do with,
and I therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject.  For
my own part I never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, that
they were the representatives of a GOVERNMENT.  There had been too great
a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind.  As long
as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and I found
them all very agreeable gentlemen.  I directed the captain to furnish
them with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort
in every way possible.  No guard was placed over them and no restriction
was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that they
would not abuse the privileges extended to them.  They were permitted to
leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank
and visiting me at my headquarters.

I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them
well by reputation and through their public services, and I had been a
particular admirer of Mr. Stephens.  I had always supposed that he was a
very small man, but when I saw him in the dusk of the evening I was very
much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be.  When he got
down on to the boat I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen
overcoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the South during
the rebellion.  The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I had
ever seen, even in Canada.  The overcoat extended nearly to his feet,
and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an
average-sized man.  He took this off when he reached the cabin of the
boat, and I was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and
out of it.

After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a dispatch from
Washington, directing me to send the commissioners to Hampton Roads to
meet the President and a member of the cabinet.  Mr. Lincoln met them
there and had an interview of short duration.  It was not a great while
after they met that the President visited me at City Point.  He spoke of
his having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there
would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would
recognize, first:  that the Union as a whole must be forever preserved,
and second:  that slavery must be abolished. If they were willing to
concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations
and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his
signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were
willing to live with us in the Union and be one people.  He always
showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and I
never heard him abuse an enemy.  Some of the cruel things said about
President Lincoln, particularly in the North, used to pierce him to the
heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful disposition
and I saw a great deal of him at City Point, for he seemed glad to get
away from the cares and anxieties of the capital.

Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln.  It was on the
occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace
commissioners at Hampton Roads.  After a little conversation, he asked
me if I had seen that overcoat of Stephens's.  I replied that I had.
"Well," said he, "did you see him take it off?"  I said yes.  "Well,"
said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear
that ever you did see?"  Long afterwards I told this story to the
Confederate General J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate.
He repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard afterwards, Stephens laughed
immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln.

The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners,
passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little
incidents.  On one occasion during this period, while I was visiting
Washington City for the purpose of conferring with the administration,
the enemy's cavalry under General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme left
and then going to the south, got in east of us.  Before their presence
was known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were
grazing in that section.  It was a fair capture, and they were
sufficiently needed by the Confederates.  It was only retaliating for
what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of
supplies taking what the Confederate army otherwise would have gotten.
As appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five
thousand head of cattle which were crossing the Mississippi River near
Port Hudson on their way from Texas to supply the Confederate army in
the East.

One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion
was the last few weeks before Petersburg.  I felt that the situation of
the Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at
the earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that I
would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing
was left but a picket line.  He had his railroad by the way of Danville
south, and I was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores
and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for
his immediate defence.  I knew he could move much more lightly and more
rapidly than I, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind
so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the
war might be prolonged another year.

I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it was
possible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where they were.
There is no doubt that Richmond would have been evacuated much sooner
than it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called
Confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course,
have had a very demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army.  When it
was evacuated (as we shall see further on), the Confederacy at once
began to crumble and fade away.  Then, too, desertions were taking
place, not only among those who were with General Lee in the
neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole Confederacy.  I
remember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior to
this, General Butler remarked that the Confederates would find great
difficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though I
am not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave."

The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a
law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen,
calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be
called the senior reserves.  The latter were to hold the necessary
points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear.
General Butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they
were thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which I
afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn.

It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they
were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire
army, by desertions alone.  Then by casualties of war, sickness, and
other natural causes, their losses were much heavier.  It was a mere
question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while
that rate of depletion was going on.  Of course long before their army
would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field
would have been able to capture theirs.  Then too I knew from the great
number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so
gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as
earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they
were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent.  Many of them were
making application to be sent North where they might get employment
until the war was over, when they could return to their Southern homes.

For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for the time
to come when I could commence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly
believed would close the war.

There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and which
detained me.  One was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy
rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams.  It was
necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move
the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army
operating in the enemy's country.  The other consideration was that
General Sheridan with the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was
operating on the north side of the James River, having come down from
the Shenandoah. It was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me,
and I was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the
James River.

Let us now take account of what he was doing.

On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan.  He had met Early between
Staunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his
entire command.  Early and some of his officers escaped by finding
refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods.

On the 12th I heard from him again.  He had turned east, to come to
White House.  He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because the rains
had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen.  He
had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across
some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have
to get over in going south as first ordered.

I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the depot
there open until he arrived.  We had intended to abandon it because the
James River had now become our base of supplies.

Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two
divisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin. General Merritt
was acting as chief of cavalry.  Sheridan moved very light, carrying
only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee,
salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition.
They stopped at Charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad
back toward Lynchburg.  He also sent a division along the James River
Canal to destroy locks, culverts etc.  All mills and factories along the
lines of march of his troops were destroyed also.

Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march
to White House was now somewhat hazardous.  He determined therefore to
fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to
Richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked.  He did this,
destroying the canal as far as Goochland, and the railroad to a point as
near Richmond as he could get.  On the 10th he was at Columbia.  Negroes
had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they
assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the
canal.  His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started,
because he had been able to find plenty of forage. He had captured most
of Early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road.  When he
reached Ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force.  He resisted
their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the South
and North Anna, going north, and reached White House safely on the 19th.

The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time
he could get away from Goldsboro where he then was. Supplies had to be
got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would
probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he
would pass.  I had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from
where he was, in the neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April, the
earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready.

Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could come
up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined to move as soon as
the roads and weather would admit of my doing so.  I had been tied down
somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting,
until Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to join
me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were
necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind.  However,
having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to
make my plans.

Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night before I was
aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into North Carolina to join
with Johnston in attempting to crush out Sherman, I had, as early as the
1st of the month of March, given instructions to the troops around
Petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should
not escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was
undertaken.

It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and General
Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and
Petersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them,
and that they must get away as soon as possible.  They, too, were
waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it
possible to move.

General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening
to enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater security than he
would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an
assault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg.  The night of the
24th of March was fixed upon for this assault, and General Gordon was
assigned to the execution of the plan.  The point between Fort Stedman
and Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected
as the point of his attack.  The attack was to be made at night, and the
troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where
they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left,
create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my
lines.  Lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an
opportunity of escape.  The plan was well conceived and the execution of
it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our
line.

Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at
which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our
picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our
main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to
charge over to not much more than fifty yards.  For some time before the
deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their
arms with them, and this the Confederate general knew.  Taking advantage
of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through
to ours as if to desert.  When they got to our lines they at once took
possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In the main
line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security.  This plan
was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the
troops that were to reinforce Gordon had to be brought from the north
side of the James River and, by some accident on the railroad on their
way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to
be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge.

The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy
passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10.  Then
turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery,
with all the arms and troops in them. Continuing the charge, they also
carried batteries Eleven and Twelve to our left, which they turned
toward City Point.

Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in his
line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters.  Parke,
however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place,
telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters, and learning that the
general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable
promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back.  General
Tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them
in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground
between the lines very thoroughly.  Hartranft was soon out with his
division, as also was Willcox.  Hartranft to the right of the breach
headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into
Fort Stedman.  On the other side they were driven back into the
intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve
were retaken by Willcox early in the morning.

Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and
batteries, and communication was once more established.  The artillery
fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the
Confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to
join them.  They all, therefore, fell captives into our hands.  This
effort of Lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their
killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours.

After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates, our
troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line,
which they strengthened and held.  This, in turn, gave us but a short
distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days
later.

The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of
March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th.
Ord, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavalry, was to
move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the
James River and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away.
He left Weitzel with the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda
Hundred and the north of the James River.  The engineer brigade was to
be left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines about Petersburg.
(*42)

Ord was at his place promptly.  Humphreys and Warren were then on our
extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps.  They were directed on the
arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to
cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west toward Five Forks, the object
being to get into a position from which we could strike the South Side
Railroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad.  There was considerable
fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in
which the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the
losses were quite severe.

This was what was known as the Battle of White Oak Road.



CHAPTER LXIV.

INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--PARKE AND
WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG.

Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th day of March.  His horses, of
course, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes.  A few days of
rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod
and put in condition for moving.  Immediately on General Sheridan's
arrival at City Point I prepared his instructions for the move which I
had decided upon.  The movement was to commence on the 29th of the
month.

After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked out of
my tent, and I followed to have some conversation with him by himself
--not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff.  In
preparing his instructions I contemplated just what took place; that is
to say, capturing Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and
Richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy.
But the Nation had already become restless and discouraged at the
prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate
except by compromise.  Knowing that unless my plan proved an entire
success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, I provided in
these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the
Army of the Potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon the
country proceed south by the way of the Danville Railroad, or near it,
across the Roanoke, get in the rear of Johnston, who was guarding that
road, and cooperate with Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with these
combined forces to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already
had received, to act in cooperation with the armies around Petersburg
and Richmond.

I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat
disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from
the Army of the Potomac, and place himself between the two main armies
of the enemy.  I said to him: "General, this portion of your
instructions I have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reason
for doing so, heretofore described.  I told him that, as a matter of
fact, I intended to close the war right here, with this movement, and
that he should go no farther.  His face at once brightened up, and
slapping his hand on his leg he said:  "I am glad to hear it, and we can
do it."

Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks until
he got further instructions from me.

One day, after the movement I am about to describe had commenced, and
when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south,
Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, at
Dabney's Mills.  He met some of my staff officers outside, and was
highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he
believed this would prove the final and successful effort.  Although my
chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position
about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridan
to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them.
Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not
been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan had
what they considered important news, and suggested that I send for him.
I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was
imbued. Knowing as I did from experience, of what great value that
feeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a
movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen
after I had started out the roads were still very heavy.  Orders were
given accordingly.

Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having been a few
days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving
indications that the time had come when we could move.  On that date I
moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to
hold the line about Petersburg.  It soon set in raining again however,
and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for
teams, and almost so for cavalry.  Sometimes a horse or mule would be
standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would
sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would
sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so
common in that part of Virginia and other southern States.  It became
necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we
advanced, to move our artillery upon.  The army had become so accustomed
to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done
very rapidly.  The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progress
to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalry
over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading
north-west to Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee's line.

This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the
west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or Five
Forks.  The column moving detached from the army still in the trenches
was, excluding the cavalry, very small.  The forces in the trenches were
themselves extending to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme left
when the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later and
thrown into line between him and Five Forks.

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on the
enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to
protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be
successfully made.  General Wright's corps had been designated to make
this assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reached
me of Sheridan's success.  He was to move under cover as close to the
enemy as he could get.

It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to be to
get up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville Railroad, as
soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th.  These roads
were so important to his very existence while he remained in Richmond
and Petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of
retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend
them.  He did on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce
Five Forks.  He also sent around to the right of his army some two or
three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in
readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on call.  He
came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right
flank.

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th,
and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks.  He had only his
cavalry with him.  Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a
very stout resistance.  He gradually drove them back however until in
the neighborhood of Five Forks.  Here he had to encounter other troops
besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way.

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and
stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly,
and asked me to send Wright's corps to his assistance.  I replied to him
that it was impossible to send Wright's corps because that corps was
already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault
when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but
the 2d (Humphreys's) and 5th (Warren's) corps were on our extreme left
and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank
of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send Warren.

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night (the
31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in communication with
Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him.  He was very slow in
moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next
morning.  When he did move it was done very deliberately, and on
arriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the recent
rains so that he regarded it as not fordable.  Sheridan of course knew
of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as
possible, sent orders to him to hasten.  He was also hastened or at
least ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade.  He now felt that he
could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed
to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their
rear; but he was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined to move
forward without him.  However, Ayres's division of Warren's corps
reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time
separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly
under Sheridan.

Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole
of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the
afternoon.  Griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of a
severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the
fighting.  This did not continue long, however; the division was brought
back and with Ayres's division did most excellent service during the
day.  Crawford's division of the same corps had backed still farther
off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was
late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance.
Once there it did very excellent service.

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in
advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon
Five Forks itself.  He was very impatient to make the assault and have
it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be
untenable for him in bivouac during the night.  Unless the assault was
made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie
Court-House, or even further than that for the night.

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get
Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren.  He sent staff
officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing that general
to report to him, but they were unable to find him.  At all events
Sheridan was unable to get that officer to him.  Finally he went
himself.  He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to
the command of the 5th corps. The troops were then brought up and the
assault successfully made.

I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory movements in the
battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time,
that I was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail
Sheridan.  He was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick
perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer,
under difficulties where he was forced to act.  But I had before
discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very
prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before
us.  He could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it.
He would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might
occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do
while he was executing his move.

I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his attention to
these defects, and to say that as much as I liked General Warren, now
was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand
in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not
to hesitate.  It was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed
Warren.  I was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still
more that I had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another
field of duty.

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets of the
enemy.  The two armies were mingled together there for a time in such
manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the
surrender of the other.  Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every
direction; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms
in large quantities, falling into our hands.  The flying troops were
pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under
Sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west.

This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when Sheridan
halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the
enemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corps
across Hatcher's Run to just south-west of Petersburg, and facing them
toward it.  Merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of
Five Forks.

This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of
April.  I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at four
o'clock on the morning of the 2d.  I also ordered the 2d corps, General
Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army of the James, on the left, to
hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken
from weakening in their front.

I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day; in fact
I had reported to him during the day and evening as I got news, because
he was so much interested in the movements taking place that I wanted to
relieve his mind as much as I could.  I notified Weitzel on the north
side of the James River, directing him, also, to keep close up to the
enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to
promptly enter the city of Richmond.

I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks as of so
much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it,
risking everything upon the cast of a single die.  It was for this
reason that I had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as
I had received the news of the capture of Five Forks.  The corps
commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not
see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. But we
kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line
including that north of the James River, until it was light enough to
move, which was about a quarter to five in the morning.

At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved out as directed, brushed
the abatis from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of
musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they
mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line.
Parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very
considerable length of line in that direction, but at that point the
outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of
Petersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a
very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence
of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this.

Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher's Run, sweeping
everything before him.  The enemy had traverses in rear of his captured
line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to
another, as Wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle.  As
you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther
from the inner one, and along about Hatcher's Run they must be nearly
two miles apart. Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of
artillery and some prisoners--Wright about three thousand of them.

In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the instructions they
had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning,
in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before
Wright got up to that point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of
the enemy's intrenchments.  The second corps soon followed; and the
outer works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops,
never to be wrenched from them again.  When Wright reached Hatcher's
Run, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side Railroad just outside
of the city.

My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills.  As soon as I received
the news of Wright's success, I sent dispatches announcing the fact to
all points around the line, including the troops at Bermuda Hundred and
those on the north side of the James, and to the President at City
Point.  Further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did I sent the
additional news to these points.  Finding at length that they were all
in, I mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works.
When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as Wright's
three thousand prisoners were coming out.  I was soon joined inside by
General Meade and his staff.

Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground.
Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort.
Before noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the James
River thus bringing the bulk of Lee's army around to the support of his
extreme right.  As soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel and
directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff,
commanding the Bermuda Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they
found any break to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for this
would separate Richmond and Petersburg.

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to Petersburg,
coming in on our left.  This gave us a continuous line from the
Appomattox River below the city to the same river above.  At eleven
o'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I reinforced Parke with two
brigades from City Point.  With this additional force he completed his
captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as
to protect his flank.  He also carried in and made an abatis between
himself and the enemy.  Lee brought additional troops and artillery
against Parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with
very heavy losses.

The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to
Petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and Fort
Whitworth.  We thought it had now become necessary to carry them by
assault.  About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was assaulted by
Foster's division of the 24th corps (Gibbon's), supported by two
brigades from Ord's command.  The battle was desperate and the National
troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and
immediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place.  The guns
of Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding
officer with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered.

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan.  In moving to
execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the
White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road.  The enemy fell back to
Sutherland Station on the South Side Road and were followed by Miles.
This position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly
intrenched.  Sheridan now came up and Miles asked permission from him to
make the assault, which Sheridan gave.  By this time Humphreys had got
through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed
command over Miles, who commanded a division in his corps.  I had sent
an order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards Petersburg.
This order he now got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone.  The
latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back
a few hundred yards.

Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed Humphreys
to send a division back to his relief.  He went himself.

Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent Merritt
with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate cavalry that had
assembled there.  Merritt drove them north to the Appomattox River.
Sheridan then took the enemy at Sutherland Station on the reverse side
from where Miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a
large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the
remainder, portions of three Confederate corps, to flight.  Sheridan
followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped.
Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with Sheridan had
carried so handsomely by assault.  I cannot explain the situation here
better than by giving my dispatch to City Point that evening:


BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG, April 2, 1865.--4.40 P.M.

COLONEL T. S. BOWERS, City Point.

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours
will be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to the river
above.  Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were not
captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or
because they could not help it. Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps
is above them.  Miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak
Road to Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he met
them, and at last accounts was engaged with them.  Not knowing whether
Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was sent with another
division from here.  The whole captures since the army started out
gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably
fifty pieces of artillery.  I do not know the number of men and guns
accurately however.  * * *  I think the President might come out and pay
us a visit tomorrow.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the river
above to the river below.  I ordered a bombardment to be commenced the
next morning at five A.M., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock;
but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early in the morning.



CHAPTER LXV.

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN PETERSBURG--THE
CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took
a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's
musketry which was flying thick and fast there.  As we would
occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the
Appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the
Confederate army.  I did not have artillery brought up, because I was
sure Lee was trying to make his escape, and I wanted to push immediately
in pursuit.  At all events I had not the heart to turn the artillery
upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture
them soon.

Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man came in
who represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of Northern
Virginia.  He said that Lee had for some time been at work preparing a
strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when
forced out of Petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he was
actually at that time drawing his troops from Richmond, and falling back
into this prepared work. This statement was made to General Meade and
myself when we were together.  I had already given orders for the
movement up the south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of heading
off Lee; but Meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he
thought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move against
Lee in his new position.  I knew that Lee was no fool, as he would have
been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams
like the James and Appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as
those of the Potomac and the James. Then these streams coming together
as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up
in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or
possibility of reinforcement.  It would only have been a question of
days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him
by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender
his army.  Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your
antagonist.  My judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to evacuate
Richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow
the Danville Road. Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that
road south of Lee, and I told Meade this.  He suggested that if Lee was
going that way we would follow him.  My reply was that we did not want
to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he
would only stay in the position he (Meade) believed him to be in at that
time, I wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the
Danville Railroad, at its crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still
found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward
and close him up.  That we would then have all the advantage we could
possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg, even if he
remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer.

I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to
start them out on the Danville Road early in the morning, supposing that
Lee would be gone during the night.  During the night I strengthened
Sheridan by sending him Humphreys's corps.

Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond, during the
day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible
for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long.
Davis was at church when he received Lee's dispatch.  The congregation
was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service.
The rebel government left Richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of
the 2d.

At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court House, his
object being to get away, join Johnston if possible, and to try to crush
Sherman before I could get there.  As soon as I was sure of this I
notified Sheridan and directed him to move out on the Danville Railroad
to the south side of the Appomattox River as speedily as possible.  He
replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out.  I then
ordered the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the
same road in the morning.  Parke's corps followed by the same road, and
the Army of the James was directed to follow the road which ran
alongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke's Station, and to repair
the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded.  That road was a 5 feet
gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge;
consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up
throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of
our cars and locomotives.

Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some days.
I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only while I felt a
strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might
not prove so; and then I would have only added another to the many
disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years.  But
when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and
bidding us Godspeed, remained there to hear the result.

The next morning after the capture of Petersburg, I telegraphed Mr.
Lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while I would await his
arrival.  I had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that
after the National army left Petersburg there was not a soul to be seen,
not even an animal in the streets.  There was absolutely no one there,
except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry.  We
had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the
President arrived.

About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warm
congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to the
army which had accomplished it, was:  "Do you know, general, that I have
had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do
something like this."  Our movements having been successful up to this
point, I no longer had any object in concealing from the President all
my movements, and the objects I had in view.  He remained for some days
near City Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully by
telegraph.

Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join me at a
fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of Lee's army.  I told him
that I had been very anxious to have the Eastern armies vanquish their
old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant
attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital.  The Western
armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the
territory from the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina, and
were now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, asking
admittance.  I said to him that if the Western armies should be even
upon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the credit would be
given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from
the section of country which those troops hailed from.  It might lead to
disagreeable bickerings between members of Congress of the East and
those of the West in some of their debates.  Western members might be
throwing it up to the members of the East that in the suppression of the
rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much
in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the
Western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them,
and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been
engaged with.

Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before,
because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came
from so the work was done.

The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years'
record in the suppression of the rebellion.  The army it had to fight
was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to
found a nation upon the territory of the United States.  Its loss would
be the loss of the cause.  Every energy, therefore, was put forth by the
Confederacy to protect and maintain their capital.  Everything else
would go if it went. Lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to
maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the
South in another quarter.

I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated, between the
soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been none
between the politicians.  Possibly I am the only one who thought of the
liability of such a state of things in advance.

When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln mounted his horse and
started on his return to City Point, while I and my staff started to
join the army, now a good many miles in advance.  Up to this time I had
not received the report of the capture of Richmond.

Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a dispatch from General
Weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of Richmond at
about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he had
found the city on fire in two places. The city was in the most utter
confusion.  The authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the
liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the
Confederate government had left, for the people to gather up.  The city
had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any
notice whatever that they were about to leave.  In fact, up to the very
hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that Lee had
gained an important victory somewhere around Petersburg.

Weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in Lee's army,
there being still a great many men and even officers in the town.  The
city was on fire.  Our troops were directed to extinguish the flames,
which they finally succeeded in doing. The fire had been started by some
one connected with the retreating army.  All authorities deny that it
was authorized, and I presume it was the work of excited men who were
leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it
was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their
enemy.  Be that as it may, the National troops found the city in flames,
and used every effort to extinguish them.

The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great many of them, were cut
off from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry
so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition,
clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along
up the Appomattox River until finally they took water and crossed over.

I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join the
command, which halted at Sutherland Station, about nine miles out.  We
had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the
roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked
up the road so that it was impossible to get on.  Then, again, our
cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the
orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever
they appeared.  This caused further delay.

General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left
back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying
to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when
they did start they would be uninterrupted.  Humphreys, who was far
ahead, was also out of rations.  They did not succeed in getting them up
through the night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, were
so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a
victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations to
running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them.  So the march
was resumed at three o'clock in the morning.

Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven them
north to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were forced to
cross.

On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations up from
Danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at
Farmville.  This showed that Lee had already abandoned the idea of
following the railroad down to Danville, but had determined to go
farther west, by the way of Farmville.  I notified Sheridan of this and
directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could
reach Lee.  He responded that he had already sent Crook's division to
get upon the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to face
north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought
Crook must be there now.  The bulk of the army moved directly for
Jetersville by two roads.

After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan saying that Crook was on
the Danville Road, I immediately ordered Meade to make a forced march
with the Army of the Potomac, and to send Parke's corps across from the
road they were on to the South Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of the
Army of the James and to protect the railroad which that army was
repairing as it went along.

Our troops took possession of Jetersville and in the telegraph office,
they found a dispatch from Lee, ordering two hundred thousand rations
from Danville.  The dispatch had not been sent, but Sheridan sent a
special messenger with it to Burkesville and had it forwarded from
there.  In the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had
reached Danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of
the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter.

At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off between
the road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on and the
Appomattox River, and were attacking the enemy in flank.  They picked up
a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property.

Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his advance north
of Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage.  The country
was very poor and afforded but very little.  His foragers scattered a
great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others
never returned to the Army of Northern Virginia.

Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of Jetersville,
and Sheridan notified me of the situation.  I again ordered Meade up
with all dispatch, Sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with a
little cavalry confronting Lee's entire army.  Meade, always prompt in
obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was
himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed.  Humphreys moved at two,
and Wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I have
said, the wagons being far in the rear.

I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the South Side Railroad.  On
the morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of the progress Meade was
making, and suggested that he might now attack Lee.  We had now no other
objective than the Confederate armies, and I was anxious to close the
thing up at once.

On the 5th I marched again with Ord's command until within about ten
miles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass. I then
received from Sheridan the following dispatch:

"The whole of Lee's army is at or near Amelia Court House, and on this
side of it.  General Davies, whom I sent out to Painesville on their
right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons.
We can capture the Army of Northern Virginia if force enough can be
thrown to this point, and then advance upon it.  My cavalry was at
Burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville Road, last
night.  General Lee is at Amelia Court House in person.  They are out of
rations, or nearly so.  They were advancing up the railroad towards
Burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point."

It now became a life and death struggle with Lee to get south to his
provisions.

Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards
Farmville, moved Davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. Davies
found the movement had already commenced.  He attacked and drove away
their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and
burning 180 wagons.  He also captured five pieces of artillery.  The
Confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have
handled him very roughly, but Sheridan had sent two more brigades of
cavalry to follow Davies, and they came to his relief in time.  A sharp
engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the
enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed.

Meade himself reached Jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon,
but in advance of all his troops.  The head of Humphreys's corps
followed in about an hour afterwards. Sheridan stationed the troops as
they came up, at Meade's request, the latter still being very sick.  He
extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the
left of Griffin's corps, and one division to the right.  The cavalry by
this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the
left, Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the
enemy intended to escape.  He wanted to attack, feeling that if time was
given, the enemy would get away; but Meade prevented this, preferring to
wait till his troops were all up.

At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to him
by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished I was
there myself.  The letter was dated Amelia Court House, April 5th, and
signed by Colonel Taylor.  It was to his mother, and showed the
demoralization of the Confederate army. Sheridan's note also gave me the
information as here related of the movements of that day.  I received a
second message from Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more
emphatically the importance of my presence.  This was brought to me by a
scout in gray uniform.  It was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up
in tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in.  This was a precaution
taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this
tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it.  It
would cause no surprise at all to see a Confederate soldier chewing
tobacco. It was nearly night when this letter was received.  I gave Ord
directions to continue his march to Burkesville and there intrench
himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all
the roads between there and Farmville.

I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of
cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade's army.  The
distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progress
was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads.  However, we
got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some
little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted
in to where Sheridan was bivouacked.  We talked over the situation for
some little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee was
trying to do, and that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the
right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and
putting us in rear of him.

We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters about
midnight.  I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow the
enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allow
the enemy to escape, and besides that, I had no doubt that Lee was
moving right then.  Meade changed his orders at once.  They were now
given for an advance on Amelia Court House, at an early hour in the
morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the
railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out
still farther to the left.



CHAPTER LXVI.

BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE--CORRESPONDENCE WITH
GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

The Appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-west
from the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville Railroad bridge, and
then trends north-westerly.  Sailor's Creek, an insignificant stream,
running northward, empties into the Appomattox between the High Bridge
and Jetersville.  Near the High Bridge the stage road from Petersburg to
Lynchburg crosses the Appomattox River, also on a bridge.  The railroad
runs on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles west, and
from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it.  The roads
coming up from the south-east to Farmville cross the Appomattox River
there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the Lynchburg and
Petersburg Railroad well to the left.

Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of all the
roads between the Danville Road and Appomattox River to move upon, and
never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting
that might be going on in his rear.  In this way he came very near
succeeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with at
least part of his army.

As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the night before, and our
army in moving upon Amelia Court House soon encountered them.  There was
a good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek was reached.  Our cavalry
charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train in
order to get it past our left.  A severe engagement ensued, in which we
captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded.
There was as much gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates in
these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war,
notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week.

The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a heavy engagement took
place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought into
action.  Our men on the right, as they were brought in against the
enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every
advantage to be derived from the lay of the country.  Our firing was
also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat
westward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he
fired.  The enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded
as in captures.  Some six general officers fell into our hands in this
engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners.  This engagement
was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat
and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked
upon the ground where the night had overtaken them.

When the move towards Amelia Court House had commenced that morning, I
ordered Wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to
the left past the whole army, to take the place of Griffin's, and
ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the
right.  The object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, Wright's,
next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously
and so efficiently in the valley of Virginia.

The 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan's direct
command until after the surrender.

Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward
between Burkesville and the High Bridge.  On the morning of the 6th he
sent Colonel Washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions to
destroy High Bridge and to return rapidly to Burkesville Station; and he
prepared himself to resist the enemy there.  Soon after Washburn had
started Ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent Colonel
Read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and
bring him back.  Very shortly after this he heard that the head of Lee's
column had got up to the road between him and where Washburn now was,
and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not
get through.  Read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy.  He
rode on to Farmville and was on his way back again when he found his
return cut off, and Washburn confronting apparently the advance of Lee's
army.  Read drew his men up into line of battle, his force now
consisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode
along their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the
same enthusiasm that he himself felt.  He then gave the order to charge.
This little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but
inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire
number.  Colonel Read fell mortally wounded, and then Washburn; and at
the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and most
of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded.  The remainder
then surrendered.  The Confederates took this to be only the advance of
a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench;
so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a
strong detachment of the Confederate army.

This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following.
Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the High
Bridge, and attempted to destroy it.  He did set fire to it, but the
flames had made but little headway when Humphreys came up with his corps
and drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it
was being burned up.  Humphreys forced his way across with some loss,
and followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at Farmville
with the one from Petersburg.  Here Lee held a position which was very
strong, naturally, besides being intrenched.  Humphreys was alone,
confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position.
He put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was
not assaulted in return.

Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of Prince Edward's Court
House, along with the 5th corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in between
Griffin and the Appomattox.  Crook's division of cavalry and Wright's
corps pushed on west of Farmville.  When the cavalry reached Farmville
they found that some of the Confederates were in ahead of them, and had
already got their trains of provisions back to that point; but our
troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat,
although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did
not get them for some time.  These troops retreated to the north side of
the Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after
them.  Considerable fighting ensued there between Wright's corps and a
portion of our cavalry and the Confederates, but finally the cavalry
forded the stream and drove them away.  Wright built a foot-bridge for
his men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of the
roads to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night.  I had stopped
the night before at Burkesville Junction.  Our troops were then pretty
much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and Ord's
command was extended from that point towards Farmville.

Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular army,
who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one of the
prisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when we had got
across the James River he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty
of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still
had a right to claim concessions. The authorities thought differently,
however.  Now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim
anything.  He said further, that for every man that was killed after
this in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little
better than murder.  He was not sure that Lee would consent to surrender
his army without being able to consult with the President, but he hoped
he would.

I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day.
Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the south.  Meade was
back towards the High Bridge, and Humphreys confronting Lee as before
stated.  After having gone into bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House,
Sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were at
Appomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and a
forced march was necessary in order to get there before Lee's army could
secure them.  He wrote me a note telling me this.  This fact, together
with the incident related the night before by Dr. Smith, gave me the
idea of opening correspondence with General Lee on the subject of the
surrender of his army.  I therefore wrote to him on this day, as
follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., 5 P.M., April 7, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE Commanding C. S. A.

The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of
further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this
struggle.  I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from
myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of
you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known
as the Army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows:


April 7, 1865.

GENERAL:  I have received your note of this day.  Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate
your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore before
considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition
of its surrender.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commanding Armies of the U. S.


This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving another letter
and wrote him as follows:


April 8, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the
condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia is just received.  In reply I would say that, peace being my
great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely:
that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking
up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly
exchanged.  I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any
officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to
you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the
surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Lee's army was rapidly crumbling.  Many of his soldiers had enlisted
from that part of the State where they now were, and were continually
dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes.  I know that I
occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at Farmville, which had
probably been used as a Confederate hospital.  The next morning when I
came out I found a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me and
said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel
of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood.  He said that
when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the
regiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped out, and now
wanted to surrender himself.  I told him to stay there and he would not
be molested.  That was one regiment which had been eliminated from Lee's
force by this crumbling process.

Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with
alacrity and without any straggling.  They began to see the end of what
they had been fighting four years for.  Nothing seemed to fatigue them.
They were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until
the end.  Straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival
for the front.  The infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry
could.

Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of Appomattox
Station, which is about five miles south-west of the Court House, to get
west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear.  They got there
the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train men
had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running
off three of the trains.  The other four were held by Custer.

The head of Lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the
9th, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union soldiers near.
The Confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession of
the trains.  However, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping
to recover them.  In the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one
of the trains, but not in getting anything from it.  Custer then ordered
the other trains run back on the road towards Farmville, and the fight
continued.

So far, only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's army were engaged.
Soon, however, Lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubt
expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry.  But our infantry
had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they
found Griffin's corps and the Army of the James confronting them.  A
sharp engagement ensued, but Lee quickly set up a white flag.



CHAPTER LXVII.

NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S HOUSE--THE
TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AFTER THE
SURRENDER.

On the 8th I had followed the Army of the Potomac in rear of Lee.  I was
suffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouse
on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army.  I spent
the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting
mustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be
cured by morning. During the night I received Lee's answer to my letter
of the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following
morning. (*43)  But it was for a different purpose from that of
surrendering his army, and I answered him as follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of yesterday is received.  As I have no authority to treat on
the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day could
lead to no good.  I will state, however, General, that I am equally
anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same
feeling.  The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood.  By
the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable
event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of
property not yet destroyed.  Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties
may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself,
etc.,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the
headache, to get to the head of the column.  I was not more than two or
three miles from Appomattox Court House at the time, but to go direct I
would have to pass through Lee's army, or a portion of it.  I had
therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from
another direction.

When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I was in
this way moving towards Appomattox Court House, and consequently could
not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what Lee had
done.  Lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise Meade and one
to the front to Sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me for
the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his
army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could be
communicated with.  As they had heard nothing of this until the fighting
had got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of these commanders
hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all.  They
were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the Army of Northern
Virginia where it could not escape except by some deception.  They,
however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours
to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if
possible.  It was found that, from the route I had taken, they would
probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back
within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel
lines.

Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message
through his lines to me.


April 9, 1865.

GENERAL:  I received your note of this morning on the picket-line
whither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were
embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender
of this army.  I now request an interview in accordance with the offer
contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT Commanding U. S. Armies.


When the officer reached me I was still suffering with the sick
headache, but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was cured.  I
wrote the following note in reply and hastened on:


April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. Armies.

Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 A.M.) received, in
consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road to
the Farmville and Lynchburg road.  I am at this writing about four miles
west of Walker's Church and will push forward to the front for the
purpose of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this road where you wish
the interview to take place will meet me.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located with his troops
drawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army near by.  They
were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a
ruse employed to enable the Confederates to get away.  They said they
believed that Johnston was marching up from North Carolina now, and Lee
was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now
were in five minutes if I would only let them go in.  But I had no doubt
about the good faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he
was.  I found him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appomattox Court
House, with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting my
arrival.  The head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of
which was an apple orchard, beyond a little valley which separated it
from that on the crest of which Sheridan's forces were drawn up in line
of battle to the south.

Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself, I will
give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree.

Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they
are believed to be true.  The war of the rebellion was no exception to
this rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictions
based on a slight foundation of fact. As I have said, there was an apple
orchard on the side of the hill occupied by the Confederate forces.
Running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point,
ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on
that side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment.
General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first met
General Lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the
road below and his back resting against the tree.  The story had no
other foundation than that.  Like many other stories, it would be very
good if it was only true.

I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him in the
Mexican War; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and
rank, that he would remember me, while I would more naturally remember
him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of General Scott in
the Mexican War.

When I had left camp that morning I had not expected so soon the result
that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb.  I was
without a sword, as I usually was when on horseback on the field, and
wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rank
to indicate to the army who I was. When I went into the house I found
General Lee.  We greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our
seats.  I had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room
during the whole of the interview.

What General Lee's feelings were I do not know.  As he was a man of much
dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether he
felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over the
result, and was too manly to show it. Whatever his feelings, they were
entirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which had
been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and
depressed.  I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall
of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much
for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for
which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least
excuse.  I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of
those who were opposed to us.

General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, and
was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which
had been presented by the State of Virginia; at all events, it was an
entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in
the field.  In my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with
the straps of a lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted very
strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of
faultless form. But this was not a matter that I thought of until
afterwards.

We soon fell into a conversation about old army times.  He remarked that
he remembered me very well in the old army; and I told him that as a
matter of course I remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in
our rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in our
ages), I had thought it very likely that I had not attracted his
attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long
interval.  Our conversation grew so pleasant that I almost forgot the
object of our meeting.  After the conversation had run on in this style
for some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of our
meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose
of getting from me the terms I proposed to give his army.  I said that I
meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them
up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly
exchanged.  He said that he had so understood my letter.

Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign
to the subject which had brought us together.  This continued for some
little time, when General Lee again interrupted the course of the
conversation by suggesting that the terms I proposed to give his army
ought to be written out. I called to General Parker, secretary on my
staff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the following
terms:


APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,

Ap 19th, 1865.

GEN. R. E. LEE, Comd'g C. S. A.

GEN:  In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th
inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of N. Va. on the
following terms, to wit:  Rolls of all the officers and men to be made
in duplicate.  One copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the
other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate.
The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms
against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged,
and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men
of their commands.  The arms, artillery and public property to be parked
and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive
them.  This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their
private horses or baggage.  This done, each officer and man will be
allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States
authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force
where they may reside.

Very respectfully, U. S. GRANT, Lt. Gen.


When I put my pen to the paper I did not know the first word that I
should make use of in writing the terms.  I only knew what was in my
mind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no
mistaking it.  As I wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the
officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important
to them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessary
humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms.

No conversation, not one word, passed between General Lee and myself,
either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects.  He
appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he had
a point to make against them he wished to wait until they were in
writing to make it.  When he read over that part of the terms about side
arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with
some feeling, I thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his
army.

Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked to me
again that their army was organized a little differently from the army
of the United States (still maintaining by implication that we were two
countries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists owned
their own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men who
so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them.  I told him
that as the terms were written they would not; that only the officers
were permitted to take their private property.  He then, after reading
over the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear.

I then said to him that I thought this would be about the last battle of
the war--I sincerely hoped so; and I said further I took it that most of
the men in the ranks were small farmers. The whole country had been so
raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able
to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next
winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding.  The United
States did not want them and I would, therefore, instruct the officers I
left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the
Confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to
his home.  Lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect.

He then sat down and wrote out the following letter:


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

GENERAL:--I received your letter of this date containing the terms of
the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you.  As
they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the
8th inst., they are accepted.  I will proceed to designate the proper
officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General. LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.


While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union generals
present were severally presented to General Lee.

The much talked of surrendering of Lee's sword and my handing it back,
this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance.
The word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until I
wrote it in the terms.  There was no premeditation, and it did not occur
to me until the moment I wrote it down.  If I had happened to omit it,
and General Lee had called my attention to it, I should have put it in
the terms precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiers
retaining their horses.

General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave,
remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, and
that they were without forage; that his men had been living for some
days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for
rations and forage.  I told him "certainly," and asked for how many men
he wanted rations.  His answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and I
authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to
Appomattox Station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of
the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted.  As for forage, we
had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that.

Generals Gibbon, Griffin and Merritt were designated by me to carry into
effect the paroling of Lee's troops before they should start for their
homes--General Lee leaving Generals Longstreet, Gordon and Pendleton for
them to confer with in order to facilitate this work.  Lee and I then
separated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and
all went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox.

Soon after Lee's departure I telegraphed to Washington as follows:


HEADQUARTERS APPOMATTOX C. H., VA., April 9th, 1865, 4.30 P.M.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington.

General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this afternoon on
terms proposed by myself.  The accompanying additional correspondence
will show the conditions fully.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


When news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced
firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory.  I at once
sent word, however, to have it stopped.  The Confederates were now our
prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall.

I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to putting a
stop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now deemed other useless
outlay of money.  Before leaving, however, I thought I (*44) would like
to see General Lee again; so next morning I rode out beyond our lines
towards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer
carrying a white flag.

Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me.  We had there
between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of
over half an hour, in the course of which Lee said to me that the South
was a big country and that we might have to march over it three or four
times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do
it as they could no longer resist us.  He expressed it as his earnest
hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and
sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result.  I then
suggested to General Lee that there was not a man in the Confederacy
whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as
his, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies I
had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity.  But Lee said,
that he could not do that without consulting the President first.  I
knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of
what was right.

I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to
have a great desire to go inside the Confederate lines.  They finally
asked permission of Lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their
old army friends, and the permission was granted.  They went over, had a
very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back
with them when they returned.

When Lee and I separated he went back to his lines and I returned to the
house of Mr. McLean.  Here the officers of both armies came in great
numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been
friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same
flag.  For the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the
war had escaped their minds.  After an hour pleasantly passed in this
way I set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort,
for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by this
time been repaired.



CHAPTER LXVIII.

MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH
--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT
LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY.

After the fall of Petersburg, and when the armies of the Potomac and the
James were in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale of the National
troops had greatly improved.  There was no more straggling, no more rear
guards.  The men who in former times had been falling back, were now, as
I have already stated, striving to get to the front.  For the first time
in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when
they could return to their homes with their country saved.  On the other
hand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly depressed.  Their
despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the
battle of Sailor's Creek.  They threw away their arms in constantly
increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to
the woods in the hope of reaching their homes.  I have already instanced
the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I met
at Farmville.  As a result of these and other influences, when Lee
finally surrendered at Appomattox, there were only 28,356 officers and
men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms.  It was
probably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes
made, North and South, that Lee surrendered a smaller number of men than
what the official figures show.  As a matter of official record, and in
addition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between March
29th and the date of surrender 19,132 Confederates, to say nothing of
Lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, during the series of
desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight.
The same record shows the number of cannon, including those at
Appomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named.

There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of
troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought between
the sections, the South magnifying the number of Union troops engaged
and belittling their own. Northern writers have fallen, in many
instances, into the same error.  I have often heard gentlemen, who were
thoroughly loyal to the Union, speak of what a splendid fight the South
had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with
their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve
four being colored slaves, non-combatants.  I will add to their
argument.  We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered
under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the South.

But the South had rebelled against the National government.  It was not
bound by any constitutional restrictions.  The whole South was a
military camp.  The occupation of the colored people was to furnish
supplies for the army.  Conscription was resorted to early, and embraced
every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those
physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of
civil officers of State and intended National government.  The old and
physically disabled furnished a good portion of these.  The slaves, the
non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in the
field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age.  Children
from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were not
much older when they began to hold the plough.  The four million of
colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number
in the North, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the
soil to support armies.  Women did not work in the fields in the North,
and children attended school.

The arts of peace were carried on in the North.  Towns and cities grew
during the war.  Inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to
increase the products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the field.
In the South no opposition was allowed to the government which had been
set up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion
had been successful.  No rear had to be protected.  All the troops in
service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground
threatened with invasion.  The press of the South, like the people who
remained at home, were loyal to the Southern cause.

In the North, the country, the towns and the cities presented about the
same appearance they do in time of peace.  The furnace was in blast, the
shops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only to
supply the population of the North and the troops invading the South,
but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war.  In the
North the press was free up to the point of open treason.  The citizen
could entertain his views and express them.  Troops were necessary in
the Northern States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army being
released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire our
Northern cities.  Plans were formed by Northern and Southern citizens to
burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infection
by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and
lake steamers--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives.  The
copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes,
and belittled those of the Union army.  It was, with a large following,
an auxiliary to the Confederate army.  The North would have been much
stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the Confederate ranks
and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentiment
was in the South, than we were as the battle was fought.

As I have said, the whole South was a military camp.  The colored
people, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the field
and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at
the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat.  The cause was
popular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men.  The
conscription took all of them.  Before the war was over, further
conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as
junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as senior
reserves.  It would have been an offence, directly after the war, and
perhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the South, who
was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war,
whether he had been in the Confederate army.  He would assert that he
had, or account for his absence from the ranks.  Under such
circumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such a
superiority of force in every battle fought.  I know they did not.

During 1862 and '3, John H. Morgan, a partisan officer, of no military
education, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rear
of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee.  He had no base of
supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went.  The army
operating against the South, on the contrary, had to protect its lines
of communication with the North, from which all supplies had to come to
the front.  Every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at
convenient distances apart.  These guards could not render assistance
beyond the points where stationed.  Morgan Was foot-loose and could
operate where, his information--always correct--led him to believe he
could do the greatest damage.  During the time he was operating in this
way he killed, wounded and captured several times the number he ever had
under his command at any one time.  He destroyed many millions of
property in addition. Places he did not attack had to be guarded as if
threatened by him.  Forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west,
and held from the National front quite as many men as could be spared
for offensive operations.  It is safe to say that more than half the
National army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were on
leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their bearing arms.
Then, again, large forces were employed where no Confederate army
confronted them.  I deem it safe to say that there were no large
engagements where the National numbers compensated for the advantage of
position and intrenchment occupied by the enemy.

While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the President went to Richmond in
company with Admiral Porter, and on board his flagship.  He found the
people of that city in great consternation.  The leading citizens among
the people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious that
something should be done to relieve them from suspense.  General Weitzel
was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring
villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagration
which they had found in progress on entering the Confederate capital.
The President sent for him, and, on his arrival, a short interview was
had on board the vessel, Admiral Porter and a leading citizen of
Virginia being also present. After this interview the President wrote an
order in about these words, which I quote from memory:  "General Weitzel
is authorized to permit the body calling itself the Legislature of
Virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia troops from
the Confederate armies."

Immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a call
for a meeting and had it published in their papers.  This call, however,
went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had contemplated, as he did not
say the "Legislature of Virginia" but "the body which called itself the
Legislature of Virginia." Mr. Stanton saw the call as published in the
Northern papers the very next issue and took the liberty of
countermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, or
any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the President was
nearer the spot than he was.

This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton.  He was a man who never
questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time what he
wanted to do.  He was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but the
Constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted.  In this
latter particular I entirely agree with the view he evidently held.  The
Constitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of
1861-5.  While it did not authorize rebellion it made no provision
against it.  Yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as
inherent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an
individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy.  The Constitution was
therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way
affected the progress and termination of the war.

Those in rebellion against the government of the United States were not
restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the acts
of their Congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which
the South was then fighting.  It would be a hard case when one-third of
a nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, is
entirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts to
maintain the Union intact, should be restrained by a Constitution
prepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the
permanency of the confederation of the States.

After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my staff and
a few others directly to Burkesville Station on my way to Washington.
The road from Burkesville back having been newly repaired and the ground
being soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it
was after midnight of the second day when I reached City Point.  As soon
as possible I took a dispatch-boat thence to Washington City.

While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing the
necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with my
different commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc.
But by the 14th I was pretty well through with this work, so as to be
able to visit my children, who were then in Burlington, New Jersey,
attending school.  Mrs. Grant was with me in Washington at the time, and
we were invited by President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to the
theatre on the evening of that day.  I replied to the President's verbal
invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would take
great pleasure in accompanying them; but that I was very anxious to get
away and visit my children, and if I could get through my work during
the day I should do so.  I did get through and started by the evening
train on the 14th, sending Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would not
be at the theatre.

At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on Broad
Street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the Delaware River,
and then ferried to Camden, at which point they took the cars again.
When I reached the ferry, on the east side of the City of Philadelphia,
I found people awaiting my arrival there; and also dispatches informing
me of the assassination of the President and Mr. Seward, and of the
probable assassination of the Vice President, Mr. Johnson, and
requesting my immediate return.

It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me
at the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination
of the President.  I knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his
yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above all
his desire to see all the people of the United States enter again upon
the full privileges of citizenship with equality among all.  I knew also
the feeling that Mr. Johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation
against the Southern people, and I feared that his course towards them
would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if they
became such they would remain so for a long while.  I felt that
reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far.

I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to Washington
City; but Mrs. Grant was with me; it was after midnight and Burlington
was but an hour away.  Finding that I could accompany her to our house
and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the
Philadelphia station, I went up with her and returned immediately by the
same special train.  The joy that I had witnessed among the people in
the street and in public places in Washington when I left there, had
been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning.  I
have stated what I believed then the effect of this would be, and my
judgment now is that I was right.  I believe the South would have been
saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by
Mr. Johnson's course towards them during the first few months of his
administration.  Be this as it may, Mr. Lincoln's assassination was
particularly unfortunate for the entire nation.

Mr. Johnson's course towards the South did engender bitterness of
feeling.  His denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark,
"Treason is a crime and must be made odious," was repeated to all those
men of the South who came to him to get some assurances of safety so
that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they
obtained would be secure to them.  He uttered his denunciations with
great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of
safety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance.

The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or ought to
be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and judgment of those over
whom he presides; and the Southerners who read the denunciations of
themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he
uttered the sentiments of the Northern people; whereas, as a matter of
fact, but for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, I believe the great
majority of the Northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would
have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the
least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their
government.  They believed, I have no doubt, as I did, that besides
being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy.

The people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into the
Union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation.  Naturally
the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not
rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old
antagonists, and the better citizens they would be from the beginning.
They surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had a
yoke around their necks.

I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at that time
were in favor of negro suffrage.  They supposed that it would naturally
follow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time of
probation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the
privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; but
Mr. Johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard
the South not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best
entitled to consideration of any of our citizens.  This was more than
the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union were
prepared for, and they became more radical in their views.  The
Southerners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr. Johnson
having gone to their side; and with a compact South, and such sympathy
and support as they could get from the North, they felt that they would
be able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted as
if they thought they were entitled to do so.

Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one hand, and receiving the
support of the South on the other, drove Congress, which was
overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one measure and then
another to restrict his power.  There being a solid South on one side
that was in accord with the political party in the North which had
sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of Congress
and of the majority of the legislatures of the States, became necessary
to enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance.  In this work, I shall
not discuss the question of how far the policy of Congress in this
particular proved a wise one.  It became an absolute necessity, however,
because of the foolhardiness of the President and the blindness of the
Southern people to their own interest.  As to myself, while strongly
favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people
who had been in rebellion, I gradually worked up to the point where,
with the majority of the people, I favored immediate enfranchisement.



CHAPTER LXIX.

SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN--CAPTURE OF
MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS--GENERAL
THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

When I left Appomattox I ordered General Meade to proceed leisurely back
to Burkesville Station with the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the
James, and to go into camp there until further orders from me.  General
Johnston, as has been stated before, was in North Carolina confronting
General Sherman.  It could not be known positively, of course, whether
Johnston would surrender on the news of Lee's surrender, though I
supposed he would; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was the
natural point from which to move to attack him.  The army which I could
have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which Sherman
confronted him was also superior; and between the two he would
necessarily have been crushed, or driven away.  With the loss of their
capital and the Army of Northern Virginia it was doubtful whether
Johnston's men would have the spirit to stand.  My belief was that he
would make no such attempt; but I adopted this course as a precaution
against what might happen, however improbable.

Simultaneously with my starting from City Point, I sent a messenger to
North Carolina by boat with dispatches to General Sherman, informing him
of the surrender of Lee and his army; also of the terms which I had
given him; and I authorized Sherman to give the same terms to Johnston
if the latter chose to accept them.  The country is familiar with the
terms that Sherman agreed to CONDITIONALLY, because they embraced a
political question as well as a military one and he would therefore have
to confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely.

General Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City Point while visiting there
to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what Mr. Lincoln
had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at Hampton Roads,
viz.:  that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would
have to agree to two points: one being that the Union should be
preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they
were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his
name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance
of the terms upon which we would live together.  He had also seen
notices in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Richmond, and had
read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening
of the Legislature of Virginia.

Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had made with
general Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the President of
the United States.  But seeing that he was going beyond his authority,
he made it a point that the terms were only conditional.  They signed
them with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms
could be sent to Washington for approval; if approved by the proper
authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then he
would give due notice, before resuming hostilities.  As the world knows,
Sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land
(Congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for a
second lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to that
grade), was denounced by the President and Secretary of War in very
bitter terms.  Some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor
--a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much
service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting such
terms as he did to Johnston and his army.  If Sherman had taken
authority to send Johnston with his army home, with their arms to be put
in the arsenals of their own States, without submitting the question to
the authorities at Washington, the suspicions against him might have
some foundation.  But the feeling against Sherman died out very rapidly,
and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullest
confidence of the American people.

When, some days after my return to Washington, President Johnson and the
Secretary of war received the terms which General Sherman had forwarded
for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and I was sent
for.  There seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest Sherman would
commit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede to
and which he had no right to grant.  A message went out directing the
troops in the South not to obey General Sherman.  I was ordered to
proceed at once to North Carolina and take charge of matter there
myself. Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon as
possible.  I repaired to Raleigh, where Sherman was, as quietly as
possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my
presence.

When I arrived I went to Sherman's headquarters, and we were at once
closeted together.  I showed him the instruction and orders under which
I visited him.  I told him that I wanted him to notify General Johnston
that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been
approved in Washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same
terms I had given General Lee.  I sent Sherman to do this himself.  I
did not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army
generally; so I left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of the
surrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that I was
anywhere near the field.  As soon as possible I started to get away, to
leave Sherman quite free and untrammelled.

At Goldsboro', on my way back, I met a mail, containing the last
newspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement in the
North over the terms Sherman had given Johnston; and harsh orders that
had been promulgated by the President and Secretary of War.  I knew that
Sherman must see these papers, and I fully realized what great
indignation they would cause him, though I do not think his feelings
could have been more excited than were my own.  But like the true and
loyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions I had given
him, obtained the surrender of Johnston's army, and settled down in his
camp about Raleigh, to await final orders.

There were still a few expeditions out in the South that could not be
communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment
of their respective commanders.  With these it was impossible to tell
how the news of the surrender of Lee and Johnston, of which they must
have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do.

The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from the
commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off:  one under Canby
himself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman from East
Tennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson, starting from Eastport,
Mississippi, on the 22d of March.  They were all eminently successful,
but without any good result. Indeed much valuable property was destroyed
and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them.
The war was practically over before their victories were gained.  They
were so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troops
away that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which
were gradually forcing the Confederate armies to a surrender.  The only
possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by
Stoneman's getting near Lynchburg about the time the armies of the
Potomac and the James were closing in on Lee at Appomattox.

Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike the
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.  He got upon that road, destroyed its
bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy
up to within a few miles of Lynchburg.  His approach caused the
evacuation of that city about the time we were at Appomattox, and was
the cause of a commotion we heard of there.  He then pushed south, and
was operating in the rear of Johnston's army about the time the
negotiations were going on between Sherman and Johnston for the latter's
surrender.  In this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount
of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners were
the trophies of his success.

Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March.  The city of Mobile
was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments--Spanish Fort,
on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely, north of the city.  These
forts were invested.  On the night of the 8th of April, the National
troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort was
evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely was
carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us.  On the 11th the
city was evacuated.

I had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent against
Mobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage.  It
finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance,
and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our
hands without any bloodshed whatever.

Wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed.  He
was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly.  Forrest was
in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time
prestige.  He now had principally conscripts.  His conscripts were
generally old men and boys.  He had a few thousand regular cavalry left,
but not enough to even retard materially the progress of Wilson's
cavalry.  Selma fell on the 2d of April, with a large number of
prisoners and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to
be disposed of by the victors.  Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Point
fell in quick succession.  These were all important points to the enemy
by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and
because of their manufactories of war material.  They were fortified or
intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were
captured.  Macon surrendered on the 21st of April.  Here news was
received of the negotiations for the surrender of Johnston's army.
Wilson belonged to the military division commanded by Sherman, and of
course was bound by his terms.  This stopped all fighting.

General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate officer
still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May he
surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command.
General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi department on
the 26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty to
continue the war.

Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the
defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. This occurred at
Irwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May.  For myself, and I believe Mr.
Lincoln shared the feeling, I would have been very glad to have seen Mr.
Davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason:  I feared that if not
captured, he might get into the trans-Mississippi region and there set
up a more contracted confederacy.  The young men now out of homes and
out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted
the war yet another year.  The Northern people were tired of the war,
they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage
upon their homes.

Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape, because he did not
wish to deal with the matter of his punishment.  He knew there would be
people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-Confederate president, for
high treason.  He thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone
for our wickedness as a nation.  At all events he did not wish to be the
judge to decide whether more should be shed or not.  But his own life
was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president of
the Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he
had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy.

All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of
all concerned.  This reflection does not, however, abate in the
slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and
great a man as Abraham Lincoln.

He would have proven the best friend the South could have had, and saved
much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by
reconstruction under a President who at first wished to revenge himself
upon Southern men of better social standing than himself, but who still
sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and
advanced the proposition to become their Moses to lead them triumphantly
out of all their difficulties.

The story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to
stay the hands of the President is too fresh in the minds of the people
to be told now.  Much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was
hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the
question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a
decision obtained. These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a
dead letter" upon the statute books of the United States, no one taking
interest enough in them to give them a passing thought.

Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing when he
was captured.  I cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of
the facts; but I have been under the belief, from information given to
me by General Wilson shortly after the event, that when Mr. Davis
learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed
in a gentleman's dressing gown.  Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted to
escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished
provided it might be done successfully.  If captured, he would be no
ordinary prisoner.  He represented all there was of that hostility to
the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war--and the
most costly in other respects of which history makes any record.  Every
one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he
would be executed.  Had he succeeded in making his escape in any
disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his
admirers.

As my official letters on file in the War Department, as well as my
remarks in this book, reflect upon General Thomas by dwelling somewhat
upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that I give
my estimate of him as a soldier.  The same remark will apply also in the
case of General Canby.  I had been at West Point with Thomas one year,
and had known him later in the old army.  He was a man of commanding
appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest
and brave.  He possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent
degree.  He gained the confidence of all who served under him, and
almost their love.  This implies a very valuable quality.  It is a
quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops
serving under the commander possessing it.

Thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. He could
not be driven from a point he was given to hold.  He was not as good,
however, in pursuit as he was in action.  I do not believe that he could
ever have conducted Sherman's army from Chattanooga to Atlanta against
the defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864.  On the other
hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which Johnston tried to
hold, neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other officer could have
done it better.

Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received,
the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the great
tragedy of 1861-5.

General Canby was an officer of great merit.  He was naturally studious,
and inclined to the law.  There have been in the army but very few, if
any, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every
act of Congress and every regulation for the government of the army as
he.  His knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff
officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered
up to the time of his being assigned to the Military Division of the
Gulf.  He was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and
learning.  I presume his feelings when first called upon to command a
large army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own when
marching a regiment against General Thomas Harris in Missouri in 1861.
Neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going into
battle with some one else commanding.  Had Canby been in other
engagements afterwards, he would, I have no doubt, have advanced without
any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility.  He was afterwards
killed in the lava beds of Southern Oregon, while in pursuit of the
hostile Modoc Indians.  His character was as pure as his talent and
learning were great.  His services were valuable during the war, but
principally as a bureau officer.  I have no idea that it was from choice
that his services were rendered in an office, but because of his
superior efficiency there.



CHAPTER LXX.

THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S ANECDOTES
--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF LINCOLN AND STANTON
--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no
more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in North Carolina and
Virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into
camp there until mustered out.  Suitable garrisons were left at the
prominent places throughout the South to insure obedience to the laws
that might be enacted for the government of the several States, and to
insure security to the lives and property of all classes.  I do not know
how far this was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time,
that such a course should be pursued.  I think now that these garrisons
were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is
not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the
sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious
apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done.

Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up to Manchester, on the
south side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there put them in
camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the situation was
there.

It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him.
Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and had issued
orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from obeying his,
Sherman's, orders.  Sherman met the papers on his return, containing
this order of Halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage.
On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from Savannah, Sherman
received an invitation from Halleck to come to Richmond and be his
guest.  This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore,
that he had seen his order.  He also stated that he was coming up to
take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably
be as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he (Sherman) would
not be responsible for what some rash person might do through
indignation for the treatment he had received.  Very soon after that,
Sherman received orders from me to proceed to Washington City, and to go
into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the
troops.

There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from
Goldsboro, to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington City.
The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been engaged in all
the battles of the West and had marched from the Mississippi through the
Southern States to the sea, from there to Goldsboro, and thence to
Washington City, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the Army
of the Potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other
body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for the
preservation of the Union.

The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to the sea and north to
Goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was
anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent
in the way it was conducted.  It had an important bearing, in various
ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war.
All the States east of the Mississippi River up to the State of Georgia,
had felt the hardships of the war.  Georgia, and South Carolina, and
almost all of North Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from
invasion by the Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts.
Their newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success, that
the people who remained at home had been convinced that the Yankees had
been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and
that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to
find a way out of the war with honor to themselves.

Even during this march of Sherman's the newspapers in his front were
proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who
were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try
to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the Southern
people.  As the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the
minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of
affairs.  In turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to
submit without compromise.

Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was
calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of
Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies.  As the troops
advanced north from Savannah, the destruction of the railroads in South
Carolina and the southern part of North Carolina, further cut off their
resources and left the armies still in Virginia and North Carolina
dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very
much exhausted of food and forage.

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and the other
from the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went into
camp near the Capital, as directed.  The troops were hardy, being inured
to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit
for duty as they had ever been in their lives.  I doubt whether an equal
body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer,
was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great
battle.

The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers
capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of
Europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and
who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called
upon to take part.  Our armies were composed of men who were able to
read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced
to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the
nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal
to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were
thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.

There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time
these troops were in camp before starting North.

I remember one little incident which I will relate as an anecdote
characteristic of Mr. Lincoln.  It occurred a day after I reached
Washington, and about the time General Meade reached Burkesville with
the army.  Governor Smith of Virginia had left Richmond with the
Confederate States government, and had gone to Danville.  Supposing I
was necessarily with the army at Burkesville, he addressed a letter to
me there informing me that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the State
of Virginia, he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmond
to Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the
functions of his office there without molestation by the Federal
authorities.  I give this letter only in substance.  He also inquired of
me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his
office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country
and go abroad without interference.  General Meade being informed that a
flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent
out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who
brought it that I was not present.  He read the letter and telegraphed
me its contents. Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving this
dispatch, I repeated its contents to him.  Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was
asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of Governor Smith's
letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted
to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a
certain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in Springfield who was very
popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much
liked.  Unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his
friends could see that the habit was growing on him.  These friends
determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a
pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks.  They asked Pat to join
them in signing the pledge, and he consented.  He had been so long out
of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to
soda-water as a substitute.  After a few days this began to grow
distasteful to him.  So holding the glass behind him, he said:  "Doctor,
couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself."

I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave me, but
I know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform the duties of
his office.  I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had been spared, there
would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the
country who desired to do so.  He would have been equally willing to
permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time
to repent of their choice.

On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a
grand review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman's and Meade's
armies.  The review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days.  Meade's
army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand
which had been erected in front of the President's house.  Sherman
witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the
President and his cabinet.  Here he showed his resentment for the cruel
and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by
the Secretary of War, by refusing to take his extended hand.

Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the Potomac.
During the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from
the Capitol.  Promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his
troops commenced to pass in review.  Sherman's army made a different
appearance from that of the Army of the Potomac.  The latter had been
operating where they received directly from the North full supplies of
food and clothing regularly:  the review of this army therefore was the
review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly
soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the
experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's
country, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman's army was not so
well-dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but their marching could not
be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly
drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or
through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp.
They exhibited also some of the order of march through Georgia where the
"sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as Sherman's army went
marching through.  In the rear of a company there would be a captured
horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and
other food picked up for the use of the men.  Negro families who had
followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company,
with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother
leading it.

The sight was varied and grand:  nearly all day for two successive days,
from the Capitol to the Treasury Building, could be seen a mass of
orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies.  The National flag
was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled
with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored
people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters
from which to get a view of the grand armies.  The city was about as
full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on
inauguration day when a new President takes his seat.

It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln and the
Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in
the executive branch of the government. There is no great difference of
opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the
President.  With Mr. Stanton the case is different.  They were the very
opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each
possessed great ability.  Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by
making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him.  He preferred
yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon
having his own way.  It distressed him to disappoint others.  In matters
of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least
offensive way.  Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority to
command, unless resisted.  He cared nothing for the feeling of others.
In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify.
He felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in
acting without advising with him.  If his act was not sustained, he
would change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did
so.

It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement
of each other.  The Secretary was required to prevent the President's
being imposed upon.  The President was required in the more responsible
place of seeing that injustice was not done to others.  I do not know
that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of
the people.  It is not a correct view, however, in my estimation.  Mr.
Lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a
public trust.

Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in
making and executing their plans.  The Secretary was very timid, and it
was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the
capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against
the army guarding the Confederate capital.  He could see our weakness,
but he could not see that the enemy was in danger.  The enemy would not
have been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field.  These
characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after
Early came so near getting into the capital.

Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war
between the States, and who attracted much public attention, but of
whose ability as soldiers I have not yet given any estimate, are Meade,
Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and Hooker.  There were others of
great merit, such as Griffin, Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie.  Of those
first named, Burnside at one time had command of the Army of the
Potomac, and later of the Army of the Ohio.  Hooker also commanded the
Army of the Potomac for a short time.

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his
usefulness that were beyond his control.  He had been an officer of the
engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with
troops until he was over forty-six years of age.  He never had, I
believe, a command of less than a brigade.  He saw clearly and
distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country
in front of his own position.  His first idea was to take advantage of
the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we
wanted to move afterwards.  He was subordinate to his superiors in rank
to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans
with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own.
He was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who
knew him.  He was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his
control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the
most offensive manner.  No one saw this fault more plainly than he
himself, and no one regretted it more.  This made it unpleasant at
times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with
information.  In spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and
deserves a high place in the annals of his country.

General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected.
He was not, however, fitted to command an army.  No one knew this better
than himself.  He always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of
officers under him beyond what they were entitled to.  It was hardly his
fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command.

Of Hooker I saw but little during the war.  I had known him very well
before, however.  Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his achievement
in bringing his command around the point of Lookout Mountain and into
Chattanooga Valley was brilliant.  I nevertheless regarded him as a
dangerous man.  He was not subordinate to his superiors.  He was
ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others.  His
disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main
body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his
standard all he could of his juniors.

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers
who did not exercise a separate command.  He commanded a corps longer
than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed
in battle a blunder for which he was responsible.  He was a man of very
conspicuous personal appearance.  Tall, well-formed and, at the time of
which I now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance
that would attract the attention of an army as he passed.  His genial
disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence
with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence
of troops serving under him.  No matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps
always felt that their commander was looking after them.

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity of
forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal
observation.  I had known him in Mexico when both of us were
lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us
would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. He stood very high in
the army, however, as an officer and a man. He was brave and
conscientious.  His ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread
responsibility.  He was willing to do any amount of battling, but always
wanted some one else to direct. He declined the command of the Army of
the Potomac once, if not oftener.

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer without a
military education.  His way was won without political influence up to
an important separate command--the expedition against Fort Fisher, in
January, 1865.  His success there was most brilliant, and won for him
the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general
of volunteers.  He is a man who makes friends of those under him by his
consideration of their wants and their dues.  As a commander, he won
their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of
perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any
given time.

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came
into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract
public attention.  All three served as such, in the last campaign of the
armies of the Potomac and the James, which culminated at Appomattox
Court House, on the 9th of April, 1865.  The sudden collapse of the
rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything
else.  I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the
army.  Graduating at West Point, as he did, during the second year of
the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its
close.  This he did upon his own merit and without influence.



CONCLUSION.

The cause of the great War of the Rebellion against the United Status
will have to be attributed to slavery.  For some years before the war
began it was a trite saying among some politicians that "A state half
slave and half free cannot exist."  All must become slave or all free,
or the state will go down.  I took no part myself in any such view of
the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole
question, I have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true.

Slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for its
security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where the
larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and
well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little
sympathy with demands upon them for its protection.  Hence the people of
the South were dependent upon keeping control of the general government
to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution.  They were
enabled to maintain this control long after the States where slavery
existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance
they received from odd men here and there throughout the Northern
States.  They saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon
the prerogatives and independence of the Northern States by enacting
such laws as the Fugitive Slave Law.  By this law every Northern man
was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend
the runaway slave of a Southern man.  Northern marshals became
slave-catchers, and Northern courts had to contribute to the support
and protection of the institution.

This was a degradation which the North would not permit any longer than
until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute
books.  Prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of
the people of the North had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long
as they were not forced to have it themselves.  But they were not
willing to play the role of police for the South in the protection of
this particular institution.

In the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs
and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any sort--the States were
each almost a separate nationality.  At that time the subject of slavery
caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind.  But the country
grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the
States got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the
National government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, had
to be enlisted in the cause of this institution.

It is probably well that we had the war when we did.  We are better off
now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid
progress than we otherwise should have made.  The civilized nations of
Europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce,
trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of different
nationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the few
who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own
country or who knew anything about other people.  Then, too, our
republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking
out of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that our
republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest
strain was brought upon it.  Now it has shown itself capable of dealing
with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have
proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality.

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of
avoiding wars in the future.

The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles shows the
lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come
upon a single individual.  Seeing a nation that extended from ocean to
ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were
growing in population, wealth and intelligence, the European nations
thought it would be well to give us a check.  We might, possibly, after
a while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their
institutions.  Hence, England was constantly finding fault with the
administration at Washington because we were not able to keep up an
effective blockade.  She also joined, at first, with France and Spain in
setting up an Austrian prince upon the throne in Mexico, totally
disregarding any rights or claims that Mexico had of being treated as an
independent power.  It is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext,
but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted.

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that
protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked
to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from
them.  Under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seized
upon Mexico as a foothold for establishing a European monarchy upon our
continent, thus threatening our peace at home.  I, myself, regarded this
as a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged,
and supposed as a matter of course that the United States would treat it
as such when their hands were free to strike.  I often spoke of the
matter to Mr. Lincoln and the Secretary of War, but never heard any
special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt
about it.  I inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were
unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our
hands.

All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the armed
intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince upon the throne
of Mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the
close of the war to throw obstacles in our way.  After the surrender of
Lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan
with a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in
expelling the French from Mexico.  These troops got off before they
could be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributed
them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in
the quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream.  This soon led to a
request from France that we should withdraw our troops from the Rio
Grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs.  Finally
Bazaine was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government.
From that day the empire began to totter.  Mexico was then able to
maintain her independence without aid from us.

France is the traditional ally and friend of the United States.  I did
not blame France for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the
ruins of the Mexican Republic.  That was the scheme of one man, an
imitator without genius or merit.  He had succeeded in stealing the
government of his country, and made a change in its form against the
wishes and instincts of his people.  He tried to play the part of the
first Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role.  He sought by
new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure
of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow.

Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was an
expensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her people.  It
was the completion of the downfall of Napoleon III.  The beginning was
when he landed troops on this continent.  Failing here, the prestige of
his name--all the prestige he ever had--was gone.  He must achieve a
success or fall.  He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia--and
fell.

I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I recognize his
great genius.  His work, too, has left its impress for good on the face
of Europe.  The third Napoleon could have no claim to having done a good
or just act.

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war.
There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last
one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in
population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations
which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless
we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being
some day made to crush us out.  Now, scarcely twenty years after the
war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on
as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion
by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time until we could
prepare for them.

We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in
the finest possible condition.  Neither of these cost much when it is
considered where the money goes, and what we get in return.  Money
expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to
prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with
foreign nations in the meantime.  Money spent upon sea-coast defences is
spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people.
The work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of
security.

England's course towards the United States during the rebellion
exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother
country.  I regretted it.  England and the United States are natural
allies, and should be the best of friends.  They speak one language, and
are related by blood and other ties.  We together, or even either
separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish
commerce between all the nationalities of the world.

England governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing
the people of different races from her own, better than any other
nation.  She is just to the conquered, but rigid.  She makes them
self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer.  She
does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she
is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home
government.

The hostility of England to the United States during our rebellion was
not so much real as it was apparent.  It was the hostility of the
leaders of one political party.  I am told that there was no time during
the civil war when they were able to get up in England a demonstration
in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in
favor of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor of the North.  Even
in Manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off
from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the North
at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.

It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up
in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before.  The
condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of
anxiety, to say the least.  But he was brought to our shores by
compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to
remain here as any other class of our citizens.  It was looking to a
settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of Santo
Domingo during the time I was President of the United States.

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration,
but by all the people, almost without price. The island is upon our
shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions
of people.  The products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her
fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there
to quickly repay the cost of their passage.  I took it that the colored
people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states
governed by their own race.  They would still be States of the Union,
and under the protection of the General Government; but the citizens
would be almost wholly colored.

By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory
almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. It was seen that
the volunteers of the Mexican war largely composed the pioneers to
settle up the Pacific coast country. Their numbers, however, were
scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important
points of the territory acquired by that war.  After our rebellion, when
so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found
they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of
the villages, but wanted larger fields.  The mines of the mountains
first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and
productive grazing and farming lands were there.  This territory, the
geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is
now as well mapped as any portion of our country.  Railroads traverse it
in every direction, north, south, east, and west.  The mines are worked.
The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural
lands are found in many of the valleys.  This is the work of the
volunteer.  It is probable that the Indians would have had control of
these lands for a century yet but for the war.  We must conclude,
therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good.

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to
remain near the scenes of their birth.  In fact an immense majority of
the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they
move among entire strangers.  So much was the country divided into small
communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost
tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak.  Before, new
territories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with
others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them,
would push out farther from civilization.  Their guns furnished meat,
and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread
and vegetables.  All the streams abounded with fish.  Trapping would
furnish pelts to be brought into the States once a year, to pay for
necessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey,
tobacco and some store goods.  Occasionally some little articles of
luxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea,
two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if
anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.

Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements
of these frontiersmen.  This is all changed now. The war begot a spirit
of independence and enterprise.  The feeling now is, that a youth must
cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the
world.  There is now such a commingling of the people that particular
idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent;
the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea";
railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps,
nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the
student of geography.

The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We have
but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home,
and the respect of other nations.  Our experience ought to teach us the
necessity of the first; our power secures the latter.

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great
harmony between the Federal and Confederate.  I cannot stay to be a
living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but I feel it within
me that it is to be so.  The universally kind feeling expressed for me
at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed
to me the beginning of the answer to "Let us have peace."

The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section
of the country, nor to a division of the people.  They came from
individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--the
Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and from the various societies of
the land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise.  Politics did
not enter into the matter at all.

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given
because I was the object of it.  But the war between the States was a
very bloody and a very costly war.  One side or the other had to yield
principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an
end.  I commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious
side.  I was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative
of that side of the controversy.  It is a significant and gratifying
fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous
move.  I hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end.



APPENDIX.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES ARMIES
1864-65.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 22,
1865.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

SIR:  I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations
of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to
command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea
that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be
brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary
to a speedy termination of the war.  The resources of the enemy and his
numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this,
we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to
garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to
protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert,
like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to
use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for
transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most
vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of
inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of
producing, for the support of their armies.  It was a question whether
our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by
these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had
that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both
North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely
broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops
practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from
using the same force at different seasons against first one and then
another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and
producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance.  Second, to
hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his
resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be
nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of
our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and
campaigns made to carry them out.  Whether they might have been better
in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of
friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say.  All I
can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the
best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests
of the whole country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending
forces was about as follows:  The Mississippi River was strongly
garrisoned by Federal troops, from St.  Louis, Missouri, to its mouth.
The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession
of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream.  A few points in
Southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together
with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande.  All the
balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in
the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably
not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been
brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have
brought them out.  The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so
that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in
garrison at any one time.  But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with
the bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along
the Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the
population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep
navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the
west of it.  To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with
the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward to
include nearly all of the State of Tennessee.  South of Chattanooga, a
small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East
Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia.
West Virginia was substantially within our lines.  Virginia, with the
exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area about
the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort
Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying along
the Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy.  Along the sea-coast
footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and New Bern, in
North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort
Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St.
Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our
possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy.
The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman and
other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territory
occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of
the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was
proposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large
population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard
every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies.  In the South,
a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy
capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in
the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them.
This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the
field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the
Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E.
Johnston, his ablest and best generals.  The army commanded by Lee
occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run
westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the
rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston
occupied a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and
defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad
centre, against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman.  In
addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in
North-east Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the
Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme
eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons,
and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the
main objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the
Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and
territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies and the
Department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate
command of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army of
the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements
of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to break
it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he
could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources.  If
the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to
the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration
of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do
so.  More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason
that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was
satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest
extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River against
Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous to my
appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March, of the
importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest
possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy
from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given his
troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the
time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of
the main object of the Red River expedition, for this force was
necessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his
expedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red River
with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of
his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for
the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then
held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring
campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops
enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other
movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an
expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move
from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of a
demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and
directions, he was instructed as follows:


"1st.  If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you
turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

"2d.  That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold
upon the Rio Grande.  This can be held with four thousand men, if they
will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions.  At
least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken
from the colored troops.

"3d.  By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to
guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand
men, if not to a less number.  Six thousand more would then hold all the
rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can
again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, this
would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which
to move against Mobile.  To this I expect to add five thousand men from
Missouri.  If however, you think the force here stated too small to hold
the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say
concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command
for operations against Mobile.  With these and such additions as I can
give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be
followed by an attack upon Mobile.  Two or more iron-clads will be
ordered to report to Admiral Farragut.  This gives him a strong naval
fleet with which to co-operate.  You can make your own arrangements with
the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach.
My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but,
from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about
the matter.  It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative
with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon.  All I
would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at
once.  Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start
at the earliest possible moment.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."


Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his
objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also.  For his
movement two plans presented themselves:  One to cross the Rapidan below
Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left.
Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections.
By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring
Richmond or going north on a raid.  But if we took this route, all we
did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out;
besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed
how to cooperate.  If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be
used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or
James rivers.  Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower
route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F.
Butler:


"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence
at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative
action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be
accomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large
ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding
on to the territory already taken from the enemy.  But, generally
speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to
the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to
guard.  By such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy
and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to
guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of
the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and
Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be
directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we
can against them.  The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of
the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it
impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I
propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems
practicable:  The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base,
Lee's army being the objective point.  You will collect all the forces
from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--I should say
not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south
side of James River, Richmond being your objective point.  To the force
you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South
Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.
Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the
troops sent into the field from your own department.

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe,
with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon
thereafter as practicable.  Should you not receive notice by that time
to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as
you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to
be made.

"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as
possible.  Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all
your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can.  From City Point
directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

"The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond is to be
your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your
force and the Army of the Potomac--must be your guide.  This indicates
the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River
as you advance.  Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments
in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of
transports the two armies would become a unit.

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your
direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry
south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time
of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable
day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the
execution of this order.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."


On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the
19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of
General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort
Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper.  The exact
time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would
not be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fight
Lee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he would stand.  Should he,
however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction
with his (General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I be
certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to
have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the
junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable
anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up
the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after
the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he
should at least detain as large a force there as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was
desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments
remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in
the background for the protection of our extended lines between the
loyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was so
held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland
and Pennsylvania.  Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant
fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small
bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give
better protection than if lying idle in garrison.  By such a movement
they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection
of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them.
General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force
into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command
of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia
Railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own
request, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up
the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General
Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the
Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men.  The one on the
Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the
infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as
could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the
Shenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook
would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down
the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the
New River Bridge and the salt-works, at Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were
delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness and
the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the
armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and
capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General
Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would
tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army,
to accomplish this desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my
determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or to
so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and
still retain enough for the defence of Richmond.  It was well
understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the
campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the
James River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort
Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of
getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying railroad communication
as far south as possible.  Believing, however, in the practicability of
capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective
point of his operations.  As the Army of the Potomac was to move
simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety,
and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of
the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as
far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the
Army of the Potomac.  My instructions for that army were all through
him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the
execution to him.  The campaigns that followed proved him to be the
right man in the right place.  His commanding always in the presence of
an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that
public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he
would otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning
of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of
Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions.  Before night, the whole
army was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at
Germania Ford, and the second corps at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, under
Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its
trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight
opposition.  The average distance travelled by the troops that day was
about twelve miles.  This I regarded as a great success, and it removed
from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of
crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and
ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through
a hostile country, and protected.  Early on the 5th, the advance corps
(the fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the
enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run.  The battle raged
furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast
as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density
of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable
promptness.

General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the Army of the
Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the
Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to
Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a
crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as
such notice was received.  This crossing he was apprised of on the
afternoon of the 4th.  By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was
leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his
troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the
Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers.  Considering that a large proportion,
probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops,
unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier,
this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the
morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set
in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on
the evening of the 5th.  After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to
turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating
considerable confusion.  But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was
personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it
and restored order.  On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed
that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to
the front, covering a part of the battle-field.  From this it was
evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his
inability to further maintain the contest in the open field,
notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an
attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my
whole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued for
a movement by his right flank.  On the night of the 7th, the march was
commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth corps moving on
the most direct road.  But the enemy having become apprised of our
movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first.
On the 8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent
out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line
taken up at Spottsylvania.  This force was steadily driven back on the
main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable
fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides.  On the morning of the
9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of
communication with Richmond.  The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in
manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results.  Among the killed on
the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major-General John
Sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps.  Major-General H. G. Wright
succeeded him in command.  Early on the morning of the 12th a general
attack was made on the enemy in position.  The second corps,
Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line,
capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces
of artillery.  But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage
gained did not prove decisive.  The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and
18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of
reinforcements from Washington.  Deeming it impracticable to make any
further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders were
issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to
commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th.  Late in the
afternoon of the 19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our
extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy
loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the
21st, when it was commenced.  But the enemy again, having the shorter
line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach
the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it.  The fifth
corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely
followed by the sixth corps. The second and ninth corps got up about the
same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying
between that and Jericho Ford.  General Warren effected a crossing the
same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon after
getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy
with great slaughter.  On the 25th, General Sheridan rejoined the Army
of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania,
having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four
trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of
railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to
Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at
Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (but
finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed
to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire,
and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he
communicated with General Butler.  This raid had the effect of drawing
off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy
to guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pursuance of
instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him with
the tenth corps.  At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight
hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with him
wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry,
under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of
Petersburg and Richmond.  On the 5th, he occupied, without opposition,
both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete
surprise.  On the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and
commenced intrenching.  On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the
Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some
fighting.  On the 9th he telegraphed as follows:


"HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, May 9, 1864.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words.  With one thousand
seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the
Chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position.
These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets
towards Richmond.

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same
day with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned the
railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting into
Beauregard's force at that point.

"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of
railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold
out against the whole of Lee's army.  I have ordered up the supplies.

"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the
cutting of the railroads by Kautz.  That portion which reached
Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many,
and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

"General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to
Lee from Beauregard's force.

"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."


On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion
of the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling,
with small loss.  The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the
benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg,
enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and
South Carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places.  On the
16th, the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of
Drury's Bluff.  He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments
between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy
intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the
city, and all that was valuable to him.  His army, therefore, though in
a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further
operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle
strongly corked.  It required but a comparatively small force of the
enemy to hold it there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid
against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan,
and Chula Stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight
trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary
and other stores; thence, crossing to the South Side Road, struck it at
Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and White's Stations, destroying the
road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which he
reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the
enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram,
attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. W. Wessells, and our
gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by
assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured.  The gunboat
Smithfield was sunk, and the Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed
itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most,
if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard
against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement, a
very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was
obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the
western part of Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was
difficult to operate from against the enemy.  I determined, therefore,
to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure
what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they
be sent forward, under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the
Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by Major-General A. E.
Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time
forward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of
his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank
of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy's
position by his right.

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan,
and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the Pamunkey River at
Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two
divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the
enemy at Hawes's Shop.  On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy
skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and
developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy.  Late on the
evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but
was repulsed with very considerable loss.  An attack was immediately
ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted in
driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad
bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry.
General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it
until relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which had
just arrived, via White House, from General Butler's army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the 6th corps
and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in
readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our
carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the
right of the 6th corps, and in front of General Smith.  During the
attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged
in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.
That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the
day, but failed.  The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for
an attack on the 3d.  On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's
works, in the hope of driving him from his position.  In this attempt
our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe,
was comparatively light.  It was the only general attack made from the
Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to
compensate for our own losses.  I would not be understood as saying that
all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished
as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy
severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of
the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was
impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the
city.  I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and
invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right
flank to the south side of the James.  While the former might have been
better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground
satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and
east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long,
vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and
that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open
to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the
James.  My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north of
Richmond, if possible.  Then, after destroying his lines of
communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the
south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he
should retreat.  After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that
the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the
army he then had.  He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks,
or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in
case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them.  Without a greater
sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be
accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond.  I therefore
determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then
occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might
present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville
and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between
Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and when the cavalry
got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River, by
the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of
supply, except by the canal.

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on
the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructions
to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his
forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was
thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down
in Sheridan's instructions.

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry, under
General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to capture
Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges
across the Appomattox.  The cavalry carried the works on the south side,
and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire.
General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and
deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without
attempting one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back
to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's command by water, via
the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac.
This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the
enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the
12th.  One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the 5th corps,
crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak
Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps.  The advance corps
reached James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House,
on the night of the 13th.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia
had been confronting each other.  In that time they had fought more
desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two
armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of
either.  The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was
displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture
Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do,
assumed that they only defended their Capital and Southern territory.
Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been
fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for
them.  Their army believed this.  It produced a morale which could only
be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting.  The battles of
the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and
terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy,
and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the
offensive.  His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the
fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the
attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field.  The
details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of
the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of
Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James
River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by
wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack
of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge
vessels.  Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the
quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency
displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief
quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to
occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and
but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel,
commenced on the 1st of May.  General Crook, who had the immediate
command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns,
giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell.  They crossed the
mountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia
Railroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and
Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and
depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at
Union on the 15th.  General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met
the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was
defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek.  Not regarding
the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal
from command, and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him.  His
instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major-General
H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:


"NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA. "May 20, 1864.

*        *        *        *        *        *        * "The enemy are
evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the
branch road running through Staunton.  On the whole, therefore, I think
it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach
Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too
much opposition.  If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he
will be doing good service.  * * *

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."


"JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.

"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should
do so, living on the country.  The railroads and canal should be
destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he
could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville
join this army.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."


General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the
Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and,
after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the
field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of
artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms.  On the 8th of the
same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from
which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he
reached and invested on the 16th day of June.  Up to this time he was
very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him
sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile
country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important,
point.  The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was
very great.  To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee
sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached
Lynchburg a short time before Hunter.  After some skirmishing on the
17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give
battle, retired from before the place.  Unfortunately, this want of
ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of
Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from
the defence of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of
Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a
position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should
the force he met have seemed to endanger it.  If it did not, he would
have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the main
line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its
defence.  I have never taken exception to the operations of General
Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no
doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his
instructions and the interests of the service.  The promptitude of his
movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of
his country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac:  The 2d corps commenced crossing
the James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's
Landing.  The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight
of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly
pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda
Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of
Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send
General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give
him without sacrificing the position he then held.  I told him that I
would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and
throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be
done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the
enemy could bring troops against us.  General Smith got off as directed,
and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next
morning, but for some reason that I have never been able to
satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines
until near sundown.  Then, with a part of his command only, he made the
assault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg from the
Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing
fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners.  This was about
seven P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no
other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced
Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear
the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations.  General
Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith just
after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might
wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed
knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops.  But
instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, he
requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured
works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack
was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under
Smith and the 2d and 9th corps.  It required until that time for the 9th
corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and
the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock
the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of
the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously
captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four
hundred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in
with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the
enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged.  The
advantages of position gained by us were very great.  The army then
proceeded to envelop Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far
as possible without attacking fortifications.

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of
his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to
get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn
before we could discover it.  General Butler, taking advantage of this,
at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond.
As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I
ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that
were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to
report to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was
notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his
present line urged upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the
line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with
his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th,
the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works.
But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold
them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of
his own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy
attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected
by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of
the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with Bermuda
Hundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against
the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as the
enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire.  The
result of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy's
cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whom
he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in
complete rout.  He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our
hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses.  On
the 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa
Court House.  This occupied until three o'clock P.M., when he advanced
in the direction of Gordonsville.  He found the enemy reinforced by
infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the
latter place and too strong to successfully assault.  On the extreme
right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and
was twice driven therefrom by infantry.  Night closed the contest.  Not
having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals
being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and
hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the
north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching
White House at the time before stated.  After breaking up the depot at
that place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after
heavy fighting.  He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan,
without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army
of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of
the James moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond.
Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's Station, destroying the depot
and several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteen
miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and
defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry.  He reached Burkesville Station
on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville
Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he
found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not
dislodge him.  He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met
the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stony
Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement.  Thence he
made a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams's Station
(supposing it to be in our possession).  At this place he was met by the
enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the
loss of his artillery and trains.  In this last encounter, General
Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way
into our lines.  General Wilson, with the remainder of his force,
succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our
left and rear.  The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than
compensated for the losses we sustained.  It severed all connection by
railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the
Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the
Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of
his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine
that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's
lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and
two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to
the north bank of the James River and joined the force General Butler
had there.  On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched
position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery.  On the 28th our
lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market Road, but in getting
this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force.  The fighting
lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides.
The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large
force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the
diversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force
back there.  One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of
the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to
relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the
assault to be made.  The other two divisions of the 2d corps and
Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved
in front of Petersburg.  On the morning of the 30th, between four and
five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a
regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th
corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion,
and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a
detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance
promptly to the ridge beyond.  Had they done this, I have every reason
to believe that Petersburg would have fallen.  Other troops were
immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up
enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete),
and get forces to this point for its defence.  The captured line thus
held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were
withdrawn, but not without heavy loss.  Thus terminated in disaster what
promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was
retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying the
Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he
returned northward and moved down that valley.  As soon as this movement
of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the
Kanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river
and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of
navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great
delay was experienced in getting there.  It became necessary, therefore,
to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy.  For this
purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against
Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning
to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued
immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River
expedition.  The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time
made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments
from the invalid corps.  One division under command of General Ricketts,
of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions
of the 6th corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to
Washington.  On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg.
General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across
the Potomac at Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's
Ferry, crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards
Frederick City.  General Wallace, with Rickett's division and his own
command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from
Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the
Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge.  His force was not
sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and
although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy,
and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two
division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before
him.  From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance
reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th.  On the 12th a
reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the
enemy's position and force.  A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost
about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded.  The enemy's loss
was probably greater.  He commenced retreating during the night.
Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by
telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th, the
assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all the
troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the
enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all
the force he could, and push Early to the last moment.  General Wright
commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken
at Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred;
and on the 20th, General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of
the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and
several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond,
I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies
operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement
against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley;
and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between
any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much
as possible.  I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the
fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave
Washington.  Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to
return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon
Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, was
ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry.  The rebel force moved
down the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania which on the
30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry,
towards Cumberland.  They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and
with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia.
From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down
between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit
messages a part of the way by boat.  It took from twenty-four to
thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be
received showing a different state of facts from those on which they
were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that
must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and
rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise
would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that
some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the
Department of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle
Department, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to
Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his
assignment to the command of all the forces against Early.  At this time
the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our
forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the
crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy
Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania.  From where I was, I
hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at
Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the
4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine for
myself what was best to be done.  On arrival there, and after
consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following
instructions:


"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND, August 5, 1864--8 P.M.

"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in the
vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and
garrisons for public property as may be necessary.  Use, in this
concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved.  From
Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the
Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him
wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as
it is safe to do so.  If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a
small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force,
detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after
the raiders, and drive them to their homes.  In detaching such a force,
the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville
may be taken into account.

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best
cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses.  These will be
instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south
side of the Potomac.  One brigade will probably start to-morrow.  In
pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to
go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite
the enemy to return.  Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for
the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy.  It is not
desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be
protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army
can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and
we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this
you want to keep him always in sight.  Be guided in your course by the
course he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular
vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country
through which you march.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER."


The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached
Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to
be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then
at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with orders
to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on
General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of
instructions.  I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on
the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to
military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of
Washington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments of West
Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted into the "Middle
Military Division," and  Major-General Sheridan was assigned to
temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were
sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at
Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September
were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many
severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were
generally successful, but no general engagement took place.  The two
armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the Opequon
Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville--that
either could bring on a battle at any time.  Defeat to us would lay open
to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances
before another army could be interposed to check him.  Under these
circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken.
Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeake
and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so
indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving
Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so
great, that I determined the risk should be taken.  But fearing to
telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of
General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I
left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his
headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done.
I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army
lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such
confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of
instructions necessary--Go in!  For the conveniences of forage, the
teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry.  I asked him
if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on
the ensuing Tuesday morning.  His reply was, that he could before
daylight on Monday.  He was off promptly to time, and I may here add,
that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to
visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked General
Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a most sanguinary
and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated
him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequon Creek to
Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of
artillery.  The enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at
Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss
on the 20th [22d].  Sheridan pursued him with great energy through
Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge.  After stripping
the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel
army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of
Cedar Creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again
returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalry
encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with
the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty
prisoners.  On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains
which separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the North Fork,
and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and
the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries
which enfiladed our whole line.  Our troops fell back with heavy loss
and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and
Newtown.  At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when
the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in
time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming
the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor.  The enemy was
defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and
trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning.  The wreck of
his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton
and Lynchburg.  Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, the
enemy's last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah Valley.  I
was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the Army of the Potomac, and
to send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the James, and
another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the
sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force
for that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had
detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in the
Shenandoah Valley.  I therefore sent the 2d corps and Gregg's division
of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler's
army, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from the
north side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and,
if possible, to draw back those sent.  In this move we captured six
pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that
were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division
(Kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this
movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the
18th, and took possession of the Weldon Railroad.  During the day he had
considerable fighting.  To regain possession of the road, the enemy made
repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great
loss.  On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the
James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front at
Petersburg.  On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry,
while at Reams's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and
after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces
of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from the City
Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad, enabling us to
supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of
Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled the
enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops
north of the James for the defence of Richmond.  On the night of the
28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the 18th corps,
Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's army, were crossed to
the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th,
carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below
Chaffin's Farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of
artillery, and the New Market Road and intrenchments.  This success was
followed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front
of the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy
loss.  Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of
this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was
unable to get further.  The position captured from the enemy was so
threatening to Richmond, that I determined to hold it.  The enemy made
several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were
unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly.  On the morning of the 30th,
General Meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the
enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of
troops to the north side.  In this reconnoissance we captured and held
the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church.  In the afternoon, troops
moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy
in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces
holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked,
but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of the
James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and
prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces.  This
he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was
repulsed with severe slaughter.  On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent
out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new
works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to
hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank.  The 2d
corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in
advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's Run,
and moved up the south side of it towards the South Side Railroad, until
the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Road
where it crosses Hatcher's Run.  At this point we were six miles distant
from the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement to
reach and hold.  But finding that we had not reached the end of the
enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful
assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to
withdraw to within our fortified line.  Orders were given accordingly.
Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected
with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters.  Soon after I left
the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap between Generals
Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a
desperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear.  General Hancock
immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove
the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration on the
north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg
Road, and also on the York River Railroad.  In the former he was
unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was
afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former
positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and
Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the
defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for
crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his
detaching any considerable force to send south.  By the 7th of February,
our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon Railroad had
been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with the
Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, respectively,
by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army at
Dalton; but finding the enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, covering
Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent through
Snake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it
in front and on the north.  This movement was successful.  Johnston,
finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified
position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th.
A heavy battle ensued.  During the night the enemy retreated south.
Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and
heavy skirmishing followed.  The next morning, however, he had again
disappeared.  He was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville
on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah.
While these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's
division of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts
and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries.  General Sherman,
having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in
motion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass
at Allatoona.  On the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under General
Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope
Church, near Dallas.  Several sharp encounters occurred at this point.
The most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General
McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New
Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and
Lost mountains.  He was forced to yield the two last-named places, and
concentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and
McPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault.  On the night of
the 2d of July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank,
and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of
this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the
Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men rest and
get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations,
crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to
Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood
succeeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming
the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman
in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which
was on the 22d of July.  About one P.M. of this day the brave,
accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed.  General Logan
succeeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennessee through this
desperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard,
on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized
him in the command of a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Finding it
impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securing
his line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his main
force round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon
roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications.  In this he succeeded,
and after defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, and
Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September
occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attempted
to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton, and
driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville,
Murfreesboro, and Franklin, and was finally driven south of the
Tennessee.  The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joined
General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made a
successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, and its
branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook,
Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining Railroad communication with
Atlanta.  The first two were successful the latter, disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt,
skilful, and brilliant.  The history of his flank movements and battles
during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest
unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying
it, give the details of that most successful campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track
railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating.  This
passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of
it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under
Forrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to
advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreat
disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility
of further use.  To guard against this danger, Sherman left what he
supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West
Tennessee.  He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send
Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him.
On the morning of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near
Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout
and confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly
pursued by the enemy.  By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his
designs upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency with
which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for
rest and repairs necessary.  In the meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith,
with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been sent by
General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return
from Red River, where they had done most excellent service.  He was
directed by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against
Forrest.  This he did with the promptness and effect which has
characterized his whole military career.  On the 14th of July, he met
the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly.  The fighting
continued through three days.  Our loss was small compared with that of
the enemy.  Having accomplished the object of his expedition, General
Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrest
annoyed us considerably.  On the 24th of March it captured Union City,
Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commanded
by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois Volunteers.  Colonel H., having
but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he
repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place.

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel General
Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, but
received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th New Jersey Volunteers,
that being placed there by his Government with adequate force to hold
his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the
question.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee,
garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and the 1st Regiment
Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth.  The garrison fought
bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy
carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms,
proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before
Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations,
were also very active in Kentucky.  The most noted of these was Morgan.
With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the State
through Pound Gap in the latter part of May.  On the 11th of June they
attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison.  On the 12th
he was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy
loss, and was finally driven out of the State.  This notorious guerilla
was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his
command captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the Red River
expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent
by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the
date of its starting.  The troops under General Smith, comprising two
divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left
Vicksburg on the 10th of March, and reached the designated point on Red
River one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks.  The rebel
forces at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the
14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the
enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort
de Russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with
its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of
artillery, and many small-arms.  Our loss was but slight.  On the 15th
he pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th.  On
the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's Hill, in
which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four
pieces of artillery.

On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel
General Taylor, at Cane River.  By the 26th, General Banks had assembled
his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore.  On the
morning of April 6th he moved from Grand Ecore.  On the afternoon of the
7th, he advanced and met the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him
from the field.  On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight
miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat.  On the
8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and
defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an
immense amount of transportation and stores.  During the night, General
Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the
9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss.  During the night, General
Banks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to
Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April.  Here a serious
difficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet which accompanied the
expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they
passed up as to prevent their return.  At the suggestion of Colonel (now
Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were
constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet
passed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerable
skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and Point
Coupee near the end of the month.  The disastrous termination of this
expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the
carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the
capture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the 7th
army corps, to  cooperate with General Banks's expedition on the Red
River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th.  On the 16th of April, after
driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in
Washita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith.
After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated,
General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of
April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red
River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's Mill, in Dallas
County, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas River.
He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d
of May.  On the 30th of April, the enemy attacked him while crossing
Saline River at Jenkins's Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable
loss.  Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the
"Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed to
send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond,
and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be
necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then
occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, General
Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was
collecting near the Mississippi River.  General Smith met and defeated
this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June.  Our loss was about
forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General Gordon
Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with
Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay.  On the 8th of
August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces.
Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment,
surrendered on the 23d.  The total captures amounted to one thousand
four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces
of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General
Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport,
on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then en
route from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri.  A cavalry
force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of
Colonel Winslow.  This made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those
of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price
and drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas,
would cut off his retreat.  On the 26th day of September, Price attacked
Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to
the Missouri River, and continued up that river towards Kansas.  General
Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such
forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General
Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with the
loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of
prisoners.  He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas.  The
impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri
for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how
little purpose a superior force may be used.  There is no reason why
General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten
and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the
Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison
at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th.
Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and
after a severe fight were compelled to surrender.  Forrest destroyed the
railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle,
skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day
cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard.
On the morning of the 30th, one column of Forrest's command, under
Buford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the
garrison.  Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the
vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its
surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before.  He
withdrew in the direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned,
and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without
success.  On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was
handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of
the 1st, but did not make an attack.  On the morning of the 3d he moved
towards Mount Pleasant.  While these operations were going on, every
exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest
before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his
escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy
the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of
October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into
his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he
was unable to dislodge him.  During the night he withdrew his command
and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies
in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting
and supplying them for future service.  The great length of road from
Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded,
allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which
was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the
whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General
Sherman to fully meet them.  He exhibited the weakness of supposing that
an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt
at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the
army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon reported to
the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded
in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of
his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing the
constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he
attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and
destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and
telegraphed me as follows:


"CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA", October 10--noon.

"Dispatch about Wilson just received.  Hood is now crossing Coosa River,
twelve miles below Rome, bound west.  If he passes over the Mobile and
Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by
Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in
Tennessee to defend the State?  He will have an ample force when the
reinforcements ordered reach Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."


For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, I
quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter:

"I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be
reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for
Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi
River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of
the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put
my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston,
to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city
of Savannah is in our possession."  This was in reply to a letter of
mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing
substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a
proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia,
etc.


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,

"October 11, 1864--11 A.M.

"Your dispatch of October 10th received.  Does it not look as if Hood
was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile
and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the
Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur?  If he does this, he ought
to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River.  If
you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but
would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such
railroad guards as are still left at home.  Hood would probably strike
for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater
damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south.  If there
is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must
trust to your own judgment.  I find I shall not be able to send a force
from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will
be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place.
I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could
not prevent Hood from going north.  With Wilson turned loose, with all
your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive
than heretofore.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."


"KINGSTON, GEORGIA, "October 11--11 A.M.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and
Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome.  He threw one
corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow.  I hold Atlanta
with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line.  This
reduces my active force to a comparatively small army.  We cannot remain
here on the defensive.  With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold
cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads.  I would infinitely
prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga
to Atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and
worthless, and with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing
things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I
believe he will be forced to follow me.  Instead of my being on the
defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he
means to do, he would have to guess at my plans.  The difference in war
is full twenty-five per cent.  I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the
mouth of the Chattahoochee.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, "October 11,1864--11.30 P.M.

"Your dispatch of to-day received.  If you are satisfied the trip to the
sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly,
you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or
Chattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."


It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to
the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east
and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west.
In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had
been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River.
General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed
movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood.
Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand
Mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th corps,  Major-General Stanley
commanding, and the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back
to Chattanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he
had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save
the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with
through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was
little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee,
or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and
beat him in battle.  It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman
should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he
commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon.  His coming-out
point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as
he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force
inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could
reach, instead of such as he might prefer.  The blindness of the enemy,
however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the only
considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi
River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open,
and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the
condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of
Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannah
on the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's
admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two
expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg,
Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's lines of
communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field.  General
Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, via
Broad River, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah.
The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General
E. D. Osband (colonel 3d United States colored cavalry), captured, on
the 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad
bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles
of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores.  The
expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results.  The
expedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate command
of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand
men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad
River and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it
moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville.  At Honey Hill, about
three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a
strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in
our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed,
wounded, and missing.  During the night General Hatch withdrew.  On the
6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the
Charleston and Savannah Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and
Tulifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which
seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom.  At all events, had I
had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the
orders under which he seemed to be acting.  On the 26th of October, the
advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but
failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded,
in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of
the Tennessee River, near Florence.  On the 28th, Forrest reached the
Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports.
On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville,
on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight
transports.  On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place,
and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison.  The gunboats
becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to
prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.  About a million and
a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in
storehouses was consumed by fire.  On the 5th the enemy disappeared and
crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville,
moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood.  On the night of
the 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached
Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and
was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch
the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general
engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from
Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance.  General Thomas,
retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the
purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of
reinforcements.  The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by
General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works
repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every
instance repulsed.  His loss in this battle was one thousand seven
hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three
thousand eight hundred wounded.  Among his losses were six general
officers killed, six wounded, and one captured.  Our entire loss was two
thousand three hundred.  This was the first serious opposition the enemy
met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations.
During the night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville.  This
left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily
abandoned--so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought
together.  The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his
line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee
River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was
ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's
command, and such other troops as he could spare.  The advance of this
reinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked Hood in
position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from
the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his
artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it
appeared to me, the unnecessary delay.  This impatience was increased
upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the
Cumberland into Kentucky.  I feared Hood would cross his whole army and
give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the
necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West to
superintend matters there in person.  Reaching Washington City, I
received General Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy,
and the result as far as the battle had progressed.  I was delighted.
All fears and apprehensions were dispelled.  I am not yet satisfied but
that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before
Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with
his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his
cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it
impracticable to attack earlier than he did.  But his final defeat of
Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that
distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by
cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandon
many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation.  On the 28th of
December our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his
escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North
Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery,
General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee
River.  A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th
Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance,
capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's
pontoon-bridge.  The details of these operations will be found
clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started from
Memphis on the 21st of December.  On the 25th he surprised and captured
Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and
pontoons for Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and large
amounts of public stores.  On the morning of the 28th he attacked and
captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of
fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the
Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and
large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public
property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under
General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee.  On the 13th of November
he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and
several hundred prisoners.  Gillem, with what was left of his command,
retreated to Knoxville.  Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to
near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen.
Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated
the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station to
operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia
--destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia
as far as he could go without endangering his command.  On the 12th of
December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's
forces wherever he met them.  On the 16th he struck the enemy, under
Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville,
capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight
prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and
the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force
under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of
Saltville, that had started in pursuit.  He at once made arrangements to
attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone.  He
then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works
at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of
artillery.  Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he
returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left
to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton
and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of
great strategic value.  The navy had been making strenuous exertions to
seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect.  The nature
of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required watching for
so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of New
Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close
the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a
land force, which I agreed to furnish.  Immediately commenced the
assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most
formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point.
This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that
of the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, and
very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of
the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers
both North and South.  The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it.
This caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of
November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and
went myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads,
where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required
and the time of starting.  A force of six thousand five hundred men was
regarded as sufficient.  The time of starting was not definitely
arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December,
if not before.  Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had gone
to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I
deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its
destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to
make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who
had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might
not be detained one moment.

On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

"GENERAL:  The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is
to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington.  If successful in this,
the second will be to capture Wilmington itself.  There are reasonable
grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of
the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in
Georgia.  The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of
the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where
they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken.  The object
of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land
between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to
the river.  Should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds
Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then
the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the
navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places.  These in our
hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would
be sealed.  Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is
built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it
will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and
surprise.  If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the
expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration.

"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer
immediately in command of the troops.

"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or
near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against
Richmond without delay.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."


General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for
this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate,
military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go
through him.  They were so sent, but General Weitzel has since
officially informed me that he never received the foregoing
instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read General
Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my
indorsement and papers accompanying it.  I had no idea of General
Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off
from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel
had received all the instructions, and would be in command.  I rather
formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness
the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat.  The expedition was
detained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the
powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any
delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General
Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at
the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening
of the 15th.  Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having
put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors.  The sea becoming
rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and
coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to
replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to
the place of rendezvous until the 24th.  The powder-boat was exploded on
the morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler from
Beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southern
newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of
the explosion until they were informed by the Northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a
reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up towards
the fort.  But before receiving a full report of the result of this
reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructions
given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the
expedition.  The re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the
27th.

On the return of the expedition officers and men among them Brevet
Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. Curtis,
First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York Volunteers,
First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and Second-Lieutenant George
Simpson, 142d New York Volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when
recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could
have been taken without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch from the
Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me
that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction
that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken.  The natural
supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition,
the navy would do so also.  Finding it had not, however, I answered on
the 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I
would send a force and make another attempt to take the place.  This
time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to
command the expedition.  The troops composing it consisted of the same
that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade,
numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train.  The
latter it was never found necessary to land.  I communicated direct to
the commander of the expedition the following instructions:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865.

"GENERAL:  The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out
to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington
ultimately, if the fort falls.  You will then proceed with as little
delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and
report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter,
commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should
exist between yourself and the naval commander.  I suggest, therefore,
that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part
to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may
be unity of action.  It would be well to have the whole programme laid
down in writing.  I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you
can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes.  I
would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own
responsibilities.  The first object to be attained is to get a firm
position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which
you can operate against that fort.  You want to look to the
practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself
against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open
to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort
Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or
another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

"My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a
portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the balance of it
operates on the outside.  Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut
it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession
of the enemy.

"A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in
readiness to be sent to you if required.  All other supplies can be
drawn from Beaufort as you need them.

"Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured.
When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as
you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

"In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to
Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions.
You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to
Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels.  These troops will be
brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard
from.  Should you require them, they will be sent to you.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY."


Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet
brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition,
was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from
those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was
there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely
to the discretion of the commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th,
arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to
the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th,
when it got under way and reached its destination that evening.  Under
cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the
morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock P.M. was completed without
loss.  On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred
yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and
turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from
the fort.  This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the
work had been seriously injured by the navy fire.  In the afternoon of
the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was
captured, with its entire garrison and armament.  Thus was secured, by
the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important
successes of the war.  Our loss was:  killed, one hundred and ten;
wounded, five hundred and thirty-six.  On the 16th and the 17th the
enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's
Island, which were immediately occupied by us.  This gave us entire
control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.

At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and
Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and
North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force
which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it,
I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas's
surplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with other
movements.  General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops,
not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, in readiness for
orders.  On the 7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was
assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General
Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible.  This
direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps
reached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to
Fort Fisher and New Bern.  On the 26th he was directed to send General
A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General
Canby.  By the 7th of February the whole force was en route for its
destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department,
and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders
of Major-General Sherman.  The following instructions were given him:


"CITY POINT, VA., January 31, 1865.

"GENERAL:-- *    *    *    Your movements are intended as co-operative
with Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina.  The
first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington.  Goldsboro' will
then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or New Bern,
or both, as you deem best.  Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro',
you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place
with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behind
you.  The enterprise under you has two objects:  the first is to give
General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second,
to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march.  As soon,
therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or
New Bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior,
you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage
for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals.  You will get of
these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior
as you may be able to occupy.  I believe General Palmer has received
some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing
supplies for his army.  You will learn what steps he has taken, and be
governed in your requisitions accordingly.  A supply of ordnance stores
will also be necessary.

"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments
in the field with me at City Point.  Communicate with me by every
opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a
special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by
telegraph.

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those
required for your own command.

"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative
duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid
Sherman.  In such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting
for instructions.  You will report, however, what you purpose doing.
The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to
you.  I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already
fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action.  Sherman may be
looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to
the 28th of February; this limits your time very materially.

"If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be
supplied from Washington.  A large force of railroad men have already
been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a
day or two.  On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD."


Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher,
accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself
the condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terry
and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his army
entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the
Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to
re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture
of Lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the
rebellion--I sent orders to General Sherman on the 6th of December, that
after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to
include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point
with the balance of his command.

On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat and
utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the
great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over
two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might
not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from
where he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views
as to what would be best to do.  A few days after this I received a
communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledging
the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations
to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation.  Also
that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to
Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me;
but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of
Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of
January.  The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to
march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my
letter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to make
preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the
railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operating
against Richmond as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the
23d corps,  Major-General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered
about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at Fort Fisher, about eight
thousand men; at New Bern, about four thousand; that if Wilmington was
captured, General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to
New Bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points
would move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with his
movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run
out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came
into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce
Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy under Admiral
Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear River.  Fort
Anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was
occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after
our appearance before it.

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the
morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards Goldsboro' during
the night.  Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro'
in two columns--one from Wilmington, and the other from New Bern--and to
repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply
General Sherman by Cape Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became
necessary.  The column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March,
at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred
prisoners.  On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched
position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the
night.  On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied,
and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington
reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on
the 22d.

By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in motion from
Savannah.  He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th; thence
moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching the
latter place on the 12th of March, opening up communication with General
Schofield by way of Cape Fear River.  On the 15th he resumed his march
on Goldsboro'.  He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a
severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat.  Our loss in this
engagement was about six hundred.  The enemy's loss was much greater.
On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston,
attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it
back upon the main body.  General Slocum, who was in the advance
ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front,
arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited
reinforcements, which were pushed forward.  On the night of the 21st the
enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our
hands.  From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had been
occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse River ten
miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General Terry had got
possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a
junction with the columns from New Bern and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston,
South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th
of February, and occupied by our forces on the 18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was directed to
send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, from East Tennessee,
to penetrate South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy the
railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was
able, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing
our prisoners there, if possible.  Of the feasibility of this latter,
however, General Stoneman was to judge.  Sherman's movements, I had no
doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could
collect, and facilitate the execution of this.  General Stoneman was so
late in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman having passed
out of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed
General Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of
last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could.
This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the
enemy.  I regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy
being driven from Richmond, he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt
a raid north through East Tennessee.  On the 14th of February the
following communication was sent to General Thomas:


"CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.

"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile
and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty
thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command.  The cavalry you have sent
to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry
already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation.
Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave
it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by
the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman.  (I take it a large
portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn.  It is so asserted in the
Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days
since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to South
Carolina to oppose Sherman.)  This being true, or even if it is not
true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and
leave the advance from your standpoint easy.  I think it advisable,
therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare,
and hold it in readiness to go south.  The object would be threefold:
first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure
success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications
and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces
brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the
points to direct the expedition against.  This, however, would not be so
important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama.  Discretion
should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where,
according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the
objects named above.

"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what
number of men you can put into the field.  If not more than five
thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient.  It
is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one
leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week.  I do
not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as
I learn.  If you should hear through other sources before hearing from
me, you can act on the information received.

"To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as
possible, relying upon the country for supplies.  I would also reduce
the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the
extra teams to the guns taken.  No guns or caissons should be taken with
less than eight horses.

"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think
you will be able to send under these directions.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."


On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the
20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the
armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the
city, north of James River, should be cut off.  The enemy having
withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley and sent it
south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce
Sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers
to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah,
which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly
the latter of the objects.  I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as
follows:


"CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865--1 P.M.

"GENERAL:--As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no
difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone.  From
there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as
to be of no further use to the rebellion.  Sufficient cavalry should be
left behind to look after Mosby's gang.  From Lynchburg, if information
you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the
streams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and join
General Sherman.  This additional raid, with one now about starting from
East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry,
one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from
Eastport, Mississippi, then thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay,
with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter
pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large
army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted
to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon.  I would advise you to
overcome great obstacles to accomplish this.  Charleston was evacuated
on Tuesday 1st.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where
Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as
to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte,
North Carolina.  In answer, the following telegram was sent him:


"CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition
he meets with from the enemy.  If strongly opposed, he may possibly have
to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit out for a new start.  I
think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has
passed.  I believe he has passed Charlotte.  He may take Fayetteville on
his way to Goldsboro'.  If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be
guided in your after movements by the information you obtain.  Before
you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from
Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one
or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from
his army to Wilmington or New Bern.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with two
divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each.  On the 1st of
March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy,
across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered
Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'.  Thence
he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an
intrenched position, under General Early.  Without stopping to make a
reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried,
and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses
and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with
subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured.  The prisoners,
under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester.
Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the
railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d.  Here
he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond and
Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south
forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of his trains.  This
necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg.
On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent
one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to New
Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal.
From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to
obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place,
but failed.  The enemy burned it on our approach.  The enemy also burned
the bridge across the river at Hardwicksville.  The other column moved
down the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst
Court House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country,
uniting with the column at New Market.  The river being very high, his
pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the
bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the South
Side Railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court House,
the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base
at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter.  From New Market
he took up his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond,
destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever
practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the
whole force at Columbia on the 10th.  Here he rested one day, and sent
through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a
request for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on the
night of the 12th.  An infantry force was immediately sent to get
possession of White House, and supplies were forwarded.  Moving from
Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station,
he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and
many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the
Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 7, 1865--9.30 A.M.

"GENERAL:--I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the
railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and
fortify there.  Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as
required.  With Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about
all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you
in the spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North
Carolina.  I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets
into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be
caught west of that.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."


Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving an
adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General
Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry
expeditions--one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson
against the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East
Tennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg--and
assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to
commence offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's
cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James were
confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond and
Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of
General Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was making
preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith
and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock was
concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard
against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it
was necessary to rest and refit at White House.  At this time the
greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would
leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of
uniting with Johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or
I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit.  On the 24th of March,
General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at
Jones's Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in
front of Petersburg on the 27th.  During this move, General Ord sent
forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement
of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 24, 1865.

"GENERAL:  On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond
will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy
out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success
of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same
time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville
railroads.  Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at first
in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest
where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving
towards Dinwiddie Court House.

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under
General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon Road and the
Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter before crossing the
Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek.
General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions
which will be given him.  All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army
of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military
Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of
service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the
defences of City Point.  Major-General Parke will be left in command of
all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point,
subject of course to orders from the commander of the Army of the
Potomac.  The 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present
line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held.  If,
however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the
left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held
by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon Road.  All troops to the
left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest
notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or
so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the
present left of the Army of the Potomac.  In the absence of further
orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will
follow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored
division the right column.  During the movement Major-General Weitzel
will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army
of the James.

"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on the
night of the 27th instant.  General Ord will leave behind the minimum
number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main
army.  A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be
started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April,
under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about
Hicksford.  This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and
therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient.  They
should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared
from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses
the Blackwater.  The crossing should probably be at Uniten.  Should
Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon Road, he will be
instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads
between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston.  The railroad bridge at Weldon
being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to
destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south
of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in
haversacks and eight days' in wagons.  To avoid as much hauling as
possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days'
supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his
commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at
the terminus of the road to fill up in passing.  Sixty rounds of
ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the
transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of
other supplies.  The densely wooded country in which the army has to
operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken
with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at
the option of the army commanders.

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation
may be commenced at once.  The reserves of the 9th corps should be
massed as much as possible.  While I would not now order an
unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready
and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front,
without waiting for orders.  In case they carry the line, then the whole
of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the
balance of the army.  To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have
rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army.  General
Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all
practicable to break through at any point, he will do so.  A success
north of the James should be followed up with great promptness.  An
attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has
detached largely.  In that case it may be regarded as evident that the
enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence
of Richmond.  Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north
of the James, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after
a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against
Richmond is left behind.  The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only
chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of
advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the
moving column, and return.  It cannot be impressed too strongly upon
commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur
without taking advantage of it.  The very fact of the enemy coming out
to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive
evidence of such a weakening of his lines.  I would have it particularly
enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the
enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding
officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move
promptly, and notify the commander of their action.  I would also enjoin
the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of
their corps are engaged.  In like manner, I would urge the importance of
following up a repulse of the enemy.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN."


Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front
of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River towards our
left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the line to the right and
left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort
against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the
reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy
loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners.
Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded,
and five hundred and six missing.  General Meade at once ordered the
other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts.
Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched
picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and
thirty-four prisoners.  The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this
line, but without success.  Our loss in front of these was fifty-two
killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven
missing.  The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about
Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them
perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated
that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the
10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should
become necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, in
co-operation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg.
General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then,
by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or
thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and Danville
Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies
operating against Richmond, as might be deemed best.  This plan he was
directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions
in the meantime.  I explained to him the movement I had ordered to
commence on the 29th of March.  That if it should not prove as entirely
successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the
Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further
supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and
Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report
that the enemy had retreated the night before.  I was firmly convinced
that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to
leave.  With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive
campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary.  By
moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and
would at least, by the destruction of the Danville Road, retard the
concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy
to abandon much material that he might otherwise save.  I therefore
determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions of the
24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the
25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, and MacKenzie's
cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing
instructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's Run
on the morning of the 29th.  On the 28th the following instructions were
given to General Sheridan:


"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.

"GENERAL:--The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at three A.M.
to-morrow morning.  The 2d moves at about nine A.M., having but about
three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the
right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House.
Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being
confined to any particular road or roads.  You may go out by the nearest
roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or
through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you
can.  It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched
position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and
attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your
entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army
will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate.  I shall be on the
field, and will probably be able to communicate with you.  Should I not
do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched
line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road.  If you find it
practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side Road, between
Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent.  I would not
advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville Road, which
I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible.  Make
your destruction on that road as complete as possible.  You can then
pass on to the South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in
like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which
are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this
army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into North
Carolina and join General Sherman.  Should you select the latter course,
get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send
orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced.  At night the cavalry
was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our infantry line extended
to the Quaker Road, near its intersection with the Boydton Plank Road.
The position of the troops from left to right was as follows:  Sheridan,
Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture
of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made.  I therefore
addressed the following communication to General Sheridan, having
previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid
contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:


"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie.
We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem Plank Road
to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously.  After
getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the
enemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker
Road intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing
about one hundred men.  Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing
on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before
going back.  I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the
enemy's roads at present.  In the morning push around the enemy, if you
can, and get on to his right rear.  The movements of the enemy's cavalry
may, of course, modify your action.  We will act all together as one
army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy.  The
signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a
cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,
taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in
such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except
as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan
advanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he found
the enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his line
across the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of
getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front
and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and
fortify.  General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main
line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and
Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of
an assault on the enemy's lines.  The two latter reported favorably.
The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our
extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be
penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct.  I determined,
therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General
Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and
turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the
enemy's lines.  The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week
before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this.  The
enemy's intrenched  picket-line captured by us at that time threw the
lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that
it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were at
once made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to General
Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement.
On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting
possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so.  To
accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps,
which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the
2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back
upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked.  A division of the 2d
corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with
heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained.  Sheridan
advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five
Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced
the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him
back towards Dinwiddie Court House.  Here General Sheridan displayed
great generalship.  Instead of retreating with his whole command on the
main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed
his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of
the horses.  This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of
wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow.  At this juncture
he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back
slowly on Dinwiddie Court House.  General Mackenzie's cavalry and one
division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.
Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could
hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisions
of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once.
Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren,
because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and
precipitated intended movements.  On the morning of the 1st of April,
General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on
Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his
strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between
five and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin
relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th corps.  The report
of this reached me after nightfall.  Some apprehensions filled my mind
lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling
upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from
his position and open the way for retreat.  To guard against this,
General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him,
and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the
morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines.
General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping
everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturing
many guns and several thousand prisoners.  He was closely followed by
two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division
of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near
Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right,
and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while
General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General
Wright on the left.  General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's
main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his
inner line.  General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs,
returned General Miles to his proper command.  On reaching the enemy's
lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's
corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the
most salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materially
shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city.  The
enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station,
where they were overtaken by Miles's division.  A severe engagement
ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened
by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station
towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front
of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our
hands his guns and many prisoners.  This force retreated by the main
road along the Appomattox River.  During the night of the 2d the enemy
evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville.  On
the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced.  General Sheridan pushed
for the Danville Road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General
Meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for
Burkesville, along the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along
that road behind him.  On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville
Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court
House.  He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of
General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached
Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the
following communication:


"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

"GENERAL:  All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach
Danville with the remnant of his force.  Sheridan, who was up with him
last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at
twenty thousand, much demoralized.  We hope to reduce this number
one-half.  I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at
Danville, will in a very few days go there.  If you can possibly do so,
push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job
with Lee's and Johnston's armies.  Whether it will be better for you to
strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able
to judge when you receive this.  Rebel armies now are the only strategic
points to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."


On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving west
of Jetersville, towards Danville.  General Sheridan moved with his
cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on his
reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps,
while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon
several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery.  General Ord
advanced from Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of
infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General
Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges.  This advance met the
head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and
detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered.
This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to
get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy
immediately intrenched himself.  In the afternoon, General Sheridan
struck the enemy south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of
artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th
corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made,
which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among
whom were many general officers.  The movements of the 2d corps and
General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except
one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's Court House;
the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on
Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High Bridge Road.  It was soon found
that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so
close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common
bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately
crossed over.  The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at
Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I
addressed him the following communication from Farmville:


"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern
Virginia in this struggle.  I feel that it is so, and regard it as my
duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of
blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate
States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmville
the following:


"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL:  I have received your note of this date.  Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate
your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before
considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition
of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


To this I immediately replied:


"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date,
asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia, is just received.  In reply, I would say, that peace
being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon
--namely, That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for
taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until
properly exchanged.  I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet
any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable
to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the
surrender of the Army of the Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General Meade
followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the
cavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox Station, followed by
General Ord's command and the 5th corps. During the day General Meade's
advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was
unable to bring on a general engagement.  Late in the evening General
Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from
there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train,
and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army.  During
this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight
received the following communication from General Lee:


April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day.  In mine of
yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition.  To be
frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender
of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object
of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end.
I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army
of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the
Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration
of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on the
old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, and
immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox:


"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of yesterday is received.  I have no authority to
treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day
could lead to no good.  I will state, however, general, that I am
equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains
the same feeling.  The terms upon which peace can be had are well
understood.  By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that
most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of
millions of property not yet destroyed.  Seriously hoping that all our
difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I
subscribe myself, etc.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th corps
reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate
effort to break through our cavalry.  The infantry was at once thrown
in.  Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of
hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the
following from General Lee:


"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received your note of this morning on the picket-line,
whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were
embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender
of this army.  I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer
contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of which is
set forth in the following correspondence:


APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:  In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the
8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia on the following terms, to wit:  Rolls of all the officers and
men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be
designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers
as you may designate.  The officers to give their individual paroles not
to take up arms against the Government of the United States until
properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like
parole for the men of their commands.  The arms, artillery, and public
property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers
appointed by me to receive them.  This will not embrace the side-arms of
the officers, nor their private horses or baggage.  This done, each
officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be
disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their
paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:  I have received your letter of this date containing the terms
of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you.  As
they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the
8th instant, they are accepted.  I will proceed to designate the proper
officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under Griffin,
and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox
Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed,
and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the army
immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his
example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately
under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and
their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directly
against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh,
which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th.  The
day preceding, news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at
Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and
General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a
suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject
to the approval of the President.  This agreement was disapproved by the
President on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your
instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the
morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your
orders.  Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for the
termination of the truce that had been entered into.  On the 25th
another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th,
which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army
upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the
20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the
railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick.  The force striking
it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying
the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually
destroyed it between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for
Greensboro', on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and
destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between
Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along
it, and captured four hundred prisoners.  At Salisbury he attacked and
defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteen
pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four
prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores.  At this place he
destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.
Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for
a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama,
commenced his movement on the 20th of March.  The 16th corps,
Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to
Fish River; the 13th corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved
from Fort Morgan and joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving
thence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General
Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from
Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially
invested Fort Blakely.  After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, a
part of its line was carried on the 8th of April.  During the night the
enemy evacuated the fort.  Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the
9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable.  These
successes practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to
approach Mobile from the north.  On the night of the 11th the city was
evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of
the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consisting
of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until
March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama.  On the 1st of April,
General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near
Ebenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred
prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the
Cahawba River.  On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of
Selma, defended by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,
destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast
quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners.  On the 4th
he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa.  On the 10th he crossed the
Alabama River, and after sending information of his operations to
General Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the
14th, the enemy having abandoned it.  At this place many stores and five
steamboats fell into our hands.  Thence a force marched direct on
Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted
and captured on the 16th.  At the former place we got one thousand five
hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the
navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public
property.  At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four
guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars.  On the
20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one
thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General
Howell Cobb.  General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to
make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him
on the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby
all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby
Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas,
and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on
the 26th day of May, and before they reached their destination, General
Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby.  This
surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the
rebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of
first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate
plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the
government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them
arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had been
surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had
surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio
Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to
defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting
great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final
triumph, that I have not mentioned.  Many of these will be found clearly
set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and
brief dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have not
as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfully
refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have
occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the East
fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference
in their fighting qualities.  All that it was possible for men to do in
battle they have done.  The Western armies commenced their battles in
the Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant
of the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina.  The armies of
the East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the
Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old
antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia.  The splendid
achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all
sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too
much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have
followed had either section failed in its duty.  All have a proud
record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other
for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over
every foot of territory belonging to the United States.  Let them hope
for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however
mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S.
GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

THE END

     
     __________
     FOOTNOTES

     (*1) Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.


     (*2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back to
     General Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, to
     the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have
     more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced.  Deeming the
     return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it,
     so he called for a volunteer.  Lieutenant Grant offered his
     services, which were accepted.--PUBLISHERS.


     (*3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and
     General Worth.--PUBLISHERS.


     (*4) NOTE.--It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a
     great many years before the Mexican war to have established in
     the United States a soldiers' home, patterned after something of
     the kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France.  He
     recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his
     annual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any
     hearing.  Now, as he had conquered the state, he made
     assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied
     by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and
     appointed officers to receive the money.  In addition to the sum
     thus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo,
     sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled
     the fund to a total of about $220,000.  Portions of this fund
     were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded
     in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some
     $118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war.  After the
     war was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied to
     have this money, which had never been turned into the Treasury
     of the United States, expended in establishing such homes as he
     had previously recommended.  This fund was the foundation of the
     Soldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,
     Kentucky.

     The latter went into disuse many years ago.  In fact it never
     had many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.


     (*5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott,
     Taylor and Pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high
     office.  It made also governors of States, members of the
     cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both
     in state and nation.  The rebellion, which contained more war in
     a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican
     war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results
     to those engaged on the Union side.  On the other side, the side
     of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort
     whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a
     Confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the
     fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few
     people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.


     (*6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me.


     (*7) NOTE.--Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs.
     W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in
     the first day's fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter from
     General Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th.  At
     the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates
     had troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump's
     landing and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near
     Shiloh.  This letter shows that at that time General Lew.
     Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might
     happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and his
     position, extending from Crump's landing westward, and he sends
     it over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg
     landing and Purdy road.  These two roads intersect nearly a mile
     west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where our
     right rested.  In this letter General Lew. Wallace advises
     General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his
     letter also says "April 5th," which is the same day the letter
     was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the
     4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and
     suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's sending a
     company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at
     the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that
     they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and
     from the different camps."

     This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has
     been said by others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace at
     the battle of Shiloh.  It shows that he naturally, with no more
     experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms,
     would take the particular road that he did start upon in the
     absence of orders to move by a different road.

     The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent
     dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found
     that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front
     and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very
     much in rear of the position of his advance.  This falling back
     had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up
     to Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the
     road nearest the river.  But my order was verbal, and to a staff
     officer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I am
     not competent to say just what order the General actually
     received.

     General Wallace's division was stationed, the First brigade at
     Crump's landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and
     a half miles out.  Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallace
     early ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the
     Second.  If the position of our front had not changed, the road
     which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right
     than the River road.

     U. S. GRANT.

     MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, June 21, 1885.


     (*8) NOTE:  In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrote
     for the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook,
     who commanded a division of Buell's army, expressed some
     unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because
     of the condition of his troops.  General Badeau, in his history,
     also makes the same statement, on my authority.  Out of justice
     to General McCook and his command, I must say that they left a
     point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the
     6th.  From the heavy rains of a few days previous and the
     passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep
     in mud, which made marching slow.  The division had not only
     marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the
     rain all night without rest.  It was engaged in the battle of
     the second day and did as good service as its position
     allowed.  In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a
     conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest
     commendation from division commanders in the Army of the
     Tennessee.  General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makes
     mention of this fact.  General McCook himself belongs to a family
     which furnished many volunteers to the army.  I refer to these
     circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook
     injustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extent
     one would suppose from the public press.  I am not willing to do
     any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I
     am always willing to make the fullest admission.


     (*9) NOTE.--For gallantry in the various engagements, from the
     time I was left in command down to 26th of October and on my
     recommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton were
     promoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20th
     Illinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri,
     M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, and
     John E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.


     (*10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate
     battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats,
     the De Soto.  Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his
     vessel.  However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew
     her up.  Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.
     With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the
     New Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf
     and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.


     (*11) One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockade
     on February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.


     (*12) NOTE.--On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of
     Illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied
     me to Carthage.  I furnished an ambulance for his use and that
     of some of the State officers who accompanied him.


     (*13) NOTE.--When General Sherman first learned of the move I
     proposed to make, he called to see me about it.  I recollect
     that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river
     to a house a short distance back from the levee.  I was seated
     on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman
     came up.  After a few moments' conversation he said that he would
     like to see me alone.  We passed into the house together and shut
     the door after us.  Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move
     I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position
     voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or
     a long time--to get me in.  I was going into the enemy's country,
     with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points
     strongly fortified above and below.  He said that it was an
     axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an
     enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would
     guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc.  He pointed out
     all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign
     proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to
     make.  This was, in substance, to go back until high ground
     could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there
     and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being
     always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster.  I
     said this would take us back to Memphis.  Sherman then said that
     was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad
     from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced.  To
     this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the
     lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election
     went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary
     enlistments had ceased throughout most of the North and
     conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far
     as Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of
     supplies would be of no use:  neither men to hold them nor
     supplies to put in them would be furnished.  The problem for us
     was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was
     lost.  No progress was being made in any other field, and we had
     to go on.

     Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins,
     embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and
     asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals
     upon the subject.  Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I
     did not see any reason for changing my plans.  The letter was
     not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned
     between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I
     remember of.  I did not regard the letter as official, and
     consequently did not preserve it.  General Sherman furnished a
     copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of
     my campaigns.  I did not regard either the conversation between
     us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply
     friendly advice which the relations between us fully
     justified.  Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a
     success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered
     by himself.  I make this statement here to correct an impression
     which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman's
     prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.


     (*14) Meant Edward's Station.

     (*15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

     MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:

     Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to
     Major-General Thomas.  You having been over the ground in
     person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further
     instructions will not be necessary for you.  It is particularly
     desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad
     between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from
     communication with the South, but being confronted by a large
     force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is
     to be effected until the result of our first effort is known.

     I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to
     Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which,
     if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above
     Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or
     thereabouts.

     U. S. GRANT
     Maj.-Gen'l.


     CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

     MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
     Chattanooga:

     All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's
     position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight.  Not being
     provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the
     mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot
     be given as might be desirable.  However, the general plan, you
     understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him
     strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a
     crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of
     Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the
     heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your
     chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern
     extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can
     concentrate against him.  You will co-operate with Sherman.  The
     troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your
     left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend
     fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of
     one division in readiness to move wherever ordered.  This
     division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the
     most practicable line for making an attack up the valley.  Your
     effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your
     advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and
     moving as near simultaneously with him as possible.  The
     junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will
     be at once established between the two armies by roads on the
     south bank of the river.  Further movements will then depend on
     those of the enemy.  Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily
     held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have
     there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland.  Howard's
     corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at
     Chattanooga or with Sherman.  It should be marched on Friday
     night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower
     down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness
     for such orders as may become necessary.  All these troops will
     be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one
     hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry
     soldier.  Special care should be taken by all officers to see
     that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away.  You
     will call on the engineer department for such preparations as
     you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery
     over the creek.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Major-General.


     (*16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reform
     after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying
     the ridge.

     (*17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24,1863.

     MAJOR-GENERAL. CEO. H. THOMAS,
     Chattanooga

     General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel
     with only slight skirmishing.  His right now rests at the tunnel
     and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek.  I have
     instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in
     the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will
     be in cooperation.  Your command will either carry the
     rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the
     left, as the presence of the enemy may require.  If Hooker's
     position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small
     force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where
     he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with
     all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable
     road.

     U. S. GRANT,

     Major-General.


     (*18) WASHINGTON, D. C.,
     December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.

     MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

     Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanooga
     is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command,
     my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill,
     courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great
     difficulties, have effected that important object.  God bless you
     all,

     A. LINCOLN,

     President U. S.


     (*19) General John G. Foster.


     (*20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill.,
     subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for General
     Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword.  The
     scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running
     nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the
     names of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

     Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at
     Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and
     Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the
     government at Washington.


     (*21) WASHINGTON, D. C.
     December 29, 1863.

     MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

     General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on
     account of disability from old wounds.  Should his request be
     granted, who would you like as his successor?  It is possible
     that Schofield will be sent to your command.

     H. W. HALLECK
     General-in-Chief.
     (OFFICIAL.)


     (*22) See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix.


     (*23) [PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

     HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
     April 4, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
     Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

     GENERAL:--It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me
     to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts
     of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre.  For
     your information I now write you my programme, as at present
     determined upon.

     I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up
     his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to
     turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the
     navy and to return your troops to you and his own to New
     Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to
     hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the
     number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number
     necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less
     than twenty-five thousand men.  To this I will add five thousand
     men from Missouri.  With this force he is to commence operations
     against Mobile as soon as he can.  It will be impossible for him
     to commence too early.

     Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate
     against Richmond from the south side of the James River.  This
     will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W.
     F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore
     the left wing.  I will stay with the Army of the Potomac,
     increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five
     thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army,
     wherever it may be found.

     Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one,
     under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the
     other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to
     move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

     Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about
     Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord.  His force will
     be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand
     men of all arms.

     You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up
     and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as
     you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war
     resources.

     I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but
     simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave
     you free to execute it in your own way.  Submit to me, however,
     as early as you can, your plan of operations.

     As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he
     can.  Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the
     18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable.  Sigel is
     concentrating now.  None will move from their places of
     rendezvous until I direct, except Banks.  I want to be ready to
     move by the 25th inst., if possible.  But all I can now direct
     is that you get ready as soon as possible.  I know you will have
     difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to
     where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish
     it.

     From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do
     not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I
     can take troops from there.  With the long line of railroad
     Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move
     directly to his front.  In this way he must get through to
     inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from
     one of his armies a large force to prevent it.  In other words,
     if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one
     else skins.

     I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     (*24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant's report,
     Appendix.


     (*25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VA.,
     April 9, 1864.

     MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE
     Com'd'g Army of the Potomac.

     For information and as instruction to govern your preparations
     for the coming campaign, the following is communicated
     confidentially for your own perusal alone.

     So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and
     towards one common centre.  Banks has been instructed to turn
     over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the
     navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and
     to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to
     move on Mobile.  This he is to do without reference to other
     movements.  From the scattered condition of his command,
     however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans
     before the 1st of May, if so soon.  Sherman will move at the same
     time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's army
     being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate
     aim.  If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to
     Mobile with the aid of Banks.

     Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of
     the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his
     front.  This he has been directed to do, and is now making
     preparations for it.  Two columns of his command will make south
     at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from
     ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the
     other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under
     Brig.-General Crook.  The former of these will endeavor to reach
     the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington,
     and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and
     return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join
     you.  The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward
     to join Ord.  The cavalry from Ord's command will try tributaries
     would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to
     within easy hauling distance of every position the army could
     occupy from the Rapidan to the James River.  But Lee could, if
     he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather
     interior to the one I would have to take in following.  A
     movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all
     that was done would have to be done with the supplies and
     ammunition we started with.  All idea of adopting this latter
     plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies
     possible to take with us was considered.  The country over which
     we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that
     we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

     While these preparations were going on the enemy was not
     entirely idle.  In the West Forrest made a raid in West
     Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of
     four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an
     attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio.  While he
     was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any
     part of the garrison.  On the first intelligence of Forrest's
     raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,
     and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself
     into.  Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him
     before he got my order.

     Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at
     Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of
     the Mississippi River.  The garrison to force a passage
     southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and
     Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting
     Richmond with all the South and South-west.

     Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South
     Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000
     men into the field directly to his front.  The force will be
     commanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith.  With Smith and Gillmore,
     Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from
     the south side of the river.  His movement will be simultaneous
     with yours.

     Lee's army will be your objective point.  Wherever Lee goes,
     there you will go also.  The only point upon which I am now in
     doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above
     or below him.  Each plan presents great advantages over the
     other with corresponding objections.  By crossing above, Lee is
     cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on
     a raid.  But if we take this route, all we do must be done
     whilst the rations we start with hold out.  We separate from
     Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate.  By the
     other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies
     until another is secured on the York or James rivers.

     These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more
     fully than I can write them.

     Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce
     you.  Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after
     the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from
     Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it.  This will enable
     you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the
     front.

     There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and
     transports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall
     back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and
     yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.
     What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing
     baggage to the very lowest possible standard.  Two wagons to a
     regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should
     be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and
     ordnance stores.  One wagon to brigade and one to division
     headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

     Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make
     arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded
     to White House on the Pamunkey.  Your estimates for this
     contingency should be made at once.  If not wanted there, there
     is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or
     elsewhere.

     If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made
     for ordnance stores.  I would say not much short of five hundred
     rounds of infantry ammunition would do.  By the other, half the
     amount would be sufficient.

     U. S. GRANT,

     Lieutenant-General.

     (*26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of
     the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave
     our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and
     estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000:  and
     General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sherman
     the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and
     was broken by his depleted command, remarks:  "The disparity of
     forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my
     two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners,
     representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and
     three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the
     enemy."


     (*27)
     UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864.

     [COMPILED.]

     LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.

     MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.


     MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps.

          First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.
               First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles.
               Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth.
               Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank.
               Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke.

          Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb.
               Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen.
               Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.

          Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward.
               Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

          Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott.
               First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister.
               Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster.

               Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball.


     MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

          First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.
               Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.
               Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

          Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.
               First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard.
               Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter.
               Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison.

          Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.
               First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless.
               Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.

          Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler.
               Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice.
               Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone

               Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright.


     MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

          First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.
               First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown.
               Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton.
               Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.
               Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.

          Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.
               Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant.
               Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill.
               Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.

          Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris.
               Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.

               Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins


     MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps.

          First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer.
               Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin.
               Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt

          Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.
               Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg.

          Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson.
               First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr.
               Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman.


     MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps.

          First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson.
               First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth.
               Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure.

          Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.
               First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss.
               Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin.

          Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox.
               First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft.
               Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ.

          Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.
               First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.
               Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas.

               Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.


     BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.

          Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton.
               First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching.
               Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.
               First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson.
               Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom.
               Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.


     GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.......
               Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick.
               Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.



     CONFEDERATE ARMY.

     Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by
     GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834.

         First Army Corps:  LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding.

     MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT'S Division.
          Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a)
          Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse's      "
               "     Eppa Hunton's      "
               "     Wm. R. Terry's     "

     MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Division. (b)
          Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade
                "    E. M. Law's (c)     "
                "    John Bratton's      "

     MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW'S Division. (d)
          Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade
                "    B. G. Humphreys'   "
                "    Goode Bryan's      "
                "    Kershaw's (Old)    "


         Second Army Corps:  MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

     MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. GORDON'S Division.
          Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e)
              "      John Pegram 's   "   (f)
              "      Gordon's         "   (g)
          Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's     "

     MAJ.-GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON'S Division.
          Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h)
          Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h)
              "      Geo H. Stewart's "  (h)
              "      L. A. Stafford's "  (e)

     MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES' Division.
          Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i)
              "      Geo. Dole's      "   (k)
              "      S. D. Ramseur's Brigade.
              "      C. A. Battle's   "
              "      R. D. Johnston's " (f)


         Third Army Corps:  LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding.

     MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE'S Division. (l)
          Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade.
                     Mahone's             "
          Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris's       "  (m)
             "       A. R. Wright's       "
             "       Joseph Finegan's     "

     MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX'S Division.
          Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n)
             "       James H. Lane's   "
             "       Sam'l McCowan's   "
             "       Alfred M. Scale's "

     MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH'S Division. (o)
          Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade.
             "       John R. Cooke's  "
             "       D. McRae's       "
             "       J. J. Archer's   "
             "       H. H. Walker's   "

                _unattached_:  5th Alabama Battalion.


       Cavalry Corps:  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p)

     MAJ.-GEN. FITZHUGH LEE'S Division
          Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade
             "      L. L. Lomax's      "

     MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER'S Division.
          Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade.
             "       P. M. B. Young's   "
             "       Thomas L. Rosser's "

     MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE'S Division.
          Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade.
             "      J. R. Chambliss's    "


       Artillery Reserve:  BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding.

     BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER'S DIVISION.*
          Cabell's Battalion.
               Manly's Battery.
               1st Co. Richmond Howitzers.
               Carleton's Battery.
               Calloway's Battery.

          Haskell's Battalion.
               Branch's Battery.
               Nelson's    "
               Garden's    "
               Rowan       "

          Huger's Battalion.
               Smith's Battery.
               Moody      "
               Woolfolk   "
               Parker's   "
               Taylor's   "
               Fickling's "
               Martin's   "

          Gibb's Battalion.
               Davidson's Battery.
               Dickenson's   "
               Otey's        "


     BRIG.-GEN. A. L. LONG'S DIVISION.

          Braxton's Battalion.
               Lee Battery.
               1st Md. Artillery.
               Stafford    "
               Alleghany   "

          Cutshaw's Battalion.
               Charlotteville Artillery.
               Staunton           "
               Courtney           "

          Carter's Battalion.
               Morris Artillery.
               Orange      "
               King William Artillery.
               Jeff Davis        "

         Nelson's Battalion.
               Amherst Artillery.
               Milledge     "
               Fluvauna     "

          Brown's Battalion.
               Powhatan Artillery.
               2d Richmond Howitzers.
               3d    "         "
               Rockbridge Artillery.
               Salem Flying Artillery.


     COL R. L.WALKER'S DIVISION.

          Cutt's Battalion.
               Ross's Battery.
               Patterson's Battery.
               Irwin Artillery.

          Richardson's Battalion.
               Lewis Artillery.
               Donaldsonville Artillery.
               Norfolk Light       "
               Huger               "

          Mclntosh 's Battalion.
               Johnson's Battery.
               Hardaway Artillery.
               Danville      "
               2d Rockbridge Artillery.

          Pegram's Battalion.
               Peedee Artillery.
               Fredericksburg Artillery.
               Letcher             "
               Purcell Battery.
               Crenshaw's Battery.

          Poague's Battalion.
               Madison Artillery.
               Albemarle    "
               Brooke       "
               Charlotte    "


     NOTE.
     (a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at
     above date.
     (b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also
     contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded by
     Colonel P. D. Bowles.
     (d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not
     indicated.

     Organization of the Army of the Valley District.
     (e) Constituting York's Brigade.
     (f) In Ramseur's Division.
     (g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and
     containing 12th Georgia Battalion.
     (h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's
     Division.
     (i) Grimes' Brigade.
     (k) Cook's    "

     (l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty;
     name not indicated.
     (m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.
     (n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four
     brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not
     indicated.
     (p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's,
     Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade.

     *But one general officer reported present for duty in the
     artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original.


     (*28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,
     May II, 1864.--3 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
     Commanding Army of the Potomac.

     Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and
     6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in
     a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock A.M. to-morrow.
     will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with
     Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and
     vigorous attack.  Warren and Wright should hold their corps as
     close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any
     diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any
     opportunity presents itself.  There is but little doubt in my
     mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely
     successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been
     heartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*29) HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S.,
     May 11, 1864.-4 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE,
     Commanding 9th Army Corps.

     Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under
     cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the
     enemy at 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow.  You will move against the
     enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible
     vigor at precisely 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow the 12th inst.  Let
     your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost
     secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.

     I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babcock,
     in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the
     direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you
     and General Hancock with instructions to render you every
     assistance in their power.  Generals Warren and Wright will hold
     their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage
     of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and will
     push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*30) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,
     May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
     Washington, D. C.

     The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and
     four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work,
     including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of
     artillery.  The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the
     last ditch.  We have lost no organizations, not even that of a
     company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division
     (Johnson's), one brigade (Doles'), and one regiment entire from
     the enemy.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*31) SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.

     HON E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR,
     Washington, D. C.

     I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for
     gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days'
     battles, to wit:  Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and
     Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S.
     S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York
     Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves,
     to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W.
     S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army.  His
     services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this
     recognition.  In making these recommendations I do not wish the
     claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but
     recommend his name to be sent in at the same time.  I would also
     ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth
     Army Corps.  I would further ask the confirmation of General
     Humphreys to the rank of Major-General.

     General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations.
     He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I
     have come in contact with.  If their services can be rewarded by
     promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the
     honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally
     gratified.  I would not like to see one of these promotions at
     this time without seeing both.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*32) QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 26, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
     Washington, D. C.

     The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee's
     right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg
     road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox
     Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little
     River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps
     and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford
     and covers the right wing of Lee's army. One division of the 9th
     corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges
     above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are
     held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army
     with equal facility.  The 5th and 6th corps with one division of
     the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short
     distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and
     near to the enemy.

     To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter
     of our men that even success would not justify.  To turn the
     enemy by his right, between the two Annas is impossible on
     account of the swamp upon which his right rests.  To turn him by
     the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna
     River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to
     the movement of our army, to be crossed.  I have determined
     therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near
     Hanover Town.  This crosses all three streams at once, and
     leaves us still where we can draw supplies.

     During the last night the teams and artillery not in position,
     belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of
     that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river
     and moved down to the rear of the left.  As soon as it is dark
     this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced
     march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings.  The
     balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and
     follow as rapidly as possible.  The left wing will also withdraw
     from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of
     the right wing.  Lee's army is really whipped.  The prisoners we
     now take show it, and the action of his army shows it
     unmistakably.  A battle with them outside of intrenchments
     cannot be had.  Our men feel that they have gained the MORALE
     over the enemy, and attack him with confidence.  I may be
     mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already
     assured.  The promptness and rapidity with which you have
     forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling
     of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the
     enemy.

     We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and
     Fredericksburg roads.  I want to leave a gap on the roads north
     of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to
     import rail from elsewhere.  Even if a crossing is not effected
     at Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move on
     down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected.  I think it
     advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port
     Royal to the White House.  I wish you would direct this change
     at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there
     in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to
     hold it.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*33) NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
     Commanding A. P.

     The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed,
     suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it
     vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful
     point from wherever they can be taken.  I shall go to where you
     are in the course of an hour.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*34) COLD HARBOR, June 5,1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington,
     D. C.

     A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be
     impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would
     protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that
     road for supplying the army.  To do so would give us a long
     vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our
     strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of
     his lines of communication on the south side of the James.  My
     idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible
     north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of
     communication on the north side of the James River to transfer
     the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or
     follow him south if he should retreat.

     I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it
     of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now
     have.  They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or
     feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where
     in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them.
     Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to
     make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of
     the city.  I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:

     I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by
     the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable
     circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be
     sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about
     Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west.  When this
     is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James
     River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to
     City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on
     north side and crossing there.  To provide for this last and
     most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest
     class ought to be immediately provided.

     Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all
     sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the
     canal.  If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be
     lost to him also.  Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make
     the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south
     side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they
     can.

     The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels
     can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our
     army is not only confident of protecting itself without
     intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever
     and whenever he can be found without this protection.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     (*35) COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER

     Commanding Dept. W. Va.

     General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with
     instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence
     there the destruction of the Va. Cen. R. R., destroying this way
     as much as possible.  The complete destruction of this road and
     of the canal on James River is of great importance to us.
     According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your
     guidance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It
     would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for
     a single day.  But that point is of so much importance to the
     enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met
     as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all.  I see,
     in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of
     your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route
     should be from Staunton via Charlottesville.  If you have so
     understood it, you will be doing just what I want.  The
     direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you
     in the valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately
     turn east by the most practicable road.  From thence move
     eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely
     and thoroughly, until you join General Sheridan.  After the work
     laid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done,
     proceed to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid out in
     General Sheridan's instructions.

     If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed
     back in your Department, you are authorized to send it back.

     If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem
     it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal.
     Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*36) FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE
     ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE.

     FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE.  | KILLED.  | WOUNDED.  | MISSING. |
     AGGREGATE.  |


     Wilderness, May 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 |
     Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601|
     North Anna, May 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 |
     Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | Cold
     Harbor, May 31st to June 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 |
     Total ................  | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 |


     (*37) CITY POINT, VA., June 17, 1864.  11 A.M.

     MAJOR-GEN. HALLECK,
     Washington, D. C.

             *        *        *        *        *        *        *

     The enemy in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg abandoned
     their intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred.  They no doubt
     expected troops from north of the James River to take their
     place before we discovered it.  General Butler took advantage of
     this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road
     between Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain
     possession of.

     Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their
     commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the
     last five days.  Day and night has been all the same, no delays
     being allowed on any account.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*38) CITY POINT, VA., July 24, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
     Commanding, etc.

     The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from
     Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from
     an attack there.  The chances they think will be better on
     Burnside's front.  If this is attempted it will be necessary to
     concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's
     line we expect to penetrate.  All officers should be fully
     impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond
     the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating
     it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they
     should not succeed in breaking through.

     To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery
     possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front
     during the assault.  Their lines would be sufficient for the
     support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought
     on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault,
     ready to follow in if successful.  The field artillery and
     infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in
     readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or
     to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders.  One
     thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders.  If
     they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it
     to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they
     should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without
     waiting for orders from army commanders.  General Ord can
     co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five
     thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce
     you or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox
     and James rivers, as may be deemed best.

     This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all.  If not
     attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy
     the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if
     possible.

             *        *        *        *        *        *        *

     Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at
     Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up....

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     (*39) See letter, August 5th, Appendix.


     (*40) See Appendix, letters of Oct. 11th.


     (*41) CITY POINT, VA., December 2,1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville Tenn.

     If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will
     lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to
     abandon the line of the Tennessee.  Should he attack you it is
     all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he
     fortifies.  Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster
     employees, citizens, etc.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864.--1.30 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville
     with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon
     ground of your own choosing.  After the repulse of Hood at
     Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to
     Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy
     where he was.  At this distance, however, I may err as to the
     best method of dealing with the enemy.  You will now suffer
     incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily
     disposed of.  Put forth therefore every possible exertion to
     attain this end.  Should you get him to retreating give him no
     peace.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     CITY POINT, VA., December 5, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to
     where he can cross it?  It seems to me whilst you should be
     getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after
     Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is.  Time strengthens
     him in all possibility as much as it does you.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864--4 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your
     cavalry.  There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign
     back to the Ohio River.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     CITY POINT, VA., December 8, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     Your dispatch of yesterday received.  It looks to me evident the
     enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are
     scattered.  Why not attack at once?  By all means avoid the
     contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat
     to the Ohio.  If you think necessary call on the governors of
     States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he
     should cross the river.  You clearly never should cross except
     in rear of the enemy.  Now is one of the finest opportunities
     ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the
     enemy.  If destroyed he never can replace it.  Use the means at
     your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that
     will resound from one end of the land to the other.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     CITY POINT, VA., December 11, 1864.--4 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be
     witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you
     will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find.  Let
     there be no further delay.  Hood cannot even stand a drawn
     battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores.  If he
     retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of
     his army.  I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day
     announcing that you have moved.  Delay no longer for weather or
     reinforcements.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     WASHINGTON, D. C., December 15, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from
     Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go
     no further.  Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is
     entirely destroyed.  Your army will cheerfully suffer many
     privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for
     future operations.  Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take
     them from the country as the enemy have done.  Much is now
     expected.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     (*42) See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan,
     March 24th, Appendix.


     (*43) See Appendix.


     (*44) NOTE.--The fac-simile of the terms of Lee's surrender
     inserted at this place, was copied from the original document
     furnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S.
     Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant's staff at the time
     of the surrender.

     Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant's manifold
     order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations
     and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of
     General Grant.  After such alteration it was handed to General
     Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to
     General Grant.  The original was then transcribed by General
     Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General
     Lee.

     The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the
     original document and all interlineations and erasures.

     There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and
     Lee each signed the articles of surrender.  The document in the
     form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor
     of McLean's house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and
     General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and
     handed it to General Grant.




...............................................................




MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN

By William T. Sherman




GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN

HIS COMRADES IN ARMS,

VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS.

Nearly ten years have passed since the close of the civil war in
America, and yet no satisfactory history thereof is accessible to
the public; nor should any be attempted until the Government has
published, and placed within the reach of students, the abundant
materials that are buried in the War Department at Washington.
These are in process of compilation; but, at the rate of progress
for the past ten years, it is probable that a new century will come
before they are published and circulated, with full indexes to
enable the historian to make a judicious selection of materials.

What is now offered is not designed as a history of the war, or
even as a complete account of all the incidents in which the writer
bore a part, but merely his recollection of events, corrected by a
reference to his own memoranda, which may assist the future
historian when he comes to describe the whole, and account for the
motives and reasons which influenced some of the actors in the
grand drama of war.

I trust a perusal of these pages will prove interesting to the
survivors, who have manifested so often their intense love of the
"cause" which moved a nation to vindicate its own authority; and,
equally so, to the rising generation, who therefrom may learn that
a country and government such as ours are worth fighting for, and
dying for, if need be.

If successful in this, I shall feel amply repaid for departing from
the usage of military men, who seldom attempt to publish their own
deeds, but rest content with simply contributing by their acts to
the honor and glory of their country.

WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,
General

St. Louis, Missouri, January 21, 1875.





PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

Another ten years have passed since I ventured to publish my
Memoirs, and, being once more at leisure, I have revised them in
the light of the many criticisms public and private.

My habit has been to note in pencil the suggestions of critics, and
to examine the substance of their differences; for critics must
differ from the author, to manifest their superiority.

Where I have found material error I have corrected; and I have
added two chapters, one at the beginning, another at the end, both
of the most general character, and an appendix.

I wish my friends and enemies to understand that I disclaim the
character of historian, but assume to be a witness on the stand
before the great tribunal of history, to assist some future Napier,
Alison, or Hume to comprehend the feelings and thoughts of the
actors in the grand conflicts of the recent past, and thereby to
lessen his labors in the compilation necessary for the future
benefit of mankind.

In this free country every man is at perfect liberty to publish his
own thoughts and impressions, and any witness who may differ from
me should publish his own version of facts in the truthful
narration of which he is interested.  I am publishing my own
memoirs, not theirs, and we all know that no three honest witnesses
of a simple brawl can agree on all the details.  How much more
likely will be the difference in a great battle covering a vast
space of broken ground, when each division, brigade, regiment, and
even company, naturally and honestly believes that it was the focus
of the whole affair! Each of them won the battle.  None ever lost.
That was the fate of the old man who unhappily commanded.

In this edition I give the best maps which I believe have ever been
prepared, compiled by General O. M. Poe, from personal knowledge
and official surveys, and what I chiefly aim to establish is the
true cause of the results which are already known to the whole
world; and it may be a relief to many to know that I shall publish
no other, but, like the player at cards, will "stand;" not that I
have accomplished perfection, but because I can do no better with
the cards in hand.  Of omissions there are plenty, but of wilful
perversion of facts, none.

In the preface to the first edition, in 1875, I used these words:
"Nearly ten years have passed since the close of the civil war in
America, and yet no satisfactory history thereof is accessible to
the public; nor should any be attempted until the Government has
published, and placed within the reach of students, the abundant
materials that are buried in the War Department at Washington.
These are in process of compilation; but, at the rate of progress
for the past ten years, it is probable that a new century will come
before they are published and circulated, with full indexes to
enable the historian to make a judicious selection of materials"

Another decade is past, and I am in possession of all these
publications, my last being Volume XI, Part 3, Series 1, the last
date in which is August 30, 1862.  I am afraid that if I assume
again the character of prophet, I must extend the time deep into
the next century, and pray meanwhile that the official records of
the war, Union and Confederate, may approach completion before the
"next war," or rather that we, as a people, may be spared another
war until the last one is officially recorded.  Meantime the rising
generation must be content with memoirs and histories compiled from
the best sources available.

In this sense I offer mine as to the events of which I was an
eye-witness and participant, or for which I was responsible.

WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,
General (retired).

St. Louis, Missouri, March 30, 1885.






MEMOIRS OF GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN.



CHAPTER I.

FROM 1820 TO THE MEXICAN WAR.

1820-1846.

According to Cothren, in his "History of Ancient Woodbury,
Connecticut," the Sherman family came from Dedham, Essex County,
England.  The first recorded name is of Edmond Sherman, with his
three sons, Edmond, Samuel, and John, who were at Boston before
1636; and farther it is distinctly recorded that Hon. Samuel
Sherman, Rev. John, his brother, and Captain John, his first
cousin, arrived from Dedham, Essex County, England, in 1634.
Samuel afterward married Sarah Mitchell, who had come (in the same
ship) from England, and finally settled at Stratford, Connecticut.
The other two (Johns) located at Watertown, Massachusetts.

From Captain John Sherman are descended Roger Sherman, the signer
of the Declaration of Independence, Hon. William M. Evarts, the
Messrs. Hoar, of Massachusetts, and many others of national fame.
Our own family are descended from the Hon. Samuel Sherman and his
son; the Rev. John, who was born in 1650-'51; then another John,
born in 1687; then Judge Daniel, born in 1721; then Taylor Sherman,
our grandfather, who was born in 1758.  Taylor Sherman was a lawyer
and judge in Norwalk, Connecticut, where he resided until his
death, May 4, 1815; leaving a widow, Betsey Stoddard Sherman, and
three children, Charles R. (our father), Daniel, and Betsey.

When the State of Connecticut, in 1786, ceded to the United States
her claim to the western part of her public domain, as defined by
her Royal Charter, she reserved a large district in what is now
northern Ohio, a portion of which (five hundred thousand acres)
composed the "Fire-Land District," which was set apart to indemnify
the parties who had lost property in Connecticut by the raids of
Generals Arnold, Tryon, and others during the latter part of the
Revolutionary War.

Our grandfather, Judge Taylor Sherman, was one of the commissioners
appointed by the State of Connecticut to quiet the Indian title,
and to survey and subdivide this Fire-Land District, which includes
the present counties of Huron and Erie.  In his capacity as
commissioner he made several trips to Ohio in the early part of
this century, and it is supposed that he then contracted the
disease which proved fatal.  For his labor and losses he received a
title to two sections of land, which fact was probably the prime
cause of the migration of our family to the West.  My father
received a good education, and was admitted to the bar at Norwalk,
Connecticut, where, in 1810, he, at twenty years of age, married
Mary Hoyt, also of Norwalk, and at once migrated to Ohio, leaving
his wife (my mother) for a time.  His first purpose was to settle
at Zanesville, Ohio, but he finally chose Lancaster, Fairfield
County, where he at once engaged in the practice of his
profession.  In 1811 he returned to Norwalk, where, meantime, was
born Charles Taylor Sherman, the eldest of the family, who with his
mother was carried to Ohio on horseback.

Judge Taylor Sherman's family remained in Norwalk till 1815, when
his death led to the emigration of the remainder of the family,
viz., of Uncle Daniel Sherman, who settled at Monroeville, Ohio, as
a farmer, where he lived and died quite recently, leaving children
and grandchildren;  and an aunt, Betsey, who married Judge Parker,
of Mansfield, and died in 1851, leaving children and grandchildren;
also Grandmother Elizabeth Stoddard Sherman, who resided with her
daughter, Mrs. Betsey Parker, in Mansfield until her death, August
1,1848.

Thus my father, Charles R. Sherman, became finally established at
Lancaster, Ohio, as a lawyer, with his own family in the year 1811,
and continued there till the time of his death, in 1829.  I have no
doubt that he was in the first instance attracted to Lancaster by
the natural beauty of its scenery, and the charms of its already
established society.  He continued in the practice of his
profession, which in those days was no sinecure, for the ordinary
circuit was made on horseback, and embraced Marietta, Cincinnati,
and Detroit.  Hardly was the family established there when the War
of 1812 caused great alarm and distress in all Ohio.  The English
captured Detroit and the shores of Lake Erie down to the Maumee
River; while the Indians still occupied the greater part of the
State.  Nearly every man had to be somewhat of a soldier, but I
think my father was only a commissary; still, he seems to have
caught a fancy for the great chief of the Shawnees, "Tecumseh."

Perry's victory on Lake Erie was the turning-point of the Western
campaign, and General Harrison's victory over the British and
Indians at the river Thames in Canada ended the war in the West,
and restored peace and tranquillity to the exposed settlers of
Ohio.  My father at once resumed his practice at the bar, and was
soon recognized as an able and successful lawyer.  When, in 1816,
my brother James was born, he insisted on engrafting the Indian
name "Tecumseh" on the usual family list.  My mother had already
named her first son after her own brother Charles; and insisted on
the second son taking the name of her other brother James, and when
I came along, on the 8th of February, 1820, mother having no more
brothers, my father succeeded in his original purpose, and named me
William Tecumseh.

The family rapidly increased till it embraced six boys and five
girls, all of whom attained maturity and married; of these six are
still living.

In the year 1821 a vacancy occurred in the Supreme Court of Ohio,
and I find this petition:


Somerset, Ohio, July 6, 1821.

May it please your Excellency:

We ask leave to recommend to your Excellency's favorable notice
Charles R. Sherman, Esq., of Lancaster, as a man possessing in an
eminent degree those qualifications so much to be desired in a
Judge of the Supreme Court.

From a long acquaintance with Mr. Sherman, we are happy to be able
to state to your Excellency that our minds are led to the
conclusion that that gentleman possesses a disposition noble and
generous, a mind discriminating, comprehensive, and combining a
heart pure, benevolent and humane.  Manners dignified, mild, and
complaisant, and a firmness not to be shaken and of unquestioned
integrity.

But Mr. Sherman's character cannot be unknown to your Excellency,
and on that acquaintance without further comment we might safely
rest his pretensions.

We think we hazard little in assuring your Excellency that his
appointment would give almost universal satisfaction to the
citizens of Perry County.

With great consideration, we have the honor to be

Your Excellency's most obedient humble servants,
CHARLES A. HOOD,
GEORGE TREAT,
PETER DITTOR,
P. ODLIN,
J. B. ORTEN,
T. BECKWITH,
WILLIAM P. DORST,
JOHN MURRAY,
JACOB MOINS,
B. EATON,
DANIEL GRIGGS,
HENRY DITTOE,
NICHOLAS McCARTY.



His Excellency ETHAN A. BROWN,
Governor of Ohio, Columbus.


He was soon after appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court, and
served in that capacity to the day of his death.

My memory extends back to about 1827, and I recall him, returning
home on horseback, when all the boys used to run and contend for
the privilege of riding his horse from the front door back to the
stable.  On one occasion, I was the first, and being mounted rode
to the stable; but "Old Dick" was impatient because the stable-door
was not opened promptly, so he started for the barn of our neighbor
Mr. King; there, also, no one was in waiting to open the gate, and,
after a reasonable time, "Dick" started back for home somewhat in a
hurry, and threw me among a pile of stones, in front of preacher
Wright's house, where I was picked up apparently a dead boy; but my
time was not yet, and I recovered, though the scars remain to this
day.

The year 1829 was a sad one to our family.  We were then ten
children, my eldest brother Charles absent at the State University,
Athens, Ohio; my next brother, James, in a store at Cincinnati; and
the rest were at home, at school.  Father was away on the circuit.
One day Jane Sturgeon came to the school, called us out, and when
we reached home all was lamentation: news had come that father was
ill unto death, at Lebanon, a hundred miles away.  Mother started
at once, by coach, but met the news of his death about Washington,
and returned home.  He had ridden on horseback from Cincinnati to
Lebanon to hold court, during a hot day in June.  On the next day
he took his seat on the bench, opened court in the forenoon, but in
the afternoon, after recess, was seized with a severe chill and had
to adjourn the court.  The best medical aid was called in, and for
three days with apparent success, but the fever then assumed a more
dangerous type, and he gradually yielded to it, dying on the sixth
day, viz., June 24, 1829.

My brother James had been summoned from Cincinnati, and was present
at his bedside, as was also Henry Stoddard, Esq., of Dayton, Ohio,
our cousin.  Mr. Stoddard once told me that the cause of my
father's death was cholera; but at that time, 1829, there was no
Asiatic cholera in the United States, and the family, attributed
his death to exposure to the hot sun of June, and a consequent
fever, "typhoid."

From the resolutions of the bench, bar, and public generally, now
in my possession, his death was universally deplored; more
especially by his neighbors in Lancaster, and by the Society of
Freemasons, of which he was the High-Priest of Arch Chapter No. 11.


His death left the family very poor, but friends rose up with
proffers of generous care and assistance; for all the neighbors
knew that mother could not maintain so large a family without help.
My eldest brother, Charles, had nearly completed his education at
the university at Athens, and concluded to go to his uncle, Judge
Parker, at Mansfield, Ohio, to study law.  My eldest sister,
Elizabeth, soon after married William J. Reese, Esq.; James was
already in a store at Cincinnati; and, with the exception of the
three youngest children, the rest of us were scattered.  I fell to
the charge of the Hon. Thomas Ewing, who took me to his family, and
ever after treated me as his own son.

I continued at the Academy in Lancaster, which was the best in the
place; indeed, as good a school as any in Ohio.  We studied all the
common branches of knowledge, including Latin, Greek, and French.
At first the school was kept by Mr. Parsons; he was succeeded by
Mr. Brown, and he by two brothers, Samuel and Mark How.  These were
all excellent teachers, and we made good progress, first at the old
academy and afterward at a new school-house, built by Samuel How,
in the orchard of Hugh Boyle, Esq.

Time passed with us as with boys generally.  Mr. Ewing was in the
United States Senate, and I was notified to prepare for West Point,
of which institution we had little knowledge, except that it was
very strict, and that the army was its natural consequence.  In
1834 I was large for my age, and the construction of canals was the
rage in Ohio.  A canal was projected to connect with the great Ohio
Canal at Carroll (eight miles above Lancaster), down the valley of
the Hock Hocking to Athens (forty-four miles), and thence to the
Ohio River by slack water.

Preacher Carpenter, of Lancaster, was appointed to make the
preliminary surveys, and selected the necessary working party out
of the boys of the town.  From our school were chosen ____Wilson,
Emanuel Geisy, William King, and myself.  Geisy and I were the
rod-men.  We worked during that fall and next spring, marking two
experimental lines, and for our work we each received a silver
half-dollar for each day's actual work, the first money any of us
had ever earned.

In June, 1835, one of our school-fellows, William Irvin, was
appointed a cadet to West Point, and, as it required sixteen years
of age for admission, I had to wait another year.  During the
autumn of 1835 and spring of 1836 I devoted myself chiefly to
mathematics and French, which were known to be the chief requisites
for admission to West Point.

Some time in the spring of 1836 I received through Mr. Ewing, then
at Washington, from the Secretary of War, Mr. Poinsett, the letter
of appointment as a cadet, with a list of the articles of clothing
necessary to be taken along, all of which were liberally provided
by Mrs. Ewing; and with orders to report to Mr. Ewing, at
Washington, by a certain date, I left Lancaster about the 20th of
May in the stage-coach for Zanesville.  There we transferred to the
coaches of the Great National Road, the highway of travel from the
West to the East.  The stages generally travelled in gangs of from
one to six coaches, each drawn by four good horses, carrying nine
passengers inside and three or four outside.

In about three days, travelling day and night, we reached
Frederick, Maryland.  There we were told that we could take
rail-cars to Baltimore, and thence to Washington; but there was
also a two-horse hack ready to start for Washington direct.  Not
having full faith in the novel and dangerous railroad, I stuck to
the coach, and in the night reached Gadsby's Hotel in Washington
City.

The next morning I hunted up Mr. Ewing, and found him boarding with
a mess of Senators at Mrs. Hill's, corner of Third and C Streets,
and transferred my trunk to the same place.  I spent a week in
Washington, and think I saw more of the place in that time than I
ever have since in the many years of residence there.  General
Jackson was President, and was at the zenith of his fame.  I recall
looking at him a full hour, one morning, through the wood railing
on Pennsylvania Avenue, as he paced up and down the gravel walk on
the north front of the White House.  He wore a cap and an overcoat
so full that his form seemed smaller than I had expected.  I also
recall the appearance of Postmaster-General Amos Kendall, of
Vice-President Van Buren, Messrs. Calhoun, Webster, Clay, Cass,
Silas Wright, etc.

In due time I took my departure for West Point with Cadets Belt and
Bronaugh.  These were appointed cadets as from Ohio, although
neither had ever seen that State.  But in those days there were
fewer applicants from Ohio than now, and near the close of the term
the vacancies unasked for were usually filled from applicants on
the spot.  Neither of these parties, however, graduated, so the
State of Ohio lost nothing.  We went to Baltimore by rail, there
took a boat up to Havre de Grace, then the rail to Wilmington,
Delaware, and up the Delaware in a boat to Philadelphia.  I staid
over in Philadelphia one day at the old Mansion House, to visit the
family of my brother-in-law, Mr. Reese.  I found his father a fine
sample of the old merchant gentleman, in a good house in Arch
Street, with his accomplished daughters, who had been to Ohio, and
whom I had seen there.  From Philadelphia we took boat to
Bordentown, rail to Amboy, and boat again to New York City,
stopping at the American Hotel.  I staid a week in New York City,
visiting my uncle, Charles Hoyt, at his beautiful place on Brooklyn
Heights, and my uncle James, then living in White Street.  My
friend William Scott was there, the young husband of my cousin,
Louise Hoyt; a neatly-dressed young fellow, who looked on me as an
untamed animal just caught in the far West--"fit food for
gunpowder," and good for nothing else.

About June 12th I embarked in the steamer Cornelius Vanderbilt for
West Point; registered in the office of Lieutenant C. F. Smith,
Adjutant of the Military Academy, as a new cadet of the class of
1836, and at once became installed as the "plebe" of my
fellow-townsman, William Irvin, then entering his Third Class.

Colonel R. E. De Russy was Superintendent; Major John Fowle, Sixth
United States Infantry, Commandant.  The principal Professors were:
Mahan, Engineering; Bartlett, Natural Philosophy; Bailey,
Chemistry; Church, Mathematics; Weir, Drawing; and Berard, French.

The routine of military training and of instruction was then fully
established, and has remained almost the same ever since.  To give
a mere outline would swell this to an inconvenient size, and I
therefore merely state that I went through the regular course of
four years, graduating in June, 1840, number six in a class of
forty-three.  These forty-three were all that remained of more than
one hundred which originally constituted the class.  At the Academy
I was not considered a good soldier, for at no time was I selected
for any office, but remained a private throughout the whole four
years.  Then, as now, neatness in dress and form, with a strict
conformity to the rules, were the qualifications required for
office, and I suppose I was found not to excel in any of these.  In
studies I always held a respectable reputation with the professors,
and generally ranked among the best, especially in drawing,
chemistry, mathematics, and natural philosophy.  My average
demerits, per annum, were about one hundred and fifty, which.
reduced my final class standing from number four to six.

In June, 1840, after the final examination, the class graduated and
we received our diplomas.  Meantime, Major Delafield, United States
Engineers, had become Superintendent; Major C. F. Smith, Commandant
of Cadets; but the corps of professors and assistants remained
almost unchanged during our whole term.  We were all granted the
usual furlough of three months, and parted for our homes, there to
await assignment to our respective corps and regiments.  In due
season I was appointed and commissioned second-lieutenant, Third
Artillery, and ordered to report at Governor's Island, New York
Harbor, at the end of September.  I spent my furlough mostly at
Lancaster and Mansfield, Ohio; toward the close of September
returned to New York, reported to Major Justin Dimock, commanding
the recruiting rendezvous at Governor's Island, and was assigned to
command a company of recruits preparing for service in Florida.
Early in October this company was detailed, as one of four, to
embark in a sailing-vessel for Savannah, Georgia, under command of
Captain and Brevet Major Penrose.  We embarked and sailed, reaching
Savannah about the middle of October, where we transferred to a
small steamer and proceeded by the inland route to St. Augustine,
Florida.  We reached St. Augustine at the same time with the Eighth
Infantry, commanded by Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General William
J. Worth.  At that time General Zachary Taylor was in chief command
in Florida, and had his headquarters at Tampa Bay.  My regiment,
the Third Artillery, occupied the posts along the Atlantic coast of
Florida, from St. Augustine south to Key Biscayne, and my own
company, A, was at Fort Pierce, Indian River.  At St. Augustine I
was detached from the company of recruits, which was designed for
the Second Infantry, and was ordered to join my proper company at
Fort Pierce.  Colonel William Gates commanded the regiment, with
Lieutenant William Austine Brown as adjutant of the regiment.
Lieutenant Bragg commanded the post of St. Augustine with his own
company, E, and G (Garner's), then commanded by Lieutenant Judd.
In, a few days I embarked in the little steamer William Gaston down
the coast, stopping one day at New Smyrna, held by John R. Vinton's
company (B), with which was serving Lieutenant William H. Shover.

In due season we arrived off the bar of Indian River and anchored.
A whale-boat came off with a crew of four men, steered by a
character of some note, known as the Pilot Ashlock.  I transferred
self and baggage to this boat, and, with the mails, was carried
through the surf over the bar, into the mouth of Indian River
Inlet.  It was then dark; we transferred to a smaller boat, and the
same crew pulled us up through a channel in the middle of Mangrove
Islands, the roosting-place of thousands of pelicans and birds that
rose in clouds and circled above our heads.  The water below was
alive with fish, whose course through it could be seen by the
phosphoric wake; and Ashlock told me many a tale of the Indian war
then in progress, and of his adventures in hunting and fishing,
which he described as the best in the world.  About two miles from
the bar, we emerged into the lagoon, a broad expanse of shallow
water that lies parallel with the coast, separated from it by a
narrow strip of sand, backed by a continuous series of islands and
promontories, covered with a dense growth of mangrove and
saw-palmetto.  Pulling across this lagoon, in about three more
miles we approached the lights of Fort Pierce.  Reaching a
small wharf, we landed, and were met by the officers of the
post, Lieutenants George Taylor and Edward J. Steptoe, and
Assistant-Surgeon James Simons.  Taking the mail-bag, we walked up
a steep sand-bluff on which the fort was situated, and across the
parade-ground to the officers' quarters.  These were six or seven
log-houses, thatched with palmetto-leaves, built on high posts,
with a porch in front, facing the water.  The men's quarters were
also of logs forming the two sides of a rectangle, open toward the
water; the intervals and flanks were closed with log stockades.  I
was assigned to one of these rooms, and at once began service with
my company, A, then commanded by Lieutenant Taylor.

The season was hardly yet come for active operations against the
Indians, so that the officers were naturally attracted to Ashlock,
who was the best fisherman I ever saw.  He soon initiated us into
the mysteries of shark-spearing, trolling for red-fish, and taking
the sheep's-head and mullet.  These abounded so that we could at
any time catch an unlimited quantity at pleasure.  The companies
also owned nets for catching green turtles.  These nets had meshes
about a foot square, were set across channels in the lagoon, the
ends secured to stakes driven into the mad, the lower line sunk
with lead or stone weights and the upper line floated with cork.
We usually visited these nets twice a day, and found from one to
six green turtles entangled in the meshes.  Disengaging them, they
were carried to pens, made with stakes stuck in the mud, where they
were fed with mangrove-leaves, and our cooks had at all times an
ample supply of the best of green turtles.  They were so cheap and
common that the soldiers regarded it as an imposition when
compelled to eat green turtle steaks, instead of poor Florida beef,
or the usual barrelled mess-pork.  I do not recall in my whole
experience a spot on earth where fish, oysters, and green turtles
so abound as at Fort Pierce, Florida.

In November, Major Childs arrived with Lieutenant Van Vliet and a
detachment of recruits to fill our two companies, and preparations
were at once begun for active operations in the field.  At that
time the Indians in the Peninsula of Florida were scattered, and
the war consisted in hunting up and securing the small fragments,
to be sent to join the others of their tribe of Seminoles already
established in the Indian Territory west of Arkansas.  Our
expeditions were mostly made in boats in the lagoons extending from
the "Haul-over," near two hundred miles above the fort, down to
Jupiter Inlet, about fifty miles below, and in the many streams
which emptied therein.  Many such expeditions were made during that
winter, with more or less success, in which we succeeded in picking
up small parties of men, women, and children.  On one occasion,
near the "Haul-over," when I was not present, the expedition was
more successful.  It struck a party of nearly fifty Indians, killed
several warriors, and captured others.  In this expedition my
classmate, lieutenant Van Vliet, who was an excellent shot, killed
a warrior who was running at full speed among trees, and one of the
sergeants of our company (Broderick) was said to have dispatched
three warriors, and it was reported that he took the scalp of one
and brought it in to the fort as a trophy.  Broderick was so elated
that, on reaching the post, he had to celebrate his victory by a
big drunk.

There was at the time a poor, weakly soldier of our company whose
wife cooked for our mess.  She was somewhat of a flirt, and rather
fond of admiration.  Sergeant Broderick was attracted to her, and
hung around the mess-house more than the husband fancied; so he
reported the matter to Lieutenant Taylor, who reproved Broderick
for his behavior.  A few days afterward the husband again appealed
to his commanding officer (Taylor), who exclaimed: "Haven't you got
a musket?  Can't you defend your own family?"  Very soon after a
shot was heard down by the mess-house, and it transpired that the
husband had actually shot Broderick, inflicting a wound which
proved mortal.  The law and army regulations required that the man
should be sent to the nearest civil court, which was at St.
Augustine; accordingly, the prisoner and necessary witnesses were
sent up by the next monthly steamer.  Among the latter were
lieutenant Taylor and the pilot Ashlock.

After they had been gone about a month, the sentinel on the roof-top
of our quarters reported the smoke of a steamer approaching the bar,
and, as I was acting quartermaster, I took a boat and pulled down to
get the mail.  I reached the log-but in which the pilots lived, and
saw them start with their boat across the bar, board the steamer,
and then return.  Ashlock was at his old post at the steering-oar,
with two ladies, who soon came to the landing, having passed through
a very heavy surf, and I was presented to one as Mrs. Ashlock, and
the other as her sister, a very pretty little Minorcan girl of about
fourteen years of age.  Mrs. Ashlock herself was probably eighteen
or twenty years old, and a very handsome woman.  I was hurriedly
informed that the murder trial was in progress at St. Augustine;
that Ashlock had given his testimony, and had availed himself of the
chance to take a wife to share with him the solitude of his desolate
hut on the beach at Indian River. He had brought ashore his wife,
her sister, and their chests, with the mail, and had orders to
return immediately to the steamer (Gaston or Harney) to bring ashore
some soldiers belonging to another company, E (Braggs), which had
been ordered from St. Augustine to Fort Pierce.  Ashlock left his
wife and her sister standing on the beach near the pilot-hut, and
started back with his whale-boat across the bar.  I also took the
mail and started up to the fort, and had hardly reached the wharf
when I observed another boat following me.  As soon as this reached
the wharf the men reported that Ashlock and all his crew, with the
exception of one man, had been drowned a few minutes after I had
left the beach. They said his surf-boat had reached the steamer, had
taken on board a load of soldiers, some eight or ten, and had
started back through the surf, when on the bar a heavy breaker upset
the boat, and all were lost except the boy who pulled the bow-oar,
who clung to the rope or painter, hauled himself to the upset boat,
held on, drifted with it outside the breakers, and was finally
beached near a mile down the coast. They reported also that the
steamer had got up anchor, run in as close to the bar as she could,
paused awhile, and then had started down the coast.

I instantly took a fresh crew of soldiers and returned to the bar;
there sat poor Mrs. Ashlock on her chest of clothes, a weeping
widow, who had seen her husband perish amid sharks and waves; she
clung to the hope that the steamer had picked him up, but, strange
to say, he could not swim, although he had been employed on the
water all his life.

Her sister was more demonstrative, and wailed as one lost to all
hope and life.  She appealed to us all to do miracles to save the
struggling men in the waves, though two hours had already passed,
and to have gone out then among those heavy breakers, with an
inexperienced crew, would have been worse than suicide.  All I
could do was to reorganize the guard at the beach, take the two
desolate females up to the fort, and give them the use of my own
quarters.  Very soon their anguish was quieted, and they began to
look, for the return of their steamer with Ashlock and his rescued
crew.  The next day I went again to the beach with Lieutenant Ord,
and we found that one or two bodies had been washed ashore, torn
all to pieces by the sharks, which literally swarmed the inlet at
every new tide.  In a few days the weather moderated, and the
steamer returned from the south, but the surf was so high that she
anchored a mile off.  I went out myself, in the whale or surf boat,
over that terrible bar with a crew of soldiers, boarded the
steamer, and learned that none other of Ashlock's crew except the
one before mentioned had been saved; but, on the contrary, the
captain of the steamer had sent one of his own boats to their
rescue, which was likewise upset in the surf, and, out of the three
men in her, one had drifted back outside the breakers, clinging to
the upturned boat, and was picked up.  This sad and fatal
catastrophe made us all afraid of that bar, and in returning to the
shore I adopted the more prudent course of beaching the boat below
the inlet, which insured us a good ducking, but was attended with
less risk to life.

I had to return to the fort and bear to Mrs. Ashlock the absolute
truth, that her husband was lost forever.

Meantime her sister had entirely recovered her equilibrium, and
being the guest of the officers, who were extremely courteous to
her, she did not lament so loudly the calamity that saved them a
long life of banishment on the beach of Indian River.  By the first
opportunity they were sent back to St. Augustine, the possessors of
all of Ashlock's worldly goods and effects, consisting of a good
rifle, several cast-nets, hand-lines, etc., etc., besides some
three hundred dollars in money, which was due him by the
quartermaster for his services as pilot.  I afterward saw these
ladies at St. Augustine, and years afterward the younger one came
to Charleston, South Carolina, the wife of the somewhat famous
Captain Thistle, agent for the United States for live-oak in
Florida, who was noted as the first of the troublesome class of
inventors of modern artillery.  He was the inventor of a gun that
"did not recoil at all," or "if anything it recoiled a little
forward."

One day, in the summer of 1841, the sentinel on the housetop at
Fort Pierce called out, "Indians!  Indians!" Everybody sprang to
his gun, the companies formed promptly on the parade-ground, and
soon were reported as approaching the post, from the pine-woods in
rear, four Indians on horseback.  They rode straight up to the
gateway, dismounted, and came in.  They were conducted by the
officer of the day to the commanding officer, Major Childs, who sat
on the porch in front of his own room.  After the usual pause, one
of them, a black man named Joe, who spoke English, said they had
been sent in by Coacoochee (Wild Cat), one of the most noted of the
Seminole chiefs, to see the big chief of the post.  He gradually
unwrapped a piece of paper, which was passed over to Major Childs,
who read it, and it was in the nature of a "Safe Guard" for "Wild
Cat" to come into Fort Pierce to receive provisions and assistance
while collecting his tribe, with the purpose of emigrating to their
reservation west of Arkansas.  The paper was signed by General
Worth, who had succeeded General Taylor, at Tampa Bay, in command
of all the troops in Florida.  Major Childs inquired, "Where is
Coacoochee?" and was answered, "Close by," when Joe explained that
he had been sent in by his chief to see if the paper was all right.
Major Childs said it was "all right," and that Coacoochee ought to
come in himself.  Joe offered to go out and bring him in, when
Major Childs ordered me to take eight or ten mounted men and go out
to escort him in.  Detailing ten men to saddle up, and taking Joe
and one Indian boy along on their own ponies, I started out under
their guidance.

We continued to ride five or six miles, when I began to suspect
treachery, of which I had heard so much in former years, and had
been specially cautioned against by the older officers; but Joe
always answered, "Only a little way."   At last we approached one
of those close hammocks, so well known in Florida, standing like an
island in the interminable pine-forest, with a pond of water near
it.  On its edge I noticed a few Indians loitering, which Joe
pointed out as the place.  Apprehensive of treachery, I halted the
guard, gave orders to the sergeant to watch me closely, and rode
forward alone with the two Indian guides.  As we neared the
hammock, about a dozen Indian warriors rose up and waited for us.
When in their midst I inquired for the chief, Coacoochee.  He
approached my horse and, slapping his breast, said, "Me
Coacoochee."  He was a very handsome young Indian warrior, not more
than twenty-five years old, but in his then dress could hardly be
distinguished from the rest.  I then explained to him, through Joe,
that I had been sent by my "chief" to escort him into the fort.  He
wanted me to get down and "talk" I told him that I had no "talk" in
me, but that, on his reaching the post, he could talk as much as he
pleased with the "big chief," Major Childs.  They all seemed to be
indifferent, and in no hurry; and I noticed that all their guns
were leaning against a tree.  I beckoned to the sergeant, who
advanced rapidly with his escort, and told him to secure the
rifles, which he proceeded to do.  Coacoochee pretended to be very
angry, but I explained to him that his warriors were tired and mine
were not, and that the soldiers would carry the guns on their
horses.  I told him I would provide him a horse to ride, and the
sooner he was ready the better for all.  He then stripped, washed
himself in the pond, and began to dress in all his Indian finery,
which consisted of buckskin leggins, moccasins, and several shirts.
He then began to put on vests, one after another, and one of them
had the marks of a bullet, just above the pocket, with the stain of
blood.  In the pocket was a one-dollar Tallahassee Bank note, and
the rascal had the impudence to ask me to give him silver coin for
that dollar.  He had evidently killed the wearer, and was
disappointed because the pocket contained a paper dollar instead of
one in silver.  In due time he was dressed with turban and
ostrich-feathers, and mounted the horse reserved for him, and thus
we rode back together to Fort Pierce.  Major Childs and all the
officers received him on the porch, and there we had a regular
"talk."  Coacoochee "was tired of the war."  "His people were
scattered and it would take a 'moon' to collect them for
emigration," and he "wanted rations for that time," etc., etc.

All this was agreed to, and a month was allowed for him to get
ready with his whole band (numbering some one hundred and fifty or
one hundred and sixty) to migrate.  The "talk" then ceased, and
Coacoochee and his envoys proceeded to get regularly drunk, which
was easily done by the agency of commissary whiskey.  They staid at
Fort Pierce daring the night, and the next day departed.  Several
times during the month there came into the post two or more of
these same Indians, always to beg for something to eat or drink,
and after a full month Coacoochee and about twenty of his warriors
came in with several ponies, but with none of their women or
children.  Major Childs had not from the beginning the least faith
in his sincerity; had made up his mind to seize the whole party and
compel them to emigrate.  He arranged for the usual council, and
instructed Lieutenant Taylor to invite Coacoochee and his uncle
(who was held to be a principal chief) to his room to take some
good brandy, instead of the common commissary whiskey.  At a signal
agreed on I was to go to the quarters of Company A, to dispatch the
first-sergeant and another man to Lieutenant Taylor's room, there
to seize the two chiefs and secure them; and with the company I was
to enter Major Childs's room and secure the remainder of the party.
Meantime Lieutenant Van Vliet was ordered to go to the quarters of
his company, F, and at the same signal to march rapidly to the rear
of the officers' quarters, so as to catch any who might attempt to
escape by the open windows to the rear.

All resulted exactly as prearranged, and in a few minutes the whole
party was in irons.  At first they claimed that we had acted
treacherously, but very soon they admitted that for a month
Coacoochee had been quietly removing his women and children toward
Lake Okeechobee and the Everglades; and that this visit to our post
was to have been their last.  It so happened that almost at the
instant of our seizing these Indians a vessel arrived off the bar
with reenforcements from St. Augustine.  These were brought up to
Fort Pierce, and we marched that night and next day rapidly, some
fifty miles, to Lake Okeechobee, in hopes to capture the balance of
the tribe, especially the families, but they had taken the alarm
and escaped.  Coacoochee and his warriors were sent by Major Childs
in a schooner to New Orleans en route to their reservation, but
General Worth recalled them to Tampa Bay, and by sending out
Coacoochee himself the women and children came in voluntarily, and
then all were shipped to their destination.  This was a heavy loss
to the Seminoles, but there still remained in the Peninsula a few
hundred warriors with their families scattered into very small
parcels, who were concealed in the most inaccessible hammocks and
swamps.  These had no difficulty in finding plenty of food anywhere
and everywhere.  Deer and wild turkey were abundant, and as for
fish there was no end to them.  Indeed, Florida was the Indian's
paradise, was of little value to us, and it was a great pity to
remove the Seminoles at all, for we could have collected there all
the Choctaws, Creeks, Cherokees, and Chickasaws, in addition to the
Seminoles.  They would have thrived in the Peninsula, whereas they
now occupy lands that are very valuable, which are coveted by their
white neighbors on all sides, while the Peninsula, of Florida still
remains with a population less than should make a good State.

During that and preceding years General W. S. Harney had penetrated
and crossed through the Everglades, capturing and hanging Chekika
and his band, and had brought in many prisoners, who were also
shipped West.  We at Fort Pierce made several other excursions to
Jupiter, Lake Worth, Lauderdale, and into the Everglades, picking
up here and there a family, so that it was absurd any longer to
call it a "war."  These excursions, however, possessed to us a
peculiar charm, for the fragrance of the air, the abundance of game
and fish, and just enough of adventure, gave to life a relish.  I
had just returned to Lauderdale from one of these scouts with
Lieutenants Rankin, Ord, George H. Thomas, Field, Van Vliet, and
others, when I received notice of my promotion to be first
lieutenant of Company G, which occurred November 30, 1841, and I
was ordered to return to Fort Pierce, turn over the public property
for which I was accountable to Lieutenant H. S. Burton, and then to
join my new company at St. Augustine.

I reached St. Augustine before Christmas, and was assigned to
command a detachment of twenty men stationed at Picolata, on the
St. John's River, eighteen miles distant.  At St. Augustine were
still the headquarters of the regiment, Colonel William Gates, with
Company E, Lieutenant Bragg, and Company G, Lieutenant H. B. Judd.
The only buildings at Picolata were the one occupied by my
detachment, which had been built for a hospital, and the dwelling
of a family named Williams, with whom I boarded.  On the other
hand, St. Augustine had many pleasant families, among whom was
prominent that of United States Judge Bronson.  I was half my time
in St. Augustine or on the road, and remember the old place with
pleasure.  In February we received orders transferring the whole
regiment to the Gulf posts, and our company, G, was ordered to
escort Colonel Gates and his family across to the Suwanee River, en
route for Pensacola.  The company, with the colonel and his family,
reached Picolata (where my detachment joined), and we embarked in a
steamboat for Pilatka.  Here Lieutenant Judd discovered that he had
forgotten something and had to return to St. Augustine, so
that I commanded the company on the march, having with me
Second-Lieutenant George B. Ayres.  Our first march was to Fort
Russell, then Micanopy, Wacahoota, and Wacasassee, all which posts
were garrisoned by the Second or Seventh Infantry.  At Wacasassee we
met General Worth and his staff, en route for Pilatka.  Lieutenant
Judd overtook us about the Suwanee, where we embarked on a small
boat for Cedar Keys, and there took a larger one for Pensacola,
where the colonel and his family landed, and our company proceeded
on in the same vessel to our post--Fort Morgan, Mobile Point.

This fort had not been occupied by troops for many years, was very
dirty, and we found little or no stores there.  Major Ogden, of the
engineers, occupied a house outside the fort.  I was quartermaster
and commissary, and, taking advantage of one of the engineer
schooners engaged in bringing materials for the fort, I went up to
Mobile city, and, through the agency of Messrs.  Deshon, Taylor,
and Myers, merchants, procured all essentials for the troops, and
returned to the post.  In the course of a week or ten days arrived
another company, H, commanded by Lieutenant James Ketchum, with
Lieutenants Rankin and Sewall L. Fish, and an assistant surgeon
(Wells.)  Ketchum became the commanding officer, and Lieutenant
Rankin quartermaster.  We proceeded to put the post in as good
order as possible; had regular guard-mounting and parades, but
little drill.  We found magnificent fishing with the seine on the
outer beach, and sometimes in a single haul we would take ten or
fifteen barrels of the best kind of fish, embracing pompinos,
red-fish, snappers, etc.

We remained there till June, when the regiment was ordered to
exchange from the Gulf posts to those on the Atlantic, extending
from Savannah to North Carolina.  The brig Wetumpka was chartered,
and our company (G) embarked and sailed to Pensacola, where we took
on board another company (D) (Burke's), commanded by Lieutenant H.
S. Burton, with Colonel Gates, the regimental headquarters, and
some families.  From Pensacola we sailed for Charleston, South
Carolina.  The weather was hot, the winds light, and we made a long
passage but at last reached Charleston Harbor, disembarked, and
took post in Fort Moultrie.

Soon after two other companies arrived, Bragg's (B) and Keyes's
(K).  The two former companies were already quartered inside of
Fort Moultrie, and these latter were placed in gun-sheds, outside,
which were altered into barracks.  We remained at Fort Moultrie
nearly five years, until the Mexican War scattered us forever.  Our
life there was of strict garrison duty, with plenty of leisure for
hunting and social entertainments.  We soon formed many and most
pleasant acquaintances in the city of Charleston; and it so
happened that many of the families resided at Sullivan's Island in
the summer season, where we could reciprocate the hospitalities
extended to us in the winter.

During the summer of 1843, having been continuously on duty for
three years, I applied for and received a leave of absence for
three months, which I spent mostly in Ohio.  In November I started
to return to my post at Charleston by way of New Orleans; took the
stage to Chillicothe, Ohio, November 16th, having Henry Stanberry,
Esq., and wife, as travelling companions, We continued by stage.
next day to Portsmouth, Ohio.

At Portsmouth Mr. Stanberry took a boat up the river, and I one
down to Cincinnati.  There I found my brothers Lampson and Hoyt
employed in the "Gazette" printing-office, and spent much time with
them and Charles Anderson, Esq., visiting his brother Larz, Mr.
Longworth, some of his artist friends, and especially Miss Sallie
Carneal, then quite a belle, and noted for her fine voice,

On the 20th I took passage on the steamboat Manhattan for St.
Louis; reached Louisville, where Dr. Conrad, of the army, joined
me, and in the Manhattan we continued on to St. Louis, with a mixed
crowd.  We reached the Mississippi at Cairo the 23d, and St. Louis,
Friday, November 24, 1843.  At St. Louis we called on Colonel S. W.
Kearney and Major Cooper, his adjutant-general, and found my
classmate, Lieutenant McNutt, of the ordnance, stationed at the
arsenal; also Mr. Deas, an artist, and Pacificus Ord, who was
studying law.  I spent a week at St. Louis, visiting the arsenal,
Jefferson Barracks, and most places of interest, and then became
impressed with its great future.  It then contained about forty
thousand people, and my notes describe thirty-six good steamboats
receiving and discharging cargo at the levee.

I took passage December 4th in the steamer John Aull for New
Orleans.  As we passed Cairo the snow was falling, and the country
was wintery and devoid of verdure.  Gradually, however, as we
proceeded south, the green color came; grass and trees showed the
change of latitude, and when in the course of a week we had reached
New Orleans, the roses were in full bloom, the sugar-cane just
ripe, and a tropical air prevalent.  We reached New Orleans
December 11, 1843, where I spent about a week visiting the
barracks, then occupied by the Seventh Infantry; the theatres,
hotels, and all the usual places of interest of that day.

On the 16th of December I continued on to Mobile in the steamer
Fashion by way of Lake Pontchartrain; saw there most of my personal
friends, Mr. and Mrs. Bull, Judge Bragg and his brother Dunbar,
Deshon, Taylor, and Myers, etc., and on the 19th of December took
passage in the steamboat Bourbon for Montgomery, Alabama, by way of
the Alabama River.  We reached Montgomery at noon, December 23d,
and took cars at 1 p. m. for Franklin, forty miles, which we reached
at 7 p. m., thence stages for Griffin, Georgia, via La Grange and
Greenville.  This took the whole night of the 23d and the day of
the 24th.  At Griffin we took cars for Macon, and thence to
Savannah, which we reached Christmas-night, finding Lieutenants
Ridgley and Ketchum at tea, where we were soon joined by Rankin and
Beckwith.

On the 26th I took the boat for Charleston, reaching my post, and
reported for duty Wednesday morning, December 27, 1843.

I had hardly got back to my post when, on the 21st of January,
1844, I received from Lieutenant R. P. Hammond, at Marietta,
Georgia, an intimation that Colonel Churchill, Inspector-General of
the Army, had applied for me to assist him in taking depositions in
upper Georgia and Alabama; concerning certain losses by volunteers
in Florida of horses and equipments by reason of the failure of the
United States to provide sufficient forage, and for which Congress
had made an appropriation.  On the 4th of February the order came
from the Adjutant-General in Washington for me to proceed to
Marietta, Georgia, and report to Inspector-General Churchill.  I
was delayed till the 14th of February by reason of being on a
court-martial, when I was duly relieved and started by rail to
Augusta, Georgia, and as far as Madison, where I took the
mail-coach, reaching Marietta on the 17th.  There I reported for
duty to Colonel Churchill, who was already engaged on his work,
assisted by Lieutenant R. P. Hammond, Third Artillery, and a
citizen named Stockton.  The colonel had his family with him,
consisting of Mrs. Churchill, Mary, now Mrs. Professor Baird, and
Charles Churchill, then a boy of about fifteen years of age.

We all lived in a tavern, and had an office convenient.  The duty
consisted in taking individual depositions of the officers and men
who had composed two regiments and a battalion of mounted
volunteers that had served in Florida.  An oath was administered to
each man by Colonel Churchill, who then turned the claimant over to
one of us to take down and record his deposition according to
certain forms, which enabled them to be consolidated and tabulated.
We remained in Marietta about six weeks, during which time I
repeatedly rode to Kenesaw Mountain, and over the very ground where
afterward, in 1864, we had some hard battles.

After closing our business at Marietta the colonel ordered us to
transfer our operations to Bellefonte, Alabama.  As he proposed to
take his family and party by the stage, Hammond lent me his
riding-horse, which I rode to Allatoona and the Etowah River.
Hearing of certain large Indian mounds near the way, I turned to
one side to visit them, stopping a couple of days with Colonel
Lewis Tumlin, on whose plantation these mounds were.  We struck up
such an acquaintance that we corresponded for some years, and as I
passed his plantation during the war, in 1864, I inquired for him,
but he was not at home.  From Tumlin's I rode to Rome, and by way
of Wills Valley over Sand Mountain and the Raccoon Range to the
Tennessee River at Bellefonte, Alabama.  We all assembled there in
March, and continued our work for nearly two months, when, having
completed the business, Colonel Churchill, with his family, went
North by way of Nashville; Hammond, Stockton, and I returning South
on horseback, by Rome, Allatoona, Marietta, Atlanta, and Madison,
Georgia.  Stockton stopped at Marietta, where he resided.  Hammond
took the cars at Madison, and I rode alone to Augusta, Georgia,
where I left the horse and returned to Charleston and Fort Moultrie
by rail.

Thus by a mere accident I was enabled to traverse on horseback the
very ground where in after-years I had to conduct vast armies and
fight great battles.  That the knowledge thus acquired was of
infinite use to me, and consequently to the Government, I have
always felt and stated.

During the autumn of 1844, a difficulty arose among the officers of
Company B, Third Artillery (John R. Yinton's), garrisoning Augusta
Arsenal, and I was sent up from Fort Moultrie as a sort of
peace-maker.  After staying there some months, certain transfers of
officers were made, which reconciled the difficulty, and I returned
to my post, Fort Moultrie.  During that winter, 1844-'45, I was
visiting at the plantation of Mr. Poyas, on the east branch of the
Cooper, about fifty miles from Fort Moultrie, hunting deer with his
son James, and Lieutenant John F. Reynolds, Third Artillery.  We
had taken our stands, and a deer came out of the swamp near that of
Mr. James Poyas, who fired, broke the leg of the deer, which turned
back into the swamp and came out again above mine.  I could follow
his course by the cry of the hounds, which were in close pursuit.
Hastily mounting my horse, I struck across the pine-woods to head
the deer off, and when at full career my horse leaped a fallen log
and his fore-foot caught one of those hard, unyielding pineknots
that brought him with violence to the ground.  I got up as quick as
possible, and found my right arm out of place at the shoulder,
caused by the weight of the double-barrelled gun.

Seeing Reynolds at some distance, I called out lustily and brought
him to me.  He soon mended the bridle and saddle, which had been
broken by the fall, helped me on my horse, and we followed the
coarse of the hounds.  At first my arm did not pain me much, but it
soon began to ache so that it was almost unendurable.  In about
three miles we came to a negro hut, where I got off and rested till
Reynolds could overtake Poyas and bring him back.  They came at
last, but by that time the arm was so swollen and painful that I
could not ride.  They rigged up an old gig belonging to the negro,
in which I was carried six miles to the plantation of Mr. Poyas,
Sr.  A neighboring physician was sent for, who tried the usual
methods of setting the arm, but without success; each time making
the operation more painful.  At last he sent off, got a set of
double pulleys and cords, with which he succeeded in extending the
muscles and in getting the bone into place.  I then returned to
Fort Moultrie, but being disabled, applied for a short leave and
went North.

I started January 25,1845; went to Washington, Baltimore, and
Lancaster, Ohio, whence I went to Mansfield, and thence back by
Newark to Wheeling, Cumberland, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New
York, whence I sailed back for Charleston on the ship Sullivan,
reaching Fort Moultrie March 9, 1845.

About that time (March 1, 1845) Congress had, by a joint
resolution, provided for the annexation of Texas, then an
independent Republic, subject to certain conditions requiring the
acceptance of the Republic of Texas to be final and conclusive.  We
all expected war as a matter of course.  At that time General
Zachary Taylor had assembled a couple of regiments of infantry and
one of dragoons at Fort Jessup, Louisiana, and had orders to extend
military protection to Texas against the Indians, or a "foreign
enemy," the moment the terms of annexation were accepted.  He
received notice of such acceptance July 7th, and forthwith
proceeded to remove his troops to Corpus Christi, Texas, where,
during the summer and fall of 1845, was assembled that force with
which, in the spring of 1846, was begun the Mexican War.

Some time during that summer came to Fort Moultrie orders for
sending Company E, Third Artillery, Lieutenant Bragg, to New
Orleans, there to receive a battery of field-guns, and thence to
the camp of General Taylor at Corpus Christi.  This was the first
company of our regiment sent to the seat of war, and it embarked on
the brig Hayne.  This was the only company that left Fort Moultrie
till after I was detached for recruiting service on the 1st of May,
1846.

Inasmuch as Charleston afterward became famous, as the spot where
began our civil war, a general description of it, as it was in
1846, will not be out of place.

The city lies on a long peninsula between the Ashley and Cooper
Rivers--a low, level peninsula, of sand.  Meeting Street is its
Broadway, with King Street, next west and parallel, the street of
shops and small stores.  These streets are crossed at right angles
by many others, of which Broad Street was the principal; and the
intersection of Meeting and Broad was the heart of the city, marked
by the Guard-House and St. Michael's Episcopal Church.  The
Custom-House, Post-Office, etc., were at the foot of Broad Street,
near the wharves of the Cooper River front.  At the extremity of
the peninsula was a drive, open to the bay, and faced by some of
the handsomest houses of the city, called the "Battery."  Looking
down the bay on the right, was James Island, an irregular triangle
of about seven miles, the whole island in cultivation with
sea-island cotton.  At the lower end was Fort Johnson, then simply
the station of Captain Bowman, United States Engineers, engaged in
building Fort Sumter.  This fort (Sumter) was erected on an
artificial island nearly in mid-channel, made by dumping rocks,
mostly brought as ballast in cotton-ships from the North.  As the
rock reached the surface it was levelled, and made the foundation
of Fort Sumter.  In 1846 this fort was barely above the water.
Still farther out beyond James Island, and separated from it by a
wide space of salt marsh with crooked channels, was Morris Island,
composed of the sand-dunes thrown up by the wind and the sea,
backed with the salt marsh.  On this was the lighthouse, but no
people.

On the left, looking down the bay from the Battery of Charleston,
was, first, Castle Pinckney, a round brick fort, of two tiers of
guns, one in embrasure, the other in barbette, built on a marsh
island, which was not garrisoned.  Farther down the bay a point of
the mainland reached the bay, where there was a group of houses,
called Mount Pleasant; and at the extremity of the bay, distant six
miles, was Sullivan's Island, presenting a smooth sand-beach to the
sea, with the line of sand-hills or dunes thrown up by the waves
and winds, and the usual backing of marsh and crooked salt-water
channels.

At the shoulder of this island was Fort Moultrie, an irregular
fort, without ditch or counterscarp, with a brick scarp wall about
twelve feet high, which could be scaled anywhere, and this was
surmounted by an earth parapet capable of mounting about forty
twenty-four and thirty-two pounder smooth-bore iron guns.  Inside
the fort were three two-story brick barracks, sufficient to quarter
the officers and men of two companies of artillery.

At sea was the usual "bar," changing slightly from year to year,
but generally the main ship-channel came from the south, parallel
to Morris Island, till it was well up to Fort Moultrie, where it
curved, passing close to Fort Sumter and up to the wharves of the
city, which were built mostly along the Cooper River front.

Charleston was then a proud, aristocratic city, and assumed a
leadership in the public opinion of the South far out of proportion
to her population, wealth, or commerce.  On more than one occasion
previously, the inhabitants had almost inaugurated civil war, by
their assertion and professed belief that each State had, in the
original compact of government, reserved to itself the right to
withdraw from the Union at its own option, whenever the people
supposed they had sufficient cause.  We used to discuss these
things at our own mess-tables, vehemently and sometimes quite
angrily; but I am sure that I never feared it would go further than
it had already gone in the winter of 1832-'33, when the attempt at
"nullification" was promptly suppressed by President Jackson's
famous declaration, "The Union must and shall be preserved!" and by
the judicious management of General Scott.

Still, civil war was to be; and, now that it has come and gone, we
can rest secure in the knowledge that as the chief cause, slavery,
has been eradicated forever, it is not likely to come again.




CHAPTER II.

EARLY RECOLLECTIONS of CALIFORNIA.

1846-1848.


In the spring of 1846 I was a first lieutenant of Company C,1,
Third Artillery, stationed at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina.  The
company was commanded by Captain Robert Anderson; Henry B. Judd was
the senior first-lieutenant, and I was the junior first-lieutenant,
and George B. Ayres the second-lieutenant.  Colonel William Gates
commanded the post and regiment, with First-Lieutenant William
Austine as his adjutant.  Two other companies were at the post,
viz., Martin Burke's and E. D. Keyes's, and among the officers were
T. W. Sherman, Morris Miller, H. B. Field, William Churchill,
Joseph Stewart, and Surgeon McLaren.

The country now known as Texas had been recently acquired, and war
with Mexico was threatening.  One of our companies (Bragg's), with
George H. Thomas, John F. Reynolds, and Frank Thomas, had gone the
year previous and was at that time with General Taylor's army at
Corpus Christi, Texas.

In that year (1846) I received the regular detail for recruiting
service, with orders to report to the general superintendent at
Governor's Island, New York; and accordingly left Fort Moultrie in
the latter part of April, and reported to the superintendent,
Colonel R. B. Mason, First Dragoons, at New York, on the 1st day of
May.  I was assigned to the Pittsburg rendezvous, whither I
proceeded and relieved Lieutenant Scott.  Early in May I took up my
quarters at the St. Charles Hotel, and entered upon the discharge
of my duties.  There was a regular recruiting-station already
established, with a sergeant, corporal, and two or three men, with
a citizen physician, Dr. McDowell, to examine the recruits.  The
threatening war with Mexico made a demand for recruits, and I
received authority to open another sub-rendezvous at Zanesville,
Ohio, whither I took the sergeant and established him.  This was
very handy to me, as my home was at Lancaster, Ohio, only
thirty-six miles off, so that I was thus enabled to visit my
friends there quite often.

In the latter part of May, when at Wheeling, Virginia, on my way
back from Zanesville to Pittsburg, I heard the first news of the
battle of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, which occurred on the
8th and 9th of May, and, in common with everybody else, felt
intensely excited.  That I should be on recruiting service, when my
comrades were actually fighting, was intolerable, and I hurried
on to my post, Pittsburg.  At that time the railroad did not
extend west of the Alleghanies, and all journeys were made by
stage-coaches.  In this instance I traveled from Zanesville to
Wheeling, thence to Washington (Pennsylvania), and thence to
Pittsburg by stage-coach.  On reaching Pittsburg I found many
private letters; one from Ord, then a first-lieutenant in Company
F, Third Artillery, at Fort McHenry, Baltimore, saying that his
company had just received orders for California, and asking me to
apply for it.  Without committing myself to that project, I wrote
to the Adjutant-General, R. Jones, at Washington, D. C., asking him
to consider me as an applicant for any active service, and saying
that I would willingly forego the recruiting detail, which I well
knew plenty of others would jump at.  Impatient to approach the
scene of active operations, without authority (and I suppose
wrongfully), I left my corporal in charge of the rendezvous, and
took all the recruits I had made, about twenty-five, in a steamboat
to Cincinnati, and turned them over to Major N. C. McCrea,
commanding at Newport Barracks.  I then reported in Cincinnati, to
the superintendent of the Western recruiting service, Colonel
Fanning, an old officer with one arm, who inquired by what
authority I had come away from my post.  I argued that I took it
for granted he wanted all the recruits he could get to forward to
the army at Brownsville, Texas; and did not know but that he might
want me to go along.  Instead of appreciating my volunteer zeal, he
cursed and swore at me for leaving my post without orders, and told
me to go back to Pittsburg.  I then asked for an order that would
entitle me to transportation back, which at first he emphatically
refused, but at last he gave the order, and I returned to
Pittsburg, all the way by stage, stopping again at Lancaster, where
I attended the wedding of my schoolmate Mike Effinger, and also
visited my sub-rendezvous at Zanesville.  R. S. Ewell, of my class,
arrived to open a cavalry rendezvous, but, finding my depot there,
he went on to Columbus, Ohio.  Tom Jordan afterward was ordered
to Zanesville, to take charge of that rendezvous, under
the general War Department orders increasing the number of
recruiting-stations.  I reached Pittsburg late in June, and found
the order relieving me from recruiting service, and detailing my
classmate H. B. Field to my place.  I was assigned to Company F,
then under orders for California.  By private letters from
Lieutenant Ord, I heard that the company had already started from
Fort McHenry for Governor's Island, New York Harbor, to take passage
for California in a naval transport.  I worked all that night, made
up my accounts current, and turned over the balance of cash to the
citizen physician, Dr. McDowell; and also closed my clothing and
property returns, leaving blank receipts with the same gentleman for
Field's signature, when he should get there, to be forwarded to the
Department at Washington, and the duplicates to me.  These I did not
receive for more than a year.  I remember that I got my orders about
8 p. m. one night, and took passage in the boat for Brownsville, the
next morning traveled by stage from Brownsville to Cumberland,
Maryland, and thence by cars to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New
York, in a great hurry lest the ship might sail without me.  I found
Company F at Governor's Island, Captain C. Q. Tompkins in command,
Lieutenant E. O. C. Ord senior first-lieutenant, myself
junior first-lieutenant, Lucien Loeser and Charles Minor the
second-lieutenants.

The company had been filled up to one hundred privates, twelve
non-commissioned officers, and one ordnance sergeant (Layton),
making one hundred and thirteen enlisted men and five officers.
Dr. James L. Ord had been employed as acting assistant surgeon to
accompany the expedition, and Lieutenant H. W. Halleck, of the
engineers, was also to go along.  The United States store-ship
Lexington was then preparing at the Navy-Yard, Brooklyn, to carry
us around Cape Horn to California.  She was receiving on board the
necessary stores for the long voyage, and for service after our
arrival there.  Lieutenant-Commander Theodorus Bailey was in
command of the vessel, Lieutenant William H. Macomb executive
officer, and Passed-Midshipmen Muse, Spotts, and J. W. A.
Nicholson, were the watch-officers; Wilson purser, and Abernethy
surgeon.  The latter was caterer of the mess, and we all made an
advance of cash for him to lay in the necessary mess-stores.  To
enable us to prepare for so long a voyage and for an indefinite
sojourn in that far-off country, the War Department had authorized
us to draw six months' pay in advance, which sum of money we
invested in surplus clothing and such other things as seemed to us
necessary.  At last the ship was ready, and was towed down abreast
of Fort Columbus, where we were conveyed on board, and on the 14th
of July, 1846, we were towed to sea by a steam-tug, and cast off:
Colonel R. B. Mason, still superintendent of the general recruiting
service, accompanied us down the bay and out to sea, returning with
the tug.  A few other friends were of the party, but at last they
left us, and we were alone upon the sea, and the sailors were busy
with the sails and ropes.  The Lexington was an old ship, changed
from a sloop-of-war to a store-ship, with an after-cabin, a
"ward-room," and "between-decks."  In the cabin were Captains
Bailey and Tompkins, with whom messed the purser, Wilson.  In the
ward-room were all the other officers, two in each state-room; and
Minor, being an extra lieutenant, had to sleep in a hammock slung
in the ward-room.  Ord and I roomed together; Halleck and Loeser
and the others were scattered about.  The men were arranged in
bunks "between-decks," one set along the sides of the ship, and
another, double tier, amidships.  The crew were slung in hammocks
well forward.  Of these there were about fifty.  We at once
subdivided the company into four squads, under the four lieutenants
of the company, and arranged with the naval officers that our men
should serve on deck by squads, after the manner of their watches;
that the sailors should do all the work aloft, and the soldiers on
deck.

On fair days we drilled our men at the manual, and generally kept
them employed as much as possible, giving great attention to the
police and cleanliness of their dress and bunks; and so successful
were we in this, that, though the voyage lasted nearly two hundred
days, every man was able to leave the ship and march up the hill to
the fort at Monterey, California, carrying his own knapsack and
equipments.

The voyage from New York to Rio Janeiro was without accident or any
thing to vary the usual monotony.  We soon settled down to the
humdrum of a long voyage, reading some, not much; playing games,
but never gambling; and chiefly engaged in eating our meals
regularly.  In crossing the equator we had the usual visit of
Neptune and his wife, who, with a large razor and a bucket of
soapsuds, came over the sides and shaved some of the greenhorns;
but naval etiquette exempted the officers, and Neptune was not
permitted to come aft of the mizzen-mast.  At last, after sixty
days of absolute monotony, the island of Raza, off Rio Janeiro, was
descried, and we slowly entered the harbor, passing a fort on our
right hand, from which came a hail, in the Portuguese language,
from a huge speaking-trumpet, and our officer of the deck answered
back in gibberish, according to a well-understood custom of the
place.  Sugar-loaf Mountain, on the south of the entrance, is very
remarkable and well named; is almost conical, with a slight lean.
The man-of-war anchorage is about five miles inside the heads,
directly in front of the city of Rio Janeiro.  Words will not
describe the beauty of this perfect harbor, nor the delightful
feeling after a long voyage of its fragrant airs, and the entire
contrast between all things there and what we had left in New York.

We found the United Staten frigate Columbia anchored there, and
after the Lexington was properly moored, nearly all the officers
went on shore for sight-seeing and enjoyment.  We landed at a wharf
opposite which was a famous French restaurant, Farroux, and after
ordering supper we all proceeded to the Rua da Ouvador, where most
of the shops were, especially those for making feather flowers, as
much to see the pretty girls as the flowers which they so
skillfully made; thence we went to the theatre, where, besides some
opera, we witnessed the audience and saw the Emperor Dom Pedro, and
his Empress, the daughter of the King of Sicily.  After the
theatre, we went back to the restaurant, where we had an excellent
supper, with fruits of every variety and excellence, such as we had
never seen before, or even knew the names of.  Supper being over,
we called for the bill, and it was rendered in French, with
Brazilian currency.  It footed up some twenty-six thousand reis.
The figures alarmed us, so we all put on the waiters' plate various
coins in gold, which he took to the counter and returned the
change, making the total about sixteen dollars.  The millreis is
about a dollar, but being a paper-money was at a discount, so as
only to be worth about fifty-six cents in coin.

The Lexington remained in Rio about a week, during which we visited
the Palace, a few miles in the country, also the Botanic Gardens, a
place of infinite interest, with its specimens of tropical fruits,
spices; etc., etc., and indeed every place of note.  The thing I
best recall is a visit Halleck and I made to the Corcovado, a high
mountain whence the water is conveyed for the supply of the city.
We started to take a walk, and passed along the aqueduct, which
approaches the city by a aeries of arches; thence up the point of
the hill to a place known as the Madre, or fountain, to which all
the water that drips from the leaves is conducted by tile gutters,
and is carried to the city by an open stone aqueduct.

Here we found Mr. Henry A. Wise, of Virginia, the United States
minister to Brazil, and a Dr. Garnett, United States Navy, his
intended son-in-law.  We had a very interesting conversation, in
which Mr. Wise enlarged on the fact that Rio was supplied from the
"dews of heaven," for in the dry season the water comes from the
mists and fogs which hang around the Corcovado, drips from the
leaves of the trees, and is conducted to the Madre fountain by
miles of tile gutters.  Halleck and I continued our ascent of the
mountain, catching from points of the way magnificent views of the
scenery round about Rio Janeiro.  We reached near the summit what
was called the emperor's coffee-plantation, where we saw
coffee-berries in their various stages, and the scaffolds on which
the berries were dried before being cleaned.  The coffee-tree
reminded me of the red haw-tree of Ohio, and the berries were
somewhat like those of the same tree, two grains of coffee being
inclosed in one berry.  These were dried and cleaned of the husk by
hand or by machinery.  A short, steep ascent from this place
carried us to the summit, from which is beheld one of the most
picturesque views on earth.  The Organ Mountains to the west and
north, the ocean to the east, the city of Rio with its red-tiled
houses at our feet, and the entire harbor like a map spread out,
with innumerable bright valleys, make up a landscape that cannot be
described by mere words.  This spot is universally visited by
strangers, and has often been described.  After enjoying it
immeasurably, we returned to the city by another route, tired but
amply repaid by our long walk.

In due time all had been done that was requisite, and the Lexington
put to sea and resumed her voyage.  In October we approached Cape
Horn, the first land descried was Staten Island, white with snow,
and the ship seemed to be aiming for the channel to its west,
straits of Le Maire, but her course was changed and we passed
around to the east.  In time we saw Cape Horn; an island rounded
like an oven, after which it takes its name (Ornos) oven.  Here we
experienced very rough weather, buffeting about under storm
stay-sails, and spending nearly a month before the wind favored our
passage and enabled the course of the ship to be changed for
Valparaiso.  One day we sailed parallel with a French sloop-of-war,
and it was sublime to watch the two ships rising and falling in
those long deep swells of the ocean.  All the time we were followed
by the usual large flocks of Cape-pigeons and albatrosses of every
color.  The former resembled the common barn-pigeon exactly, but
are in fact gulls of beautiful and varied colors, mostly
dove-color.  We caught many with fishing-lines baited with pork.
We also took in the same way many albatrosses.  The white ones are
very large, and their down is equal to that of the swan.  At last
Cape Horn and its swelling seas were left behind, and we reached
Valparaiso in about sixty days from Rio.  We anchored in the open
roadstead, and spent there about ten days, visiting all the usual
places of interest, its foretop, main-top, mizzen-top, etc.
Halleck and Ord went up to Santiago, the capital of Chili, some
sixty miles inland, but I did not go.  Valparaiso did not impress
me favorably at all.  Seen from the sea, it looked like a long
string of houses along the narrow beach, surmounted with red banks
of earth, with little verdure, and no trees at all.  Northward the
space widened out somewhat, and gave room for a plaza, but the mass
of houses in that quarter were poor.  We were there in November,
corresponding to our early spring, and we enjoyed the large
strawberries which abounded.  The Independence frigate, Commodore
Shubrick, came in while we were there, having overtaken us, bound
also for California.  We met there also the sloop-of-war levant,
from California, and from the officers heard of many of the events
that had transpired about the time the navy, under Commodore Sloat,
had taken possession of the country.

All the necessary supplies being renewed in Valparaiso, the voyage
was resumed.  For nearly forty days we had uninterrupted favorable
winds, being in the "trades," and, having settled down to sailor
habits, time passed without notice.  We had brought with us all the
books we could find in New York about California, and had read them
over and over again: Wilkes's "Exploring Expedition;" Dana's "Two
Years before the Mast;" and Forbes's "Account of the Missions."  It
was generally understood we were bound for Monterey, then the
capital of Upper California.  We knew, of course, that General
Kearney was enroute for the same country overland; that Fremont was
therewith his exploring party; that the navy had already taken
possession, and that a regiment of volunteers, Stevenson's, was
to follow us from New York; but nevertheless we were impatient to
reach our destination.  About the middle of January the ship began
to approach the California coast, of which the captain was duly
cautious, because the English and Spanish charts differed some
fifteen miles in the longitude, and on all the charts a current of
two miles an hour was indicated northward along the coast.  At last
land was made one morning, and here occurred one of those accidents
so provoking after a long and tedious voyage.  Macomb, the master
and regular navigator, had made the correct observations, but
Nicholson during the night, by an observation on the north star,
put the ship some twenty miles farther south than was the case by
the regular reckoning, so that Captain Bailey gave directions to
alter the course of the ship more to the north, and to follow the
coast up, and to keep a good lookout for Point Pinos that marks the
location of Monterey Bay.  The usual north wind slackened, so that
when noon allowed Macomb to get a good observation, it was found
that we were north of Ano Nuevo, the northern headland of Monterey
Bay.  The ship was put about, but little by little arose one of
those southeast storms so common on the coast in winter, and we
buffeted about for several days, cursing that unfortunate
observation on the north star, for, on first sighting the coast,
had we turned for Monterey, instead of away to the north, we would
have been snugly anchored before the storm.  But the southeaster
abated, and the usual northwest wind came out again, and we sailed
steadily down into the roadstead of Monterey Bay.  This is shaped
somewhat like a fish hook, the barb being the harbor, the point
being Point Pinos, the southern headland.  Slowly the land came out
of the water, the high mountains about Santa Cruz, the low beach of
the Saunas, and the strongly-marked ridge terminating in the sea in
a point of dark pine-trees.  Then the line of whitewashed houses of
adobe, backed by the groves of dark oaks, resembling old
apple-trees; and then we saw two vessels anchored close to the
town.  One was a small merchant-brig and another a large ship
apparently dismasted.  At last we saw a boat coming out to meet us,
and when it came alongside, we were surprised to find Lieutenant
Henry Wise, master of the Independence frigate, that we had left at
Valparaiso.  Wise had come off to pilot us to our anchorage.  While
giving orders to the man at the wheel, he, in his peculiar fluent
style, told to us, gathered about him, that the Independence had
sailed from Valparaiso a week after us and had been in Monterey a
week; that the Californians had broken out into an insurrection;
that the naval fleet under Commodore Stockton was all down the
coast about San Diego; that General Kearney had reached the
country, but had had a severe battle at San Pascual, and had been
worsted, losing several officers and men, himself and others
wounded; that war was then going on at Los Angeles; that the whole
country was full of guerrillas, and that recently at Yerba Buena
the alcalde, Lieutenant Bartlett, United States Navy, while out
after cattle, had been lassoed, etc., etc.  Indeed, in the short
space of time that Wise was piloting our ship in, he told us more
news than we could have learned on shore in a week, and, being
unfamiliar with the great distances, we imagined that we should
have to debark and begin fighting at once.  Swords were brought
out, guns oiled and made ready, and every thing was in a bustle
when the old Lexington dropped her anchor on January 26, 1847, in
Monterey Bay, after a voyage of one hundred and ninety-eight days
from New York.  Every thing on shore looked bright and beautiful,
the hills covered with grass and flowers, the live-oaks so serene
and homelike, and the low adobe houses, with red-tiled roofs and
whitened walls, contrasted well with the dark pine-trees behind,
making a decidedly good impression upon us who had come so far to
spy out the land.  Nothing could be more peaceful in its looks than
Monterey in January, 1847.  We had already made the acquaintance of
Commodore Shubrick and the officers of the Independence in
Valparaiso, so that we again met as old friends.  Immediate
preparations were made for landing, and, as I was quartermaster and
commissary, I had plenty to do.  There was a small wharf and an
adobe custom-house in possession of the navy; also a barrack of two
stories, occupied by some marines, commanded by Lieutenant Maddox;
and on a hill to the west of the town had been built a two-story
block-house of hewed logs occupied by a guard of sailors under
command of Lieutenant Baldwin, United States Navy.  Not a single
modern wagon or cart was to be had in Monterey, nothing but the old
Mexican cart with wooden wheels, drawn by two or three pairs of
oxen, yoked by the horns.  A man named Tom Cole had two or more of
these, and he came into immediate requisition.  The United States
consul, and most prominent man there at the time, was Thomas O.
Larkin, who had a store and a pretty good two-story house occupied
by his family.  It was soon determined that our company was to land
and encamp on the hill at the block-house, and we were also to have
possession of the warehouse, or custom-house, for storage.  The
company was landed on the wharf, and we all marched in full dress
with knapsacks and arms, to the hill and relieved the guard under
Lieutenant Baldwin.  Tents and camp-equipage were hauled up, and
soon the camp was established.  I remained in a room at the
customhouse, where I could superintend the landing of the stores
and their proper distribution.  I had brought out from New York
twenty thousand dollars commissary funds, and eight thousand
dollars quartermaster funds, and as the ship contained about six
months' supply of provisions, also a saw-mill, grist-mill, and
almost every thing needed, we were soon established comfortably.
We found the people of Monterey a mixed set of Americans, native
Mexicans, and Indians, about one thousand all told.  They were kind
and pleasant, and seemed to have nothing to do, except such as
owned ranches in the country for the rearing of horses and cattle.
Horses could be bought at any price from four dollars up to
sixteen, but no horse was ever valued above a doubloon or Mexican
ounce (sixteen dollars).  Cattle cost eight dollars fifty cents for
the best, and this made beef net about two cents a pound, but at
that time nobody bought beef by the pound, but by the carcass.

Game of all kinds--elk, deer, wild geese, and ducks--was abundant;
but coffee, sugar, and small stores, were rare and costly.

There were some half-dozen shops or stores, but their shelves were
empty.  The people were very fond of riding, dancing, and of shows
of any kind.  The young fellows took great delight in showing off
their horsemanship, and would dash along, picking up a half-dollar
from the ground, stop their horses in full career and turn about on
the space of a bullock's hide, and their skill with the lasso was
certainly wonderful.  At full speed they could cast their lasso
about the horns of a bull, or so throw it as to catch any
particular foot.  These fellows would work all day on horseback in
driving cattle or catching wildhorses for a mere nothing, but all
the money offered would not have hired one of them to walk a mile.
The girls were very fond of dancing, and they did dance gracefully
and well.  Every Sunday, regularly, we had a baile, or dance, and
sometimes interspersed through the week.

I remember very well, soon after our arrival, that we were all
invited to witness a play called "Adam and Eve."   Eve was
personated by a pretty young girl known as Dolores Gomez, who,
however, was dressed very unlike Eve, for she was covered with a
petticoat and spangles.  Adam was personated by her brother--the
same who has since become somewhat famous as the person on whom is
founded the McGarrahan claim.  God Almighty was personated, and
heaven's occupants seemed very human.  Yet the play was pretty,
interesting, and elicited universal applause.  All the month of
February we were by day preparing for our long stay in the country,
and at night making the most of the balls and parties of the most
primitive kind, picking up a smattering of Spanish, and extending
our acquaintance with the people and the costumbrea del pais.  I
can well recall that Ord and I, impatient to look inland, got
permission and started for the Mission of San Juan Bautista.
Mounted on horses, and with our carbines, we took the road by El
Toro, quite a prominent hill, around which passes the road to the
south, following the Saunas or Monterey River.  After about twenty
miles over a sandy country covered with oak-bushes and scrub, we
entered quite a pretty valley in which there was a ranch at the
foot of the Toro.  Resting there a while and getting some
information, we again started in the direction of a mountain to the
north of the Saunas, called the Gavillano.  It was quite dark when
we reached the Saunas River, which we attempted to pass at several
points, but found it full of water, and the quicksands were bad.
Hearing the bark of a dog, we changed our course in that direction,
and, on hailing, were answered by voices which directed us where to
cross.  Our knowledge of the language was limited, but we managed
to understand, and to founder through the sand and water, and
reached a small adobe-house on the banks of the Salinas, where we
spent the night: The house was a single room, without floor or
glass; only a rude door, and window with bars.  Not a particle of
food but meat, yet the man and woman entertained us with the
language of lords put themselves, their house, and every thing, at
our  "disposition," and made little barefoot children dance for our
entertainment.  We made our supper of beef, and slept on a
bullock's hide on the dirt-floor.  In the morning we crossed the
Salinas Plain, about fifteen miles of level ground, taking a shot
occasionally at wild-geese, which abounded there, and entering the
well-wooded valley that comes out from the foot of the Gavillano.
We had cruised about all day, and it was almost dark when we
reached the house of a Senor Gomez, father of those who at Monterey
had performed the parts of Adam and Eve.  His house was a two-story
adobe, and had a fence in front.  It was situated well up among the
foot-hills of the Gavillano, and could not be seen until within a
few yards.  We hitched our horses to the fence and went in just as
Gomez was about to sit down to a tempting supper of stewed hare and
tortillas.  We were officers and caballeros and could not be
ignored.  After turning our horses to grass, at his invitation we
joined him at supper.  The allowance, though ample for one, was
rather short for three, and I thought the Spanish grandiloquent
politeness of Gomez, who was fat and old, was not over-cordial.
However, down we sat, and I was helped to a dish of rabbit, with
what I thought to be an abundant sauce of tomato.  Taking a good
mouthful, I felt as though I had taken liquid fire; the tomato was
chile colorado, or red pepper, of the purest kind.  It nearly
killed me, and I saw Gomez's eyes twinkle, for he saw that his
share of supper was increased.--I contented myself with bits of
the meat, and an abundant supply of tortillas.  Ord was better
case-hardened, and stood it better.  We staid at Gomez's that
night, sleeping, as all did, on the ground, and the next morning we
crossed the hill by the bridle-path to the old Mission of San Juan
Bautista.  The Mission was in a beautiful valley, very level, and
bounded on all sides by hills.  The plain was covered with
wild-grasses and mustard, and had abundant water.  Cattle and
horses were seen in all directions, and it was manifest that the
priests who first occupied the country were good judges of land.
It was Sunday, and all the people, about, a hundred, had come to
church from the country round about.  Ord was somewhat of a
Catholic, and entered the church with his clanking spars and
kneeled down, attracting the attention of all, for he had on the
uniform of an American officer.  As soon as church was out, all
rushed to the various sports.  I saw the priest, with his gray
robes tucked up, playing at billiards, others were cock fighting,
and some at horse-racing.  My horse had become lame, and I resolved
to buy another.  As soon as it was known that I wanted a horse,
several came for me, and displayed their horses by dashing past and
hauling them up short.  There was a fine black stallion that
attracted my notice, and, after trying him myself, I concluded a
purchase.  I left with the seller my own lame horse, which he was
to bring to me at Monterey, when I was to pay him ten dollars for
the other.  The Mission of San Juan bore the marks of high
prosperity at a former period, and had a good pear-orchard just
under the plateau where stood the church.  After spending the day,
Ord and I returned to Monterey, about thirty-five miles, by a
shorter route, Thus passed the month of February, and, though there
were no mails or regular expresses, we heard occasionally from
Yerba Buena and Sutter's Fort to the north, and from the army and
navy about Los Angeles at the south.  We also knew that a quarrel
had grown up at Los Angeles, between General Kearney, Colonel
Fremont, and Commodore Stockton, as to the right to control affairs
in California.  Kearney had with him only the fragments of the two
companies of dragoons, which had come across from New Mexico with
him, and had been handled very roughly by Don Andreas Pico, at San
Pascual, in which engagement Captains Moore and Johnson, and
Lieutenant Hammond, were killed, and Kearney himself wounded.
There remained with him Colonel Swords, quartermaster; Captain H.
S. Turner, First Dragoons; Captains Emory and Warner, Topographical
Engineers; Assistant Surgeon Griffin, and Lieutenant J. W.
Davidson.  Fremont had marched down from the north with a battalion
of volunteers; Commodore Stockton had marched up from San Diego to
Los Angeles, with General Kearney, his dragoons, and a battalion of
sailors and marines, and was soon joined there by Fremont, and they
jointly received the surrender of the insurgents under Andreas
Pico.  We also knew that General R. B. Mason had been ordered to
California; that Colonel John D. Stevenson was coming out to
California with a regiment of New York Volunteers; that Commodore
Shubrick had orders also from the Navy Department to control
matters afloat; that General Kearney, by virtue of his rank, had
the right to control all the land-forces in the service of the
United States; and that Fremont claimed the same right by virtue of
a letter he had received from Colonel Benton, then a Senator, and a
man of great influence with Polk's Administration.  So that among
the younger officers the query was very natural, "Who the devil is
Governor of California?"  One day I was on board the Independence
frigate, dining with the ward-room officers, when a war-vessel was
reported in the offing, which in due time was made out to be the
Cyane, Captain DuPont.  After dinner we were all on deck to watch
the new arrival, the ships meanwhile exchanging signals, which were
interpreted that General Kearney was on board.  As the Cyane
approached, a boat was sent to meet her, with Commodore Shubrick's
flag-officer, Lieutenant Lewis, to carry the usual messages, and to
invite General Kearney to come on board the Independence as the
guest of Commodore Shubrick.  Quite a number of officers were on
deck, among them  Lieutenants Wise, Montgomery Lewis, William
Chapman, and others, noted wits and wags of the navy.  In due time
the Cyane anchored close by, and our boat was seen returning with a
stranger in the stern-sheets, clothed in army blue.  As the boat
came nearer, we saw that it was General Kearney with an old dragoon
coat on, and an army-cap, to which the general had added the broad
vizor, cut from a full-dress hat, to shade his face and eyes
against the glaring sun of the Gila region.  Chapman exclaimed:
"Fellows, the problem is solved; there is the grand-vizier (visor)
by G-d!  He is Governor of California."

All hands received the general with great heartiness, and he soon
passed out of our sight into the commodore's cabin.  Between
Commodore Shubrick and General Kearney existed from that time
forward the greatest harmony and good feeling, and no further
trouble existed as to the controlling power on the Pacific coast.
General Kearney had dispatched from San Diego his quartermaster,
Colonel Swords, to the Sandwich Islands, to purchase clothing and
stores for his men, and had come up to Monterey, bringing with him
Turner and Warner, leaving Emory and the company of dragoons below.
He was delighted to find a full strong company of artillery,
subject to his orders, well supplied with clothing and money in all
respects, and, much to the disgust of our Captain Tompkins, he took
half of his company clothing and part of the money held by me for
the relief of his worn-out and almost naked dragoons left behind at
Los Angeles.  In a few days he moved on shore, took up his quarters
at Larkin's house, and established his headquarters, with Captain
Turner as his adjutant general.  One day Turner and Warner were at
my tent, and, seeing a store-bag full of socks, drawers, and calico
shirts, of which I had laid in a three years' supply, and of which
they had none, made known to me their wants, and I told them to
help themselves, which Turner and Warner did.  The latter, however,
insisted on paying me the cost, and from that date to this Turner
and I have been close friends.  Warner, poor fellow, was afterward
killed by Indians.  Things gradually came into shape, a
semi-monthly courier line was established from Yerba Buena to San
Diego, and we were thus enabled to keep pace with events throughout
the country.  In March Stevenson's regiment arrived.  Colonel Mason
also arrived by sea from Callao in the store-ship Erie, and P. St.
George Cooke's battalion of Mormons reached San Luis Rey.  A. J.
Smith and George Stoneman were with him, and were assigned to the
company of dragoons at Los Angeles.  All these troops and the navy
regarded General Kearney as the rightful commander, though Fremont
still remained at Los Angeles, styling himself as Governor, issuing
orders and holding his battalion of California Volunteers in
apparent defiance of General Kearney.  Colonel Mason and Major
Turner were sent down by sea with a paymaster, with muster-rolls and
orders to muster this battalion into the service of the United
States, to pay and then to muster them out; but on their reaching
Los Angeles Fremont would not consent to it, and the controversy
became so angry that a challenge was believed to have passed between
Mason and Fremont, but the duel never came about.  Turner rode up by
land in four or five days, and Fremont, becoming alarmed, followed
him, as we supposed, to overtake him, but he did not succeed.  On
Fremont's arrival at Monterey, he camped in a tent about a mile out
of town and called on General Kearney, and it was reported that the
latter threatened him very severely and ordered him back to Los
Angeles immediately, to disband his volunteers, and to cease the
exercise of authority of any kind in the country. Feeling a natural
curiosity to see Fremont, who was then quite famous by reason of his
recent explorations and the still more recent conflicts with Kearney
and Mason, I rode out to his camp, and found him in a conical tent
with one Captain Owens, who was a mountaineer, trapper, etc., but
originally from Zanesville, Ohio. I spent an hour or so with Fremont
in his tent, took some tea with him, and left, without being much
impressed with him.  In due time Colonel Swords returned from the
Sandwich Islands and relieved me as quartermaster.  Captain William
G. Marcy, son of the Secretary of War, had also come out in one of
Stevenson's ships as an assistant commissary of subsistence, and was
stationed at Monterey and relieved me as commissary, so that I
reverted to the condition of a company-officer.  While acting as a
staff officer I had lived at the custom-house in Monterey, but when
relieved I took a tent in line with the other company-officers on
the hill, where we had a mess.

Stevenson'a regiment reached San Francisco Bay early in March,
1847.  Three companies were stationed at the Presidio under Major
James A. Hardier one company (Brackett's) at Sonoma; three, under
Colonel Stevenson, at Monterey; and three, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Burton, at Santa Barbara.  One day I was down at the headquarters
at Larkin's horse, when General Kearney remarked to me that he was
going down to Los Angeles in the ship Lexington, and wanted me to
go along as his aide.  Of course this was most agreeable to me.
Two of Stevenson's companies, with the headquarters and the
colonel, were to go also.  They embarked, and early in May we
sailed for San Pedro.  Before embarking, the United States
line-of-battle-ship Columbus had reached the coast from China with
Commodore Biddle, whose rank gave him the supreme command of the
navy on the coast.  He was busy in calling in--"lassooing "--from
the land-service the various naval officers who under Stockton had
been doing all sorts of military and civil service on shore.
Knowing that I was to go down the coast with General Kearney, he
sent for me and handed me two unsealed parcels addressed to
Lieutenant Wilson, United States Navy, and Major Gillespie, United
States Marines, at Los Angeles.  These were written orders pretty
much in these words: "On receipt of this order you will repair at
once on board the United States ship Lexington at San Pedro, and on
reaching Monterey you will report to the undersigned.-JAMES
BIDDLE."   Of course, I executed my part to the letter, and these
officers were duly "lassooed."  We sailed down the coast with a
fair wind, and anchored inside the kelp, abreast of Johnson's
house.  Messages were forthwith dispatched up to Los Angeles,
twenty miles off, and preparations for horses made for us to ride
up.  We landed, and, as Kearney held to my arm in ascending the
steep path up the bluff, he remarked to himself, rather than to me,
that it was strange that Fremont did not want to return north by
the Lexington on account of sea-sickness, but preferred to go by
land over five hundred miles.  The younger officers had been
discussing what the general would do with Fremont, who was supposed
to be in a state of mutiny.  Some, thought he would be tried and
shot, some that he would be carried back in irons; and all agreed
that if any one else than Fremont had put on such airs, and had
acted as he had done, Kearney would have shown him no mercy, for he
was regarded as the strictest sort of a disciplinarian.  We had a
pleasant ride across the plain which lies between the seashore and
Los Angeles, which we reached in about three hours, the infantry
following on foot.  We found Colonel P. St. George Cooke living at
the house of a Mr. Pryor, and the company of dragoons, with A. J.
Smith, Davidson, Stoneman, and Dr. Griffin, quartered in an
adobe-house close by.  Fremont held his court in the only two-story
frame-house in the place.  After sometime spent at Pryor's house,
General Kearney ordered me to call on Fremont to notify him of his
arrival, and that he desired to see him.  I walked round to the
house which had been pointed out to me as his, inquired of a man at
the door if the colonel was in, was answered "Yea," and was
conducted to a large room on the second floor, where very soon
Fremont came in, and I delivered my message.  As I was on the point
of leaving, he inquired where I was going to, and I answered that I
was going back to Pryor's house, where the general was, when he
remarked that if I would wait a moment he would go along.  Of
course I waited, and he soon joined me, dressed much as a
Californian, with the peculiar high, broad-brimmed hat, with a
fancy cord, and we walked together back to Pryor's, where I left
him with General Kearney.  We spent several days very pleasantly at
Los Angeles, then, as now, the chief pueblo of the south, famous
for its grapes, fruits, and wines.  There was a hill close to the
town, from which we had a perfect view of the place.  The
surrounding country is level, utterly devoid of trees, except the
willows and cotton-woods that line the Los Angeles Creek and the
acequias, or ditches, which lead from it.  The space of ground
cultivated in vineyards seemed about five miles by one, embracing
the town.  Every house had its inclosure of vineyard, which
resembled a miniature orchard, the vines being very old, ranged in
rows, trimmed very close, with irrigating ditches so arranged that
a stream of water could be diverted between each row of vines.  The
Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers are fed by melting snows from a
range of mountains to the east, and the quantity of cultivated land
depends upon the amount of water.  This did not seem to be very
large; but the San Gabriel River, close by, was represented to
contain a larger volume of water, affording the means of greatly
enlarging the space for cultivation.  The climate was so moderate
that oranges, figs, pomegranates, etc....  were generally to be
found in every yard or inclosure.

At the time of our visit, General Kearney was making his
preparations to return overland to the United States, and he
arranged to secure a volunteer escort out of the battalion of
Mormons that was then stationed at San Luis Rey, under Colonel
Cooke and a Major Hunt.  This battalion was only enlisted for one
year, and the time for their discharge was approaching, and it was
generally understood that the majority of the men wanted to be
discharged so as to join the Mormons who had halted at Salt Lake,
but a lieutenant and about forty men volunteered to return to
Missouri as the escort of General Kearney.  These were mounted on
mules and horses, and I was appointed to conduct them to Monterey
by land.  Leaving the party at Los Angeles to follow by sea in the
Lexington, I started with the Mormon detachment and traveled by
land.  We averaged about thirty miles a day, stopped one day at
Santa Barbara, where I saw Colonel Burton, and so on by the usually
traveled road to Monterey, reaching it in about fifteen days,
arriving some days in advance of the Lexington.  This gave me the
best kind of an opportunity for seeing the country, which was very
sparsely populated indeed, except by a few families at the various
Missions.  We had no wheeled vehicles, but packed our food and
clothing on mules driven ahead, and we slept on the ground in the
open air, the rainy season having passed.  Fremont followed me by
land in a few days, and, by the end of May, General Kearney was all
ready at Monterey to take his departure, leaving to succeed him in
command Colonel R. B. Mason, First Dragoons.  Our Captain
(Tompkins), too, had become discontented at his separation from his
family, tendered his resignation to General Kearney, and availed
himself of a sailing-vessel bound for Callao to reach the East.
Colonel Mason selected me as his adjutant-general; and on the very
last day of May General Kearney, with his Mormon escort, with
Colonel Cooke, Colonel Swords (quartermaster), Captain Turner, and
a naval officer, Captain Radford, took his departure for the East
overland, leaving us in full possession of California and its fate.
Fremont also left California with General Kearney, and with him
departed all cause of confusion and disorder in the country.  From
that time forth no one could dispute the authority of Colonel Mason
as in command of all the United States forces on shore, while the
senior naval officer had a like control afloat.  This was Commodore
James Biddle, who had reached the station from China in the
Columbus, and he in turn was succeeded by Commodore T. Ap Catesby
Jones in the line-of-battle-ship Ohio.  At that time Monterey was
our headquarters, and the naval commander for a time remained
there, but subsequently San Francisco Bay became the chief naval
rendezvous.

Colonel R. B. Mason, First Dragoons, was an officer of great
experience, of stern character, deemed by some harsh and severe,
but in all my intercourse with him he was kind and agreeable.  He
had a large fund of good sense, and, during our long period of
service together, I enjoyed his unlimited confidence.  He had been
in his day a splendid shot and hunter, and often entertained me
with characteristic anecdotes of Taylor, Twiggs, Worth, Harvey,
Martin Scott, etc., etc, who were then in Mexico, gaining a
national fame.  California had settled down to a condition of
absolute repose, and we naturally repined at our fate in being
so remote from the war in Mexico, where our comrades were
reaping large honors.  Mason dwelt in a house not far from the
Custom-House, with Captain Lanman, United States Navy; I had a small
adobe-house back of Larkin's.  Halleck and Dr. Murray had a small
log-house not far off.  The company of artillery was still on the
hill, under the command of Lieutenant Ord, engaged in building a
fort whereon to mount the guns we had brought out in the Lexington,
and also in constructing quarters out of hewn pine-logs for the men.
Lieutenant Minor, a very clever young officer, had taken violently
sick and died about the time I got back from Los Angeles, leaving
Lieutenants Ord and Loeser alone with the company, with
Assistant-Surgeon Robert Murray.  Captain William G. Marcy was the
quartermaster and commissary.  Naglee's company of Stevenson's
regiment had been mounted and was sent out against the Indians in
the San Joaquin Valley, and Shannon's company occupied the barracks.
Shortly after General Kearney had gone East, we found an order of
his on record, removing one Mr. Nash, the Alcalde of Sonoma, and
appointing to his place ex-Governor L. W. Boggs.  A letter came to
Colonel and Governor Mason from Boggs, whom he had personally known
in Missouri, complaining that, though he had been appointed alcalde,
the then incumbent (Nash) utterly denied Kearney's right to remove
him, because he had been elected by the people under the
proclamation of Commodore Sloat, and refused to surrender his office
or to account for his acts as alcalde.  Such a proclamation had been
made by Commodore Sloat shortly after the first occupation of
California, announcing that the people were free and enlightened
American citizens, entitled to all the rights and privileges as
such, and among them the right to elect their own officers, etc.
The people of Sonoma town and valley, some forty or fifty immigrants
from the United States, and very few native Californians, had
elected Mr. Nash, and, as stated, he refused to recognize the right
of a mere military commander to eject him and to appoint another to
his place.  Neither General Kearney nor Mason had much respect for
this land of "buncombe," but assumed the true doctrine that
California was yet a Mexican province, held by right of conquest,
that the military commander was held responsible to the country, and
that the province should be held in statu quo until a treaty of
peace.  This letter of Boggs was therefore referred to Captain
Brackett, whose company was stationed at Sonoma, with orders to
notify Nash that Boggs was the rightful alcalde; that he must
quietly surrender his office, with the books and records thereof,
and that he must account for any moneys received from the sale of
town-lots, etc., etc.; and in the event of refusal he (Captain
Brackett) must compel him by the use of force.  In due time we got
Brackett's answer, saying that the little community of Sonoma was in
a dangerous state of effervescence caused by his orders; that Nash
was backed by most of the Americans there who had come across from
Missouri with American ideas; that as he (Brackett) was a volunteer
officer, likely to be soon discharged, and as he designed to settle
there, he asked in consequence to be excused from the execution of
this (to him) unpleasant duty.  Such a request, coming to an old
soldier like Colonel Mason, aroused his wrath, and he would have
proceeded rough-shod against Brackett, who, by-the-way, was a West
Point graduate, and ought to have known better; but I suggested to
the colonel that, the case being a test one, he had better send me
up to Sonoma, and I would settle it quick enough.  He then gave me
an order to go to Sonoma to carry out the instructions already given
to Brackett.

I took one soldier with me, Private Barnes, with four horses, two
of which we rode, and the other two we drove ahead.  The first day
we reached Gilroy's and camped by a stream near three or four
adobe-huts known as Gilroy's ranch.  The next day we passed
Murphy's, San Jose, and Santa Clara Mission, camping some four
miles beyond, where a kind of hole had been dug in the ground for
water.  The whole of this distance, now so beautifully improved and
settled, was then scarcely occupied, except by poor ranches
producing horses and cattle.  The pueblo of San Jose was a string
of low adobe-houses festooned with red peppers and garlic; and the
Mission of Santa Clara was a dilapidated concern, with its church
and orchard.  The long line of poplar-trees lining the road from
San Jose to Santa Clara bespoke a former period when the priests
had ruled the land.  Just about dark I was lying on the ground near
the well, and my soldier Barnes had watered our horses and picketed
them to grass, when we heard a horse crushing his way through the
high mustard-bushes which filled the plain, and soon a man came to
us to inquire if we had seen a saddle-horse pass up the road.  We
explained to him what we had heard, and he went off in pursuit of
his horse.  Before dark he came back unsuccessful, and gave his
name as Bidwell, the same gentleman who has since been a member of
Congress, who is married to Miss Kennedy, of Washington City, and
now lives in princely style at Chico, California.

He explained that he was a surveyor, and had been in the lower
country engaged in surveying land; that the horse had escaped him
with his saddle-bags containing all his notes and papers, and some
six hundred dollars in money, all the money he had earned.  He
spent the night with us on the ground, and the next morning we left
him there to continue the search for his horse, and I afterward
heard that he had found his saddle-bags all right, but never
recovered the horse.  The next day toward night we approached the
Mission of San Francisco, and the village of Yerba Buena, tired and
weary--the wind as usual blowing a perfect hurricane, and a more
desolate region it was impossible to conceive of.  Leaving Barnes
to work his way into the town as best he could with the tired
animals, I took the freshest horse and rode forward.  I fell in
with Lieutenant Fabius Stanley, United States Navy, and we rode
into Yerba Buena together about an hour before sundown, there being
nothing but a path from the Mission into the town, deep and heavy
with drift-sand.  My horse could hardly drag one foot after the
other when we reached the old Hudson Bay Company's house, which was
then the store of Howard and Mellus.  There I learned where Captain
Folsom, the quartermaster, was to be found.  He was staying with a
family of the name of Grimes, who had a small horse back of
Howard's store, which must have been near where Sacramento Street
now crosses Kearney.  Folsom was a classmate of mine, had come out
with Stevenson's regiment as quartermaster, and was at the time the
chief-quartermaster of the department.  His office was in the old
custom-horse standing at the northwest corner of the Plaza.  He had
hired two warehouses, the only ones there at the time, of one
Liedsdorff, the principal man of Yerba Buena, who also owned the
only public-house, or tavern, called the City Hotel, on Kearney
Street, at the southeast corner of the Plaza.  I stopped with
Folsom at Mrs. Grimes's, and he sent my horse, as also the other
three when Barnes had got in after dark, to a coral where he had a
little barley, but no hay.  At that time nobody fed a horse, but he
was usually turned out to pick such scanty grass as he could find
on the side-hills.  The few government horses used in town were
usually sent out to the Presidio, where the grass was somewhat
better.  At that time (July, 1847), what is now called San
Francisco was called Yerba Buena.  A naval officer, Lieutenant
Washington A. Bartlett, its first alcalde, had caused it to be
surveyed and laid out into blocks and lots, which were being sold
at sixteen dollars a lot of fifty vuras square; the understanding
being that no single person could purchase of the alcalde more than
one in-lot of fifty varas, and one out-lot of a hundred varas.
Folsom, however, had got his clerks, orderlies, etc., to buy lots,
and they, for a small consideration, conveyed them to him, so that
he was nominally the owner of a good many lots.  Lieutenant Halleck
had bought one of each kind, and so had Warner.  Many naval
officers had also invested, and Captain Folsom advised me to buy
some, but I felt actually insulted that he should think me such a
fool as to pay money for property in such a horrid place as Yerba
Buena, especially ridiculing his quarter of the city, then called
Happy Valley.  At that day Montgomery Street was, as now, the
business street, extending from Jackson to Sacramento, the water of
the bay leaving barely room for a few houses on its east side, and
the public warehouses were on a sandy beach about where the Bank of
California now stands, viz., near the intersection of Sansome and
California, Streets.  Along Montgomery Street were the stores of
Howard & Mellus, Frank Ward, Sherman & Ruckel, Ross & Co., and it
may be one or two others.  Around the Plaza were a few houses,
among them the City Hotel and the Custom-House, single-story adobes
with tiled roofs, and they were by far the most substantial and
best houses in the place.  The population was estimated at about
four hundred, of whom Kanakas (natives of the Sandwich Islands)
formed the bulk.

At the foot of Clay Street was a small wharf which small boats
could reach at high tide; but the principal landing-place was where
some stones had fallen into the water, about where Broadway now
intersects Battery Street.  On the steep bluff above had been
excavated, by the navy, during the year before, a bench, wherein
were mounted a couple of navy-guns, styled the battery, which, I
suppose, gave name to the street.  I explained to Folsom the object
of my visit, and learned from him that he had no boat in which to
send me to Sonoma, and that the only, chance to get there was to
borrow a boat from the navy.  The line-of-battle-ship Columbus was
then lying at anchor off the town, and he said if I would get up
early the next morning I could go off to her in one of the
market-boats.

Accordingly, I was up bright and early, down at the wharf, found a
boat, and went off to the Columbus to see Commodore Biddle.  On
reaching the ship and stating to the officer of the deck my
business, I was shown into the commodore's cabin, and soon made
known to him my object.  Biddle was a small-sized man, but
vivacious in the extreme.  He had a perfect contempt for all
humbug, and at once entered into the business with extreme
alacrity.  I was somewhat amused at the importance he attached to
the step.  He had a chaplain, and a private secretary, in a small
room latticed off from his cabin, and he first called on them to go
out, and, when we were alone, he enlarged on the folly of Sloat's
proclamation, giving the people the right to elect their own
officers, and commended Kearney and Mason for nipping that idea in
the bud, and keeping the power in their own hands.  He then sent
for the first lieutenant (Drayton), and inquired if there were
among the officers on board any who had ever been in the Upper Bay,
and learning that there was a midshipman (Whittaker) he was sent
for.  It so happened that this midshipman had been on a frolic on
shore a few nights before, and was accordingly much frightened when
summoned into the commodore's presence, but as soon as he was
questioned as to his knowledge of the bay, he was sensibly
relieved, and professed to know every thing about it.

Accordingly, the long boat was ordered with this midshipman and
eight sailors, prepared with water and provisions for several days
absence.  Biddle then asked me if I knew any of his own officers,
and which one of them I would prefer to accompany me.  I knew most
of them, and we settled down on Louis McLane.  He was sent for, and
it was settled that McLane and I were to conduct this important
mission, and the commodore enjoined on us complete secrecy, so as
to insure success, and he especially cautioned us against being
pumped by his ward-room officers, Chapman, Lewis, Wise, etc., while
on board his ship.  With this injunction I was dismissed to the
wardroom, where I found Chapman, Lewis, and Wise, dreadfully
exercised at our profound secrecy.  The fact that McLane and I had
been closeted with the commodore for an hour, that orders for the
boat and stores had been made, that the chaplain and clerk had been
sent out of the cabin, etc., etc., all excited their curiosity; but
McLane and I kept our secret well.  The general impression was,
that we had some knowledge about the fate of Captain Montgomery's
two sons and the crew that had been lost the year before.  In 1846
Captain Montgomery commanded at Yerba Buena, on board the St. Mary
sloop-of-war, and he had a detachment of men stationed up at
Sonoma.  Occasionally a boat was sent up with provisions or
intelligence to them.  Montgomery had two sons on board his ship,
one a midshipman, the other his secretary.  Having occasion to send
some money up to Sonoma, he sent his two sons with a good boat and
crew.  The boat started with a strong breeze and a very large sail,
was watched from the deck until she was out of sight, and has never
been heard of since.  There was, of coarse, much speculation as to
their fate, some contending that the boat must have been capsized
in San Pablo Bay, and that all were lost; others contending that
the crew had murdered the officers for the money, and then escaped;
but, so far as I know, not a man of that crew has ever been seen or
heard of since.  When at last the boat was ready for us, we
started, leaving all hands, save the commodore, impressed with the
belief that we were going on some errand connected with the loss of
the missing boat and crew of the St. Mary.  We sailed directly
north, up the bay and across San Pablo, reached the month of Sonoma
Creek about dark, and during the night worked up the creek some
twelve miles by means of the tide, to a landing called the
Embarcadero.  To maintain the secrecy which the commodore had
enjoined on us, McLane and I agreed to keep up the delusion by
pretending to be on a marketing expedition to pick up chickens,
pigs, etc., for the mess of the Columbus, soon to depart for home.

Leaving the midshipman and four sailors to guard the boat, we
started on foot with the other four for Sonoma Town, which we soon
reached.  It was a simple open square, around which were some
adobe-houses, that of General Vallejo occupying one side.  On
another was an unfinished two-story adobe building, occupied as a
barrack by Bracken's company.  We soon found Captain Brackett, and
I told him that I intended to take Nash a prisoner and convey him
back to Monterey to answer for his mutinous behavior.  I got an old
sergeant of his company, whom I had known in the Third Artillery,
quietly to ascertain the whereabouts of Nash, who was a bachelor,
stopping with the family of a lawyer named Green.  The sergeant
soon returned, saying that Nash had gone over to Napa, but would be
back that evening; so McLane and I went up to a farm of some
pretensions, occupied by one Andreas Hoepner, with a pretty Sitka
wife, who lived a couple of miles above Sonoma, and we bought of
him some chickens, pigs, etc.  We then visited Governor Boggs's
family and that of General Vallejo, who was then, as now, one of
the most prominent and influential natives of California.  About
dark I learned that Nash had come back, and then, giving Brackett
orders to have a cart ready at the corner of the plaza, McLane and
I went to the house of Green.  Posting an armed sailor on each side
of the house, we knocked at the door and walked in.  We found
Green, Nash, and two women, at supper.  I inquired if Nash were in,
and was first answered "No," but one of the women soon pointed to
him, and he rose.  We were armed with pistols, and the family was
evidently alarmed.  I walked up to him and took his arm, and told
him to come along with me.  He asked me, "Where?" and I said,
"Monterey."   "Why?" I would explain that more at leisure.  Green
put himself between me and the door, and demanded, in theatrical
style, why I dared arrest a peaceable citizen in his house.  I
simply pointed to my pistol, and told him to get out of the way,
which he did.  Nash asked to get some clothing, but I told him he
should want for nothing.  We passed out, Green following us with
loud words, which brought the four sailors to the front-door, when
I told him to hush up or I would take him prisoner also.  About
that time one of the sailors, handling his pistol carelessly,
discharged it, and Green disappeared very suddenly.  We took Nash
to the cart, put him in, and proceeded back to our boat.  The next
morning we were gone.

Nash being out of the way, Boggs entered on his office, and the
right to appoint or remove from civil office was never again
questioned in California during the military regime.  Nash was an
old man, and was very much alarmed for his personal safety.  He had
come across the Plains, and had never yet seen the sea.  While on
our way down the bay, I explained fully to him the state of things
in California, and he admitted he had never looked on it in that
light before, and professed a willingness to surrender his office;
but, having gone so far, I thought it best to take him to Monterey.
On our way down the bay the wind was so strong, as we approached
the Columbus, that we had to take refuge behind Yerba Buena Island,
then called Goat Island, where we landed, and I killed a gray seal.
The next morning, the wind being comparatively light, we got out
and worked our way up to the Columbus, where I left my prisoner on
board, and went on shore to find Commodore Biddle, who had gone to
dine with Frank Ward.  I found him there, and committed Nash to his
charge, with the request that he would send him down to Monterey,
which he did in the sloop-of-war Dale, Captain Selfridge
commanding.  I then returned to Monterey by land, and, when the
Dale arrived, Colonel Mason and I went on board, found poor old Mr.
Nash half dead with sea-sickness and fear, lest Colonel Mason would
treat him with extreme military rigor.  But, on the contrary, the
colonel spoke to him kindly, released him as a prisoner on his
promise to go back to Sonoma, surrender his office to Boggs, and
account to him for his acts while in office.  He afterward came on
shore, was provided with clothing and a horse, returned to Sonoma,
and I never have seen him since.

Matters and things settled down in Upper California, and all moved
along with peace and harmony.  The war still continued in Mexico,
and the navy authorities resolved to employ their time with the
capture of Mazatlan and Guaymas.  Lower California had already been
occupied by two companies of Stevenson's regiment, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Burton, who had taken post at La Paz, and a
small party of sailors was on shore at San Josef, near Cape San
Lucas, detached from the Lexington, Lieutenant-Commander Bailey.
The orders for this occupation were made by General Kearney before
he left, in pursuance of instructions from the War Department,
merely to subserve a political end, for there were few or no people
in Lower California, which is a miserable, wretched, dried-up
peninsula.  I remember the proclamation made by Burton and Captain
Bailey, in taking possession, which was in the usual florid style.
Bailey signed his name as the senior naval officer at the station,
but, as it was necessary to put it into Spanish to reach the
inhabitants of the newly-acquired country, it was interpreted, "El
mas antiguo de todos los oficiales de la marina," etc., which,
literally, is "the  most ancient of all the naval officers," etc.,
a translation at which we made some fun.

The expedition to Mazatlan was, however, for a different purpose,
viz., to get possession of the ports of Mazatlan and Guaymas, as a
part of the war against Mexico, and not for permanent conquest.

Commodore Shubrick commanded this expedition, and took Halleck
along as his engineer-officer.  They captured Mazatlan and Guaymas,
and then called on Colonel Mason to send soldiers down to hold
possession, but he had none to spare, and it was found impossible
to raise other volunteers either in California or Oregon, and the
navy held these places by detachments of sailors and marines till
the end of the war.  Burton also called for reenforcements, and
Naglee'a company was sent to him from Monterey, and these three
companies occupied Lower California at the end of the Mexican War.
Major Hardie still commanded at San Francisco and above; Company F,
Third Artillery, and Shannon's company of volunteers, were at
Monterey; Lippett's company at Santa Barbara; Colonel Stevenson,
with one company of his regiment, and the company of the First
Dragoons, was at Los Angeles; and a company of Mormons, reenlisted
out of the Mormon Battalion, garrisoned San Diego--and thus matters
went along throughout 1847 into 1848.  I had occasion to make
several trips to Yerba Buena and back, and in the spring of 1848
Colonel Mason and I went down to Santa Barbara in the sloop-of-war
Dale.

I spent much time in hunting deer and bear in the mountains back of
the Carmel Mission, and ducks and geese in the plains of the
Salinas.  As soon as the fall rains set in, the young oats would
sprout up, and myriads of ducks, brant, and geese, made their
appearance.  In a single day, or rather in the evening of one day
and the morning of the next, I could load a pack-mule with geese
and ducks.  They had grown somewhat wild from the increased number
of hunters, yet, by marking well the place where a flock lighted, I
could, by taking advantage of gullies or the shape of the ground,
creep up within range; and, giving one barrel on the ground, and
the other as they rose, I have secured as many as nine at one
discharge.  Colonel Mason on one occasion killed eleven geese by
one discharge of small shot.  The seasons in California are well
marked.  About October and November the rains begin, and the whole
country, plains and mountains, becomes covered with a bright-green
grass, with endless flowers.  The intervals between the rains give
the finest weather possible.  These rains are less frequent in
March, and cease altogether in April and May, when gradually the
grass dies and the whole aspect of things changes, first to yellow,
then to brown, and by midsummer all is burnt up and dry as an
ashheap.

When General Kearney first departed we took his office at Larkin's;
but shortly afterward we had a broad stairway constructed to lead
from the outside to the upper front porch of the barracks.  By
cutting a large door through the adobe-wall, we made the upper room
in the centre our office; and another side-room, connected with it
by a door, was Colonel Mason's private office.

I had a single clerk, a soldier named Baden; and William E. P.
Hartnell, citizen, also had a table in the same room.  He was the
government interpreter, and had charge of the civil archives.
After Halleck's return from Mazatlan, he was, by Colonel Mason,
made Secretary of State; and he then had charge of the civil
archives, including the land-titles, of which Fremont first had
possession, but which had reverted to us when he left the country.

I remember one day, in the spring of 1848, that two men, Americans,
came into the office and inquired for the Governor.  I asked their
business, and one answered that they had just come down from
Captain Sutter on special business, and they wanted to see Governor
Mason in person.  I took them in to the colonel, and left them
together.  After some time the colonel came to his door and called
to me.  I went in, and my attention was directed to a series of
papers unfolded on his table, in which lay about half an ounce of
placer gold.  Mason said to me, "What is that?" I touched it and
examined one or two of the larger pieces, and asked, "Is it gold?"
Mason asked me if I had ever seen native gold.  I answered that, in
1844, I was in Upper Georgia, and there saw some native gold, but
it was much finer than this, and that it was in phials, or in
transparent quills; but I said that, if this were gold, it could be
easily tested, first, by its malleability, and next by acids.  I
took a piece in my teeth, and the metallic lustre was perfect.  I
then called to the clerk, Baden, to bring an axe and hatchet from
the backyard.  When these were brought, I took the largest piece
and beat it out flat, and beyond doubt it was metal, and a pure
metal.  Still, we attached little importance to the fact, for gold
was known to exist at San Fernando, at the south, and yet was not
considered of much value.  Colonel Mason then handed me a letter
from Captain Sutter, addressed to him, stating that he (Sutter) was
engaged in erecting a saw-mill at Coloma, about forty miles up the
American Fork, above his fort at New Helvetia, for the general
benefit of the settlers in that vicinity; that he had incurred
considerable expense, and wanted a "preemption" to the
quarter-section of land on which the mill was located, embracing the
tail-race in which this particular gold had been found.  Mason
instructed me to prepare a letter, in answer, for his signature.  I
wrote off a letter, reciting that California was yet a Mexican
province, simply held by us as a conquest; that no laws of the
United States yet applied to it, much less the land laws or
preemption laws, which could only apply after a public survey.
Therefore it was impossible for the Governor to promise him (Sutter)
a title to the land; yet, as there were no settlements within forty
miles, he was not likely to be disturbed by trespassers.  Colonel
Mason signed the letter, handed it to one of the gentlemen who had
brought the sample of gold, and they departed.  That gold was the
first discovered in the Sierra Nevada, which soon revolutionized the
whole country, and actually moved the whole civilized world.  About
this time (May and June, 1848), far more importance was attached to
quicksilver.  One mine, the New Almaden, twelve miles south of San
Jose, was well known, and was in possession of the agent of a Scotch
gentleman named Forties, who at the time was British consul at
Tepic, Mexico.  Mr. Forties came up from San Blas in a small brig,
which proved to be a Mexican vessel; the vessel was seized,
condemned, and actually sold, but Forties was wealthy, and bought
her in.  His title to the quicksilver-mine was, however, never
disputed, as he had bought it regularly, before our conquest of the
country, from another British subject, also named Forties, a
resident of Santa Clara Mission, who had purchased it of the
discoverer, a priest; but the boundaries of the land attached to the
mine were even then in dispute.  Other men were in search of
quicksilver; and the whole range of mountains near the New Almaden
mine was stained with the brilliant red of the sulphuret of mercury
(cinnabar).  A company composed of T. O. Larkin, J. R. Snyder, and
others, among them one John Ricord (who was quite a character), also
claimed a valuable mine near by. Ricord was a lawyer from about
Buffalo, and by some means had got to the Sandwich Islands, where he
became a great favorite of the king, Kamehameha; was his
attorney-general, and got into a difficulty with the Rev. Mr. Judd,
who was a kind of prime-minister to his majesty.  One or the other
had to go, and Ricord left for San Francisco, where he arrived while
Colonel Mason and I were there on some business connected with the
customs. Ricord at once made a dead set at Mason with flattery, and
all sorts of spurious arguments, to convince him that our military
government was too simple in its forms for the new state of facts,
and that he was the man to remodel it.  I had heard a good deal to
his prejudice, and did all I could to prevent Mason taking him, into
his confidence. We then started back for Monterey.  Ricord was
along, and night and day he was harping on his scheme; but he
disgusted Colonel Mason with his flattery, and, on reaching
Monterey, he opened what he called a law-office, but there were
neither courts nor clients, so necessity forced him to turn his
thoughts to something else, and quicksilver became his hobby.  In
the spring of 1848 an appeal came to our office from San Jose, which
compelled the Governor to go up in person.  Lieutenant Loeser and I,
with a couple of soldiers, went along.  At San Jose the Governor
held some kind of a court, in which Ricord and the alcalde had a
warm dispute about a certain mine which Ricord, as a member of the
Larkin Company, had opened within the limits claimed by the New
Almaden Company.  On our way up we had visited the ground, and were
therefore better prepared to understand the controversy.  We had
found at New Almaden Mr. Walkinshaw, a fine Scotch gentleman, the
resident agent of Mr. Forbes.  He had built in the valley, near a
small stream, a few board-houses, and some four or five furnaces for
the distillation of the mercury.  These were very simple in their
structure, being composed of whalers' kettles, set in masonry.
These kettles were filled with broken ore about the size of
McAdam-stone, mingled with lime.  Another kettle, reversed, formed
the lid, and the seam was luted with clay.  On applying heat, the
mercury was volatilized and carried into a chimney-stack, where it
condensed and flowed back into a reservoir, and then was led in
pipes into another kettle outside.  After witnessing this process,
we visited the mine itself, which outcropped near the apex of the
hill, about a thousand feet above the furnaces.  We found wagons
hauling the mineral down the hill and returning empty, and in the
mines quite a number of Sonora miners were blasting and driving for
the beautiful ore (cinnabar). It was then, and is now, a most
valuable mine. The adit of the mine was at the apex of the hill,
which drooped off to the north.  We rode along this hill, and saw
where many openings had been begun, but these, proving of little or
no value, had been abandoned.  Three miles beyond, on the west face
of the bill, we came to the opening of the "Larkin Company."  There
was evidence of a good deal of work, but the mine itself was filled
up by what seemed a land-slide.  The question involved in the
lawsuit before the alcalde at San Jose was, first, whether the mine
was or was not on the land belonging to the New Almaden property;
and, next, whether the company had complied with all the conditions
of the mite laws of Mexico, which were construed to be still in
force in California.

These laws required that any one who discovered a valuable mine on
private land should first file with the alcalde, or judge of the
district, a notice and claim for the benefits of such discovery;
then the mine was to be opened and followed for a distance of at
least one hundred feet within a specified time, and the claimants
must take out samples of the mineral and deposit the same with the
alcalde, who was then required to inspect personally the mine, to
see that it fulfilled all the conditions of the law, before he
could give a written title.  In this case the alcalde had been to
the mine and had possession of samples of the ore; but, as the
mouth of the mine was closed up, as alleged, from the act of God,
by a land-slide, it was contended by Ricord and his associates that
it was competent to prove by good witnesses that the mine had been
opened into the hill one hundred feet, and that, by no negligence
of theirs, it had caved in.  It was generally understood that
Robert J. Walker, United States Secretary of the Treasury, was then
a partner in this mining company; and a vessel, the bark Gray
Eagle, was ready at San Francisco to sail for New York with the
title-papers on which to base a joint-stock company for speculative
uses.  I think the alcalde was satisfied that the law had been
complied with, that he had given the necessary papers, and, as at
that time there was nothing developed to show fraud, the Governor
(Mason) did not interfere.  At that date there was no public house
or tavern in San Jose where we could stop, so we started toward
Santa Cruz and encamped about ten miles out, to the west of the
town, where we fell in with another party of explorers, of whom
Ruckel, of San Francisco, was the head; and after supper, as we sat
around the camp-fire, the conversation turned on quicksilver in
general, and the result of the contest in San Jose in particular.
Mason was relating to Ruckel the points and the arguments of
Ricord, that the company should not suffer from an act of God,
viz., the caving in of the mouth of the mine, when a man named
Cash, a fellow who had once been in the quartermaster's employ as a
teamster, spoke up: "Governor Mason, did Judge Ricord say that?"
"Yes," said the Governor; and then Cash related how he and another
man, whose name he gave, had been employed by Ricord to undermine a
heavy rock that rested above the mouth of the mine, so that it
tumbled down, carrying with it a large quantity of earth, and
completely filled it up, as we had seen; "and," said Cash, "it took
us three days of the hardest kind of work."  This was the act of
God, and on the papers procured from the alcalde at that time, I
understand, was built a huge speculation, by which thousands of
dollars changed hands in the United States and were lost.  This
happened long before the celebrated McGarrahan claim, which has
produced so much noise, and which still is being prosecuted in the
courts and in Congress.

On the next day we crossed over the Santa Cruz Mountains, from
which we had sublime views of the scenery, first looking east
toward the lower Bay of San Francisco, with the bright plains of
Santa Clara and San Jose, and then to the west upon the ocean, the
town of Monterey being visible sixty miles off.  If my memory is
correct, we beheld from that mountain the firing of a salute from
the battery at Monterey, and counted the number of guns from the
white puffs of smoke, but could not hear the sound.  That night we
slept on piles of wheat in a mill at Soquel, near Santa Cruz, and,
our supplies being short, I advised that we should make an early
start next morning, so as to reach the ranch of Don Juan Antonio
Vallejo, a particular friend, who had a large and valuable
cattle-ranch on the Pajaro River, about twenty miles on our way to
Monterey.  Accordingly, we were off by the first light of day, and
by nine o'clock we had reached the ranch.  It was on a high point
of the plateau, overlooking the plain of the Pajaro, on which were
grazing numbers of horses and cattle.  The house was of adobe, with
a long range of adobe-huts occupied by the semi-civilized Indians,
who at that time did all the labor of a ranch, the herding and
marking of cattle, breaking of horses, and cultivating the little
patches of wheat and vegetables which constituted all the farming
of that day.  Every thing about the house looked deserted, and,
seeing a small Indian boy leaning up against a post, I approached
him and asked him in Spanish, "Where is the master?"  "Gone to the
Presidio" (Monterey).  "Is anybody in the house?"  "No."   "Is it
locked up?"  "Yes."   "Is no one about who can get in?"  "No."
"Have you any meat?"  "No."   "Any flour or grain?"  "No."   "Any
chickens?"  "No."   "Any eggs?"  "No."   "What do you live on?"
"Nada" (nothing).  The utter indifference of this boy, and the
tone of his answer "Nada," attracted the attention of Colonel
Mason, who had been listening to our conversation, and who
knew enough of Spanish to catch the meaning, and he exclaimed
with some feeling, "So we get nada for our breakfast."  I felt
mortified, for I had held out the prospect of a splendid
breakfast of meat and tortillas with rice, chickens, eggs, etc., at
the ranch of my friend Josh Antonio, as a justification for
taking the Governor, a man of sixty years of age, more than
twenty miles at a full canter for his breakfast.  But there was
no help for it, and we accordingly went a short distance to a
pond, where we unpacked our mules and made a slim breakfast; on
some scraps of hard bread and a bone of pork that remained in our
alforjas.  This was no uncommon thing in those days, when many
a ranchero with his eleven leagues of land, his hundreds of
horses and thousands of cattle, would receive us with all the
grandiloquence of a Spanish lord, and confess that he had nothing
in his house to eat except the carcass of a beef hung up, from
which the stranger might cut and cook, without money or price, what
he needed.  That night we slept on Salinas Plain, and the next
morning reached Monterey.  All the missions and houses at that
period were alive with fleas, which the natives looked on as
pleasant titillators, but they so tortured me that I always gave
them a wide berth, and slept on a saddle-blanket, with the saddle
for a pillow and the serape, or blanket, for a cover.  We never
feared rain except in winter.  As the spring and summer of 1848
advanced, the reports came faster and faster from the gold-mines at
Sutter's saw-mill.  Stories reached us of fabulous discoveries, and
spread throughout the land.  Everybody was talking of "Gold!
gold!" until it assumed the character of a fever.  Some of our
soldiers began to desert; citizens were fitting out trains of
wagons and packmules to go to the mines.  We heard of men earning
fifty, five hundred, and thousands of dollars per day, and for a
time it seemed as though somebody would reach solid gold.  Some of
this gold began to come to Yerba Buena in trade, and to disturb the
value of merchandise, particularly of mules, horses, tin pans, and
articles used in mining: I of course could not escape the
infection, and at last convinced Colonel Mason that it was our duty
to go up and see with our own eyes, that we might report the truth
to our Government.  As yet we had no regular mail to any part of
the United States, but mails had come to us at long intervals,
around Cape Horn, and one or two overland.  I well remember the
first overland mail.  It was brought by Kit Carson in saddle-bags
from Taos in New Mexico.  We heard of his arrival at Los Angeles,
and waited patiently for his arrival at headquarters.  His fame
then was at its height, from the publication of Fremont's books,
and I was very anxious to see a man who had achieved such feats of
daring among the wild animals of the Rocky Mountains, and still
wilder Indians of the Plains.  At last his arrival was reported at
the tavern at Monterey, and I hurried to hunt him up.  I cannot
express my surprise at beholding a small, stoop-shouldered man,
with reddish hair, freckled face, soft blue eyes, and nothing to
indicate extraordinary courage or daring.  He spoke but little, and
answered questions in monosyllables.  I asked for his mail, and he
picked up his light saddle-bags containing the great overland mail,
and we walked together to headquarters, where he delivered his
parcel into Colonel Mason's own hands.  He spent some days in
Monterey, during which time we extracted with difficulty some items
of his personal history.  He was then by commission a lieutenant in
the regiment of Mounted Rifles serving in Mexico under Colonel
Sumner, and, as he could not reach his regiment from California,
Colonel Mason ordered that for a time he should be assigned to duty
with A. J. Smith's company, First Dragoons, at Los Angeles.  He
remained at Los Angeles some months, and was then sent back to the
United Staten with dispatches, traveling two thousand miles almost
alone, in preference to being encumbered by a large party.

Toward the close of June, 1848, the gold-fever being at its height,
by Colonel Mason's orders I made preparations for his trip to the
newly-discovered gold-mines at Sutter's Fort.  I selected four good
soldiers, with Aaron, Colonel Mason's black servant, and a good
outfit of horses and pack-mules, we started by the usually traveled
route for Yerba Buena.  There Captain Fulsom and two citizens
joined our party.  The first difficulty was to cross the bay to
Saucelito.  Folsom, as quartermaster, had a sort of scow with a
large sail, with which to discharge the cargoes of ships, that
could not come within a mile of the shore.  It took nearly the
whole day to get the old scow up to the only wharf there, and then
the water was so shallow that the scow, with its load of horses,
would not float at the first high tide, but by infinite labor on
the next tide she was got off and safely crossed over to Saucelito.
We followed in a more comfortable schooner.  Having safely landed
our horses and mules, we picked up and rode to San Rafael Mission,
stopping with Don Timoteo Murphy.  The next day's journey took us
to Bodega, where lived a man named Stephen Smith, who had the only
steam saw-mill in California.  He had a Peruvian wife, and employed
a number of absolutely naked Indians in making adobes.  We spent a
day very pleasantly with him, and learned that he had come to
California some years before, at the personal advice of Daniel
Webster, who had informed him that sooner or later the United
States would be in possession of California, and that in
consequence it would become a great country.  From Bodega we
traveled to Sonoma, by way of Petaluma, and spent a day with
General Vallejo.  I had been there before, as related, in the
business of the alcalde Nash.  From Sonoma we crossed over by way
of Napa, Suisun, and Vaca's ranch, to the Puta.  In the rainy
season, the plain between the Puta and Sacramento Rivers is
impassable, but in July the waters dry up; and we passed without
trouble, by the trail for Sutter's Embarcadero.  We reached the
Sacramento River, then full of water, with a deep, clear current.
The only means of crossing over was by an Indian dugout canoe.  We
began by carrying across our packs and saddles, and then our
people.  When all things were ready, the horses were driven into
the water, one being guided ahead by a man in the canoe.  Of
course, the horses and mules at first refused to take to the water,
and it was nearly a day's work to get them across, and even then
some of our animals after crossing escaped into the woods and
undergrowth that lined the river, but we secured enough of them to
reach Sutter's Fort, three miles back from the embcarcadero, where
we encamped at the old slough, or pond, near the fort.  On
application, Captain Butter sent some Indians back into the bushes,
who recovered and brought in all our animals.  At that time there
was not the sign of a habitation there or thereabouts, except the
fort, and an old adobe-house, east of the fort, known as the
hospital.  The fort itself was one of adobe-walls, about twenty
feet high, rectangular in form, with two-story block houses at
diagonal corners.  The entrance was by a large gate, open by day
and closed at night, with two iron ship's guns near at hand.
Inside there was a large house, with a good shingle-roof, used as a
storehouse, and all round the  walls were ranged rooms, the fort
wall being the outer wall of the house.  The inner wall also was of
adobe.  These rooms were used by Captain Sutter himself and by his
people.  He had a blacksmith's shop, carpenter's shop, etc., and
other rooms where the women made blankets.  Sutter was monarch of
all he surveyed, and had authority to inflict punishment even unto
death, a power he did not fail to use.  He had horses, cattle, and
sheep, and of these he gave liberally and without price to all in
need.  He caused to be driven into our camp a beef and some sheep,
which were slaughtered for our use.  Already the goldmines were
beginning to be felt.  Many people were then encamped, some going
and some coming, all full of gold-stories, and each surpassing the
other.  We found preparations in progress for celebrating the
Fourth of July, then close at hand, and we agreed to remain over to
assist on the occasion; of course, being the high officials, we
were the honored guests.  People came from a great distance to
attend this celebration of the Fourth of July, and the tables were
laid in the large room inside the storehouse of the fort.  A man of
some note, named Sinclair, presided, and after a substantial meal
and a reasonable supply of aguardiente we began the toasts.  All
that I remember is that Folsom and I spoke for our party; others,
Captain Sutter included, made speeches, and before the celebration
was over Sutter was enthusiastic, and many others showed the
effects of the aguardiente.  The next day (namely, July 5, 1848) we
resumed our journey toward the mines, and, in twenty-five miles of
as hot and dusty a ride as possible, we reached Mormon Island.  I
have heretofore stated that the gold was first found in the
tail-race of the stew-mill at Coloma, forty miles above Sutter's
Fort, or fifteen above Mormon Island, in the bed of the American
Fork of the Sacramento River.  It seems that Sutter had employed an
American named Marshall, a sort of millwright, to do this work for
him, but Marshall afterward claimed that in the matter of the
saw-mill they were copartners.  At all events, Marshall and the
family of Mr. Wimmer were living at Coloma, where the pine-trees
afforded the best material for lumber.  He had under him four white
men, Mormons, who had been discharged from Cooke's battalion, and
some Indians.  These were engaged in hewing logs, building a
mill-dam, and putting up a saw-mill.  Marshall, as the architect,
had made the "tub-wheel," and had set it in motion, and had also
furnished some of the rude parts of machinery necessary for an
ordinary up-and-down saw-mill.

Labor was very scarce, expensive, and had to be economized.  The
mill was built over a dry channel of the river which was calculated
to be the tail-race.  After arranging his head-race, dam and
tub-wheel, he let on the water to test the goodness of his
machinery.  It worked very well until it was found that the
tail-race did not carry off the water fast enough, so he put his
men to work in a rude way to clear out the tail-race.  They
scratched a kind of ditch down the middle of the dry channel,
throwing the coarser stones to one side; then, letting on the water
again, it would run with velocity down the channel, washing away
the dirt, thus saving labor.  This course of action was repeated
several times, acting exactly like the long Tom afterward resorted
to by the miners.  As Marshall himself was working in this ditch,
he observed particles of yellow metal which he gathered up in his
hand, when it seemed to have suddenly flashed across his mind that
it was gold.  After picking up about an ounce, he hurried down to
the fort to report to Captain Sutter his discovery.  Captain Sutter
himself related to me Marshall's account, saying that, as he sat in
his room at the fort one day in February or March, 1848, a knock
was heard at his door, and he called out, "Come in."   In walked
Marshall, who was a half-crazy man at best, but then looked
strangely wild.  "What is the matter, Marshall!"  Marshall
inquired if any one was within hearing, and began to peer about the
room, and look under the bed, when Sutter, fearing that some
calamity had befallen the party up at the saw-mill, and that
Marshall was really crazy, began to make his way to the door,
demanding of Marshall to explain what was the matter.  At last he
revealed his discovery, and laid before Captain Sutter the
pellicles of gold he had picked up in the ditch.  At first, Sutter
attached little or no importance to the discovery, and told
Marshall to go back to the mill, and say nothing of what he had
seen to Mr. Wimmer, or any one else.  Yet, as it might add value to
the location, he dispatched to our headquarters at Monterey, as I
have already related, the two men with a written application for a
preemption to the quarter-section of land at Coloma.  Marshall
returned to the mill, but could not keep out of his wonderful
ditch, and by some means the other men employed there learned his
secret.  They then wanted to gather the gold, and Marshall
threatened to shoot them if they attempted it; but these men had
sense enough to know that if "placer"-gold existed at Coloma, it
would also be found farther down-stream, and they gradually
"prospected" until they reached Mormon Island, fifteen miles below,
where they discovered one of the richest placers on earth.  These
men revealed the fact to some other Mormons who were employed by
Captain Sutter at a grist-mill he was building still lower down the
American Fork, and six miles above his fort.  All of them struck
for higher wages, to which Sutter yielded, until they asked ten
dollars a day, which he refused, and the two mills on which he had
spent so much money were never built, and fell into decay.


In my opinion, when the Mormons were driven from Nauvoo, Illinois,
in 1844, they cast about for a land where they would not be
disturbed again, and fixed on California.  In the year 1845 a ship,
the Brooklyn, sailed from New York for California, with a colony of
Mormons, of which Sam Brannan was the leader, and we found them
there on our arrival in January, 1847.  When General Kearney, at
Fort Leavenworth, was collecting volunteers early in 1846, for the
Mexican War, he, through the instrumentality of Captain James
Allen, brother to our quartermaster, General Robert Allen, raised
the battalion of Mormons at Kanesville, Iowa, now Council Bluffs,
on the express understanding that it would facilitate their
migration to California.  But when the Mormons reached Salt Lake,
in 1846, they learned that they had been forestalled by the United
States forces in California, and they then determined to settle
down where they were.  Therefore, when this battalion of five
companies of Mormons (raised by Allen, who died on the way, and was
succeeded by Cooke) was discharged at Los Angeles, California, in
the early summer of 1847, most of the men went to their people at
Salt Lake, with all the money received, as pay from the United
States, invested in cattle and breeding-horses; one company
reenlisted for another year, and the remainder sought work in the
country.  As soon as the fame of the gold discovery spread through
California, the Mormons naturally turned to Mormon Island, so that
in July, 1848, we found about three hundred of them there at work.
Sam Brannan was on hand as the high-priest, collecting the tithes.
Clark, of Clark's Point, an early pioneer, was there also, and
nearly all the Mormons who had come out in the Brooklyn, or who had
staid in California after the discharge of their battalion, had
collected there.  I recall the scene as perfectly to-day as though
it were yesterday.  In the midst of a broken country, all parched
and dried by the hot sun of July, sparsely wooded with live-oaks
and straggling pines, lay the valley of the American River, with
its bold mountain-stream coming out of the Snowy Mountains to the
east.  In this valley is a fiat, or gravel-bed, which in high water
is an island, or is overflown, but at the time of our visit was
simply a level gravel-bed of the river.  On its edges men were
digging, and filling buckets with the finer earth and gravel, which
was carried to a machine made like a baby's cradle, open at the
foot, and at the head a plate of sheet-iron or zinc, punctured full
of holes.  On this metallic plate was emptied the earth, and water
was then poured on it from buckets, while one man shook the cradle
with violent rocking by a handle.  On the bottom were nailed cleats
of wood.  With this rude machine four men could earn from forty to
one hundred dollars a day, averaging sixteen dollars, or a gold
ounce, per man per day.  While the' sun blazed down on the heads of
the miners with tropical heat, the water was bitter cold, and all
hands were either standing in the water or had their clothes wet
all the time; yet there were no complaints of rheumatism or cold.
We made our camp on a small knoll, a little below the island, and
from it could overlook the busy scene.  A few bush-huts near by
served as stores, boardinghouses, and for sleeping; but all hands
slept on the ground, with pine-leaves and blankets for bedding.  As
soon as the news spread that the Governor was there, persons came
to see us, and volunteered all kinds of information, illustrating
it by samples of the gold, which was of a uniform kind,
"scale-gold," bright and beautiful.  A large variety, of every
conceivable shape and form, was found in the smaller gulches round
about, but the gold in the river-bed was uniformly "scale-gold."  I
remember that Mr. Clark was in camp, talking to Colonel Mason about
matters and things generally, when he inquired, "Governor, what
business has Sam Brannan to collect the tithes here?"  Clark
admitted that Brannan was the head of the Mormon church in
California, and he was simply questioning as to Brannan's right, as
high-priest, to compel the Mormons to pay him the regular tithes.
Colonel Mason answered, "Brannan has a perfect right to collect the
tax, if you Mormons are fools enough to pay it."   "Then," said
Clark, "I for one won't pay it any longer."  Colonel Mason added:
"This is public land, and the gold is the property of the United
States; all of you here are trespassers, but, as the Government is
benefited by your getting out the gold, I do not intend to
interfere."  I understood, afterward, that from that time the
payment of the tithes ceased, but Brannan had already collected
enough money wherewith to hire Sutter's hospital, and to open a
store there, in which he made more money than any merchant in
California, during that summer and fall. The understanding was, that
the money collected by him as tithes was the foundation of his
fortune, which is still very large in San Francisco.  That evening
we all mingled freely with the miners, and witnessed the process of
cleaning up and "panning" out, which is the last process for
separating the pure gold from the fine dirt and black sand.

The next day we continued our journey up the valley of the American
Fork, stopping at various camps, where mining was in progress; and
about noon we reached Coloma, the place where gold had been first
discovered.  The hills were higher, and the timber of better
quality.  The river was narrower and bolder, and but few miners
were at work there, by reason of  Marshall's and Sutter's claim to
the site.  There stood the sawmill unfinished, the dam and
tail-race just as they were left when the Mormons ceased work.
Marshall and Wimmer's family of wife and half a dozen children were
there, guarding their supposed treasure; living in a house made of
clapboards.  Here also we were shown many specimens of gold, of a
coarser grain than that found at Mormon Island.  The next day we
crossed the American River to its north side, and visited many
small camps of men, in what were called the "dry diggings."  Little
pools of water stood in the beds of the streams, and these were
used to wash the dirt; and there the gold was in every conceivable
shape and size, some of the specimens weighing several ounces.
Some of these "diggings" were extremely rich, but as a whole they
were more precarious in results than at the river.  Sometimes a
lucky fellow would hit on a "pocket," and collect several thousand
dollars in a few days, and then again he would be shifting about
from place to place, "prospecting," and spending all he had made.
Little stores were being opened at every point, where flour, bacon,
etc., were sold; every thing being a dollar a pound, and a meal
usually costing three dollars.  Nobody paid for a bed, for he slept
on the ground, without fear of cold or rain.  We spent nearly a
week in that region, and were quite bewildered by the fabulous
tales of recent discoveries, which at the time were confined to the
several forks of the American and Yuba Rivers.' All this time our
horses had nothing to eat but the sparse grass in that region, and
we were forced to work our way down toward the Sacramento Valley,
or to see our animals perish.  Still we contemplated a visit to the
Yuba and Feather Rivers, from which we had heard of more wonderful
"diggings;" but met a courier, who announced the arrival of a ship
at Monterey, with dispatches of great importance from Mazatlan.  We
accordingly turned our horses back to Sutter's Fort.  Crossing the
Sacramento again by swimming our horses, and ferrying their loads
in that solitary canoe, we took our back track as far as the Napa,
and then turned to Benicia, on Carquinez Straits.  We found there a
solitary adobe-house, occupied by Mr. Hastings and his family,
embracing Dr. Semple, the proprietor of the ferry.  This ferry was
a ship's-boat, with a latteen-sail, which could carry across at one
time six or eight horses.

It took us several days to cross over, and during that time we got
well acquainted with the doctor, who was quite a character.  He had
come to California from Illinois, and was brother to Senator
Semple.  He was about seven feet high, and very intelligent.  When
we first reached Monterey, he had a printing-press, which belonged
to the United States, having been captured at the custom-house, and
had been used to print custom-house blanks.  With this Dr. Semple,
as editor, published the Californian, a small sheet of news, once a
week; and it was a curiosity in its line, using two v's for a w,
and other combinations of letters, made necessary by want of type.
After some time he removed to Yerba Buena with his paper, and it
grew up to be the Alta California of today.  Foreseeing, as he
thought, the growth of a great city somewhere on the Bay of San
Francisco, he selected Carquinez Straits as its location, and
obtained from General Vallejo a title to a league of land, on
condition of building up a city thereon to bear the name of
Vallejo's wife.  This was Francisca Benicia; accordingly, the new
city was named "Francisca."  At this time, the town near the mouth
of the bay was known universally as Yerba Buena; but that name was
not known abroad, although San Francisco was familiar to the whole
civilized world.  Now, some of the chief men of Yerba Buena,
Folsom, Howard, Leidesdorf, and others, knowing the importance of a
name, saw their danger, and, by some action of the ayuntamiento, or
town council, changed the name of Yerba Buena to "San Francisco."
Dr. Semple was outraged at their changing the name to one so like
his of Francisca, and he in turn changed his town to the other name
of Mrs. Vallejo, viz., "Benicia;" and Benicia it has remained to
this day.  I am convinced that this little circumstance was big
with consequences.  That Benicia has the best natural site for a
commercial city, I am, satisfied; and had half the money and half
the labor since bestowed upon San Francisco been expended at
Benicia, we should have at this day a city of palaces on the
Carquinez Straits.  The name of "San Francisco," however, fixed the
city where it now is; for every ship in 1848-'49, which cleared
from any part of the world, knew the name of San Francisco, but not
Yerba Buena or Benicia; and, accordingly, ships consigned to
California came pouring in with their contents, and were anchored
in front of Yerba Buena, the first town.  Captains and crews
deserted for the gold-mines, and now half the city in front of
Montgomery Street is built over the hulks thus abandoned.  But Dr.
Semple, at that time, was all there was of Benicia; he was captain
and crew of his ferry boat, and managed to pass our party to the
south side of Carquinez Straits in about two days.

Thence we proceeded up Amador Valley to Alameda Creek, and so on to
the old mission of San Jose; thence to the pueblo of San Jose,
where Folsom and those belonging in Yerba Buena went in that
direction, and we continued on to Monterey, our party all the way
giving official sanction to the news from the gold-mines, and
adding new force to the "fever."

On reaching Monterey, we found dispatches from Commodore Shubrick,
at Mazatlan, which gave almost positive assurance that the war with
Mexico was over; that hostilities had ceased, and commissioners
were arranging the terms of peace at Guadalupe Hidalgo.  It was
well that this news reached California at that critical time; for
so contagious had become the "gold-fever" that everybody was
bound to go and try his fortune, and the volunteer regiment of
Stevenson's would have deserted en masse, had the men not been
assured that they would very soon be entitled to an honorable
discharge.

Many of our regulars did desert, among them the very men who had
escorted us faithfully to the mines and back.  Our servants also
left us, and nothing less than three hundred dollars a month would
hire a man in California; Colonel Mason's black boy, Aaron, alone
of all our then servants proving faithful.  We were forced to
resort to all manner of shifts to live.  First, we had a mess with
a black fellow we called Bustamente as cook; but he got the fever,
and had to go.  We next took a soldier, but he deserted, and
carried off my double-barreled shot-gun,  which I prized very
highly.  To meet this condition of facts, Colonel Mason ordered
that liberal furloughs should be given to the soldiers, and
promises to all in turn, and he allowed all the officers to draw
their rations in kind.  As the actual valve of the ration was very
large, this enabled us to live.  Halleck, Murray, Ord, and I,
boarded with Dona Augustias, and turned in our rations as pay for
our board.

Some time in September, 1848, the official news of the treaty of
peace reached us, and the Mexican War was over.  This treaty was
signed in May, and came to us all the way by land by a courier from
Lower California, sent from La Paz by Lieutenant-Colonel Burton.
On its receipt, orders were at once made for the muster-out of all
of Stevenson's regiment, and our military forces were thus reduced
to the single company of dragoons at Los Angeles, and the one
company of artillery at Monterey.  Nearly all business had ceased,
except that connected with gold; and, during that fall, Colonel
Mason, Captain Warner, and I, made another trip up to Sutter's
Fort, going also to the newly-discovered mines on the Stanislaus,
called "Sonora," named from the miners of Sonora, Mexico, who had
first discovered them.  We found there pretty much the same state
of facts as before existed at Mormon Island and Coloma, and we
daily received intelligence of the opening of still other mines
north and south.

But I have passed over a very interesting fact.  As soon as we had
returned from our first visit to the gold-mines, it became
important to send home positive knowledge of this valuable
discovery.  The means of communication with the United States were
very precarious, and I suggested to Colonel Mason that a special
courier ought to be sent; that Second-Lieutenant Loeser had been
promoted to first-lieutenant, and was entitled to go home.  He was
accordingly detailed to carry the news.  I prepared with great care
the letter to the adjutant-general of August 17, 1848, which
Colonel Mason modified in a few Particulars; and, as it was
important to send not only the specimens which had been presented
to us along our route of travel, I advised the colonel to allow
Captain Folsom to purchase and send to Washington a large sample of
the commercial gold in general use, and to pay for the same out of
the money in his hands known as the "civil fund," arising from
duties collected at the several ports in California.  He consented
to this, and Captain Folsom bought an oyster-can full at ten
dollars the ounce, which was the rate of value at which it was then
received at the custom house.  Folsom was instructed further to
contract with some vessel to carry the messenger to South America,
where he could take the English steamers as far east as Jamaica,
with a conditional charter giving increased payment if the vessel
could catch the October steamer.  Folsom chartered the bark La
Lambayecana, owned and navigated by Henry D. Cooke, who has since
been the Governor of the District of Columbia.  In due time this
vessel reached Monterey, and Lieutenant Loeser, with his report and
specimens of gold, embarked and sailed.  He reached the South
American Continent at Payta, Peru, in time; took the English
steamer of October to Panama, and thence went on to Kingston,
Jamaica, where he found a sailing vessel bound for New Orleans.  On
reaching New Orleans, he telegraphed to the War Department his
arrival; but so many delays had occurred that he did not reach
Washington in time to have the matter embraced in the President's
regular message of 1848, as we had calculated.  Still, the
President made it the subject of a special message, and thus became
"official" what had before only reached the world in a very
indefinite shape.  Then began that wonderful development, and the
great emigration to California, by land and by sea, of 1849 and
1850.

As before narrated, Mason, Warner, and I, made a second visit to
the mines in September and October, 1848.  As the winter season
approached, Colonel Mason returned to Monterey, and I remained for
a time at Sutter's Fort.  In order to share somewhat in the riches
of the land, we formed a partnership in a store at Coloma, in
charge of Norman S. Bestor, who had been Warner's clerk.  We
supplied the necessary money, fifteen hundred dollars (five hundred
dollars each), and Bestor carried on the store at Coloma for his
share.  Out of this investment, each of us realized a profit of
about fifteen hundred dollars.  Warner also got a regular leave of
absence, and contracted with Captain Sutter for surveying and
locating the town of Sacramento.  He received for this sixteen
dollars per day for his services as surveyor; and Sutter paid all
the hands engaged in the work.  The town was laid off mostly up
about the fort, but a few streets were staked off along the river
bank, and one or two leading to it.  Captain Sutter always
contended, however, that no town could possibly exist on the
immediate bank of the river, because the spring freshets rose over
the bank, and frequently it was necessary to swim a horse to reach
the boat-landing.  Nevertheless, from the very beginning the town
began to be built on the very river-bank, viz., First, Second, and
Third Streets, with J and K Streets leading back.  Among the
principal merchants and traders of that winter, at Sacramento, were
Sam Brannan and Hensley, Reading & Co.  For several years the site
was annually flooded; but the people have persevered in building
the levees, and afterward in raising all the streets, so that
Sacramento is now a fine city, the capital of the State, and stands
where, in 1848, was nothing but a dense mass of bushes, vines, and
submerged land.  The old fort has disappeared altogether.

During the fall of 1848, Warner, Ord, and I, camped on the bank of
the American River, abreast of the fort, at what was known as the
"Old Tan-Yard."  I was cook, Ord cleaned up the dishes, and Warner
looked after the horses; but Ord was deposed as scullion because he
would only wipe the tin plates with a tuft of grass, according to
the custom of the country, whereas Warner insisted on having them
washed after each meal with hot water.  Warner was in consequence
promoted to scullion, and Ord became the hostler.  We drew our
rations in kind from the commissary at San Francisco, who sent them
up to us by a boat; and we were thus enabled to dispense a generous
hospitality to many a poor devil who otherwise would have had
nothing to eat.

The winter of 1848 '49 was a period of intense activity throughout
California.  The rainy season was unfavorable to the operations of
gold-mining, and was very hard upon the thousands of houseless men
and women who dwelt in the mountains, and even in the towns.  Most
of the natives and old inhabitants had returned to their ranches
and houses; yet there were not roofs enough in the country to
shelter the thousands who had arrived by sea and by land.  The news
had gone forth to the whole civilized world that gold in fabulous
quantities was to be had for the mere digging, and adventurers came
pouring in blindly to seek their fortunes, without a thought of
house or food.  Yerba Buena had been converted into San Francisco.
Sacramento City had been laid out, lots were being rapidly sold,
and the town was being built up as an entrepot to the mines.
Stockton also had been chosen as a convenient point for trading
with the lower or southern mines.  Captain Sutter was the sole
proprietor of the former, and Captain Charles Weber was the owner
of the site of Stockton, which was as yet known as "French Camp."




CHAPTER III.

EARLY RECOLLECTIONS OF CALIFORNIA--(CONTINUED).

1849-1850.


The department headquarters still remained at Monterey, but, with
the few soldiers, we had next to nothing to do.  In midwinter we
heard of the approach of a battalion of the Second Dragoons, under
Major Lawrence Pike Graham, with Captains Rucker, Coutts, Campbell,
and others, along.  So exhausted were they by their long march from
Upper Mexico that we had to send relief to meet them as they
approached.  When this command reached Los Angeles, it was left
there as the garrison, and Captain A. J. Smith's company of the
First Dragoons was brought up to San Francisco.  We were also
advised that the Second Infantry, Colonel B. Riley, would be sent
out around Cape Horn in sailing-ships; that the Mounted Rifles,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Loring, would march overland to Oregon;
and that Brigadier-General Persifer F. Smith would come out in
chief command on the Pacific coast.  It was also known that a
contract had been entered into with parties in New York and New
Orleans for a monthly line of steamers from those cities to
California, via Panama.  Lieutenant-Colonel Burton had come up from
Lower California, and, as captain of the Third Artillery, he was
assigned to command Company F, Third Artillery, at Monterey.
Captain Warner remained at Sacramento, surveying; and Halleck,
Murray, Ord, and I, boarded with Dona Augustias.  The season was
unusually rainy and severe, but we passed the time with the usual
round of dances and parties.  The time fixed for the arrival of the
mail-steamer was understood to be about January 1, 1849, but the
day came and went without any tidings of her.  Orders were given to
Captain Burton to announce her arrival by firing a national
salute, and each morning we listened for the guns from the fort.
The month of January passed, and the greater part of February, too.
As was usual, the army officers celebrated the 22d of February with
a grand ball, given in the new stone school-house, which Alcalde
Walter Colton had built.  It was the largest and best hall then in
California.  The ball was really a handsome affair, and we kept it
up nearly all night.  The next morning we were at breakfast:
present, Dona Augustias, and Manuelita, Halleck, Murray, and
myself.  We were dull and stupid enough until a gun from the fort
aroused us, then another and another.  "The steamer" exclaimed all,
and, without waiting for hats or any thing, off we dashed.  I
reached the wharf hatless, but the dona sent my cap after me by a
servant.  The white puffs of smoke hung around the fort, mingled
with the dense fog, which hid all the water of the bay, and well
out to sea could be seen the black spars of some unknown vessel.
At the wharf I found a group of soldiers and a small row-boat,
which belonged to a brig at anchor in the bay.  Hastily ordering a
couple of willing soldiers to get in and take the oars, and Mr.
Larkin and Mr. Hartnell asking to go along, we jumped in and pushed
off.  Steering our boat toward the spars, which loomed up above the
fog clear and distinct, in about a mile we came to the black hull
of the strange monster, the long-expected and most welcome steamer
California.  Her wheels were barely moving, for her pilot could not
see the shore-line distinctly, though the hills and Point of Pines
could be clearly made out over the fog, and occasionally a glimpse
of some white walls showed where the town lay.  A "Jacob's ladder"
was lowered for us from the steamer, and in a minute I scrambled up
on deck, followed by Larkin and Hartnell, and we found ourselves
in the midst of many old friends.  There was Canby, the
adjutant-general, who was to take my place; Charley Hoyt, my cousin;
General Persifer F. Smith and wife; Gibbs, his aide-de-camp; Major
Ogden, of the Engineers, and wife; and, indeed, many old
Californians, among them Alfred Robinson, and Frank Ward with his
pretty bride. By the time the ship was fairly at anchor we had
answered a million of questions about gold and the state of the
country; and, learning that the ship was out of fuel, had informed
the captain (Marshall) that there was abundance of pine-wood, but no
willing hands to cut it; that no man could be hired at less than an
ounce of gold a day, unless the soldiers would volunteer to do it
for some agreed-upon price.  As for coal, there was not a pound in
Monterey, or anywhere else in California.  Vessels with coal were
known to be en route around Cape Horn, but none had yet reached
California.

The arrival of this steamer was the beginning of a new epoch on the
Pacific coast; yet there she lay, helpless, without coal or fuel.
The native Californians, who had never seen a steamship, stood for
days on the beach looking at her, with the universal exclamation,
"Tan feo!"--how ugly!--and she was truly ugly when compared with
the clean, well-sparred frigates and sloops-of-war that had
hitherto been seen on the North Pacific coast.  It was first
supposed it would take ten days to get wood enough to prosecute her
voyage, and therefore all the passengers who could took up their
quarters on shore.  Major Canby relieved me, and took the place I
had held so long as adjutant-general of the Department of
California.  The time seemed most opportune for me to leave the
service, as I had several splendid offers of employment and of
partnership, and, accordingly, I made my written resignation; but
General Smith put his veto upon it, saying that he was to command
the Division of the Pacific, while General Riley was to have the
Department of California, and Colonel Loring that of Oregon.  He
wanted me as his adjutant-general, because of my familiarity with
the country, and knowledge of its then condition: At the time, he
had on his staff Gibbs as aide-de-camp, and Fitzgerald as
quartermaster.  He also had along with him quite a retinue of
servants, hired with a clear contract to serve him for a whole year
after reaching California, every one of whom deserted, except a
young black fellow named Isaac.  Mrs. Smith, a pleasant but
delicate Louisiana lady, had a white maid-servant, in whose
fidelity she had unbounded confidence; but this girl was married to
a perfect stranger, and off before she had even landed in San
Francisco.  It was, therefore, finally arranged that, on the
California, I was to accompany General Smith to San Francisco as
his adjutant-general.  I accordingly sold some of my horses, and
arranged for others to go up by land; and from that time I became
fairly enlisted in the military family of General Persifer F.
Smith.

I parted with my old commander, Colonel Mason, with sincere regret.
To me he had ever been kind and considerate, and, while stern,
honest to a fault, he was the very embodiment of the principle of
fidelity to the interests of the General Government.  He possessed
a native strong intellect, and far more knowledge of the principles
of civil government and law than he got credit for.  In private and
public expenditures he was extremely economical, but not penurious.
In cases where the officers had to contribute money for parties and
entertainments, he always gave a double share, because of his
allowance of double rations.  During our frequent journeys, I was
always caterer, and paid all the bills.  In settling with him he
required a written statement of the items of account, but never
disputed one of them.  During our time, California was, as now,
full of a bold, enterprising, and speculative set of men, who were
engaged in every sort of game to make money.  I know that
Colonel-Mason was beset by them to use his position to make a
fortune for himself and his friends; but he never bought land or
town-lots, because, he said, it was his place to hold the public
estate for the Government as free and unencumbered by claims as
possible; and when I wanted him to stop the public-land sales in San
Francisco, San Jose, etc., he would not; for, although he did not
believe the titles given by the alcaldes worth a cent, yet they
aided to settle the towns and public lands, and he thought, on the
whole, the Government would be benefited thereby.  The same thing
occurred as to the gold-mines.  He never took a title to a town lot,
unless it was one, of no real value, from Alcalde Colton, in
Monterey, of which I have never heard since.  He did take a share in
the store which Warner, Beator, and I, opened at Coloma, paid his
share of the capital, five hundred dollars, and received his share
of the profits, fifteen hundred dollars.  I think also he took a
share in a venture to China with Larkin and others; but, on leaving
California, he was glad to sell out without profit or loss.  In the
stern discharge of his duty he made some bitter enemies, among them
Henry M. Naglee, who, in the newspapers of the day, endeavored to
damage his fair name.  But, knowing him intimately, I am certain
that he is entitled to all praise for having so controlled the
affairs of the country that, when his successor arrived, all things
were so disposed that a civil form of government was an easy matter
of adjustment.  Colonel Mason was relieved by General Riley some
time in April, and left California in the steamer of the 1st May for
Washington and St. Louis, where he died of cholera in the summer of
1850, and his body is buried in Bellefontaine Cemetery. His widow
afterward married Major (since General) Don Carlos Buell, and is now
living in Kentucky.

In overhauling the hold of the steamer California, as she lay at
anchor in Monterey Bay, a considerable amount of coal was found
under some heavy duplicate machinery.  With this, and such wood as
had been gathered, she was able to renew her voyage.  The usual
signal was made, and we all went on board.  About the 1st of March
we entered the Heads, and anchored off San Francisco, near the
United States line-of-battle-ship Ohio, Commodore T. Catesby Jones.
As was the universal custom of the day, the crew of the California
deserted her; and she lay for months unable to make a trip back to
Panama, as was expected of her.  As soon as we reached San
Francisco, the first thing was to secure an office and a house to
live in.  The weather was rainy and stormy, and snow even lay on
the hills back of the Mission.  Captain Folsom, the quartermaster,
agreed to surrender for our office the old adobe custom house, on
the upper corner of the plaza, as soon as he could remove his
papers and effects down to one of his warehouses on the beach; and
he also rented for us as quarters the old Hudson Bay Company house
on Montgomery Street, which had been used by Howard & Mellua as a
store, and at that very time they were moving their goods into a
larger brick building just completed for them.  As these changes
would take some time, General Smith and Colonel Ogden, with their
wives, accepted the hospitality offered by Commodore Jones on board
the Ohio.  I opened the office at the custom house, and Gibbs,
Fitzgerald, and some others of us, slept in the loft of the Hudson
Bay Company house until the lower part was cleared of Howard's
store, after which General Smith and the ladies moved in.  There we
had a general mess, and the efforts at house-keeping were simply
ludicrous.  One servant after another, whom General Smith had
brought from New Orleans, with a solemn promise to stand by him for
one whole year, deserted without a word of notice or explanation,
and in a few days none remained but little Isaac.  The ladies had
no maid or attendants; and the general, commanding all the mighty
forces of the United States on the Pacific coast, had to scratch to
get one good meal a day for his family!  He was a gentleman of fine
social qualities, genial and gentle, and joked at every thing.
Poor Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Ogden did not bear it so philosophically.
Gibbs, Fitzgerald, and I, could cruise around and find a meal,
which cost three dollars, at some of the many restaurants which had
sprung up out of red-wood boards and cotton lining; but the general
and ladies could not go out, for ladies were rara aves at that day
in California.  Isaac was cook, chamber-maid, and everything,
thoughtless of himself, and struggling, out of the slimmest means,
to compound a breakfast for a large and hungry family.  Breakfast
would be announced any time between ten and twelve, and dinner
according to circumstances.  Many a time have I seen General Smith,
with a can of preserved meat in his hands, going toward the house,
take off his hat on meeting a negro, and, on being asked the reason
of his politeness, he would answer that they were the only real
gentlemen in California.  I confess that the fidelity of Colonel
Mason's boy "Aaron," and of General Smith's boy "Isaac," at a time
when every white man laughed at promises as something made to be
broken, has given me a kindly feeling of respect for the negroes,
and makes me hope that they will find an honorable "status" in the
jumble of affairs in which we now live.

That was a dull hard winter in San Francisco; the rains were heavy,
and the mud fearful.  I have seen mules stumble in the street, and
drown in the liquid mud!  Montgomery Street had been filled up with
brush and clay, and I always dreaded to ride on horseback along it,
because the mud was so deep that a horse's legs would become
entangled in the bushes below, and the rider was likely to be
thrown and drowned in the mud.  The only sidewalks were made of
stepping-stones of empty boxes, and here and there a few planks
with barrel-staves nailed on.  All the town lay along Montgomery
Street, from Sacramento to Jackson, and about the plaza.  Gambling
was the chief occupation of the people.  While they were waiting
for the cessation of the rainy season, and for the beginning of
spring, all sorts of houses were being put up, but of the most
flimsy kind, and all were stores, restaurants, or gambling
-saloons.  Any room twenty by sixty feet would rent for a thousand
dollars a month.  I had, as my pay, seventy dollars a month, and no
one would even try to hire a servant under three hundred dollars.
Had it not been for the fifteen hundred dollars I had made in the
store at Coloma, I could not have lived through the winter.  About
the 1st of April arrived the steamer Oregon; but her captain
(Pearson) knew what was the state of affairs on shore, and ran his
steamer alongside the line-of-battle-ship Ohio at Saucelito, and
obtained the privilege of leaving his crew on board as "prisoners"
until he was ready to return to sea.  Then, discharging his
passengers and getting coal out of some of the ships which had
arrived, he retook his crew out of limbo and carried the first
regular mail back to Panama early in April.  In regular order
arrived the third steamer, the Panama; and, as the vessels were
arriving with coal, The California was enabled to hire a crew and
get off.  From that time forward these three ships constituted the
regular line of mail-steamers, which has been kept up ever since.
By the steamer Oregon arrived out Major R. P. Hammond, J. M.
Williams, James Blair, and others; also the gentlemen who, with
Major Ogden, were to compose a joint commission to select the sites
for the permanent forts and navyyard of California.  This
commission was composed of Majors Ogden, Smith, and Leadbetter, of,
the army, and Captains Goldsborough, Van Brunt, and Blunt, of the
navy.  These officers, after a most careful study of the whole
subject, selected Mare Island for the navy-yard, and "Benicia" for
the storehouses and arsenals of the army.  The Pacific Mail
Steamship Company also selected Benicia as their depot.  Thus was
again revived the old struggle for supremacy of these  two points
as the site of the future city of the Pacific.  Meantime, however,
San Francisco had secured the name.  About six hundred ships were
anchored there without crews, and could not get away; and there the
city was, and had to be.

Nevertheless, General Smith, being disinterested and unprejudiced,
decided on Benicia as the point where the city ought to be, and
where the army headquarters should be.  By the Oregon there arrived
at San Francisco a man who deserves mention here--Baron
Steinberger.  He had been a great cattle-dealer in the United
States, and boasted that he had helped to break the United States
Bank, by being indebted to it five million dollars! At all events,
he was a splendid looking fellow, and brought with him from
Washington a letter to General Smith and another for Commodore
Jones, to the effect that he was a man of enlarged experience in
beef; that the authorities in Washington knew that there existed in
California large herds of cattle, which were only valuable for
their hides and tallow; that it was of great importance to the
Government that this beef should be cured and salted so as to be of
use to the army and navy, obviating the necessity of shipping
salt-beef around Cape Horn.  I know he had such a letter from the
Secretary of War, Marcy, to General Smith, for it passed into my
custody, and I happened to be in Commodore Jones's cabin when the
baron presented the one for him from the Secretary of the Navy.
The baron was anxious to pitch in at once, and said that all he
needed to start with were salt and barrels.  After some inquiries
of his purser, the commodore promised to let him have the barrels
with their salt, as fast as they were emptied by the crew.  Then
the baron explained that he could get a nice lot of cattle from Don
Timoteo Murphy, at the Mission of San Rafael, on the north aide of
the bay, but he could not get a boat and crew to handle them.
Under the authority from the Secretary of the Navy, the commodore
then promised him the use of a boat and crew, until he (the baron)
could find and purchase a suitable one for himself.  Then the baron
opened the first regular butcher-shop in San Francisco, on the
wharf about the foot of Broadway or Pacific Street, where we could
buy at twenty-five or fifty cents a pound the best roasts, steaks,
and cuts of beef, which had cost him nothing, for he never paid
anybody if he could help it, and he soon cleaned poor Don Timoteo
out.  At first, every boat of his, in coming down from the San
Rafael, touched at the Ohio, and left the best beefsteaks and
roasts for the commodore, but soon the baron had enough money to
dispense with the borrowed boat, and set up for himself, and from
this small beginning, step by step, he rose in a few months to be
one of the richest and most influential men in San Francisco; but
in his wild speculations he was at last caught, and became
helplessly bankrupt.  He followed General Fremont to St. Louis in
1861, where I saw him, but soon afterward he died a pauper in one
of the hospitals.  When General Smith had his headquarters in San
Francisco, in the spring of 1849, Steinberger gave dinners worthy
any baron of old; and when, in after-years, I was a banker there,
he used to borrow of me small sums of money in repayment for my
share of these feasts; and somewhere among my old packages I hold
one of his confidential notes for two hundred dollars, but on the
whole I got off easily.  I have no doubt that, if this man's
history could be written out, it would present phases as wonderful
as any of romance; but in my judgment he was a dangerous man,
without any true-sense of honor or honesty.

Little by little the rains of that season grew less and less, and
the hills once more became green and covered with flowers.  It
became perfectly evident that no family could live in San Francisco
on such a salary as Uncle Sam allowed his most favored officials;
so General Smith and Major Ogden concluded to send their families
back to the United States, and afterward we men-folks could take to
camp and live on our rations.  The Second Infantry had arrived, and
had been distributed, four companies to Monterey, and the rest
somewhat as Stevenson's regiment had been.  A. J. Smith's company
of dragoons was sent up to Sonoma, whither General Smith had
resolved to move our headquarters.  On the steamer which sailed
about May 1st (I think the California), we embarked, the ladies for
home and we for Monterey.  At Monterey we went on shore, and
Colonel Mason, who meantime had been relieved by General Riley,
went on board, and the steamer departed for Panama.  Of all that
party I alone am alive.

General Riley had, with his family, taken the house which Colonel
Mason had formerly used, and Major Canby and wife had secured rooms
at Alvarado's.  Captain Bane was quartermaster, and had his family
in the house of a man named Garner, near the redoubt.  Burton and
Company F were still at the fort; the four companies of the Second
Infantry were quartered in the barracks, the same building in which
we had had our headquarters; and the company officers were
quartered in hired buildings near by.  General Smith and his aide,
Captain Gibbs, went to Larkin's house, and I was at my old rooms at
Dona Augustias.  As we intended to go back to San Francisco by land
and afterward to travel a good deal, General Smith gave me the
necessary authority to fit out the party.  There happened to be
several trains of horses and mules in town, so I purchased about a
dozen horses and mules at two hundred dollars a head, on account of
the Quartermaster's Department, and we had them kept under guard in
the quartermaster's corral.

I remember one night being in the quarters of Lieutenant Alfred
Sully, where nearly all the officers of the garrison were
assembled, listening to Sully's stories.  Lieutenant Derby,
"Squibob," was one of the number, as also Fred Steele, "Neighbor"
Jones, and others, when, just after "tattoo," the orderly-sergeants
came to report the result of  "tattoo" roll-call; one reported five
men absent, another eight, and so on, until it became certain that
twenty-eight men had deserted; and they were so bold and open in
their behavior that it amounted to defiance.  They had deliberately
slung their knapsacks and started for the gold-mines.  Dr. Murray
and I were the only ones present who were familiar with the
country, and I explained how easy they could all be taken by a
party going out at once to Salinas Plain, where the country was so
open and level that a rabbit could not cross without being seen;
that the deserters could not go to the mines without crossing that
plain, and could not reach it before daylight.  All agreed that the
whole regiment would desert if these men were not brought back.
Several officers volunteered on the spot to go after them; and, as
the soldiers could not be trusted, it was useless to send any but
officers in pursuit.  Some one went to report the affair to the
adjutant-general, Canby, and he to General Riley.  I waited some
time, and, as the thing grew cold, I thought it was given up, and
went to my room and to bed.

About midnight I was called up and informed that there were seven
officers willing to go, but the difficulty was to get horses and
saddles.  I went down to Larkin's house and got General Smith to
consent that we might take the horses I had bought for our trip.
It was nearly three o'clock a.m. before we were all mounted and
ready.  I had a musket which I used for hunting.  With this I led
off at a canter, followed by the others.  About six miles out, by
the faint moon, I saw ahead of us in the sandy road some blue
coats, and, fearing lest they might resist or escape into the dense
bushes which lined the road, I halted and found with me Paymaster
Hill, Captain N. H. Davis, and Lieutenant John Hamilton.  We waited
some time for the others, viz., Canby, Murray, Gibbs, and Sully, to
come up, but as they were not in sight we made a dash up the road
and captured six of the deserters, who were Germans, with heavy
knapsacks on, trudging along the deep, sandy road.  They had not
expected pursuit, had not heard our horses, and were accordingly
easily taken.  Finding myself the senior officer present, I ordered
Lieutenant Hamilton to search the men and then to march them back
to Monterey, suspecting, as was the fact, that the rest of our
party had taken a road that branched off a couple of miles back.
Daylight broke as we reached the Saunas River, twelve miles out,
and there the trail was broad and fresh leading directly out on the
Saunas Plain.  This plain is about five miles wide, and then the
ground becomes somewhat broken.  The trail continued very plain,
and I rode on at a gallop to where there was an old adobe-ranch on
the left of the road, with the head of a lagoon, or pond, close by.
I saw one or two of the soldiers getting water at the pond, and
others up near the house.  I had the best horse and was
considerably ahead, but on looking back could see Hill and Davis
coming up behind at a gallop.  I motioned to them to hurry forward,
and turned my horse across the head of the pond, knowing the ground
well, as it was a favorite place for shooting geese and ducks.
Approaching the house, I ordered the men who were outside to go in.
They did not know me personally, and exchanged glances, but I had
my musket cocked, and, as the two had seen Davis and Hill coming up
pretty fast, they obeyed.  Dismounting, I found the house full of
deserters, and there was no escape for them.  They naturally
supposed that I had a strong party with me, and when I ordered them
to "fall in" they obeyed from habit.  By the time Hill and Davis
came up I had them formed in two ranks, the front rank facing
about, and I was taking away their bayonets, pistols, etc.  We
disarmed them, destroying a musket and several pistols, and, on
counting them, we found that we three had taken eighteen, which,
added to the six first captured, made twenty-four.  We made them
sling their knapsacks and begin their homeward march.  It was near
night when we got back, so that these deserters had traveled nearly
forty miles since "tattoo" of the night before.  The other party
had captured three, so that only one man had escaped.  I doubt not
this prevented the desertion of the bulk of the Second Infantry
that spring, for at that time so demoralizing was the effect of the
gold-mines that everybody not in the military service justified
desertion, because a soldier, if free, could earn more money in a
day than he received per month.  Not only did soldiers and sailors
desert, but captains and masters of ships actually abandoned their
vessels and cargoes to try their luck at the mines.  Preachers
and professors forgot their creeds and took to trade, and
even to keeping gambling-houses.  I remember that one of our
regular soldiers, named Reese, in deserting stole a favorite
double-barreled gun of mine, and when the orderly-sergeant of the
company, Carson, was going on furlough, I asked him when he came
across Reese to try and get my gun back.  When he returned he told
me that he had found Reese and offered him a hundred dollars for my
gun, but Reese sent me word that he liked the gun, and would not
take a hundred dollars for it.  Soldiers or sailors who could reach
the mines were universally shielded by the miners, so that it was
next to useless to attempt their recapture.  In due season General
Persifer Smith, Gibbs, and I, with some hired packers, started back
for San Francisco, and soon after we transferred our headquarters to
Sonoma.  About this time Major Joseph Hooker arrived from the East
--the regular adjutant-general of the division--relieved me, and I
became thereafter one of General Smith's regular aides-de-camp.

As there was very little to do, General Smith encouraged us to go
into any business that would enable us to make money.  R. P.
Hammond, James Blair, and I, made a contract to survey for Colonel
J. D. Stevenson his newly-projected city of "New York of the
Pacific," situated at the month of the San Joaquin River.  The
contract embraced, also, the making of soundings and the marking
out of a channel through Suisun Bay.  We hired, in San Francisco, a
small metallic boat, with a sail, laid in some stores, and
proceeded to the United States ship Ohio, anchored at Saucelito,
where we borrowed a sailor-boy and lead-lines with which to sound
the channel.  We sailed up to Benicia, and, at General Smith's
request, we surveyed and marked the line dividing the city of
Benicia from the government reserve.  We then sounded the bay back
and forth, and staked out the best channel up Suisun Bay, from
which Blair made out sailing directions.  We then made the
preliminary surveys of the city of "New York of the Pacific," all
of which were duly plotted; and for this work we each received from
Stevenson five hundred dollars and ten or fifteen lots.  I sold
enough lots to make up another five hundred dollars, and let the
balance go; for the city of "New York of the Pacific" never came to
any thing.  Indeed, cities at the time were being projected by
speculators all round the bay and all over the country.

While we were surveying at "New York of the Pacific," occurred one
of those little events that showed the force of the gold-fever.  We
had a sailor-boy with us, about seventeen years old, who cooked our
meals and helped work the boat.  Onshore, we had the sail spread so
as to shelter us against the wind and dew.  One morning I awoke
about daylight, and looked out to see if our sailor-boy was at work
getting breakfast; but he was not at the fire at all.  Getting up,
I discovered that he had converted a tule-bolsa into a sail boat,
and was sailing for the gold-mines.  He was astride this bolsa,
with a small parcel of bread and meat done up in a piece of
cloth; another piece of cloth, such as we used for making our
signal-stations, he had fixed into a sail; and with a paddle he was
directing his precarious craft right out into the broad bay, to
follow the general direction of the schooners and boats that he
knew were ascending the Sacramento River.  He was about a hundred
yards from the shore.  I jerked up my gun, and hailed him to come
back.  After a moment's hesitation, he let go his sheet and began
to paddle back.  This bolsa was nothing but a bundle of tule, or
bullrush, bound together with grass-ropes in the shape of a cigar,
about ten feet long and about two feet through the butt.  With
these the California Indiana cross streams of considerable size.
When he came ashore, I gave him a good overhauling for attempting
to desert, and put him to work getting breakfast.  In due time we
returned him to his ship, the Ohio.  Subsequently, I made a bargain
with Mr. Hartnell to survey his ranch at Cosnmnes River, Sacramento
Valley.  Ord and a young citizen, named Seton, were associated with
me in this.  I bought of Rodman M. Price a surveyor's compass,
chain, etc., and, in San Francisco, a small wagon and harness.
Availing ourselves of a schooner, chartered to carry Major Miller
and two companies of the Second Infantry from San Francisco to
Stockton, we got up to our destination at little cost.  I recall an
occurrence that happened when the schooner was anchored in
Carquinez Straits, opposite the soldiers' camp on shore.  We were
waiting for daylight and a fair wind; the schooner lay anchored at
an ebb-tide, and about daylight Ord and I had gone ashore for
something.  Just as we were pulling off from shore, we heard the
loud shouts of the men, and saw them all running down toward the
water.  Our attention thus drawn, we saw something swimming in the
water, and pulled toward it, thinking it a coyote; but we soon
recognized a large grizzly bear, swimming directly across the
channel.  Not having any weapon, we hurriedly pulled for the
schooner, calling out, as we neared it, "A bear! a bear!" It so
happened that Major Miller was on deck, washing his face and hands.
He ran rapidly to the bow of the vessel, took the musket from the
hands of the sentinel, and fired at the bear, as he passed but a
short distance ahead of the schooner.  The bear rose, made a growl
or howl, but continued his course.  As we scrambled up the
port-aide to get our guns, the mate, with a crew, happened to have
a boat on the starboard-aide, and, armed only with a hatchet, they
pulled up alongside the bear, and the mate struck him in the head
with the hatchet.  The bear turned, tried to get into the boat, but
the mate struck his claws with repeated blows, and made him let go.
After several passes with him, the mate actually killed the bear,
got a rope round him, and towed him alongside the schooner, where
he was hoisted on deck.  The carcass weighed over six hundred
pounds.  It was found that Major Miller's shot had struck the bear
in the lower jaw, and thus disabled him.  Had it not been for this,
the bear would certainly have upset the boat and drowned all in it.
As it was, however, his meat served us a good turn in our trip up
to Stockton.  At Stockton we disembarked our wagon, provisions, and
instruments.  There I bought two fine mules at three hundred
dollars each, and we hitched up and started for the Coaumnes River.
About twelve miles off was the Mokelumne, a wide, bold stream, with
a canoe as a ferry-boat.  We took our wagon to pieces, and ferried
it and its contents across, and then drove our mules into the
water.  In crossing, one mule became entangled in the rope of the
other, and for a time we thought he was a gone mule; but at last he
revived and we hitched up.  The mules were both pack-animals;
neither had ever before seen a wagon.  Young Seton also was about
as green, and had never handled a mule.  We put on the harness, and
began to hitch them in, when one of the mules turned his head, saw
the wagon, and started.  We held on tight, but the beast did not
stop until he had shivered the tongue-pole into a dozen fragments.
The fact was, that Seton had hitched the traces before he had put
on the blind-bridle.  There was considerable swearing done, but
that would not mend the pole.  There was no place nearer than
Sutter's Fort to repair damages, so we were put to our wits' end.
We first sent back a mile or so, and bought a raw-hide.  Gathering
up the fragments of the pole and cutting the hide into strips, we
finished it in the rudest manner.  As long as the hide was green, the
pole was very shaky; but gradually the sun dried the hide,
tightened it, and the pole actually held for about a month.  This
cost us nearly a day of delay; but, when damages were repaired, we
harnessed up again, and reached the crossing of the Cosumnes, where
our survey was to begin.  The expediente, or title-papers, of the
ranch described it as containing nine or eleven leagues on the
Cosumnes, south side, and between the San Joaquin River and Sierra
Nevada Mountains.  We began at the place where the road crosses the
Cosumnes, and laid down a line four miles south, perpendicular to
the general direction of the stream; then, surveying up the stream,
we marked each mile so as to admit of a subdivision of one mile by
four.  The land was dry and very poor, with the exception of here
and there some small pieces of bottom land, the great bulk of the
bottom-land occurring on the north side of the stream.  We
continued the survey up some twenty miles into the hills above the
mill of Dailor and Sheldon.  It took about a month to make this
survey, which, when finished, was duly plotted; and for it we
received one-tenth of the land, or two subdivisions.  Ord and I
took the land, and we paid Seton for his labor in cash.  By the
sale of my share of the land, subsequently, I realized three
thousand dollars.  After finishing Hartnell's survey, we crossed
over to Dailor's, and did some work for him at five hundred dollars
a day for the party.  Having finished our work on the Cosumnes, we
proceeded to Sacramento, where Captain Sutter employed us to
connect the survey of Sacramento City, made by Lieutenant Warner,
and that of Sutterville, three miles below, which was then being
surveyed by Lieutenant J. W. Davidson, of the First Dragoons.  At
Sutterville, the plateau of the Sacramento approached quite near
the river, and it would have made a better site for a town than the
low, submerged land where the city now stands; but it seems to be a
law of growth that all natural advantages are disregarded wherever
once business chooses a location.  Old Sutter's embarcadero became
Sacramento City, simply because it was the first point used for
unloading boats for Sutter's Fort, just as the site for San
Francisco was fixed by the use of Yerba Buena as the hide-landing
for the Mission of  "San Francisco de Asis."

I invested my earnings in this survey in three lots in Sacramento
City, on which I made a fair profit by a sale to one McNulty, of
Mansfield, Ohio.  I only had a two months' leave of absence, during
which General Smith, his staff, and a retinue of civil friends,
were making a tour of the gold-mines, and hearing that he was en
route back to his headquarters at Sonoma, I knocked off my work,
sold my instruments, and left my wagon and mules with my cousin
Charley Hoyt, who had a store in Sacramento, and was on the point
of moving up to a ranch, for which he had bargained, on Bear Creek,
on which was afterward established Camp "Far West."  He afterward
sold the mules, wagon, etc., for me, and on the whole I think I
cleared, by those two months' work, about six thousand dollars.  I
then returned to headquarters at Sonoma, in time to attend my
fellow aide-de-camp Gibbs through a long and dangerous sickness,
during which he was on board a store-ship, guarded by Captain
George Johnson, who now resides in San Francisco.  General Smith
had agreed that on the first good opportunity he would send me to
the United States as a bearer of dispatches, but this he could not
do until he had made the examination of Oregon, which was also in
his command.  During the summer of 1849 there continued to pour
into California a perfect stream of people.  Steamers came, and a
line was established from San Francisco to Sacramento, of which the
Senator was the pioneer, charging sixteen dollars a passage, and
actually coining money.  Other boats were built, out of materials
which had either come around Cape Horn or were brought from the
Sandwich Islands.  Wharves were built, houses were springing up
as if by magic, and the Bay of San Francisco presented as busy a
scene of life as any part of the world.  Major Allen, of the
Quartermaster's Department, who had come out as chief-quartermaster
of the division, was building a large warehouse at Benicia, with a
row of quarters, out of lumber at one hundred dollars per thousand
feet, and the work was done by men at sixteen dollars a day.  I
have seen a detailed soldier, who got only his monthly pay of eight
dollars a month, and twenty cents a day for extra duty, nailing on
weather-boards and shingles, alongside a citizen who was paid
sixteen dollars a day.  This was a real injustice, made the
soldiers discontented, and it was hardly to be wondered at that so
many deserted.

While the mass of people were busy at gold and in mammoth
speculations, a set of busy politicians were at work to secure the
prizes of civil government.  Gwin and Fremont were there, and T.
Butler King, of Georgia, had come out from the East, scheming for
office.  He staid with us at Sonoma, and was generally regarded as
the Government candidate for United States Senator.  General Riley
as Governor, and Captain Halleck as Secretary of State, had issued
a proclamation for the election of a convention to frame a State
constitution.  In due time the elections were held, and the
convention was assembled at Monterey.  Dr. Semple was elected
president; and Gwin, Sutter, Halleck, Butler King, Sherwood,
Gilbert, Shannon, and others, were members.  General Smith took no
part in this convention, but sent me down to watch the proceedings,
and report to him.  The only subject of interest was the slavery
question.  There were no slaves then in California, save a few who
had come out as servants, but the Southern people at that time
claimed their share of territory, out of that acquired by the
common labors of all sections of the Union in the war with Mexico.
Still, in California there was little feeling on the subject.  I
never heard General Smith, who was a Louisianian, express any
opinion about it.  Nor did Butler King, of Georgia, ever manifest
any particular interest in the matter.  A committee was named to
draft a constitution, which in due time was reported, with the
usual clause, then known as the Wilmot Proviso, excluding slavery;
and during the debate which ensued very little opposition was made
to this clause, which was finally adopted by a large majority,
although the convention was made up in large part of men from our
Southern States.  This matter of California being a free State,
afterward, in the national Congress, gave rise to angry debates,
which at one time threatened civil war.  The result of the
convention was the election of State officers, and of the
Legislature which sat in San Jose in October and November, 1849,
and which elected Fremont and Gwin as the first United States
Senators in Congress from the Pacific coast.

Shortly after returning from Monterey, I was sent by General Smith
up to Sacramento City to instruct Lieutenants Warner and
Williamson, of the Engineers, to push their surveys of the Sierra
Nevada Mountains, for the purpose of ascertaining the possibility
of passing that range by a railroad, a subject that then elicited
universal interest.  It was generally assumed that such a road
could not be made along any of the immigrant roads then in use, and
Warner's orders were to look farther north up the Feather River, or
some one of its tributaries.  Warner was engaged in this survey
during the summer and fall of 1849, and had explored, to the very
end of Goose Lake, the source of Feather River.  Then, leaving
Williamson with the baggage and part of the men, he took about ten
men and a first-rate guide, crossed the summit to the east, and had
turned south, having the range of mountains on his right hand, with
the intention of regaining his camp by another pass in the
mountain.  The party was strung out, single file, with wide spaces
between, Warner ahead.  He had just crossed a small valley and
ascended one of the spurs covered with sage-brush and rocks, when a
band of Indians rose up and poured in a shower of arrows.  The mule
turned and ran back to the valley, where Warner fell off dead,
punctured by five arrows.  The mule also died.  The guide, who was
near to Warner, was mortally wounded; and one or two men had arrows
in their bodies, but recovered.  The party gathered about Warner's
body, in sight of the Indians, who whooped and yelled, but did not
venture away from their cover of rocks.  This party of men remained
there all day without burying the bodies, and at night, by a wide
circuit, passed the mountain, and reached Williamson's camp.  The
news of Warner's death cast a gloom over all the old Californians,
who knew him well.  He was a careful, prudent, and honest officer,
well qualified for his business, and extremely accurate in all his
work.  He and I had been intimately associated during our four
years together in California, and I felt his loss deeply.  The
season was then too far advanced to attempt to avenge his death,
and it was not until the next spring that a party was sent out to
gather up and bury his scattered bones.

As winter approached, the immigrants overland came pouring into
California, dusty and worn with their two thousand miles of weary
travel across the plains and mountains.  Those who arrived in
October and November reported thousands still behind them, with
oxen perishing, and short of food.  Appeals were made for help, and
General Smith resolved to attempt relief.  Major Rucker, who had
come across with Pike.  Graham's Battalion of Dragoons, had
exchanged with Major Fitzgerald, of the Quartermaster's Department,
and was detailed to conduct this relief.  General Smith ordered him
to be supplied with one hundred thousand dollars out of the civil
fund, subject to his control, and with this to purchase at
Sacramento flour, bacon, etc., and to hire men and mules to send
out and meet the immigrants.  Major Rucker fulfilled this duty
perfectly, sending out pack-trains loaded with food by the many
routes by which the immigrants were known to be approaching, went
out himself with one of these trains, and remained in the mountains
until the last immigrant had got in.  No doubt this expedition
saved many a life which has since been most useful to the country.
I remained at Sacramento a good part of the fall of 1849,
recognizing among the immigrants many of my old personal
friends--John C. Fall, William King, Sam Stambaugh, Hugh Ewing,
Hampton Denman, etc.  I got Rucker to give these last two employment
along with the train for the relief of the immigrants.  They had
proposed to begin a ranch on my land on the Cosumnes, but afterward
changed their minds, and went out with Rucker.

While I was at Sacramento General Smith had gone on his
contemplated trip to Oregon, and promised that he would be back in
December, when he would send me home with dispatches.  Accordingly,
as the winter and rainy season was at hand, I went to San
Francisco, and spent some time at the Presidio, waiting patiently
for General Smith's return.  About Christmas a vessel arrived from
Oregon with the dispatches, and an order for me to deliver them in
person to General Winfield Scott, in New York City.  General Smith
had sent them down, remaining in Oregon for a time.  Of course I
was all ready, and others of our set were going home by the same
conveyance, viz., Rucker, Ord, A. J. Smith--some under orders, and
the others on leave.  Wanting to see my old friends in Monterey, I
arranged for my passage in the steamer of January 1, 1850, paying
six hundred dollars for passage to New York, and went down to
Monterey by land, Rucker accompanying me.  The weather was
unusually rainy, and all the plain about Santa Clara was under
water; but we reached Monterey in time.  I again was welcomed by my
friends, Dona Augustias, Manuelita, and the family, and it was
resolved that I should take two of the boys home with me and put
them at Georgetown College for education, viz., Antonio and
Porfirio, thirteen and eleven years old.  The dona gave me a bag of
gold-dust to pay for their passage and to deposit at the college.
On the 2d day of January punctually appeared the steamer Oregon.

We were all soon on board and off for home.  At that time the
steamers touched at San Diego, Acapulco, and Panama.  Our
passage down the coast was unusually pleasant.  Arrived at
Panama, we hired mules and rode across to Gorgona, on the
Cruces River, where we hired a boat and paddled down to the
mouth of the river, off which lay the steamer Crescent City.  It
usually took four days to cross the isthmus, every passenger taking
care of himself, and it was really funny to watch the efforts of
women and men unaccustomed to mules.  It was an old song to us, and
the trip across was easy and interesting.  In due time we were rowed
off to the Crescent City, rolling back and forth in the swell, and
we scrambled aboard by a "Jacob's ladder" from the stern.  Some of
the women had to be hoisted aboard by lowering a tub from the end
of a boom; fun to us who looked on, but awkward enough to the poor
women, especially to a very fat one, who attracted much notice.
General Fremont, wife and child (Lillie) were passengers with us
down from San Francisco; but Mrs. Fremont not being well, they
remained over one trip at Panama.

Senator Gwin was one of our passengers, and went through to New
York.  We reached New York about the close of January, after a safe
and pleasant trip.  Our party, composed of Ord, A. J. Smith, and
Rucker, with the two boys, Antonio and Porfirio, put up at
Delmonico's, on Bowling Green; and, as soon as we had cleaned up
somewhat, I took a carriage, went to General Scott's office in
Ninth Street, delivered my dispatches, was ordered to dine with him
next day, and then went forth to hunt up my old friends and
relations, the Scotts, Hoyts, etc., etc.

On reaching New York, most of us had rough soldier's clothing, but
we soon got a new outfit, and I dined with General Scott's family,
Mrs. Scott being present, and also their son-in-law and daughter
(Colonel and Mrs. H. L. Scott).  The general questioned me pretty
closely in regard to things on the Pacific coast, especially the
politics, and startled me with the assertion that "our country was
on the eve of a terrible civil war."  He interested me by anecdotes
of my old army comrades in his recent battles around the city of
Mexico, and I felt deeply the fact that our country had passed
through a foreign war, that my comrades had fought great battles,
and yet I had not heard a hostile shot.  Of course, I thought it
the last and only chance in my day, and that my career as a soldier
was at an end.  After some four or five days spent in New York, I
was, by an order of General Scott, sent to Washington, to lay
before the Secretary of War (Crawford, of Georgia) the dispatches
which I had brought from California.  On reaching Washington, I
found that Mr. Ewing was Secretary of the Interior, and I at once
became a member of his family.  The family occupied the house of
Mr. Blair, on Pennsylvania Avenue, directly in front of the War
Department.  I immediately repaired to the War Department, and
placed my dispatches in the hands of Mr. Crawford, who questioned
me somewhat about California, but seemed little interested in the
subject, except so far as it related to slavery and the routes
through Texas.  I then went to call on the President at the White
House.  I found Major Bliss, who had been my teacher in mathematics
at West Point, and was then General Taylor's son-in-law and private
secretary.  He took me into the room, now used by the President's
private secretaries, where President Taylor was.  I had never seen
him before, though I had served under him in Florida in 1840-'41,
and was most agreeably surprised at his fine personal appearance,
and his pleasant, easy manners.  He received me with great
kindness, told me that Colonel Mason had mentioned my name with
praise, and that he would be pleased to do me any act of favor.  We
were with him nearly an hour, talking about California generally,
and of his personal friends, Persifer Smith, Riley, Canby, and
others: Although General Scott was generally regarded by the army
as the most accomplished soldier of the Mexican War, yet General
Taylor had that blunt, honest, and stern character, that endeared
him to the masses of the people, and made him President.  Bliss,
too, had gained a large fame by his marked skill and intelligence
as an adjutant-general and military adviser.  His manner was very
unmilitary, and in his talk he stammered and hesitated, so as to
make an unfavorable impression on a stranger; but he was
wonderfully accurate and skillful with his pen, and his orders and
letters form a model of military precision and clearness.




CHAPTER IV.

MISSOURI, LOUISIANA, AND CALIFORNIA

1850-1855.


Having  returned from California in January, 1850, with dispatches
for the War Department, and having delivered them in person first
to General Scott in New York City, and afterward to the Secretary
of War (Crawford) in Washington City, I applied for and received a
leave of absence for six months.  I first visited my mother, then
living at Mansfield, Ohio, and returned to Washington, where, on
the 1st day of May, 1850, I was married to Miss Ellen Boyle Ewing,
daughter of the Hon. Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Interior.  The
marriage ceremony was attended by a large and distinguished
company, embracing Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, T. H. Benton,
President Taylor, and all his cabinet.  This occurred at the house
of Mr. Ewing, the same now owned and occupied by Mr. F. P. Blair,
senior, on Pennsylvania Avenue, opposite the War Department.  We
made a wedding tour to Baltimore, New York, Niagara, and Ohio, and
returned to Washington by the 1st of July.  General Taylor
participated in the celebration of the Fourth of July, a very hot
day, by hearing a long speech from the Hon. Henry S. Foote, at the
base of the Washington Monument.  Returning from the celebration
much heated and fatigued, he partook too freely of his favorite
iced milk with cherries, and during that night was seized with a
severe colic, which by morning had quite prostrated him.  It was
said that he sent for his son-in-law, Surgeon Wood, United States
Army, stationed in Baltimore, and declined medical assistance from
anybody else.  Mr. Ewing visited him several times, and was
manifestly uneasy and anxious, as was also his son-in-law, Major
Bliss, then of the army, and his confidential secretary.  He
rapidly grew worse, and died in about four days.


At that time there was a high state of political feeling pervading
the country, on account of the questions growing out of the new
Territories just acquired from Mexico by the war.  Congress was in
session, and General Taylor's sudden death evidently created great
alarm.  I was present in the Senate-gallery, and saw the oath of
office administered to the Vice-President, Mr. Fillmore, a man of
splendid physical proportions and commanding appearance; but on the
faces of Senators  and people could easily be read the feelings of
doubt and uncertainty that prevailed.  All knew that a change in
the cabinet and general policy was likely to result, but at the
time it was supposed that Mr. Fillmore, whose home was in Buffalo,
would be less liberal than General Taylor to the politicians of the
South, who feared, or pretended to fear, a crusade against slavery;
or, as was the political cry of the day, that slavery would be
prohibited in the Territories and in the places exclusively under
the jurisdiction of the United States.  Events, however, proved the
contrary.

I attended General Taylor's funeral as a sort of aide-decamp, at
the request of the Adjutant-General of the army, Roger Jones, whose
brother, a militia-general, commanded the escort, composed of
militia and some regulars.  Among the regulars I recall the names
of Captains John Sedgwick and W. F. Barry.

Hardly was General Taylor decently buried in the Congressional
Cemetery when the political struggle recommenced, and it became
manifest that Mr. Fillmore favored the general compromise then
known as Henry Clay's "Omnibus Bill," and that a general change of
cabinet would at once occur: Webster was to succeed Mr. Clayton as
Secretary of State, Corwin to succeed Mr. Meredith as Secretary of
the Treasury, and A. H. H. Stuart to succeed Mr. Ewing as Secretary
of the Interior.  Mr. Ewing, however, was immediately appointed by
the Governor of the State to succeed Corwin in the Senate.
These changes made it necessary for Mr. Ewing to discontinue
house-keeping, and Mr. Corwin took his home and furniture off his
hands. I escorted the family out to their home in Lancaster, Ohio;
but, before this had occurred, some most interesting debates took
place in the Senate, which I regularly attended, and heard Clay,
Benton, Foots, King of Alabama, Dayton, and the many real orators of
that day.  Mr. Calhoun was in his seat, but he was evidently
approaching his end, for he was pale and feeble in the extreme.  I
heard Mr. Webster's last speech on the floor of the Senate, under
circumstances that warrant a description.  It was publicly known
that he was to leave the Senate, and enter the new cabinet of Mr.
Fillmore, as his Secretary of State, and that prior to leaving he
was to make a great speech on the "Omnibus Bill."  Resolved to hear
it, I went up to the Capitol on the day named, an hour or so
earlier than usual.  The speech was to be delivered in the old
Senate-chamber, now used by the Supreme Court.  The galleries were
much smaller than at present, and I found them full to overflowing,
with a dense crowd about the door, struggling to reach the stairs. I
could not get near, and then tried the reporters' gallery, but found
it equally crowded; so I feared I should lose the only possible
opportunity to hear Mr. Webster.

I had only a limited personal acquaintance with any of the
Senators, but had met Mr. Corwin quite often at Mr. Ewing's house,
and I also knew that he had been extremely friendly to my father in
his lifetime; so I ventured to send in to him my card, "W. T. S.,
First-Lieutenant, Third Artillery."  He came to the door promptly,
when I said, "Mr. Corwin, I believe Mr. Webster is to speak
to-day."  His answer was, "Yes, he has the floor at one o'clock."
I then added that I was extremely anxious to hear him.  "Well,"
said he, "why don't you go into the gallery?"  I explained that it
was full, and I had tried every access, but found all jammed with
people.  "Well," said he, "what do you want of me?"  I explained
that I would like him to take me on the floor of the Senate; that I
had often seen from the gallery persons on the floor, no better
entitled to it than I.  He then asked in his quizzical way, "Are
you a foreign embassador?"  "No."  "Are you the Governor of a
State?"  "No."  "Are you a member of the other House?"  "Certainly
not"  "Have you ever had a vote of thanks by name?"  "No!"  "Well,
these are the only privileged members."  I then told him he knew
well enough who I was, and that if he chose he could take me in.
He then said, "Have you any impudence?"  I told him,  "A reasonable
amount if occasion called for it."  "Do you think you could become
so interested in my conversation as not to notice the door-keeper?"
(pointing to him).  I told him that there was not the least doubt
of it, if he would tell me one of his funny stories.  He then took
my arm, and led me a turn in the vestibule, talking about some
indifferent matter, but all the time directing my looks to his left
hand, toward which he was gesticulating with his right; and thus we
approached the door-keeper, who began asking me, "Foreign
ambassador?  Governor of a State?  Member of Congress?" etc.; but I
caught Corwin's eye, which said plainly, "Don't mind him, pay
attention to me," and in this way we entered the Senate-chamber by
a side-door.  Once in, Corwin said, "Now you can take care of
yourself," and I thanked him cordially.

I found a seat close behind Mr. Webster, and near General Scott,
and heard the whole of the speech.  It was heavy in the extreme,
and I confess that I was disappointed and tired long before it was
finished.  No doubt the speech was full of fact and argument, but
it had none of the fire of oratory, or intensity of feeling, that
marked all of Mr. Clay's efforts.

Toward the end of July, as before stated, all the family went home
to Lancaster.  Congress was still in session, and the bill adding
four captains to the Commissary Department had not passed, but was
reasonably certain to, and I was equally sure of being one of them.
At that time my name was on the muster-roll of (Light) Company C,
Third Artillery (Bragg's), stationed at Jefferson Barracks, near
St. Louis.  But, as there was cholera at St. Louis, on application,
I was permitted to delay joining my company until September.  Early
in that month, I proceeded to Cincinnati, and thence by steamboat
to St. Louis, and then to Jefferson Barracks, where I reported
for duty to Captain and Brevet-Colonel Braxton Bragg, commanding
(Light) Company C, Third Artillery.  The other officers of the
company were First-Lieutenant James A. Hardie, and afterward
Haekaliah Brown.  New horses had just been purchased for the
battery, and we were preparing for work, when the mail brought the
orders announcing the passage of the bill increasing the Commissary
Department by four captains, to which were promoted Captains
Shiras, Blair, Sherman, and Bowen.  I was ordered to take post at
St. Louis, and to relieve Captain A. J. Smith, First Dragoons, who
had been acting in that capacity for some months.  My commission
bore date September 27,1850.  I proceeded forthwith to the city,
relieved Captain Smith, and entered on the discharge of the duties
of the office.

Colonel N. S. Clarke, Sixth Infantry, commanded the department;
Major D. C. Buell was adjutant-general, and Captain W. S. Hancock
was regimental quartermaster; Colonel Thomas Swords was the depot
quartermaster, and we had our offices in the same building, on the
corner of Washington Avenue and Second.  Subsequently Major S. Van
Vliet relieved Colonel Swords.  I remained at the Planters' House
until my family arrived, when we occupied a house on Chouteau
Avenue, near Twelfth.

During the spring and summer of 1851, Mr. Ewing and Mr. Henry
Stoddard, of Dayton, Ohio, a cousin of my father, were much in St.
Louis, on business connected with the estate of Major Amos
Stoddard, who was of the old army, as early as the beginning of
this century.  He was stationed at the village of St. Louis at the
time of the Louisiana purchase, and when Lewis and Clarke made
their famous expedition across the continent to the Columbia River.
Major Stoddard at that early day had purchased a small farm back of
the village, of some Spaniard or Frenchman, but, as he was a
bachelor, and was killed at Fort Meigs, Ohio, during the War of
1812, the title was for many years lost sight of, and the farm was
covered over by other claims and by occupants.  As St. Louis began
to grow, his brothers and sisters, and their descendants, concluded
to look up the property.  After much and fruitless litigation, they
at last retained Mr. Stoddard, of Dayton, who in turn employed Mr.
Ewing, and these, after many years of labor, established the title,
and in the summer of 1851 they were put in possession by the United
States marshal.  The ground was laid off, the city survey extended
over it, and the whole was sold in partition.  I made some
purchases, and acquired an interest, which I have retained more or
less ever since.

We continued to reside in St. Louis throughout the year 1851, and
in the spring of 1852 I had occasion to visit Fort Leavenworth on
duty, partly to inspect a lot of cattle which a Mr. Gordon, of Cass
County, had contracted to deliver in New Mexico, to enable Colonel
Sumner to attempt his scheme of making the soldiers in New Mexico
self-supporting, by raising their own meat, and in a measure their
own vegetables.  I found Fort Leavenworth then, as now, a most
beautiful spot, but in the midst of a wild Indian country.  There
were no whites settled in what is now the State of Kansas.  Weston,
in Missouri, was the great town, and speculation in town-lots there
and thereabout burnt the fingers of some of the army-officers, who
wanted to plant their scanty dollars in a fruitful soil.  I rode on
horseback over to Gordon's farm, saw the cattle, concluded the
bargain, and returned by way of Independence, Missouri.  At
Independence I found F. X. Aubrey, a noted man of that day, who had
just made a celebrated ride of six hundred miles in six days.  That
spring the United States quartermaster, Major L. C. Easton, at Fort
Union, New Mexico, had occasion to send some message east by a
certain date, and contracted with Aubrey to carry it to the nearest
post-office (then Independence, Missouri), making his compensation
conditional on the time consumed.  He was supplied with a good
horse, and an order on the outgoing trains for an exchange.  Though
the whole route was infested with hostile Indians, and not a house
on it, Aubrey started alone with his rifle.  He was fortunate in
meeting several outward-bound trains, and there, by made frequent
changes of horses, some four or five, and reached Independence in
six days, having hardly rested or slept the whole way.  Of course,
he was extremely fatigued, and said there was an opinion among the
wild Indians that if a man "sleeps out his sleep," after such
extreme exhaustion, he will never awake; and, accordingly, he
instructed his landlord to wake him up after eight hours of sleep.
When aroused at last, he saw by the clock that he had been asleep
twenty hours, and he was dreadfully angry, threatened to murder his
landlord, who protested he had tried in every way to get him up,
but found it impossible, and had let him "sleep it out" Aubrey, in
describing his sensations to me, said he took it for granted he was
a dead man; but in fact he sustained no ill effects, and was off
again in a few days.  I met him afterward often in California, and
always esteemed him one of the best samples of that bold race of
men who had grown up on the Plains, along with the Indians, in the
service of the fur companies.  He was afterward, in 1856, killed by
R. C. Weightman, in a bar-room row, at Santa Fe, New Mexico, where
he had just arrived from California.

In going from Independence to Fort Leavenworth, I had to swim Milk
Creek, and sleep all night in a Shawnee camp.  The next day I
crossed the Kaw or Kansas River in a ferry boat, maintained by the
blacksmith of the tribe, and reached the fort in the evening.  At
that day the whole region was unsettled, where now exist many rich
counties, highly cultivated, embracing several cities of from ten
to forty thousand inhabitants.  From Fort Leavenworth I returned by
steamboat to St. Louis.

In the summer of 1852, my family went to Lancaster, Ohio; but I
remained at my post.  Late in the season, it was rumored that I was
to be transferred to New Orleans, and in due time I learned the
cause.  During a part of the Mexican War, Major Seawell, of the
Seventh Infantry, had been acting commissary of subsistence at New
Orleans, then the great depot of supplies for the troops in Texas,
and of those operating beyond the Rio Grande.  Commissaries at that
time were allowed to purchase in open market, and were not
restricted to advertising and awarding contracts to the lowest
bidders.  It was reported that Major Seawell had purchased largely
of the house of Perry Seawell & Co., Mr. Seawell being a relative
of his.  When he was relieved in his duties by Major Waggman, of
the regular Commissary Department, the latter found Perry Seawell &
Co. so prompt and satisfactory that he continued the patronage;
for which there was a good reason, because stores for the use of
the troops at remote posts had to be packed in a particular way, to
bear transportation in wagons, or even on pack-mules; and this firm
had made extraordinary preparations for this exclusive purpose.
Some time about 1849, a brother of Major Waggaman, who had been
clerk to Captain Casey, commissary of subsistence, at Tampa Bay,
Florida, was thrown out of office by the death of the captain, and
he naturally applied to his brother in New Orleans for employment;
and he, in turn, referred him to his friends, Messrs.  Perry
Seawell & Co.  These first employed him as a clerk, and afterward
admitted him as a partner.  Thus it resulted, in fact, that Major
Waggaman was dealing largely, if not exclusively, with a firm of
which his brother was a partner.

One day, as General Twiggs was coming across Lake Pontchartrain, he
fell in with one of his old cronies, who was an extensive grocer.
This gentleman gradually led the conversation to the downward
tendency of the times since he and Twiggs were young, saying that,
in former years, all the merchants of New Orleans had a chance at
government patronage; but now, in order to sell to the army
commissary, one had to take a brother in as a partner.  General
Twiggs resented this, but the merchant again affirmed it, and gave
names.  As soon as General Twiggs reached his office, he instructed
his adjutant-general, Colonel Bliss--who told me this--to address a
categorical note of inquiry to Major Waggaman.  The major very
frankly stated the facts as they had arisen, and insisted that the
firm of Perry Seawell & Co. had enjoyed a large patronage, but
deserved it richly by reason of their promptness, fairness, and
fidelity.  The correspondence was sent to Washington, and the
result was, that Major Waggaman was ordered to St. Louis, and I was
ordered to New Orleans.

I went down to New Orleans in a steamboat in the month of
September, 1852, taking with me a clerk, and, on arrival, assumed
the office, in a bank-building facing Lafayette Square, in which
were the offices of all the army departments.  General D. Twiggs
was in command of the department, with Colonel W. W. S. Bliss
(son-in-law of General Taylor) as his adjutant-general.  Colonel A.
C. Myers was quartermaster, Captain John F. Reynolds aide-de-camp,
and Colonel A. J. Coffee paymaster.  I took rooms at the St. Louis
Hotel, kept by a most excellent gentleman, Colonel Mudge.

Mr. Perry Seawell came to me in person, soliciting a continuance of
the custom which he had theretofore enjoyed; but I told him frankly
that a change was necessary, and I never saw or heard of him
afterward.  I simply purchased in open market, arranged for the
proper packing of the stores, and had not the least difficulty in
supplying the troops and satisfying the head of the department in
Washington.

About Christmas, I had notice that my family, consisting of Mrs.
Sherman, two children, and nurse, with my sister Fanny (now Mrs.
Moulton, of Cincinnati, Ohio), were en route for New Orleans by
steam-packet; so I hired a house on Magazine Street, and furnished
it.  Almost at the moment of their arrival, also came from St.
Louis my personal friend Major Turner, with a parcel of documents,
which, on examination, proved to be articles of copartnership for a
bank in California under the title of "Lucas, Turner & Co.," in
which my name was embraced as a partner.  Major Turner was, at the
time, actually en route for New York, to embark for San Francisco,
to inaugurate the bank, in the nature of a branch of the firm
already existing at St. Louis under the name of "Lucas & Symonds."
We discussed the matter very fully, and he left with me the papers
for reflection, and went on to New York and California.

Shortly after arrived James H. Lucas, Esq., the principal of the
banking-firm in St. Louis, a most honorable and wealthy gentleman.
He further explained the full programme of the branch in
California; that my name had been included at the insistence of
Major Turner, who was a man of family and property in St. Louis,
unwilling to remain long in San Francisco, and who wanted me to
succeed him there.  He offered me a very tempting income, with an
interest that would accumulate and grow.  He also disclosed to me
that, in establishing a branch in California, he was influenced by
the apparent prosperity of Page, Bacon & Co., and further that he
had received the principal data, on which he had founded the
scheme, from B. R. Nisbet, who was then a teller in the firm of
Page, Bacon & Co., of San Francisco; that he also was to be taken
in as a partner, and was fully competent to manage all the details
of the business; but, as Nisbet was comparatively young, Mr. Lucas
wanted me to reside in San Francisco permanently, as the head of
the firm.  All these matters were fully discussed, and I agreed to
apply for a six months' leave of absence, go to San Francisco, see
for myself, and be governed by appearances there.  I accordingly,
with General Twiggs's approval, applied to the adjutant-general for
a six months' leave, which was granted; and Captain John F.
Reynolds was named to perform my duties during my absence.

During the stay of my family in New Orleans, we enjoyed the society
of the families of General Twiggs, Colonel Myers, and Colonel
Bliss, as also of many citizens, among whom was the wife of Mr.
Day, sister to my brother-in-law, Judge Bartley.  General Twiggs
was then one of the oldest officers of the army.  His history
extended back to the War of 1812, and he had served in early days
with General Jackson in Florida and in the Creek campaigns.  He had
fine powers of description, and often entertained us, at his
office, with accounts of his experiences in the earlier settlements
of the Southwest.  Colonel Bliss had been General Taylor's adjutant
in the Mexican War, and was universally regarded as one of the most
finished and accomplished scholars in the army, and his wife was a
most agreeable and accomplished lady.

Late in February, I dispatched my family up to Ohio in the
steamboat Tecumseh (Captain Pearce); disposed of my house and
furniture; turned over to Major Reynolds the funds, property, and
records of the office; and took passage in a small steamer for
Nicaragua, en route for California.  We embarked early in March,
and in seven days reached Greytown, where we united with the
passengers from New York, and proceeded, by the Nicaragua River and
Lake, for the Pacific Ocean.  The river was low, and the little
steam canal-boats, four in number, grounded often, so that the
passengers had to get into the water, to help them over the bare.
In all there were about six hundred passengers, of whom about sixty
were women and children.  In four days we reached Castillo, where
there is a decided fall, passed by a short railway, and above this
fall we were transferred to a larger boat, which carried us up the
rest of the river, and across the beautiful lake Nicaragua, studded
with volcanic islands.  Landing at Virgin Bay, we rode on mules
across to San Juan del Sur, where lay at anchor the propeller S. S.
Lewis (Captain Partridge, I think).  Passengers were carried
through the surf by natives to small boats, and rowed off to the
Lewis.  The weather was very hot, and quite a scramble followed for
state-rooms, especially for those on deck.  I succeeded in reaching
the purser's office, got my ticket for a berth in one of the best
state-rooms on deck, and, just as I was turning from the window, a
lady who was a fellow-passenger from New Orleans, a Mrs. D-, called
to me to secure her and her lady friend berths on deck, saying that
those below were unendurable.  I spoke to the purser, who, at the
moment perplexed by the crowd and clamor, answered: "I must put
their names down for the other two berths of your state-room; but,
as soon as the confusion is over, I will make some change whereby
you shall not suffer."  As soon as these two women were assigned to
a state-room, they took possession, and I was left out.  Their
names were recorded as "Captain Sherman and ladies."  As soon as
things were quieted down I remonstrated with the purser, who at
last gave me a lower berth in another and larger state-room on
deck, with five others, so that my two ladies had the state-room
all to themselves.  At every meal the steward would come to me, and
say, "Captain Sherman, will you bring your ladies to the table?"
and we had the best seats in the ship.

This continued throughout the voyage, and I assert that "my ladies"
were of the most modest and best-behaved in the ship; but some time
after we had reached San Francisco one of our fellow-passengers
came to me and inquired if I personally knew Mrs. D---, with flaxen
tresses, who sang so sweetly for us, and who had come out under my
especial escort.  I replied I did not, more than the chance
acquaintance of the voyage, and what she herself had told me, viz.,
that she expected to meet her husband, who lived about Mokelumne
Hill.  He then informed me that she was a woman of the town.
Society in California was then decidedly mixed.  In due season the
steamship Lewis got under weigh.  She was a wooden ship, long and
narrow, bark-rigged, and a propeller; very slow, moving not over
eight miles an hour.  We stopped at Acapulco, and, in eighteen
days, passed in sight of Point Pinoa at Monterey, and at the speed
we were traveling expected to reach San Francisco at 4 A. M. the
next day.  The cabin passengers, as was usual, bought of the
steward some champagne and cigars, and we had a sort of ovation for
the captain, purser, and surgeon of the ship, who were all very
clever fellows, though they had a slow and poor ship.  Late at
night all the passengers went to bed, expecting to enter the port
at daylight.  I did not undress, as I thought the captain could and
would run in at night, and I lay down with my clothes on.  About 4
A. M. I was awakened by a bump and sort of grating of the vessel,
which I thought was our arrival at the wharf in San Francisco; but
instantly the ship struck heavily; the engines stopped, and the
running to and fro on deck showed that something was wrong.  In a
moment I was out of my state-room, at the bulwark, holding fast to
a stanchion, and looking over the side at the white and seething
water caused by her sudden and violent stoppage.  The sea was
comparatively smooth, the night pitch-dark, and the fog deep and
impenetrable; the ship would rise with the swell, and come down
with a bump and quiver that was decidedly unpleasant.  Soon the
passengers were out of their rooms, undressed, calling for help,
and praying as though the ship were going to sink immediately.  Of
course she could not sink, being already on the bottom, and the
only question was as to the strength of hull to stand the bumping
and straining.  Great confusion for a time prevailed, but soon I
realized that the captain had taken all proper precautions to
secure his boats, of which there were six at the davits.  These are
the first things that steerage-passengers make for in case of
shipwreck, and right over my head I heard the captain's voice say
in a low tone, but quite decided: "Let go that falls, or, damn you,
I'll blow your head off!"  This seemingly harsh language gave me
great comfort at the time, and on saying so to the captain
afterward, he explained that it was addressed to a passenger who
attempted to lower one of the boats.  Guards, composed of the crew,
were soon posted to prevent any interference with the boats, and
the officers circulated among the passengers the report that there
was no immediate danger; that, fortunately, the sea was smooth;
that we were simply aground, and must quietly await daylight.

They advised the passengers to keep quiet, and the ladies and
children to dress and sit at the doors of their state-rooms, there
to await the advice and action of the officers of the ship, who
were perfectly cool and self-possessed.  Meantime the ship was
working over a reef-for a time I feared she would break in two;
but, as the water gradually rose inside to a level with the sea
outside, the ship swung broadside to the swell, and all her keel
seemed to rest on the rock or sand.  At no time did the sea break
over the deck--but the water below drove all the people up to the
main-deck and to the promenade-deck, and thus we remained for about
three hours, when daylight came; but there was a fog so thick that
nothing but water could be seen.  The captain caused a boat to be
carefully lowered, put in her a trustworthy officer with a
boat-compass, and we saw her depart into the fog.  During her
absence the ship's bell was kept tolling.  Then the fires were all
out, the ship full of water, and gradually breaking up, wriggling
with every swell like a willow basket--the sea all round us full of
the floating fragments of her sheeting, twisted and torn into a
spongy condition.  In less than an hour the boat returned, saying
that the beach was quite near, not more than a mile away, and had a
good place for landing.  All the boats were then carefully lowered,
and manned by crews belonging to the ship; a piece of the gangway,
on the leeward side, was cut away, and all the women, and a few of
the worst-scared men, were lowered into the boats, which pulled for
shore.  In a comparatively short time the boats returned, took new
loads, and the debarkation was afterward carried on quietly and
systematically.  No baggage was allowed to go on shore except bags
or parcels carried in the hands of passengers.  At times the fog
lifted so that we could see from the wreck the tops of the hills,
and the outline of the shore; and I remember sitting on, the upper
or hurricane deck with the captain, who had his maps and compass
before him, and was trying to make out where the ship was.  I
thought I recognized the outline of the hills below the mission of
Dolores, and so stated to him; but he called my attention to the
fact that the general line of hills bore northwest, whereas the
coast south of San Francisco bears due north and south.  He
therefore concluded that the ship had overrun her reckoning, and
was then to the north of San Francisco.  He also explained that,
the passage up being longer than usual, viz., eighteen days, the
coal was short; that at the time the firemen were using some cut-up
spars along with the slack of coal, and that this fuel had made
more than usual steam, so that the ship must have glided along
faster than reckoned.  This proved to be the actual case, for, in
fact, the steamship Lewis was wrecked April 9, 1853, on "Duckworth
Reef," Baulinas Bay, about eighteen miles above the entrance to San
Francisco.

The captain had sent ashore the purser in the first boat, with
orders to work his way to the city as soon as possible, to report
the loss of his vessel, and to bring back help.  I remained on the
wreck till among the last of the passengers, managing to get a can
of crackers and some sardines out of the submerged pantry, a thing
the rest of the passengers did not have, and then I went quietly
ashore in one of the boats.  The passengers were all on the beach,
under a steep bluff; had built fires to dry their clothes, but had
seen no human being, and had no idea where they were.  Taking along
with me a fellow-passenger, a young chap about eighteen years old,
I scrambled up the bluff, and walked back toward the hills, in
hopes to get a good view of some known object.  It was then the
month of April, and the hills were covered with the beautiful
grasses and flowers of that season of the year.  We soon found
horse paths and tracks, and following them we came upon a drove of
horses grazing at large, some of which had saddle-marks.  At about
two miles from the beach we found a corral; and thence, following
one of the strongest-marked paths, in about a mile more we
descended into a valley, and, on turning a sharp point, reached a
board shanty, with a horse picketed near by.  Four men were inside
eating a meal.  I inquired if any of the Lewis's people had been
there; they did not seem to understand what I meant when I
explained to them that about three miles from them, and beyond the
old corral, the steamer Lewis was wrecked, and her passengers were
on the beach.  I inquired where we were, and they answered, "At
Baulinas Creek;" that they were employed at a saw-mill just above,
and were engaged in shipping lumber to San Francisco; that a
schooner loaded with lumber was then about two miles down the
creek, waiting for the tide to get out, and doubtless if we would
walk down they would take us on board.

I wrote a few words back to the captain, telling him where he was,
and that I would hurry to the city to send him help.  My companion
and I their went on down the creek, and soon descried the schooner
anchored out in the stream.  On being hailed, a small boat came in
and took us on board.  The "captain" willingly agreed for a small
sum to carry us down to San Francisco; and, as his whole crew
consisted of a small boy about twelve years old, we helped him to
get up his anchor and pole the schooner down the creek and out over
the bar on a high tide.  This must have been about 2 P.M. Once over
the bar, the sails were hoisted, and we glided along rapidly with a
strong, fair, northwest wind.  The fog had lifted, so we could see
the shores plainly, and the entrance to the bay.  In a couple of
hours we were entering the bay, and running "wing-and-wing."
Outside the wind was simply the usual strong breeze; but, as it
passes through the head of the Golden Gate, it increases, and
there, too, we met a strong ebb-tide.

The schooner was loaded with lumber, much of which was on deck,
lashed down to ring bolts with raw-hide thongs.  The captain was
steering, and I was reclining on the lumber, looking at the
familiar shore, as we approached Fort Point, when I heard a sort of
cry, and felt the schooner going over.  As we got into the throat
of the "Heads," the force of the wind, meeting a strong ebb-tide,
drove the nose of the schooner under water; she dove like a duck,
went over on her side, and began, to drift out with the tide.  I
found myself in the water, mixed up with pieces of plank and ropes;
struck out, swam round to the stern, got on the keel, and clambered
up on the side.  Satisfied that she could not sink, by reason of
her cargo, I was not in the least alarmed, but thought two
shipwrecks in one day not a good beginning for a new, peaceful
career.  Nobody was drowned, however; the captain and crew were
busy in securing such articles as were liable to float off, and I
looked out for some passing boat or vessel to pick us up.  We were
drifting steadily out to sea, while I was signaling to a boat about
three miles off, toward Saucelito, and saw her tack and stand
toward us.  I was busy watching this sail-boat, when I heard a
Yankee's voice, close behind, saying, "This is a nice mess you've
got yourselves into," and looking about I saw a man in a small
boat, who had seen us upset, and had rowed out to us from a
schooner anchored close under the fort.  Some explanations were
made, and when the sail-boat coming from Saucelito was near enough
to be spoken to, and the captain had engaged her to help his
schooner, we bade him good by, and got the man in the small boat-to
carry us ashore, and land us at the foot of the bluff, just below
the fort.  Once there, I was at home, and we footed it up to the
Presidio.  Of the sentinel I inquired who was in command of the
post, and was answered, "Major Merchant."  He was not then in, but
his adjutant, Lieutenant Gardner, was.  I sent my card to him; he
came out, and was much surprised to find me covered with sand, and
dripping with water, a good specimen of a shipwrecked mariner.  A
few words of explanation sufficed; horses were provided, and we
rode hastily into the city, reaching the office of the Nicaragua
Steamship Company (C. K. Garrison, agent) about dark, just as the
purser had arrived; by a totally different route.  It was too late
to send relief that night, but by daylight next morning two
steamers were en route for and reached the place of wreck in time
to relieve the passengers and bring them, and most of the baggage.
I lost my carpet-bag, but saved my trunk.  The Lewis went to pieces
the night after we got off, and, had there been an average sea
during the night of our shipwreck, none of us probably would have
escaped.  That evening in San Francisco I hunted up Major Turner,
whom I found boarding, in company with General E. A. Hitchcock, at
a Mrs. Ross's, on Clay Street, near Powell.  I took quarters with
them, and began to make my studies, with a view to a decision
whether it was best to undertake this new and untried scheme of
banking, or to return to New Orleans and hold on to what I then
had, a good army commission.

At the time of my arrival, San Francisco was an the top wave of
speculation and prosperity.  Major Turner had rented at six hundred
dollars a month the office formerly used and then owned by Adams &
Co., on the east side of Montgomery Street, between Sacramento and
California Streets.  B. R. Nisbet was the active partner, and James
Reilly the teller.  Already the bank of Lucas, Turner & Co.  was
established, and was engaged in selling bills of exchange,
receiving deposits, and loaning money at three per cent.  a month.

Page, Bacon & Co., and Adams & Co., were in full blast across the
street, in Parrott's new granite building, and other bankers were
doing seemingly a prosperous business, among them Wells, Fargo &
Co.; Drexel, Sather & Church; Burgoyne & Co.; James King of Win.;
Sanders & Brenham; Davidson & Co.; Palmer, Cook & Co., and others.
Turner and I had rooms at Mrs. Ross's, and took our meals at
restaurants down-town, mostly at a Frenchman's named Martin, on the
southwest corner of Montgomery and California Streets.  General
Hitchcock, of the army, commanding the Department of California,
usually messed with us; also a Captain Mason, and Lieutenant
Whiting, of the Engineer Corps.  We soon secured a small share of
business, and became satisfied there was room for profit.
Everybody seemed to be making money fast; the city was being
rapidly extended and improved; people paid their three per cent. a
month interest without fail, and without deeming it excessive.
Turner, Nisbet, and I, daily discussed the prospects, and gradually
settled down to the conviction that with two hundred thousand
dollars capital, and a credit of fifty thousand dollars in New
York, we could build up a business that would help the St. Louis
house, and at the same time pay expenses in California, with a
reasonable profit.  Of course, Turner never designed to remain long
in California, and I consented to go back to St. Louis, confer with
Mr. Lucas and Captain Simonds, agree upon further details, and then
return permanently.

I have no memoranda by me now by which to determine the fact, but
think I returned to New York in July, 1853, by the Nicaragua route,
and thence to St. Louis by way of Lancaster, Ohio, where my family
still was.  Mr. Lucas promptly agreed to the terms proposed, and
further consented, on the expiration of the lease of the Adams &
Co.  office, to erect a new banking-house in San Francisco, to cost
fifty thousand dollars.  I then returned to Lancaster, explained to
Mr. Ewing and Mrs. Sherman all the details of our agreement, and,
meeting their approval, I sent to the Adjutant-General of the army
my letter of resignation, to take effect at the end of the six
months' leave, and the resignation was accepted, to take effect
September 6, 1853.  Being then a citizen, I engaged a passage out
to California by the Nicaragua route, in the steamer leaving New
York September 20th, for myself and family, and accordingly
proceeded to New York, where I had a conference with Mr. Meigs,
cashier of the American Exchange Bank, and with Messrs.  Wadsworth
& Sheldon, bankers, who were our New York correspondents; and on
the 20th embarked for San Juan del Norte, with the family, composed
of Mrs. Sherman, Lizzie, then less than a year old, and her nurse,
Mary Lynch.  Our passage  down was uneventful, and, on the boats up
the Nicaragua River, pretty much the same as before.  On reaching
Virgin Bay, I engaged a native with three mules to carry us across
to the Pacific, and as usual the trip partook of the ludicrous
--Mrs. Sherman mounted on a donkey about as large as a Newfoundland
dog; Mary Lynch on another, trying to carry Lizzie on a pillow
before her, but her mule had a fashion of lying down, which scared
her, till I exchanged mules, and my California spurs kept that mule
on his legs.  I carried Lizzie some time till she was fast asleep,
when I got our native man to carry her awhile.  The child woke up,
and, finding herself in the hands of a dark-visaged man, she yelled
most lustily till I got her away.  At the summit of the pass, there
was a clear-running brook, where we rested an hour, and bathed
Lizzie in its sweet waters.  We then continued to the end of our
journey, and, without going to the tavern at San Juan del Sur, we
passed directly to the vessel, then at anchor about two miles out.
To reach her we engaged a native boat, which had to be kept outside
the surf.  Mrs. Sherman was first taken in the arms of two stout
natives; Mary Lynch, carrying Lizzie, was carried by two others;
and I followed, mounted on the back of a strapping fellow, while
fifty or a hundred others were running to and fro, cackling like
geese.

Mary Lynch got scared at the surf, and began screaming like a fool,
when Lizzie became convulsed with fear, and one of the natives
rushed to her, caught her out of Mary's arms, and carried her
swiftly to Mrs. Sherman, who, by that time, was in the boat, but
Lizzie had fainted with fear, and for a long time sobbed as though
permanently injured.  For years she showed symptoms that made us
believe she had never entirely recovered from the effects of the
scare.  In due time we reached the steamer Sierra Nevada, and got a
good state-room.  Our passage up the coast was pleasant enough; we
reached San Francisco; on the 15th of October, and took quarters at
an hotel on Stockton Street, near Broadway.

Major Turner remained till some time in November, when he also
departed for the East, leaving me and Nisbet to manage the bank.  I
endeavored to make myself familiar with the business, but of course
Nisbet kept the books, and gave his personal attention to the
loans, discounts, and drafts, which yielded the profits.  I soon
saw, however, that the three per cent. charged as premium on bills
of exchange was not all profit, but out of this had to come one and
a fourth to one and a half for freight, one and a third for
insurance, with some indefinite promise of a return premium; then,
the cost of blanks, boxing of the bullion, etc., etc.  Indeed, I
saw no margin for profit at all.  Nisbet, however, who had long
been familiar with the business, insisted there was a profit, in
the fact that the gold-dust or bullion shipped was more valuable
than its cost to us.  We, of course, had to remit bullion to meet
our bills on New York, and bought crude gold-dust, or bars refined
by Kellogg & Humbert or E. Justh & Co., for at that time the United
States Mint was not in operation.  But, as the reports of our
shipments came back from New York, I discovered that I was right,
and Nisbet was wrong; and, although we could not help selling our
checks on New York and St. Louis at the same price as other
bankers, I discovered that, at all events, the exchange business in
San Francisco was rather a losing business than profitable.  The
same as to loans.  We could loan, at three per cent. a month, all
our own money, say two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and a
part of our deposit account.  This latter account in California was
decidedly uncertain.  The balance due depositors would run down to
a mere nominal sum on steamer-days, which were the 1st and 15th of
each month, and then would increase till the next steamer-day, so
that we could not make use of any reasonable part of this balance
for loans beyond the next steamer-day; or, in other words, we had
an expensive bank, with expensive clerks, and all the machinery for
taking care of other people's money for their benefit, without
corresponding profit.  I also saw that loans were attended with
risk commensurate with the rate; nevertheless, I could not attempt
to reform the rules and customs established by others before me,
and had to drift along with the rest toward that Niagara that none
foresaw at the time.

Shortly after arriving out in 1853, we looked around for a site for
the new bank, and the only place then available on Montgomery
Street, the Wall Street of San Francisco, was a lot at the corner
of Jackson Street, facing Montgomery, with an alley on the north,
belonging to James Lick.  The ground was sixty by sixty-two feet,
and I had to pay for it thirty-two thousand dollars.  I then made a
contract with the builders, Keyser, & Brown, to erect a three-story
brick building, with finished basement, for about fifty thousand
dollars.  This made eighty-two thousand instead of fifty thousand
dollars, but I thought Mr. Lucas could stand it and would approve,
which he did, though it resulted in loss to him.  After the civil
war, he told me he had sold the building for forty thousand
dollars, about half its cost, but luckily gold was then at 250, so
that he could use the forty thousand dollars gold as the equivalent
of one hundred thousand dollars currency.  The building was
erected; I gave it my personal supervision, and it was strongly and
thoroughly built, for I saw it two years ago, when several
earthquakes had made no impression on it; still, the choice of site
was unfortunate, for the city drifted in the opposite direction,
viz., toward Market Street.  I then thought that all the heavy
business would remain toward the foot of Broadway and Jackson
Street, because there were the deepest water and best wharves, but
in this I made a mistake.  Nevertheless, in the spring of 1854, the
new bank was finished, and we removed to it, paying rents
thereafter to our Mr. Lucas instead of to Adams & Co.  A man named
Wright, during the same season, built a still finer building just
across the street from us; Pioche, Bayerque & Co. were already
established on another corner of Jackson Street, and the new
Metropolitan Theatre was in progress diagonally opposite us.
During the whole of 1854 our business steadily grew, our average
deposits going up to half a million, and our sales of exchange and
consequent shipment of bullion averaging two hundred thousand
dollars per steamer.  I signed all bills of exchange, and insisted
on Nisbet consulting me on loans and discounts.  Spite of every
caution, however, we lost occasionally by bad loans, and worse by
the steady depreciation of real estate.  The city of San Francisco
was then extending her streets, sewering them, and planking them,
with three-inch lumber.  In payment for the lumber and the work of
contractors, the city authorities paid scrip in even sums of one
hundred, five hundred, one thousand, and five thousand dollars.
These formed a favorite collateral for loans at from fifty to sixty
cents on the dollar, and no one doubted their ultimate value,
either by redemption or by being converted into city bonds.
The notes also of H. Meiggs, Neeley Thompson & Co., etc.,
lumber-dealers, were favorite notes, for they paid their interest
promptly, and lodged large margins of these street-improvement
warrants as collateral.  At that time, Meiggs was a prominent man,
lived in style in a large house on Broadway, was a member of the
City Council, and owned large saw-mills up the coast about
Mendocino.  In him Nisbet had unbounded faith, but, for some
reason, I feared or mistrusted him, and remember that I cautioned
Nisbet not to extend his credit, but to gradually contract his
loans.  On looking over our bills receivable, then about six
hundred thousand dollars, I found Meiggs, as principal or indorser,
owed us about eighty thousand dollars--all, however, secured by
city warrants; still, he kept bank accounts elsewhere, and was
generally a borrower.  I instructed Nisbet to insist on his
reducing his line as the notes matured, and, as he found it
indelicate to speak to Meiggs, I instructed him to refer him to me;
accordingly, when, on the next steamer-day, Meiggs appealed at the
counter for a draft on Philadelphia, of about twenty thousand
dollars, for which he offered his note and collateral, he was
referred to me, and I explained to him that our draft was the same
as money; that he could have it for cash, but that we were already
in advance to him some seventy-five or eighty thousand dollars, and
that instead of increasing the amount I must insist on its
reduction.  He inquired if I mistrusted his ability, etc.  I
explained, certainly not, but that our duty was to assist those who
did all their business with us, and, as our means were necessarily
limited, I must restrict him to some reasonable sum, say,
twenty-five thousand dollars.  Meiggs invited me to go with him to a
rich mercantile house on Clay Street, whose partners belonged in
Hamburg, and there, in the presence of the principals of the house,
he demonstrated, as clearly as a proposition in mathematics, that
his business at Mendocino was based on calculations that could not
fail.  The bill of exchange which he wanted, he said would make the
last payment on a propeller already built in Philadelphia, which
would be sent to San Francisco, to tow into and out of port the
schooners and brigs that were bringing his lumber down the coast. I
admitted all he said, but renewed my determination to limit his
credit to twenty-five thousand dollars.  The Hamburg firm then
agreed to accept for him the payment of all his debt to us, except
the twenty-five thousand dollars, payable in equal parts for the
next three steamer-days.  Accordingly, Meiggs went back with me to
our bank, wrote his note for twenty-five thousand dollars, and
secured it by mortgage on real estate and city warrants, and
substituted the three acceptances of the Hamburg firm for the
overplus.  I surrendered to him all his former notes, except one for
which he was indorser.  The three acceptances duly matured and were
paid; one morning Meiggs and family were missing, and it was
discovered they had embarked in a sailing-vessel for South America.
This was the beginning of a series of failures in San Francisco,
that extended through the next two years.  As soon as it was known
that Meiggs had fled, the town was full of rumors, and everybody was
running to and fro to secure his money.  His debts amounted to
nearly a million dollars.  The Hamburg house which, had been
humbugged, were heavy losers and failed, I think.  I took possession
of Meiggs's dwelling-house and other property for which I held his
mortgage, and in the city warrants thought I had an overplus; but it
transpired that Meiggs, being in the City Council, had issued
various quantities of street scrip, which was adjudged a forgery,
though, beyond doubt, most of it, if not all, was properly signed,
but fraudulently issued.  On this city scrip our bank must have lost
about ten thousand dollars.  Meiggs subsequently turned up in Chili,
where again he rose to wealth and has paid much of his San Francisco
debts, but none to us.  He is now in Peru, living like a prince.
With Meiggs fell all the lumber-dealers, and many persons dealing in
city scrip.  Compared with others, our loss was a trifle.  In a
short time things in San Francisco resumed their wonted course, and
we generally laughed at the escapade of Meiggs, and the cursing of
his deluded creditors.

Shortly after our arrival in San Francisco, I rented of a Mr.
Marryat, son of the English Captain Marryat, the author, a small
frame-house on Stockton Street, near Green, buying of him his
furniture, and we removed to it about December 1,1853.  Close by,
around on Green Street, a man named Dickey was building two small
brick-houses, on ground which he had leased of Nicholson.  I bought
one of these houses, subject to the ground-rent, and moved into it
as soon as finished.  Lieutenant T. H. Stevens, of the United
States Navy, with his family, rented the other; we lived in this
house throughout the year 1854, and up to April 17, 1855.




CHAPTER V.

CALIFORNIA

1855-1857


During  the winter of 1854-'55, I received frequent intimations in
my letters from the St. Louis house, that the bank of Page, Bacon &
Co.  was in trouble, growing out of their relations to the Ohio &
Mississippi Railroad, to the contractors for building which they
had made large advances, to secure which they had been compelled to
take, as it were, an assignment of the contract itself, and finally
to assume all the liabilities of the contractors.  Then they had to
borrow money in New York, and raise other money from time to time,
in the purchase of iron and materials for the road, and to pay the
hands.  The firm in St. Louis and that in San Francisco were
different, having different partners, and the St. Louis house
naturally pressed the San Francisco firm to ship largely of
"gold-dust," which gave them a great name; also to keep as large a
balance as possible in New York to sustain their credit.  Mr. Page
was a very wealthy man, but his wealth consisted mostly of land and
property in St. Louis.  He was an old man, and a good one; had been
a baker, and knew little of banking as a business.  This part of
his general business was managed exclusively by his son-in-law,
Henry D. Bacon, who was young, handsome, and generally popular.
How he was drawn into that affair of the Ohio & Mississippi road I
have no means of knowing, except by hearsay.  Their business in New
York was done through the American Exchange Bank, and through
Duncan, Sherman & Co.  As we were rival houses, the St. Louis
partners removed our account from the American Exchange Bank to the
Metropolitan Bank; and, as Wadsworth & Sheldon had failed, I was
instructed to deal in time bills, and in European exchange, with
Schnchardt & Gebhard, bankers in Nassau Street.

In California the house of Page, Bacon & Co.  was composed of the
same partners as in St. Louis, with the addition of Henry Haight,
Judge Chambers, and young Frank Page.  The latter had charge of the
"branch" in Sacramento.  Haight was the real head-man, but he was
too fond of lager-beer to be in trusted with so large a business.
Beyond all comparison, Page, Bacon & Co.  were the most prominent
bankers in California in 1853-'55.  Though I had notice of danger
in that quarter, from our partners in St. Louis, nobody in
California doubted their wealth and stability.  They must have had,
during that winter, an average deposit account of nearly two
million dollars, of which seven hundred thousand dollars was in
"certificates of deposit," the most stable of all accounts in a
bank.  Thousands of miners invested their earnings in such
certificates, which they converted into drafts on New York, when
they were ready to go home or wanted to send their "pile" to their
families.  Adams & Co. were next in order, because of their
numerous offices scattered throughout the mining country.  A
gentleman named Haskell had been in charge of Adams & Co. in San
Francisco, but in the winter of 1854-'55 some changes were made,
and the banking department had been transferred to a magnificent
office in Halleck's new Metropolitan Block.  James King of Wm. had
discontinued business on his own account, and been employed by
Adams & Co. as their cashier and banker, and Isaiah C. Wood had
succeeded Haskell in chief control of the express department.
Wells, Fargo & Co. were also bankers as well as expressmen, and
William J. Pardee was the resident partner.

As the mail-steamer came in on February 17, 1855, according to her
custom, she ran close to the Long Wharf (Meiggs's) on North Beach,
to throw ashore the express-parcels of news for speedy delivery.
Some passenger on deck called to a man of his acquaintance standing
on the wharf, that Page & Bacon had failed in New York.  The news
spread like wild-fire, but soon it was met by the newspaper
accounts to the effect that some particular acceptances of Page &
Bacon, of St. Louis, in the hands of Duncan, Sherman & Co., in New
York, had gone to protest.  All who had balances at Page, Bacon &
Co.'s, or held certificates of deposit, were more or less alarmed,
wanted to secure their money, and a general excitement pervaded the
whole community.  Word was soon passed round that the matter
admitted of explanation, viz., that the two houses were distinct
and separate concerns, that every draft of the California house had
been paid in New York, and would continue to be paid.  It was
expected that this assertion would quiet the fears of the
California creditors, but for the next three days there was a
steady "run" on that bank.  Page, Bacon & Co. stood the first day's
run very well, and, as I afterward learned, paid out about six
hundred thousand dollars in gold coin.  On the 20th of February
Henry Height came to our bank, to see what help we were willing to
give him; but I was out, and Nisbet could not answer positively for
the firm.  Our condition was then very strong.  The deposit account
was about six hundred thousand dollars, and we had in our vault
about five hundred thousand dollars in coin and bullion, besides an
equal amount of good bills receivable.  Still I did not like to
weaken ourselves to help others; but in a most friendly spirit,
that night after bank-hours, I went down to Page, Bacon & Co., and
entered their office from the rear.  I found in the cashier's room
Folsom, Parrott, Dewey and Payne, Captain Ritchie, Donohue, and
others, citizens and friends of the house, who had been called in
for consultation.  Passing into the main office, where all the
book-keepers, tellers, etc., with gas-lights, were busy writing up
the day's work, I found Mr. Page, Henry Height, and Judge Chambers.
I spoke to Height, saying that I was sorry I had been out when he
called at our bank, and had now come to see him in the most
friendly spirit.  Height had evidently been drinking, and said
abruptly that "all the banks would break," that "no bank could
instantly pay all its obligations," etc.  I answered he could speak
for himself, but not for me; that I had come to offer to buy with
cash a fair proportion of his bullion, notes, and bills; but, if
they were going to fail, I would not be drawn in.  Height's manner
was extremely offensive, but Mr. Page tried to smooth it over,
saying they had had a bad day's run, and could not answer for the
result till their books were written up.

I passed back again into the room where the before-named gentlemen
were discussing some paper which lay before them, and was going to
pass out, when Captain Folsom, who was an officer of the army, a
class-mate and intimate friend of mine, handed me the paper the
contents of which they were discussing.  It was very short, and in
Henry Haight's handwriting, pretty much in these terms: "We, the
undersigned property-holders of San Francisco, having personally
examined the books, papers, etc., of Page, Bacon & Co., do hereby
certify that the house is solvent and able to pay all its debts,"
etc.  Height had drawn up and asked them to sign this paper, with
the intention to publish it in the next morning's papers, for
effect.  While I was talking with Captain Folsom, Height came into
the room to listen.  I admitted that the effect of such a
publication would surely be good, and would probably stave off
immediate demand till their assets could be in part converted or
realized; but I naturally inquired of Folsom, "Have you personally
examined the accounts, as herein recited, and the assets, enough to
warrant your signature to this paper?" for, "thereby you in effect
become indorsers."   Folsom said they had not, when Height turned
on me rudely and said, "Do you think the affairs of such a house as
Page, Bacon & Co. can be critically examined in an hour?"  I
answered: "These gentlemen can do what they please, but they have
twelve hours before the bank will open on the morrow, and if the
ledger is written up" (as I believed it was or could be by
midnight), "they can (by counting the coin, bullion on hand, and
notes or stocks of immediate realization) approximate near enough
for them to indorse for the remainder."  But Height pooh-poohed me,
and I left.  Folsom followed me out, told me he could not afford to
imperil all he had, and asked my advice.  I explained to him that
my partner Nisbet had been educated and trained in that very house
of Page, Bacon & Co.; that we kept our books exactly as they did;
that every day the ledger was written up, so that from it one could
see exactly how much actual money was due the depositors and
certificates; and then by counting the money in the vault,
estimating the bullion on hand, which, though not actual money,
could easily be converted into coin, and supplementing these
amounts by "bills receivable," they ought to arrive at an
approximate-result.  After Folsom had left me, John Parrott also
stopped and talked with me to the same effect.  Next morning I
looked out for the notice, but no such notice appeared in the
morning papers, and I afterward learned that, on Parrott and Folsom
demanding an actual count of the money in the vault, Haight angrily
refused unless they would accept his word for it, when one after
the other declined to sign his paper.

The run on Page, Bacon & Co. therefore continued throughout the
21st, and I expected all day to get an invitation to close our bank
for the next day, February 22, which we could have made a holiday
by concerted action; but each banker waited for Page, Bacon & Co.
to ask for it, and, no such circular coming, in the then state of
feeling no other banker was willing to take the initiative.  On the
morning of February 22, 1855, everybody was startled by receiving a
small slip of paper, delivered at all the houses, on which was
printed a short notice that, for "want of coin," Page, Bacon & Co.
found it necessary to close their bank for a short time.  Of
course, we all knew the consequences, and that every other bank in
San Francisco would be tried.  During the 22d we all kept open, and
watched our depositors closely; but the day was generally observed
by the people as a holiday, and the firemen paraded the streets of
San Francisco in unusual strength.  But, on writing up our books
that night, we found that our deposit account had diminished about
sixty-five thousand dollars.  Still, there was no run on us, or any
other of the banks, that day; yet, observing little knots of men on
the street, discussing the state of the banks generally, and
overhearing Haight's expression quoted, that, in case of the
failure of Page, Bacon & Co., "all the other banks would break," I
deemed it prudent to make ready.  For some days we had refused all
loans and renewals, and we tried, without, success, some of our
call-loans; but, like Hotspur's spirits, they would not come.

Our financial condition on that day (February 22, 1855) was: Due
depositors and demand certificates, five hundred and twenty
thousand dollars; to meet which, we had in the vault: coin, three
hundred and eighty thousand dollars; bullion, seventy-five thousand
dollars; and bills receivable, about six hundred thousand dollars.
Of these, at least one hundred thousand dollars were on demand,
with stock collaterals.  Therefore, for the extent of our business,
we were stronger than the Bank of England, or any bank in New York
City.

Before daylight next morning, our door-bell was rung, and I was
called down-stairs by E. Casserly, Esq. (an eminent lawyer of the
day, since United States Senator), who informed me he had just come
up from the office of Adams & Co., to tell me that their affairs
were in such condition that they would not open that morning at
all; and that this, added to the suspension of Page, Bacon & Co.,
announced the day before, would surely cause a general run on all
the banks.  I informed him that I expected as much, and was
prepared for it.

In going down to the bank that morning, I found Montgomery Street
full; but, punctually to the minute, the bank opened, and in rushed
the crowd.  As usual, the most noisy and clamorous were men and
women who held small certificates; still, others with larger
accounts were in the crowd, pushing forward for their balances.
All were promptly met and paid.  Several gentlemen of my personal
acquaintance merely asked my word of honor that their money was
safe, and went away; others, who had large balances, and no
immediate use for coin, gladly accepted gold-bars, whereby we paid
out the seventy-five thousand dollars of bullion, relieving the
coin to that amount.

Meantime, rumors from the street came pouring in that Wright & Co.
had failed; then Wells, Fargo & Co.; then Palmer, Cook & Co., and
indeed all, or nearly all, the banks of the city; and I was told
that parties on the street were betting high, first, that we would
close our doors at eleven o'clock; then twelve, and so on; but we
did not, till the usual hour that night.  We had paid every demand,
and still had a respectable amount left.

This run on the bank (the only one I ever experienced) presented
all the features, serious and comical, usual to such occasions.  At
our counter happened that identical case, narrated of others, of
the Frenchman, who was nearly squeezed to death in getting to the
counter, and, when he received his money, did not know what to do
with it.  "If you got the money, I no want him; but if you no got
him, I want it like the devil!"

Toward the close of the day, some of our customers deposited,
rather ostentatiously, small amounts, not aggregating more than
eight or ten thousand dollars.  Book-keepers and tellers were kept
at work to write up the books; and these showed:

Due depositors and certificates, about one hundred and twenty
thousand dollars, for which remained of coin about fifty thousand
dollars.  I resolved not to sleep until I had collected from those
owing the bank a part of their debts; for I was angry with them
that they had stood back and allowed the panic to fall on the banks
alone.  Among these were Captain Folsom, who owed us twenty-five
thousand dollars, secured by a mortgage on the American Theatre and
Tehama Hotel; James Smiley, contractor for building the
Custom-House, who owed us two notes of twenty thousand and sixteen
thousand dollars, for which we held, as collateral, two acceptances
of the collector of the port, Major R. P. Hammond, for twenty
thousand dollars each; besides other private parties that I need
not name.  The acceptances given to Smiley were for work done on
the Custom-House, but could not be paid until the work was actually
laid in the walls, and certified by Major Tower, United States
Engineers; but Smiley had an immense amount of granite, brick,
iron, etc., on the ground, in advance of construction, and these
acceptances were given him expressly that he might raise money
thereon for the payment of such materials.

Therefore, as soon as I got my dinner, I took my saddle-horse, and
rode to Captain Folsom's house, where I found him in great pain and
distress, mental and physical.  He was sitting in a chair, and
bathing his head with a sponge.  I explained to him the object of
my visit, and he said he had expected it, and had already sent his
agent, Van Winkle, down-town, with instructions to raise what money
he could at any cost; but he did not succeed in raising a cent.  So
great was the shock to public confidence, that men slept on their
money, and would not loan it for ten per cent.  a week, on any
security whatever--even on mint certificates, which were as good as
gold, and only required about ten days to be paid in coin by the
United States Mint.  I then rode up to Hammond's house, on Rincon
Hill, and found him there.  I explained to him exactly Smiley's
affairs, and only asked him to pay one of his acceptances.  He
inquired, "Why not both?"  I answered that was so much the better;
it would put me under still greater obligations.  He then agreed to
meet me at our bank at 10 P.M.  I sent word to others that I
demanded them to pay what they could on their paper, and then
returned to the bank, to meet Hammond.  In due time, he came down
with Palmer (of Palmer, Cook & Co.), and there he met Smiley, who
was, of course, very anxious to retire his notes.  We there
discussed the matter fully, when Hammond said, "Sherman, give me up
my two acceptances, and I will substitute therefor my check of
forty thousand dollars," with "the distinct understanding that, if
the money is not needed by you, it shall be returned to me, and the
transaction then to remain statu quo."  To this there was a general
assent.  Nisbet handed him his two acceptances, and he handed me
his check, signed as collector of the port, on Major J. R. Snyder,
United States Treasurer, for forty thousand dollars.  I afterward
rode out, that night, to Major Snyder's house on North Beach, saw
him, and he agreed to meet me at 8 a.m.  next day, at the United
States Mint, and to pay the check, so that I could have the money
before the bank opened.  The next morning, as agreed on, we met,
and he paid me the check in two sealed bags of gold-coin, each
marked twenty thousand dollars, which I had carried to the bank,
but never opened them, or even broke the seals.

That morning our bank opened as usual, but there was no appearance
of a continuation of the "run;" on the contrary, money began to
come back on deposit, so that by night we had a considerable
increase, and this went on from day to day, till nearly the old
condition of things returned.  After about three days, finding I
had no use for the money obtained on Hammond's check, I took the
identical two bags back to the cashier of the Custom-House, and
recovered the two acceptances which had been surrendered as
described; and Smiley's two notes were afterward paid in their due
course, out of the cash received on those identical acceptances.
But, years afterward, on settling with Hammond for the Custom-House
contract when completed, there was a difference, and Smiley sued
Lucas, Turner & Co. for money had and received for his benefit,
being the identical forty thousand dollars herein explained, but he
lost his case.  Hammond, too, was afterward removed from office,
and indicted in part for this transaction.  He was tried before the
United States Circuit Court, Judge McAlister presiding, for a
violation of the sub-Treasury Act, but was acquitted.  Our bank,
having thus passed so well through the crisis, took at once a first
rank; but these bank failures had caused so many mercantile losses,
and had led to such an utter downfall in the value of real estate,
that everybody lost more or less money by bad debts, by
depreciation of stocks and collaterals, that became unsalable, if
not worthless.

About this time (viz., February, 1855) I had exchanged my house on
Green, street, with Mr. Sloat, for the half of a fifty-vara lot on
Harrison Street, between Fremont and First, on which there was a
small cottage, and I had contracted for the building of a new
frame-house thereon, at six thousand dollars.  This house was
finished on the 9th of April, and my family moved into it at once.

For some time Mrs. Sherman had been anxious to go home to
Lancaster, Ohio, where we had left our daughter Minnie, with her
grandparents, and we arranged that S. M. Bowman, Esq., and wife,
should move into our new house and board us, viz., Lizzie, Willie
with the nurse Biddy, and myself, for a fair consideration.  It so
happened that two of my personal friends, Messrs.  Winters and
Cunningham of Marysville, and a young fellow named Eagan, now a
captain in the Commissary Department, were going East in the
steamer of the middle of April, and that Mr..  William H.
Aspinwall, of New York, and Mr. Chauncey, of Philadelphia, were
also going back; and they all offered to look to the personal
comfort of Mrs. Sherman on the voyage.  They took passage in the
steamer Golden Age (Commodore Watkins), which sailed on April 17,
1855.  Their passage down the coast was very pleasant till within a
day's distance of Panama, when one bright moonlit night, April
29th, the ship, running at full speed, between the Islands Quibo
and Quicara, struck on a sunken reef, tore out a streak in her
bottom, and at once began to fill with water.  Fortunately she did
not sink fast, but swung off into deep water, and Commodore Watkins
happening to be on deck at the moment, walking with Mr. Aspinwall,
learning that the water was rushing in with great rapidity, gave
orders for a full head of steam, and turned the vessel's bow
straight for the Island Quicara.  The water rose rapidly in the
hold, the passengers were all assembled, fearful of going down, the
fires were out, and the last revolution of the wheels made, when
her bow touched gently on the beach, and the vessel's stern sank in
deep water.  Lines were got out, and the ship held in an upright
position, so that the passengers were safe, and but little
incommoded.  I have often heard Mrs. Sherman tell of the boy Eagan,
then about fourteen years old, coming to her state-room, and
telling to her not to be afraid, as he was a good swimmer; but on
coming out into the cabin, partially dressed, she felt more
confidence in the cool manner, bearing, and greater strength of Mr.
Winters.  There must have been nearly a thousand souls on board at
the time, few of whom could have been saved had the steamer gone
down in mid-channel, which surely would have resulted, had not
Commodore Watkins been on deck, or had he been less prompt in his
determination to beach his ship.  A sailboat was dispatched toward
Panama, which luckily met the steamer John T. Stephens, just coming
out of the bay, loaded with about a thousand passengers bound for
San Francisco, and she at once proceeded to the relief of the
Golden Age.  Her passengers were transferred in small boats to the
Stephens, which vessel, with her two thousand people crowded
together with hardly standing-room, returned to Panama, whence the
passengers for the East proceeded to their destination without
further delay.  Luckily for Mrs. Sherman, Purser Goddard, an old
Ohio friend of ours, was on the Stephens, and most kindly gave up
his own room to her, and such lady friends as she included in her
party.  The Golden Age was afterward partially repaired at Quicara,
pumped out, and steamed to Panama, when, after further repairs, she
resumed her place in the line.  I think she is still in existence,
but Commodore Watkins afterward lost his life in China, by falling
down a hatchway.

Mrs. Sherman returned in the latter part of November of the same
year, when Mr. and Mrs. Bowman, who meantime had bought a lot next
to us and erected a house thereon, removed to it, and we thus
continued close neighbors and friends until we left the country for
good in 1857.

During the summer of 1856, in San Francisco, occurred one of those
unhappy events, too common to new countries, in which I became
involved in spite of myself.

William Neely Johnson was Governor of California, and resided at
Sacramento City; General John E. Wool commanded the Department of
California, having succeeded General Hitchcock, and had his
headquarters at Benicia; and a Mr. Van Ness was mayor of the city.
Politics had become a regular and profitable business, and
politicians were more than suspected of being corrupt.  It was
reported and currently believed that the sheriff (Scannell) had
been required to pay the Democratic Central Committee a hundred
thousand dollars for his nomination, which was equivalent to an
election, for an office of the nominal salary of twelve thousand
dollars a year for four years.  In the election all sorts of
dishonesty were charged and believed, especially of "ballot-box
stuffing," and too generally the better classes avoided the
elections and dodged jury-duty, so that the affairs of the city
government necessarily passed into the hands of a low set of
professional politicians.  Among them was a man named James Casey,
who edited a small paper, the printing office of which was in a
room on the third floor of our banking office.  I hardly knew him
by sight, and rarely if ever saw his paper; but one day Mr. Sather,
of the excellent banking firm of Drexel, Sather & Church, came to
me, and called my attention to an article in Casey's paper so full
of falsehood and malice, that we construed it as an effort to
black-mail the banks generally.  At that time we were all laboring
to restore confidence, which had been so rudely shaken by the
panic, and I went up-stairs, found Casey, and pointed out to him
the objectionable nature of his article, told him plainly that I
could not tolerate his attempt to print and circulate slanders in
our building, and, if he repeated it, I would cause him and his
press to be thrown out of the windows.  He took the hint and moved
to more friendly quarters.  I mention this fact, to show my
estimate of the man, who became a figure in the drama I am about to
describe.  James King of Wm., as before explained, was in 1853 a
banker on his own account, but some time in 1854 he had closed out
his business, and engaged with Adams & Co. as cashier.  When this
firm failed, he, in common with all the employees, was thrown out
of employment, and had to look around for something else.  He
settled down to the publication of an evening paper, called the
Bulletin, and, being a man of fine manners and address, he at once
constituted himself the champion of society against the public and
private characters whom he saw fit to arraign.

As might have been expected, this soon brought him into the usual
newspaper war with other editors, and especially with Casey, and
epithets a la "Eatanswill" were soon bandying back and forth
between them.  One evening of May, 1856, King published, in the
Bulletin, copies of papers procured from New York, to show that
Casey had once been sentenced to the State penitentiary at Sing
Sing.  Casey took mortal offense, and called at the Bulletin
office, on the corner of Montgomery and Merchant Streets, where he
found King, and violent words passed between them, resulting in
Casey giving King notice that he would shoot him on sight.  King
remained in his office till about 5 or 6 p.m., when he started
toward his home on Stockton Street, and, as he neared the corner of
Washington, Casey approached him from the opposite direction,
called to him, and began firing.  King had on a short cloak, and in
his breast-pocket a small pistol, which he did not use.  One of
Casey's shots struck him high up in the breast, from which he
reeled, was caught by some passing friend, and carried into the
express-office on the corner, where he was laid on the counter; and
a surgeon sent for.  Casey escaped up Washington Street, went to
the City Hall, and delivered himself to the sheriff (Scannell), who
conveyed him to jail and locked him in a cell.  Meantime, the news
spread like wildfire, and all the city was in commotion, for grog
was very popular.  Nisbet, who boarded with us on Harrison Street,
had been delayed at the bank later than usual, so that he happened
to be near at the time, and, when he came out to dinner, he brought
me the news of this affair, and said that there was every
appearance of a riot down-town that night.  This occurred toward
the evening of May 14, 1856.

It so happened that, on the urgent solicitation of Van Winkle and
of Governor Johnson; I had only a few days before agreed to accept
the commission of major-general of the Second Division of Militia,
embracing San Francisco.  I had received the commission, but
had not as yet formally accepted it, or even put myself in
communication with the volunteer companies of the city.  Of these,
at that moment of time, there was a company of artillery with four
guns, commanded by a Captain Johns, formerly of the army, and two
or three uniformed companies of infantry.  After dinner I went down
town to see what was going on; found that King had been removed to
a room in the Metropolitan Block; that his life was in great peril;
that Casey was safe in jail, and the sheriff had called to his
assistance a posse of the city police, some citizens, and one of
the militia companies.  The people were gathered in groups on the
streets, and the words "Vigilance Committee" were freely spoken,
but I saw no signs of immediate violence.  The next morning, I
again went to the jail, and found all things quiet, but the militia
had withdrawn.  I then went to the City Hall, saw the mayor, Van
Ness, and some of the city officials, agreed to do what I could to
maintain order with such militia as were on hand, and then formally
accepted the commission, and took the "oath."

In 1851 (when I was not in California) there had been a Vigilance
Committee, and it was understood that its organization still
existed.  All the newspapers took ground in favor of the Vigilance
Committee, except the Herald (John Nugent, editor), and nearly all
the best people favored that means of redress.  I could see they
were organizing, hiring rendezvous, collecting arms, etc., without
concealment.  It was soon manifest that the companies of volunteers
would go with the "committee," and that the public authorities
could not rely on them for aid or defense.  Still, there were a
good many citizens who contended that, if the civil authorities
were properly sustained by the people at large, they could and
would execute the law.  But the papers inflamed the public mind,
and the controversy spread to the country.  About the third day
after the shooting of King, Governor Johnson telegraphed me that he
would be down in the evening boat, and asked me to meet him on
arrival for consultation.  I got C. H. Garrison to go with me, and
we met the Governor and his brother on the wharf, and walked up to
the International Hotel on Jackson Street, above Montgomery.  We
discussed the state of affairs fully; and Johnson, on learning that
his particular friend, William T. Coleman, was the president of the
Vigilance Committee, proposed to go and see him.  En route we
stopped at King's room, ascertained that he was slowly sinking, and
could not live long; and then near midnight we walked to the
Turnverein Hall, where the committee was known to be sitting in
consultation.  This hall was on Bush Street, at about the
intersection of Stockton.  It was all lighted up within, but the
door was locked.  The Governor knocked at the door, and on inquiry
from inside  "Who's there?"--gave his name.  After some delay we
were admitted into a sort of vestibule, beyond which was a large
hall, and we could hear the suppressed voices of a multitude.  We
were shown into a bar-room to the right, when the Governor asked to
see Coleman.  The man left us, went into the main hall, and soon
returned with Coleman, who was pale and agitated.  After shaking
hands all round, the Governor said, "Coleman, what the devil is the
matter here?" Coleman said, "Governor, it is time this shooting on
our streets should stop."  The Governor replied, "I agree with you
perfectly, and have come down, from Sacramento to assist."  Coleman
rejoined that "the people were tired of it, and had no faith in the
officers of the law."  A general conversation then followed, in
which it was admitted that King would die, and that Casey must be
executed; but the manner of execution was the thing to be settled,
Coleman contending that the people would do it without trusting the
courts or the sheriff.  It so happened that at that time Judge
Norton was on the bench of the court having jurisdiction, and he
was universally recognized as an able and upright man, whom no one
could or did mistrust; and it also happened that a grand-jury was
then in session.  Johnson argued that the time had passed in
California for mobs and vigilance committees, and said if Coleman
and associates would use their influence to support the law, he
(the Governor) would undertake that, as soon as King died, the
grand-jury should indict, that Judge Norton would try the murderer,
and the whole proceeding should be as speedy as decency would
allow.  Then Coleman said "the people had no confidence in
Scannell, the sheriff," who was, he said, in collusion with the
rowdy element of San Francisco.  Johnson then offered to be
personally responsible that Casey should be safely guarded, and
should be forthcoming for trial and execution at the proper time.
I remember very well Johnson's assertion that he had no right to
make these stipulations, and maybe no power to fulfill them; but he
did it to save the city and state from the disgrace of a mob.
Coleman disclaimed that the vigilance organization was a "mob,"
admitted that the proposition of the Governor was fair, and all he
or any one should ask; and added, if we would wait awhile, he would
submit it to the council, and bring back an answer.

We waited nearly an hour, and could hear the hum of voices
in the hall, but no words, when Coleman came back, accompanied by a
committee, of which I think the two brothers Arrington, Thomas
Smiley the auctioneer, Seymour, Truett, and others, were members.
The whole conversation was gone over again, and the Governor's
proposition was positively agreed to, with this further condition,
that the Vigilance Committee should send into the jail a small
force of their own men, to make certain that Casey should not be
carried off or allowed to escape.

The Governor, his brother William, Garrison, and I, then went up to
the jail, where we found the sheriff and his posse comitatus of
police and citizens.  These were styled the "Law-and-Order party,"
and some of them took offense that the Governor should have held
communication with the "damned rebels," and several of them left
the jail; but the sheriff seemed to agree with the Governor that
what he had done was right and best; and, while we were there, some
eight or ten armed men arrived from the Vigilance Committee, and
were received by the sheriff (Scannell) as a part of his regular
posse.

The Governor then, near daylight, went to his hotel, and I to my
house for a short sleep.  Next day I was at the bank, as usual,
when, about noon the Governor called, and asked me to walk with him
down-street He said he had just received a message from the
Vigilance Committee to the effect that they were not bound by
Coleman's promise not to do any thing till the regular trial by
jury should be had, etc.  He was with reason furious, and asked me
to go with him to Truett's store, over which the Executive
Committee was said to be in session.  We were admitted to a
front-room up-stairs, and heard voices in the back-room.  The
Governor inquired for Coleman, but he was not forthcoming.  Another
of the committee, Seymour, met us, denied in toto the promise of
the night before, and the Governor openly accused him of treachery
and falsehood.


The quarrel became public, and the newspapers took it up, both
parties turning on the Governor; one, the Vigilantes, denying the
promise made by Coleman, their president; and the other, the
"Law-and-Order party," refusing any farther assistance, because
Johnson had stooped to make terms with rebels.  At all events, he
was powerless, and had to let matters drift to a conclusion.

King died about Friday, May 20th, and the funeral was appointed for
the next Sunday.  Early on that day the Governor sent for me at my
house.  I found him on the roof of the International, from which we
looked down on the whole city, and more especially the face of
Telegraph Hill, which was already covered with a crowd of people,
while others were moving toward the jail on Broadway.  Parties of
armed men, in good order, were marching by platoons in the same
direction; and formed in line along Broadway, facing the jail-door.
Soon a small party was seen to advance to this door, and knock; a
parley ensued, the doors were opened, and Casey was led out.  In a
few minutes another prisoner was brought out, who, proved to be
Cora, a man who had once been tried for killing Richardson, the
United States Marshal, when the jury disagreed, and he was awaiting
a new trial.  These prisoners were placed in carriages, and
escorted by the armed force down to the rooms of the Vigilance
Committee, through the principal streets of the city.  The day was
exceedingly beautiful, and the whole proceeding was orderly in the
extreme.  I was under the impression that Casey and Cora were
hanged that same Sunday, but was probably in error; but in a very
few days they were hanged by the neck--dead--suspended from beams
projecting from the windows of the committee's rooms, without other
trial than could be given in secret, and by night.

We all thought the matter had ended there, and accordingly the
Governor returned to Sacramento in disgust, and I went about my
business.  But it soon became manifest that the Vigilance Committee
had no intention to surrender the power thus usurped.  They took a
building on Clay Street, near Front, fortified it, employed guards
and armed sentinels, sat in midnight council, issued writs of
arrest and banishment, and utterly ignored all authority but their
own.  A good many men were banished and forced to leave the
country, but they were of that class we could well spare.  Yankee
Sullivan, a prisoner in their custody, committed suicide, and a
feeling of general insecurity pervaded the city.  Business was
deranged; and the Bulletin, then under control of Tom King, a
brother of James, poured out its abuse on some of our best men, as
well as the worst.  Governor Johnson, being again appealed to,
concluded to go to work regularly, and telegraphed me about the 1st
of June to meet him at General Wool's headquarters at Benicia that
night.  I went up, and we met at the hotel where General Wool was
boarding.  Johnson had with him his Secretary of State.  We
discussed the state of the country generally, and I had agreed that
if Wool would give us arms and ammunition out of the United States
Arsenal at Benicia, and if Commodore Farragat, of the navy,
commanding the navy-yard on Mare Island, would give us a ship, I
would call out volunteers, and, when a sufficient number had
responded, I would have the arms come down from Benicia in the
ship, arm my men, take possession of a thirty-two-pound-gun battery
at the Marine Hospital on Rincon Point, thence command a dispersion
of the unlawfully-armed force of the Vigilance Committee, and
arrest some of the leaders.

We played cards that night, carrying on a conversation, in which
Wool insisted on a proclamation commanding the Vigilance Committee
to disperse, etc., and he told us how he had on some occasion, as
far back as 1814, suppressed a mutiny on the Northern frontier.  I
did not understand him to make any distinct promise of assistance
that night, but he invited us to accompany him on an inspection of
the arsenal the next day, which we did.  On handling some rifled
muskets in the arsenal storehouse he asked me how they would answer
our purpose.  I said they were the very things, and that we did not
want cartridge boxes or belts, but that I would have the cartridges
carried in the breeches-pockets, and the caps in the vestpockets.
I knew that there were stored in that arsenal four thousand
muskets, for I recognized the boxes which we had carried out in the
Lexington around Cape Horn in 1846.  Afterward we all met at the
quarters of Captain D. R. Jones of the army, and I saw the
Secretary of State, D. F. Douglass, Esq., walk out with General
Wool in earnest conversation, and this Secretary of State afterward
asserted that Wool there and then promised us the arms and
ammunition, provided the Governor would make his proclamation for
the committee to disperse, and that I should afterward call out the
militia, etc.  On the way back to the hotel at Benicia, General
Wool, Captain Callendar of the arsenal, and I, were walking side by
side, and I was telling him (General Wool) that I would also need
some ammunition for the thirty-two-pound guns then in position at
Rineon Point, when Wool turned to Callendar and inquired, "Did I
not order those guns to be brought away?"  Callendar said "Yes,
general.  I made a requisition on the quartermaster for
transportation, but his schooner has been so busy that the guns are
still there."  Then said Wool: "Let them remain; we may have use for
them."  I therefrom inferred, of course, that it was all agreed to
so far as he was concerned.

Soon after we had reached the hotel, we ordered a buggy, and
Governor Johnson and I drove to Vallejo, six miles, crossed over to
Mare Island, and walked up to the commandant's house, where we
found Commodore Farragut and his family.  We stated our business
fairly, but the commodore answered very frankly that he had no
authority, without orders from his department, to take any part in
civil broils; he doubted the wisdom of the attempt; said he had no
ship available except the John Adams, Captain Boutwell, and that
she needed repairs.  But he assented at last, to the proposition to
let the sloop John Adams drop down abreast of the city after
certain repairs, to lie off there for moral effect, which afterward
actually occurred.

We then returned to Benicia, and Wool's first question was, "What
luck?"  We answered, "Not much," and explained what Commodore
Farragut could and would do, and that, instead of having a naval
vessel, we would seize and use one of the Pacific Mail Company's
steamers, lying at their dock in Benicia, to carry down to San
Francisco the arms and munitions when the time came.

As the time was then near at hand for the arrival of the evening
boats, we all walked down to the wharf together, where I told
Johnson that he could not be too careful; that I had not heard
General Wool make a positive promise of assistance.

Upon this, Johnson called General Wool to one side, and we three
drew together.  Johnson said: "General Wool, General Sherman is
very particular, and wants to know exactly what you propose to do."
Wool answered: "I understand, Governor, that in the first place a
writ of Habeas corpus will be issued commanding the jailers of the
Vigilance Committee to produce the body of some one of the
prisoners held by them (which, of course, will be refused); that
you then issue your proclamation commanding them to disperse, and,
failing this, you will call out the militia, and command General
Sherman with it to suppress the Vigilance Committee as an unlawful
body;" to which the Governor responded, "Yes."  "Then," said Wool,
"on General Sherman's making his requisition, approved by you, I
will order the issue of the necessary arms and ammunition."  I
remember well that I said, emphatically: "That is all I want.
--Now, Governor, you may go ahead."  We soon parted; Johnson and
Douglas taking the boat to Sacramento, and I to San Francisco.

The Chief-Justice, Terry, came to San Francisco the next day,
issued a writ of habeas corpus for the body of one Maloney, which
writ was resisted, as we expected.  The Governor then issued his
proclamation, and I published my orders, dated June 4, 1855.  The
Quartermaster-General of the State, General Kibbe, also came to San
Francisco, took an office in the City Hall, engaged several rooms
for armories, and soon the men began to enroll into companies.  In
my general orders calling out the militia, I used the expression,
"When a sufficient number of men are enrolled, arms and ammunition
will be supplied."  Some of the best men of the "Vigilantes" came
to me and remonstrated, saying that collision would surely result;
that it would be terrible, etc.  All I could say in reply was, that
it was for them to get out of the way.  "Remove your fort; cease
your midnight councils; and prevent your armed bodies from
patrolling the streets."  They inquired where I was to get arms,
and I answered that I had them certain.  But personally I went
right along with my business at the bank, conscious that at any
moment we might have trouble.  Another committee of citizens, a
conciliatory body, was formed to prevent collision if possible, and
the newspapers boiled over with vehement vituperation.  This second
committee was composed of such men as Crockett, Ritchie, Thornton,
Bailey Peyton, Foote, Donohue, Kelly, and others, a class of the
most intelligent and wealthy men of the city, who earnestly and
honestly desired to prevent bloodshed.  They also came to me, and I
told them that our men were enrolling very fast, and that, when I
deemed the right moment had come, the Vigilance Committee must
disperse, else bloodshed and destruction of property would
inevitably follow.  They also had discovered that the better men of
the Vigilance Committee itself were getting tired of the business,
and thought that in the execution of Casey and Cora, and the
banishment of a dozen or more rowdies, they had done enough, and
were then willing to stop.  It was suggested that, if our
Law-and-Order party would not arm, by a certain day near at hand
the committee would disperse, and some of their leaders would
submit to an indictment and trial by a jury of citizens, which they
knew would acquit them of crime.  One day in the bank a man called
me to the counter and said, "If you expect to get arms of General
Wool, you will be mistaken, for I was at Benicia yesterday, and
heard him say he would not give them."  This person was known to me
to be a man of truth, and I immediately wrote to General Wool a
letter telling him what I had heard, and how any hesitation on his
part would compromise me as a man of truth and honor; adding that I
did not believe we should ever need the arms, but only the promise
of them, for "the committee was letting down, and would soon
disperse and submit to the law," etc.  I further asked him to
answer me categorically that very night, by the Stockton boat,
which would pass Benicia on its way down about midnight, and I
would sit up and wait for his answer.  I did wait for his letter,
but it did not come, and the next day I got a telegraphic dispatch
from Governor Johnson, who, at Sacramento, had also heard of
General Wool's "back-down," asking me to meet him again at Benicia
that night.

I went up in the evening boat, and found General Wool's
aide-de-camp, Captain Arnold, of the army, on the wharf, with a
letter in his hand, which he said was for me.  I asked for it, but
he said he knew its importance, and preferred we should go to
General Wool's room together, and the general could hand it to me in
person.  We did go right up to General Wool's, who took the sealed
parcel and laid it aside, saying that it was literally a copy of one
he had sent to Governor Johnson, who would doubtless give me a copy;
but I insisted that I had made a written communication, and was
entitled to a written answer.

At that moment several gentlemen of the "Conciliation party," who
had come up in the same steamer with me, asked for admission and
came in.  I recall the names of Crockett, Foote, Bailey Peyton,
Judge Thornton, Donohue, etc., and the conversation became general,
Wool trying to explain away the effect of our misunderstanding,
taking good pains not to deny his promise made to me personally on
the wharf.  I renewed my application for the letter addressed to
me, then lying on his table.  On my statement of the case, Bailey
Peyton said, "General Wool, I think General Sherman has a right to
a written answer from you, for he is surely compromised."  Upon
this Wool handed me the letter.  I opened and read it, and it
denied any promise of arms, but otherwise was extremely evasive and
non-committal.  I had heard of the arrival at the wharf of the
Governor and party, and was expecting them at Wool's room, but,
instead of stopping at the hotel where we were, they passed to
another hotel on the block above.  I went up and found there, in a
room on the second floor over the bar-room, Governor Johnson,
Chief-Justice Terry, Jones, of Palmer, Cooke & Co., E. D. Baker,
Volney E. Howard, and one or two others.  All were talking
furiously against Wool, denouncing him as a d---d liar, and not
sparing the severest terms.  I showed the Governor General Wool's
letter to me, which he said was in effect the same as the one
addressed to and received by him at Sacramento.  He was so offended
that he would not even call on General Wool, and said he would
never again recognize him as an officer or gentleman.  We discussed
matters generally, and Judge Terry said that the Vigilance
Committee were a set of d---d pork-merchants; that they were
getting scared, and that General Wool was in collusion with them to
bring the State into contempt, etc.  I explained that there were no
arms in the State except what General Wool had, or what were in the
hands of the Vigilance Committee of San Francisco, and that the
part of wisdom for us was to be patient and cautious.  About that
time Crockett and his associates sent up their cards, but Terry and
the more violent of the Governor's followers denounced them as no
better than "Vigilantes," and wanted the Governor to refuse even to
receive them.  I explained that they were not "Vigilantes," that
Judge Thornton was a "Law-and-Order" man, was one of the first to
respond to the call of the sheriff, and that he went actually to
the jail with his one arm the night we expected the first attempt
at rescue, etc.  Johnson then sent word for them to reduce their
business to writing.  They simply sent in a written request for an
audience, and they were then promptly admitted.  After some general
conversation, the Governor said he was prepared to hear them, when
Mr. Crockett rose and made a prepared speech embracing a clear and
fair statement of the condition of things in San Francisco,
concluding with the assertion of the willingness of the committee
to disband and submit to trial after a certain date not very
remote.  All the time Crockett was speaking, Terry sat with his hat
on, drawn over his eyes, and with his feet on a table.  As soon as
Crockett was through, they were dismissed, and Johnson began to
prepare a written answer.  This was scratched, altered, and
amended, to suit the notions of his counselors, and at last was
copied and sent.  This answer amounted to little or nothing.
Seeing that we were powerless for good, and that violent counsels
would prevail under the influence of Terry and others, I sat down
at the table, and wrote my resignation, which Johnson accepted in a
complimentary note on the spot, and at the same time he appointed
to my place General Volney E. Howard, then present, a lawyer who
had once been a member of Congress from Texas, and who was expected
to drive the d---d pork-merchants into the bay at short notice.  I
went soon after to General Wool's room, where I found  Crockett and
the rest of his party; told them that I was out of the fight,
having resigned my commission; that I had neglected business that
had been intrusted to me by my St. Louis partners; and that I would
thenceforward mind my own business, and leave public affairs
severely alone.  We all returned to San Francisco that night by the
Stockton boat, and I never after-ward had any thing to do with
politics in California, perfectly satisfied with that short
experience.  Johnson and Wool fought  out their quarrel of veracity
in the newspapers and on paper.  But, in my opinion, there is not a
shadow of doubt that General Wool did deliberately deceive us; that
he had authority to issue arms, and that, had he adhered to his
promise, we could have checked the committee before it became a
fixed institution, and a part of the common law of California.
Major-General Volney  E. Howard came to San Francisco soon after;
continued the organization of militia which I had begun; succeeded
in getting a few arms from the country; but one day the Vigilance
Committee sallied from their armories, captured the arms of the
"Law-and-Order party," put some of their men into prison,  while
General Howard, with others, escaped to the country; after which
the Vigilance Committee had it all their own way.  Subsequently, in
July, 1856, they arrested Chief-Justice Terry, and tried him for
stabbing one of their constables, but he managed to escape at
night, and took refuge on the John Adams.  In August, they hanged
Hetherington and Brace in broad daylight, without any jury-trial;
and, soon after, they quietly disbanded.  As they controlled the
press, they wrote their own history, and the world generally gives
them the credit of having purged San Francisco of rowdies and
roughs; but their success  has given great stimulus to a dangerous
principle, that would at any time justify the mob in seizing all
the power of government;  and who is to say that the Vigilance
Committee may not be composed of the worst, instead of the best,
elements of a community? Indeed, in San Francisco, as soon as it
was demonstrated that the real power had passed from the City Hall
to the committee  room, the same set of bailiffs, constables, and
rowdies that had infested the City Hall were found in the
employment of the  "Vigilantes;" and, after three months
experience, the better class of people became tired of the midnight
sessions and left the business and power of the committee in the
hands of a court, of which a Sydney man was reported to be the head
or chief-justice.

During the winter of 1855-'56, and indeed throughout the year 1856,
all kinds of business became unsettled in California.  The mines
continued to yield about fifty millions of gold a year; but little
attention was paid to agriculture or to any business other than
that of "mining," and, as the placer-gold was becoming worked out,
the miners were restless and uneasy, and were shifting about from
place to place, impelled by rumors put afloat for speculative
purposes.  A great many extensive enterprises by joint-stock
companies had been begun, in the way of water-ditches, to bring
water from the head of the mountain-streams down to the richer
alluvial deposits, and nearly all of these companies became
embarrassed or bankrupt.  Foreign capital, also, which had been
attracted to California by reason of the high rates of interest,
was being withdrawn, or was tied up in property which could not be
sold; and, although our bank's having withstood the panic gave us
great credit, still the community itself was shaken, and loans of
money were risky in the extreme.  A great many merchants, of the
highest name, availed themselves of the extremely liberal bankrupt
law to get discharged of their old debts, without sacrificing much,
if any, of their stocks of goods on hand, except a lawyer's fee;
thus realizing Martin Burke's saying that "many a clever fellow had
been ruined by paying his debts."  The merchants and business-men
of San Francisco did not intend to be ruined by such a course.  I
raised the rate of exchange from three to three and a half, while
others kept on at the old rate; and I labored hard to collect old
debts, and strove, in making new loans, to be on the safe side.
The State and city both denied much of their public debt; in fact,
repudiated it; and real estate, which the year before had been
first-class security, became utterly unsalable.

The office labor and confinement, and the anxiety attending the
business, aggravated my asthma to such an extent that at times it
deprived me of sleep, and threatened to become chronic and serious;
and I was also conscious that the first and original cause which
had induced Mr. Lucas to establish the bank in California had
ceased.  I so reported to him, and that I really believed that he
could use his money more safely and to better advantage in St.
Louis.  This met his prompt approval, and he instructed me
gradually to draw out, preparatory to a removal to New York City.
Accordingly, early in April, 1857, I published an advertisement in
the San Francisco papers, notifying our customers that, on the 1st
day of May, we would discontinue business and remove East,
requiring all to withdraw their accounts, and declaring that,
if any remained on that day of May, their balances would be
transferred to the banking-house of Parrott & Co. Punctually to the
day, this was done, and the business of Lucas, Turner & Co., of San
Francisco, was discontinued, except the more difficult and
disagreeable part of collecting their own moneys and selling the
real estate, to which the firm had succeeded by purchase or
foreclosure.  One of the partners, B. R. Nisbet, assisted by our
attorney, S. M. Bowman, Esq., remained behind to close up the
business of the bank.




CHAPTER VI.

CALIFORNIA, NEW YORK, AND KANSAS.

1857-1859.

Having closed the bank at San Francisco on the 1st day of May,
1857, accompanied by my family I embarked in the steamer Sonora for
Panama, crossed the isthmus, and sailed to New York, whence we
proceeded to Lancaster, Ohio, where Mrs. Sherman and the family
stopped, and I went on to St. Louis.  I found there that some
changes had been made in the parent, house, that Mr. Lucas had
bought out his partner, Captain Symonds, and that the firm's name
had been changed to that of James H. Lucas & Co.

It had also been arranged that an office or branch was to be
established in New York City, of which I was to have charge, on
pretty much the same terms and conditions as in the previous San
Francisco firm.

Mr. Lucas, Major Turner, and I, agreed to meet in New York, soon
after the 4th of July.  We met accordingly at the Metropolitan
Hotel, selected an office, No. 12 Pall Street, purchased the
necessary furniture, and engaged a teller, bookkeeper, and porter.
The new firm was to bear the same title of Lucas, Turner & Co.,
with about the same partners in interest, but the nature of the
business was totally different.  We opened our office on the 21st
of July, 1857, and at once began to receive accounts from the West
and from California, but our chief business was as the resident
agents of the St. Louis firm of James H. Lucas & Co. Personally I
took rooms at No. 100 Prince Street, in which house were also
quartered Major J. G. Barnard, and Lieutenant J. B. McPherson,
United States Engineers, both of whom afterward attained great fame
in the civil war.

My business relations in New York were with the Metropolitan Bank
and Bank of America; and with the very wealthy and most respectable
firm of Schuchhardt & Gebhard, of Nassau Street.  Every thing went
along swimmingly till the 21st of August, when all Wall Street was
thrown into a spasm by the failure of the Ohio Life and Trust
Company, and the panic so resembled that in San Francisco, that,
having nothing seemingly at stake, I felt amused.  But it soon
became a serious matter even to me.  Western stocks and securities
tumbled to such a figure, that all Western banks that held such
securities, and had procured advances thereon, were compelled to
pay up or substitute increased collaterals.  Our own house was
not a borrower in New York at all, but many of our Western
correspondents were, and it taxed my tune to watch their interests.
In September, the panic extended so as to threaten the safety of
even some of the New York banks not connected with the West; and
the alarm became general, and at last universal.

In the very midst of this panic came the news that the steamer
Central America, formerly the George Law, with six hundred
passengers and about sixteen hundred thousand dollars of treasure,
coming from Aspinwall, had foundered at sea, off the coast of
Georgia, and that about sixty of the passengers had been
providentially picked up by a Swedish bark, and brought into
Savannah.  The absolute loss of this treasure went to swell the
confusion and panic of the day.

A few days after, I was standing in the vestibule of the
Metropolitan Hotel, and heard the captain of the Swedish bark tell
his singular story of the rescue of these passengers.  He was a
short, sailor-like-looking man, with a strong German or Swedish
accent.  He said that he was sailing from some port in Honduras for
Sweden, running down the Gulf Stream off Savannah.  The weather had
been heavy for some days, and, about nightfall, as he paced his
deck, he observed a man-of-war hawk circle about his vessel,
gradually lowering, until the bird was as it were aiming at him.
He jerked out a belaying-pin, struck at the bird, missed it, when
the hawk again rose high in the air, and a second time began to
descend, contract his circle, and make at him again.  The second
time he hit the bird, and struck it to the deck....  This strange
fact made him uneasy, and he thought it betokened danger; he went
to the binnacle, saw the course he was steering, and without any
particular reason he ordered the steersman to alter the course one
point to the east.

After this it became quite dark, and he continued to promenade the
deck, and had settled into a drowsy state, when as in a dream he
thought he heard voices all round his ship.  Waking up, he ran to
the side of the ship, saw something struggling in the water, and
heard clearly cries for help.  Instantly heaving his ship to, and
lowering all his boats, he managed to pick up sixty or more persons
who were floating about on skylights, doors, spare, and whatever
fragments remained of the Central America.  Had he not changed the
course of his vessel by reason of the mysterious conduct of that
man-of-war hawk, not a soul would probably have survived the night.
It was stated by the rescued passengers, among whom was Billy
Birch, that the Central America had sailed from Aspinwall with the
passengers and freight which left San Francisco on the 1st of
September, and encountered the gale in the Gulf Stream somewhere
off Savannah, in which she sprung a leak, filled rapidly, and went
down.  The passengers who were saved had clung to doors, skylights,
and such floating objects as they could reach, and were thus
rescued; all the rest, some five hundred in number, had gone down
with the ship.

The panic grew worse and worse, and about the end of September
there was a general suspension of the banks of New York, and a
money crisis extended all over the country.  In New York, Lucas,
Turner & Co. had nothing at risk.  We had large cash balances in
the Metropolitan Bank and in the Bank of America, all safe, and we
held, for the account of the St. Louis house, at least two hundred
thousand dollars, of St. Louis city and county bonds, and of
acceptances falling due right along, none extending beyond ninety
days.  I was advised from St. Louis that money matters were
extremely tight; but I did not dream of any danger in that quarter.
I knew well that Mr. Lucas was worth two or three million dollars
in the best real estate, and inferred from the large balances to
their credit with me that no mere panic could shake his credit;
but, early on the morning of October 7th, my cousin, James M. Hoyt,
came to me in bed, and read me a paragraph in the morning paper, to
the effect that James H. Lucas & Co., of St. Louis, had suspended.
I was, of course, surprised, but not sorry; for I had always
contended that a man of so much visible wealth as Mr. Lucas should
not be engaged in a business subject to such vicissitudes.  I
hurried down to the office, where I received the same information
officially, by telegraph, with instructions to make proper
disposition of the affairs of the bank, and to come out to St.
Louis, with such assets as would be available there.  I transferred
the funds belonging to all our correspondents, with lists of
outstanding checks, to one or other of our bankers, and with the
cash balance of the St. Louis house and their available assets
started for St. Louis.  I may say with confidence that no man lost
a cent by either of the banking firms of Lucas, Turner & Co., of
San Francisco or New York; but, as usual, those who owed us were
not always as just.  I reached St. Louis October 17th, and found
the partners engaged in liquidating the balances due depositors as
fast as collections could be forced; and, as the panic began to
subside, this process became quite rapid, and Mr. Lucas, by making
a loan in Philadelphia, was enabled to close out all accounts
without having made any serious sacrifices, Of course, no person
ever lost a cent by him: he has recently died, leaving an estate of
eight million dollars.  During his lifetime, I had opportunities to
know him well, and take much pleasure in bearing testimony to his
great worth and personal kindness.  On the failure of his bank, he
assumed personally all the liabilities, released his partners of
all responsibility, and offered to assist me to engage in business,
which he supposed was due to me because I had resigned my army
commission.  I remained in St. Louis till the 17th of December,
1857, assisting in collecting for the bank, and in controlling all
matters which came from the New York and San Francisco branches.
B. R. Nisbet was still in San Francisco, but had married a Miss
Thornton, and was coming home.  There still remained in California
a good deal of real estate, and notes, valued at about two hundred
thousand dollars in the aggregate; so that, at Mr. Lucas's request,
I agreed to go out again, to bring matters, if possible, nearer a
final settlement.  I accordingly left St. Louis, reached Lancaster,
where my family was, on the 10th, staid there till after Christmas,
and then went to New York, where I remained till January 5th, when
I embarked on the steamer Moles Taylor (Captain McGowan) for
Aspinwall; caught the Golden Gate (Captain Whiting) at Panama,
January 15, 1858; and reached San Francisco on the 28th of January.
I found that Nisbet and wife had gone to St. Louis, and that we had
passed each other at sea.  He had carried the ledger and books to
St. Louis, but left a schedule, notes, etc., in the hands of S. M.
Bowman, Esq., who passed them over to me.

On the 30th of January I published a notice of the dissolution of
the partnership, and called on all who were still indebted to the
firm of Lucas, Turner & Co. to pay up, or the notes would be sold
at auction.  I also advertised that all the real property, was for
sale.

Business had somewhat changed since 1857.  Parrott & Co.; Garrison,
Fritz & Ralston; Wells, Fargo & Co.; Drexel, Sather & Church, and
Tallant & Wilde, were the principal bankers.  Property continued
almost unsalable, and prices were less than a half of what they
had been in 1853-'54.  William Blending, Esq., had rented my house
on Harrison Street; so I occupied a room in the bank, No. 11, and
boarded at the Meiggs House, corner of Broadway and Montgomery,
which we owned.  Having reduced expenses to a minimum, I proceeded,
with all possible dispatch, to collect outstanding debts, in some
instances making sacrifices and compromises.  I made some few
sales, and generally aimed to put matters in such a shape that time
would bring the best result.  Some of our heaviest creditors were
John M. Rhodes & Co., of Sacramento and Shasta; Langton & Co., of
Downieville; and E. M. Stranger of Murphy's.  In trying to put
these debts in course of settlement, I made some arrangement in
Downieville with the law-firm of Spears & Thornton, to collect, by
suit, a certain note of Green & Purdy for twelve thousand dollars.
Early in April, I learned that Spears had collected three thousand
seven hundred dollars in money, had appropriated it to his own use,
and had pledged another good note taken in part payment of three
thousand and fifty-three dollars.  He pretended to be insane.  I
had to make two visits to Downieville on this business, and there,
made the acquaintance of Mr. Stewart, now a Senator from Nevada.
He was married to a daughter of Governor Foote; was living in a
small frame house on the bar just below the town; and his little
daughter was playing about the door in the sand.  Stewart was then
a lawyer in Downieville, in good practice; afterward, by some lucky
stroke, became part owner of a valuable silver-mine in Nevada, and
is now accounted a millionaire.  I managed to save something out of
Spears, and more out of his partner Thornton.  This affair of
Spears ruined him, because his insanity was manifestly feigned.

I remained in San Francisco till July 3d, when, having collected
and remitted every cent that I could raise, and got all the
property in the best shape possible, hearing from St. Louis
that business had revived, and that there was no need of
further sacrifice; I put all the papers, with a full letter of
instructions, and power of attorney, in the hands of William
Blending, Esq., and took passage on the good steamer Golden Gate,
Captain Whiting, for Panama and home.  I reached Lancaster on July
28, 1858, and found all the family well.  I was then perfectly
unhampered, but the serious and greater question remained, what was
I to do to support my family, consisting of a wife and four
children, all accustomed to more than the average comforts of life?

I remained at Lancaster all of August, 1858, during which time I
was discussing with Mr. Ewing and others what to do next.  Major
Turner and Mr. Lucas, in St. Louis, were willing to do any thing to
aid me, but I thought best to keep independent.  Mr. Ewing had
property at Chauncey, consisting of salt-wells and coal-mines, but
for that part of Ohio I had no fancy.  Two of his sons, Hugh and T.
E., Jr., had established themselves at Leavenworth, Kansas, where
they and their father had bought a good deal of land, some near the
town, and some back in the country.  Mr. Ewing offered to confide
to me the general management of his share of interest, and Hugh and
T. E., Jr., offered me an equal copartnership in their law-firm.

Accordingly, about the 1st of September, I started for Kansas,
stopping a couple of weeks in St. Louis, and reached Leavenworth.
I found about two miles below the fort, on the river-bank, where in
1851 was a tangled thicket, quite a handsome and thriving city,
growing rapidly in rivalry with Kansas City, and St. Joseph,
Missouri.  After looking about and consulting with friends, among
them my classmate Major Stewart Van Vliet, quartermaster at the
fort, I concluded to accept the proposition of Mr. Ewing, and
accordingly the firm of Sherman & Ewing was duly announced, and our
services to the public offered as attorneys-at-law.  We had an
office on Main Street, between Shawnee and Delaware, on the second
floor, over the office of Hampton Denman, Esq., mayor of the city.
This building was a mere shell, and our office was reached by a
stairway on the outside.  Although in the course of my military
reading I had studied a few of the ordinary law-books, such as
Blackstone, Kent, Starkie, etc., I did not presume to be a lawyer;
but our agreement was that Thomas Ewing, Jr., a good and thorough
lawyer, should manage all business in the courts, while I gave
attention to collections, agencies for houses and lands, and such
business as my experience in banking had qualified me for.  Yet, as
my name was embraced in a law-firm, it seemed to me proper to take
out a license.  Accordingly, one day when United States Judge
Lecompte was in our office, I mentioned the matter to him; he told
me to go down to the clerk of his court, and he would give me the
license.  I inquired what examination I would have to submit to,
and he replied, "None at all;" he would admit me on the ground of
general intelligence.

During that summer we got our share of the business of the
profession, then represented by several eminent law-firms,
embracing names that have since flourished in the Senate, and in
the higher courts of the country.  But the most lucrative single
case was given me by my friend Major Van Vliet, who employed me to
go to Fort Riley, one hundred and thirty-six miles west of Fort
Leavenworth, to superintend the repairs to the military road.  For
this purpose he supplied me with a four-mule ambulance and driver.
The country was then sparsely settled, and quite as many Indians
were along the road as white people; still there were embryo towns
all along the route, and a few farms sprinkled over the beautiful
prairies.  On reaching Indianola, near Topeka, I found everybody
down with the chills and fever.  My own driver became so shaky that
I had to act as driver and cook.  But in due season I reconnoitred
the road, and made contracts for repairing some bridges, and for
cutting such parts of the road as needed it.  I then returned to
Fort Leavenworth, and reported, receiving a fair compensation.  On
my way up I met Colonel Sumner's column, returning from their
summer scout on the plains, and spent the night with the officers,
among whom were Captains Sackett, Sturgis, etc.  Also at Fort Riley
I was cordially received and entertained by some old army-friends,
among them Major Sedgwick, Captains Totted, Eli Long, etc.

Mrs. Sherman and children arrived out in November, and we spent the
winter very comfortably in the house of Thomas Ewing, Jr., on the
corner of Third and Pottawottamie Streets.  On the 1st of January,
1859, Daniel McCook, Esq., was admitted to membership in our firm,
which became Sherman, Ewing & McCook.  Our business continued to
grow, but, as the income hardly sufficed for three such expensive
personages, I continued to look about for something more certain
and profitable, and during that spring undertook for the Hon.
Thomas Ewing, of Ohio, to open a farm on a large tract of land he
owned on Indian Creek, forty miles west of Leavenworth, for the
benefit of his grand-nephew, Henry Clark, and his grand-niece, Mrs.
Walker.  These arrived out in the spring, by which time I had
caused to be erected a small frame dwelling-house, a barn, and
fencing for a hundred acres.  This helped to pass away time, but
afforded little profit; and on the 11th of June, 1859, I wrote to
Major D. C. Buel, assistant adjutant-general, on duty in the War
Department with Secretary of War Floyd, inquiring if there was a
vacancy among the army paymasters, or any thing in his line that I
could obtain.  He replied promptly, and sent me the printed
programme for a military college about to be organized in
Louisiana, and advised me to apply for the superintendent's place,
saying that General G. Mason Graham, the half-brother of my old
commanding-general, R. B. Mason, was very influential in this
matter, and would doubtless befriend me on account of the relations
that had existed between General Mason and myself in California.
Accordingly, I addressed a letter of application to the Hon. R. C.
Wickliffe, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, asking the answer to be sent to
me at Lancaster, Ohio, where I proposed to leave my family.  But,
before leaving this branch of the subject, I must explain a little
matter of which I have seen an account in print, complimentary or
otherwise of the firm of Sherman, Ewing & McCook, more especially
of the senior partner.

One day, as I sat in our office, an Irishman came in and said he
had a case and wanted a lawyer.  I asked him to sit down and give
me the points of his case, all the other members of the firm being
out.  Our client stated that he had rented a lot of an Irish
landlord for five dollars a month; that he had erected thereon a
small frame shanty, which was occupied by his family; that he had,
paid his rent regularly up to a recent period, but to his house he
had appended a shed which extended over a part of an adjoining
vacant lot belonging to the same landlord, for which he was charged
two and a half dollars a month, which he refused to pay.  The
consequence was, that his landlord had for a few months declined
even his five dollars monthly rent until the arrears amounted to
about seventeen dollars, for which he was sued.  I told him we
would undertake his case, of which I took notes, and a fee of five
dollars in advance, and in due order I placed the notes in the
hands of McCook, and thought no more of it.

A month or so after, our client rushed into the office and said his
case had been called at Judge Gardner's (I think), and he wanted
his lawyer right away.  I sent him up to the Circuit Court, Judge
Pettit's, for McCook, but he soon returned, saying he could not
find McCook, and accordingly I hurried with him up to Judge
Gardner's office, intending to ask a continuance, but I found our
antagonist there, with his lawyer and witnesses, and Judge Gardner
would not grant a continuance, so of necessity I had to act, hoping
that at every minute McCook would come.  But the trial proceeded
regularly to its end; we were beaten, and judgment was entered
against our client for the amount claimed, and costs.  As soon as
the matter was explained to McCook, he said "execution" could not
be taken for ten days, and, as our client was poor, and had nothing
on which the landlord could levy but his house, McCook advised him
to get his neighbors together, to pick up the house, and carry it
on to another vacant lot, belonging to a non-resident, so that even
the house could not be taken in execution.  Thus the grasping
landlord, though successful in his judgment, failed in the
execution, and our client was abundantly satisfied.

In due time I closed up my business at Leavenworth, and went to
Lancaster, Ohio, where, in July, 1859, I received notice from
Governor Wickliffe that I had been elected superintendent of the
proposed college, and inviting me to come down to Louisiana as
early as possible, because they were anxious to put the college
into operation by the 1st of January following.  For this honorable
position I was indebted to Major D. C. Buell and General G. Mason
Graham, to whom I have made full and due acknowledgment.  During
the civil war, it was reported and charged that I owed my position
to the personal friendship of Generals Bragg and Beauregard, and
that, in taking up arms against the South, I had been guilty of a
breach of hospitality and friendship.  I was not indebted to
General Bragg, because he himself told me that he was not even
aware that I was an applicant, and had favored the selection of
Major Jenkins, another West Point graduate.  General Beauregard had
nothing whatever to do with the matter.




CHAPTER VII.

LOUISIANA

1859-1861.


In the autumn of 1859, having made arrangements for my family to
remain in Lancaster, I proceeded, via Columbus, Cincinnati, and
Louisville, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where I reported for duty to
Governor Wickliffe, who, by virtue of his office, was the president
of the Board of Supervisors of the new institution over which I was
called to preside.  He explained to me the act of the Legislature
under which the institution was founded; told me that the building
was situated near Alexandria, in the parish of Rapides, and was
substantially finished; that the future management would rest with
a Board of Supervisors, mostly citizens of Rapides Parish, where
also resided the Governor-elect, T. O. Moore, who would soon
succeed him in his office as Governor and president ex officio; and
advised me to go at once to Alexandria, and put myself in
communication with Moore and the supervisors.  Accordingly I took a
boat at Baton Rouge, for the mouth of Red River.

The river being low, and its navigation precarious, I there took
the regular mail-coach, as the more certain conveyance, and
continued on toward Alexandria.  I found, as a fellow-passenger in
the coach, Judge Henry Boyce, of the United States District Court,
with whom I had made acquaintance years before, at St. Louis, and,
as we neared Alexandria, he proposed that we should stop at
Governor Moore's and spend the night.  Moore's house and plantation
were on Bayou Robert, about eight miles from Alexandria.  We found
him at home, with his wife and a married daughter, and spent the
night there.  He sent us forward to Alexandria the next morning, in
his own carriage.  On arriving at Alexandria, I put up at an inn,
or boarding-house, and almost immediately thereafter went about ten
miles farther up Bayou Rapides, to the plantation and house of
General G. Mason Graham, to whom I looked as the principal man with
whom I had to deal.  He was a high-toned gentleman, and his whole
heart was in the enterprise.  He at once put me at ease.  We acted
together most cordially from that time forth, and it was at his
house that all the details of the seminary were arranged.  We first
visited the college-building together.  It was located on an old
country place of four hundred acres of pineland, with numerous
springs, and the building was very large and handsome.  A
carpenter, named James, resided there, and had the general charge
of the property; but, as there was not a table, chair, black-board,
or any thing on hand, necessary for a beginning, I concluded to
quarter myself in one of the rooms of the seminary, and board with
an old black woman who cooked for James, so that I might personally
push forward the necessary preparations.  There was an old
rail-fence about the place, and a large pile of boards in front.  I
immediately engaged four carpenters, and set them at work to make
out of these boards mess-tables, benches, black-boards, etc.  I
also opened a correspondence with the professors-elect, and with
all parties of influence in the State, who were interested in our
work: At the meeting of the Board of Supervisors, held at
Alexandria, August 2, 1859, five professors had been elected:
1.  W. T. Sherman, Superintendent, and Professor of Engineering, etc.;
2.  Anthony Vallas, Professor of Mathematics, Philosophy, etc.;
3.  Francis W. Smith, Professor of Chemistry, etc.;
4.  David F. Boyd, Professor of Languages, English and Ancient;
5.  E. Berti St. Ange, Professor of French and Modern Languages.

These constituted the Academic Board, while the general supervision
remained in the Board of Supervisors, composed of the Governor of
the State, the Superintendent of Public Education, and twelve
members, nominated by the Governor, and confirmed by the Senate.
The institution was bound to educate sixteen beneficiary students,
free of any charge for tuition.  These had only to pay for their
clothing and books, while all others had to pay their entire
expenses, including tuition.

Early in November, Profs.  Smith, Yallas, St. Ange, and I, met a
committee of the Board of Supervisors, composed of T. C. Manning,
G. Mason Graham, and W. W. Whittington, at General Graham's house,
and resolved to open the institution to pupils on the 1st day of
January, 1860.  We adopted a series of bylaws for the government of
the institution, which was styled the "Louisiana Seminary of
Learning and Military Academy."  This title grew out of the
original grant, by the Congress of the United States, of a certain
township of public land, to be sold by the State, and dedicated to
the use of a "seminary of learning."  I do not suppose that
Congress designed thereby to fix the name or title; but the subject
had so long been debated in Louisiana that the name, though
awkward, had become familiar.  We appended to it "Military
Academy," as explanatory of its general design.

On the 17th of November, 1859, the Governor of the State,
Wickliffe, issued officially a general circular, prepared by us,
giving public notice that the "Seminary of Learning" would open on
the 1st day of January, 1860; containing a description of the
locality, and the general regulations for the proposed institution;
and authorizing parties to apply for further information to the
"Superintendent," at Alexandria, Louisiana.

The Legislature had appropriated for the sixteen beneficiaries at
the rate of two hundred and eighty-three dollars per annum, to
which we added sixty dollars as tuition for pay cadets; and, though
the price was low, we undertook to manage for the first year on
that basis.

Promptly to the day, we opened, with about sixty cadets present.
Major Smith was the commandant of cadets, and I the superintendent.
I had been to New Orleans, where I had bought a supply of
mattresses, books, and every thing requisite, and we started very
much on the basis of West Point and of the Virginia Military
Institute, but without uniforms or muskets; yet with roll-calls,
sections, and recitations, we kept as near the standard of West
Point as possible.  I kept all the money accounts, and gave general
directions to the steward, professors, and cadets.  The other
professors had their regular classes and recitations.  We all lived
in rooms in the college building, except Vallas, who had a family,
and rented a house near by.  A Creole gentleman, B. Jarrean, Esq.,
had been elected steward, and he also had his family in a house not
far off.  The other professors had a mess in a room adjoining the
mess-hall.  A few more cadets joined in the course of the winter,
so that we had in all, during the first term, seventy-three cadets,
of whom fifty-nine passed the examination on the 30th of July,
1860.  During our first term many defects in the original act of
the Legislature were demonstrated, and, by the advice of the Board
of Supervisors, I went down to Baton Rouge during the session of
the Legislature, to advocate and urge the passage of a new bill,
putting the institution on a better footing.  Thomas O. Moors was
then Governor, Bragg was a member of the Board of Public Works, and
Richard Taylor was a Senator.  I got well acquainted with all of
these, and with some of the leading men of the State, and was
always treated with the greatest courtesy and kindness.  In
conjunction with the proper committee of the Legislature, we
prepared a new bill, which was passed and approved on the 7th of
March, 1860, by which we were to have a beneficiary cadet for each
parish, in all fifty-six, and fifteen thousand dollars annually for
their maintenance; also twenty thousand dollars for the general use
of the college.  During that session we got an appropriation of
fifteen thousand dollars for building two professors' houses, for
the purchase of philosophical and chemical apparatus, and for the
beginning of a college library.  The seminary was made a State
Arsenal, under the title of State Central Arsenal, and I was
allowed five hundred dollars a year as its superintendent.  These
matters took me several times to Baton Rouge that winter, and I
recall an event of some interest, which most have happened in
February.  At that time my brother, John Sherman, was a candidate,
in the national House of Representatives, for Speaker, against
Bocock, of Virginia.  In the South he was regarded as an
"abolitionist," the most horrible of all monsters; and many people
of Louisiana looked at me with suspicion, as the brother of the
abolitionist, John Sherman, and doubted the propriety of having me
at the head of an important State institution.  By this time I was
pretty well acquainted with many of their prominent men, was
generally esteemed by all in authority, and by the people of
Rapides Parish especially, who saw that I was devoted to my
particular business, and that I gave no heed to the political
excitement of the day.  But the members of the State Senate and
House did not know me so well, and it was natural that they should
be suspicions of a Northern man, and the brother of him who was the
"abolition" candidate for Speaker of the House.

One evening, at a large dinner-party at Governor Moore's, at which
were present several members of the Louisiana Legislature, Taylor,
Bragg, and the Attorney-General Hyams, after the ladies had left
the table, I noticed at Governor Moore's end quite a lively
discussion going on, in which my name was frequently used; at
length the Governor called to me, saying: "Colonel Sherman, you can
readily understand that, with your brother the abolitionist
candidate for Speaker, some of our people wonder that you should be
here at the head of an important State institution.  Now, you are
at my table, and I assure you of my confidence.  Won't you speak
your mind freely on this question of slavery, that so agitates the
land? You are under my roof, and, whatever you say, you have my
protection."


I answered: "Governor Moors, you mistake in calling my brother,
John Sherman, an abolitionist.  We have been separated since
childhood--I in the army, and he pursuing his profession of
law in Northern Ohio; and it is possible we may differ in
general sentiment, but I deny that he is considered at home an
abolitionist; and, although he prefers the free institutions under
which he lives to those of slavery which prevail here, he would not
of himself take from you by law or force any property whatever,
even slaves."

Then said Moore: "Give us your own views of slavery as you see it
here and throughout the South."

I answered in effect that "the people of Louisiana were hardly
responsible for slavery, as they had inherited it; that I found two
distinct conditions of slavery, domestic and field hands.  The
domestic slaves, employed by the families, were probably better
treated than any slaves on earth; but the condition of the
field-hands was different, depending more on the temper and
disposition of their masters and overseers than were those employed
about the house;" and I went on to say that, "were I a citizen of
Louisiana, and a member of the Legislature, I would deem it wise to
bring the legal condition of the slaves more near the status of
human beings under all Christian and civilized governments.  In the
first place, I argued that, in sales of slaves made by the State, I
would forbid the separation of families, letting the father,
mother, and children, be sold together to one person, instead of
each to the highest bidder.  And, again, I would advise the repeal
of the statute which enacted a severe penalty for even the owner to
teach his slave to read and write, because that actually qualified
property and took away a part of its value; illustrating the
assertion by the case of Henry Sampson, who had been the slave of
Colonel Chambers, of Rapides Parish, who had gone to California as
the servant of an officer of the army, and who was afterward
employed by me in the bank at San Francisco.  At first he could not
write or read, and I could only afford to pay him one hundred
dollars a month; but he was taught to read and write by Reilley,
our bank-teller, when his services became worth two hundred and
fifty dollars a month, which enabled him to buy his own freedom and
that of his brother and his family."

What I said was listened to by all with the most profound
attention; and, when I was through, some one (I think it was Mr.
Hyams) struck the table with his fist, making the glasses jingle,
and said, "By God, he is right!" and at once he took up the debate,
which went on, for an hour or more, on both sides with ability and
fairness.  Of course, I was glad to be thus relieved, because at
the time all men in Louisiana were dreadfully excited on questions
affecting their slaves, who constituted the bulk of their wealth,
and without whom they honestly believed that sugar, cotton, and
rice, could not possibly be cultivated.

On the 30th and 31st of July, 1860, we had an examination at the
seminary, winding up with a ball, and as much publicity as possible
to attract general notice; and immediately thereafter we all
scattered--the cadets to their homes, and the professors wherever
they pleased--all to meet again on the 1st day of the next
November.  Major Smith and I agreed to meet in New York on a
certain day in August, to purchase books, models, etc.  I went
directly to my family in Lancaster, and after a few days proceeded
to Washington, to endeavor to procure from the General Government
the necessary muskets and equipments for our cadets by the
beginning of the next term.  I was in Washington on the 17th
day of August, and hunted up my friend Major Buell, of the
Adjutant-General's Department, who was on duty with the Secretary of
War, Floyd.  I had with me a letter of Governor Moore's, authorizing
me to act in his name.  Major Buell took me into Floyd's room at the
War Department, to whom I explained my business, and I was agreeably
surprised to meet with such easy success.  Although the State of
Louisiana had already drawn her full quota of arms, Floyd promptly
promised to order my requisition to be filled, and I procured the
necessary blanks at the Ordnance-Office, filled them with two
hundred cadet muskets, and all equipments complete, and was assured
that all these articles would be shipped to Louisiana in season for
our use that fall.  These assurances were faithfully carried out.

I then went on to New York, there met Major Smith according to
appointment, and together we selected and purchased a good supply
of uniforms, clothing, and text books, as well as a fair number of
books of history and fiction, to commence a library.

When this business was completed, I returned to Lancaster, and
remained with my family till the time approached for me to return
to Louisiana.  I again left my family at Lancaster, until assured
of the completion of the two buildings designed for the married
professors for which I had contracted that spring with Mr. Mills,
of Alexandria, and which were well under progress when I left in
August.  One of these was designed for me and the other for Vallas.
Mr. Ewing presented me with a horse, which I took down the river
with me, and en route I ordered from Grimsley & Co. a full
equipment of saddle, bridle, etc., the same that I used in the war,
and which I lost with my horse, shot under me at Shiloh.

Reaching Alexandria early in October, I pushed forward the
construction of the two buildings, some fences, gates, and all
other work, with the object of a more perfect start at the opening
of the regular term November 1, 1860.

About this time Dr. Powhatan Clark was elected Assistant Professor
of Chemistry, etc., and acted as secretary of the Board of
Supervisors, but no other changes were made in our small circle of
professors.

November came, and with it nearly if not quite all our first set of
cadets, and others, to the number of about one hundred and thirty.
We divided them into two companies, issued arms and clothing, and
began a regular system of drills and instruction, as well as the
regular recitations.  I had moved into my new house, but prudently
had not sent for my family, nominally on the ground of waiting
until the season was further advanced, but really because of the
storm that was lowering heavy on the political horizon.  The
presidential election was to occur in November, and the nominations
had already been made in stormy debates by the usual conventions.
Lincoln and Hamlin (to the South utterly unknown) were the nominees
of the Republican party, and for the first time both these
candidates were from Northern States.  The Democratic party
divided--one set nominating a ticket at Charleston, and the other
at Baltimore.  Breckenridge and Lane were the nominees of the
Southern or Democratic party; and Bell and Everett, a kind of
compromise, mostly in favor in Louisiana.  Political excitement was
at its very height, and it was constantly asserted that Mr.
Lincoln's election would imperil the Union.  I purposely kept aloof
from politics, would take no part, and remember that on the day of
the election in November I was notified that it would be advisable
for me to vote for Bell and Everett, but I openly said I would not,
and I did not.  The election of Mr. Lincoln fell upon us all like a
clap of thunder.  People saw and felt that the South had threatened
so long that, if she quietly submitted, the question of slavery in
the Territories was at an end forever.  I mingled freely with the
members of the Board of Supervisors, and with the people of Rapides
Parish generally, keeping aloof from all cliques and parties, and I
certainly hoped that the threatened storm would blow over, as had
so often occurred before, after similar threats.  At our seminary
the order of exercises went along with the regularity of the
seasons.  Once a week, I had the older cadets to practise reading,
reciting, and elocution, and noticed that their selections were
from Calhoun, Yancey, and other Southern speakers, all treating of
the defense of their slaves and their home institutions as the very
highest duty of the patriot.  Among boys this was to be expected;
and among the members of our board, though most of them declaimed
against politicians generally, and especially abolitionists, as
pests, yet there was a growing feeling that danger was in the wind.
I recall the visit of a young gentleman who had been sent from
Jackson, by the Governor of Mississippi, to confer with Governor
Moore, then on his plantation at Bayou Robert, and who had come
over to see our college.  He spoke to me openly of secession as a
fixed fact, and that its details were only left open for
discussion.  I also recall the visit of some man who was said to be
a high officer in the order of "Knights of the Golden Circle," of
the existence of which order I was even ignorant, until explained
to me by Major Smith and Dr. Clark.  But in November, 1860, no man
ever approached me offensively, to ascertain my views, or my
proposed course of action in case of secession, and no man in or
out of authority ever tried to induce me to take part in steps
designed to lead toward disunion.  I think my general opinions were
well known and understood, viz., that "secession was treason, was
war;" and that in no event would the North and West permit the
Mississippi River to pass out of their control.  But some men at
the South actually supposed at the time that the Northwestern
States, in case of a disruption of the General Government, would be
drawn in self-interest to an alliance with the South.  What I now
write I do not offer as any thing like a history of the important
events of that time, but rather as my memory of them, the effect
they had on me personally, and to what extent they influenced my
personal conduct.

South Carolina seceded December 20, 1860, and Mississippi soon
after.  Emissaries came to Louisiana to influence the Governor,
Legislature, and people, and it was the common assertion that, if
all the Cotton States would follow the lead of South Carolina, it
would diminish the chances of civil war, because a bold and
determined front would deter the General Government from any
measures of coercion.  About this time also, viz., early in
December, we received Mr. Buchanan's annual message to Congress, in
which he publicly announced that the General Government had no
constitutional power to "coerce a State."  I confess this staggered
me, and I feared that the prophecies and assertions of Alison and
other European commentators on our form of government were right,
and that our Constitution was a mere rope of sand, that would break
with the first pressure.

The Legislature of Louisiana met on the 10th of December, and
passed an act calling a convention of delegates from the people, to
meet at Baton Rouge, on the 8th of January, to take into
consideration the state of the Union; and, although it was
universally admitted that a large majority of the voters of the
State were opposed to secession, disunion, and all the steps of the
South Carolinians, yet we saw that they were powerless, and that
the politicians would sweep them along rapidly to the end,
prearranged by their leaders in Washington.  Before the ordinance
of secession was passed, or the convention had assembled, on the
faith of a telegraphic dispatch sent by the two Senators, Benjamin
and Slidell, from their seats in the United States Senate at
Washington, Governor Moore ordered the seizure of all the United
States forts at the mouth of the Mississippi and Lake
Pontchartrain, and of the United States arsenal at Baton Rouge.
The forts had no garrisons, but the arsenal was held by a small
company of artillery, commanded by Major Haskins, a most worthy and
excellent officer, who had lost an arm in Mexico.  I remember well
that I was strongly and bitterly impressed by the seizure of the
arsenal, which occurred on January 10, 1861.

When I went first to Baton Rouge, in 1859, en route to Alexandria,
I found Captain Rickett's company of artillery stationed in the
arsenal, but soon after there was somewhat of a clamor on the Texas
frontier about Brownsville, which induced the War Department to
order Rickett's company to that frontier.  I remember that Governor
Moore remonstrated with the Secretary of War because so much
dangerous property, composed of muskets, powder, etc., had been
left by the United States unguarded, in a parish where the slave
population was as five or six to one of whites; and it was on his
official demand that the United States Government ordered Haskinss
company to replace Rickett's.  This company did not number forty
men.  In the night of January 9th, about five hundred New Orleans
militia, under command of a Colonel Wheat, went up from New Orleans
by boat, landed, surrounded the arsenal, and demanded its
surrender.  Haskins was of course unprepared for such a step, yet
he at first resolved to defend the post as he best could with his
small force.  But Bragg, who was an old army acquaintance of his,
had a parley with him, exhibited to him the vastly superior force
of his assailants, embracing two field-batteries, and offered to
procure for him honorable terms, to march out with drums and
colors, and to take unmolested passage in a boat up to St. Louis;
alleging, further, that the old Union was at an end, and that a
just settlement would be made between the two new fragments for all
the property stored in the arsenal.  Of course it was Haskins's
duty to have defended his post to the death; but up to that time
the national authorities in Washington had shown such
pusillanimity, that the officers of the army knew not what to do.
The result, anyhow, was that Haskins surrendered his post, and at
once embarked for St. Louis.  The arms and munitions stored in the
arsenal were scattered--some to Mississippi, some to New Orleans,
some to Shreveport; and to me, at the Central Arsenal, were
consigned two thousand muskets, three hundred Jager rifles, and a
large amount of cartridges and ammunition.  The invoices were
signed by the former ordnance-sergeant, Olodowski, as a captain of
ordnance, and I think he continued such on General Bragg's staff
through the whole of the subsequent civil war.  These arms, etc.,
came up to me at Alexandria, with orders from Governor Moore to
receipt for and account for them.  Thus I was made the receiver of
stolen goods, and these goods the property of the United States.
This grated hard on my feelings as an ex-army-officer, and on
counting the arms I noticed that they were packed in the old
familiar boxes, with the "U. S."  simply scratched off.  General G.
Mason Graham had resigned as the chairman of the Executive
Committee, and Dr. S. A. Smith, of Alexandria, then a member of the
State Senate, had succeeded him as chairman, and acted as head of
the Board of Supervisors.  At the time I was in most intimate
correspondence with all of these parties, and our letters must have
been full of politics, but I have only retained copies of a few of
the letters, which I will embody in this connection, as they will
show, better than by any thing I can now recall, the feelings of
parties at that critical period.  The seizure of the arsenal at
Baton Rouge occurred January 10, 1861, and the secession ordinance
was not passed until about the 25th or 26th of the same month.  At
all events, after the seizure of the arsenal, and before the
passage of the ordinance of secession, viz., on the 18th of
January, I wrote as follows:


Louisiana State Seminary of Learning and Military Academy
January 18, 1861

Governor THOMAS O. MOORE, Baton, Rouge, Louisiana.

Sir: As I occupy a quasi-military position under the laws of the
State, I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted such
position when Louisiana was a State in the Union, and when the
motto of this seminary was inserted in marble over the main door:
"By the liberality of the General Government of the United States.
The Union--esto perpetua."

Recent events foreshadow a great change, and it becomes all men to
choose.  If Louisiana withdraw from the Federal Union, I prefer to
maintain my allegiance to the Constitution as long as a fragment of
it survives; and my longer stay here would be wrong in every sense
of the word.

In that event, I beg you will send or appoint some authorized agent
to take charge of the arms and munitions of war belonging to the
State, or advise me what disposition to make of them.

And furthermore, as president of the Board of Supervisors, I beg
you to take immediate steps to relieve me as superintendent, the
moment the State determines to secede, for on no earthly account
will I do any act or think any thought hostile to or in defiance of
the old Government of the United States.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Superintendent.



[PRIVATE.]

January 18, 1861.

To Governor Moore:

My Dear Sir: I take it for granted that you have been expecting for
some days the accompanying paper from me (the above official
letter).  I have repeatedly and again made known to General Graham
and Dr. Smith that, in the event of a severance of the relations
hitherto existing between the Confederated States of this Union, I
would be forced to choose the old Union.  It is barely possible all
the States may secede, South and North, that new combinations may
result, but this process will be one of time and uncertainty, and I
cannot with my opinions await the subsequent development.

I have never been a politician, and therefore undervalue the
excited feelings and opinions of present rulers, but I do think, if
this people cannot execute a form of government like the present,
that a worse one will result.

I will keep the cadets as quiet as possible.  They are nervous, but
I think the interest of the State requires them here, guarding this
property, and acquiring a knowledge which will be useful to your
State in after-times.

When I leave, which I now regard as certain, the present professors
can manage well enough, to afford you leisure time to find a
suitable successor to me.  You might order Major Smith to receipt
for the arms, and to exercise military command, while the academic
exercises could go on under the board.  In time, some gentleman
will turn up, better qualified than I am, to carry on the seminary
to its ultimate point of success.  I entertain the kindest feelings
toward all, and would leave the State with much regret; only in
great events we must choose, one way or the other.

Truly, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN



January 19, 1881--Saturday.

Dr. S. A. Smith, President Board of Supervisors, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana.

Dear Sir: I have just finished my quarterly reports to the parents
of all the cadets here, or who have been here.  All my books of
account are written up to date.  All bills for the houses, fences,
etc., are settled, and nothing now remains but the daily tontine of
recitations and drills.  I have written officially and unofficially
to Governor Moore, that with my opinions of the claimed right of
accession, of the seizure of public forts, arsenals, etc., and the
ignominious capture of a United States garrison, stationed in your
midst, as a guard to the arsenal and for the protection of your own
people, it would be highly improper for me longer to remain.  No
great inconvenience can result to the seminary.  I will be the
chief loser.  I came down two months before my pay commenced.  I
made sacrifices in Kansas to enable me thus to obey the call of
Governor Wickliffe, and you know that last winter I declined a most
advantageous offer of employment abroad; and thus far I have
received nothing as superintendent of the arsenal, though I went to
Washington and New York (at my own expense) on the faith of the
five hundred dollars salary promised.

These are all small matters in comparison with those involved in
the present state of the country, which will cause sacrifices by
millions, instead of by hundreds.  The more I think of it, the more
I think I should be away, the sooner the better; and therefore I
hope you will join with Governor Moors in authorizing me to turn
over to Major Smith the military command here, and to the academic
board the control of the daily exercises and recitations.

There will be no necessity of your coming up.  You can let Major
Smith receive the few hundreds of cash I have on hand, and I can
meet you on a day certain in New Orleans, when we can settle the
bank account.  Before I leave, I can pay the steward Jarrean his
account for the month, and there would be no necessity for other
payments till about the close of March, by which time the board can
meet, and elect a treasurer and superintendent also.

At present I have no class, and there will be none ready till about
the month of May, when there will be a class in "surveying."  Even
if you do not elect a superintendent in the mean time, Major Smith
could easily teach this class, as he is very familiar with the
subject-matter: Indeed, I think you will do well to leave the
subject of a new superintendent until one perfectly satisfactory
turns up.

There is only one favor I would ask.  The seminary has plenty of
money in bank.  The Legislature will surely appropriate for my
salary as superintendent of this arsenal.  Would you not let me
make my drafts on the State Treasury, send them to you, let the
Treasurer note them for payment when the appropriation is made, and
then pay them out of the seminary fund?  The drafts will be paid in
March, and the seminary will lose nothing.  This would be just to
me; for I actually spent two hundred dollars and more in going to
Washington and New York, thereby securing from the United States,
in advance, three thousand dollars' worth of the very best arms;
and clothing and books, at a clear profit to the seminary of over
eight hundred dollars.  I may be some time in finding new
employment, and will stand in need of this money (five hundred
dollars); otherwise I would abandon it.

I will not ask you to put the Board of Supervisors to the trouble
of meeting, unless you can get a quorum at Baton Rouge.

With great respect, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN.


By course of mail, I received the following answer from Governor
Moore, the original of which I still possess.  It is all in General
Braggs handwriting, with which I am familiar--


Executive Office,

BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA, January 23, 1861

MY DEAR SIR: It is with the deepest regret I acknowledge receipt of
your communication of the 18th inst.  In the pressure of official
business, I can now only request you to transfer to Prof. Smith the
arms, munitions, and funds in your hands, whenever you conclude to
withdraw from the position you have filled with so much
distinction.  You cannot regret more than I do the necessity which
deprives us of your services, and you will bear with you the
respect, confidence, and admiration, of all who have been
associated with you.  Very truly, your friend,

Thomas O. Moore.

Colonel W. T. SHERMAN, Superintendent Military Academy, Alexandria.


I must have received several letters from Bragg, about this time,
which have not been preserved; for I find that, on the 1st of
February, 1861, I wrote him thus:

Seminary of Learning
Alexandria, LOUISIANA, February 1, 1881.

Colonel Braxton BRAGG, Baton, Rouge, Louisiana.

Dear Sir: Yours of January 23d and 27th are received.  I thank you
most kindly, and Governor Moors through you, for the kind manner in
which you have met my wishes.

Now that I cannot be compromised by political events, I will so
shape my course as best to serve the institution, which has a
strong hold on my affections and respect.

The Board of Supervisors will be called for the 9th instant, and I
will cooperate with them in their measures to place matters here on
a safe and secure basis.  I expect to be here two weeks, and will
make you full returns of money and property belonging to the State
Central Arsenal.  All the arms and ammunition are safely stored
here.  Then I will write you more at length.  With sincere respect,
your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN.


Major Smith's receipt to me, for the arms and property belonging
both to the seminary and to the arsenal, is dated February 19,
1861.  I subjoin also, in this connection, copies of one or two
papers that may prove of interest


BATON ROUGE, January 28, 1881.
To Major SHERMAN, Superintendent, Alexandria.

My DEAR SIR: Your letter was duly receive, and would have been
answered ere this time could I have arranged sooner the matter of
the five hundred dollars.  I shall go from here to New Orleans
to-day or tomorrow, and will remain there till Saturday after next,
perhaps.  I shall expect to meet you there, as indicated in your
note to me.

I need not tell you that it is with no ordinary regret that I view
your determination to leave us, for really I believe that the
success of our institution, now almost assured, is jeopardized
thereby.  I am sore that we will never have a superintendent with
whom I shall have more pleasant relations than those which have
existed between yourself and me.

I fully appreciate the motives which have induced you to give up a
position presenting so many advantages to yourself, and sincerely
hope that you may, in any future enterprise, enjoy the success
which your character and ability merit and deserve.

Should you come down on the Rapides (steamer), please look after my
wife, who will, I hope, accompany you on said boat, or some other
good one.

Colonel Bragg informs me that the necessary orders have been given
for the transfer and receipt by Major Smith of the public property.

I herewith transmit a request to the secretary to convene the Board
of Supervisors, that they may act as seems best to them in the
premises.

In the mean time, Major Smith will command by seniority the cadets,
and the Academic Board will be able to conduct the scientific
exercises of the institution until the Board of Supervisors can
have time to act.  Hoping to meet you soon at the St. Charles, I
am,

Most truly, your friend and servant,    S. A. Smith

P. S. Governor Moors desires me to express his profound regret that
the State is about to lose one who we all fondly hoped had cast his
destinies for weal or for woe among us; and that he is sensible
that we lose thereby an officer whom it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to replace.

S. A. S.


BATON ROUGE, February 11, 1881.
To Major Sherman, Alexandria.

Dear Sir: I have been in New Orleans for ten days, and on returning
here find two letters from you, also your prompt answer to the
resolution of the House of Representatives, for which I am much
obliged.

The resolution passed the last day before adjournment.  I was
purposing to respond, when your welcome reports came to hand.  I
have arranged to pay you your five hundred dollars.

I will say nothing of general politics, except to give my opinion
that there is not to be any war.

In that event, would it not be possible for you to become a citizen
of our State? Everyone deplores your determination to leave us.  At
the same time, your friends feel that you are abandoning a position
that might become an object of desire to any one.

I will try to meet you in New Orleans at any time you may indicate;
but it would be best for you to stop here, when, if possible, I
will accompany you.  Should you do so, you will find me just above
the State-House, and facing it.

Bring with you a few copies of the "Rules of the Seminary."

Yours truly,

S. A. Smith


Colonel W. T. SHERMAN.

Sir: I am instructed by the Board of Supervisors of this
institution to present a copy of the resolutions adopted by them at
their last meeting.

"Resolved, That the thanks of the Board of Supervisors are due, and
are hereby tendered, to Colonel William T. Sherman for the able and
efficient manner in which he has conducted the affairs of the
seminary during the time the institution has been under his
control--a period attended with unusual difficulties, requiring on
the part of the superintendent to successfully overcome them a high
order of administrative talent.  And the board further bear willing
testimony to the valuable services that Colonel Sherman has
rendered them in their efforts to establish an institution of
learning in accordance with the beneficent design of the State and
Federal Governments; evincing at all times a readiness to adapt
himself to the ever-varying requirements of an institution of
learning in its infancy, struggling to attain a position of honor
and usefulness.

"Resolved, further, That, in accepting the resignation of Colonel
Sherman as Superintendent of the State Seminary of Learning and
Military Academy, we tender to him assurances of our high personal
regard, and our sincere regret at the occurrence of causes that
render it necessary to part with so esteemed and valued a friend,
as well as co-laborer in the cause of education."

Powhatan Clarke, Secretary of the Board.


A copy of the resolution of the Academic Board, passed at their
session of April 1,1861:

"Resolved, That in the resignation of the late superintendent,
Colonel W. T. Sherman, the Academic Board deem it not improper to
express their deep conviction of the loss the institution has
sustained in being thus deprived of an able head.  They cannot fail
to appreciate the manliness of character which has always marked
the actions of Colonel Sherman.  While he is personally endeared to
many of them as a friend, they consider it their high pleasure to
tender to him in this resolution their regret on his separation,
and their sincere wish for his future welfare."


I have given the above at some length, because, during the civil
war, it was in Southern circles asserted that I was guilty of a
breach of hospitality in taking up arms against the South.  They
were manifestly the aggressors, and we could only defend our own by
assailing them.  Yet, without any knowledge of what the future had
in store for me, I took unusual precautions that the institution
should not be damaged by my withdrawal.  About the 20th of
February, having turned over all property, records, and money, on
hand, to Major Smith, and taking with me the necessary documents to
make the final settlement with Dr. S. A. Smith, at the bank in New
Orleans, where the funds of the institution were deposited to my
credit, I took passage from Alexandria for that city, and arrived
there, I think, on the 23d.  Dr. Smith met me, and we went to the
bank, where I turned over to him the balance, got him to audit all
my accounts, certify that they were correct and just, and that
there remained not one cent of balance in my hands.  I charged in
my account current for my salary up to the end of February, at the
rate of four thousand dollars a year, and for the five hundred
dollars due me as superintendent of the Central Arsenal, all of
which was due and had been fairly earned, and then I stood free and
discharged of any and every obligation, honorary or business, that
was due by me to the State of Louisiana, or to any corporation or
individual in that State.

This business occupied two or three days, during which I staid at
the St. Louis Hotel.  I usually sat at table with Colonel and Mrs.
Bragg, and an officer who wore the uniform of the State of
Louisiana, and was addressed as captain.  Bragg wore a colonel's
uniform, and explained to me that he was a colonel in the State
service, a colonel of artillery, and that some companies of his
regiment garrisoned Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and the arsenal
at Baton Rouge.

Beauregard at the time had two sons at the Seminary of Learning.  I
had given them some of my personal care at the father's request,
and, wanting to tell him of their condition and progress, I went to
his usual office in the Custom-House Building, and found him in the
act of starting for Montgomery, Alabama.  Bragg said afterward that
Beauregard had been sent for by Jefferson Davis, and that it was
rumored that he had been made a brigadier-general, of which fact he
seemed jealous, because in the old army Bragg was the senior.

Davis and Stephens had been inaugurated President and
Vice-President of the Confederate States of America, February 18,
1860, at Montgomery, and those States only embraced the seven
cotton States.  I recall a conversation at the tea-table, one
evening, at the St. Louis Hotel.  When Bragg was speaking of
Beauregard's promotion, Mrs. Bragg, turning to me, said, "You know
that my husband is not a favorite with the new President."  My mind
was resting on Mr. Lincoln as the new President, and I said I did
not know that Bragg had ever met Mr. Lincoln, when Mrs. Bragg said,
quite pointedly, "I didn't mean your President, but our President."
I knew that Bragg hated Davis bitterly, and that he had resigned
from the army in 1855, or 1856, because Davis, as Secretary of War,
had ordered him, with his battery, from Jefferson Barracks,
Missouri, to Fort Smith or Fort Washita, in the Indian country, as
Bragg expressed it, "to chase Indians with six-pounders."

I visited the quartermaster, Colonel A. C. Myers, who had resigned
from the army, January 28, 1861, and had accepted service under the
new regime.  His office was in the same old room in the Lafayette
Square building, which he had in 1853, when I was there a
commissary, with the same pictures on the wall, and the letters "U.
S."  on every thing, including his desk, papers, etc.  I asked him
if he did not feel funny.  "No, not at all.  The thing was
inevitable, secession was a complete success; there would be no
war, but the two Governments would settle all matters of business
in a friendly spirit, and each would go on in its allotted sphere,
without further confusion."  About this date, February 16th,
General Twiggs, Myers's father-in-law, had surrendered his entire
command, in the Department of Texas, to some State troops, with all
the Government property, thus consummating the first serious step
in the drama of the conspiracy, which was to form a confederacy of
the cotton States, before working upon the other slave or border
States, and before the 4th of March, the day for the inauguration
of President Lincoln.

I walked the streets of New Orleans, and found business going along
as usual.  Ships were strung for miles along the lower levee, and
steamboats above, all discharging or receiving cargo.  The Pelican
flag of Louisiana was flying over the Custom House, Mint, City
Hall, and everywhere.  At the levee ships carried every flag on
earth except that of the United States, and I was told that during
a procession on the 22d of February, celebrating their emancipation
from the despotism of the United States Government, only one
national flag was shown from a house, and that the houses of
Cuthbert Bullitt, on Lafayette Square.  He was commanded to take it
down, but he refused, and defended it with his pistol.

The only officer of the army that I can recall, as being there at
the time, who was faithful, was Colonel C. L. Kilburn, of the
Commissary Department, and he was preparing to escape North.

Everybody regarded the change of Government as final; that
Louisiana, by a mere declaration, was a free and independent State,
and could enter into any new alliance or combination she chose.

Men were being enlisted and armed, to defend the State, and there
was not the least evidence that the national Administration
designed to make any effort, by force, to vindicate the national
authority.  I therefore bade adieu to all my friends, and about the
25th of February took my departure by railroad, for Lancaster, via
Cairo and Cincinnati.

Before leaving this subject, I will simply record the fate of some
of my associates.  The seminary was dispersed by the war, and all
the professors and cadets took service in the Confederacy, except
Yallas, St. Ange, and Cadet Taliaferro.  The latter joined a Union
regiment, as a lieutenant, after New Orleans was retaken by the
United States fleet under Farragut.  I think that both Yallas and
St. Ange have died in poverty since the war.  Major Smith joined
the rebel army in Virginia, and was killed in April, 1865, as he
was withdrawing his garrison, by night, from the batteries at
Drury's Bluff, at the time General Lee began his final retreat from
Richmond.  Boyd became a captain of engineers on the staff of
General Richard Taylor, was captured, and was in jail at Natchez,
Mississippi, when I was on my Meridian expedition.  He succeeded in
getting a letter to me on my arrival at Vicksburg, and, on my way
down to New Orleans, I stopped at Natchez, took him along, and
enabled him to effect an exchange through General Banks.  As soon
as the war was over, he returned to Alexandria, and reorganized the
old institution, where I visited him in 1867; but, the next winter,
the building took fire end burned to the ground.  The students,
library, apparatus, etc., were transferred to Baton Rouge, where
the same institution now is, under the title of the Louisiana
University.  I have been able to do them many acts of kindness, and
am still in correspondence, with Colonel Boyd, its president.

General G. Mason Graham is still living on his plantation, on Bayou
Rapides, old and much respected.

Dr. S. A. Smith became a surgeon in the rebel army, and at the
close of the war was medical director of the trans-Mississippi
Department, with General Kirby Smith.  I have seen him since the
war, at New Orleans, where he died about a year ago.

Dr. Clark was in Washington recently, applying for a place as
United States consul abroad.  I assisted him, but with no success,
and he is now at Baltimore, Maryland.

After the battle of Shiloh, I found among the prisoners Cadet
Barrow, fitted him out with some clean clothing, of which he was in
need, and from him learned that Cadet Workman was killed in that
battle.

Governor Moore's plantation was devastated by General Banks's
troops.  After the war he appealed to me, and through the
Attorney-General, Henry Stanbery, I aided in having his
land restored to him, and I think he is now living there.

Bragg, Beauregard, and Taylor, enacted high parts in the succeeding
war, and now reside in Louisiana or Texas.




CHAPTER VIII.

MISSOURI

APRIL AND MAY, 1861.

During the time of these events in Louisiana, I was in constant
correspondence with my brother, John Sherman, at Washington; Mr.
Ewing, at Lancaster, Ohio; and Major H. S. Turner, at St. Louis.  I
had managed to maintain my family comfortably at Lancaster, but was
extremely anxious about the future.  It looked like the end of my
career, for I did not suppose that "civil war" could give me an
employment that would provide for the family.  I thought, and may
have said, that the national crisis had been brought about by the
politicians, and, as it was upon us, they "might fight it out"
Therefore, when I turned North from New Orleans, I felt more
disposed to look to St. Louis for a home, and to Major.  Turner to
find me employment, than to the public service.

I left New Orleans about the 1st of March, 1861, by rail to Jackson
and Clinton, Mississippi, Jackson, Tennessee, and Columbus,
Kentucky, where we took a boat to Cairo, and thence, by rail, to
Cincinnati and Lancaster.  All the way, I heard, in the cars and
boats, warm discussions about polities; to the effect that, if Mr.
Lincoln should attempt coercion of the seceded States, the other
slave or border States would make common cause, when, it was
believed, it would be madness to attempt to reduce them to
subjection.  In the South, the people were earnest, fierce and
angry, and were evidently organizing for action; whereas, in
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, I saw not the least sign of
preparation.  It certainly looked to me as though the people of the
North would tamely submit to a disruption of the Union, and the
orators of the South used, openly and constantly, the expressions
that there would be no war, and that a lady's thimble would hold
all the blood to be shed.  On reaching Lancaster, I found letters
from my brother John, inviting me to come to Washington, as he
wanted to see me; and from Major Tamer, at St. Louis, that he was
trying to secure for me the office of president of the Fifth Street
Railroad, with a salary of twenty-five hundred dollars; that Mr.
Lucas and D. A. January held a controlling interest of stock, would
vote for me, and the election would occur in March.  This suited me
exactly, and I answered Turner that I would accept, with thanks.
But I also thought it right and proper that I should first go to
Washington, to talk with my brother, Senator Sherman.

Mr. Lincoln had just been installed, and the newspapers were filled
with rumors of every kind indicative of war; the chief act of
interest was that Major Robert Anderson had taken by night into
Fort Sumter all the troops garrisoning Charleston Harbor, and that
he was determined to defend it against the demands of the State of
South Carolina and of the Confederate States.  I must have reached
Washington about the 10th of March.  I found my brother there, just
appointed Senator, in place of Mr. Chase, who was in the cabinet,
and I have no doubt my opinions, thoughts, and feelings, wrought up
by the events in Louisiana; seemed to him gloomy and extravagant.
About Washington I saw but few signs of preparation, though the
Southern Senators and Representatives were daily sounding their
threats on the floors of Congress, and were publicly withdrawing to
join the Confederate Congress at Montgomery.  Even in the War
Department and about the public offices there was open, unconcealed
talk, amounting to high-treason.

One day, John Sherman took me with him to see Mr. Lincoln.  He
walked into the room where the secretary to the President now sits,
we found the room full of people, and Mr. Lincoln sat at the end of
the table, talking with three or four gentlemen, who soon left.
John walked up, shook hands, and took a chair near him, holding in
his hand some papers referring to, minor appointments in the State
of Ohio, which formed the subject of conversation.  Mr. Lincoln
took the papers, said he would refer them to the proper heads of
departments, and would be glad to make the appointments asked for,
if not already promised.  John then turned to me, and said, "Mr.
President, this is my brother, Colonel Sherman, who is just up from
Louisiana, he may give you some information you want."  "Ah!" said
Mr. Lincoln, "how are they getting along down there?" I said, "They
think they are getting along swimmingly--they are preparing for
war."  "Oh, well!" said he, "I guess we'll manage to keep house."
I was silenced, said no more to him, and we soon left.  I was sadly
disappointed, and remember that I broke out on John, d--ning the
politicians generally, saying, "You have got things in a hell of a
fig, and you may get them out as you best can," adding that the
country was sleeping on a volcano that might burst forth at any
minute, but that I was going to St. Louis to take care of my
family, and would have no more to do with it.  John begged me to be
more patient, but I said I would not; that I had no time to wait,
that I was off for St. Louis; and off I went.  At Lancaster I found
letters from Major Turner, inviting me to St. Louis, as the place
in the Fifth Street Railroad was a sure thing, and that Mr. Lucas
would rent me a good house on Locust Street, suitable for my
family, for six hundred dollars a year.

Mrs. Sherman and I gathered our family and effects together,
started for St. Louis March 27th, where we rented of Mr. Lucas the
house on Locust Street, between Tenth and Eleventh, and occupied it
on the 1st of April.  Charles Ewing and John Hunter had formed a
law-partnership in St. Louis, and agreed to board with us, taking
rooms on the third floor In the latter part of March, I was duly
elected president of the Fifth Street Railroad, and entered on the
discharge of my duties April 1, 1861.  We had a central office on
the corner of Fifth and Locust, and also another up at the stables
in Bremen.  The road was well stocked and in full operation, and
all I had to do was to watch the economical administration of
existing affairs, which I endeavored to do with fidelity and zeal.
But the whole air was full of wars and rumors of wars.  The
struggle was going on politically for the border States.  Even in
Missouri, which was a slave State, it was manifest that the
Governor of the State, Claiborne Jackson, and all the leading
politicians, were for the South in case of a war.  The house on the
northwest corner of Fifth and Pine was the rebel headquarters,
where the rebel flag was hung publicly, and the crowds about the
Planters' House were all more or less rebel.  There was also a camp
in Lindell's Grove, at the end of Olive, Street, under command of
General D. M. Frost, a Northern man, a graduate of West Point, in
open sympathy with the Southern leaders.  This camp was nominally a
State camp of instruction, but, beyond doubt, was in the interest
of the Southern cause, designed to be used against the national
authority in the event of the General Government's attempting to
coerce the Southern Confederacy.  General William S. Harvey was in
command of the Department of Missouri, and resided in his own
house, on Fourth Street, below Market; and there were five or six
companies of United States troops in the arsenal, commanded by
Captain N. Lyon; throughout the city, there had been organized,
almost exclusively out of the German part of the population, four
or five regiments of "Home Guards," with which movement Frank
Blair, B. Gratz Brown, John M. Schofield, Clinton B. Fisk, and
others, were most active on the part of the national authorities.
Frank Blair's brother Montgomery was in the cabinet of Mr. Lincoln
at Washington, and to him seemed committed the general management
of affairs in Missouri.

The newspapers fanned the public excitement to the highest pitch,
and threats of attacking the arsenal on the one hand, and the mob
of d--d rebels in Camp Jackson on the other, were bandied about.  I
tried my best to keep out of the current, and only talked freely
with a few men; among them Colonel John O'Fallon, a wealthy
gentleman who resided above St. Louis.  He daily came down to my
office in Bremen, and we walked up and down the pavement by the
hour, deploring the sad condition of our country, and the seeming
drift toward dissolution and anarchy.  I used also to go down to
the arsenal occasionally to see Lyon, Totten, and other of my army
acquaintance, and was glad to see them making preparations to
defend their post, if not to assume the offensive.

The bombardment of Fort Sumter, which was announced by telegraph,
began April 12th, and ended on the 14th.  We then knew that the war
was actually begun, and though the South was openly, manifestly the
aggressor, yet her friends and apologists insisted that she was
simply acting on a justifiable defensive, and that in the forcible
seizure of, the public forts within her limits the people were
acting with reasonable prudence and foresight.  Yet neither party
seemed willing to invade, or cross the border.  Davis, who ordered
the bombardment of Sumter, knew the temper of his people well, and
foresaw that it would precipitate the action of the border States;
for almost immediately Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and
Tennessee, followed the lead of the cotton States, and conventions
were deliberating in Kentucky and Missouri.

On the night of Saturday, April 6th, I received the following,
dispatch:


Washington,  April 6,1861.

Major W. T. Sherman:

Will you accept the chief clerkship of the War Department? We will
make you assistant Secretary of War when Congress meets.

M. Blair, Postmaster-General.


To which I replied by telegraph, Monday morning; "I cannot accept;"
and by mail as follows:


Monday, April 8, 1861.
Office of the St. Louis Railroad Company.

Hon. M. Blair, Washington, D. C.

I received, about nine o'clock Saturday night, your telegraph
dispatch, which I have this moment answered, "I cannot accept."

I have quite a large family, and when I resigned my place in
Louisiana, on account of secession, I had no time to lose; and,
therefore, after my hasty visit to Washington, where I saw no
chance of employment, I came to St. Louis, have accepted a place in
this company, have rented a house, and incurred other obligations,
so that I am not at liberty to change.

I thank you for the compliment contained in your offer, and assure
you that I wish the Administration all success in its almost
impossible task of governing this distracted and anarchical people.

Yours truly,

W.T. SHERMAN


I was afterward told that this letter gave offense, and that some
of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet concluded that I too would prove false to
the country.

Later in that month, after the capture of Fort Sumter by the
Confederate authorities, a Dr. Cornyn came to our house on Locust
Street, one night after I had gone to bed, and told me he had been
sent by Frank Blair, who was not well, and wanted to see me that
night at his house.  I dressed and walked over to his house on
Washington Avenue, near Fourteenth, and found there, in the
front-room, several gentlemen, among whom I recall Henry T. Blow.
Blair was in the back-room, closeted with some gentleman, who soon
left, and I was called in.  He there told me that the Government
was mistrustful of General Harvey, that a change in the command of
the department was to be made; that he held it in his power to
appoint a brigadier-general, and put him in command of the
department, and he offered me the place.  I told him I had once
offered my services, and they were declined; that I had made
business engagements in St. Louis, which I could not throw off at
pleasure; that I had long deliberated on my course of action, and
must decline his offer, however tempting and complimentary.  He
reasoned with me, but I persisted.  He told me, in that event, he
should appoint Lyon, and he did so.

Finding that even my best friends were uneasy as to my political
status, on the 8th of May I addressed the following official letter
to the Secretary of War:


Office of the St. Louis Railroad Company,
May 8,1881.

Hon. S. Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir: I hold myself now, as always, prepared to serve my
country in the capacity for which I was trained.  I did not and
will not volunteer for three months, because I cannot throw my
family on the cold charity of the world.  But for the three-years
call, made by the President, an officer can prepare his command and
do good service.

I will not volunteer as a soldier, because rightfully or wrongfully
I feel unwilling to take a mere private's place, and, having for
many years lived in California and Louisiana, the men are not well
enough acquainted with me to elect me to my appropriate place.

Should my services be needed, the records of the War Department
will enable you to designate the station in which I can render most
service.

Yours truly,   W. T. SHERMAN.


To this I do not think I received a direct answer; but, on the 10th
of the same month, I was appointed colonel of the Thirteenth
Regular Infantry.

I remember going to the arsenal on the 9th of May, taking my
children with me in the street-cars.  Within the arsenal wall were
drawn up in parallel lines four regiments of the "Home Guards," and
I saw men distributing cartridges to the boxes.  I also saw General
Lyon running about with his hair in the wind, his pockets full of
papers, wild and irregular, but I knew him to be a man of vehement
purpose and of determined action.  I saw of course that it meant
business, but whether for defense or offense I did not know.  The
next morning I went up to the railroad-office in Bremen, as usual,
and heard at every corner of the streets that the "Dutch" were
moving on Camp Jackson.  People were barricading their houses, and
men were running in that direction.  I hurried through my business
as quickly as I could, and got back to my house on Locust Street by
twelve o'clock.  Charles Ewing and Hunter were there, and insisted
on going out to the camp to see "the fun."  I tried to dissuade
them, saying that in case of conflict the bystanders were more
likely to be killed than the men engaged, but they would go.  I
felt as much interest as anybody else, but staid at home, took my
little son Willie, who was about seven years old, and walked up and
down the pavement in front of our house, listening for the sound of
musketry or cannon in the direction of Camp Jackson.  While so
engaged Miss Eliza Dean, who lived opposite us, called me across
the street, told me that her brother-in-law, Dr. Scott, was a
surgeon in Frost's camp, and she was dreadfully afraid he would be
killed.  I reasoned with her that General Lyon was a regular
officer; that if he had gone out, as reported, to Camp Jackson, he
would take with him such a force as would make resistance
impossible; but she would not be comforted, saying that the camp
was made up of the young men from the first and best families of
St. Louis, and that they were proud, and would fight.  I explained
that young men of the best families did not like to be killed
better than ordinary people.  Edging gradually up the street, I was
in Olive Street just about Twelfth, when I saw a man running from
the direction of Camp Jackson at full speed, calling, as he went,
"They've surrendered, they've surrendered!" So I turned back and
rang the bell at Mrs. Dean's.  Eliza came to the door, and I
explained what I had heard; but she angrily slammed the door in my
face!  Evidently she was disappointed to find she was mistaken in
her estimate of the rash courage of the best families.

I again turned in the direction of Camp Jackson, my boy Willie with
me still.  At the head of Olive Street, abreast of Lindell's Grove,
I found Frank Blair's regiment in the street, with ranks opened,
and the Camp Jackson prisoners inside.  A crowd of people was
gathered around, calling to the prisoners by name, some hurrahing
for Jeff Davis, and others encouraging the troops.  Men, women, and
children, were in the crowd.  I passed along till I found myself
inside the grove, where I met Charles Ewing and John Hunter, and we
stood looking at the troops on the road, heading toward the city.
A band of music was playing at the head, and the column made one or
two ineffectual starts, but for some reason was halted.  The
battalion of regulars was abreast of me, of which Major Rufus
Saxton was in command, and I gave him an evening paper, which I had
bought of the newsboy on my way out.  He was reading from it some
piece of news, sitting on his horse, when the column again began to
move forward, and he resumed his place at the head of his command.
At that part of the road, or street, was an embankment about eight
feet high, and a drunken fellow tried to pass over it to the people
opposite.

One of the regular sergeant file-closers ordered him back, but he
attempted to pass through the ranks, when the sergeant barred his
progress with his musket "a-port."  The drunken man seized his
musket, when the sergeant threw him off with violence, and he
rolled over and over down the bank.  By the time this man had
picked himself up and got his hat, which had fallen off, and had
again mounted the embankment, the regulars had passed, and the head
of Osterhaus's regiment of Home Guards had come up.  The man had in
his hand a small pistol, which he fired off, and I heard that the
ball had struck the leg of one of Osterhaus's staff; the regiment
stopped; there was a moment of confusion, when the soldiers of that
regiment began to fire over our heads in the grove.  I heard the
balls cutting the leaves above our heads, and saw several men and
women running in all directions, some of whom were wounded.  Of
course there was a general stampede.  Charles Ewing threw Willie on
the ground and covered him with his body.  Hunter ran behind the
hill, and I also threw myself on the ground.  The fire ran back
from the head of the regiment toward its rear, and as I saw the men
reloading their pieces, I jerked Willie up, ran back with him into
a gully which covered us, lay there until I saw that the fire had
ceased, and that the column was again moving on, when I took up
Willie and started back for home round by way of Market Street.  A
woman and child were killed outright; two or three men were also
killed, and several others were wounded.  The great mass of the
people on that occasion were simply curious spectators, though men
were sprinkled through the crowd calling out, "Hurrah for Jeff
Davis!" and others were particularly abusive of the "damned Dutch"
Lyon posted a guard in charge of the vacant camp, and marched his
prisoners down to the arsenal; some were paroled, and others held,
till afterward they were regularly exchanged.

A very few days after this event, May 14th, I received a dispatch
from my brother Charles in Washington, telling me to come on at
once; that I had been appointed a colonel of the Thirteenth Regular
Infantry, and that I was wanted at Washington immediately.

Of course I could no longer defer action.  I saw Mr. Lucas, Major
Turner, and other friends and parties connected with the road, who
agreed that I should go on.  I left my family, because I was under
the impression that I would be allowed to enlist my own regiment,
which would take some time, and I expected to raise the regiment
and organize it at Jefferson Barracks.  I repaired to Washington,
and there found that the Government was trying to rise to a level
with the occasion.  Mr. Lincoln had, without the sanction of law,
authorized the raising of ten new regiments of regulars, each
infantry regiment to be composed of three battalions of eight
companies each; and had called for seventy-five thousand State
volunteers.  Even this call seemed to me utterly inadequate; still
it was none of my business.  I took the oath of office, and was
furnished with a list of officers, appointed to my regiment, which
was still, incomplete.  I reported in person to General Scott, at
his office on Seventeenth Street, opposite the War Department, and
applied for authority to return West, and raise my regiment at
Jefferson Barracks, but the general said my lieutenant-colonel,
Burbank, was fully qualified to superintend the enlistment, and
that he wanted me there; and he at once dictated an order for me to
report to him in person for inspection duty.

Satisfied that I would not be permitted to return to St. Louis, I
instructed Mrs. Sherman to pack up, return to Lancaster, and trust
to the fate of war.

I also resigned my place as president of the Fifth Street Railroad,
to take effect at the end of May, so that in fact I received pay
from that road for only two months' service, and then began my new
army career.




CHAPTER IX.

FROM THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN TO PADUCAH KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI

1861-1862.

And now that, in these notes, I have fairly reached the period of
the civil war, which ravaged our country from 1861 to 1865--an
event involving a conflict of passion, of prejudice, and of arms,
that has developed results which, for better or worse, have left
their mark on the world's history--I feel that I tread on delicate
ground.

I have again and again been invited to write a history of the war,
or to record for publication my personal recollections of it, with
large offers of money therefor; all of which I have heretofore
declined, because the truth is not always palatable, and should not
always be told.  Many of the actors in the grand drama still live,
and they and their friends are quick to controversy, which should
be avoided.  The great end of peace has been attained, with little
or no change in our form of government, and the duty of all good
men is to allow the passions of that period to subside, that we may
direct our physical and mental labor to repair the waste of war,
and to engage in the greater task of continuing our hitherto
wonderful national development.

What I now propose to do is merely to group some of my personal
recollections about the historic persons and events of the day,
prepared not with any view to their publication, but rather for
preservation till I am gone; and then to be allowed to follow into
oblivion the cords of similar papers, or to be used by some
historian who may need them by way of illustration.

I have heretofore recorded how I again came into the military
service of the United States as a colonel of the Thirteenth Regular
Infantry, a regiment that had no existence at the time, and that,
instead of being allowed to enlist the men and instruct them, as
expected, I was assigned in Washington City, by an order of
Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, to inspection duty near him on
the 20th of June, 1861.

At that time Lieutenant-General Scott commanded the army in chief,
with Colonel E. D. Townsend as his adjutant-general,

Major G. W. Cullum, United States Engineers, and Major Schuyler
Hamilton, as aides.-de-camp.  The general had an office up stairs
on Seventeenth Street, opposite the War Department, and resided in
a house close by, on Pennsylvania Avenue.  All fears for the
immediate safety of the capital had ceased, and quite a large force
of regulars and volunteers had been collected in and about
Washington.  Brigadier-General J. K. Mansfield commanded in the
city, and Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell on the other side of the
Potomac, with his headquarters at Arlington House.  His troops
extended in a semicircle from Alexandria to above Georgetown.
Several forts and redoubts were either built or in progress, and
the people were already clamorous for a general forward movement.
Another considerable army had also been collected in Pennsylvania
under General Patterson, and, at the time I speak of, had moved
forward to Hagerstown and Williamsport, on the Potomac River.  My
brother, John Sherman, was a volunteer aide-de-camp to General
Patterson, and, toward the end of June, I went up to Hagerstown to
see him.  I found that army in the very act of moving, and we rode
down to Williamsport in a buggy, and were present when the leading
division crossed the Potomac River by fording it waist-deep.  My
friend and classmate, George H. Thomas, was there, in command of a
brigade in the leading division.  I talked with him a good deal,
also with General Cadwalader, and with the staff-officers of
General Patterson, viz., Fitz-John Porter, Belger, Beckwith, and
others, all of whom seemed encouraged to think that the war was to
be short and decisive, and that, as soon as it was demonstrated
that the General Government meant in earnest to defend its rights
and property, some general compromise would result.

Patterson's army crossed the Potomac River on the 1st or 2d of
July, and, as John Sherman was to take his seat as a Senator in the
called session of Congress, to meet July 4th, he resigned his place
as aide-de-camp, presented me his two horses and equipment, and we
returned to Washington together.

The Congress assembled punctually on the 4th of July, and the
message of Mr. Lincoln was strong and good: it recognized the fact
that civil war was upon us, that compromise of any kind was at an
end; and he asked for four hundred thousand men, and four hundred
million dollars, wherewith to vindicate the national authority, and
to regain possession of the captured forts and other property of
the United States.

It was also immediately demonstrated that the tone and temper of
Congress had changed since the Southern Senators and members had
withdrawn, and that we, the military, could now go to work with
some definite plans and ideas.

The appearance of the troops about Washington was good, but it was
manifest they were far from being soldiers.  Their uniforms were as
various as the States and cities from which they came; their arms
were also of every pattern and calibre; and they were so loaded
down with overcoats, haversacks, knapsacks, tents, and baggage,
that it took from twenty-five to fifty wagons to move the camp of a
regiment from one place to another, and some of the camps had
bakeries and cooking establishments that would have done credit to
Delmonico.

While I was on duty with General Scott, viz., from June 20th to
about June 30th, the general frequently communicated to those about
him his opinions and proposed plans.  He seemed vexed with the
clamors of the press for immediate action, and the continued
interference in details by the President, Secretary of War, and
Congress.  He spoke of organizing a grand army of invasion, of
which the regulars were to constitute the "iron column," and seemed
to intimate that he himself would take the field in person, though
he was at the time very old, very heavy, and very unwieldy.  His
age must have been about seventy-five years.

At that date, July 4, 1861, the rebels had two armies in front of
Washington; the one at Manassas Junction, commanded by General
Beauregard, with his advance guard at Fairfax Court House, and
indeed almost in sight of Washington.  The other, commanded by
General Joe Johnston, was at Winchester, with its advance at
Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry; but the advance had fallen back
before Patterson, who then occupied Martinsburg and the line of the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.

The temper of Congress and the people would not permit the slow and
methodical preparation desired by General Scott; and the cry of "On
to Richmond!" which was shared by the volunteers, most of whom had
only engaged for ninety days, forced General Scott to hasten his
preparations, and to order a general advance about the middle of
July.  McDowell was to move from the defenses of Washington, and
Patterson from Martinsburg.  In the organization of McDowell's army
into divisions and brigades, Colonel David Hunter was assigned to
command the Second Division, and I was ordered to take command of
his former brigade, which was composed of five regiments in
position in and about Fort Corcoran, and on the ground opposite
Georgetown.  I assumed command on the 30th of June, and proceeded
at once to prepare it for the general advance.  My command
constituted the Third Brigade of the First Division, which division
was commanded by Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler, a graduate of West
Point, but who had seen little or no actual service.  I applied to
General McDowell for home staff-officers, and he gave me, as
adjutant-general, Lieutenant Piper, of the Third Artillery, and, as
aide-de-camp, Lieutenant McQuesten, a fine young cavalry-officer,
fresh from West Point.

I selected for the field the Thirteenth New York, Colonel Quinby;
the Sixty-ninth New York, Colonel Corcoran; the Seventy-ninth New
York, Colonel Cameron; and the Second Wisconsin, Lieutenant-
Colonel Peck.  These were all good, strong, volunteer regiments,
pretty well commanded; and I had reason to believe that I had one
of the best brigades in the whole army.  Captain Ayres's battery of
the Third Regular Artillery was also attached to my brigade.  The
other regiment, the Twenty-ninth New York, Colonel Bennett, was
destined to be left behind in charge of the forts and camps during
our absence, which was expected to be short.  Soon after I had
assumed the command, a difficulty arose in the Sixty-ninth, an
Irish regiment.  This regiment had volunteered in New York, early
in April, for ninety days; but, by reason of the difficulty of
passing through Baltimore, they had come via Annapolis, had been
held for duty on the railroad as a guard for nearly a month before
they actually reached Washington, and were then mustered in about a
month after enrollment.  Some of the men claimed that they were
entitled to their discharge in ninety days from the time of
enrollment, whereas the muster-roll read ninety days from the date
of muster-in.  One day, Colonel Corcoran explained this matter to
me.  I advised him to reduce the facts to writing, and that I would
submit it to the War Department for an authoritative decision.  He
did so, and the War Department decided that the muster-roll was the
only contract of service, that it would be construed literally; and
that the regiment would be held till the expiration of three months
from the date of muster-in, viz., to about August 1, 1861.  General
Scott at the same time wrote one of his characteristic letters to
Corcoran, telling him that we were about to engage in battle, and
he knew his Irish friends would not leave him in such a crisis.
Corcoran and the officers generally wanted to go to the expected
battle, but a good many of the men were not so anxious.  In the
Second Wisconsin, also, was developed a personal difficulty.  The
actual colonel was S. P. Coon, a good-hearted gentleman, who knew
no more of the military art than a child; whereas his lieutenant-
colonel, Peck, had been to West Point, and knew the drill.
Preferring that the latter should remain in command of the
regiment, I put Colonel Coon on my personal staff, which reconciled
the difficulty.

In due season, about July 15th, our division moved forward
leaving our camps standing; Keyes's brigade in the lead, then
Schenck's, then mine, and Richardson's last.  We marched via
Vienna, Germantown, and Centreville, where all the army, composed
of five divisions, seemed to converge.  The march demonstrated
little save the general laxity of discipline; for with all my
personal efforts I could not prevent the men from straggling for
water, blackberries, or any thing on the way they fancied.

At Centreville, on the 18th, Richardson's brigade was sent by
General Tyler to reconnoitre Blackburn's Ford across Bull Run, and
he found it strongly guarded.  From our camp, at Centreville, we
heard the cannonading, and then a sharp musketry-fire.  I received
orders from General Tyler to send forward Ayres's battery, and very
soon after another order came for me to advance with my whole
brigade.  We marched  the three miles at the double-quick, arrived
in time to relieve Richardson's brigade, which was just drawing
back from the ford, worsted, and stood for half an hour or so under
a fire of artillery, which killed four or five of my men.  General
Tyler was there in person, giving directions, and soon after
he ordered us all back to our camp in Centreville.  This
reconnoissance had developed a strong force, and had been made
without the orders of General McDowell; however, it satisfied us
that the enemy was in force on the other side of Bull Run, and had
no intention to leave without a serious battle.  We lay in camp at
Centreville all of the 19th and 20th, and during that night began
the movement which resulted in the battle of Bull Run, on July
21st.  Of this so much has been written that more would be
superfluous; and the reports of the opposing commanders, McDowell
and Johnston, are fair and correct.  It is now generally admitted
that it was one of the best-planned battles of the war, but one of
the worst-fought.  Our men had been told so often at home that all
they had to do was to make a bold  appearance, and the rebels would
run; and nearly all of us for the first time then heard the sound
of cannon and muskets in anger, and saw the bloody scenes common to
all battles, with which we were soon to be familiar.  We had good
organization, good men, but no cohesion, no real discipline, no
respect for authority, no real knowledge of war.  Both armies were
fairly defeated, and, whichever had stood fast, the other would
have run.  Though the North was overwhelmed with mortification and
shame, the South really had not much to boast of, for in the three
or four hours of fighting their organization was so broken up that
they did not and could not follow our army, when it was known to be
in a state of disgraceful and causeless flight.  It is easy to
criticise a battle after it is over, but all now admit that none
others, equally raw in war, could have done better than we did at
Bull Run; and the lesson of that battle should not be lost on a
people like ours.

I insert my official report, as a condensed statement of my share
in the battle:


HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION
FORT CORCORAN, July 25, 1861

To Captain A. BAIRD, Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division
(General Tyler's).

Sir: I have the honor to submit this my report of the operations of
my brigade during the action of the 21st instant.  The brigade is
composed of the Thirteenth New York Volunteers, Colonel Quinby's
Sixty-ninth New York, Colonel Corcoran; Seventy-ninth New York,
Colonel Cameron; Second Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck; and
Company E, Third Artillery, under command of Captain R. B. Ayres,
Fifth Artillery.

We left our camp near Centreville, pursuant to orders, at half-past
2 A. M., taking place in your column, next to the brigade of
General Schenck, and proceeded as far as the halt, before the
enemy's position, near the stone bridge across Bull Run.  Here the
brigade was deployed in line along the skirt of timber to the right
of the Warrenton road, and remained quietly in position till after
10 a.m.  The enemy remained very quiet, but about that time we saw
a rebel regiment leave its cover in our front, and proceed in
double-quick time on the road toward Sudley Springs, by which we
knew the columns of Colonels Hunter and Heintzelman were
approaching.  About the same time we observed in motion a large
mass of the enemy, below and on the other side of the stone bridge.
I directed Captain Ayres to take position with his battery near our
right, and to open fire on this mass; but you had previously
detached the two rifle-guns belonging to this battery, and, finding
that the smooth-bore guns did not reach the enemy's position, we
ceased firing, and I sent a request that you would send to me the
thirty-pounder rifle-gun attached to Captain Carlisle's battery.
At the same time I shifted the New York Sixty-ninth to the extreme
right of the brigade.  Thus we remained till we heard the
musketry-fire across Bull Run, showing that the head of Colonel
Hunter's column was engaged.  This firing was brisk, and showed that
Hunter was driving before him the enemy, till about noon, when it
became certain the enemy had come to a stand, and that our forces on
the other side of Bull Run were all engaged, artillery and infantry.

Here you sent me the order to cross over with the whole brigade, to
the assistance of Colonel Hunter.  Early in the day, when
reconnoitring the ground, I had seen a horseman descend from a
bluff in our front, cross the stream, and show himself in the open
field on this aide; and, inferring that we could cross over at the
same point, I sent forward a company as skirmishers, and followed
with the whole brigade, the New York Sixty-ninth leading.

We found no difficulty in crossing over, and met with no opposition
in ascending the steep bluff opposite with our infantry, but it was
impassable to the artillery, and I sent word back to Captain Ayres
to follow if possible, otherwise to use his discretion.  Captain
Ayres did not cross Bull Run, but remained on that side, with the
rest of your division.  His report herewith describes his
operations during the remainder of the day.  Advancing slowly and
cautiously with the head of the column, to give time for the
regiments in succession to close up their ranks, we first
encountered a party of the enemy retreating along a cluster of
pines; Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty, of the Sixty-ninth, without
orders, rode out alone, and endeavored to intercept their retreat.
One of the enemy, in full view, at short range, shot Haggerty, and
he fell dead from his horse.  The Sixty-ninth opened fire on this
party, which was returned; but, determined to effect our junction
with Hunter's division, I ordered this fire to cease, and we
proceeded with caution toward the field where we then plainly saw
our forces engaged.  Displaying our colors conspicuously at the
head of our column, we succeeded in attracting the attention of our
friends, and soon formed the brigade in rear of Colonel Porter's.
Here I learned that Colonel Hunter was disabled by a severe wound,
and that General McDowell was on the field.  I sought him out, and
received his orders to join in pursuit of the enemy, who was
falling back to the left of the road by which the army had
approached from Sudley Springs.  Placing Colonel Quinby's regiment
of rifles in front, in column, by division, I directed the other
regiments to follow in line of battle, in the order of the
Wisconsin Second, New York Seventy-ninth, and New York Sixty-ninth.
Quinby's regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge,
from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made another
stand on ground very favorable to him, and the regiment continued
advancing as the enemy gave way, till the head of the column
reached the point near which Rickett's battery was so severely cut
up.  The other regiments descended the hill in line of battle,
under a severe cannonade; and, the ground affording comparative
shelter from the enemy's artillery, they changed direction, by the
right flank, and followed the road before mentioned.  At the point
where this road crosses the ridge to our left front, the ground was
swept by a most severe fire of artillery, rifles, and musketry, and
we saw, in succession, several regiments driven from it; among them
the Zouaves and battalion of marines.  Before reaching the crest of
this hill, the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, and
I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible; but when
the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of Major
Wadsworth, of General McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave the
roadway, by the left flank, and to attack the enemy.

This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received
the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, and
advanced, delivering its fire.  This regiment is uniformed in gray
cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the
secession army; and, when the regiment fell into confusion and
retreated toward the road, there was a universal cry that they were
being fired on by our own men.  The regiment rallied again, passed
the brow of the hill a second time, but was again repulsed in
disorder.  By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up,
and in like manner it was ordered to cross the brow of, the hill,
and drive the enemy from cover.  It was impossible to get a good
view of this ground.  In it there was one battery of artillery,
which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and the
ground was very irregular with small clusters of pines, affording
shelter, of which the enemy took good advantage.  The fire of
rifles and musketry was very severe.  The Seventy-ninth, headed by
its colonel, Cameron, charged across the hill, and for a short time
the contest was severe; they rallied several times under fire, but
finally broke, and gained the cover of the hill.

This left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, Colonel
Corcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest; and
had in full, open view the ground so severely contested; the fire
was very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles,
incessant; it was manifest the enemy was here in great force, far
superior to us at that point.  The Sixty-ninth held the ground for
some time, but finally fell back in disorder.

All this time Quinby's regiment occupied another ridge, to our
left, overlooking the same field of action, and similarly engaged.
Here, about half-past 3 p.m., began the scene of confusion and
disorder that characterized the remainder of the day.  Up to that
time, all had kept their places, and seemed perfectly cool, and
used to the shell and shot that fell, comparatively harmless, all
around us; but the short exposure to an intense fire of small-arms,
at close range, had killed many, wounded more, and had produced
disorder in all of the battalions that had attempted to encounter
it.  Men fell away from their ranks, talking, and in great
confusion.  Colonel Cameron had been mortally wounded, was carried
to an ambulance, and reported dying.  Many other officers were
reported dead or missing, and many of the wounded were making their
way, with more or less assistance, to the buildings used as
hospitals, on the ridge to the west.  We succeeded in partially
reforming the regiments, but it was manifest that they would not
stand, and I directed Colonel Corcoran to move along the ridge to
the rear, near the position where we had first formed the brigade.
General McDowell was there in person, and need all possible efforts
to reassure the men.  By the active exertions of Colonel Corcoran,
we formed an irregular square against the cavalry which were then
seen to issue from the position from which we had been driven, and
we began our retreat toward the same ford of Bull Run by which we
had approached the field of battle.  There was no positive order to
retreat, although for an hour it had been going on by the operation
of the men themselves.  The ranks were thin and irregular, and we
found a stream of people strung from the hospital across Bull Run,
and far toward Centreville.  After putting in motion the irregular
square in person, I pushed forward to find Captain Ayres's battery
at the crossing of Bull Run.  I sought it at its last position,
before the brigade had crossed over, but it was not there; then
passing through the woods, where, in the morning, we had first
formed line, we approached the blacksmith's shop, but there found a
detachment of the secession cavalry and thence made a circuit,
avoiding Cub Run Bridge, into Centreville, where I found General
McDowell, and from him understood that it was his purpose to rally
the forces, and make a stand at Centreville.

But, about nine o'clock at night, I received from General Tyler, in
person, the order to continue the retreat to the Potomac.  This
retreat was by night, and disorderly in the extreme.  The men of
different regiments mingled together, and some reached the river at
Arlington, some at Long Bridge, and the greater part returned to
their former camp, at or near Fort Corcoran.  I reached this point
at noon the next day, and found a miscellaneous crowd crossing over
the aqueduct and ferries..  Conceiving this to be demoralizing, I
at once commanded the guard to be increased, and all persons
attempting to pass over to be stopped.  This soon produced its
effect; men sought their proper companies and regiments.
Comparative order was restored, and all were posted to the best
advantage.

I herewith inclose the official report of Captain Belly, commanding
officer of the New York Sixty-ninth; also, fall lists of the
killed, wounded, and missing.

Our loss was heavy, and occurred chiefly at the point near where
Rickett's battery was destroyed.  Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty was
killed about noon, before we had effected a junction with Colonel
Hunter's division.  Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded leading
his regiment in the charge, and Colonel Corcoran has been missing
since the cavalry-charge near the building used as a hospital.

For names, rank, etc., of the above, I refer to the lists herewith.

Lieutenants Piper and McQuesten, of my personal staff, were under
fire all day, and carried orders to and fro with as much coolness
as on parade.  Lieutenant Bagley, of the New York Sixty-ninth, a
volunteer aide, asked leave to serve with his company, during the
action, and is among those reported missing.  I have intelligence
that he is a prisoner, and slightly wounded.

Colonel Coon, of Wisconsin, a volunteer aide, also rendered good
service during the day.

W. T. SHERMAN, Colonel commanding Brigade.


This report, which I had not read probably since its date till now,
recalls to me vividly the whole scene of the affair at Blackburn's
Ford, when for the first time in my life I saw cannonballs strike
men and crash through the trees and saplings above and around us,
and realized the always sickening confusion as one approaches a
fight from the rear; then the night-march from Centreville, on the
Warrenton road, standing for hours wondering what was meant; the
deployment along the edge of the field that sloped down to
Bull-Run, and waiting for Hunter's approach on the other aide from
the direction of Sudley Springs, away off to our right; the
terrible scare of a poor negro who was caught between our lines;
the crossing of Bull Run, and the fear lest we should be fired on
by our own men; the killing of Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty, which
occurred in plain sight; and the first scenes of a field strewed
with dead men and horses.  Yet, at that period of the battle, we
were the victors and felt jubilant.  At that moment, also, my
brigade passed Hunter's division; but Heintzelman's was still ahead
of us, and we followed its lead along the road toward Manassas
Junction, crossing a small stream and ascending a long hill, at the
summit of which the battle was going on.  Here my regiments came
into action well, but successively, and were driven back, each in
its turn.  For two hours we continued to dash at the woods on our
left front, which were full of rebels; but I was convinced their
organization was broken, and that they had simply halted there and
taken advantage of these woods as a cover, to reach which we had to
pass over the intervening fields about the Henry House, which were
clear, open, and gave them a decided advantage.  After I had put in
each of my regiments, and had them driven back to the cover of the
road, I had no idea that we were beaten, but reformed the regiments
in line in their proper order, and only wanted a little rest, when
I found that my brigade was almost alone, except Syke's regulars,
who had formed square against cavalry and were coming back.  I then
realized that the whole army was "in retreat," and that my own men
were individually making back for the stone bridge.  Corcoran and I
formed the brigade into an irregular square, but it fell to pieces;
and, along with a crowd, disorganized but not much scared, the
brigade got back to Centreville to our former camps.  Corcoran was
captured, and held a prisoner for some time; but I got safe to
Centreville.  I saw General McDowell in Centreville, and understood
that several of his divisions had not been engaged at all, that he
would reorganize them at Centreville, and there await the enemy.  I
got my four regiments in parallel lines in a field, the same in
which we had camped before the battle, and had lain down to sleep
under a tree, when I heard some one asking for me.  I called out
where I was, when General Tyler in person gave me orders to march
back to our camps at Fort Corcoran.  I aroused my aides, gave them
orders to call up the sleeping men, have each regiment to leave the
field by a flank and to take the same road back by which we had
come.  It was near midnight, and the road was full of troops,
wagons, and batteries.  We tried to keep our regiments separate,
but all became inextricably mixed.  Toward morning we reached
Vienna, where I slept some hours, and the next day, about noon, we
reached Fort Corcoran.

A slow, mizzling rain had set in, and probably a more gloomy day
never presented itself.  All organization seemed to be at an end;
but I and my staff labored hard to collect our men into their
proper companies and into their former camps, and, on the 23d of
July, I moved the Second Wisconsin and Seventy-ninth New York
closer in to Fort Corcoran, and got things in better order than I
had expected.  Of course, we took it for granted that the rebels
would be on our heels, and we accordingly prepared to defend our
posts.  By the 25th I had collected all the materials, made my
report, and had my brigade about as well governed as any in that
army; although most of the ninety-day men, especially the
Sixty-ninth, had become extremely tired of the war, and wanted to
go home.  Some of them were so mutinous, at one time, that I had
the battery to unlimber, threatening, if they dared to leave camp
without orders, I would open fire on them.  Drills and the daily
exercises were resumed, and I ordered that at the three principal
roll-calls the men should form ranks with belts and muskets, and
that they should keep their ranks until I in person had received
the reports and had dismissed them.  The Sixty-ninth still occupied
Fort Corcoran, and one morning, after reveille, when I had just
received the report, had dismissed the regiment, and was leaving, I
found myself in a crowd of men crossing the drawbridge on their way
to a barn close by, where they had their sinks; among them was an
officer, who said: "Colonel, I am going to New York today.  What
can I do for you?" I answered: "How can you go to New York? I do
not remember to have signed a leave for you."  He said, "No; he did
not want a leave.  He had engaged to serve three months, and had
already served more than that time.  If the Government did not
intend to pay him, he could afford to lose the money; that he was a
lawyer, and had neglected his business long enough, and was then
going home."  I noticed that a good many of the soldiers had paused
about us to listen, and knew that, if this officer could defy me,
they also would.  So I turned on him sharp, and said: "Captain,
this question of your term of service has been submitted to the
rightful authority, and the decision has been published in orders.
You are a soldier, and must submit to orders till you are properly
discharged.  If you attempt to leave without orders, it will be
mutiny, and I will shoot you like a dog!  Go back into the fort
now, instantly, and don't dare to leave without my consent."  I had
on an overcoat, and may have had my hand about the breast, for he
looked at me hard, paused a moment, and then turned back into the
fort.  The men scattered, and I returned to the house where I was
quartered, close by.

That same day, which must have been about July 26th, I was near the
river-bank, looking at a block-house which had been built for the
defense of the aqueduct, when I saw a carriage coming by the road
that crossed the Potomac River at Georgetown by a ferry.  I thought
I recognized in the carriage the person of President Lincoln.  I
hurried across a bend, so as to stand by the road-side as the
carriage passed.  I was in uniform, with a sword on, and was
recognized by Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward, who rode side by side in
an open hack.  I inquired if they were going to my camps, and Mr.
Lincoln said: "Yes; we heard that you had got over the big scare,
and we thought we would come over and see the 'boys.'"  The roads
had been much changed and were rough.  I asked if I might give
directions to his coachman, he promptly invited me to jump in and
to tell the coachman which way to drive.  Intending to begin on the
right and follow round to the left, I turned the driver into a
side-road which led up a very steep hill, and, seeing a soldier,
called to him and sent him up hurriedly to announce to the colonel
(Bennett, I think) that the President was coming: As we slowly
ascended the hill, I discovered that Mr. Lincoln was full of
feeling, and wanted to encourage our men.  I asked if he intended
to speak to them, and he said he would like to.  I asked him then
to please discourage all cheering, noise, or any sort of confusion;
that we had had enough of it before Bull Run to ruin any set of
men, and that what we needed were cool, thoughtful, hard-fighting
soldiers--no more hurrahing, no more humbug.  He took my remarks in
the most perfect good-nature.  Before we had reached the first
camp, I heard the drum beating the "assembly," saw the men running
for their tents, and in a few minutes the regiment was in line,
arms presented, and then brought to an order and "parade rest!"

Mr. Lincoln stood up in the carriage, and made one of the neatest,
best, and most feeling addresses I ever listened to, referring to
our late disaster at Bull Run, the high duties that still devolved
on us, and the brighter days yet to come.  At one or two points the
soldiers began to cheer, but he promptly checked them, saying:
"Don't cheer, boys.  I confess I rather like it myself, but Colonel
Sherman here says it is not military; and I guess we had better
defer to his opinion."  In winding up, he explained that, as
President, he was commander-in-chief; that he was resolved that the
soldiers should have every thing that the law allowed; and he
called on one and all to appeal to him personally in case they were
wronged.  The effect of this speech was excellent.

We passed along in the same manner to all the camps of my brigade;
and Mr. Lincoln complimented me highly for the order, cleanliness,
and discipline, that he observed.  Indeed, he and Mr. Seward both
assured me that it was the first bright moment they had experienced
since the battle.

At last we reached Fort Corcoran.  The carriage could not enter, so
I ordered the regiment, without arms, to come outside, and gather
about Mr. Lincoln, who would speak to them.  He made to them the
same feeling address, with more personal allusions, because of
their special gallantry in the battle under Corcoran, who was still
a prisoner in the hands of the enemy; and he concluded with the
same general offer of redress in case of grievances. In the crowd I
saw the officer with whom I had had the passage at reveille that
morning.  His face was pale, and lips compressed.  I foresaw a
scene, but sat on the front seat of the carriage as quiet as a
lamb.  This officer forced his way through the crowd to the
carriage, and said: "Mr. President, I have a cause of grievance.
This morning I went to speak to Colonel Sherman, and he threatened
to shoot me."  Mr. Lincoln, who was still standing, said,
"Threatened to shoot you?"  "Yes, sir, he threatened to shoot me."
Mr. Lincoln looked at him, then at me, and stooping his tall, spare
form toward the officer, said to him in a loud stage-whisper,
easily heard for some yards around: "Well, if I were you, and he
threatened to shoot, I would not trust him, for I believe he would
do it."  The officer turned about and disappeared, and the men
laughed at him.  Soon the carriage drove on, and, as we descended
the hill, I explained the facts to the President, who answered, "Of
course I didn't know any thing about it, but I thought you knew
your own business best."  I thanked him for his confidence, and
assured him that what he had done would go far to enable me to
maintain good discipline, and it did.

By this time the day was well spent.  I asked to take my leave, and
the President and Mr. Seward drove back to Washington.  This spirit
of mutiny was common to the whole army, and was not subdued till
several regiments or parts of regiments had been ordered to Fort
Jefferson, Florida, as punishment.

General McDowell had resumed his headquarters at the Arlington
House, and was busily engaged in restoring order to his army,
sending off the ninety-days men, and replacing them by regiments
which had come under the three-years call.  We were all trembling
lest we should be held personally accountable for the disastrous
result of the battle.  General McClellan had been summoned from the
West to Washington, and changes in the subordinate commands were
announced almost daily.  I remember, as a group of officers were
talking in the large room of the Arlington House, used as the
adjutant-general's office, one evening, some young officer came in
with a list of the new brigadiers just announced at the War
Department, which-embraced the names of Heintzehvan, Keyes,
Franklin, Andrew Porter, W. T. Sherman, and others, who had been
colonels in the battle, and all of whom had shared the common
stampede.  Of course, we discredited the truth of the list; and
Heintzehvan broke out in his nasal voice, "Boys, it's all a lie!
every mother's son of you will be cashiered."  We all felt he was
right, but, nevertheless, it was true; and we were all announced in
general orders as brigadier-generals of volunteers.

General McClellan arrived, and, on assuming command, confirmed
McDowell's organization.  Instead of coming over the river, as we
expected, he took a house in Washington, and only came over from
time to time to have a review or inspection.

I had received several new regiments, and had begun two new forts
on the hill or plateau, above and farther out than Fort Corcoran;
and I organized a system of drills, embracing the evolutions of the
line, all of which was new to me, and I had to learn the tactics
from books; but I was convinced that we had a long, hard war before
us, and made up my mind to begin at the very beginning to prepare
for it.

August was passing, and troops were pouring in from all quarters;
General McClellan told me he intended to organize an army of a
hundred thousand men, with one hundred field-batteries, and I still
hoped he would come on our side of the Potomac, pitch his tent, and
prepare for real hard work, but his headquarters still remained in
a house in Washington City.  I then thought, and still think, that
was a fatal mistake.  His choice as general-in-chief at the time
was fully justified by his high reputation in the army and country,
and, if he then had any political views or ambition, I surely did
not suspect it.

About the middle of August I got a note from Brigadier-General
Robert Anderson, asking me to come and see him at his room at
Willard's Hotel.  I rode over and found him in conversation with
several gentlemen, and he explained to me that events in Kentucky
were approaching a crisis; that the Legislature was in session, and
ready, as soon as properly backed by the General Government, to
take open sides for the Union cause; that he was offered the
command of the Department of the Cumberland, to embrace Kentucky,
Tennessee, etc., and that he wanted help, and that the President
had offered to allow him to select out of the new brigadiers four
of his own choice.  I had been a lieutenant in Captain Anderson's
company, at Fort Moultrie, from 1843 to 1846, and he explained that
he wanted me as his right hand.  He also indicated George H.
Thomas, D. C. Buell, and Burnside, as the other three.  Of course,
I always wanted to go West, and was perfectly willing to go with
Anderson, especially in a subordinate capacity: We agreed to call
on the President on a subsequent day, to talk with him about it,
and we did.  It hardly seems probable that Mr. Lincoln should have
come to Willard's Hotel to meet us, but my impression is that he
did, and that General Anderson had some difficulty in prevailing on
him to appoint George H. Thomas, a native of Virginia, to be
brigadier-general, because so many Southern officers, had already
played false; but I was still more emphatic in my indorsement of
him by reason of my talk with him at the time he crossed the
Potomac with Patterson's army, when Mr. Lincoln promised to appoint
him and to assign him to duty with General Anderson.  In this
interview with Mr. Lincoln, I also explained to him my extreme
desire to serve in a subordinate capacity, and in no event to be
left in a superior command.  He promised me this with promptness,
making the jocular remark that his chief trouble was to find places
for the too many generals who wanted to be at the head of affairs,
to command armies, etc.

The official order is dated:

[Special Order No. 114.]
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
Washington, August 24, 1881.

The following assignment is made of the general officers of the
volunteer service, whose appointment was announced in General
Orders No. 82, from the War Department

To the Department of the Cumberland, Brigadier-General Robert
Anderson commanding:

Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman,
Brigadier-General George H. Thomas.

By command of Lieutenant-General Scott:
E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant adjutant-General.


After some days, I was relieved in command of my brigade and post
by Brigadier General Fitz-John Porter, and at once took my
departure for Cincinnati, Ohio, via Cresson, Pennsylvania, where
General Anderson was with his family; and he, Thomas, and I, met by
appointment at the house of his brother, Larz Anderson, Esq., in
Cincinnati.  We were there on the 1st and 2d of September, when
several prominent gentlemen of Kentucky met us, to discuss the
situation, among whom were Jackson, Harlan, Speed, and others.  At
that time, William Nelson, an officer of the navy, had been
commissioned a brigadier-general of volunteers, and had his camp at
Dick Robinson, a few miles beyond the Kentucky River, south of
Nicholasville; and Brigadier-General L. H. Rousseau had another
camp at Jeffersonville, opposite Louisville.  The State Legislature
was in session at Frankfort, and was ready to take definite action
as soon as General Anderson was prepared, for the State was
threatened with invasion from Tennessee, by two forces: one from
the direction of Nashville, commanded by Generals Albert Sidney
Johnston and Buckner; and the other from the direction of
Cumberland Gap, commanded by Generals Crittenden and Zollicoffer.
General Anderson saw that he had not force enough to resist these
two columns, and concluded to send me in person for help to
Indianapolis and Springfield, to confer with the Governors of
Indiana, and Illinois, and to General Fremont, who commanded in St.
Louis.

McClellan and Fremont were the two men toward whom the country
looked as the great Union leaders, and toward them were streaming
the newly-raised regiments of infantry and cavalry, and batteries
of artillery; nobody seeming to think of the intervening link
covered by Kentucky.  While I was to make this tour, Generals
Anderson and Thomas were to go to Louisville and initiate the
department.  None of us had a staff, or any of the machinery for
organizing an army, and, indeed, we had no army to organize.
Anderson was empowered to raise regiments in Kentucky, and to
commission a few brigadier-generals.

At Indianapolis I found Governor Morton and all the State officials
busy in equipping and providing for the new regiments, and my
object was to divert some of them toward Kentucky; but they were
called for as fast as they were mustered in, either for the army of
McClellan or Fremont.  At Springfield also I found the same general
activity and zeal, Governor Yates busy in providing for his men;
but these men also had been promised to Fremont.  I then went on to
St. Louis, where all was seeming activity, bustle, and preparation.
Meeting R. M. Renick at the Planters' House (where I stopped), I
inquired where I could find General Fremont.  Renick said, "What do
you want with General Fremont?"  I said I had come to see him on
business; and he added, "You don't suppose that he will see such as
you?" and went on to retail all the scandal of the day: that Fremont
was a great potentate, surrounded by sentries and guards; that he
had a more showy court than any real king; that he kept senators,
governors, and the first citizens, dancing attendance for days and
weeks before granting an audience, etc.; that if I expected to see
him on business, I would have to make my application in writing,
and submit to a close scrutiny by his chief of staff and by his
civil surroundings.  Of course I laughed at all this, and renewed
my simple inquiry as to where was his office, and was informed that
he resided and had his office at Major Brant's new house on
Chouteau Avenue.  It was then late in the afternoon, and I
concluded to wait till the next morning; but that night I received
a dispatch from General Anderson in Louisville to hurry back, as
events were pressing, and he needed me.

Accordingly, I rose early next morning before daybreak, got
breakfast with the early railroad-passengers, and about sunrise was
at the gate of General Fremont's headquarters.  A sentinel with
drawn sabre paraded up and down in front of the house.  I had on my
undress uniform indicating my rank, and inquired of the sentinel,
"Is General Fremont up?"  He answered, "I don't know."  Seeing that
he was a soldier by his bearing, I spoke in a sharp, emphatic
voice, "Then find out."  He called for the corporal of the guard,
and soon a fine-looking German sergeant came, to whom I addressed
the same inquiry.  He in turn did not know, and I bade him find
out, as I had immediate and important business with the general.
The sergeant entered the house by the front-basement door, and
after ten or fifteen minutes the main front-door above was slowly
opened from the inside, and who should appear but my old San
Francisco acquaintance Isaiah C. Woods, whom I had not seen or
heard of since his flight to Australia, at the time of the failure
of Adams & Co. in 1851!  He ushered me in hastily, closed the door,
and conducted me into the office on the right of the hall.  We were
glad to meet, after so long and eventful an interval, and mutually
inquired after our respective families and special acquaintances.
I found that he was a commissioned officer, a major on duty with
Fremont, and Major Eaton, now of the paymaster's Department, was in
the same office with him.  I explained to them that I had come from
General Anderson, and wanted to confer with General Fremont in
person.  Woods left me, but soon returned, said the general would
see me in a very few minutes, and within ten minutes I was shown
across the hall into the large parlor, where General Fremont
received me very politely.  We had met before, as early as 1847, in
California, and I had also seen him several times when he was
senator.  I then in a rapid manner ran over all the points of
interest in General Anderson's new sphere of action, hoped he would
spare us from the new levies what troops he could, and generally
act in concert with us.  He told me that his first business would
be to drive the rebel General Price and his army out of Missouri,
when he would turn his attention down the Mississippi.  He asked my
opinion about the various kinds of field-artillery which
manufacturers were thrusting on him, especially the then
newly-invented James gun, and afterward our conversation took a wide
turn about the character of the principal citizens of St. Louis,
with whom I was well acquainted.

Telling General Fremont that I had been summoned to Louisville and
that I should leave in the first train, viz., at 3 p.m., I took my
leave of him.  Returning to Wood's office, I found there two more
Californians, viz., Messrs.  Palmer and Haskell, so I felt that,
while Fremont might be suspicious of others, he allowed free
ingress to his old California acquaintances.

Returning to the Planters' House, I heard of Beard, another
Californian, a Mormon, who had the contract for the line of
redoubts which Fremont had ordered to be constructed around the
city, before he would take his departure for the interior of the
State; and while I stood near the office-counter, I saw old Baron
Steinberger, a prince among our early California adventurers, come
in and look over the register.  I avoided him on purpose, but his
presence in St. Louis recalled the maxim, "Where the vultures are,
there is a carcass close by;" and I suspected that the profitable
contracts of the quartermaster, McKinstry, had drawn to St. Louis
some of the most enterprising men of California.  I suspect they
can account for the fact that, in a very short time, Fremont fell
from his high estate in Missouri, by reason of frauds, or supposed
frauds, in the administration of the affairs of his command.

I left St. Louis that afternoon and reached Louisville the next
morning.  I found General Anderson quartered at the Louisville
Hotel, and he had taken a dwelling homes on ______ Street as an
office.  Captain O. D. Greens was his adjutant-general, Lieutenant
Throckmorton his aide, and Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps,
was on duty with him.  General George H. Thomas had been dispatched
to camp Dick Robinson, to relieve Nelson.

The city was full of all sorts of rumors.  The Legislature, moved
by considerations purely of a political nature, had taken the step,
whatever it was, that amounted to an adherence to the Union,
instead of joining the already-seceded States.  This was
universally known to be the signal for action.  For it we were
utterly unprepared, whereas the rebels were fully prepared.
General Sidney Johnston immediately crossed into Kentucky, and
advanced as far as Bowling Green, which he began to fortify, and
thence dispatched General Buckner with a division forward toward
Louisville; General Zollicoffer, in like manner, entered the State
and advanced as far as Somerset.  On the day I reached Louisville
the excitement ran high.  It was known that Columbus, Kentucky, had
been occupied, September 7th, by a strong rebel force, under
Generals Pillow and Polk, and that General Grant had moved from
Cairo and occupied Paducah in force on the 6th.  Many of the rebel
families expected Buckner to reach Louisville at any moment.  That
night, General Anderson sent for me, and I found with him Mr.
Guthrie, president of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, who had
in his hands a dispatch to the effect that the bridge across the
Rolling Fork of Salt Creek, less than thirty miles out, had been
burned, and that Buckner's force, en route for Louisville, had been
detained beyond Green River by a train thrown from the track.  We
learned afterward that a man named Bird had displaced a rail on
purpose to throw the train off the track, and thereby give us time.

Mr. Guthrie explained that in the ravine just beyond Salt Creek
were several high and important trestles which, if destroyed, would
take months to replace, and General Anderson thought it well.
worth the effort to save them.  Also, on Muldraugh's Hill beyond,
was a strong position, which had in former years been used as the
site for the State "Camp of Instruction," and we all supposed that
General Buckner, who was familiar with the ground, was aiming for a
position there, from which to operate on Louisville.

All the troops we had to counteract Buckner were Rousseau's Legion,
and a few Home Guards in Louisville.  The former were still
encamped across the river at Jeffersonville; so General Anderson
ordered me to go over, and with them, and such Home Guards as we
could collect, make the effort to secure possession of Muldraugh's
Hill before Buckner could reach it.  I took Captain Prime with me;
and crossed over to Rousseau's camp.  The long-roll was beaten, and
within an hour the men, to the number of about one thousand, were
marching for the ferry-boat and for the Nashville depot.  Meantime
General Anderson had sent to collect some Home Guards, and Mr.
Guthrie to get the trains ready.  It was after midnight before we
began to move.  The trains proceeded slowly, and it was daybreak
when we reached Lebanon Junction, twenty-six miles out, where we
disembarked, and marched to the bridge over Salt River, which we
found had been burnt; whether to prevent Buckner coming into
Louisville, or us from going out, was not clear.  Rousseau's Legion
forded the stream and marched up to the State Camp of Instruction,
finding the high trestles all secure.  The railroad hands went to
work at once to rebuild the bridge.  I remained a couple of days at
Lebanon Junction, during which General Anderson forwarded two
regiments of volunteers that had come to him.  Before the bridge
was done we  advanced the whole camp to the summit of Muldraugh's
Hill, just back of Elizabethtown.  There I learned definitely that
General Buckner had not crossed Green River at all, that General
Sidney Johnston was fortifying Bowling Green, and preparing for a
systematic advance into Kentucky, of which he was a native, and
with whose people and geography he must have been familiar.  As
fast as fresh troops reached Louisville, they were sent out to me
at Muldraugh's Hill, where I was endeavoring to put them into shape
for service, and by the 1st of October I had the equivalent of a
division of two brigades preparing to move forward toward Green
River.  The daily correspondence between General Anderson and
myself satisfied me that the worry and harassment at Louisville
were exhausting his strength and health, and that he would soon
leave.  On a telegraphic summons from him, about the 5th of
October, I went down to Louisville, when General Anderson said he
could not stand the mental torture of his command any longer, and
that he must go away, or it would kill him.  On the 8th of October
he actually published an order relinquishing the command, and, by
reason of my seniority, I had no alternative but to assume command,
though much against the grain, and in direct violation of Mr.
Lincoln's promise to me.  I am certain that, in my earliest
communication to the War Department, I renewed the expression of my
wish to remain in a subordinate position, and that I received the
assurance that Brigadier-General Buell would soon arrive from
California, and would be sent to relieve me.  By that time I had
become pretty familiar with the geography and the general resources
of Kentucky.  We had parties all over the State raising regiments
and companies; but it was manifest that the young men were
generally inclined to the cause of the South, while the older men
of property wanted to be let alone--i.e., to remain neutral.  As to
a forward movement that fall, it was simply impracticable; for we
were forced to use divergent lines, leading our columns farther and
farther apart; and all I could attempt was to go on and collect
force and material at the two points already chosen, viz., Dick
Robinson and Elizabethtown.  General George H. Thomas still
continued to command the former, and on the 12th of October I
dispatched Brigadier-General A. McD. McCook to command the latter,
which had been moved forward to Nolin Creek, fifty-two miles out of
Louisville, toward Bowling Green.  Staff-officers began to arrive
to relieve us of the constant drudgery which, up to that time, had
been forced on General Anderson and myself; and these were all good
men.  Colonel Thomas Swords, quartermaster, arrived on the 13th;
Paymaster Larned on the 14th; and Lieutenant Smyzer, Fifth
Artillery, acting ordnance-officer, on the 20th; Captain Symonds
was already on duty as the commissary of subsistence; Captain O.
D. Greene was the adjutant-general, and completed a good working
staff.

The everlasting worry of citizens complaining of every petty
delinquency of a soldier, and forcing themselves forward to discuss
politics, made the position of a commanding general no sinecure.  I
continued to strengthen the two corps forward and their routes of
supply; all the time expecting that Sidney Johnston, who was a real
general, and who had as correct information of our situation as I
had, would unite his force with Zollicoffer, and fall on Thomas at
Dick Robinson, or McCook at Nolin: Had he done so in October, 1861,
he could have walked into Louisville, and the vital part of the
population would have hailed him as a deliverer.  Why he did not,
was to me a mystery then and is now; for I know that he saw the
move; and had his wagons loaded up at one time for a start toward
Frankfort, passing between our two camps.  Conscious of our
weakness, I was unnecessarily unhappy, and doubtless exhibited it
too much to those near me; but it did seem to me that the
Government at Washington, intent on the larger preparations of
Fremont in Missouri and McClellan in Washington, actually ignored
us in Kentucky.

About this time, say the middle of October, I received notice, by
telegraph, that the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron (then in St.
Louis), would visit me at Louisville, on his way back to
Washington.  I was delighted to have an opportunity to properly
represent the actual state of affairs, and got Mr. Guthrie to go
with me across to Jeffersonville, to meet the Secretary of War and
escort him to Louisville.  The train was behind time, but Mr.
Guthrie and I waited till it actually arrived.  Mr. Cameron was
attended by Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas, and six or seven
gentlemen who turned out to be newspaper reporters.  Mr. Cameron's
first inquiry was, when he could start for Cincinnati, saying that,
as he had been detained at St. Louis so long, it was important he
should hurry on to Washington.  I explained that the regular
mail-boat would leave very soon--viz., at 12 M.--but I begged him
to come over to Louisville; that I wanted to see him on business as
important as any in Washington, and hoped he would come and spend
at least a day with us.  He asked if every thing was not well with
us, and I told him far from it; that things were actually bad, as
bad as bad could be.  This seemed to surprise him, and Mr. Guthrie
added his persuasion to mine; when Mr. Cameron, learning that he
could leave Louisville by rail via Frankfort next morning early,
and make the same connections at Cincinnati, consented to go with
us to Louisville, with the distinct understanding that he must
leave early the next morning for Washington.

We accordingly all took hacks, crossed the river by the ferry, and
drove to the Galt House, where I was then staying.  Brigadier-
General T. J. Wood had come down from Indianapolis by the same
train, and was one of the party.  We all proceeded to my room on
the first floor of the Galt House, where our excellent landlord,
Silas Miller, Esq., sent us a good lunch and something to drink.
Mr. Cameron was not well, and lay on my bed, but joined in the
general conversation.  He and his party seemed to be full of the
particulars of the developments in St. Louis of some of Fremont's
extravagant contracts and expenses, which were the occasion of
Cameron's trip to St. Louis, and which finally resulted in
Fremont's being relieved, first by General Hunter, and after by
General H. W. Halleck.

After some general conversation, Mr. Cameron called to me, "Now,
General Sherman, tell us of your troubles."  I said I preferred not
to discuss business with so many strangers present.  He said,
"They are all friends, all members of my family, and you may speak
your mind freely and without restraint."  I am sure I stepped to
the door, locked it to prevent intrusion, and then fully and fairly
represented the state of affairs in Kentucky, especially the
situation and numbers of my troops.  I complained that the new
levies of Ohio and Indiana were diverted East and West, and we got
scarcely any thing; that our forces at Nolin and Dick Robinson were
powerless for invasion, and only tempting to a general such as we
believed Sidney Johnston to be; that, if Johnston chose, he could
march to Louisville any day.  Cameron exclaimed: "You astonish me!
Our informants, the Kentucky Senators and members of Congress,
claim that they have in Kentucky plenty of men, and all they want
are arms and money."  I then said it was not true; for the young
men were arming and going out openly in broad daylight to the rebel
camps, provided with good horses and guns by their fathers, who
were at best "neutral;" and as to arms, he had, in Washington,
promised General Anderson forty thousand of the best Springfield
muskets, instead of which we had received only about twelve
thousand Belgian muskets, which the Governor of Pennsylvania had
refused, as had also the Governor of Ohio, but which had been
adjudged good enough for Kentucky.  I asserted that volunteer
colonels raising regiments in various parts of the State had come
to Louisville for arms, and when they saw what I had to offer had
scorned to receive them--to confirm the truth of which I appealed
to Mr. Guthrie, who said that every word I had spoken was true, and
he repeated what I had often heard him say, that no man who owned a
slave or a mule in Kentucky could be trusted.

Mr. Cameron appeared alarmed at what was said, and turned to
Adjutant-General L. Thomas, to inquire if he knew of any troops
available, that had not been already assigned.  He mentioned
Negley's Pennsylvania Brigade, at Pittsburg, and a couple of other
regiments that were then en route for St. Louis.  Mr. Cameron
ordered him to divert these to Louisville, and Thomas made the
telegraphic orders on the spot.  He further promised, on reaching
Washington, to give us more of his time and assistance.

In the general conversation which followed, I remember taking a
large map of the United States, and assuming the people of the
whole South to be in rebellion, that our task was to subdue them,
showed that McClellan was on the left, having a frontage of less
than a hundred miles, and Fremont the right, about the same;
whereas I, the centre, had from the Big Sandy to Paducah, over
three hundred miles of frontier; that McClellan had a hundred
thousand men, Fremont sixty thousand, whereas to me had only been
allotted about eighteen thousand.  I argued that, for the purpose
of defense we should have sixty thousand men at once, and for
offense, would need two hundred thousand, before we were done.  Mr.
Cameron, who still lay on the bed, threw up his hands and
exclaimed, "Great God! where are they to come from?"  I asserted
that there were plenty of men at the North, ready and willing to
come, if he would only accept their services; for it was notorious
that regiments had been formed in all the Northwestern States,
whose services had been refused by the War Department, on the
ground that they would not be needed.  We discussed all these
matters fully, in the most friendly spirit, and I thought I had
aroused Mr. Cameron to a realization of the great war that was
before us, and was in fact upon us.  I heard him tell General
Thomas to make a note of our conversation, that he might attend to
my requests on reaching Washington.  We all spent the evening
together agreeably in conversation, many Union citizens calling to
pay their respects, and the next morning early we took the train
for Frankfort; Mr. Cameron and party going on to Cincinnati and
Washington, and I to Camp Dick Robinson to see General Thomas and
the troops there.

I found General Thomas in a tavern, with most of his regiments
camped about him.  He had sent a small force some miles in advance
toward Cumberland Gap, under Brigadier-General Schoepf.  Remaining
there a couple of days, I returned to Louisville; on the 22d of
October, General Negley's brigade arrived in boats from Pittsburg,
was sent out to Camp Nolin; and the Thirty-seventh Indiana.,
Colonel Hazzard, and Second Minnesota, Colonel Van Cleve, also
reached Louisville by rail, and were posted at Elizabethtown and
Lebanon Junction.  These were the same troops which had been
ordered by Mr. Cameron when at Louisville, and they were all that I
received thereafter, prior to my leaving Kentucky.  On reaching
Washington, Mr. Cameron called on General Thomas, as he himself
afterward told me, to submit his memorandum of events during his
absence, and in that memorandum was mentioned my insane request for
two hundred thousand men.  By some newspaper man this was seen and
published, and, before I had the least conception of it, I was
universally published throughout the country as "insane, crazy,"
etc.  Without any knowledge, however, of this fact, I had
previously addressed to the Adjutant-General of the army at
Washington this letter:


HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OP THE CUMBERLAND, LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY,
October 22, 1881.

To General L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.

Sir: On my arrival at Camp Dick Robinson, I found General
Thomas had stationed a Kentucky regiment at Rock Castle Hill,
beyond a river of the same name, and had sent an Ohio and an
Indiana regiment forward in support.  He was embarrassed for
transportation, and I authorized him to hire teams, and to move his
whole force nearer to his advance-guard, so as to support it, as he
had information of the approach of Zollicoffer toward London.  I
have just heard from him, that he had sent forward General Schoepf
with Colonel Wolford's cavalry, Colonel Steadman's Ohio regiment,
and a battery of artillery, followed on a succeeding day by a
Tennessee brigade.  He had still two Kentucky regiments, the
Thirty-eighth Ohio and another battery of artillery, with which he
was to follow yesterday.  This force, if concentrated, should be
strong enough for the purpose; at all events, it is all he had or I
could give him.

I explained to you fully, when here, the supposed position of our
adversaries, among which was a force in the valley of Big Sandy,
supposed to be advancing on Paris, Kentucky.  General Nelson at
Maysville was instructed to collect all the men he could, and
Colonel Gill's regiment of Ohio Volunteers.  Colonel Harris was
already in position at Olympian Springs, and a regiment lay at
Lexington, which I ordered to his support.  This leaves the line of
Thomas's operations exposed, but I cannot help it.  I explained so
fully to yourself and the Secretary of War the condition of things,
that I can add nothing new until further developments, You know my
views that this great centre of our field is too weak, far too
weak, and I have begged and implored till I dare not say more.

Buckner still is beyond Green River.  He sent a detachment of his
men, variously estimated at from two to four thousand toward
Greensburg.  General Ward, with about one thousand men, retreated
to Campbellsburg, where he called to his assistance some
partially-formed regiments to the number of about two thousand.
The enemy did not advance, and General Ward was at last dates at
Campbellsburg.  The officers charged with raising regiments must of
necessity be near their homes to collect men, and for this reason
are out of position; but at or near Greensburg and Lebanon, I
desire to assemble as large a force of the Kentucky Volunteers as
possible.  This organization is necessarily irregular, but the
necessity is so great that I must have them, and therefore have
issued to them arms and clothing during the process of formation.
This has facilitated their enlistment; but inasmuch as the
Legislature has provided money for organizing the Kentucky
Volunteers, and intrusted its disbursement to a board of loyal
gentlemen, I have endeavored to cooperate with them to hasten the
formation of these corps.

The great difficulty is, and has been, that as volunteers offer, we
have not arms and clothing to give them.  The arms sent us are, as
you already know, European muskets of uncouth pattern, which the
volunteers will not touch.

General McCook has now three brigades--Johnson's, Wood's, and
Rousseau's.  Negley's brigade arrived to-day, and will be sent out
at once.  The Minnesota regiment has also arrived, and will be sent
forward.  Hazzard's regiment of Indiana troops I have ordered to
the month of Salt Creek, an important point on the turnpike-road
leading to Elizabethtown.

I again repeat that our force here is out of all proportion to the
importance of the position.  Our defeat would be disastrous to the
nation; and to expect of new men, who never bore arms, to do
miracles, is not right.

I am, with much respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding.


About this time my attention was drawn to the publication in all
the Eastern papers, which of course was copied at the West, of the
report that I was "crazy, insane, and mad," that "I had demanded
two hundred thousand men for the defense of Kentucky;" and the
authority given for this report was stated to be the Secretary of
War himself, Mr. Cameron, who never, to my knowledge, took pains to
affirm or deny it.  My position was therefore simply unbearable,
and it is probable I resented the cruel insult with language of
intense feeling.  Still I received no orders, no reenforcements,
not a word of encouragement or relief.  About November 1st, General
McClellan was appointed commander-in-chief of all the armies in the
field, and by telegraph called for a report from me.  It is
herewith given:


HEADQUARTERS THE DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Louisville,
Kentucky, November 4, 1861

General L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.

Sir: In compliance with the telegraphic orders of General
McClellan, received late last night, I submit this report of the
forces in Kentucky, and of their condition.

The tabular statement shows the position of the several regiments.
The camp at Nolin is at the present extremity of the Nashville
Railroad.  This force was thrown forward to meet the advance of
Buckner's army, which then fell back to Green River, twenty-three
miles beyond.  These regiments were substantially without means of
transportation, other than the railroad, which is guarded at all
dangerous points, yet is liable to interruption at any moment, by
the tearing up of a rail by the disaffected inhabitants or a hired
enemy.  These regiments are composed of good materials, but devoid
of company officers of experience, and have been put under thorough
drill since being in camp.  They are generally well clad, and
provided for.  Beyond Green River, the enemy has masked his forces,
and it is very difficult to ascertain even the approximate numbers.
No pains have been spared to ascertain them, but without success,
and it is well known that they far outnumber us.  Depending,
however, on the railroads to their rear for transportation, they
have not thus far advanced this side of Green River, except in
marauding parties.  This is the proper line of advance, but will
require a very large force, certainly fifty thousand men, as their
railroad facilities south enable them to concentrate at
Munfordsville the entire strength of the South.  General McCook's
command is divided into four brigades, under Generals Wood, R. W.
Johnson, Rousseau, and Negley.

General Thomas's line of operations is from Lexington, toward
Cumberland Gap and Ford, which are occupied by a force of rebel
Tennesseeans, under the command of Zollicoffer.  Thomas occupies
the position at London, in front of two roads which lead to the
fertile part of Kentucky, the one by Richmond, and the other by
Crab Orchard, with his reserve at Camp Dick Robinson, eight miles
south of the Kentucky River.  His provisions and stores go by
railroad from Cincinnati to Nicholasville, and thence in wagons to
his several regiments.  He is forced to hire transportation.

Brigadier-General Nelson is operating by the line from Olympian
Springs, east of Paris, on the Covington & Lexington Railroad,
toward Prestonburg, in the valley of the Big Sandy where is
assembled a force of from twenty-five to thirty-five hundred rebel
Kentuckians waiting reenforcements from Virginia.  My last report
from him was to October 28th, at which time he had Colonel Harris's
Ohio Second, nine hundred strong; Colonel Norton's Twenty-first
Ohio, one thousand; and Colonel Sill's Thirty-third Ohio, seven
hundred and fifty strong; with two irregular Kentucky regiments,
Colonels Marshall and Metcalf.  These troops were on the road near
Hazel Green and West Liberty, advancing toward Prestonburg.

Upon an inspection of the map, you will observe these are all
divergent lines, but rendered necessary, from the fact that our
enemies choose them as places of refuge from pursuit, where they
can receive assistance from neighboring States.  Our lines are all
too weak, probably with the exception of that to Prestonburg.  To
strengthen these, I am thrown on the raw levies of Ohio and
Indiana, who arrive in detachments, perfectly fresh from the
country, and loaded down with baggage, also upon the Kentuckians,
who are slowly forming regiments all over the State, at points
remote from danger, and whom it will be almost impossible to
assemble together.  The organization of this latter force is, by
the laws of Kentucky, under the control of a military board of
citizens, at the capital, Frankfort, and they think they will be
enabled to have fifteen regiments toward the middle of this month,
but I doubt it, and deem it unsafe to rely on them: There are four
regiments forming in the neighborhood of Owensboro, near the mouth
of Green River, who are doing good service, also in the
neighborhood of Campbellsville, but it is unsafe to rely on troops
so suddenly armed and equipped.  They are not yet clothed or
uniformed.  I know well you will think our force too widely
distributed, but we are forced to it by the attitude of our
enemies, whose force and numbers the country never has and probably
never will comprehend.

I am told that my estimate of troops needed for this line, viz.,
two hundred thousand, has been construed to my prejudice, and
therefore leave it for the future.  This is the great centre on
which our enemies can concentrate whatever force is not employed
elsewhere.  Detailed statement of present force inclosed with this.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding.


BRIGADIER-GENERAL McCOOK'S CAMP, AT NOLIN, FIFTY-TWO MILES FROM
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, NOVEMBER 4, 1861.

First Brigade (General ROUSSEAU).-Third Kentucky, Colonel Bulkley;
Fourth Kentucky, Colonel Whittaker; First Cavalry, Colonel Board;
Stone's battery; two companies Nineteenth United States Infantry,
and two companies Fifteenth United States Infantry, Captain Gilman.

Second Brigade (General T. J. WOOD).-Thirty-eighth Indiana, Colonel
Scribner; Thirty-ninth Indiana, Colonel Harrison; Thirtieth
Indiana, Colonel Bass; Twenty-ninth Indiana, Colonel Miller.

Third Brigade (General JOHNSON).-Forty-ninth Ohio, Colonel Gibson;
Fifteenth Ohio, Colonel Dickey; Thirty-fourth Illinois, Colonel
King; Thirty-second Indiana, Colonel Willach.

Fourth Brigade (General NEGLEY).-Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania,
Colonel Hambright; Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, Colonel Sinnell;
Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania, Colonel Stambaugh; Battery, Captain
Mueller.

Camp Dick Robinson (General G. H. THOMAS).---Kentucky, Colonel
Bramlette;--Kentucky, Colonel Fry;--Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel
Woolford; Fourteenth Ohio, Colonel Steadman; First Artillery,
Colonel Barnett; Third Ohio, Colonel Carter;--East Tennessee,
Colonel Byrd.

Bardstown, Kentucky.-Tenth Indiana, Colonel Manson.

Crab Orchard.-Thirty-third Indiana, Colonel Coburn.

Jeffersonville, Indiana.-Thirty-fourth Indiana, Colonel Steele;
Thirty-sixth Indiana, Colonel Gross; First Wisconsin, Colonel
Starkweather.

Mouth of Salt River.-Ninth Michigan, Colonel Duffield;
Thirty-seventh Indiana, Colonel Hazzard.

Lebanon Junction..-Second Minnesota, Colonel Van Cleve.

Olympian Springs.-Second Ohio, Colonel Harris.

Cynthiana, Kentucky.-Thirty-fifth Ohio, Colonel Vandever.

Nicholasville, Kentucky.-Twenty-first Ohio, Colonel Norton;
Thirty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Bradley.

Big Hill.-Seventeenth Ohio, Colonel Connell.

Colesburg.-Twenty-fourth Illinois, Colonel Hecker.

Elizabethtown, Kentucky.-Nineteenth Illinois, Colonel Turchin.

Owensboro' or Henderson.-Thirty-first Indiana, Colonel Cruft;
Colonel Edwards, forming Rock Castle; Colonel Boyle, Harrodsburg;
Colonel Barney, Irvine; Colonel Hazzard, Burksville; Colonel
Haskins, Somerset.

And, in order to conclude this subject, I also add copies of two
telegraphic dispatches, sent for General McClellan's use about the
same time, which are all the official letters received at his
headquarters, as certified by the Adjutant-General, L. Thomas, in a
letter of February 1, 1862; in answer to an application of my
brother, Senator John Sherman, and on which I was adjudged insane:


Louisville, November 3, 10 p.m.

To General McLELLAN, Washington, D. C.:

Dispatch just received.  We are forced to operate on three lines,
all dependent on railroads of doubtful safety, requiring strong
guards.  From Paris to Prestonbnrg, three Ohio regiments and some
militia--enemy variously reported from thirty-five hundred to seven
thousand.  From Lexington toward Cumberland Gap, Brigadier-General
Thomas, one Indiana and five Ohio regiments, two Kentucky and two
Tennessee; hired wagons and badly clad.  Zollicoffer, at Cumberland
Ford, about seven thousand.  Lee reported on the way with Virginia
reenforcements.  In front of Louisville, fifty-two miles, McCook,
with four brigades of about thirteen thousand, with four regiments
to guard the railroad, at all times in danger.  Enemy along the
railroad from Green River to Bowling Green, Nashville, and
Clarksville.  Buckner, Hardee, Sidney Johnston, Folk, and Pillow,
the two former in immediate command, the force as large as they
want or can subsist, from twenty-five to thirty thousand.  Bowling
Green strongly fortified.  Our forces too small to do good, and too
large to sacrifice.

W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General.



HEADQUARTERS THE DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Louisville,
Kentucky, November 6, 1861

General L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

Sir: General McClellan telegraphs me to report to him daily the
situation of affairs here.  The country is so large that it is
impossible to give clear and definite views.  Our enemies have a
terrible advantage in the fact that in our midst, in our camps, and
along our avenues of travel, they have active partisans, farmers
and business-men, who seemingly pursue their usual calling, but are
in fact spies.  They report all our movements and strength, while
we can procure information only by circuitous and unreliable means.
I inclose you the copy of an intercepted letter, which is but the
type of others.  Many men from every part of the State are now
enrolled under Buckner--have gone to him--while ours have to be
raised in neighborhoods, and cannot be called together except at
long notice.  These volunteers are being organized under the laws
of the State, and the 10th of November is fixed for the time of
consolidating them into companies and regiments.  Many of them are
armed by the United States as home guards, and many by General
Anderson and myself, because of the necessity of being armed to
guard their camps against internal enemies.  Should we be
overwhelmed, they would scatter, and their arms and clothing will
go to the enemy, furnishing the very material they so much need.
We should have here a very large force, sufficient to give
confidence to the Union men of the ability to do what should be
done--possess ourselves of all the State.  But all see and feel we
are brought to a stand-still, and this produces doubt and alarm.
With our present force it would be simple madness to cross Green
River, and yet hesitation may be as fatal.  In like manner the
other columns are in peril, not so much in front as rear, the
railroads over which our stores must pass being much exposed.  I
have the Nashville Railroad guarded by three regiments, yet it is
far from being safe; and, the moment actual hostilities commence,
these roads will be interrupted, and we will be in a dilemma.  To
meet this in part I have put a cargo of provisions at the mouth of
Salt River, guarded by two regiments.  All these detachments weaken
the main force, and endanger the whole.  Do not conclude, as
before, that I exaggerate the facts.  They are as stated, and the
future looks as dark as possible.  It would be better if some man
of sanguine mind were here, for I am forced to order according to
my convictions.

Yours truly,
W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding.


After the war was over, General Thomas J. Wood, then in command of
the district of Vicksburg, prepared a statement addressed to the
public, describing the interview with the Secretary of War, which
he calls a "Council of War."  I did not then deem it necessary to
renew a matter which had been swept into oblivion by the war
itself; but, as it is evidence by an eyewitness, it is worthy of
insertion here.


STATEMENT.

On the 11th of October, 1861, the writer, who had been personally
on mustering duty in Indiana, was appointed a brigadier-general of
volunteers, and ordered to report to General Sherman, then in
command of the Department of the Cumberland, with his headquarters
at Louisville, having succeeded General Robert Anderson.  When the
writer was about leaving Indianapolis to proceed to Louisville, Mr.
Cameron, returning from his famous visit of inspection to General
Fremont's department, at St. Louis, Missouri, arrived at
Indianapolis, and announced his intention to visit General Sherman.

The writer was invited to accompany the party to Louisville.
Taking the early morning train from Indianapolis to Louisville on
the 16th of October, 1861, the party arrived in Jeffersonville
shortly after mid-day.  General Sherman met the party in
Jeffersonville, and accompanied it to the Galt House, in
Louisville, the hotel at which he was stopping.

During the afternoon General Sherman informed the writer that a
council of war was to be held immediately in his private room in
the hotel, and desired him to be present at the council.  General
Sherman and the writer proceeded directly to the room.  The writer
entered the room first, and observed in it Mr. Cameron, Adjutant-
General L. Thomas, and some other persons, all of whose names he
did not know, but whom he recognized as being of Mr. Cameron's
party.  The name of one of the party the writer had learned, which
he remembers as Wilkinson, or Wilkerson, and who he understood was
a writer for the New York Tribune newspaper.  The Hon. James
Guthrie was also in the room, having been invited, on account of
his eminent position as a citizen of Kentucky, his high civic
reputation, and his well-known devotion to the Union, to meet the
Secretary of War in the council.  When General Sherman entered the
room he closed the door, and turned the key in the lock.

Before entering on the business of the meeting, General Sherman
remarked substantially: "Mr. Cameron, we have met here to discuss
matters and interchange views which should be known only by persons
high in the confidence of the Government.  There are persons
present whom I do not know, and I desire to know, before opening
the business of the council, whether they are persons who may be
properly allowed to hear the views which I have to submit to you."
Mr. Cameron replied, with some little testiness of manner, that the
persons referred to belonged to his party, and there was no
objection to their knowing whatever might be communicated to him.

Certainly the legitimate and natural conclusion from this remark of
Mr. Cameron's was that whatever views might be submitted by General
Sherman would be considered under the protection of the seal of
secrecy, and would not be divulged to the public till all
apprehension of injurious consequences from such disclosure had
passed.  And it may be remarked, further, that justice to General
Sherman required that if, at any future time, his conclusions as to
the amount of force necessary to conduct the operations committed
to his charge should be made public, the grounds on which his
conclusions were based should be made public at the same time.

Mr. Cameron then asked General Sherman what his plans were.  To
this General Sherman replied that he had no plans; that no
sufficient force had been placed at his disposition with which to
devise any plan of operations; that, before a commanding general
could project a plan of campaign, he must know what amount of force
he would have to operate with.

The general added that he had views which he would be happy to
submit for the consideration of the Secretary.  Mr. Cameron desired
to hear General Sherman's views.

General Sherman began by giving his opinion of the people of
Kentucky, and the then condition of the State.  He remarked that he
believed a very large majority of the people of Kentucky were
thoroughly devoted to the Union, and loyal to the Government, and
that the Unionists embraced almost all the older and more
substantial men in the State; but, unfortunately, there was no
organization nor arms among the Union men; that the rebel minority,
thoroughly vindictive in its sentiments, was organized and armed
(this having been done in advance by their leaders), and, beyond
the reach of the Federal forces, overawed and prevented the Union
men from organizing; that, in his opinion, if Federal protection
were extended throughout the State to the Union men, a large force
could be raised for the service of the Government.

General Sherman next presented a resume of the information in his
possession as to the number of the rebel troops in Kentucky.
Commencing with the force at Columbus, Kentucky, the reports
varied, giving the strength from ten to twenty thousand.  It was
commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk.  General Sherman fixed it at
the lowest estimate; say, ten thousand.  The force at Bowling
Green, commanded by General.  A. S. Johnston, supported by Hardee,
Buckner, and others, was variously estimated at from eighteen to
thirty thousand.  General Sherman estimated this force at the
lowest figures given to it by his information--eighteen thousand.

He explained that, for purposes of defense, these two forces ought,
owing to the facility with which troops might be transported from
one to the other, by the net-work of railroads in Middle and West
Tennessee, to be considered almost as one.  General Sherman
remarked, also, on the facility with which reinforcements could be
transported by railroad to Bowling Green, from the other rebellions
States.

The third organized body of rebel troops was in Eastern Kentucky,
under General Zollicoffer, estimated, according to the most
reliable information, at six thousand men.  This force threatened a
descent, if unrestrained, on the blue-grass region of Kentucky,
including the cities of Lexington, and Frankfort, the capital of
the State; and if successful in its primary movements, as it would
gather head as it advanced, might endanger the safety of
Cincinnati.

General Sherman said that the information in his possession
indicated an intention, on the part of the rebels, of a general and
grand advance toward the Ohio River.  He further expressed the
opinion that, if such advance should be made, and not checked, the
rebel force would be swollen by at least twenty thousand recruits
from the disloyalists in Kentucky.  His low computation of the
organized rebel soldiers then in Kentucky fixed the strength at
about thirty-five thousand.  Add twenty thousand for reenforcements
gained in Kentucky, to say nothing of troops drawn from other rebel
States, and the effective rebel force in the State, at a low
estimate, would be fifty-five thousand men.

General Sherman explained forcibly how largely the difficulties of
suppressing the rebellion would be enhanced, if the rebels should
be allowed to plant themselves firmly, with strong fortifications,
at commanding points on the Ohio River.  It would be facile for
them to carry the war thence into the loyal States north of the
river.

To resist an advance of the rebels, General Sherman stated that he
did not have at that time in Kentucky more than some twelve to
fourteen thousand effective men.  The bulk of this force was posted
at camp Nolin, on the Louisville & Nashville Railway, fifty miles
south of Louisville.  A part of it was in Eastern Kentucky, under
General George H. Thomas, and a very small force was in the lower
valley of Green River.

This disposition of the force had been made for the double purpose
of watching and checking the rebels, and protecting the raising and
organization of troops among the Union men of Kentucky.

Having explained the situation from the defensive point of view,
General Sherman proceeded to consider it from the offensive
stand-point.  The Government had undertaken to suppress the
rebellion; the onus faciendi, therefore, rested on the Government.
The rebellion could never be put down, the authority of the
paramount Government asserted, and the union of the States declared
perpetual, by force of arms, by maintaining the defensive; to
accomplish these grand desiderata, it was absolutely necessary the
Government should adopt, and maintain until the rebellion was
crushed, the offensive.

For the purpose of expelling the rebels from Kentucky, General
Sherman said that at least sixty thousand soldiers were necessary.
Considering that the means of accomplishment must always be
proportioned to the end to be achieved, and bearing in mind the
array of rebel force then in Kentucky, every sensible man must
admit that the estimate of the force given by General Sherman, for
driving the rebels out of the State, and reestablishing and
maintaining the authority of the Government, was a very low one.
The truth is that, before the rebels were driven from Kentucky,
many more than sixty thousand soldiers were sent into the State.

Ascending from the consideration of the narrow question of the
political and military situation in Kentucky, and the extent of
force necessary to redeem the State from rebel thraldom,
forecasting in his sagacious intellect the grand and daring
operations which, three years afterward, he realized in a campaign,
taken in its entirety, without a parallel in modern times, General
Sherman expressed the opinion that, to carry the war to the Gulf of
Mexico, and destroy all armed opposition to the Goverment, in the
entire Mississippi Valley, at least two hundred thousand troops
were absolutely requisite.

So soon as General Sherman had concluded the expression of his
views, Mr. Cameron asked, with much warmth and apparent irritation,
"Where do you suppose, General Sherman, all this force is to come
from."  General Sherman replied that he did not know; that it was
not his duty to raise, organize, and put the necessary military
force into the field; that duty pertained to the War Department.
His duty was to organize campaigns and command the troops after
they had been put into the field.

At this point of the proceedings, General Sherman suggested that it
might be agreeable to the Secretary to hear the views of Mr.
Guthrie.  Thus appealed to, Mr. Guthrie said he did not consider
himself, being a civilian, competent to give an opinion as to the
extent of force necessary to parry the war to the Gulf of Mexico;
but, being well informed of the condition of things in Kentucky, he
indorsed fully General Sherman's opinion of the force required to
drive the rebels out of the State.

The foregoing is a circumstantial account of the deliberations of
the council that were of any importance.

A good deal of desultory conversation followed, on immaterial
matters; and some orders were issued by telegraph, by the Secretary
of War, for some small reenforcements to be sent to Kentucky
immediately, from Pennsylvania and Indiana.

A short time after the council was held--the exact time is not now
remembered by the writer--an imperfect narrative of it appeared in
the New York Tribune.  This account announced to the public the
conclusions uttered by General Sherman in the council, without
giving the reasons on which his conclusions were based.  The
unfairness of this course to General Sherman needs no comment.  All
military men were shocked by the gross breach of faith which had
been committed

TH. J. WOOD, Major-General Volunteers

Vicksburg, Mississippi, August 24, 1886.


Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell arrived at Louisville about the
middle of November, with orders to relieve me, and I was
transferred for duty to the Department of the Missouri, and ordered
to report in person to Major-General H. W. Halleck at St. Louis.  I
accompanied General Buell to the camp at Nolin, where he reviewed
and inspected the camp and troops under the command of General A.
McD. McCook, and on our way back General Buell inspected the
regiment of Hazzard at Elizabethtown.  I then turned over my
command to him, and took my departure for St. Louis.

At the time I was so relieved I thought, of course, it was done in
fulfillment of Mr. Lincoln's promise to me, and as a necessary
result of my repeated demand for the fulfillment of that promise;
but I saw and felt, and was of course deeply moved to observe, the
manifest belief that there was more or less of truth in the rumor
that the cares, perplexities, and anxiety of the situation had
unbalanced my judgment and mind.  It was, doubtless, an incident
common to all civil wars, to which I could only submit with the
best grace possible, trusting to the future for an opportunity to
redeem my fortune and good name.  Of course I could not deny the
fact, and had to submit to all its painful consequences for months;
and, moreover, I could not hide from myself that many of the
officers and soldiers subsequently placed under my command looked
at me askance and with suspicion.  Indeed, it was not until the
following April that the battle of Shiloh gave me personally the
chance to redeem my good name.

On reaching St. Louis and reporting to General Halleck, I was
received kindly, and was shortly afterward (viz., November 23d)
sent up to Sedalia to inspect the camp there, and the troops
located along the road back to Jefferson City, and I was ordered to
assume command in a certain contingency.  I found General Steels at
Sedalia with his regiments scattered about loosely; and General
Pope at Otterville, twenty miles back, with no concert between
them.  The rebel general, Sterling Price, had his forces down about
Osceola and Warsaw.  I advised General Halleck to collect the whole
of his men into one camp on the La Mine River, near Georgetown, to
put them into brigades and divisions, so as to be ready to be
handled, and I gave some preliminary orders looking to that end.
But the newspapers kept harping on my insanity and paralyzed my
efforts.  In spite of myself, they tortured from me some words and
acts of imprudence.  General Halleck telegraphed me on November
26th: "Unless telegraph-lines are interrupted, make no movement
of troops without orders;" and on November 29th: "No forward
movement of troops on Osceola will be made; only strong
reconnoitring-parties will be sent out in the supposed direction of
the enemy; the bulk of the troops being held in position till more
reliable information is obtained."

About the same time I received the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI
November 28, 1881.
Brigadier-General SHERMAN, Sedalia:

Mrs. Sherman is here.  General Halleck is satisfied, from reports
of scouts received here, that no attack on Sedalia is intended.
You will therefore return to this city, and report your
observations on the condition of the troops you have examined.
Please telegraph when you will leave.

SCHUYLER HAMILTON, Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.


I accordingly returned to St. Louis, where I found Mrs. Sherman,
naturally and properly distressed at the continued and reiterated
reports of the newspapers of my insanity, and she had come from
Lancaster to see me.  This recall from Sedalia simply swelled the
cry.  It was alleged that I was recalled by reason of something
foolish I had done at Sedalia, though in fact I had done absolutely
nothing, except to recommend what was done immediately thereafter
on the advice of Colonel McPherson, on a subsequent inspection.
Seeing and realizing that my efforts were useless, I concluded to
ask for a twenty days' leave of absence, to accompany Mrs. Sherman
to our home in Lancaster, and to allow the storm to blow over
somewhat.  It also happened to be mid-winter, when, nothing was
doing; so Mrs. Sherman and I returned to Lancaster, where I was
born, and where I supposed I was better known and appreciated.

The newspapers kept up their game as though instigated by malice,
and chief among them was the Cincinnati Commercial, whose editor,
Halsted, was generally believed to be an honorable man.  P. B.
Ewing, Esq., being in Cincinnati, saw him and asked him why he, who
certainly knew better, would reiterate such a damaging slander.  He
answered, quite cavalierly, that it was one of the news-items of
the day, and he had to keep up with the time; but he would be most
happy to publish any correction I might make, as though I could
deny such a malicious piece of scandal affecting myself.  On the
12th of November I had occasion to write to General Halleck, and I
have a copy of his letter in answer:


ST. Louis, December 18, 1881.
Brigadier-General W. T. SHERMAN, Lancaster, Ohio.

My DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 12th was received a day or two ago,
but was mislaid for the moment among private papers, or I should
have answered it sooner.  The newspaper attacks are certainly
shameless and scandalous, but I cannot agree with you, that they
have us in their power "to destroy us as they please."  I certainly
get my share of abuse, but it will not disturb me.

Your movement of the troops was not countermanded by me because I
thought it an unwise one in itself, but because I was not then
ready for it.  I had better information of Price's movements than
you had, and I had no apprehension of an attack.  I intended to
concentrate the forces on that line, but I wished the movement
delayed until I could determine on a better position.

After receiving Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson's report, I made
precisely the location you had ordered.  I was desirous at the time
not to prevent the advance of Price by any movement on our part,
hoping that he would move on Lexington; but finding that he had
determined to remain at Osceola for some time at least, I made the
movement you proposed.  As you could not know my plans, you and
others may have misconstrued the reason of my countermanding your
orders....

I hope to see you well enough for duty soon.  Our organization goes
on slowly, but we will effect it in time.  Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK.


And subsequently, in a letter to Hon. Thomas Ewing, in answer to
some inquiries involving the same general subject, General Halleck
wrote as follows:

Hon. THOMAS  EWING, Lancaster, Ohio.

DEAR SIR: Your note of the 13th, and one of this date, from Mr.
Sherman, in relation to Brigadier-General Sherman's having being
relieved from command in Sedalia, in November last, are just
received.  General Sherman was not put in command at Sedalia; he
was authorized to assume it, and did so for a day or two.  He did
not know my plans, and his movement of troops did not accord with
them.  I therefore directed him to leave them as they were, and
report here the result of his inspection, for which purpose he had
been ordered there.

No telegram or dispatch of any kind was sent by me, or by any one
with my knowledge or authority, in relation to it.  After his
return here, I gave him a leave of absence of twenty days, for the
benefit of his health.  As I was then pressing General McClellan
for more officers, I deemed it necessary to explain why I did so.
I used these words: "I am satisfied that General Sherman's physical
and mental system is so completely broken by labor and care as to
render him, for the present, unfit for duty; perhaps a few weeks'
rest may restore him."  This was the only communication I made on
the subject.  On no occasion have I ever expressed an opinion that
his mind was affected otherwise than by over-exertion; to have said
so would have done him the greatest injustice.

After General Sherman returned from his short leave, I found that
his health was nearly restored, and I placed him temporarily in
command of the camp of instruction, numbering over fifteen thousand
men.  I then wrote to General McClellan that he would soon be able
to again take the field.  I gave General Sherman a copy of my
letter.  This is the total of my correspondence on the subject.  As
evidence that I have every confidence in General Sherman, I have
placed him in command of Western Kentucky--a command only second in
importance in this department.  As soon as divisions and columns
can be organized, I propose to send him into the field where he can
render most efficient service.  I have seen newspaper squibs,
charging him with being "crazy," etc.  This is the grossest
injustice; I do not, however, consider such attacks worthy of
notice.  The best answer is General Sherman's present position, and
the valuable services he is rendering to the country.  I have the
fullest confidence in him.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.


On returning to St. Louis, on the expiration of my leave of
absence, I found that General Halleck was beginning to move his
troops: one part, under General U. S. Grant, up the Tennessee
River; and another part, under General S. R. Curtis, in the
direction of Springfield, Missouri.  General Grant was then at
Paducah, and General Curtis was under orders for Rolls.  I was
ordered to take Curtis's place in command of the camp of
instruction, at Benton Barracks, on the ground back of North St.
Louis, now used as the Fair Grounds, by the following order:


[Special Order No. 87].

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI
St. Louis, December 23, 1861

[EXTRACT.]

Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, United States Volunteers, is
hereby assigned to the command of the camp of instruction and post
of Benton Barracks.  He will have every armed regiment and company
in his command ready for service at a moment's warning, and will
notify all concerned that, when marching orders are received, it is
expected that they will be instantly obeyed; no excuses for delay
will be admitted.  General Sherman will immediately report to these
headquarters what regiments and companies, at Benton Barracks, are
ready for the field.

By order of Major-General Halleck,

J. C. KELTEN, Assistant Adjutant-General.


I immediately assumed command, and found, in the building
constructed for the commanding officer, Brigadier-General Strong,
and the family of a captain of Iowa cavalry, with whom we boarded.
Major Curtis, son of General Curtis, was the adjutant-general, but
was soon relieved by Captain J. H. Hammond, who was appointed
assistant adjutant-general, and assigned to duty with me.

Brigadier-General Hurlbut was also there, and about a dozen
regiments of infantry and cavalry.  I at once gave all matters
pertaining to the post my personal attention, got the regiments in
as good order as possible, kept up communication with General
Halleck's headquarters by telegraph, and, when orders came for the
movement of any regiment or detachment, it moved instantly.  The
winter was very wet, and the ground badly drained.  The quarters
had been erected by General Fremont, under contract; they were mere
shells, but well arranged for a camp, embracing the Fair Grounds,
and some forty acres of flat ground west of it.  I instituted
drills, and was specially ordered by General Halleck to watch
Generals Hurlbut and Strong, and report as to their fitness for
their commissions as brigadier-generals.  I had known Hurlbut as a
young lawyer, in Charleston, South Carolina, before the Mexican
War, at which time he took a special interest in military matters,
and I found him far above the average in the knowledge of
regimental and brigade drill, and so reported.  General Strong had
been a merchant, and he told me that he never professed to be a
soldier, but had been urged on the Secretary of War for the
commission of a brigadier-general, with the expectation of be
coming quartermaster or commissary-general.  He was a good,
kind-hearted gentleman, boiling over with patriotism and zeal.  I
advised him what to read and study, was considerably amused at his
receiving instruction from a young lieutenant who knew the company
and battalion drill, and could hear him practise in his room the
words of command, and tone of voice, "Break from the right, to
march to the left!"  "Battalion, halt!"  "Forward into line!" etc.
Of course I made a favorable report in his case.  Among the
infantry and cavalry colonels were some who afterward rose to
distinction--David Stuart, Gordon Granger, Bussey, etc., etc.

Though it was mid-winter, General Halleck was pushing his
preparations most vigorously, and surely he brought order out of
chaos in St. Louis with commendable energy.  I remember, one night,
sitting in his room, on the second floor of the Planters' House,
with him and General Cullum, his chief of staff, talking
of things generally, and the subject then was of the much-talked-of
"advance," as soon as the season would permit.  Most people urged
the movement down the Mississippi River; but Generals Polk and
Pillow had a large rebel force, with heavy guns in a very strong
position, at Columbus, Kentucky, about eighteen miles below Cairo.
Commodore Foote had his gunboat fleet at Cairo; and General U. S.
Grant, who commanded the district, was collecting a large force at
Paducah, Cairo, and Bird's Point.  General Halleck had a map on his
table, with a large pencil in his hand, and asked, "where is the
rebel line?"  Cullum drew the pencil through Bowling Green, Forts
Donelson and Henry, and Columbus, Kentucky.  "That is their line,"
said Halleck.  "Now, where is the proper place to break it?"  And
either Cullum or I said, "Naturally the centre."  Halleck drew a
line perpendicular to the other, near its middle, and it coincided
nearly with the general course of the Tennessee River; and he said,
"That's the true line of operations."  This occurred more than a
month before General Grant began the movement, and, as he was
subject to General Halleck's orders, I have always given Halleck
the full credit for that movement, which was skillful, successful,
and extremely rich in military results; indeed, it was the first
real success on our side in the civil war.  The movement up the
Tennessee began about the 1st of February, and Fort Henry was
captured by the joint action of the navy under Commodore Foote, and
the land forces under General Grant, on the 6th of February, 1862.
About the same time, General S. R. Curtis had moved forward from
Rolls, and, on the 8th of March, defeated the rebels under
McCulloch, Van Dom, and Price, at Pea Ridge.

As soon as Fort Henry fell, General Grant marched straight across
to Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, invested the place, and,
as soon as the gunboats had come round from the Tennessee, and had
bombarded the water-front, he assaulted; whereupon Buckner
surrendered the garrison of twelve thousand men; Pillow and
ex-Secretary of War General Floyd having personally escaped across
the river at night, occasioning a good deal of fun and criticism at
their expense.

Before the fall of Donelson, but after that of Henry, I received,
at Benton Barracks, the following orders:

HEADQUARTERS THE DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI
St. Louis, February,13, 1862

Brigadier-General SHERMAN, Benton Barracks:

You will immediately repair to Paducah, Kentucky, and assume
command of that post.  Brigadier-General Hurlbut will accompany
you.  The command of Benton Barracks will be turned over to General
Strong.

H. W. HALECK,  Major-General.


I started for Paducah the same day, and think that General Cullum
went with me to Cairo; General Halleck's purpose being to push
forward the operations up the Tennessee River with unusual vigor.
On reaching Paducah, I found this dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS THE DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI
St. Louis, February 15, 1862

Brigadier-General SHERMAN, Paducah, Kentucky:

Send General Grant every thing you can spare from Paducah and Smith
and also General Hurlbut.

Bowling Green has been evacuated entirely.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.


The next day brought us news of the surrender of Buckner, and
probably at no time during the war did we all feel so heavy a
weight raised from our breasts, or so thankful for a most fruitful
series of victories.  They at once gave Generals Halleck, Grant,
and C. F. Smith, great fame.  Of course, the rebels let go their
whole line, and fell back on Nashville and Island No. Ten, and to
the Memphis & Charleston Railroad.  Everybody was anxious to help.
Boats passed up and down constantly, and very soon arrived the
rebel prisoners from Donelson.  I saw General Buckner on the boat,
he seemed self-sufficient, and thought their loss was not really so
serious to their cause as we did.

About this time another force of twenty or twenty-five thousand men
was collected on the west bank of the Mississippi, above Cairo,
under the command of Major-General John Pope, designed to become
the "Army of the Mississippi," and to operate, in conjunction with
the navy, down the river against the enemy's left flank, which had
held the strong post of Columbus, Kentucky, but which, on the fall
of Fort Donelson, had fallen back to New Madrid and Island No. 10.





CHAPTER X.

BATTLE of SHILOH.

MARCH AND APRIL, 1862.


By the end of February, 1862, Major-General Halleck commanded all
the armies in the valley of the Mississippi, from his headquarters
in St: Louis.  These were, the Army of the Ohio, Major-General
Buell, in Kentucky; the Army of the Tennessee, Major-General Grant,
at Forts Henry and Donelson; the Army of the Mississippi,
Major-General Pope; and that of General S. R. Curtis, in Southwest
Missouri.  He posted his chief of staff, General Cullum, at Cairo,
and me at Paducah, chiefly to expedite and facilitate the important
operations then in progress up the Tennessee, and Cumberland
Rivers.

Fort Donelson had surrendered to General Grant on the 16th of
February, and there must have been a good deal of confusion
resulting from the necessary care of the wounded, and disposition
of prisoners, common to all such occasions, and there was a real
difficulty in communicating between St. Louis and Fort Donelson.

General Buell had also followed up the rebel army, which had
retreated hastily from Bowling Green to and through Nashville, a
city of so much importance to the South, that it was at one time
proposed as its capital.  Both Generals Grant and Buell looked to
its capture as an event of great importance.  On the 21st General
Grant sent General Smith with his division to Clarksville, fifty
miles above Donelson, toward Nashville, and on the 27th went
himself to Nashville to meet and confer with General Buell, but
returned to Donelson the next day.

Meantime, General Halleck at St. Louis must have felt that his
armies were getting away from him, and began to send dispatches to
me at Paducah, to be forwarded by boat, or by a rickety
telegraph-line up to Fort Henry, which lay entirely in a hostile
country, and was consequently always out of repair.  On the 1st of
March I received the following dispatch, and forwarded it to
General Grant, both by the telegraph and boat:

To General GRANT, Fort Henry

Transports will be sent you as soon as possible, to move your
column up the Tennessee River.  The main object of this expedition
will be to destroy the railroad-bridge over Bear Creek, near
Eastport, Mississippi; and also the railroad connections at
Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt.  It is thought best that these
objects be attempted in the order named.  Strong detachments of
cavalry and light artillery, supported by infantry, may by rapid
movements reach these points from the river, without any serious
opposition.

Avoid any general engagements with strong forces.  It will be
better to retreat than to risk a general battle.  This should be
strongly impressed on the officers sent with expeditions from the
river.  General C. F. Smith or some very discreet officer should be
selected for such commands.  Having accomplished these objects, or
such of them as may be practicable, you will return to Danville,
and move on Paris.

Perhaps the troops sent to Jackson and Humbolt can reach Paris by
land as easily as to return to the transports.  This must depend on
the character of the roads and the position of the enemy.  All
telegraphic lines which can be reached must be cut.  The gunboats
will accompany the transports for their protection.  Any loyal
Tennesseeans who desire it, may be enlisted and supplied with arms.
Competent officers should be left to command Forts Henry and
Donelson in your absence.  I have indicated in general terms the
object of this.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.


Again on the 2d:

Cairo, March 1, 1862

To General GRANT:

General Halleck, February 25th, telegraphs me: "General Grant will
send no more forces to Clarksville.  General Smith's division will
come to Fort Henry, or a point higher up on the Tennessee River;
transports will also be collected at Paducah.  Two gunboats in
Tennessee River with Grant.  General Grant will immediately have
small garrisons detailed for Forts Henry and Donelson, and all
other forces made ready for the field"

From your letter of the 28th, I learn you were at Fort Donelson,
and General Smith at Nashville, from which I infer you could not
have received orders.  Halleck's telegram of last night says: "Who
sent Smith's division to Nashville?  I ordered it across to the
Tennessee, where they are wanted immediately.  Order them back.
Send all spare transports up Tennessee to General Grant."
Evidently the general supposes you to be on the Tennessee.  I am
sending all the transports I can find for you, reporting to General
Sherman for orders to go up the Cumberland for you, or, if you
march across to Fort Henry, then to send them up the Tennessee.

G. W. CULLUM, Brigadier-General.


On the 4th came this dispatch:

To Major-General U. S. GRANT

You will place Major-General C. F. Smith in command of expedition,
and remain yourself at Fort Henry.  Why do you not obey my orders
to report strength and positions of your command?

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.


Halleck was evidently working himself into a passion, but he was
too far from the seat of war to make due allowance for the actual
state of facts.  General Grant had done so much, that General
Halleck should have been patient.  Meantime, at Paducah, I was busy
sending boats in every direction--some under the orders of General
Halleck, others of General Cullum; others for General Grant, and
still others for General Buell at Nashville; and at the same time I
was organizing out of the new troops that were arriving at Paducah
a division for myself when allowed to take the field, which I had
been promised by General Halleck.  His purpose was evidently to
operate up the Tennessee River, to break up Bear Creek Bridge and
the railroad communications between the Mississippi and Tennessee
Rivers, and no doubt he was provoked that Generals Grant and Smith
had turned aside to Nashville.  In the mean time several of the
gunboats, under Captain Phelps, United States Navy, had gone up the
Tennessee as far as Florence, and on their return had reported a
strong Union feeling among the people along the river.  On the 10th
of March, having received the necessary orders from General
Halleck, I embarked my division at Paducah.  It was composed of
four brigades.  The First, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, was
composed of the Fortieth Illinois, Forty-sixth Ohio, and Morton's
Indiana Battery, on the boats Sallie List, Golden Gate, J. B.
Adams, and Lancaster.

The Second Brigade, Colonel D. Stuart, was composed of the
Fifty-fifth Illinois, Seventy-first Ohio, and Fifty-fourth Ohio;
embarked on the Hannibal, Universe, Hazel Dell, Cheeseman, and
Prairie Rose.

The Third Brigade, Colonel Hildebrand, was composed of the
Seventy-seventh Ohio, Fifty-seventh Ohio, and Fifty-third Ohio;
embarked on the Poland, Anglo-Saxon, Ohio No. Three, and
Continental.

The Fourth Brigade, Colonel Buckland, was composed of the
Seventy-second Ohio, Forty-eighth Ohio, and Seventieth Ohio;
embarked on the Empress, Baltic, Shenango, and Marrengo.

We steamed up to Fort Henry, the river being high and in splendid
order.  There I reported in person to General C. F. Smith, and by
him was ordered a few miles above, to the remains of the burned
railroad bridge, to await the rendezvous of the rest of his army.
I had my headquarters on the Continental.

Among my colonels I had a strange character--Thomas Worthington,
colonel of the Forty-sixth Ohio.  He was a graduate of West Point,
of the class of 1827; was, therefore, older than General Halleck,
General Grant, or myself, and claimed to know more of war than all
of us put together.  In ascending the river he did not keep his
place in the column, but pushed on and reached Savannah a day
before the rest of my division.  When I reached that place, I found
that Worthington had landed his regiment, and was flying about
giving orders, as though he were commander-in-chief.  I made him
get back to his boat, and gave him to understand that he must
thereafter keep his place.  General C. F. Smith arrived about the
13th of March, with a large fleet of boats, containing Hurlbut's
division, Lew. Wallace's division, and that of himself, then
commanded by Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace.

General Smith sent for me to meet him on his boat, and ordered me
to push on under escort of the two gunboats, Lexington and Tyler,
commanded by Captains Gwin and Shirk, United States Navy.  I was to
land at some point below Eastport, and make a break of the Memphis
& Charleston Railroad, between Tuscumbia and Corinth.  General
Smith was quite unwell, and was suffering from his leg, which was
swollen and very sore, from a mere abrasion in stepping
into a small boat.  This actually mortified, and resulted in his
death about a month after, viz., April 25, 1862.  He was
adjutant of the Military Academy during the early part of my
career there, and afterward commandant of cadets.  He was a very
handsome and soldierly man, of great experience, and at Donelson
had acted with so much personal bravery that to him many attributed
the success of the assault.

I immediately steamed up the Tennessee River, following the two
gunboats, and, in passing Pittsburg Landing, was told by Captain
Gwin that, on his former trip up the river, he had found a rebel
regiment of cavalry posted there, and that it was the usual
landing-place for the people about Corinth, distant thirty miles.
I sent word back to General Smith that, if we were detained up the
river, he ought to post some troops at Pittsburg Landing.  We went
on up the river cautiously, till we saw Eastport and Chickasaw,
both of which were occupied by rebel batteries and a small rebel
force of infantry.

We then dropped back quietly to the mouth of Yellow River, a few
miles below, whence led a road to Burnsville, a place on the
Memphis & Charleston road, where were the company's repair-shops.
We at once commenced disembarking the command: first the cavalry,
which started at once for Burnsville, with orders to tear up the
railroad-track, and burn the depots, shops, etc; and I followed
with the infantry and artillery as fast as they were disembarked.
It was raining very hard at the time.  Daylight found us about six
miles out, where we met the cavalry returning.  They had made
numerous attempts to cross the streams, which had become so swollen
that mere brooks covered the whole bottom; and my aide-de-camp,
Sanger, whom I had dispatched with the cavalry, reported the loss,
by drowning, of several of the men.  The rain was pouring in
torrents, and reports from the rear came that the river was rising
very fast, and that, unless we got back to our boats soon, the
bottom would be simply impassable.  There was no alternative but to
regain our boats; and even this was so difficult, that we had to
unharness the artillery-horses, and drag the guns under water
through the bayous, to reach the bank of the river.  Once more
embarked, I concluded to drop down to Pittsburg Landing, and to
make the attempt from there.  During the night of the 14th, we
dropped down to Pittsburg Landing, where I found Hurlbut's division
in boats.  Leaving my command there, I steamed down to Savannah,
and reported to General Smith in person, who saw in the flooded
Tennessee the full truth of my report; and he then instructed me to
disembark my own division, and that of General Hurlbut, at
Pittsburg Landing; to take positions well back, and to leave room
for his whole army; telling me that he would soon come up in
person, and move out in force to make the lodgment on the railroad,
contemplated by General Halleck's orders.

Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, of General C. F. Smith's, or rather
General Halleck's, staff, returned with me, and on the 16th of
March we disembarked and marched out about ten miles toward
Corinth, to a place called Monterey or Pea Ridge, where the rebels
had a cavalry regiment, which of course decamped on our approach,
but from the people we learned that trains were bringing large
masses of men from every direction into Corinth.  McPherson and I
reconnoitred the ground well, and then returned to our boats.  On
the 18th, Hurlbut disembarked his division and took post about a
mile and a half out, near where the roads branched, one leading to
Corinth and the other toward Hamburg.  On the 19th I disembarked my
division, and took post about three miles back, three of the
brigades covering the roads to Purdy and Corinth, and the other
brigade (Stuart's) temporarily at a place on the Hamburg Road, near
Lick Creek Ford, where the Bark Road came into the Hamburg Road.
Within a few days, Prentiss's division arrived and camped on my
left, and afterward McClernand's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions,
which formed a line to our rear.  Lew Wallace's division remained
on the north side of Snake Creek, on a road leading from Savannah
or Cramp's Landing to Purdy.

General C. F. Smith remained back at Savannah, in chief command,
and I was only responsible for my own division.  I kept pickets
well out on the roads, and made myself familiar with all the ground
inside and outside my lines.  My personal staff was composed of
Captain J. H. Hammond, assistant adjutant-general; Surgeons
Hartshorn and L'Hommedieu; Lieutenant Colonels Hascall and
Sanger, inspector-generals; Lieutenants McCoy and John Taylor,
aides-de-camp.  We were all conscious that the enemy was collecting
at Corinth, but in what force we could not know, nor did we know
what was going on behind us.  On the 17th of March, General U. S.
Grant was restored to the command of all the troops up the
Tennessee River, by reason of General Smith's extreme illness, and
because he had explained to General Halleck satisfactorily his
conduct after Donelson; and he too made his headquarters at
Savannah, but frequently visited our camps.  I always acted on the
supposition that we were an invading army; that our purpose was to
move forward in force, make a lodgment on the Memphis & Charleston
road, and thus repeat the grand tactics of Fort Donelson, by
separating the rebels in the interior from those at Memphis and on
the Mississippi River.  We did not fortify our camps against an
attack, because we had no orders to do so, and because such a
course would have made our raw men timid.  The position was
naturally strong, with Snake Creek on our right, a deep, bold
stream, with a confluent (Owl Creek) to our right front; and Lick
Creek, with a similar confluent, on our left, thus narrowing the
space over which we could be attacked to about a mile and a half or
two miles.

At a later period of the war, we could have rendered this position
impregnable in one night, but at this time we did not do it, and it
may be it is well we did not.  From about the 1st of April we were
conscious that the rebel cavalry in our front was getting bolder
and more saucy; and on Friday, the 4th of April, it dashed down and
carried off one of our picket-guards, composed of an officer and
seven men, posted a couple of miles out on the Corinth road.
Colonel Buckland sent a company to its relief, then followed
himself with a regiment, and, fearing lest he might be worsted, I
called out his whole brigade and followed some four or five miles,
when the cavalry in advance encountered artillery.  I then, after
dark, drew back to our lines, and reported the fact by letter to
General Grant, at Savannah; but thus far we had not positively
detected the presence of infantry, for cavalry regiments generally
had a couple of guns along, and I supposed the guns that opened on
the on the evening of Friday, April 4th, belonged to the cavalry
that was hovering along our whole front.

Saturday passed in our camps without any unusual event, the weather
being wet and mild, and the roads back to the steamboat landing
being heavy with mud; but on Sunday morning, the 6th, early, there
was a good deal of picket-firing, and I got breakfast, rode out
along my lines, and, about four hundred yards to the front of
Appler's regiment, received from some bushes in a ravine to the
left front a volley which killed my orderly, Holliday.  About the
same time I saw the rebel lines of battle in front coming down on
us as far as the eye could reach.  All my troops were in line of
battle, ready, and the ground was favorable to us.  I gave the
necessary orders to the battery (Waterhouse's) attached to
Hildebrand's brigade, and cautioned the men to reserve their fire
till the rebels had crossed the ravine of Owl Creek, and had begun
the ascent; also, sent staff-officers to notify Generals McClernand
and Prentiss of the coming blow.  Indeed, McClernand had already
sent three regiments to the support of my left flank, and they were
in position when the onset came.

In a few minutes the battle of "Shiloh" began with extreme fury,
and lasted two days.  Its history has been well given, and it has
been made the subject of a great deal of controversy.  Hildebrand's
brigade was soon knocked to pieces, but Buckland's and McDowell's
kept their organization throughout.  Stuart's was driven back to
the river, and did not join me in person till the second day of the
battle.  I think my several reports of that battle are condensed
and good, made on the spot, when all the names and facts were fresh
in my memory, and are herewith given entire:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION
PITTSBURG LANDING, March 17, 1862

Captain Wm.  McMICHAEL, Assistant Adjutant-General to General C. F
SMITH, Savannah, Tennessee.

SIR: Last night I dispatched a party of cavalry, at 6 p.m., under
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Heath, Fifth Ohio Cavalry, for a
strong reconnoissance, if possible, to be converted into an attack
upon the Memphis road.  The command got off punctually, followed at
twelve o'clock at night by the First Brigade of my division,
commanded by Colonel McDowell, the other brigades to follow in
order.

About one at night the cavalry returned, reporting the road
occupied in force by the enemy, with whose advance-guard they
skirmished, driving them back--about a mile, taking two prisoners,
and having their chief guide, Thomas Maxwell, Esq., and three men
of the Fourth Illinois wounded.

Inclosed please find the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Heath; also a
copy of his instructions, and the order of march.  As soon as the
cavalry returned, I saw that an attempt on the road was frustrated,
and accordingly have placed McDowell's brigade to our right front,
guarding the pass of Snake Creek; Stuart's brigade to the left
front, to watch the pass of Lick Creek; and I shall this morning
move directly out on the Corinth road, about eight miles to or
toward Pea Ridge, which is a key-point to the southwest.

General Hurlbut's division will be landed to-day, and the artillery
and infantry disposed so as to defend Pittsburg, leaving my
division entire for any movement by land or water.

As near as I can learn, there are five regiments of rebel infantry
at Purdy; at Corinth, and distributed along the railroad to Inca,
are probably thirty thousand men; but my information from prisoners
is very indistinct.  Every road and path is occupied by the enemy's
cavalry, whose orders seem to be to fire a volley, retire, again
fire and retire.  The force on the Purdy road attacked and driven
by Major Bowman yesterday, was about sixty strong.  That
encountered last night on the Corinth road was about five companies
of Tennessee cavalry, sent from Purdy about 2 p.m.  yesterday.

I hear there is a force of two regiments on Pea Ridge, at the point
where the Purdy and Corinth roads come together.

I am satisfied we cannot reach the Memphis & Charleston road
without a considerable engagement, which is prohibited by General
Halleck's instructions, so that I will be governed by your orders
of yesterday, to occupy Pittsburg strongly, extend the pickets so
as to include a semicircle of three miles, and push a strong
reconnoissance as far out as Lick Creek and Pea Ridge.

I will send down a good many boats to-day, to be employed as you
may direct; and would be obliged if you would send a couple of
thousand sacks of corn, as much hay as you can possibly spare, and,
if possible, a barge of coal.

I will send a steamboat under care of the gunboat, to collect corn
from cribs on the river-bank.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding First Division.


HEADQUARTERS, STEAMBOAT CONTINENTAL,
Pittsburg, March 18, 1882.

Captain RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General
to General GRANT.

SIR: The division surgeon having placed some one hundred or more
sick on board the Fanny Bullitt, I have permitted her to take them
to Savannah.  There is neither house nor building of any kind that
can be used for a hospital here.

I hope to receive an order to establish floating hospitals, but in
the mean time, by the advise of the surgeon, allow these sick men
to leave.  Let me hope that it will meet your approbation.

The order for debarkation came while General Sherman was absent
with three brigades, and no men are left to move the effects of
these brigades.

The landing, too, is small, with scarcely any chance to increase
it; therefore there is a great accumulation of boats.  Colonel
McArthur has arrived, and is now cutting a landing for himself.

General Sherman will return this evening.  I am obliged to
transgress, and write myself in the mean time,

Respectfully your obedient servant,

J. H. HAMMOND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

P. S--4 p.m.--Just back; have been half-way to Corinth and to
Purdy.  All right.  Have just read this letter, and approve all but
floating hospitals; regimental surgeons can take care of all sick,
except chronic cases, which can always be sent down to Paducah.

Magnificent plain for camping and drilling, and a military point of
great strength.  The enemy has felt us twice, at great loss and
demoralization; will report at length this evening; am now much
worn out.

W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General.



HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION
Pittsburg Landing, March 19, 1862.

Captain RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General
to General GRANT, Savannah, Tennessee.

SIR: I have just returned from an extensive reconnoissance toward
Corinth and Purdy, and am strongly impressed with the importance of
this position, both for its land advantages and its strategic
position.  The ground itself admits of easy defense by a small
command, and yet affords admirable camping-ground for a hundred
thousand men.  I will as soon as possible make or cause to be made
a topographical sketch of the position.  The only drawback is that,
at this stage of water, the space for landing is contracted too
much for the immense fleet now here discharging.

I will push the loading and unloading of boats, but suggest that
you send at once (Captain Dodd, if possible) the best quartermaster
you can, that he may control and organize this whole matter.  I
have a good commissary, and will keep as few provisions afloat as
possible.  Yours, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS SHERMAN'S DIVISION
Camp Shiloh, near Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, April 2, 1862

Captain J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General
to General GRANT.

SIR: In obedience to General Grant's instructions of March 31st,
with one section of Captain Muench's Minnesota Battery, two
twelve-pound howitzers, a detachment of Fifth Ohio Cavalry of one
hundred and fifty men, under Major Ricker, and two battalions of
infantry from the Fifty-seventh and Seventy-seventh Ohio, under the
command of Colonels Hildebrand and Mungen, I marched to the river,
and embarked on the steamers Empress and Tecumseh.  The gunboat
Cairo did not arrive at Pittsburg, until after midnight, and at 6
p.m.  Captain Bryant, commanding the gunboat, notified me that he
was ready to proceed up the river.  I followed, keeping the
transports within about three hundred yards of the gunboat.  About
1 p.m., the Cairo commenced shelling the battery above the mouth of
Indian Creek, but elicited no reply.  She proceeded up the river
steadily and cautiously, followed close by the Tyler and Lexington,
all throwing shells at the points where, on former visits of the
gunboats, enemy's batteries were found.  In this order all
followed, till it was demonstrated that all the enemy's batteries,
including that at Chickasaw, were abandoned.

I ordered the battalion of infantry under Colonel Hildebrand to
disembark at Eastport, and with the other battalion proceeded to
Chickasaw and landed.  The battery at this point had evidently been
abandoned some time, and consisted of the remains of an old Indian
mound, partly washed away by the river, which had been fashioned
into a two-gun battery, with a small magazine.  The ground to its
rear had evidently been overflowed during the late freshet, and led
to the removal of the guns to Eastport, where the batteries were on
high, elevated ground, accessible at all seasons from the country
to the rear.

Upon personal inspection, I attach little importance to Chickasaw
as a military position.  The people, who had fled during the
approach of the gunboats, returned to the village, and said the
place had been occupied by one Tennessee regiment and a battery of
artillery from Pensacola.  After remaining at Chickasaw some
hours, all the boats dropped back to Eastport, not more than a mile
below, and landed there.  Eastport Landing during the late freshet
must have been about twelve feet under water, but at the present
stage the landing is the best I have seen on the Tennessee River.

The levee is clear of trees or snags, and a hundred boats could
land there without confusion.

The soil is of sand and gravel, and very firm.  The road back is
hard, and at a distance of about four hundred yards from the water
begin the gravel hills of the country.  The infantry scouts sent
out by Colonel Hildebrand found the enemy's cavalry mounted, and
watching the Inca road, about two miles back of Eastport.  The
distance to Inca is only eight miles, and Inca is the nearest point
and has the best road by which the Charleston & Memphis Railroad
can be reached.  I could obtain no certain information as to the
strength of the enemy there, but am satisfied that it would have
been folly to have attempted it with my command.  Our object being
to dislodge the enemy from the batteries recently erected near
Eastport, and this being attained, I have returned, and report the
river to be clear to and beyond Chickasaw.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Brigadier-General commanding Division.



HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION
CAMP SHILOH, April 5, 1862.

Captain J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General, District of
Western Tennessee.

SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday, about 3 p.m., the
lieutenant commanding and seven men of the advance pickets
imprudently advanced from their posts and were captured.  I ordered
Major Ricker, of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, to proceed rapidly to the
picket-station, ascertain the truth, and act according to
circumstances.  He reached the station, found the pickets had been
captured as reported, and that a company of infantry sent by the
brigade commander had gone forward in pursuit of some cavalry.  He
rapidly advanced some two miles, and found them engaged, charged
the enemy, and drove them along the Ridge road, till he
met and received three discharges of artillery, when he very
properly wheeled under cover, and returned till he met me.

As soon as I heard artillery, I advanced with two regiments of
infantry, and took position, and remained until the scattered
companies of infantry and cavalry had returned.  This was after
night.

I infer that the enemy is in some considerable force at Pea Ridge,
that yesterday morning they crossed a brigade of two regiments
of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one battery of
field-artillery, to the ridge on which the Corinth road lies.  They
halted the infantry and artillery at a point abort five miles in my
front, sent a detachment to the lane of General Meeks, on the north
of Owl Creek, and the cavalry down toward our camp.  This cavalry
captured a part of our advance pickets, and afterward engaged the
two companies of Colonel Buckland's regiment, as described by him
in his report herewith inclosed.  Our cavalry drove them back upon
their artillery and Infantry, killing many, and bringing off ten
prisoners, all of the First Alabama Cavalry, whom I send to you.

We lost of the pickets one first-lieutenant and seven men of the
Ohio Seventieth Infantry (list inclosed); one major, one
lieutenant, and one private of the Seventy-second Ohio, taken
prisoners; eight privates wounded (names in full, embraced in
report of Colonel Buckland, inclosed herewith).

We took ten prisoners, and left two rebels wounded and many killed
on the field.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding Division.



HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION
Camp Shiloh, April 10, 1862.

Captain J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General
to General GRANT.

SIR: I had the honor to report that, on Friday the 4th inst., the
enemy's cavalry drove in our pickets, posted about a mile and a
half in advance of my centre, on the main Corinth road, capturing
one first-lieutenant and seven men; that I caused a pursuit by the
cavalry of my division, driving them back about five miles, and
killing many.  On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was again very bold,
coming well down to our front; yet I did not believe they designed
any thing but a strong demonstration.  On Sunday morning early, the
6th inst., the enemy drove our advance-guard back on the main body,
when I ordered under arms all my division, and sent word to General
McClernand, asking him to support my left; to General Prentiss,
giving him notice that the enemy was in our front in force, and to
General Hurlbut, asking him to support General Prentiss.  At that
time--7 a.m.--my division was arranged as follows:

First Brigade, composed of the Sixth Iowa, Colonel J. A. McDowell;

Fortieth Illinois, Colonel Hicks; Forty-sixth Ohio, Colonel
Worthington; and the Morton battery, Captain Behr, on the extreme
right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road over Owl Creek.

Second Brigade, composed of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, Colonel D.
Stuart; the Fifty-fourth Ohio, Colonel T. Kilby Smith; and the
Seventy-first Ohio, Colonel Mason, on the extreme left, guarding
the ford over Lick Creek.

Third Brigade, composed of the Seventy-seventh Ohio, Colonel
Hildebrand; the Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel Appler; and the
Fifty-seventh Ohio, Colonel Mungen, on the left of the Corinth
road, its right resting on Shiloh meeting-house.

Fourth Brigade, composed of the Seventy-second Ohio, Colonel
Buckland; the Forty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Sullivan; and the
Seventieth Ohio, Colonel Cookerill, on the right of the Corinth
road, its left resting on Shiloh meeting-house.

Two batteries of artillery--Taylor's and Waterhouse's--were posted,
the former at Shiloh, and the latter on a ridge to the left, with a
front-fire over open ground between Mungen's and Appler's
regiments.  The cavalry, eight companies of the Fourth Illinois,
under Colonel Dickey, were posted in a large open field to the left
and rear of Shiloh meeting-house, which I regarded as the centre of
my position.

Shortly after 7 a.m., with my entire staff, I rode along a portion
of our front, and when in the open field before Appler's regiment,
the enemy's pickets opened a brisk fire upon my party, killing my
orderly, Thomas D. Holliday, of Company H, Second Illinois Cavalry.
The fire came from the bushes which line a small stream that rises
in the field in front of Appler's camp, and flows to the north
along my whole front.

This valley afforded the enemy partial cover; but our men were so
posted as to have a good fire at them as they crossed the valley
and ascended the rising ground on our side.

About 8 a.m.  I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of
infantry to our left front in the woods beyond the small stream
alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy
designed a determined attack on our whole camp.

All the regiments of my division were then in line of battle at
their proper posts.  I rode to Colonel Appler, and ordered him to
hold his ground at all hazards, as he held the left flank of our
first line of battle, and I informed him that he had a good battery
on his right, and strong support to his rear.  General McClernand
had promptly and energetically responded to my request, and had
sent me three regiments which were posted to protect Waterhouse's
battery and the left flank of my line.

The battle opened by the enemy's battery, in the woods to our
front, throwing shells into our camp.  Taylor's and Waterhouse's
batteries promptly responded, and I then observed heavy battalions
of infantry passing obliquely to the left, across the open field in
Appler's front; also, other columns advancing directly upon my
division.  Our infantry and artillery opened along the whole line,
and the battle became general.  Other heavy masses of the enemy's
forces kept passing across the field to our left, and directing
their course on General Prentiss.  I saw at once that the enemy
designed to pass my left flank, and fall upon Generals McClernand
and Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with the
Tennessee River, and about two miles back from it.  Very soon the
sound of artillery and musketry announced that General Prentiss was
engaged; and about 9 A. M. I judged that he was falling back.
About this time Appler's regiment broke in disorder, followed by
Mungen's regiment, and the enemy pressed forward on Waterhouse's
battery thereby exposed.

The three Illinois regiments in immediate support of this battery
stood for some time; but the enemy's advance was so vigorous, and
the fire so severe, that when Colonel Raith, of the Forty-third
Illinois, received a severe wound and fell from his horse, his
regiment and the others manifested disorder, and the enemy got
possession of three guns of this (Waterhouse's) battery.  Although
our left was thus turned, and the enemy was pressing our whole
line, I deemed Shiloh so important, that I remained by it and
renewed my orders to Colonels McDowell and Buckland to hold their
ground; and we did hold these positions until about 10 a.m., when
the enemy had got his artillery to the rear of our left flank and
some change became absolutely necessary.  Two regiments of
Hildebrand's brigade--Appler's and Mungen's--had already
disappeared to the rear, and Hildebrand's own regiment was in
disorder.  I therefore gave orders for Taylor's battery--still at
Shiloh--to fall back as far as the Purdy and Hamburg road, and for
McDowell and Buckland to adopt that road as their new line.  I rode
across the angle and met Behr's battery at the cross-roads, and
ordered it immediately to come into battery, action right.  Captain
Behr gave the order, but he was almost immediately shot from his
horse, when drivers and gunners fled in disorder, carrying off the
caissons, and abandoning five out of six guns, without firing a
shot.  The enemy pressed on, gaining this battery, and we were
again forced to choose a new line of defense.  Hildebrand's brigade
had substantially disappeared from the field, though he himself
bravely remained.  McDowell's and Buckland's brigades maintained
their organizations, and were conducted by my aides, so as to join
on General McClernand's right, thus abandoning my original camps
and line.  This was about 10 1/2 a.m., at which time the enemy had
made a furious attack on General McClernand's whole front.  He
straggled most determinedly, but, finding him pressed, I moved
McDowell's brigade directly against the left flank of the enemy,
forced him back some distance, and then directed the men to avail
themselves of every cover-trees, fallen timber, and a wooded valley
to our right.  We held this position for four long hours, sometimes
gaining and at others losing ground; General McClernand and myself
acting in perfect concert, and struggling to maintain this line.
While we were so hard pressed, two Iowa regiments approached from
the rear, but could not be brought up to the severe fire that was
raging in our front, and General Grant, who visited us on that
ground, will remember our situation about 3 p.m.; but about 4 p.m.
it was evident that Hurlbut's line had been driven back to the
river; and knowing that General Lew Wallace was coming with
reinforcements from Cramp's Landing, General McClernand and I, on
consultation, selected a new line of defense, with its right
covering a bridge by which General Wallace had to approach.  We
fell back as well as we could, gathering in addition to our own
such scattered forces as we could find, and formed the new line.

During this change the enemy's cavalry charged us, but were
handsomely repulsed by the Twenty-ninth Illinois Regiment.  The
Fifth Ohio Battery, which had come up, rendered good service in
holding the enemy in check for some time, and Major Taylor also
came up with another battery and got into position, just in time to
get a good flank-fire upon the enemy's column, as he pressed on
General McClernand's right, checking his advance; when General
McClernand's division made a fine charge on the enemy and drove him
back into the ravines to our front and right.  I had a clear field,
about two hundred yards wide, in my immediate front, and contented
myself with keeping the enemy's infantry at that distance during
the rest of the day.  In this position we rested for the night.

My command had become decidedly of a mixed character.  Buckland's
brigade was the only one that retained its organization.  Colonel
Hildebrand was personally there, but his brigade was not.  Colonel
McDowell had been severely injured by a fall off his horse, and had
gone to the river, and the three regiments of his brigade were not
in line.  The Thirteenth Missouri, Colonel Crafts J. Wright, had
reported to me on the field, and fought well, retaining its
regimental organization; and it formed a part of my line during
Sunday night and all Monday.  Other fragments of regiments and
companies had also fallen into my division, and acted with it
during the remainder of the battle.  General Grant and Buell
visited me in our bivouac that evening, and from them I learned the
situation of affairs on other parts of the field.  General Wallace
arrived from Crump's Landing shortly after dark, and formed his
line to my right rear.  It rained hard during the night, but our
men were in good spirits, lay on their arms, being satisfied with
such bread and meat as could be gathered at the neighboring camps,
and determined to redeem on Monday the losses of Sunday.

At daylight of Monday I received General Grant's orders to advance
and recapture our original camps.  I dispatched several members of
my staff to bring up all the men they could find, especially the
brigade of Colonel Stuart, which had been separated from the
division all the day before; and at the appointed time the
division, or rather what remained of it, with the Thirteenth
Missouri and other fragments, moved forward and reoccupied the
ground on the extreme right of General McClernand's camp, where we
attracted the fire of a battery located near Colonel McDowell's
former headquarters.  Here I remained, patiently waiting for the
sound of General Buell's advance upon the main Corinth road.  About
10 a.m.  the heavy firing in that direction, and its steady
approach, satisfied me; and General Wallace being on our right
flank with his well-conducted division, I led the head of my column
to General McClernand's right, formed line of battle, facing south,
with Buckland's brigade directly across the ridge, and Stuart's
brigade on its right in the woods; and thus advanced, steadily and
slowly, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery.  Taylor had
just got to me from the rear, where he had gone for ammunition, and
brought up three guns, which I ordered into position, to advance by
hand firing.  These guns belonged to Company A, Chicago Light
Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant P. P. Wood, and did most
excellent service.  Under cover of their fire, we advanced till we
reached the point where the Corinth road crosses the line of
McClernand's camp, and here I saw for the first time the
well-ordered and compact columns of General Buell's Kentucky
forces, whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to our
newer and less disciplined men.  Here I saw Willich's regiment
advance upon a point of water-oaks and thicket, behind which I knew
the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style.
Then arose the severest musketry-fire I ever heard, and lasted some
twenty minutes, when this splendid regiment had to fall back.  This
green point of timber is about five hundred yards east of Shiloh
meeting-home, and it was evident here was to be the struggle.  The
enemy could also be seen forming his lines to the south.  General
McClernand sending to me for artillery, I detached to him the three
guns of Wood's battery, with which he speedily drove them back,
and, seeing some others to the rear, I sent one of my staff to
bring them forward, when, by almost providential decree, they
proved to be two twenty-four pound howitzers belonging to
McAlister's battery, and served as well as guns ever could be.

This was about 2 p.m.  The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh,
and another near the Hamburg road, both pouring grape and canister
upon any column of troops that advanced upon the green point of
water-oaks.  Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a whole
brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully, deployed, and
entered this dreaded wood.  I ordered my second brigade (then
commanded by Colonel T. Kilby Smith, Colonel Smart being wounded)
to form on its right, and my fourth brigade, Colonel Buckland, on
its right; all to advance abreast with this Kentucky brigade before
mentioned, which I afterward found to be Rousseau's brigade of
McCook's division.  I gave personal direction to the twenty-four
pounder guns, whose well-directed fire first silenced the enemy's
guns to the left, and afterward at the Shiloh meeting-house.


Rousseau's brigade moved in splendid order steadily to the front,
sweeping every thing before it, and at 4 p.m.  we stood upon the
ground of our original front line; and the enemy was in full
retreat.  I directed my several brigades to resume at once their
original camps.

Several times during the battle, cartridges gave out; but General
Grant had thoughtfully kept a supply coming from the rear.  When I
appealed to regiments to stand fast, although out of cartridges, I
did so because, to retire a regiment for any cause, has a bad
effect on others.  I commend the Fortieth Illinois and Thirteenth
Missouri for thus holding their ground under heavy fire, although
their cartridge-boxes were empty.

I am ordered by General Grant to give personal credit where I think
it is due, and censure where I think it merited.  I concede that
General McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back the
enemy along the Corinth road, which was the great centre of this
field of battle, where Beauregard commanded in person, supported by
Bragg's, Polk's, and Breckenridge's divisions.  I think Johnston
was killed by exposing himself in front of his troops, at the time
of their attack on Buckland's brigade on Sunday morning; although
in this I may be mistaken.

My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, nearly all
having received their muskets for the first time at Paducah.  None
of them had ever been under fire or beheld heavy columns of an
enemy bearing down on them as they did on last Sunday.

To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of older troops would
be wrong.  They knew not the value of combination and organization.
When individual fears seized them, the first impulse was to get
away.  My third brigade did break much too soon, and I am not yet
advised where they were during Sunday afternoon and Monday morning.
Colonel Hildebrand, its commander, was as cool as any man I ever
saw, and no one could have made stronger efforts to hold his men to
their places than he did.  He kept his own regiment with individual
exceptions in hand, an hour after Appler's and Mungen's regiments
had left their proper field of action.  Colonel Buckland managed
his brigade well.  I commend him to your notice as a cool,
intelligent, and judicious gentleman, needing only confidence and
experience, to make a good commander.  His subordinates, Colonels
Sullivan and Cockerill, behaved with great gallantry; the former
receiving a severe wound on Sunday, and yet commanding and holding
his regiment well in hand all day, and on Monday, until his right
arm was broken by a shot.  Colonel Cookerill held a larger
proportion of his men than any colonel in my division, and was with
me from first to last.

Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding the first brigade, held his
ground on Sunday, till I ordered him to fall back, which he did in
line of battle; and when ordered, he conducted the attack on the
enemy's left in good style.  In falling back to the next position,
he was thrown from his horse and injured, and his brigade was not
in position on Monday morning.  His subordinates, Colonels Hicks
and Worthington, displayed great personal courage.  Colonel Hicks
led his regiment in the attack on Sunday, and received a wound,
which it is feared may prove mortal.  He is a brave and gallant
gentleman, and deserves well of his country.  Lieutenant-Colonel
Walcutt, of the Ohio Forty-sixth, was severely wounded on Sunday,
and has been disabled ever since.  My second brigade, Colonel
Stuart, was detached nearly two miles from my headquarters.  He had
to fight his own battle on Sunday, against superior numbers, as the
enemy interposed between him and General Prentiss early in the day.
Colonel Stuart was wounded severely, and yet reported for duty on
Monday morning, but was compelled to leave during the day, when the
command devolved on Colonel T. Kilby Smith, who was always in the
thickest of the fight, and led the brigade handsomely.

I have not yet received Colonel Stuart's report of the operations
of his brigade during the time he was detached, and must therefore
forbear to mention names.  Lieutenant-Colonel Kyle, of the
Seventy-first, was mortally wounded on Sunday, but the regiment
itself I did not see, as only a small fragment of it was with the
brigade when it joined the division on Monday morning.  Great
credit is due the fragments of men of the disordered regiments who
kept in the advance.  I observed and noticed them, but until the
brigadiers and colonels make their reports, I cannot venture to
name individuals, but will in due season notice all who kept in our
front line, as well as those who preferred to keep back near the
steamboat-landing.  I will also send a full list of the killed,
wounded, and missing, by name, rank, company, and regiment.  At
present I submit the result in figures:

[Summary of General Sherman's detailed  table:]
Killed ........................  318
Wounded ....................... 1275
Missing .......................  441
Aggregate loss in the division: 2034

The enemy captured seven of our guns on Sunday, but on Monday we
recovered seven; not the identical guns we had lost, but enough in
number to balance the account.  At the time of recovering our camps
our men were so fatigued that we could not follow the retreating
masses of the enemy; but on the following day I followed up with
Buckland's and Hildebrand's brigade for six miles, the result of
which I have already reported.

Of my personal staff, I can only speak with praise and thanks.  I
think they smelled as much gunpowder and heard as many cannon-balls
and bullets as must satisfy their ambition.  Captain Hammond, my
chief of staff, though in feeble health, was very active in
rallying broken troops, encouraging the steadfast and aiding to
form the lines of defense and attack.  I recommend him to your
notice.  Major Sanger's intelligence, quick perception, and rapid
execution, were of very great value to me, especially in bringing
into line the batteries that cooperated so efficiently in our
movements.  Captains McCoy and Dayton, aides-de-camp, were with me
all the time, carrying orders, and acting with coolness, spirit,
and courage.  To Surgeon Hartshorne and Dr. L'Hommedieu hundreds of
wounded men are indebted for the kind and excellent treatment
received on the field of battle and in the various temporary
hospitals created along the line of our operations.  They worked
day and night, and did not rest till all the wounded of our own
troops as well as of the enemy were in safe and comfortable
shelter.  To Major Taylor, chief of artillery, I feel under deep
obligations, for his good sense and judgment in managing the
batteries, on which so much depended.  I inclose his report and
indorse his recommendations.  The cavalry of my command kept to the
rear, and took little part in the action; but it would have been
madness to have exposed horses to the musketry-fire under which we
were compelled to remain from Sunday at 8 a.m. till Monday at
4 p.m. Captain Kossack, of the engineers, was with me all the time,
and was of great assistance.  I inclose his sketch of the
battlefield, which is the best I have seen, and which will enable
you to see the various positions occupied by my division, as well as
of the others that participated in the battle.  I will also send in,
during the day, the detailed reports of my brigadiers and colonels,
and will indorse them with such remarks as I deem proper.

I am, with much respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Brigadier-General commanding Fifth Division.



HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION
Tuesday, April 8,1862

Sir: With the cavalry placed at my command and two brigades of my
fatigued troops, I went this morning out on the Corinth road.  One
after another of the abandoned camps of the enemy lined the roads,
with hospital flags for their protection; at all we found more or
less wounded and dead men.  At the forks of the road I found the
head of General T. J. Wood's division of Buell's Army.  I ordered
cavalry to examine both roads leading toward Corinth, and found the
enemy on both.  Colonel Dickey, of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry,
asking for reenforcements, I ordered General Wood to advance the
head of his column cautiously on the left-hand road, while I
conducted the head of the third brigade of my division up the
right-hand road.  About half a mile from the forks was a clear
field, through which the road passed, and, immediately beyond, a
space of some two hundred yards of fallen timber, and beyond that
an extensive rebel camp.  The enemy's cavalry could be seen in this
camp; after reconnoisance, I ordered the two advance companies of
the Ohio Seventy-seventh, Colonel Hildebrand, to deploy forward as
skirmishers, and the regiment itself forward into line, with an
interval of one hundred yards.  In this order we advanced
cautiously until the skirmishers were engaged.  Taking it for
granted this disposition would clear the camp, I held Colonel
Dickey's Fourth Illinois Cavalry ready for the charge.  The enemy's
cavalry came down boldly at a charge, led by General Forrest in
person, breaking through our line of skirmishers; when the regiment
of infantry, without cause, broke, threw away their muskets, and
fled.  The ground was admirably adapted for a defense of infantry
against cavalry, being miry and covered with fallen timber.

As the regiment of infantry broke, Dickey's Cavalry began to
discharge their carbines, and fell into disorder.  I instantly sent
orders to the rear for the brigade to form line of battle, which
was promptly executed.  The broken infantry and cavalry rallied on
this line, and, as the enemy's cavalry came to it, our cavalry in
turn charged and drove them from the field.  I advanced the entire
brigade over the same ground and sent Colonel Dickey's cavalry a
mile farther on the road.  On examining the ground which had been
occupied by the Seventy-seventh Ohio, we found fifteen of our men
dead and about twenty-five wounded.  I sent for wagons and had all
the wounded carried back to camp, and caused the dead to be buried,
also the whole rebel camp to be destroyed.

Here we found much ammunition for field-pieces, which was
destroyed; also two caissons, and a general hospital, with about
two hundred and eighty Confederate wounded, and about fifty of our
own wounded men.  Not having the means of bringing them off,
Colonel Dickey, by my orders, took a surrender, signed by the
medical director (Lyle) and by all the attending surgeons, and a
pledge to report themselves to you as prisoners of war; also a
pledge that our wounded should be carefully attended to, and
surrendered to us to-morrow as soon as ambulances could go out.  I
inclose this written document, and request that you cause wagons or
ambulances for our wounded to be sent to-morrow, and that wagons'
be sent to bring in the many tents belonging to us which are
pitched along the road for four miles out.  I did not destroy them,
because I knew the enemy could not move them.  The roads are very
bad, and are strewed with abandoned wagons, ambulances, and
limber-boxes.  The enemy has succeeded in carrying off the guns,
but has crippled his batteries by abandoning the hind limber-boxes
of at least twenty caissons.  I am satisfied the enemy's infantry
and artillery passed Lick Creek this morning, traveling all of last
night, and that he left to his rear all his cavalry, which has
protected his retreat; but signs of confusion and disorder mark the
whole road.  The check sustained by us at the fallen timber delayed
our advance, so that night came upon us before the wounded were
provided for and the dead buried, and our troops being fagged out
by three days' hard fighting, exposure, and privation, I ordered
them back to their camps, where they now are.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W.T. SHERMAN
Brigadier-General commanding Division.


General Grant did not make an official report of the battle of
Shiloh, but all its incidents and events were covered by the
reports of division commanders and Subordinates.  Probably no
single battle of the war gave rise to such wild and damaging
reports.  It was publicly asserted at the North that our army was
taken completely by surprise; that the rebels caught us in our
tents; bayoneted the men in their beds; that General Grant was
drunk; that Buell's opportune arrival saved the Army of the
Tennessee from utter annihilation, etc.  These reports were in a
measure sustained by the published opinions of Generals Buell,
Nelson, and others, who had reached the steamboat-landing from the
east, just before nightfall of the 6th, when there was a large
crowd of frightened, stampeded men, who clamored and declared that
our army was all destroyed and beaten.  Personally I saw General
Grant, who with his staff visited me about 10 a.m.  of the 6th,
when we were desperately engaged.  But we had checked the headlong
assault of our enemy, and then held our ground.  This gave him
great satisfaction, and he told me that things did not look as well
over on the left.  He also told me that on his way up from Savannah
that morning he had stopped at Crump's Landing, and had ordered Lew
Wallace's division to cross over Snake Creek, so as to come up on
my right, telling me to look out for him.  He came again just
before dark, and described the last assault made by the rebels at
the ravine, near the steamboat-landing, which he had repelled by a
heavy battery collected under Colonel J. D. Webster and other
officers, and he was convinced that the battle was over for that
day.  He ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the
morning, saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at the
crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever
assumed the offensive was sure to win.  General Grant also
explained to me that General Buell had reached the bank of the
Tennessee River opposite Pittsburg Landing, and was in the act of
ferrying his troops across at the time he was speaking to me.

About half an hour afterward General Buell himself rode up to where
I was, accompanied by Colonels Fry, Michler, and others of his
staff.  I was dismounted at the time, and General Buell made of me
a good many significant inquiries about matters and things
generally.  By the aid of a manuscript map made by myself, I
pointed out to him our positions as they had been in the morning,
and our then positions; I also explained that my right then covered
the bridge over Snake Creek by which we had all day been expecting
Lew Wallace; that McClernand was on my left, Hurlbut on his left,
and so on.  But Buell said he had come up from the landing, and had
not seen our men, of whose existence in fact he seemed to doubt.  I
insisted that I had five thousand good men still left in line, and
thought that McClernand had as many more, and that with what was
left of Hurlbut's, W. H. L. Wallace's, and Prentiss's divisions, we
ought to have eighteen thousand men fit for battle.  I reckoned
that ten thousand of our men were dead, wounded, or prisoners, and
that the enemy's loss could not be much less.  Buell said that
Nelson's, McCook's, and Crittendens divisions of his army,
containing eighteen thousand men, had arrived and could cross over
in the night, and be ready for the next day's battle.  I argued
that with these reenforcements we could sweep the field.  Buell
seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not like the
looks of things, especially about the boat-landing,--and I really
feared he would not cross over his army that night, lest he should
become involved in our general disaster.  He did not, of course,
understand the shape of the ground, and asked me for the use of my
map, which I lent him on the promise that he would return it.  He
handed it to Major Michler to have it copied, and the original
returned to me, which Michler did two or three days after the
battle.  Buell did cross over that night, and the next day we
assumed the offensive and swept the field, thus gaining the battle
decisively.  Nevertheless, the controversy was started and kept up,
mostly to the personal prejudice of General Grant, who as usual
maintained an imperturbable silence.

After the battle, a constant stream of civilian surgeons, and
sanitary commission agents, men and women, came up the Tennessee to
bring relief to the thousands of maimed and wounded soldiers for
whom we had imperfect means of shelter and care.  These people
caught up the camp-stories, which on their return home they
retailed through their local papers, usually elevating their own
neighbors into heroes, but decrying all others: Among them was
Lieutenant-Governor Stanton, of Ohio, who published in Belfontaine,
Ohio, a most abusive article about General Grant and his
subordinate generals.  As General Grant did not and would not take
up the cudgels, I did so.  My letter in reply to Stanton, dated
June 10, 1862, was published in the Cincinnati Commercial soon
after its date.  To this Lieutenant-Governor Stanton replied, and I
further rejoined in a letter dated July 12, 1862.  These letters
are too personal to be revived.  By this time the good people of
the North had begun to have their eyes opened, and to give us in
the field more faith and support.  Stanton was never again elected
to any public office, and was commonly spoken of as "the late Mr.
Stanton."  He is now dead, and I doubt not in life he often
regretted his mistake in attempting to gain popular fame by abusing
the army-leaders, then as now an easy and favorite mode of gaining
notoriety, if not popularity.  Of course, subsequent events gave
General Grant and most of the other actors in that battle their
appropriate place in history, but the danger of sudden popular
clamors is well illustrated by this case.

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, was one of the most
fiercely contested of the war.  On the morning of April 6, 1862,
the five divisions of McClernand, Prentiss, Hurlbut, W. H. L.
Wallace, and Sherman, aggregated about thirty-two thousand men.  We
had no intrenchments of any sort, on the theory that as soon as
Buell arrived we would march to Corinth to attack the enemy.  The
rebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston, was,
according to their own reports and admissions, forty-five thousand
strong, had the momentum of attack, and beyond all question fought
skillfully from early morning till about 2 a.m., when their
commander-in-chief was killed by a Mini-ball in the calf of his
leg, which penetrated the boot and severed the main artery.  There
was then a perceptible lull for a couple of hours, when the attack
was renewed, but with much less vehemence, and continued up to
dark.  Early at night the division of Lew Wallace arrived from the
other side of Snake Creek, not having fired a shot.  A very small
part of General Buell's army was on our side of the Tennessee River
that evening, and their loss was trivial.

During that night, the three divisions of McCook, Nelson, and
Crittenden, were ferried across the Tennessee, and fought with us
the next day (7th).  During that night, also, the two wooden
gunboats, Tyler, commanded by Lieutenant Groin, and Lexington,
Lieutenant Shirk, both of the regular navy, caused shells to be
thrown toward that part of the field of battle known to be occupied
by the enemy.  Beauregard afterward reported his entire loss as ten
thousand six hundred and ninety-nine.  Our aggregate loss, made up
from official statements, shows seventeen hundred killed, seven
thousand four hundred and ninety-five wounded, and three thousand
and twenty-two prisoners; aggregate, twelve thousand two hundred
and seventeen, of which twenty-one hundred and sixty-seven were in
Buell's army, leaving for that of Grant ten thousand and fifty.
This result is a fair measure of the amount of fighting done by
each army.




CHAPTER XI.

SHILOH TO MEMPHIS.

APRIL TO JULY, 1862.


While, the "Army of the Tennessee," under Generals Grant and C. F.
Smith, was operating up the Tennessee River, another force, styled
the "Army of the Mississippi," commanded by Major-General John
Pope, was moving directly down the Mississippi River, against that
portion of the rebel line which, under Generals Polk and Pillow,
had fallen back from Columbus, Kentucky, to Island Number Ten and
New Madrid.  This army had the full cooperation of the gunboat
fleet, commanded by Admiral Foote, and was assisted by the high
flood of that season, which enabled General Pope, by great skill
and industry, to open a canal from a point above Island Number Ten
to New Madrid below, by which he interposed between the rebel army
and its available line of supply and retreat.  At the very time
that we were fighting the bloody battle on the Tennessee River,
General Pope and Admiral Foote were bombarding the batteries on
Island Number Ten, and the Kentucky shore abreast of it; and
General Pope having crossed over by steamers a part of his army to
the east bank, captured a large part of this rebel army, at and
near Tiptonville.

General Halleck still remained at St. Louis, whence he gave general
directions to the armies of General Curtis, Generals Grant, Buell,
and Pope; and instead of following up his most important and
brilliant successes directly down the Mississippi, he concluded to
bring General Pope's army around to the Tennessee, and to come in
person to command there.  The gunboat fleet pushed on down the
Mississippi, but was brought up again all standing by the heavy
batteries at Fort Pillow, about fifty miles above Memphis.  About
this time Admiral Farragut, with another large sea-going fleet, and
with the cooperating army of General Butler, was entering the
Mississippi River by the Passes, and preparing to reduce Forts
Jackson and St, Philip in order to reach New Orleans; so that all
minds were turned to the conquest of the Mississippi River, and
surely adequate means were provided for the undertaking.

The battle of Shiloh had been fought, as described, on the 6th and
7th of April; and when the movement of the 8th had revealed that
our enemy was gone, in full retreat, leaving killed, wounded, and
much property by the way, we all experienced a feeling of relief.
The struggle had been so long, so desperate and bloody, that the
survivors seemed exhausted and nerveless; we appreciated the value
of the victory, but realized also its great cost of life.  The
close of the battle had left the Army of the Tennessee on the
right, and the Army of the Ohio on the left; but I believe neither
General Grant nor Buell exercised command, the one over the other;
each of them having his hands full in repairing damages.  All the
division, brigade, and regimental commanders were busy in
collecting stragglers, regaining lost property, in burying dead men
and horses, and in providing for their wounded.  Some few new
regiments came forward, and some changes of organization became
necessary.  Then, or very soon after, I consolidated my font
brigades into three, which were commanded: First, Brigadier-General
Morgan L: Smith; Second, Colonel John A. McDowell; Third,
Brigadier-General J. W. Denver.  About the same time I was promoted
to major-general volunteers.

The Seventy-first Ohio was detached to Clarksville, Tennessee, and
the Sixth and Eighth Missouri were transferred to my division.

In a few days after the battle, General Halleck arrived by
steamboat from St. Louis, pitched his camp near the steamboat-
landing, and assumed personal command of all the armies.  He was
attended by his staff, composed of General G. W. Cullum, U. S.
Engineers, as his chief of staff; Colonel George Thom, U. S.
Engineers; and Colonels Kelton and Kemper, adjutants-general.  It
soon became manifest that his mind had been prejudiced by the
rumors which had gone forth to the detriment of General Grant; for
in a few days he issued an order, reorganizing and rearranging the
whole army.  General Buell's Army of the Ohio constituted the
centre; General Pope's army, then arriving at Hamburg Landing, was
the left; the right was made up of mine and Hurlbut's divisions,
belonging to the old Army of the Tennessee, and two new ones, made
up from the fragments of the divisions of Prentiss and C. F. Smith,
and of troops transferred thereto, commanded by Generals T. W.
Sherman and Davies.  General George H. Thomas was taken from Buell,
to command the right.  McClernand's and Lew Wallace's divisions
were styled the reserve, to be commanded by McClernand.  General
Grant was substantially left out, and was named "second in
command," according to some French notion, with no clear,
well-defined command or authority.  He still retained his old
staff, composed of Rawlins, adjutant-general; Riggin, Lagow, and
Hilyer, aides; and he had a small company of the Fourth Illinois
Cavalry as an escort.  For more than a month he thus remained,
without any apparent authority, frequently visiting me and others,
and rarely complaining; but I could see that he felt deeply the
indignity, if not insult, heaped upon him.

General Thomas at once assumed command of the right wing, and,
until we reached Corinth, I served immediately under his command.
We were classmates, intimately acquainted, had served together
before in the old army, and in Kentucky, and it made to us little
difference who commanded the other, provided the good cause
prevailed.

Corinth was about thirty miles distant, and we all knew that we
should find there the same army with which we had so fiercely
grappled at Shiloh, reorganized, reenforced, and commanded in chief
by General Beauregard in place of Johnston, who had fallen at
Shiloh.  But we were also reenforced by Buell's and Pope's armies;
so that before the end of April our army extended from Snake Creek
on the right to the Tennessee River, at Hamburg, on the left, and
must have numbered nearly one hundred thousand men.

Ample supplies of all kinds reached us by the Tennessee River,
which had a good stage of water; but our wagon transportation was
limited, and much confusion occurred in hauling supplies to the
several camps.  By the end of Aril, the several armies seemed to be
ready, and the general forward movement on Corinth began.  My
division was on the extreme right of the right wing, and marched
out by the "White House," leaving Monterey or Pea Ridge to the
south.  Crossing Lick Creek, we came into the main road about a
mile south of Monterey, where we turned square to the right, and
came into the Purdy road, near "Elams."  Thence we followed the
Purdy road to Corinth, my skirmishers reaching at all times the
Mobile & Ohio Railroad.  Of course our marches were governed by the
main centre, which followed the direct road from Pittsburg Landing
to Corinth; and this movement was provokingly slow.  We fortified
almost every camp at night, though we had encountered no serious
opposition, except from cavalry, which gave ground easily as we
advanced.  The opposition increased as we neared Corinth, and at a
place called Russell's we had a sharp affair of one brigade, under
the immediate direction of Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith,
assisted by the brigade of General Denver.  This affair occurred on
the 19th of May, and our line was then within about two miles of
the northern intrenchments of Corinth.

On the 27th I received orders from General Halleck "to send a force
the next day to drive the rebels from the house in our front, on
the Corinth road, to drive in their pickets as far as possible, and
to make a strong demonstration on Corinth itself;" authorizing me
to call on any adjacent division for assistance.

I reconnoitred the ground carefully, and found that the main road
led forward along the fence of a large cotton-field to our right
front, and ascended a wooded hill, occupied in some force by the
enemy, on which was the farm-house referred to in General Halleck's
orders.  At the farther end of the field was a double log-house,
whose chinking had been removed; so that it formed a good block
house from which the enemy could fire on any person approaching
from our quarter.

General Hurlbut's division was on my immediate left, and General
McClernand's reserve on our right rear.  I asked of each the
assistance of a brigade.  The former sent General Veatch's, and the
latter General John A. Logan's brigade.  I asked the former to
support our left flank, and the latter our right flank.  The next
morning early, Morgan L. Smith's brigade was deployed under cover
on the left, and Denver's on the right, ready to move forward
rapidly at a signal.  I had a battery of four twenty-pound Parrott
guns, commanded by Captain Silversparre.  Colonel Ezra Taylor,
chief of artillery, had two of these guns moved up silently by hand
behind a small knoll, from the crest of which the enemy's
block-house and position could be distinctly seen; when all were
ready, these guns were moved to the crest, and several quick rounds
were fired at the house, followed after an interval by a single
gum.  This was the signal agreed on, and the troops responded
beautifully, crossed the field in line of battle, preceded by their
skirmishers who carried the position in good style, and pursued the
enemy for half a mile beyond.

The main line halted on the crest of the ridge, from which we could
look over the parapets of the rebel works at Corinth, and hear
their drum and bugle calls.  The rebel brigade had evidently been
taken by surprise in our attack; it soon rallied and came back on
us with the usual yell, driving in our skirmishers, but was quickly
checked when it came within range of our guns and line of battle.
Generals Grant and Thomas happened to be with me during this
affair, and were well pleased at the handsome manner in which the
troops behaved.  That night we began the usual entrenchments, and
the next day brought forward the artillery and the rest of the
division, which then extended from the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, at
Bowie Hill Out, to the Corinth & Purdy road, there connecting with
Hurlbut's division.  That night, viz., May 29th, we heard unusual
sounds in Corinth, the constant whistling of locomotives, and soon
after daylight occurred a series of explosions followed by a dense
smoke rising high over the town.  There was a telegraph line
connecting my headquarters with those of General Halleck, about
four miles off, on the Hamburg road.  I inquired if he knew the
cause of the explosions and of the smoke, and he answered to
"advance with my division and feel the enemy if still in my front"
I immediately dispatched two regiments from each of my three
brigades to feel the immediate front, and in a very short time
advanced with the whole division.  Each brigade found the rebel
parapets abandoned, and pushed straight for the town, which lies in
the northeast angle of intersection of the Mobile & Ohio and
Memphis & Charleston Railroads.  Many buildings had been burned by
the enemy on evacuation, which had begun the night before at 6
p.m., and continued through the night, the rear-guard burning their
magazine at the time of withdrawing, about daybreak.  Morgan L.
Smith's brigade followed the retreating rear-guard some four miles
to the Tuacumbia Bridge, which was found burned.  I halted the
other brigades at the college, about a mile to the southwest of the
town, where I was overtaken by General Thomas in person.

The heads of all the columns had entered the rebel lines about the
same time, and there was some rather foolish clamor for the first
honors, but in fact there was no honor in the event.  Beauregard
had made a clean retreat to the south, and was only seriously
pursued by cavalry from General Pope's flank.  But he reached
Tupelo, where he halted for reorganization; and there is no doubt
that at the moment there was much disorganization in his ranks, for
the woods were full of deserters whom we did not even take
prisoners, but advised them to make their way home and stay there.
We spent the day at and near the college, when General Thomas, who
applied for orders at Halleck's headquarters, directed me to
conduct my division back to the camp of the night before, where we
had left our trains The advance on Corinth had occupied all of the
month of May, the most beautiful and valuable month of the year for
campaigning in this latitude.  There had been little fighting, save
on General Pope's left flank about Farmington; and on our right.  I
esteemed it a magnificent drill, as it served for the instruction
of our men in guard and picket duty, and in habituating them to
out-door life; and by the time we had reached Corinth I believe
that army was the best then on this continent, and could have gone
where it pleased.  The four subdivisions were well commanded, as
were the divisions and brigades of the whole army.  General Halleck
was a man of great capacity, of large acquirements, and at the time
possessed the confidence of the country, and of most of the army.
I held him in high estimation, and gave him credit for the
combinations which had resulted in placing this magnificent army of
a hundred thousand men, well equipped and provided, with a good
base, at Corinth, from which he could move in any direction.

Had he held his force as a unit, he could have gone to Mobile, or
Vicksburg, or anywhere in that region, which would by one move have
solved the whole Mississippi problem; and, from what he then told
me, I believe he intended such a campaign, but was overruled from
Washington.  Be that as it may, the army had no sooner settled down
at Corinth before it was scattered: General Pope was called to the
East, and his army distributed among the others; General Thomas was
relieved from the command of the right wing, and reassigned to his
division in the Army of the Ohio; and that whole army under General
Buell was turned east along the Memphis & Charleston road, to march
for Chattanooga.  McClernand's "reserve" was turned west to Bolivar
and Memphis.  General Halleck took post himself at Corinth,
assigned Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson to take charge of the
railroads, with instructions to repair them as far as Columbus,
Kentucky, and to collect cars and locomotives to operate them to
Corinth and Grand Junction.  I was soon dispatched with my own and
Hurlbut's divisions northwest fourteen miles to Chewalla, to save
what could be of any value out of six trains of cars belonging to
the rebels which had been wrecked and partially burned at the time
of the evacuation of Corinth.

A short time before leaving Corinth I rode from my camp to General
Halleck's headquarters, then in tents just outside of the town,
where we sat and gossiped for some time, when he mentioned to me
casually that General Grant was going away the next morning.  I
inquired the cause, and he said that he did not know, but that
Grant had applied for a thirty days' leave, which had been given
him.  Of course we all knew that he was chafing under the slights
of his anomalous position, and I determined to see him on my way
back.  His camp was a short distance off the Monterey road, in the
woods, and consisted of four or five tents, with a sapling railing
around the front.  As I rode up, Majors Rawlins, Lagow, and Hilyer,
were in front of the camp, and piled up near them were the usual
office and camp chests, all ready for a start in the morning.  I
inquired for the general, and was shown to his tent, where I found
him seated on a camp-stool, with papers on a rude camp-table; he
seemed to be employed in assorting letters, and tying them up with
red tape into convenient bundles.  After passing the usual
compliments, I inquired if it were true that he was going away.  He
said, "Yes."  I then inquired the reason, and he said "Sherman, you
know.  You know that I am in the way here.  I have stood it as long
as I can, and can endure it no longer."  I inquired where he was
going to, and he said, "St. Louis."  I then asked if he had any
business there, and he said, "Not a bit."  I then begged him to
stay, illustrating his case by my own.

Before the battle of Shiloh, I had been cast down by a mere
newspaper assertion of "crazy;" but that single battle had given me
new life, and now I was in high feather; and I argued with him
that, if he went away, events would go right along, and he would be
left out; whereas, if he remained, some happy accident might
restore him to favor and his true place.  He certainly appreciated
my friendly advice, and promised to wait awhile; at all events, not
to go without seeing me again, or communicating with me.  Very soon
after this, I was ordered to Chewalla, where, on the 6th of June, I
received a note from him, saying that he had reconsidered his
intention, and would remain.  I cannot find the note, but my answer
I have kept:

Chewalla, Jane 6, 1862.

Major-General GRANT.

My DEAR SIR: I have just received your note, and am rejoiced at
your conclusion to remain; for you could not be quiet at home for a
week when armies were moving, and rest could not relieve your mind
of the gnawing sensation that injustice had been done you.


My orders at Chewalla were to rescue the wrecked trains there, to
reconnoitre westward and estimate the amount of damage to the
railroad as far as Grand Junction, about fifty miles.  We camped
our troops on high, healthy ground to the south of Chewalla, and
after I had personally reconnoitred the country, details of men
were made and volunteer locomotive engineers obtained to
superintend the repairs.  I found six locomotives and about sixty
cars, thrown from the track, parts of the machinery detached and
hidden in the surrounding swamp, and all damaged as much by fire as
possible.  It seems that these trains were inside of Corinth during
the night of evacuation, loading up with all sorts of commissary
stores, etc., and about daylight were started west; but the
cavalry-picket stationed at the Tuscumbia bridge had, by mistake or
panic, burned the bridge before the trains got to them.  The
trains, therefore, were caught, and the engineers and guards
hastily scattered the stores into the swamp, and disabled the
trains as far as they could, before our cavalry had discovered
their critical situation.  The weather was hot, and the swamp
fairly stunk with the putrid flour and fermenting sugar and
molasses; I was so much exposed there in the hot sun, pushing
forward the work, that I got a touch of malarial fever, which hung
on me for a month, and forced me to ride two days in an ambulance,
the only time I ever did such a thing during the whole war.  By the
7th I reported to General Halleck that the amount of work necessary
to reestablish the railroad between Corinth and Grand Junction was
so great, that he concluded not to attempt its repair, but to rely
on the road back to Jackson (Tennessee), and forward to Grand
Junction; and I was ordered to move to Grand Junction, to take up
the repairs from there toward Memphis.

The evacuation of Corinth by Beauregard, and the movements of
General McClernand's force toward Memphis, had necessitated the
evacuation of Fort Pillow, which occurred about June 1st; soon
followed by the further withdrawal of the Confederate army from
Memphis, by reason of the destruction of the rebel gunboats in the
bold and dashing attack by our gun-boats under command of Admiral
Davis, who had succeeded Foote.  This occurred June 7th.  Admiral
Farragut had also captured New Orleans after the terrible passage
of Forts Jackson and St. Philip on May 24th, and had ascended the
river as high as Vicksburg; so that it seemed as though, before the
end of June, we should surely have full possession of the whole
river.  But it is now known that the progress of our Western armies
had aroused the rebel government to the exercise of the most
stupendous energy.  Every man capable of bearing arms at the South
was declared to be a soldier, and forced to act as such.  All their
armies were greatly reenforced, and the most despotic power was
granted to enforce discipline and supplies.  Beauregard was
replaced by Bragg, a man of more ability--of greater powers of
organization, of action, and discipline--but naturally exacting and
severe, and not possessing the qualities to attract the love of his
officers and men.  He had a hard task to bring into order and
discipline that mass of men to whose command he succeeded at
Tupelo, with which he afterward fairly outmanoeuvred General Buell,
and forced him back from Chattanooga to Louisville.  It was a fatal
mistake, however, that halted General Halleck at Corinth, and led
him to disperse and scatter the best materials for a fighting army
that, up to that date, had been assembled in the West.

During the latter part of June and first half of July, I had my own
and Hurlbut's divisions about Grand Junction, Lagrange, Moscow, and
Lafayette, building railroad-trestles and bridges, fighting off
cavalry detachments coming from the south, and waging an
everlasting quarrel with planters about their negroes and fences
--they trying, in the midst of moving armies, to raise a crop of
corn.  On the 17th of June I sent a detachment of two brigades,
under General M. L. Smith, to Holly Springs, in the belief that I
could better protect the railroad from some point in front than
by scattering our men along it; and, on the 23d, I was at
Lafayette Station, when General Grant, with his staff and a very
insignificant escort, arrived from Corinth en route for Memphis, to
take command of that place and of the District of West Tennessee.
He came very near falling into the hands of the enemy, who infested
the whole country with small but bold detachments of cavalry.  Up
to that time I had received my orders direct from General Halleck
at Corinth, but soon after I fell under the immediate command of
General Grant and so continued to the end of the war; but, on the
29th, General Halleck notified me that "a division of troops under
General C. S. Hamilton of 'Rosecrans's army corps,' had passed the
Hatchie from Corinth," and was destined for Holly Springs, ordering
me to "cooperate as far as advisable," but "not to neglect the
protection of the road."  I ordered General Hurlbut to leave
detachments at Grand Junction and Lagrange, and to march for Holly
Springs.  I left detachments at Moscow and Lafayette, and, with
about four thousand men, marched for the same point.  Hurlbut and I
met at Hudsonville, and thence marched to the Coldwater, within
four miles of Holly Springs.  We encountered only small detachments
of rebel cavalry under Colonels Jackson and Pierson, and drove them
into and through Holly Springs; but they hung about, and I kept an
infantry brigade in Holly Springs to keep them out.  I heard
nothing from General Hamilton till the 5th of July, when I received
a letter from him dated Rienzi, saying that he had been within
nineteen miles of Holly Springs and had turned back for Corinth;
and on the next day, July 6th, I got a telegraph order from General
Halleck, of July 2d, sent me by courier from Moscow, "not to
attempt to hold Holly Springs, but to fall back and protect the
railroad."  We accordingly marched back twenty-five miles--Hurlbut
to Lagrange, and I to Moscow.  The enemy had no infantry nearer
than the Tallahatchee bridge, but their cavalry was saucy and
active, superior to ours, and I despaired of ever protecting a
railroad, preventing a broad front of one hundred miles, from their
dashes.

About this time, we were taunted by the Confederate soldiers and
citizens with the assertion that Lee had defeated McClellan at
Richmond; that he would soon be in Washington; and that our turn
would come next.  The extreme caution of General Halleck also
indicated that something had gone wrong, and, on the 16th of July,
at Moscow, I received a dispatch from him, announcing that he had
been summoned to Washington, which he seemed to regret, and which
at that moment I most deeply deplored.  He announced that his
command would devolve on General Grant, who had been summoned
around from Memphis to Corinth by way of Columbus, Kentucky, and
that I was to go into Memphis to take command of the District of
West Tennessee, vacated by General Grant.  By this time, also, I
was made aware that the great, army that had assembled at Corinth
at the end of May had been scattered and dissipated, and that
terrible disasters had befallen our other armies in Virginia and
the East.

I soon received orders to move to Memphis, taking Hurlbut's
division along.  We reached Memphis on the 21st, and on the 22d I
posted my three brigades mostly in and near Fort Dickering, and
Hurlbut's division next below on the river-bank by reason of the
scarcity of water, except in the Mississippi River itself.  The
weather was intensely hot.  The same order that took us to Memphis
required me to send the division of General Lew Wallace (then
commanded by Brigadier-General A. P. Hovey) to Helena, Arkansas, to
report to General Curtis, which was easily accomplished by
steamboat.  I made my own camp in a vacant lot, near Mr. Moon's
house, and gave my chief attention to the construction of Fort
Pickering, then in charge of Major Prime, United States Engineers;
to perfecting the drill and discipline of the two divisions under
my command; and to the administration of civil affairs.

At the time when General Halleck was  summoned from Corinth to
Washington, to succeed McClellan as commander-in-chief, I surely
expected of him immediate and important results.  The Army of the
Ohio was at the time marching toward Chattanooga, and was strung
from Eastport by Huntsville to Bridgeport, under the command of
General Buell.  In like manner, the Army of the Tennessee was
strung along the same general line, from Memphis to Tuscumbia, and
was commanded by General Grant, with no common commander for both
these forces: so that the great army which General Halleck had so
well assembled at Corinth, was put on the defensive, with a
frontage of three hundred miles.  Soon thereafter the rebels
displayed peculiar energy and military skill.  General Bragg had
reorganized the army of Beauregard at Tupelo, carried it rapidly
and skillfully toward Chattanooga, whence he boldly assumed the
offensive, moving straight for Nashville and Louisville, and
compelling General Buell to fall back to the Ohio River at
Louisville.

The army of Van Dorn and Price had been brought from the
trans-Mississippi Department to the east of the river, and was
collected at and about Holly Springs, where, reenforced by
Armstrong's and Forrests cavalry, it amounted to about forty
thousand brave and hardy soldiers.  These were General Grant's
immediate antagonists, and so many and large detachments had been
drawn from him, that for a time he was put on the defensive.  In
person he had his headquarters at Corinth, with the three divisions
of Hamilton, Davies, and McKean, under the immediate orders of
General Rosecrans.  General Ord had succeeded to the division of
McClernand (who had also gone to Washington), and held Bolivar and
Grand Junction.  I had in Memphis my own and Hurlbut's divisions,
and other smaller detachments were strung along the Memphis &
Charleston road.  But the enemy's detachments could strike this
road at so many points, that no use could be made of it, and
General Grant had to employ the railroads, from Columbus, Kentucky,
to Corinth and Grand Junction, by way of Jackson, Tennessee, a
point common to both roads, and held in some force.

In the early part of September the enemy in our front manifested
great activity, feeling with cavalry at all points, and on the 13th
General Van Dorn threatened Corinth, while General Price seized the
town of Iuka, which was promptly abandoned by a small garrison
under Colonel Murphy.  Price's force was about eight thousand men,
and the general impression was that he was en route for Eastport,
with the purpose to cross the Tennessee River in the direction of
Nashville, in aid of General Bragg, then in full career for
Kentucky.  General Grant determined to attack him in force,
prepared to regain Corinth before Van Dorn could reach it.  He had
drawn Ord to Corinth, and moved him, by Burnsville, on Iuka, by the
main road, twenty-six miles.  General Grant accompanied this column
as far as Burnsville.  At the same time he had dispatched Rosecrans
by roads to the south, via Jacinto, with orders to approach Iuka by
the two main roads, coming into Iuka from the south, viz., they
Jacinto and Fulton roads.

On the 18th General Ord encountered the enemy about four miles out
of Iuka.  His orders contemplated that he should not make a serious
attack, until Rosecrans had gained his position on the south; but,
as usual, Rosecrans had encountered difficulties in the confusion
of roads, his head of column did not reach the vicinity of Iuka
till 4 p.m.  of the 19th, and then his troops were long drawn out
on the single Jacinto road, leaving the Fulton road clear for
Price's use.  Price perceived his advantage, and attacked with
vehemence the head of Rosecrans's column, Hamilton's division,
beating it back, capturing a battery, and killing and disabling
seven hundred and thirty-six men, so that when night closed in
Rosecrans was driven to the defensive, and Price, perceiving his
danger, deliberately withdrew by the Fulton road, and the next
morning was gone.  Although General Ord must have been within four
or six miles of this battle, he did not hear a sound; and he or
General Grant did not know of it till advised the next morning by a
courier who had made a wide circuit to reach them.  General Grant
was much offended with General Rosecrans because of this affair,
but in my experience these concerted movements generally fail,
unless with the very best kind of troops, and then in a country on
whose roads some reliance can be placed, which is not the case in
Northern Mississippi.  If Price was aiming for Tennessee; he
failed, and was therefore beaten.  He made a wide circuit by the
south, and again joined Van Dorn.

On the 6th of September, at Memphis, I received an order from
General Grant dated the 2d, to send Hurlbut's division to
Brownsville, in the direction of Bolivar, thence to report by
letter to him at Jackson.  The division started the same day, and,
as our men and officers had been together side by side from the
first landing at Shiloh, we felt the parting like the breaking up
of a family.  But General Grant was forced to use every man, for he
knew well that Van Dorn could attack him at pleasure, at any point
of his long line.  To be the better prepared, on the 23d of
September he took post himself at Jackson, Tennessee, with a small
reserve force, and gave Rosecrans command of Corinth, with his
three divisions and some detachments, aggregating about twenty
thousand men.  He posted General Ord with his own and Hurlbut'a
divisions at Bolivar, with outposts toward Grand Junction and
Lagrange.  These amounted to nine or ten thousand men, and I held
Memphis with my own division, amounting to about six thousand men.
The whole of General Grant's men at that time may have aggregated
fifty thousand, but he had to defend a frontage of a hundred and
fifty miles, guard some two hundred miles of railway, and as much
river.  Van Dom had forty thousand men, united, at perfect liberty
to move in any direction, and to choose his own point of attack,
under cover of woods, and a superior body of cavalry, familiar with
every foot of the ground.  Therefore General Grant had good reason
for telegraphing to General Halleck, on the 1st of October, that
his position was precarious, "but I hope to get out of it all
right."  In Memphis my business was to hold fast that important
flank, and by that date Fort Dickering had been made very strong,
and capable of perfect defense by a single brigade.  I therefore
endeavored by excursions to threaten Van Dorn's detachments to the
southeast and east.  I repeatedly sent out strong detachments
toward Holly Springs, which was his main depot of supply; and
General Grierson, with his Sixth Illinois, the only cavalry I had,
made some bold and successful dashes at the Coldwater, compelling
Van Dorn to cover it by Armstrong's whole division of cavalry.
Still, by the 1st of October, General Grant was satisfied that the
enemy was meditating an attack in force on Bolivar or Corinth; and
on the 2d Van Dorn made his appearance near Corinth, with his
entire army.  On the 3d he moved down on that place from the north
and northwest, General Roseerana went out some four miles to meet
him, but was worsted and compelled to fall back within the line of
his forts.  These had been began under General Halleck, but were
much strengthened by General Grant, and consisted of several
detached redoubts, bearing on each other, and inclosing the town
and the depots of stores at the intersection of the two railroads.
Van Dorn closed down on the forts by the evening of the 3d, and on
the morning of the 4th assaulted with great vehemence.  Our men,
covered by good parapets, fought gallantly, and defended their
posts well, inflicting terrible losses on the enemy, so that by
noon the rebels were repulsed at all points, and drew off, leaving
their dead and wounded in our hands.  Their losses, were variously
estimated, but the whole truth will probably never be known, for in
that army reports and returns were not the fashion.  General
Rosecrans admitted his own loss to be three hundred and fifteen
killed, eighteen hundred and twelve wounded, and two hundred and
thirty-two missing or prisoners, and claimed on the part of the
rebels fourteen hundred and twenty-three dead, two thousand and
twenty-five prisoners and wounded.  Of course, most of the wounded
must have gone off or been carried off, so that, beyond doubt, the
rebel army lost at Corinth fully six thousand men.

Meantime, General Grant, at Jackson, had dispatched Brigadier-
General McPherson, with a brigade, directly for Corinth, which
reached General Rosecrans after the battle; and, in anticipation of
his victory, had ordered him to pursue instantly, notifying him
that he had ordered Ord's and Hurlbut's divisions rapidly across to
Pocahontas, so as to strike the rebels in flank.  On the morning of
the 5th, General Ord reached the Hatchie River, at Davies bridge,
with four thousand men; crossed over and encountered the retreating
army, captured a battery and several hundred prisoners, dispersing
the rebel advance, and forcing the main column to make a wide
circuit by the south in order to cross the Hatchie River.  Had
General Rosecrans pursued promptly, and been on the heels of this
mass of confused and routed men, Van Dorn's army would surely have
been utterly ruined; as it was, Van Dom regained Holly Springs
somewhat demoralized.

General Rosecrans did not begin his pursuit till the next morning,
the 5th, and it was then too late.  General Grant was again
displeased with him, and never became fully reconciled.  General
Rosecrans was soon after relieved, and transferred to the Army of
the Cumberland, in Tennessee, of which he afterward obtained the
command, in place of General Buell, who was removed.

The effect of the battle of Corinth was very great.  It was,
indeed, a decisive blow to the Confederate cause in our quarter,
and changed the whole aspect of affairs in West Tennessee.  From
the timid defensive we were at once enabled to assume the bold
offensive.  In Memphis I could see its effects upon the citizens,
and they openly admitted that their cause had sustained a
death-blow.  But the rebel government was then at its maximum
strength; Van Dorn was reenforced, and very soon Lieutenant-General
J. C. Pemberton arrived and assumed the command, adopting for his
line the Tallahatchie River, with an advance-guard along the
Coldwater, and smaller detachments forward at Grand Junction and
Hernando.  General Grant, in like manner, was reenforced by new
regiments.

Out of those which were assigned to Memphis, I organized two new
brigades, and placed them under officers who had gained skill and
experience during the previous campaign.





CHAPTER XII.

MEMPHIS TO ARKANSAS POST.

JULY, 1882 TO JANUARY, 1883


When we first entered Memphis, July 21,1862, I found the place
dead; no business doing, the stores closed, churches, schools, and
every thing shut up.  The people were all more or less in sympathy
with our enemies, and there was a strong prospect that the whole
civil population would become a dead weight on our hands.  Inasmuch
as the Mississippi River was then in our possession northward, and
steamboats were freely plying with passengers and freight, I caused
all the stores to be opened, churches, schools, theatres, and
places of amusement, to be reestablished, and very soon Memphis
resumed its appearance of an active, busy, prosperous place.  I
also restored the mayor (whose name was Parks) and the city
government to the performance of their public functions, and
required them to maintain a good civil police.

Up to that date neither Congress nor the President had made any
clear, well-defined rules touching the negro slaves, and the
different generals had issued orders according to their own
political sentiments.  Both Generals Halleck and Grant regarded the
slave as still a slave, only that the labor of the slave belonged
to his owner, if faithful to the Union, or to the United States, if
the master had taken up arms against the Government, or adhered to
the fortunes of the rebellion.  Therefore, in Memphis, we received
all fugitives, put them to work on the fortifications, supplied
them with food and clothing, and reserved the question of payment
of wages for future decision.  No force was allowed to be used to
restore a fugitive slave to his master in any event; but if the
master proved his loyalty, he was usually permitted to see his
slave, and, if he could persuade him to return home, it was
permitted.  Cotton, also, was a fruitful subject of controversy.
The Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Chase, was extremely anxious at
that particular time to promote the purchase of cotton, because
each bale was worth, in gold, about three hundred dollars, and
answered the purpose of coin in our foreign exchanges.  He
therefore encouraged the trade, so that hundreds of greedy
speculators flocked down the Mississippi, and resorted to all sorts
of measures to obtain cotton from the interior, often purchasing it
from negroes who did not own it, but who knew where it was
concealed.  This whole business was taken from the jurisdiction of
the military, and committed to Treasury agents appointed by Mr.
Chase.

Other questions absorbed the attention of military commanders; and
by way of illustration I here insert a few letters from my
"letter-book," which contains hundreds on similar subjects:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION
Memphis, Tennessee, August 11, 1862

Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.

Sir: Your letter of August 2d, just received, invites my discussion
of the cotton question.

I will write plainly and slowly, because I know you have no time to
listen to trifles.  This is no trifle; when one nation is at war
with another, all the people of the one are enemies of the other:
then the rules are plain and easy of understanding.  Most
unfortunately, the war in which we are now engaged has been
complicated with the belief on the one hand that all on the other
are not enemies.  It would have been better if, at the outset, this
mistake had not been made, and it is wrong longer to be misled by
it.  The Government of the United States may now safely proceed on
the proper rule that all in the South are enemies of all in the
North; and not only are they unfriendly, but all who can procure
arms now bear them as organized regiments, or as guerrillas.  There
is not a garrison in Tennessee where a man can go beyond the sight
of the flag-staff without being shot or captured.  It so happened
that these people had cotton, and, whenever they apprehended our
large armies would move, they destroyed the cotton in the belief
that, of course, we world seize it, and convert it to our use.
They did not and could not dream that we would pay money for it.
It had been condemned to destruction by their own acknowledged
government, and was therefore lost to their people; and could have
been, without injustice, taken by us, and sent away, either as
absolute prize of war, or for future compensation.  But the
commercial enterprise of the Jews soon discovered that ten cents
would buy a pound of cotton behind our army; that four cents would
take it to Boston, where they could receive thirty cents in gold.
The bait was too tempting, and it spread like fire, when here they
discovered that salt, bacon, powder, fire-arms, percussion-caps,
etc., etc., were worth as much as gold; and, strange to say, this
traffic was not only permitted, but encouraged.  Before we in the
interior could know it, hundreds, yea thousands of barrels of salt
and millions of dollars had been disbursed; and I have no doubt
that Bragg's army at Tupelo, and Van Dorn's at Vicksburg, received
enough salt to make bacon, without which they could not have moved
their armies in mass; and that from ten to twenty thousand fresh
arms, and a due supply of cartridges, have also been got, I am
equally satisfied.  As soon as I got to Memphis, having seen the
effect in the interior, I ordered (only as to my own command) that
gold, silver, and Treasury notes, were contraband of war, and
should not go into the interior, where all were hostile.  It is
idle to talk about Union men here: many want peace, and fear war
and its results; but all prefer a Southern, independent government,
and are fighting or working for it.  Every gold dollar that was
spent for cotton, was sent to the seaboard, to be exchanged for
bank-notes and Confederate scrip, which will buy goods here, and
are taken in ordinary transactions.  I therefore required cotton to
be paid for in such notes, by an obligation to pay at the end of
the war, or by a deposit of the price in the hands of a trustee,
viz., the United States Quartermaster.  Under these rules cotton is
being obtained about as fast as by any other process, and yet the
enemy receives no "aid or comfort."  Under the "gold" rule, the
country people who had concealed their cotton from the burners, and
who openly scorned our greenbacks, were willing enough to take
Tennessee money, which will buy their groceries; but now that the
trade is to be encouraged, and gold paid out, I admit that cotton
will be sent in by our open enemies, who can make better use of
gold than they can of their hidden bales of cotton.

I may not appreciate the foreign aspect of the question, but my
views on this may be ventured.  If England ever threatens war
because we don't furnish her cotton, tell her plainly if she can't
employ and feed her own people, to send them here, where they
cannot only earn an honest living, but soon secure independence by
moderate labor.  We are not bound to furnish her cotton.  She has
more reason to fight the South for burning that cotton, than us for
not shipping it.  To aid the South on this ground would be
hypocrisy which the world would detect at once.  Let her make her
ultimatum, and there are enough generous minds in Europe that will
counteract her in the balance.  Of course her motive is to cripple
a power that rivals her in commerce and manufactures, that
threatens even to usurp her history.  In twenty more years of
prosperity, it will require a close calculation to determine
whether England, her laws and history, claim for a home the
Continent of America or the Isle of Britain.  Therefore, finding us
in a death-struggle for existence, she seems to seek a quarrel to
destroy both parts in detail.

Southern people know this full well, and will only accept the
alliance of England in order to get arms and manufactures in
exchange for their cotton.  The Southern Confederacy will accept no
other mediation, because she knows full well that in Old England
her slaves and slavery will receive no more encouragement than in
New England.

France certainly does not need our cotton enough to disturb her
equilibrium, and her mediation would be entitled to a more respect
consideration than on the part of her present ally.  But I feel
assured the French will not encourage rebellion and secession
anywhere as a political doctrine.  Certainly all the German states
must be our ardent friends; and, in case of European intervention;
they could not be kept down.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION, ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, Memphis, July
23, 1862

Dr. E. S. PLUMMER and others, Physician  in Memphis, Signers to a
Petition.

GENTLEMEN: I have this moment received your communication, and
assure you that it grieves my heart thus to be the instrument of
adding to the seeming cruelty and hardship of this unnatural war.

On my arrival here, I found my predecessor (General Hovey) had
issued an order permitting the departure south of all persons
subject to the conscript law of the Southern Confederacy.  Many
applications have been made to me to modify this order, but I
regarded it as a condition precedent by which I was bound in honor,
and therefore I have made no changes or modifications; nor shall I
determine what action I shall adopt in relation to persons
unfriendly to our cause who remain after the time limited by
General Hovey's order had expired.  It is now sunset, and all who
have not availed themselves of General Hovey's authority, and who
remain in Memphis, are supposed to be loyal and true men.

I will only say that I cannot allow the personal convenience of
even a large class of ladies to influence me in my determination to
make Memphis a safe place of operations for an army, and all people
who are unfriendly should forthwith prepare to depart in such
direction as I may hereafter indicate.

Surgeons are not liable to be made prisoners of war, but they
should not reside within the lines of an army which they regard as
hostile.  The situation would be too delicate.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


HEADQUARTERS, MEMPHIS, July 24, 1862

SAMUEL SAWYER, Esq., Editor Union Appeal, Memphis.

DEAR SIR: It is well I should come to an understanding at once
with the press as well as the people of Memphis, which I am ordered
to command; which means, to control for the interest, welfare; and
glory of the whole Government of the United States.

Personalities in a newspaper are wrong and criminal.  Thus, though
you meant to be complimentary in your sketch of my career, you make
more than a dozen mistakes of fact, which I need not correct, as I
don't desire my biography to be written till I am dead.  It is
enough for the world to know that I live and am a soldier, bound to
obey the orders of my superiors, the laws of my country, and to
venerate its Constitution; and that, when discretion is given me, I
shall exercise it wisely and account to my superiors.

I regard your article headed "City Council--General Sherman and
Colonel Slack," as highly indiscreet.  Of course, no person who can
jeopardize the safety of Memphis can remain here, much less
exercise public authority; but I must take time, and be satisfied
that injustice be not done.

If the parties named be the men you describe, the fact should not
be published, to put them on their guard and thus to encourage
their escape.  The evidence should be carefully collected,
authenticated, and then placed in my hands.  But your statement of
facts is entirely qualified; in my mind, and loses its force by
your negligence of the very simple facts within your reach as to
myself: I had been in the army six years in 1846; am not related by
blood to any member of Lucas, Turner & Co.; was associated with
them in business six years (instead of two); am not colonel of the
Fifteenth Infantry, but of the Thirteenth.  Your correction, this
morning, of the acknowledged error as to General Denver and others,
is still erroneous.  General Morgan L. Smith did not belong to my
command at the battle of Shiloh at all, but he was transferred to
my division just before reaching Corinth.  I mention these facts in
kindness, to show you how wrong it is to speak of persons.

I will attend to the judge, mayor, Boards of Aldermen, and
policemen, all in good time.

Use your influence to reestablish system, order, government.  You
may rest easy that no military commander is going to neglect
internal safety, or to guard against external danger; but to do
right requires time, and more patience than I usually possess.  If
I find the press of Memphis actuated by high principle and a sole
devotion to their country, I will be their best friend; but, if I
find them personal, abusive, dealing in innuendoes and hints at a
blind venture, and looking to their own selfish aggrandizement and
fame, then they had better look out; for I regard such persons as
greater enemies to their country and to mankind than the men who,
from a mistaken sense of State pride, have taken up muskets, and
fight us about as hard as we care about.  In haste, but in
kindness, yours, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.




HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, July 27, 1882.

JOHN PARK, Mayor of Memphis, present.

Sir: Yours of July 24th is before me, and has received, as all
similar papers ever will, my careful and most respectful
consideration.  I have the most unbounded respect for the civil
law, courts, and authorities, and shall do all in my power to
restore them to their proper use, viz., the protection of life,
liberty, and property.

Unfortunately, at this time, civil war prevails in the land, and
necessarily the military, for the time being, must be superior to
the civil authority, but it does not therefore destroy it.  Civil
courts and executive officers should still exist and perform
duties, without which civil or municipal bodies would soon pass
into disrespect--an end to be avoided.  I am glad to find in
Memphis a mayor and municipal authorities not only in existence,
but in the co-exercise of important functions, and I shall endeavor
to restore one or more civil tribunals for the arbitration of
contracts and punishment of crimes, which the military have neither
time nor inclination to interfere with.  Among these, first in
importance is the maintenance of order, peace, and quiet, within
the jurisdiction of Memphis.  To insure this, I will keep a strong
provost guard in the city, but will limit their duty to guarding
public property held or claimed by the United States, and for the
arrest and confinement of State prisoners and soldiers who are
disorderly or improperly away from their regiments.  This guard
ought not to arrest citizens for disorder or minor crimes.  This
should be done by the city police.  I understand that the city
police is too weak in numbers to accomplish this perfectly, and I
therefore recommend that the City Council at once take steps to
increase this force to a number which, in their judgment, day and
night can enforce your ordinances as to peace, quiet, and order; so
that any change in our military dispositions will not have a
tendency to leave your people unguarded.  I am willing to instruct
the provost guard to assist the police force when any combination
is made too strong for them to overcome; but the city police should
be strong enough for any probable contingency.  The cost of
maintaining this police force must necessarily fall upon all
citizens equitably.  I am not willing, nor do I think it good
policy, for the city authorities to collect the taxes belonging to
the State and County, as you recommend; for these would have to be
refunded.  Better meet the expenses at once by a new tax on all
interested.  Therefore, if you, on consultation with the proper
municipal body, will frame a good bill for the increase of your
police force, and for raising the necessary means for their support
and maintenance, I will approve it and aid you in the collection of
the tax.  Of course, I cannot suggest how this tax should be laid,
but I think that it should be made uniform on all interests, real
estate, and personal property, including money, and merchandise.

All who are protected should share the expenses in proportion to
the interests involved.  I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
MEMPHIS, August 7, 1862.

Captain FITCH, Assistant Quartermaster, Memphis, Tennessee.

SIR: The duties devolving on the quartermaster of this post, in
addition to his legitimate functions, are very important and
onerous, and I am fully aware that the task is more than should
devolve on one man.  I will endeavor to get you help in the person
of some commissioned officer, and, if possible, one under bond, as
he must handle large amounts of money in trust; but, for the
present, we most execute the duties falling to our share as well as
possible.  On the subject of vacant houses, General Grant's orders
are: "Take possession of all vacant stores and houses in the city,
and have them rented at reasonable rates; rent to be paid monthly
in advance.  These buildings, with their tenants, can be turned
over to proprietors on proof of loyalty; also take charge of such
as have been leased out by disloyal owners."

I understand that General Grant takes the rents and profits of this
class of real property under the rules and laws of war, and not
under the confiscation act of Congress; therefore the question of
title is not involved simply the possession, and the rents and
profits of houses belonging to our enemies, which are not vacant,
we hold in trust for them or the Government, according to the
future decisions of the proper tribunals.

Mr. McDonald, your chief agent in renting and managing this
business, called on me last evening and left with me written
questions, which it would take a volume to answer and a Webster to
elucidate; but as we can only attempt plain, substantial justice, I
will answer these questions as well as I can, briefly and to the
point.

First.  When ground is owned by parties who have gone south, and
have leased the ground to parties now in the city who own the
improvements on the ground?

Answer.  The United States takes the rents due the owner of the
land; does not disturb the owner of the improvements.

Second.  When parties owning houses have gone south, and the tenant
has given his notes for the rent in advance?

Answer.  Notes are mere evidence of the debt due landlord.  The
tenant pays the rent to the quartermaster, who gives a bond of
indemnity against the notes representing the debt for the
particular rent.

Third.  When the tenant has expended several months' rent in
repairs on the house?

Answer.  Of course, allow all such credits on reasonable proof and
showing.

Fourth.  When the owner has gone south, and parties here hold liens
on the property and are collecting the rents to satisfy their
liens?

Answer.  The rent of a house can only be mortgaged to a person in
possession.  If a loyal tenant be in possession and claim the rent
from himself as due to himself on some other debt, allow it; but,
if not in actual possession of the property, rents are not good
liens for a debt, but must be paid to the quartermaster.

Fifth.  Of parties claiming foreign protection?

Answer.  Many claim foreign protection who are not entitled to it.
If they are foreign subjects residing for business in this,
country, they are entitled to consideration and protection so
long as they obey the laws of the country.  If they occupy
houses belonging to absent rebels, they must pay rent to the
quarter-master.  If they own property, they must occupy it by
themselves, tenants, or servants.

Eighth.  When houses are occupied and the owner has gone south,
leaving an agent to collect rent for his benefit?

Answer.  Rent must be paid to the quartermaster.  No agent can
collect and remit money south without subjecting himself to arrest
and trial for aiding and abetting the public enemy.

Ninth..  When houses are owned by loyal citizens, but are
unoccupied?

Answer.  Such should not be disturbed, but it would be well to
advise them to have some servant at the house to occupy it.

Tenth.  When parties who occupy the house are creditors of the
owner, who has gone south? Answer.  You only look to collection of
rents.  Any person who transmits money south is liable to arrest
and trial for aiding and abetting the enemy; but I do not think it
our business to collect debts other than rents.

Eleventh.  When the parties who own the property have left the city
under General Hovey's Order No. 1, but are in the immediate
neighborhood, on their plantations?

Answer.  It makes no difference where they are, so they are absent.

Twelfth.  When movable property is found in stores that are closed?

Answer.  The goods are security for the rent.  If the owner of the
goods prefers to remove the goods to paying rent, he can do so.

Thirteenth.  When the owner lives in town, and refuses to take the
oath of allegiance?

Answer.  If the house be occupied, it does not fall under the
order.  If the house be vacant, it does.  The owner can recover his
property by taking the oath.

All persons in Memphis residing within our military lines are
presumed to be loyal, good citizens, and may at any moment be
called to serve on juries, posses comitatua, or other civil service
required by the Constitution and laws of our country.  Should they
be called upon to do such duty, which would require them to
acknowledge their allegiance and subordination to the Constitution
of the United States, it would then be too late to refuse.  So long
as they remain quiet and conform to these laws, they are entitled
to protection in their property and lives.

We have nothing to do with confiscation.  We only deal with
possession, and therefore the necessity of a strict accountability,
because the United States assumes the place of trustee, and must
account to the rightful owner for his property, rents, and profits.
In due season courts will be established to execute the laws, the
confiscation act included, when we will be relieved of this duty
and trust.  Until that time, every opportunity should be given to
the wavering and disloyal to return to their allegiance to the
Constitution of their birth or adoption.  I am, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN.

Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, August 26,1862

Major-General GRANT, Corinth, Mississippi.

Sir: In pursuance of your request that I should keep you advised of
matters of interest here, in addition to the purely official
matters, I now write.

I dispatched promptly the thirteen companies of cavalry, nine of
Fourth Illinois, and four of Eleventh Illinois, to their respective
destinations, punctually on the 23d instant, although the order was
only received on the 22d.  I received at the same time, from
Colonel Dickey, the notice that the bridge over Hatchie was burned,
and therefore I prescribed their order of march via Bolivar.  They
started at 12 m.  of the 23d, and I have no news of them since.
None of the cavalry ordered to me is yet heard from.

The guerrillas have destroyed several bridges over Wolf Creek; one
at Raleigh, on the road by which I had prescribed trade and travel
to and from the city.  I have a strong guard at the lower bridge
over Wolf River, by which we can reach the country to the north of
that stream; but, as the Confederates have burned their own
bridges, I will hold them to my order, and allow no trade over any
other road than the one prescribed, using the lower or Randolph
road for our own convenience.  I am still satisfied there is no
large force of rebels anywhere in the neighborhood.  All the navy
gunboats are below except the St. Louis, which lies off the city.
When Commodore Davis passes down from Cairo, I will try to see him,
and get him to exchange the St. Louis for a fleeter boat not
iron-clad; one that can move up and down the river, to break up
ferry-boats and canoes, and to prevent all passing across the
river.  Of course, in spite of all our efforts, smuggling is
carried on.  We occasionally make hauls of clothing, gold-lace,
buttons, etc., but I am satisfied that salt and arms are got to the
interior somehow.  I have addressed the Board of Trade a letter on
this point, which will enable us to control it better.

You may have been troubled at hearing reports of drunkenness here.
There was some after pay-day, but generally all is as quiet and
orderly as possible.  I traverse the city every day and night, and
assert that Memphis is and has been as orderly a city as St. Louis,
Cincinnati, or New York.

Before the city authorities undertook to license saloons, there was
as much whiskey here as now, and it would take all my command as
customhouse inspectors, to break open all the parcels and packages
containing liquor.  I can destroy all groggeries and shops where
soldiers get liquor just as we would in St. Louis.

The newspapers are accusing me of cruelty to the sick; as base a
charge as was ever made.  I would not let the Sanitary Committee
carry off a boat-load of sick, because I have no right to.  We have
good hospitals here, and plenty of them.  Our regimental hospitals
are in the camps of the men, and the sick do much better there than
in the general hospitals; so say my division surgeon and the
regimental surgeons.  The civilian doctors would, if permitted,
take away our entire command.  General Curtis sends his sick up
here, but usually no nurses; and it is not right that nurses should
be taken from my command for his sick.  I think that, when we are
endeavoring to raise soldiers and to instruct them, it is bad
policy to keep them at hospitals as attendants and nurses.

I send you Dr. Derby's acknowledgment that he gave the leave of
absence of which he was charged.  I have placed him in arrest, in
obedience to General Halleck's orders, but he remains in charge of
the Overton Hospital, which is not full of patients.

The State Hospital also is not full, and I cannot imagine what Dr.
Derby wants with the Female Academy on Vance Street.  I will see
him again, and now that he is the chief at Overton Hospital, I
think he will not want the academy.  Still, if he does, under your
orders I will cause it to be vacated by the children and Sisters of
Mercy.  They have just advertised for more scholars, and will be
sadly disappointed.  If, however, this building or any other be
needed for a hospital, it must be taken; but really, in my heart, I
do not see what possible chance there is, under present
circumstances, of filling with patients the two large hospitals now
in use, besides the one asked for.  I may, however, be mistaken in
the particular building asked for by Dr. Derby, and will go myself
to see.

The fort is progressing well, Captain Jenney having arrived.
Sixteen heavy guns are received, with a large amount of shot and
shell, but the platforms are not yet ready; still, if occasion
should arise for dispatch, I can put a larger force to work.
Captain Prime, when here, advised that the work should proceed
regularly under the proper engineer officers and laborers.
I am, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, September 4, 1862

Colonel J. C, KELTON, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of
the army, Washington, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL: Please acknowledge to the major-general commanding
the receipt by me of his letter, and convey to him my assurances
that I have promptly modified my first instructions about cotton,
so as to conform to his orders.  Trade in cotton is now free, but
in all else I endeavor so to control it that the enemy shall
receive no contraband goods, or any aid or comfort; still I feel
sure that the officers of steamboats are sadly tempted by high
prices to land salt and other prohibited articles at waypoints
along the river.  This, too, in time will be checked.  All seems
well here and hereabout; no large body of the enemy within striking
distance.  A force of about two thousand, cavalry passed through
Grand Junction north last Friday, and fell on a detachment of the
Bolivar army at Middleburg, the result of which is doubtless
reported to you.  As soon as I heard of the movement, I dispatched
a force to the southeast by way of diversion, and am satisfied that
the enemy's infantry and artillery fell back in consequence behind
the Tallahatchie.  The weather is very hot, country very dry, and
dust as bad as possible.  I hold my two divisions ready, with their
original complement of transportation, for field service.  Of
course all things most now depend on events in front of Washington
and in Kentucky.  The gunboat Eastport and four transports loaded
with prisoners of war destined for Vicksburg have been lying before
Memphis for two days, but are now steaming up to resume their
voyage.  Our fort progresses well, but our guns are not yet
mounted.  The engineers are now shaping the banquette to receive
platforms.  I expect Captain Prime from Corinth in two or three
days.

I am, with great respect, yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, September 21, 1862

Editor Bulletin.

SIR: Your comments on the recent orders of Generals Halleck and
McClellan afford the occasion appropriate for me to make public the
fact that there is a law of Congress, as old as our Government
itself, but reenacted on the 10th of April, 1806, and in force ever
since.  That law reads:

"All officers and soldiers are to behave themselves orderly in
quarters and on the march; and whoever shall commit any waste or
spoil, either in walks of trees, parks, warrens, fish-ponds, houses
and gardens, cornfields, inclosures or meadows, or shall
maliciously destroy any property whatever belonging to the
inhabitants of the United States, unless by order of the
commander-in-chief of the armies of said United States, shall
(besides such penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished
according to the nature and degree of the offense, by the judgment
of a general or regimental court-martial."

Such is the law of Congress; and the orders of the commander-
in-chief are, that officers or soldiers convicted of straggling and
pillaging shall be punished with death.  These orders have not come
to me officially, but I have seen them in newspapers, and am
satisfied that they express the determination of the commander-
in-chief.  Straggling and pillaging have ever been great military
crimes; and every officer and soldier in my command knows what
stress I have laid upon them, and that, so far as in my power lies,
I will punish them to the full extent of the law and orders.

The law is one thing, the execution of the law another.  God
himself has commanded: "Thou shalt not kill,"  "thou shalt not
steal,"  "thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods," etc.  Will
any one say these things are not done now as well as before these
laws were announced at Sinai.  I admit the law to be that "no officer
or soldier of the United States shall commit waste or destruction
of cornfields, orchards, potato-patches, or any kind of pillage on
the property of friend or foe near Memphis," and that I stand
prepared to execute the law as far as possible.

No officer or soldier should enter the house or premises of any
peaceable citizen, no matter what his politics, unless on business;
and no such officer or soldier can force an entrance unless he have
a written order from a commanding officer or provost-marshal, which
written authority must be exhibited if demanded.  When property
such as forage, building or other materials are needed by the
United States, a receipt will be given by the officer taking them,
which receipt should be presented to the quartermaster, who will
substitute therefor a regular voucher, to be paid-according to the
circumstances of the case.  If the officer refuse to give such
receipt, the citizen may fairly infer that the property is
wrongfully taken, and he should, for his own protection, ascertain
the name, rank, and regiment of the officer, and report him in
writing.  If any soldier commits waste or destruction, the person
whose property is thus wasted must find out the name, company, and
regiment of the actual transgressor.  In order to punish there must
be a trial, and there must be testimony.  It is not sufficient that
a general accusation be made, that soldiers are doing this or that.
I cannot punish my whole command, or a whole battalion, because one
or two bad soldiers do wrong.  The punishment must reach the
perpetrators, and no one can identify them as well as the party who
is interested.  The State of Tennessee does not hold itself
responsible for acts of larceny committed by her citizens, nor does
the United Staten or any other nation.  These are individual acts
of wrong, and punishment can only be inflicted on the wrong-doer.
I know the difficulty of identifying particular soldiers, but
difficulties do not alter the importance of principles of justice.
They should stimulate the parties to increase their efforts to find
out the actual perpetrators of the crime.

Colonels of regiments and commanders of corps are liable to severe
punishment for permitting their men to leave their camps to commit
waste or destruction; but I know full well that many of the acts
attributed to soldiers are committed by citizens and negroes, and
are charged to soldiers because of a desire to find fault with
them; but this only reacts upon the community and increases the
mischief.  While every officer would willingly follow up an
accusation against any one or more of his men whose names or
description were given immediately after the discovery of the act,
he would naturally resent any general charge against his good men,
for the criminal conduct of a few bad ones.

I have examined into many of the cases of complaint made in this
general way, and have felt mortified that our soldiers should do
acts which are nothing more or less than stealing, but I was
powerless without some clew whereby to reach the rightful party.  I
know that the great mass of our soldiers would scorn to steal or
commit crime, and I will not therefore entertain vague and general
complaints, but stand, prepared always to follow up any reasonable
complaint when the charge is definite and the names of witnesses
furnished.

I know, moreover, in some instances when our soldiers are
complained of, that they have been insulted by sneering remarks
about "Yankees,"  "Northern barbarians,"  "Lincoln's hirelings,"
etc.  People who use such language must seek redress through some
one else, for I will not tolerate insults to our country or cause.
When people forget their obligations to a Government that made them
respected among the nations of the earth, and speak contemptuously
of the flag which is the silent emblem of that country, I will not
go out of my way to protect them or their property.  I will punish
the soldiers for trespass or waste if adjudged by a court-martial,
because they disobey orders; but soldiers are men and citizens as
well as soldiers, and should promptly resent any insult to their
country, come from what quarter it may.  I mention this phase
because it is too common.  Insult to a soldier does not justify
pillage, but it takes from the officer the disposition he would
otherwise feel to follow up the inquiry and punish the wrong-doers.

Again, armies in motion or stationary must commit some waste.
Flankers must let down fences and cross fields; and, when an attack
is contemplated or apprehended, a command will naturally clear the
ground of houses, fences, and trees.  This is waste, but is the
natural consequence of war, chargeable on those who caused the war.
So in fortifying a place, dwelling-houses must be taken, materials
used, even wasted, and great damage done, which in the end may
prove useless.  This, too, is an expense not chargeable to us, but
to those who made the war; and generally war is destruction and
nothing else.

We must bear this in mind, that however peaceful things look, we
are really at war; and much that looks like waste or destruction is
only the removal of objects that obstruct our fire, or would afford
cover to an enemy.

This class of waste must be distinguished from the wanton waste
committed by army-stragglers, which is wrong, and can be punished
by the death-penalty if proper testimony can be produced.

Yours, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


Satisfied that, in the progress of the war, Memphis would become an
important depot, I pushed forward the construction of Fort
Pickering, kept most of the troops in camps back of the city, and
my own headquarters remained in tents on the edge of the city, near
Mr. Moon's house, until, on the approach of winter, Mrs. Sherman
came down with the children to visit me, when I took a house nearer
the fort.

All this time battalion and brigade drills were enforced, so that,
when the season approached for active operations farther south, I
had my division in the best possible order, and about the 1st of
November it was composed as follows:

First Brigade, Brigadier-General M. L. SMITH--Eighth Missouri,
Colonel G. A. Smith; Sixth Missouri, Colonel Peter E. Bland; One
Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, Colonel George B. Hoge;
Fifty-fourth Ohio, Colonel T. Kilby Smith; One Hundred and
Twentieth Illinois, Colonel G. W. McKeaig.

Second Brigade, Colonel JOHN ADAIR McDOWELL.--Sixth Iowa,
Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Corse; Fortieth Illinois, Colonel J. W.
Booth; Forty-sixth Ohio, Colonel O. C. Walcutt; Thirteenth United
States Infantry, First Battalion, Major D. Chase.

Third Brigade, Brigadier-General J. W. DENVER.--Forty-eighth Ohio,
Colonel P. J. Sullivan; Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel W. S. Jones;
Seventieth Ohio, Colonel J. R. Cockerill.

Fourth Brigade, Colonel DAVID STUART.--Fifty-fifth Illinois,
Colonel O. Malmburg; Fifty-seventh Ohio, Colonel W. Mungen;
Eighty-third Indiana, Colonel B. Spooner; One Hundred and Sixteenth
Illinois, Colonel Tupper; One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois,
Lieutenant-Colonel Eldridge.

Fifth Brigade, Colonel R. P. BUCKLAND.--Seventy-second Ohio,
Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. C. Loudon; Thirty-second Wisconsin,
Colonel J. W. Howe; Ninety-third Indiana, Colonel Thomas;
Ninety-third Illinois, Major J. M. Fisher.


Subsequently, Brigadier-General J. G. Lauman arrived at Memphis,
and I made up a sixth brigade, and organized these six brigades
into three divisions, under Brigadier-Generals M. L. Smith, J. W.
Denver, and J. G. Lauman.

About the 17th of November I received an order from General Grant,
dated:

LAGRANGE, November 16, 1862.

Meet me at Columbus, Kentucky, on Thursday next.  If you have a
good map of the country south of you, take it up with you.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


I started forthwith by boat, and met General Grant, who had reached
Columbus by the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee.  He explained to
me that he proposed to move against Pemberton, then intrenched on a
line behind the Tallahatchie River below Holly Springs; that he
would move on Holly Springs and Abberville, from Grand Junction;
that McPherson, with the troops at Corinth, would aim to make
junction with him at Holly Springs; and that he wanted me to leave
in Memphis a proper garrison, and to aim for the Tallahatchie, so
as to come up on his right by a certain date.  He further said that
his ultimate object was to capture Vicksburg, to open the
navigation of the Mississippi River, and that General Halleck had
authorized him to call on the troops in the Department of Arkansas,
then commanded by General S. R. Curtis, for cooperation.  I
suggested to him that if he would request General Curtis to send an
expedition from some point on the Mississippi, near Helena, then
held in force, toward Grenada, to the rear of Pemberton, it would
alarm him for the safety of his communications, and would assist us
materially in the proposed attack on his front.  He authorized me
to send to the commanding officer at Helena a request to that
effect, and, as soon as I reached Memphis, I dispatched my aide,
Major McCoy, to Helena, who returned, bringing me a letter from
General Frederick Steele, who had just reached Helena with
Osterhaus's division, and who was temporarily in command, General
Curtis having gone to St. Louis.  This letter contained the
assurance that he "would send from Friar's Point a large force
under Brigadier-General A. P. Hovey in the direction of Grenada,
aiming to reach the Tallahatchie at Charleston, on the next Monday,
Tuesday, or Wednesday (December 1st) at furthest."  My command was
appointed to start on Wednesday, November 24th, and meantime
Major-General S. A. Hurlbut, having reported for duty, was assigned
to the command of Memphis, with four regiments of infantry one
battery of artillery, two companies of Thielman's cavalry and the
certain prospect of soon receiving a number of new regiments, known
to be en route.

I marched out of Memphis punctually with three small divisions,
taking different roads till we approached the Tallahatchie, when we
converged on Wyatt to cross the river, there a bold, deep stream,
with a newly-constructed fort behind.  I had Grierson's Sixth
Illinois Cavalry with me, and with it opened communication with
General Grant when we were abreast of Holly Springs.  We reached
Wyatt on the 2d day of December without the least opposition, and
there learned that Pemberton's whole army had fallen back to the
Yalabusha near Grenada, in a great measure by reason of the
exaggerated reports concerning the Helena force, which had reached
Charleston; and some of General Hovey's cavalry, under General
Washburn, having struck the railroad in the neighborhood of
Coffeeville, naturally alarmed General Pemberton for the safety of
his communications, and made him let go his Tallahatchie line with
all the forts which he had built at great cost in labor.  We had to
build a bridge at Wyatt, which consumed a couple of days, and on
the 5th of December my whole command was at College Hill, ten miles
from Oxford, whence I reported to General Grant in Oxford.

On the 8th I received the following letter:

OXFORD MISSISSIPPI, December 8, 1862--Morning

General SHERMAN, College Hill.

DEAR GENERAL: The following is a copy of dispatch just received
from Washington:


WASHINGTON, December 7, 1862--12M

General GRANT:

The capture of Grenada may change our plans in regard to Vicksburg.
You will move your troops as you may deem best to accomplish the
great object in view.  You will retain, till further orders, all
troops of General Curtis now in your department.  Telegraph to
General Allen in St. Louis for all steamboats you may require.  Ask
Porter to cooperate.  Telegraph what are your present plans.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in.-Chief.


I wish you would come over this evening and stay to-night, or come
in the morning.  I would like to talk with you about this matter.
My notion is to send two divisions back to Memphis, and fix upon a
day when they should effect a landing, and press from here with
this command at the proper time to cooperate.  If I do not do this
I will move our present force to Grenada, including Steele's,
repairing road as we proceed, and establish a depot of provisions
there.  When a good ready is had, to move immediately on Jackson,
Mississippi, cutting loose from the road.  Of the two plans I look
most favorably on the former.

Come over and we will talk this matter over.
Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


I repaired at once to Oxford, and found General Grant in a large
house with all his staff, and we discussed every possible chance.
He explained to me that large reenforcements had been promised,
which would reach Memphis very soon, if not already there; that the
entire gunboat fleet, then under the command of Admiral D. D.
Porter, would cooperate; that we could count on a full division
from the troops at Helena; and he believed that, by a prompt
movement, I could make a lodgment up the Yazoo and capture
Vicksburg from the rear; that its garrison was small, and he, at
Oxford, would so handle his troops as to hold Pemberton away from
Vicksburg.  I also understood that, if Pemberton should retreat
south, he would follow him up, and would expect to find me at the
Yazoo River, if not inside of Vicksburg.  I confess, at that moment
I did not dream that General McClernand, or anybody else, was
scheming for the mere honor of capturing Vicksburg.  We knew at the
time that General Butler had been reenforced by General Banks at
New Orleans, and the latter was supposed to be working his way
up-stream from New Orleans, while we were working down.  That day
General Grant dispatched to General Halleck, in Washington, as
follows:

OXFORD, December 8, 1862.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

General Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi.
He will have a force of about forty thousand men; will land above
Vicksburg (up the Yazoo, if practicable), and out the Mississippi
Central road and the road running east from Vicksburg, where they
cross Black River.  I will cooperate from here, my movements
depending on those of the enemy.  With the large cavalry force now
at my command, I will be able to have them show themselves at
different points on the Tallahatchie and Yalabusha; and, when an
opportunity occurs, make a real attack.  After cutting the two
roads, General Sherman's movements to secure the end desired will
necessarily be left to his judgment.

I will occupy this road to Coffeeville.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


I was shown this dispatch before it was sent, and afterward the
general drew up for me the following letter of instructions in his
own handwriting, which I now possess:

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
OXFORD, Mississippi, December 8, 1862.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Right Wing Army In the
Field, present.

GENERAL: You will proceed with as little delay as practicable to
Memphis, Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present
command.  On your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all
the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at
present east of the Mississippi River, and organize them into
brigades and divisions in your own way.

As soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity
of Vicksburg, and, with the cooperation of the gunboat fleet under
command of Flag-Officer Porter, proceed to the reduction of that
place in such manner as circumstances and your own judgment may
dictate.

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary
to take, will be left entirely to yourself.

The quartermaster in St. Louis will be instructed to send you
transportation for thirty thousand men.  Should you still find
yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make
up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of
Memphis.

On arriving in Memphis put yourself in communication with Admiral
Porter, and arrange with him for his cooperation.

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will
embark, and such plans as may then be matured.  I will hold the
forces here in readiness to cooperate with you in such manner as
the movements of the enemy may make necessary.

Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient
officer and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the
siege-guns, and what  ever cavalry force may be there.

One regiment of infantry and at least a section of artillery will
also be left at Friar's Point or Delta, to protect the stores of
the cavalry post that will be left there.  Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


I also insert here another letter, dated the 14th instant, sent
afterward to me at Memphis, which completes all instructions
received by me governing the first movement against Vicksburg:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, December 14, 1862

Major-General SHERMAN, commanding, etc.,
Memphis, Tennessee.

I have not had one word from Grierson since he left, and am getting
uneasy about him.  I hope General Gorman will give you no
difficulty about retaining the troops on this side the river, and
Steele to command them.  The twenty-one thousand men you have, with
the twelve thousand from Helena, will make a good force.  The enemy
are as yet on the Yalabusha.  I am pushing down on them slowly, but
so as to keep up the impression of a continuous move.  I feel
particularly anxious to have the Helena cavalry on this side of the
river; if not now, at least after you start.  If Gorman will send
them, instruct them where to go and how to communicate with me.  My
headquarters will probably be in Coffeeville one week hence....  In
the mean time I will order transportation, etc.... It would be well
if you could have two or three small boats suitable for navigating
the Yazoo.  It may become necessary for me to look to that base for
supplies before we get through....

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


When we rode to Oxford from College Hill, there happened a little
circumstance which seems worthy of record.  While General Van Dorn
had his headquarters in Holly Springs, viz., in October, 1862, he
was very short of the comforts and luxuries of life, and resorted
to every possible device to draw from the abundant supplies in
Memphis.  He had no difficulty whatever in getting spies into the
town for information, but he had trouble in getting bulky supplies
out through our guards, though sometimes I connived at his supplies
of cigars, liquors, boots, gloves, etc., for his individual use;
but medicines and large supplies of all kinds were confiscated, if
attempted to be passed out.  As we rode that morning toward Oxford,
I observed in a farmer's barn-yard a wagon that looked like a city
furniture-wagon with springs.  We were always short of wagons, so I
called the attention of the quartermaster, Colonel J. Condit Smith,
saying, "There is a good wagon; go for it."  He dropped out of the
retinue with an orderly, and after we had ridden a mile or so he
overtook us, and I asked him, "What luck?"  He answered, "All
right; I have secured that wagon, and I also got another," and
explained that he had gone to the farmer's house to inquire about
the furniture-wagon, when the farmer said it did not belong to him,
but to some party in Memphis, adding that in his barn was another
belonging to the same party.  They went to the barn, and there
found a handsome city hearse, with pall and plumes.  The farmer
said they had had a big funeral out of Memphis, but when it reached
his house, the coffin was found to contain a fine assortment of
medicines for the use of Van Dorn's army.  Thus under the pretense
of a first-class funeral, they had carried through our guards the
very things we had tried to prevent.  It was a good trick, but
diminished our respect for such pageants afterward.

As soon as I was in possession of General Grant's instructions of
December 8th, with a further request that I should dispatch Colonel
Grierson, with his cavalry, across by land to Helena, to notify
General Steele of the general plan, I returned to College Hill,
selected the division of Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith to
return with me to Memphis; started Grierson on his errand to
Helena, and ordered Generals Denver and Lauman to report to General
Grant for further orders.  We started back by the most direct
route, reached Memphis by noon of December 12th, and began
immediately the preparations for the Vicksburg movement.  There I
found two irregular divisions which had arrived at Memphis in my
absence, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General A. J. Smith
and Brigadier-General George W. Morgan.  These were designated the
First and Third Divisions, leaving the Second Division of Morgan Z.
Smith to retain its original name and number.

I also sent orders, in the name of General Grant, to General
Gorman, who meantime had replaced General Steele in command of
Helena, in lieu of the troops which had been east of the
Mississippi and had returned, to make up a strong division to
report to me on my way down.  This division was accordingly
organized, and was commanded by Brigadier-General Frederick Steele,
constituting my Fourth Division.

Meantime a large fleet of steamboats was assembling from St. Louis
and Cairo, and Admiral Porter dropped down to Memphis with his
whole gunboat fleet, ready to cooperate in the movement.  The
preparations were necessarily hasty in the extreme, but this was
the essence of the whole plan, viz., to reach Vicksburg as it were
by surprise, while General Grant held in check Pemberton's army
about Grenada, leaving me to contend only with the smaller garrison
of Vicksburg and its well-known strong batteries and defenses.  On
the 19th the Memphis troops were embarked, and steamed down to
Helena, where on the 21st General Steele's division was also
embarked; and on the 22d we were all rendezvoused at Friar's Point,
in the following order, viz.:

Steamer Forest Queen, general headquarters, and battalion
Thirteenth United States Infantry.

First Division, Brigadier-General A. J. SMITH.--Steamers Des Arc,
division headquarters and escort; Metropolitan, Sixth Indiana; J.
H. Dickey, Twenty-third Wisconsin; J. C. Snow, Sixteenth Indiana;
Hiawatha, Ninety-sixth Ohio; J. S. Pringle, Sixty-seventh Indiana;
J. W. Cheeseman, Ninth Kentucky; R. Campbell, Ninety-seventh
Indiana; Duke of Argyle, Seventy-seventh Illinois; City of Alton,
One Hundred and Eighth and Forty-eighth Ohio; City of Louisiana,
Mercantile Battery; Ohio Belle, Seventeenth Ohio Battery; Citizen,
Eighty-third Ohio; Champion, commissary-boat; General Anderson,
Ordnance.

Second Division,, Brigadier-General M. L. SMITH.--Steamers
Chancellor, headquarters, and Thielman's cavalry; Planet, One
Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois; City of Memphis, Batteries A and B
(Missouri Artillery), Eighth Missouri, and section of Parrott guns;
Omaha, Fifty-seventh Ohio; Sioux City, Eighty-third Indiana; Spread
Eagle, One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois; Ed.  Walsh, One
Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois; Westmoreland, Fifty-fifth
Illinois, headquarters Fourth Brigade; Sunny South, Fifty-fourth
Ohio; Universe, Sixth Missouri; Robert Allen, commissary-boat.

Third Division, Brigadier-General G. W. MORGAN.--Steamers Empress,
division headquarters; Key West, One Hundred and Eighteenth
Illinois; Sam Gaty, Sixty-ninth Indiana; Northerner, One Hundred
and Twentieth Ohio; Belle Peoria, headquarters Second Brigade, two
companies Forty-ninth Ohio, and pontoons; Die Vernon, Third
Kentucky; War Eagle, Forty-ninth Indiana (eight companies), and
Foster's battery; Henry von Phul, headquarters Third Brigade, and
eight companies Sixteenth Ohio; Fanny Bullitt, One Hundred and
Fourteenth Ohio, and Lamphere's battery; Crescent City,
Twenty-second Kentucky and Fifty-fourth Indiana; Des Moines,
Forty-second Ohio; Pembina, Lamphere's and Stone's batteries; Lady
Jackson, commissary-boat.

Fourth Division, Brigadier-General FREDERICK STEELE--Steamers
Continental, headquarters, escort and battery; John J. Roe, Fourth
and Ninth Iowa; Nebraska, Thirty-first Iowa; Key West, First Iowa
Artillery; John Warner, Thirteenth Illinois; Tecumseh, Twenty-sixth
Iowa; Decatur, Twenty-eighth Iowa; Quitman, Thirty-fourth Iowa;
Kennett, Twenty ninth Missouri; Gladiator, Thirtieth Missouri;
Isabella, Thirty-first Missouri; D. G. Taylor, quartermaster's
stores and horses; Sucker State, Thirty-second Missouri; Dakota,
Third Missouri; Tutt, Twelfth Missouri Emma, Seventeenth Missouri;
Adriatic, First Missouri; Meteor, Seventy-sixth Ohio; Polar Star,
Fifty-eighth Ohio.


At the same time were communicated the following instructions:

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING, THIRTEENTH ARMY Corps
FOREST QUEEN, December 23, 1882.

To Commanders of Divisions, Generals F. STEELE, GEORGE W. MORGAN,
A.J. SMITH, and M. L. SMITH

With this I hand to each of you a copy of a map, compiled from the
best sources, and which in the main is correct.  It is the same
used by Admiral Porter and myself.  Complete military success can
only be accomplished by united action on some general plan,
embracing usually a large district of country.  In the present
instance, our object is to secure the navigation of the Mississippi
River and its main branches, and to hold them as military channels
of communication and for commercial purposes.  The river, above
Vicksburg, has been gained by conquering the country to its rear,
rendering its possession by our enemy useless and unsafe to him,
and of great value to us.  But the enemy still holds the river from
Vicksburg to Baton Rouge, navigating it with his boats, and the
possession of it enables him to connect his communications and
routes of supply, east and west.  To deprive him of this will be a
severe blow, and, if done effectually, will be of great advantage
to us, and probably, the most decisive act of the war.  To
accomplish this important result we are to act our part--an
important one of the great whole.  General Banks, with a large
force, has reinforced General Butler in Louisiana, and from that
quarter an expedition, by water and land, is coming northward.
General Grant, with the Thirteenth Army Corps, of which we compose
the right wing, is moving southward.  The naval squadron (Admiral
Porter) is operating with his gunboat fleet by water, each in
perfect harmony with the other.

General Grant's left and centre were at last accounts approaching
the Yalabusha, near Grenada, and the railroad to his rear, by which
he drew his supplies, was reported to be seriously damaged.  This
may disconcert him somewhat, but only makes more important our line
of operations.  At the Yalabusha General Grant may encounter the
army of General Pemberton, the same which refused him battle on the
line of the Tallahatchie, which was strongly fortified; but, as he
will not have time to fortify it, he will hardly stand there; and,
in that event, General Grant will immediately advance down the high
ridge between the Big Black and Yazoo, and will expect to meet us
on the Yazoo and receive from us the supplies which he needs, and
which he knows we carry along.  Parts of this general plan are to
cooperate with the naval squadron in the reduction of Vicksburg; to
secure possession of the land lying between the Yazoo and Big
Black; and to act in concert with General Grant against Pemberton's
forces, supposed to have Jackson, Mississippi, as a point of
concentration.  Vicksburg is doubtless very strongly fortified,
both against the river and land approaches.  Already the gunboats
have secured the Yazoo up for twenty-three miles, to a fort on the
Yazoo at Haines's Bluff, giving us a choice for a landing-place at
some point up the Yazoo below this fort, or on the island which
lies between Vicksburg and the present mouth of the Yazoo.  (See
map [b, c, d], Johnson's plantation.)

     But, before any actual collision with the enemy, I purpose,
after our whole land force is rendezvoused at Gaines's Landing,
Arkansas, to proceed in order to Milliken's Bend (a), and there
dispatch a brigade, without wagons or any incumbrances whatever, to
the Vicksburg & Shreveport Railroad (at h and k), to destroy that
effectually, and to cut off that fruitful avenue of supply; then to
proceed to the mouth of the Yazoo, and, after possessing ourselves
of the latest and most authentic information from naval officers
now there, to land our whole force on the Mississippi side, and
then to reach the point where the Vicksburg & Jackson Railroad
crosses the Big Black (f); after which to attack Vicksburg by land,
while the gun-boats assail it by water.  It may be necessary
(looking to Grant's approach), before attacking Vicksburg, to
reduce the battery at Haine's Bluff first, so as to enable some of
the lighter gunboats and transports to ascend the Yazoo and
communicate with General Grant.  The detailed manner of
accomplishing all these results will be communicated in due season,
and these general points are only made known at this time, that
commanders may study the maps, and also that in the event of
non-receipt of orders all may act in perfect concert by following
the general movement, unless specially detached.

You all now have the same map, so that no mistakes or confusion
need result from different names of localities.  All possible
preparations as to wagons, provisions, axes, and intrenching-tools,
should be made in advance, so that when we do land there will be no
want of them.  When we begin to act on shore, we must do the work
quickly and effectually.  The gunboats under Admiral Porter will do
their full share, and I feel every assurance that the army will not
fall short in its work.

Division commanders may read this to regimental commanders, and
furnish brigade commanders a copy.  They should also cause as many
copies of the map to be made on the same scale as possible, being
very careful in copying the names.

The points marked e and g (Allan's and Mount Albans) are evidently
strategical points that will figure in our future operations, and
these positions should be well studied.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


The Mississippi boats were admirably calculated for handling
troops, horses, guns, stores, etc., easy of embarkation and
disembarkation, and supplies of all kinds were abundant, except
fuel.  For this we had to rely on wood, but most of the wood-yards,
so common on the river before the war, had been exhausted, so that
we had to use fence-rails, old dead timber, the logs of houses,
etc.  Having abundance of men and plenty of axes, each boat could
daily procure a supply.

In proceeding down the river, one or more of Admiral Porter's
gunboats took the lead; others were distributed throughout the
column, and some brought up the rear.  We manoeuvred by divisions
and brigades when in motion, and it was a magnificent sight as we
thus steamed down the river.  What few inhabitants remained at the
plantations on the river-bank were unfriendly, except the slaves;
some few guerrilla-parties infested the banks, but did not dare to
molest so, strong a force as I then commanded.

We reached Milliken's Bend on Christmas-day, when I detached one
brigade (Burbridge's), of A. J. Smith's division, to the southwest,
to break up the railroad leading from Vicksburg toward Shreveport,
Louisiana.  Leaving A. J. Smith's division there to await the
return of Burbridge, the remaining three divisions proceeded, on
the 26th, to the mouth of the Yazoo, and up that river to
Johnson's plantation, thirteen miles, and there disembarked
Steele's division above the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou, Morgans
division near the house of Johnson (which had been burned by the
gunboats on a former occasion), and M. L. Smith's just below.  A.
J. Smith's division arrived the next night, and disembarked below
that of M. L. Smith.  The place of our disembarkation was in fact
an island, separated from the high bluff known as Walnut Hills, on
which the town of Vicksburg stands, by a broad and shallow
bayou-evidently an old channel of the Yazoo.  On our right was
another wide bayou, known as Old River; and on the left still
another, much narrower, but too deep to be forded, known as
Chickasaw Bayou.  All the island was densely wooded, except
Johnson's plantation, immediately on the bank of the Yazoo, and a
series of old cotton-fields along Chickasaw Bayou.  There was a
road from Johnson's plantation directly to Vicksburg, but it
crossed numerous bayous and deep swamps by bridges, which had been
destroyed; and this road debouched on level ground at the foot of
the Vicksburg bluff, opposite strong forts, well prepared and
defended by heavy artillery.  On this road I directed General A. J.
Smith's division, not so much by way of a direct attack as a
diversion and threat.

Morgan was to move to his left, to reach Chickasaw Bayou, and to
follow it toward the bluff, about four miles above A. J. Smith.
Steele was on Morgan's left, across Chickasaw Bayou, and M. L.
Smith on Morgan's right.  We met light resistance at all points,
but skirmished, on the 27th, up to the main bayou, that separated
our position from the bluffs of Vicksburg, which were found to be
strong by nature and by art, and seemingly well defended.  On
reconnoitring the front in person, during the 27th and 28th, I
became satisfied that General A. J. Smith could not cross the
intervening obstacles under the heavy fire of the forts immediately
in his front, and that the main bayou was impassable, except at two
points--one near the head of Chickasaw Bayou, in front of Morgan,
and the other about a mile lower down, in front of M. L. Smith's
division.

During the general reconnoissance of the 28th General Morgan L.
Smith received a severe and dangerous wound in his hip, which
completely disabled him and compelled him to go to his steamboat,
leaving the command of his division to Brigadier General D.
Stuart; but I drew a part of General A. J. Smith's division, and
that general himself, to the point selected for passing the bayou,
and committed that special task to his management.

General Steele reported that it was physically impossible to reach
the bluffs from his position, so I ordered him to leave but a show
of force there, and to return to the west side of Chickasaw Bayou
in support of General Morgan's left.  He had to countermarch and
use the steamboats in the Yazoo to get on the firm ground on our
side of the Chickasaw.

On the morning of December 29th all the troops were ready and in
position.  The first step was to make a lodgment on the foot-hills
and bluffs abreast of our position, while diversions were made by
the navy toward Haines's Bluff, and by the first division directly
toward Vicksburg.  I estimated the enemy's forces, then strung from
Vicksburg to Haines's Bluff, at fifteen thousand men, commanded by
the rebel Generals Martin Luther Smith and Stephen D. Lee.  Aiming
to reach firm ground beyond this bayou, and to leave as little time
for our enemy to reenforce as possible, I determined to make a show
of attack along the whole front, but to break across the bayou at
the two points named, and gave general orders accordingly.  I
pointed out to General Morgan the place where he could pass the
bayou, and he answered, "General, in ten minutes after you give the
signal I'll be on those hills."  He was to lead his division in
person, and was to be supported by Steele's division.  The front
was very narrow, and immediately opposite, at the base of the hills
about three hundred yards from the bayou, was a rebel battery,
supported by an infantry force posted on the spurs of the hill
behind.  To draw attention from this, the real point of attack, I
gave instructions to commence the attack at the flanks.

I went in person about a mile to the right rear of Morgan's
position, at a place convenient to receive reports from all other
parts of the line; and about noon of December 29th gave the orders
and signal for the main attack.  A heavy artillery-fire opened
along our whole line, and was replied to by the rebel batteries,
and soon the infantry-fire opened heavily, especially on A. J.
Smith's front, and in front of General George W. Morgan.  One
brigade (DeCourcey's) of Morgan's troops crossed the bayou safely,
but took to cover behind the bank, and could not be moved forward.
Frank Blairs brigade, of Steele's division, in support, also
crossed the bayou, passed over the space of level ground to the
foot of the hills; but, being unsupported by Morgan, and meeting a
very severe cross-fire of artillery, was staggered and gradually
fell back, leaving about five hundred men behind, wounded and
prisoners; among them Colonel Thomas Fletcher, afterward Governor
of Missouri.  Part of Thayer's brigade took a wrong direction, and
did not cross the bayou at all; nor did General Morgan cross in
person.  This attack failed; and I have always felt that it was due
to the failure of General G. W. Morgan to obey his orders, or to
fulfill his promise made in person.  Had he used with skill and
boldness one of his brigades, in addition to that of Blair's, he
could have made a lodgment on the bluff, which would have opened
the door for our whole force to follow.  Meantime the Sixth
Missouri Infantry, at heavy loss, had also crossed the bayou at the
narrow passage lower down, but could not ascend the steep bank;
right over their heads was a rebel battery, whose fire was in a
measure kept down by our sharp-shooters (Thirteenth United States
Infantry) posted behind logs, stumps, and trees, on our side of the
bayou.

The men of the Sixth Missouri actually scooped out with their hands
caves in the bank, which sheltered them against the fire of the
enemy, who, right over their heads, held their muskets outside the
parapet vertically, and fired down So critical was the position,
that we could not recall the men till after dark, and then one at a
time.  Our loss had been pretty heavy, and we had accomplished
nothing, and had inflicted little loss on our enemy.  At first I
intended to renew the assault, but soon became satisfied that, the
enemy's attention having been drawn to the only two practicable
points, it would prove too costly, and accordingly resolved to look
elsewhere for a point below Haines's Bluff, or Blake's plantation.
That night I conferred with Admiral Porter, who undertook to cover
the landing; and the next day (December 30th) the boats were all
selected, but so alarmed were the captains and pilots, that we had
to place sentinels with loaded muskets to insure their remaining at
their posts.  Under cover of night, Steele's division, and one
brigade of Stuart's, were drawn out of line, and quietly embarked
on steamboats in the Yazoo River.  The night of December 30th was
appointed for this force, under the command of General Fred Steele,
to proceed up the Yazoo just below Haines's Bluff, there to
disembark about daylight, and make a dash for the hills.  Meantime
we had strengthened our positions near Chickasaw Bayou, had all our
guns in good position with parapets, and had every thing ready to
renew our attack as soon as we heard the sound of battle above.

At midnight I left Admiral Porter on his gunboat; he had his fleet
ready and the night was propitious.  I rode back to camp and gave
orders for all to be ready by daybreak; but when daylight came I
received a note from General Steele reporting that, before his
boats had got up steam, the fog had settled down on the river so
thick and impenetrable, that it was simply impossible to move; so
the attempt had to be abandoned.  The rain, too, began to fall, and
the trees bore water-marks ten feet above our heads, so that I
became convinced that the part of wisdom was to withdraw.  I
ordered the stores which had been landed to be reembarked on the
boats, and preparations made for all the troops to regain their
proper boats during the night of the 1st of January, 1863.  From
our camps at Chickasaw we could hear, the whistles of the trains
arriving in Vicksburg, could see battalions of men marching up
toward Haines's Bluff, and taking post at all points in our front.
I was more than convinced that heavy reenforcements were coming to
Vicksburg; whether from Pemberton at Grenada, Bragg in Tennessee,
or from other sources, I could not tell; but at no point did the
enemy assume the offensive; and when we drew off our rear-guard, on
the morning of the 2d, they simply followed up the movement,
timidly.  Up to that moment I had not heard a word from General
Grant since leaving Memphis; and most assuredly I had listened for
days for the sound of his guns in the direction of Yazoo City.  On
the morning of January 2d, all my command were again afloat in
their proper steamboats, when Admiral Porter told me that General
McClernand had arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo in the steamboat
Tigress, and that it was rumored he had come down to supersede me.
Leaving my whole force where it was, I ran down to the month of the
Yazoo in a small tug boat, and there found General McClernand, with
orders from the War Department to command the expeditionary force
on the Mississippi River.  I explained what had been done, and what
was the actual state of facts; that the heavy reenforcements
pouring into Vicksburg must be Pemberton's army, and that General
Grant must be near at hand.  He informed me that General Grant was
not coming at all; that his depot at Holly Springs had been
captured by Van Dorn, and that he had drawn back from Coffeeville
and Oxford to Holly Springs and Lagrange; and, further, that
Quinby's division of Grant's army was actually at Memphis for
stores when he passed down.  This, then, fully explained how
Vicksburg was being reenforced.  I saw that any attempt on the
place from the Yazoo was hopeless; and, with General McClernand's
full approval, we all came out of the Yazoo, and on the 3d of
January rendezvoused at Milliken's Bend, about ten miles above.
On the 4th General McClernand issued his General Order No. 1,
assuming command of the Army of the Mississippi, divided into two
corps; the first to be commanded by General Morgan, composed of his
own and A. J. Smith's divisions; and the second, composed of
Steele's and Stuart's divisions, to be commanded by me.  Up to that
time the army had been styled the right wing of (General Grant's)
Thirteenth Army Corps, and numbered about thirty thousand men.  The
aggregate loss during the time of any command, mostly on the 29th
of December, was one hundred and seventy-five killed, nine hundred
and thirty wounded, and seven hundred and forty-three prisoners.
According to Badeau, the rebels lost sixty-three killed, one
hundred and thirty-four wounded, and ten prisoners.  It afterward
transpired that Van Dorn had captured Holly Springs on the 20th of
December, and that General Grant fell back very soon after.
General Pemberton, who had telegraphic and railroad communication
with Vicksburg, was therefore at perfect liberty to reenforce the
place with a garrison equal, if not superior, to my command.  The
rebels held high, commanding ground, and could see every movement
of our men and boats, so that the only possible hope of success
consisted in celerity and surprise, and in General Grant's holding
all of Pemberton's army hard pressed meantime.  General Grant was
perfectly aware of this, and had sent me word of the change, but it
did not reach me in time; indeed, I was not aware of it until after
my assault of December 29th, and until the news was brought me by
General McClernand as related.  General McClernand was appointed to
this command by President Lincoln in person, who had no knowledge
of what was then going on down the river.  Still, my relief, on the
heels of a failure, raised the usual cry, at the North, of
"repulse, failure, and bungling."  There was no bungling on my
part, for I never worked harder or with more intensity of purpose
in my life; and General Grant, long after, in his report of the
operations of the siege of Vicksburg, gave us all full credit for
the skill of the movement, and described the almost impregnable
nature of the ground; and, although in  all official reports I
assumed the whole responsibility, I have ever felt that had General
Morgan promptly and skillfully sustained the lead of Frank Blair's
brigade on that day, we should have broken the rebel line, and
effected a lodgment on the hills behind Vicksburg.  General Frank
Blair was outspoken and  indignant against Generals Morgan and De
Courcey at the time, and always abused me for assuming the whole
blame.  But, had we succeeded, we might have found ourselves in a
worse trap, when General Pemberton was at full liberty to turn his
whole force against us.  While I was engaged at Chickasaw Bayou,
Admiral Porter was equally busy in the Yazoo River, threatening the
enemy's batteries at Haines's and Snyder's Bluffs above.  In a
sharp engagement he lost one of his best officers, in the person of
Captain Gwin, United States Navy, who, though on board an ironclad,
insisted on keeping his post on deck, where he was struck in the
breast by a round shot, which carried away the muscle,  and
contused the lung within, from which he died a few days after.  We
of the army deplored his loss quite as much as his fellows of the
navy, for he had been intimately associated with us in our previous
operations on the Tennessee River, at Shiloh and above, and we had
come to regard him as one of us.

On the 4th of January, 1863, our fleet of transports was collected
at Milliken's Bend, about ten miles above the mouth of the Yazoo,
Admiral Porter remaining with his gunboats at the Yazoo.  General
John A. McClernand was in chief command, General George W. Morgan
commanded the First Corps and I the Second Corps of the Army of the
Mississippi.

I had learned that a small steamboat, the Blue Wing, with a mail,
towing coal-barges and loaded with ammunition, had left Memphis for
the Yazoo, about the 20th of December, had been captured by a rebel
boat which had come out of the Arkansas River, and had been carried
up that river to Fort Hind.

We had reports from this fort, usually called the "Post of
Arkansas," about forty miles above the mouth, that it was held by
about five thousand rebels, was an inclosed work, commanding the
passage of the river, but supposed to be easy of capture from the
rear.  At that time I don't think General McClernand had any
definite views or plays of action.  If so, he did not impart them
to me.  He spoke, in general terms of opening the navigation of the
Mississippi, "cutting his way to the sea," etc., etc., but the
modus operandi was not so clear.  Knowing full well that we could
not carry on operations against Vicksburg as long as the rebels
held the Post of Arkansas, whence to attack our boats coming and
going without convoy, I visited him on his boat, the Tigress, took
with me a boy who had been on the Blue Wing, and had escaped, and
asked leave to go up the Arkansas, to clear out the Post.  He made
various objections, but consented to go with me to see Admiral
Porter about it.  We got up steam in the Forest Queen, during the
night of January 4th, stopped at the Tigress, took General
McClernand on board, and proceeded down the river by night to the
admiral's boat, the Black Hawk, lying in the mouth of the Yazoo.
It must have been near midnight, and Admiral Porter was in
deshabille.  We were seated in his cabin and I explained my views
about Arkansas Post, and asked his cooperation.  He said that he
was short of coal, and could not use wood in his iron-clad boats.
Of these I asked for two, to be commanded by Captain Shirk or
Phelps, or some officer of my acquaintance.  At that moment, poor
Gwin lay on his bed, in a state-room close by, dying from the
effect of the cannon shot received at Haines's Bluff, as before
described.  Porter's manner to McClernand was so curt that I
invited him out into a forward-cabin where he had his charts, and
asked him what he meant by it.  He said that "he did not like him;"
that in Washington, before coming West, he had been introduced to
him by President Lincoln, and he had taken a strong prejudice
against him.  I begged him, for the sake of harmony, to waive that,
which he promised to do.  Returning to the cabin, the conversation
was resumed, and, on our offering to tow his gunboats up the river
to save coal, and on renewing the request for Shirk to command the
detachment, Porter said, "Suppose I go along myself?"  I answered,
if he would do so, it would insure the success of the enterprise.
At that time I supposed General McClernand would send me on this
business, but he concluded to go himself, and to take his whole
force.  Orders were at once issued for the troops not to disembark
at Milliken's Bend, but to remain as they were on board the
transports.  My two divisions were commanded--the First, by
Brigadier-General Frederick Steele, with three brigades, commanded
by Brigadier-Generals F. P. Blair, C. E. Hooey, and J. M. Thayer;
the Second, by Brigadier-General D. Stuart, with two brigades,
commanded by Colonels G. A. Smith and T. Kilby Smith.

The whole army, embarked on steamboats convoyed by the gunboats, of
which three were iron-clads, proceeded up the Mississippi River to
the mouth of White River, which we reached January 8th.  On the
next day we continued up White River to the "Cut-off;" through this
to the Arkansas, and up the Arkansas to Notrib's farm, just below
Fort Hindman.  Early the next morning we disembarked.  Stuart's
division, moving up the river along the bank, soon encountered a
force of the enemy intrenched behind a line of earthworks,
extending from the river across to the swamp.  I took Steele's
division, marching by the flank by a road through the swamp to the
firm ground behind, and was moving up to get to the rear of Fort
Hindman, when General McClernand overtook me, with the report that
the rebels had abandoned their first position, and had fallen back
into the fort.  By his orders, we counter-marched, recrossed the
swamp, and hurried forward to overtake Stuart, marching for Fort
Hindman.  The first line of the rebels was about four miles below
Fort Hindman, and the intervening space was densely, wooded and
obscure, with the exception of some old fields back of and close to
the fort.  During the night, which was a bright moonlight one, we
reconnoitred close up, and found a large number of huts which had
been abandoned, and the whole rebel force had fallen back into and
about the fort.  Personally I crept up to a stump so close that I
could hear the enemy hard at work, pulling down houses, cutting
with axes, and building intrenchments.  I could almost hear their
words, and I was thus listening when, about 4 A. M. the bugler in
the rebel camp sounded as pretty a reveille as I ever listened to.

When daylight broke it revealed to us a new line of parapet
straight across the peninsula, connecting Fort Hindman, on the
Arkansas River bank, with the impassable swamp about a mile to its
left or rear.  This peninsula was divided into two nearly equal
parts by a road.  My command had the ground to the right of the
road, and Morgan's corps that to the left.  McClernand had his
quarters still on the Tigress, back at Notrib's farm, but moved
forward that morning (January 11th) to a place in the woods to our
rear, where he had a man up a tree, to observe and report the
movements.

There was a general understanding with Admiral Porter that he was
to attack the fort with his three ironclad gunboats directly by its
water-front, while we assaulted by land in the rear.  About 10 a.m.
I got a message from General McClernand, telling me where he could
be found, and asking me what we were waiting for.  I answered that
we were then in close contact with the enemy, viz., about five or
six hundred yards off; that the next movement must be a direct
assault; that this should be simultaneous along the whole line; and
that I was waiting to hear from the gunboats; asking him to notify
Admiral Porter that we were all ready.  In about half an hour I
heard the clear ring of the navy-guns; the fire gradually
increasing in rapidity and advancing toward the fort.  I had
distributed our field-guns, and, when I judged the time had come, I
gave the orders to begin.  The intervening ground between us and
the enemy was a dead level, with the exception of one or two small
gullies, and our men had no cover but the few standing trees and
some logs on the ground.  The troops advanced well under a heavy
fire, once or twice falling to the ground for a sort of rest or
pause.  Every tree had its group of men, and behind each log was a
crowd of sharp-shooters, who kept up so hot a fire that the rebel
troops fired wild.  The fire of the fort proper was kept busy by
the gunboats and Morgan's corps, so that all my corps had to
encounter was the direct fire from the newly-built parapet across
the peninsula.  This line had three sections of field-guns, that
kept things pretty lively, and several round-shot came so near me
that I realized that they were aimed at my staff; so I dismounted,
and made them scatter.

As the gunboats got closer up I saw their flags actually over the
parapet of Fort Hindman, and the rebel gunners scamper out of the
embrasures and run down into the ditch behind.  About the same time
a man jumped up on the rebel parapet just where the road entered,
waving a large white flag, and numerous smaller white rags appeared
above the parapet along the whole line.  I immediately ordered,
"Cease firing!" and sent the same word down the line to General
Steele, who had made similar progress on the right, following the
border of he swamp.  I ordered my aide, Colonel Dayton, to jump on
his horse and ride straight up to the large white flag, and when
his horse was on the parapet I followed with the rest of my staff.
All firing had ceased, except an occasional shot away to the right,
and one of the captains (Smith) of the Thirteenth Regulars was
wounded after the display of the white flag.  On entering the line,
I saw that our muskets and guns had done good execution; for there
was a horse-battery, and every horse lay dead in the traces.  The
fresh-made parapet had been knocked down in many places, and dead
men lay around very thick.  I inquired who commanded at that point,
and a Colonel Garland stepped up and said that he commanded that
brigade.  I ordered him to form his brigade, stack arms, hang the
belts on the muskets, and stand waiting for orders.  Stuart's
division had been halted outside the parapet.  I then sent Major
Hammond down the rebel line to the right, with orders to stop
Steele's division outside, and to have the other rebel brigade
stack its arms in like manner, and to await further orders.  I
inquired of Colonel Garland who commanded in chief, and he said
that General Churchill did, and that he was inside the fort.  I
then rode into the fort, which was well built, with good parapets,
drawbridge, and ditch, and was an inclosed work of four bastions.
I found it full of soldiers and sailors, its parapets toward the
river well battered in, and Porter's gunboats in the river, close
against the fort, with their bows on shore.  I soon found General
Churchill, in conversation with Admiral Porter and General A. J.
Smith, and about this time my adjutant-general, Major J. H.
Hammond, came and reported that General Deshler, who commanded the
rebel brigade facing and opposed to Steele, had refused to stack
arms and surrender, on the ground that he had received no orders
from his commanding general; that nothing separated this brigade
from Steele's men except the light parapet, and that there might be
trouble there at any moment.  I advised General Churchill to send
orders at once, because a single shot might bring the whole of
Steele's division on Deshler's brigade, and I would not be
responsible for the consequences; soon afterward, we both concluded
to go in person.  General Churchill had the horses of himself and
staff in the ditch; they were brought in, and we rode together to
where Garland was standing, and Churchill spoke to him in an angry
tone, "Why did you display the white flag!"  Garland replied, "I
received orders to do so from one of your staff."  Churchill denied
giving such an order, and angry words passed between them.  I
stopped them, saying that it made little difference then, as they
were in our power.  We continued to ride down the line to its
extreme point, where we found Deshler in person, and his troops
were still standing to the parapet with their muskets in hand.
Steele'e men were on the outside.  I asked Deshler: "What does this
mean? You are a regular officer, and ought to know better."  He
answered, snappishly, that "he had received no orders to
surrender;" when General Churchill said: "You see, sir, that we are
in their power, and you may surrender."  Deshler turned to his
staff-officers and ordered them to repeat the command to "stack
arms," etc., to the colonels of his brigade.  I was on my horse,
and he was on foot.  Wishing to soften the blow of defeat, I spoke
to him kindly, saying that I knew a family of Deshlers in Columbus,
Ohio, and inquired if they were relations of his.  He disclaimed
any relation with people living north of the Ohio, in an offensive
tone, and I think I gave him a piece of my mind that he did not
relish.  He was a West Point graduate, small but very handsome, and
was afterward killed in battle.  I never met him again.

Returning to the position where I had first entered the rebel line,
I received orders from General McClernand, by one of his staff, to
leave General A. J. Smith in charge of the fort and prisoners, and
with my troops to remain outside.  The officer explained that the
general was then on the Tigress, which had moved up from below, to
a point in the river just above the fort; and not understanding his
orders, I concluded to go and see him in person.  My troops were
then in possession of two of the three brigades which composed the
army opposed to us; and my troops were also in possession of all
the ground of the peninsula outside the "fort-proper" (Hindman).  I
found General McClernand on the Tigress, in high spirits.  He said
repeatedly: "Glorious! glorious! my star is ever in the ascendant!"
He spoke complimentarily of the troops, but was extremely jealous
of the navy.  He said: "I'll make a splendid report;"  "I had a man
up a tree;" etc.  I was very hungry and tired, and fear I did not
appreciate the honors in reserve for us, and asked for something to
eat and drink.  He very kindly ordered something to be brought, and
explained to me that by his "orders" he did not wish to interfere
with the actual state of facts; that General A. J. Smith would
occupy "Fort Hindman," which his troops had first entered, and I
could hold the lines outside, and go on securing the prisoners and
stores as I had begun.  I returned to the position of Garland's
brigade and gave the necessary orders for marching all the
prisoners, disarmed, to a pocket formed by the river and two deep
gullies just above the fort, by which time it had become quite
dark.  After dark another rebel regiment arrived from Pine Bluff,
marched right in, and was also made prisoners.  There seemed to be
a good deal of feeling among the rebel officers against Garland,
who asked leave to stay with me that night, to which I of course
consented.  Just outside the rebel parapet was a house which had
been used for a hospital.  I had a room cleaned out, and occupied
it that night.  A cavalry-soldier lent me his battered coffee-pot
with some coffee and scraps of hard bread out of his nose-bag;
Garland and I made some coffee, ate our bread together, and talked
politics by the fire till quite late at night, when we lay down on
straw that was saturated with the blood of dead or wounded men.
The next day the prisoners were all collected on their boats, lists
were made out, and orders given for their transportation to St.
Louis, in charge of my aide, Major Sanger.  We then proceeded to
dismantle and level the forts, destroy or remove the stores, and we
found in the magazine the very ammunition which had been sent for
us in the Blue Wing, which was secured and afterward used in our
twenty-pound Parrott guns.

On the 13th we reembarked; the whole expedition returned out of the
river by the direct route down the Arkansas during a heavy
snow-storm, and rendezvoused in the Mississippi, at Napoleon, at
the mouth of the Arkansas.  Here General McClernand told me he had
received a letter from General Grant at Memphis, who disapproved of
our movement up the Arkansas; but that communication was made
before he had learned of our complete success.  When informed of
this, and of the promptness with which it had been executed, he
could not but approve.  We were then ordered back to Milliken's
Bend, to await General Grant's arrival in person.  We reached
Milliken's Bend January 21st.

McClernand's report of the capture of Fort Hindman almost ignored
the action of Porter's fleet altogether.  This was unfair, for I
know that the admiral led his fleet in person in the river-attack,
and that his guns silenced those of Fort Hindman, and drove the
gunners into the ditch.

The aggregate loss in my corps at Arkansas Post was five hundred
and nineteen, viz., four officers and seventy-five men killed,
thirty-four officers and four hundred and six men wounded.  I never
knew the losses in the gunboat fleet, or in Morgan's corps; but
they must have been less than in mine, which was more exposed.  The
number of rebel dead must have been nearly one hundred and fifty;
of prisoners, by actual count, we secured four thousand seven
hundred and ninety-one, and sent them north to St. Louis.




CHAPTER XIII.

VICKSBURG.

JANUARY TO JULY, 1888.


The campaign of 1863, resulting, in the capture of Vicksburg, was
so important, that its history has been well studied and well
described in all the books treating of the civil war, more
especially by Dr. Draper, in his "History of the Civil War in
America," and in Badeau's "Military History of General Grant."  In
the latter it is more fully and accurately given than in any other,
and is well illustrated by maps and original documents.  I now need
only attempt to further illustrate Badeau's account by some
additional details.  When our expedition came out of the Arkansas
River, January, 18,1863, and rendezvoused at the river-bank, in
front of the town of Napoleon, Arkansas, we were visited by General
Grant in person, who had come down from Memphis in a steamboat.
Although at this time Major-General J. A. McClernand was in command
of the Army of the Mississippi, by virtue of a confidential order
of the War Department, dated October 21, 1862, which order bore the
indorsement of President Lincoln, General Grant still exercised a
command over him, by reason of his general command of the
Department of the Tennessee.  By an order (No. 210) of December 18,
1862, from the War Department, received at Arkansas Post, the
Western armies had been grouped into five corps d'armee, viz.: the
Thirteenth, Major-General McClernand; the Fourteenth, Major-General
George H. Thomas, in Middle Tennessee; the Fifteenth, Major-General
W. T. Sherman; the Sixteenth, Major-General Hurlbut, then at or
near Memphis; and the Seventeenth, Major-General McPherson, also at
and back of Memphis.  General Grant when at Napoleon, on the 18th
of January, ordered McClernand with his own and my corps to return
to Vicksburg, to disembark on the west bank, and to resume work on
a canal across the peninsula, which had been begun by General
Thomas Williams the summer before, the object being to turn the
Mississippi River at that point, or at least to make a passage for
our fleet of gunboats and transports across the peninsula, opposite
Vicksburg.  General Grant then returned to Memphis, ordered to Lake
Providence, about sixty miles above us, McPherson's corps, the
Seventeenth, and then came down again to give his personal
supervision to the whole movement.

The Mississippi River was very high and rising, and we began that
system of canals on which we expended so much hard work
fruitlessly: first, the canal at Young's plantation, opposite
Vicksburg; second, that at Lake Providence; and third, at the Yazoo
Pass, leading into the head-waters of the Yazoo River.  Early in
February the gunboats Indianola and Queen of the West ran the
batteries of Vicksburg.  The latter was afterward crippled in Red
River, and was captured by the rebels; and the Indianola was butted
and sunk about forty miles below Vicksburg.  We heard the booming
of the guns, but did not know of her loss till some days after.
During the months of January and February, we were digging the
canal and fighting off the water of the Mississippi, which
continued to rise and threatened to drown us.  We had no sure place
of refuge except the narrow levee, and such steamboats as remained
abreast of our camps.  My two divisions furnished alternately a
detail of five hundred men a day, to work on the canal.  So high
was the water in the beginning of March, that McClernand's corps
was moved to higher ground, at Milliken's Bend, but I remained at
Young's plantation, laid off a due proportion of the levee for each
subdivision of my command, and assigned other parts to such
steamboats as lay at the levee.  My own headquarters were in Mrs.
Grove's house, which had the water all around it, and could only be
reached by a plank-walk from the levee, built on posts.  General
Frederick Steele commanded the first division, and General D. Smart
the second; this latter division had been reenforced by General
Hugh Ewing's brigade, which had arrived from West Virginia.

At the time of its date I received the following note from General
Grant:

MILLIKEN'S BEND, March 16, 1863

General SHERMAN.

DEAR SIR: I have just returned from a reconnoissance up Steele's
Bayou, with the admiral (Porter), and five of his gunboats.  With
some labor in cutting tree-tops out of the way, it will be
navigable for any class of steamers.

I want you to have your pioneer corps, or one regiment of good men
for such work, detailed, and at the landing as soon as possible.

The party will want to take with them their rations, arms, and
sufficient camp and garrison equipage for a few days.  I will have
a boat at any place you may designate, as early as the men can be
there.  The Eighth Missouri (being many of them boatmen) would be
excellent men for this purpose.

As soon as you give directions for these men to be in readiness,
come up and see me, and I will explain fully.  The tug that takes
this is instructed to wait for you.  A full supply of axes will be
required.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


This letter was instantly (8 a.m.) sent to Colonel Giles A. Smith,
commanding the Eighth Missouri, with orders to prepare immediately.
He returned it at 9.15, with an answer that the regiment was all
ready.  I went up to Milliken's Bend in the tug, and had a
conference with the general, resulting in these orders:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
BEFORE VICKSBURG, March 16, 1863

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.

GENERAL: You will proceed as early as practicable up Steele's
Bayou, and through Black Bayou to Deer Creek, and thence with the
gunboats now there by any route they may take to get into the Yazoo
River, for the purpose of determining the feasibility of getting an
army through that route to the east bank of that river, and at a
point from which they can act advantageously against Vicksburg.

Make such details from your army corps as may be required to clear
out the channel of the various bayous through which transports
would have to ran, and to hold such points as in your judgment
should be occupied.

I place at your disposal to-day the steamers Diligent and Silver
Wave, the only two suitable for the present navigation of this
route.  Others will be supplied you as fast as required, and they
can be got.

I have given directions (and you may repeat them) that the party
going on board the steamer Diligent push on until they reach Black
Bayou, only stopping sufficiently long at any point before reaching
there to remove such obstructions as prevent their own progress.
Captain Kossak, of the Engineers, will go with this party.  The
other boat-load will commence their work in Steele's Bayou, and
make the navigation as free as possible all the way through.

There is but little work to be done in Steele's Bayou, except for
about five miles abort midway of the bayou.  In this portion many
overhanging trees will have to be removed, and should be dragged
out of the channel.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


On returning to my camp at Young's Point, I started these two boats
up the Yazoo and Steele's Bayou, with the Eighth Missouri and some
pioneers, with axes, saws, and all the tools necessary.  I gave
orders for a part of Stuart's division to proceed in the large
boats up the Mississippi River to a point at Gwin's plantation,
where a bend of Steele's Bayou neared the main river; and the next
day, with one or two stag-officers and orderlies, got a navy-tug,
and hurried up to overtake Admiral Porter.  About sixty miles up
Steele's Bayou we came to the gunboat Price, Lieutenant Woodworth,
United States Navy; commanding, and then turned into Black Bayou, a
narrow, crooked channel, obstructed by overhanging oaks, and filled
with cypress and cotton-wood trees.  The gunboats had forced their
way through, pushing aside trees a foot in diameter.  In about four
miles we overtook the gunboat fleet just as it was emerging into
Deer Creek.  Along Deer Creek the alluvium was higher, and there
was a large cotton-plantation belonging to a Mr. Hill, who was
absent, and the negroes were in charge of the place.  Here I
overtook Admiral Porter, and accompanied him a couple of miles up
Deer Creek, which was much wider and more free of trees, with
plantations on both sides at intervals.  Admiral Porter thought he
had passed the worst, and that he would be able to reach the
Rolling Fork and Sunflower.  He requested me to return and use all
possible means to clear out Black Bayou.  I returned to Hill's
plantation, which was soon reached by Major Coleman, with a part
of the Eighth Missouri; the bulk of the regiment and the pioneers
had been distributed along the bayous, and set to work under
the general supervision of Captain Kosaak.  The Diligent and
Silver Wave then returned to twin's plantation and brought up
Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, with the Sixth Missouri, and part
of the One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois.  Admiral Porter was then
working up Deer Creek with his iron-clads, but he had left me a tug,
which enabled me to reconnoitre the country, which was all under
water except the narrow strip along Deer Creek.  During the 19th I
heard the heavy navy-guns booming more frequently than seemed
consistent with mere guerrilla operations; and that night I got a
message from Porter, written on tissue-paper, brought me through
the swamp by a negro, who had it concealed in a piece of tobacco.

The admiral stated that he had met a force of infantry and
artillery which gave him great trouble by killing the men who had
to expose themselves outside the iron armor to shove off the bows
of the boats, which had so little headway that they would not
steer.  He begged me to come to his rescue as quickly as possible.
Giles A. Smith had only about eight hundred men with him, but I
ordered him to start up Deer Creek at once, crossing to the east
side by an old bridge at Hill's plantation, which we had repaired
for the purpose; to work his way up to the gunboat, fleet, and to
report to the admiral that I would come, up with every man I could
raise as soon as possible.  I was almost alone at Hill's, but took
a canoe, paddled down Black Bayou to the gunboat Price, and there,
luckily, found the Silver wave with a load of men just arrived from
twin's plantation.  Taking some of the parties who were at work
along the bayou into an empty coal-barge, we tugged it up by a
navy-tug, followed by the Silver Wave, crashing through the trees,
carrying away pilot-house, smoke-stacks, and every thing
above-deck; but the captain (McMillan, of Pittsburg) was a brave
fellow, and realized the necessity.  The night was absolutely
black, and we could only make two and a half of the four miles.  We
then disembarked, and marched through the canebrake, carrying
lighted candles in our hands, till we got into the open
cotton-fields at Hill's plantation, where we lay down for a few
hours' rest.  These men were a part of Giles A. Smith's brigade,
and part belonged to the brigade of T. Bilby Smith, the senior
officer present being Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, Fifty-fourth Ohio,
an excellent young officer.  We had no horses.

On Sunday morning, March 21st, as soon as daylight appeared, we
started, following the same route which Giles A. Smith had taken
the day before; the battalion of the Thirteenth United States
Regulars, Major Chase, in the lead.  We could hear Porter's guns,
and knew that moments were precious.  Being on foot myself, no man
could complain, and we generally went at the double-quick, with
occasional rests.  The road lay along Deer Creek, passing several
plantations; and occasionally, at the bends, it crossed the swamp,
where the water came above my hips.  The smaller drummer-boys had
to carry their drums on their heads, and most of the men slang
their cartridge-boxes around their necks.  The soldiers generally
were glad to have their general and field officers afoot, but we
gave them a fair specimen of marching, accomplishing about
twenty-one miles by noon.  Of course, our speed was accelerated by
the sounds of the navy-guns, which became more and more distinct,
though we could see nothing.  At a plantation near some Indian
mounds we met a detachment of the Eighth Missouri, that had been up
to the fleet, and had been sent down as a picket to prevent any
obstructions below.  This picket reported that Admiral Porter had
found Deer Creek badly obstructed, had turned back; that there was
a rebel force beyond the fleet, with some six-pounders, and nothing
between us and the fleet.  So I sat down on the door-sill of a
cabin to rest, but had not been seated ten minutes when, in the
wood just ahead, not three hundred yards off, I heard quick and
rapid firing of musketry.  Jumping up, I ran up the road, and found
Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, who said the head of his column had struck
a small force of rebels with a working gang of negroes, provided
with axes, who on the first fire had broken and run back into the
swamp.  I ordered Rice to deploy his brigade, his left on the road,
and extending as far into the swamp as the ground would permit, and
then to sweep forward until he uncovered the gunboats.  The
movement was rapid and well executed, and we soon came to some
large cotton-fields and could see our gunboats in Deer Creek,
occasionally firing a heavy eight-inch gun across the cotton field
into the swamp behind.  About that time Major Kirby, of the Eighth
Missouri, galloped down the road on a horse he had picked up the
night before, and met me.  He explained the situation of affairs,
and offered me his horse.  I got on bareback, and rode up the
levee, the sailors coming out of their iron-clads and cheering most
vociferously as I rode by, and as our men swept forward across the
cotton-field in full view.  I soon found Admiral Porter, who was on
the deck of one of his iron-clads, with a shield made of the
section of a smoke-stack, and I doubt if he was ever more glad to
meet a friend than he was to see me.  He explained that he had
almost reached the Rolling Fork, when the woods became full of
sharp-shooters, who, taking advantage of trees, stumps, and the
levee, would shoot down every man that poked his nose outside the
protection of their armor; so that he could not handle his clumsy
boats in the narrow channel.  The rebels had evidently dispatched a
force from Haines's Bluff up the Sunflower to the Rolling Fork, had
anticipated the movement of Admiral Porter's fleet, and had
completely obstructed the channel of the upper part of Deer Creek
by felling trees into it, so that further progress in that
direction was simply impossible.  It also happened that, at the
instant of my arrival, a party of about four hundred rebels, armed
and supplied with axes, had passed around the fleet and had got
below it, intending in like manner to block up the channel by the
felling of trees, so as to cut off retreat.  This was the force we
had struck so opportunely at the time before described.  I inquired
of Admiral Porter what he proposed to do, and he said he wanted to
get out of that scrape as quickly as possible.  He was actually
working back when I met him, and, as we then had a sufficient force
to cover his movement completely, he continued to back down Deer
Creek.  He informed me at one time things looked so critical that
he had made up his mind to blow up the gunboats, and to escape with
his men through the swamp to the Mississippi River.  There being no
longer any sharp-shooters to bother the sailors, they made good
progress; still, it took three full days for the fleet to back out
of Deer Creek into Black Bayou, at Hill's plantation, whence
Admiral Porter proceeded to his post at the month of the Yazoo,
leaving Captain Owen in command of the fleet.  I reported the facts
to General Grant, who was sadly disappointed at the failure of the
fleet to get through to the Yazoo above Haines's Bluff, and ordered
us all to resume our camps at Young's Point.  We accordingly
steamed down, and regained our camps on the 27th.  As this
expedition up Deer Creek was but one of many efforts to secure a
footing from which to operate against Vicksburg, I add the report
of Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, who was the first to reach the
fleet:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION
FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, YOUNGS POINT, LOUISIANA,
March 28, 1863

Captain L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.

CAPTAIN:  I have the honor to report the movements of the First
Brigade in the expedition up Steele's Bayou, Black Bayou, and Deer
Creek.  The Sixth Missouri and One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois
regiments embarked at the month of Muddy Bayou on the evening of
Thursday, the 18th of March, and proceeded up Steele's Bayou to the
month of Black; thence up Black Bayou to Hill's plantation, at its
junction with Deer Creek, where we arrived on Friday at four
o'clock p.m., and joined the Eighth Missouri, Lieutenant-Colonel
Coleman commanding, which had arrived at that point two days
before.  General Sherman had also established his headquarters
there, having preceded the Eighth Missouri in a tug, with no other
escort than two or three of his staff, reconnoitring all the
different bayous and branches, thereby greatly facilitating the
movements of the troops, but at the same time exposing himself
beyond precedent in a commanding general.  At three o'clock of
Saturday morning, the 20th instant, General Sherman having received
a communication from Admiral Porter at the mouth of Rolling Fork,
asking for a speedy cooperation of the land forces with his fleet,
I was ordered by General Sherman to be ready, with all the
available force at that point, to accompany him to his relief; but
before starting it was arranged that I should proceed with the
force at hand (eight hundred men), while he remained, again
entirely unprotected, to hurry up the troops expected to arrive
that night, consisting of the Thirteenth Infantry and One Hundred
and Thirteenth Illinois Volunteers, completing my brigade, and the
Second Brigade, Colonel T. Kilby Smith commanding.

This, as the sequel showed; proved a very wise measure, and
resulted in the safety of the whole fleet.  At daybreak we were in
motion, with a regular guide.  We had proceeded but about six
miles, when we found the enemy had been very busy felling trees to
obstruct the creek.

All the negroes along the route had been notified to be ready at
night fall to continue the work.  To prevent this as much as
possible, I ordered all able-bodied negroes to be taken along, and
warned some of the principal inhabitants that they would be held
responsible for any more obstructions being placed across the
creek.  We reached the admiral about four o'clock p.m., with no
opposition save my advance-guard (Company A, Sixth Missouri) being
fired into from the opposite side of  the creek, killing one man,
and slightly wounding another; having no way of crossing, we had to
content ourselves with driving them beyond musket-range.
Proceeding with as little loss of time as possible, I found the
fleet obstructed in front by fallen trees, in rear by a sunken
coal-barge, and surrounded, by a large force of rebels with an
abundant supply of artillery, but wisely keeping their main force
out of range of the admiral's guns.  Every tree and stump covered a
sharp-shooter, ready to pick off any luckless marine who showed his
head above-decks, and entirely preventing the working-parties from
removing obstructions.

In pursuance of orders from General Sherman, I reported to Admiral
Porter for orders, who turned over to me all the land-forces in his
fleet (about one hundred and fifty men), together with two
howitzers, and I was instructed by him to retain a sufficient force
to clear out the sharp-shooters, and to distribute the remainder
along the creek for six or seven miles below, to prevent any more
obstructions being placed in it during the night.  This was
speedily arranged, our skirmishers capturing three prisoners.
Immediate steps were now taken to remove the coal-barge, which was
accomplished about daylight on Sunday morning, when the fleet moved
back toward Black Bayou.  By three o'clock p.m.  we had only made
about six miles, owing to the large number of trees to be removed;
at this point, where our progress was very slow, we discovered a
long line of the enemy filing along the edge of the woods, and
taking position on the creek below us, and about one mile ahead of
our advance.  Shortly after, they opened fire on the gunboats from
batteries behind the cavalry and infantry.  The boats not only
replied to the batteries, which they soon silenced, but poured a
destructive fire into their lines.  Heavy skirmishing was also
heard in our front, supposed to be by three companies from the
Sixth and Eighth Missouri, whose position, taken the previous night
to guard the creek, was beyond the point reached by the enemy, and
consequently liable to be cut off or captured.  Captain Owen, of
the Louisville, the leading boat, made every effort to go through
the obstructions and aid in the rescuing of the men.  I ordered
Major Kirby, with four companies of the Sixth Missouri, forward,
with two companies deployed.  He soon met General Sherman, with the
Thirteenth Infantry and One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois,
driving the enemy before them, and opening communication along the
creek with the gunboats.  Instead of our three companies referred
to as engaging the enemy, General Sherman had arrived at a very
opportune moment with the two regiments mentioned above, and the
Second Brigade.  The enemy, not expecting an attack from that
quarter, after some hot skirmishing, retreated.  General Sherman
immediately ordered the Thirteenth Infantry and One Hundred and
Thirteenth Illinois to pursue; but, after following their trace for
about two miles, they were recalled.

We continued our march for about two miles, when we bivouacked for
the night.  Early on Monday morning (March 22d) we continued our
march, but owing to the slow progress of the gunboats did not reach
Hill's plantation until Tuesday, the 23d instant, where we remained
until the 25th; we then reembarked, and arrived at Young's Point on
Friday, the 27th instant.

Below you will find a list of casualties.  Very respectfully,

Giles A. SMITH,
Colonel Eighth Missouri, commanding First Brigade.

P. S.-I forgot to state above that the Thirteenth Infantry and One
Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois being under the immediate command
of General Sherman, he can mention them as their conduct deserves.


On the 3d of April, a division of troops, commanded by
Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle, was assigned to my corps, and
was designated the Third Division; and, on the 4th of April,
Brigadier-General D. Stuart was relieved from the command of the
Second Division, to which Major-General Frank P. Blair was appointed
by an order from General Grant's headquarters.  Stuart had been with
me from the time we were at Benton Barracks, in command of the
Fifty-fifth Illinois, then of a brigade, and finally of a division;
but he had failed in seeking a confirmation by the Senate to his
nomination as brigadier-general, by reason of some old affair at
Chicago, and, having resigned his commission as colonel, he was out
of service. I esteemed him very highly, and was actually mortified
that the service should thus be deprived of so excellent and gallant
an officer.  He afterward settled in New Orleans as a lawyer, and
died about 1867 or 1868.

On the 6th of April, my command, the Fifteenth Corps, was composed
of three divisions:

The First Division, commanded by Major-General Fred Steele; and his
three brigades by Colonel Manter, Colonel Charles R. Wood, and
Brigadier-General John M. Thayer.

The Second Division, commanded by Major-General Frank P. Blair; and
his three brigades by Colonel Giles A. Smith, Colonel Thomas Gilby
Smith, and Brigadier-General Hugh Ewing.

The Third Division, commanded by Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle;
and his three brigades by Brigadier-General R. P. Buckland, Colonel
J. A. Mower, and Brigadier-General John E. Smith.

My own staff then embraced: Dayton, McCoy, and Hill, aides; J. H.
Hammond, assistant adjutant-general; Sanger, inspector-general;
McFeeley, commissary; J. Condit Smith, quartermaster; Charles
McMillan, medical director; Ezra Taylor, chief of artillery;
Jno. C. Neely, ordnance-officer; Jenney and Pitzman, engineers.

By this time it had become thoroughly demonstrated that we could
not divert the main river Mississippi, or get practicable access to
the east bank of the Yazoo, in the rear of Vicksburg, by any of the
passes; and we were all in the habit of discussing the various
chances of the future.  General Grant's headquarters were at
Milliken's Bend, in tents, and his army was strung along the river
all the way from Young's Point up to Lake Providence, at least
sixty miles.  I had always contended that the best way to take
Vicksburg was to resume the movement which had been so well begun
the previous November, viz., for the main army to march by land
down the country inland of the Mississippi River; while the
gunboat-fleet and a minor land-force should threaten Vicksburg on
its river-front.

I reasoned that, with the large force then subject to General
Grant's orders-viz., four army corps--he could easily resume the
movement from Memphis, by way of Oxford and Grenada, to Jackson,
Mississippi, or down the ridge between the Yazoo and Big Black; but
General Grant would not, for reasons other than military, take any
course which looked like, a step backward; and he himself concluded
on the river movement below Vicksburg, so as to appear like
connecting with General Banks, who at the same time was besieging
Port Hudson from the direction of New Orleans.

Preliminary orders had already been given, looking to the digging
of a canal, to connect the river at Duckport with Willow Bayou,
back of Milliken's Bend, so as to form a channel for the conveyance
of supplies, by way of Richmond, to New Carthage; and several steam
dredge-boats had come from the upper rivers to assist in the work.
One day early in April, I was up at General Grant's headquarters,
and we talked over all these things with absolute freedom.  Charles
A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, was there, and Wilson,
Rawlins, Frank Blair, McPherson, etc.  We all knew, what was
notorious, that General McClernand was still intriguing against
General Grant, in hopes to regain the command of the whole
expedition, and that others were raising a clamor against General
Grant in the news papers at the North.  Even Mr. Lincoln and
General Halleck seemed to be shaken; but at no instant of time did
we (his personal friends) slacken in our loyalty to him.  One
night, after such a discussion, and believing that General
McClernand had no real plan of action shaped in his mind, I wrote
my letter of April 8, 1863, to Colonel Rawlins, which letter is
embraced in full at page 616 of Badeau's book, and which I now
reproduce here:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR VICKSBURG, April 8,1868.

Colonel J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General to General GRANT.

SIR: I would most respectfully suggest (for reasons which I will
not name) that General Grant call on his corps commanders for their
opinions, concise and positive, on the best general plan of a
campaign.  Unless this be done, there are men who will, in any
result falling below the popular standard, claim that their advice
was unheeded, and that fatal consequence resulted therefrom.  My
own opinions are:

First. That the Army of the Tennessee is now far in advance of the
other grand armies of the United States.

Second.  That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved from
St. Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Arkansas; supplies
collected there while the river is full, and land communication
with Memphis opened via Des Arc on the White, and Madison on the
St. Francis River.

Third.  That as much of the Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and Tallahatchie
Rivers, as can be gained and fortified, be held, and the main army
be transported thither by land and water; that the road back to
Memphis be secured and reopened, and, as soon as the waters
subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp-road across to Helena
be patrolled by cavalry.

Fourth.  That the line of the Yalabusha be the base from which to
operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses
Big Black, above Canton; and, lastly, where the Vicksburg & Jackson
Railroad crosses the same river (Big Black).  The capture of
Vicksburg would result.

Fifth.  That a minor force be left in this vicinity, not to exceed
ten thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float and
transport them to any desired point; this force to be held always
near enough to act with the gunboats when the main army is known to
be near Vicksburg--Haines's Bluff or Yazoo City.

Sixth.  I do doubt the capacity of Willow Bayou (which I estimate
to be fifty miles long and very tortuous) as a military channel, to
supply an army large enough to operate against Jackson,
Mississippi, or the Black River Bridge; and such a channel will be
very vulnerable to a force coming from the west, which we must
expect.  Yet this canal will be most useful as the way to convey
coals and supplies to a fleet that should navigate the lower reach
of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and the Red River.

Seventh.  The chief reason for operating solely by water was the
season of the year and high water in the Tallahatchie and Yalabusha
Rivers.  The spring is now here, and soon these streams will be no
serious obstacle, save in the ambuscades of the forest, and
whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Grenada.
North Mississippi is too valuable for us to allow the enemy to hold
it and make crops this year.

I make these suggestions, with the request that General Grant will
read them and give them, as I know he will, a share of his
thoughts.  I would prefer that he should not answer this letter,
but merely give it as much or as little weight as it deserves.
Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the same
zealous cooperation and energetic support as though conceived by
myself.  I do not believe General Banks will make any serious
attack on Port Hudson this spring.  I am, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


This is the letter which some critics have styled a "protest."  We
never had a council of war at any time during the Vicksburg
campaign.  We often met casually, regardless of rank or power, and
talked and gossiped of things in general, as officers do and
should.  But my letter speaks for itself--it shows my opinions
clearly at that stage of the game, and was meant partially to
induce General Grant to call on General McClernand for a similar
expression of opinion, but, so far as I know, he did not.  He went
on quietly to work out his own designs; and he has told me, since
the war, that had we possessed in December, 1862, the experience of
marching and maintaining armies without a regular base, which we
afterward acquired, he would have gone on from Oxford as first
contemplated, and would not have turned back because of the
destruction of his depot at Holly Springs by Van Dorn.  The
distance from Oxford to the rear of Vicksburg is little greater
than by the circuitous route we afterward followed, from Bruinsburg
to Jackson and Vicksburg, during which we had neither depot nor
train of supplies.  I have never criticised General Grant's
strategy on this or any other occasion, but I thought then that
he had lost an opportunity, which cost him and us six months'
extra-hard work, for we might have captured Vicksburg from the
direction of Oxford in January, quite as easily as was afterward
done in July, 1863.

General Grant's orders for the general movement past Vicksburg, by
Richmond and Carthage, were dated April 20, 1863.  McClernand was
to lead off with his corps, McPherson next, and my corps (the
Fifteenth) to bring up the rear.  Preliminary thereto, on the night
of April 16th, seven iron-clads led by Admiral Porter in person, in
the Benton, with three transports, and ten barges in tow, ran the
Vicksburg batteries by night.  Anticipating a scene, I had four
yawl-boats hauled across the swamp, to the reach of the river below
Vicksburg, and manned them with soldiers, ready to pick up any of
the disabled wrecks as they floated by.  I was out in the stream
when the fleet passed Vicksburg, and the scene was truly sublime.
As soon as the rebel gunners detected the Benton, which was in the
lead, they opened on her, and on the others in succession, with
shot and shell; houses on the Vicksburg side and on the opposite
shore were set on fire, which lighted up the whole river; and the
roar of cannon, the bursting of shells, and finally the burning of
the Henry Clay, drifting with the current, made up a picture of the
terrible not often seen.  Each gunboat returned the fire as she
passed the town, while the transports hugged the opposite shore.
When the Benton had got abreast of us, I pulled off to her,
boarded, had a few words with Admiral Porter, and as she was
drifting rapidly toward the lower batteries at Warrenton, I left,
and pulled back toward the shore, meeting the gunboat Tuscumbia
towing the transport Forest Queen into the bank out of the range of
fire.  The Forest Queen, Captain Conway, had been my flag-boat up
the Arkansas, and for some time after, and I was very friendly with
her officers.  This was the only transport whose captain would not
receive volunteers as a crew, but her own officers and crew stuck
to their boat, and carried her safely below the Vicksburg
batteries, and afterward rendered splendid service in ferrying
troops across the river at Grand Gulf and Bruinsburg.  In passing
Vicksburg, she was damaged in the hull and had a steam-pipe cut
away, but this was soon repaired.  The Henry Clay was set on fire
by bursting shells, and burned up; one of my yawls picked up her
pilot floating on a piece of wreck, and the bulk of her crew
escaped in their own yawl-boat to the shore above.  The Silver
Wave, Captain McMillan, the same that was with us up Steele's
Bayou, passed safely, and she also rendered good service afterward.

Subsequently, on the night of April 26th, six other transports with
numerous barges loaded with hay, corn, freight, and provisions,
were drifted past Vicksburg; of these the Tigress was hit, and sunk
just as she reached the river-bank below, on our side: I was there
with my yawls, and saw Colonel Lagow, of General Grant's staff, who
had passed the batteries in the Tigress, and I think he was
satisfied never to attempt such a thing again.  Thus General
Grant's army had below Vicksburg an abundance of stores, and boats
with which to cross the river.  The road by which the troops
marched was very bad, and it was not until the 1st of May that it
was clear for my corps.  While waiting my turn to march, I received
a letter from General Grant, written at Carthage, saying that he
proposed to cross over and attack Grand Gulf, about the end of
April, and he thought I could put in my time usefully by making a
"feint" on Haines's Bluff, but he did not like to order me to do
it, because it might be reported at the North that I had again been
"repulsed, etc."  Thus we had to fight a senseless clamor at the
North, as well as a determined foe and the obstacles of Nature.  Of
course, I answered him that I would make the "feint," regardless of
public clamor at a distance, and I did make it most effectually;
using all the old boats I could get about Milliken's Bend and the
mouth of the Yazoo, but taking only ten small regiments, selected
out of Blair's division, to make a show of force.  We afterward
learned that General Pemberton in Vicksburg had previously
dispatched a large force to the assistance of General Bowers, at
Grand Gulf and Port Gibson, which force had proceeded as far as
Hankinson's Ferry, when he discovered our ostentatious movement up
the Yazoo, recalled his men, and sent them up to Haines's Bluff to
meet us.  This detachment of rebel troops must have marched nearly
sixty miles without rest, for afterward, on reaching Vicksburg, I
heard that the men were perfectly exhausted, and lay along the road
in groups, completely fagged out.  This diversion, made with so
much pomp and display, therefore completely fulfilled its purpose,
by leaving General Grant to contend with a minor force, on landing
at Bruinsburg, and afterward at Port Gibson and Grand Gulf.

In May the waters of the Mississippi had so far subsided that all
our canals were useless, and the roads had become practicable.
After McPherson's corps had passed Richmond, I took up the route of
march, with Steele's and Tuttle's divisions.  Blair's division
remained at Milliken's Bend to protect our depots there, till
relieved by troops from Memphis, and then he was ordered to follow
us.  Our route lay by Richmond and Roundabout Bayou; then,
following Bayou Vidal we struck the Mississippi at Perkins's
plantation.  Thence the route followed Lake St. Joseph to a
plantation called Hard Times, about five miles above Grand Gulf.
The road was more or less occupied by wagons and detachments
belonging to McPherson's corps; still we marched rapidly and
reached Hard Times on the 6th of May.  Along the Bayou or Lake St.
Joseph were many very fine cotton plantations, and I recall that of
a Mr. Bowie, brother-in-law of the Hon. Reverdy Johnson, of
Baltimore.  The house was very handsome, with a fine, extensive
grass-plot in front.  We entered the yard, and, leaving our horses
with the headquarters escort, walked to the house.  On the
front-porch I found a magnificent grand-piano, with several
satin-covered arm-chairs, in one of which sat a Union soldier (one
of McPherson's men), with his feet on the keys of the piano, and
his musket and knapsack lying on the porch.  I asked him what he
was doing there, and he answered that he was "taking a rest;" this
was manifest and I started him in a hurry, to overtake his command.
The house was tenantless, and had been completely ransacked;
articles of dress and books were strewed about, and a handsome
boudoir with mirror front had been cast down, striking a French
bedstead, shivering the glass.  The library was extensive, with a
fine collection of books; and hanging on the wall were two
full-length portraits of Reverdy Johnson and his wife, one of the
most beautiful ladies of our country, with whom I had been
acquainted in Washington at the time of General Taylor's
administration.  Behind the mansion was the usual double row of
cabins called the "quarters."  There I found an old negro (a family
servant) with several women, whom I sent to the house to put things
in order; telling the old man that other troops would follow, and
he must stand on the porch to tell any officers who came along that
the property belonged to Mr. Bowie, who was the brother-in-law of
our friend Mr. Reverdy Johnson, of Baltimore, asking them to see
that no further harm was done.  Soon after we left the house I saw
some negroes carrying away furniture which manifestly belonged to
the house, and compelled them to carry it back; and after reaching
camp that night, at Hard Times, I sent a wagon back to Bowie's
plantation, to bring up to Dr. Hollingsworth's house the two
portraits for safe keeping; but before the wagon had reached
Bowie's the house was burned, whether by some of our men or by
negroes I have never learned.

At the river there was a good deal of scrambling to get across,
because the means of ferriage were inadequate; but by the aid of
the Forest Queen and several gunboats I got my command across
during the 7th of May, and marched out to Hankiuson's Ferry
(eighteen miles), relieving General Crocker's division of
McPherson's corps.  McClernand's corps and McPherson's were still
ahead, and had fought the battle of Port Gibson, on the 11th.  I
overtook General Grant in person at Auburn, and he accompanied my
corps all the way into Jackson, which we reached May 14th.
McClernand's corps had been left in observation toward Edwards's
Ferry.  McPherson had fought at Raymond, and taken the left-hand
road toward Jackson, via Clinton, while my troops were ordered by
General Grant in person to take the right-hand road leading through
Mississippi Springs.  We reached Jackson at the same time;
McPherson fighting on the Clinton road, and my troops fighting just
outside the town, on the Raymond road, where we captured three
entire field-batteries, and about two hundred prisoners of war.
The rebels, under General Joe Johnston, had retreated through the
town northward on the Canton road.  Generals Grant, McPherson, and
I, met in the large hotel facing the State-House, where the former
explained to us that he had intercepted dispatches from Pemberton
to Johnston, which made it important for us to work smart to
prevent a junction of their respective forces.  McPherson was
ordered to march back early the next day on the Clinton road to
make junction with McClernand, and I was ordered to remain one day
to break up railroads, to destroy the arsenal, a foundery, the
cotton-factory of the Messrs.  Green, etc., etc., and then to
follow McPherson.

McPherson left Jackson early on the 15th, and General Grant during
the same day.  I kept my troops busy in tearing up railroad-tracks,
etc., but early on the morning of the 16th received notice from
General Grant that a battle was imminent near Edwards's Depot; that
he wanted me to dispatch one of my divisions immediately, and to
follow with the other as soon as I had completed the work of
destruction.  Steele's division started immediately, and later in
the day I followed with the other division (Tuttle's).  Just as I
was leaving Jackson, a very fat man came to see me, to inquire if
his hotel, a large, frame building near the depot, were doomed to
be burned.  I told him we had no intention to burn it, or any other
house, except the machine-shops, and such buildings as could easily
be converted to hostile uses.  He professed to be a law-abiding
Union man, and I remember to have said that this fact was manifest
from the sign of his hotel, which was the "Confederate Hotel;" the
sign "United States" being faintly painted out, and "Confederate"
painted over it! I remembered that hotel, as it was the
supper-station for the New Orleans trains when I used to travel the
road before the war.  I had not the least purpose, however, of
burning it, but, just as we were leaving the town, it burst out in
flames and was burned to the ground.  I never found out exactly who
set it on fire, but was told that in one of our batteries were some
officers and men who had been made prisoners at Shiloh, with
Prentiss's division, and had been carried past Jackson in a
railroad-train; they had been permitted by the guard to go to this
very hotel for supper, and had nothing to pay but greenbacks, which
were refused, with insult, by this same law-abiding landlord.
These men, it was said, had quietly and stealthily applied the fire
underneath the hotel just as we were leaving the town.

About dark we met General Grant's staff-officer near Bolton
Station, who turned us to the right, with orders to push on to
Vicksburg by what was known as the upper Jackson Road, which
crossed the Big Black at Bridgeport.  During that day (May 16th)
the battle of Champion Hills had been fought and won by
McClernand's and McPherson's corps, aided by one division of mine
(Blairs), under the immediate command of General Grant; and
McPherson was then following the mass of  Pemberton's army,
disordered and retreating toward Vicksburg by the Edwards's Ferry
road.  General Blair's division had come up from the rear, was
temporarily attached to McClernand's corps, taking part with it in
the battle of Champion Hills, but on the 17th it was ordered by
General Grant across to Bridgeport, to join me there.

Just beyond Bolton there was a small hewn-log house, standing back
in a yard, in which was a well; at this some of our soldiers were
drawing water.  I rode in to get a drink, and, seeing a book on the
ground, asked some soldier to hand it to me.  It was a volume of
the Constitution of the United States, and on the title-page was
written the name of Jefferson Davis.  On inquiry of a negro, I
learned that the place belonged to the then President of the
Southern Confederation.  His brother Joe Davis's plantation was not
far off; one of my staff-officers went there, with a few soldiers,
and took a pair of carriage-horses, without my knowledge at the
time.  He found Joe Davis at home, an old man, attended by a young
and affectionate niece; but they were overwhelmed with grief to see
their country overran and swarming with Federal troops.

We pushed on, and reached the Big Black early, Blair's
troops having preceded us by an hour or so.  I found General
Blair in person, and he reported that there was no bridge across
the Big Black; that it was swimming-deep; and that there was
a rebel force on the opposite side, intrenched.  He had ordered
a detachment of the Thirteenth United States Regulars, under
Captain Charles Ewing, to strip some artillery-horses, mount the
men, and swim the river above the ferry, to attack and drive
away the party on the opposite bank.  I did not approve of this
risky attempt, but crept down close to the brink of the
river-bank, behind a corn-crib belonging to a plantation house near
by, and saw the parapet on the opposite bank.  Ordering a section of
guns to be brought forward by hand behind this corn-crib, a few
well-directed shells brought out of their holes the little party
that was covering the crossing, viz., a lieutenant and ten men, who
came down to the river-bank and surrendered.  Blair's pon-toon-train
was brought up, consisting of India-rubber boats, one of which was
inflated, used as a boat, and brought over the prisoners.  A
pontoon-bridge was at once begun, finished by night, and the troops
began the passage.  After dark, the whole scene was lit up with
fires of pitch-pine.  General Grant joined me there, and we sat on a
log, looking at the passage of the troops by the light of those
fires; the bridge swayed to and fro under the passing feet, and made
a fine war-picture.  At daybreak we moved on, ascending the ridge,
and by 10 a.m. the head of my column, long drawn out, reached the
Benton road, and gave us command of the peninsula between the Yazoo
and Big Black.  I dispatched Colonel Swan, of the Fourth Iowa
Cavalry, to Haines's Bluff, to capture that battery from the rear,
and he afterward reported that he found it abandoned, its garrison
having hastily retreated into Vicksburg, leaving their guns
partially disabled, a magazine full of ammunition, and a hospital
full of wounded and sick men.  Colonel Swan saw one of our gunboats
lying about two miles below in the Yazoo, to which he signaled.  She
steamed up, and to its commander the cavalry turned over the battery
at Haines's Bluff, and rejoined me in front of Vicksburg.  Allowing
a couple of hours for rest and to close up the column, I resumed the
march straight on Vicksburg. About two miles before reaching the
forts, the road forked; the left was the main Jackson road, and the
right was the "graveyard" road, which entered Vicksburg near a large
cemetery.  General Grant in person directed me to take the
right-hand road, but, as McPherson had not yet got up from the
direction of the railroad-bridge at Big Black, I sent the Eighth
Missouri on the main Jackson road, to push the rebel skirmishers
into town, and to remain until relieved by McPherson's advance,
which happened late that evening, May 18th.  The battalion of the
Thirteenth United States Regulars, commanded by Captain Washington,
was at the head of the column on the right-hand road, and pushed the
rebels close behind their parapets; one of my staff, Captain
Pitzman, receiving a dangerous wound in the hip, which apparently
disabled him for life. By night Blair's whole division had closed up
against the defenses of Vicksburg, which were found to be strong and
well manned; and, on General Steele's head of column arriving, I
turned it still more to the right, with orders to work its way down
the bluff, so as to make connection with our fleet in the
Mississippi River.  There was a good deal of desultory fighting that
evening, and a man was killed by the aide of General Grant and
myself, as we sat by the road-side looking at Steele's division
passing to the right.  General Steele's men reached the road which
led from Vicksburg up to Haines's Bluff, which road lay at the foot
of the hills, and intercepted some prisoners and wagons which were
coming down from Haines's Bluff.

All that night McPherson's troops were arriving by the main Jackson
road, and McClernand'a by another near the railroad, deploying
forward as fast as they struck the rebel works.  My corps (the
Fifteenth) had the right of the line of investment; McPherson's
(the Seventeenth) the centre; and McClernand's (the Thirteenth) the
left, reaching from the river above to the railroad below.  Our
lines connected, and invested about three-quarters of the
land-front of the fortifications of Vicksburg.  On the supposition
that the garrison of Vicksburg was demoralized by the defeats at
Champion Hills and at the railroad crossing of the Big Black,
General Grant ordered an assault at our respective fronts on the
19th.  My troops reached the top of the parapet, but could not
cross over.  The rebel parapets were strongly manned, and the enemy
fought hard and well.  My loss was pretty heavy, falling chiefly on
the Thirteenth Regulars, whose commanding officer, Captain
Washington, was killed, and several other regiments were pretty
badly cut up.  We, however, held the ground up to the ditch till
night, and then drew back only a short distance, and began to
counter-trench.  On the graveyard road, our parapet was within less
than fifty yards of the rebel ditch.

On the 20th of May, General Grant called the three corps commanders
together, viz., McClernand, McPherson, and Sherman.  We compared
notes, and agreed that the assault of the day before had failed, by
reason of the natural strength of the position, and because we were
forced by the nature of the ground to limit our attacks to the
strongest parts of the enemy's line, viz., where the three
principal roads entered the city.

It was not a council of war, but a mere consultation, resulting in
orders from General Grant for us to make all possible preparations
for a renewed assault on the 22d, simultaneously, at 10 a.m.  I
reconnoitred my front thoroughly in person, from right to left, and
concluded to make my real attack at the right flank of the bastion,
where the graveyard road entered the enemy's intrenchments, and at
another point in the curtain about a hundred yards to its right
(our left); also to make a strong demonstration by Steele's
division, about a mile to our right, toward the river.  All our
field batteries were put in position, and were covered by good
epaulements; the troops were brought forward, in easy support,
concealed by the shape of the ground; and to the minute,  viz.,
10 a.m. of May 22d, the troops sprang to the assault.  A small
party, that might be called a forlorn hope, provided with plank to
cross the ditch, advanced at a run, up to the very ditch; the lines
of infantry sprang from cover, and advanced rapidly in line of
battle.  I took a position within two hundred yards of the rebel
parapet, on the off slope of a spur of ground, where by advancing
two or three steps I could see every thing.  The rebel line,
concealed by the parapet, showed no sign of unusual activity, but
as our troops came in fair view, the enemy rose behind their
parapet and poured a furious fire upon our lines; and, for about
two hours, we had a severe and bloody battle, but at every point we
were repulsed.  In the very midst of this, when shell and shot fell
furious and fast, occurred that little episode which has been
celebrated in song and story, of the boy Orion P. Howe, badly
wounded, bearing me a message for cartridges, calibre 54,
described in my letter to the Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.
This boy was afterward appointed a cadet to the United States Naval
Academy, at Annapolis, but he could not graduate, and I do not now
know what has become of him.

After our men had been fairly beaten back from off the parapet, and
had got cover behind the spurs of ground close up to the rebel
works, General Grant came to where I was, on foot, having left his
horse some distance to the rear.  I pointed out to him the rebel
works, admitted that my assault had failed, and he said the result
with McPherson and McClernand was about the same.  While he was
with me, an orderly or staff-officer came and handed him a piece of
paper, which he read and handed to me.  I think the writing was in
pencil, on a loose piece of paper, and was in General McClernand's
handwriting, to the effect that "his troops had captured the rebel
parapet in his front," that, "the flag of the Union waved over the
stronghold of Vicksburg," and asking him (General Grant) to give
renewed orders to McPherson and Sherman to press their attacks on
their respective fronts, lest the enemy should concentrate on him
(McClernand).  General Grant said, "I don't believe a word of it;"
but I reasoned with him, that this note was official, and must be
credited, and I offered to renew the assault at once with new
troops.  He said he would instantly ride down the line to
McClernand's front, and if I did not receive orders to the
contrary, by 3 o'clock p.m., I might try it again.  Mower's fresh
brigade was brought up under cover, and some changes were made in
Giles Smith's brigade; and, punctually at 3 p.m., hearing heavy
firing down along the line to my left, I ordered the second
assault.  It was a repetition of the first, equally unsuccessful
and bloody.  It also transpired that the same thing had occurred
with General McPherson, who lost in this second assault some most
valuable officers and men, without adequate result; and that
General McClernand, instead of having taken any single point of the
rebel main parapet, had only taken one or two small outlying
lunettes open to the rear, where his men were at the mercy of the
rebels behind their main parapet, and most of them were actually
thus captured.  This affair caused great feeling with us, and
severe criticisms on General McClernand, which led finally to his
removal from the command of the Thirteenth Corps, to which
General Ord succeeded.  The immediate cause, however, of
General McClernand's removal was the publication of a sort of
congratulatory order addressed to his troops, first published in
St. Louis, in which he claimed that he had actually succeeded in
making a lodgment in Vicksburg, but had lost it, owing to the fact
that McPherson and Sherman did not fulfill their parts of the
general plan of attack.  This was simply untrue.  The two several
assaults made May 22d, on the lines of Vicksburg, had failed, by
reason of the great strength of the position and the determined
fighting of its garrison.  I have since seen the position at
Sevastopol, and without hesitation I declare that at Vicksburg to
have been the more difficult of the two.

Thereafter our proceedings were all in the nature of a siege.
General Grant drew more troops from Memphis, to prolong our general
line to the left, so as completely to invest the place on its
land-side, while the navy held the river both above and below.
General Mower's brigade of Tuttle's division was also sent across
the river to the peninsula, so that by May 31st Vicksburg was
completely beleaguered.  Good roads were constructed from our camps
to the several landing-places on the Yazoo River, to which points
our boats brought us ample supplies; so that we were in a splendid
condition for a siege, while our enemy was shut up in a close fort,
with a large civil population of men, women, and children to feed,
in addition to his combatant force.  If we could prevent sallies,
or relief from the outside, the fate of the garrison of Vicksburg
was merely a question of time.

I had my headquarters camp close up to the works, near the centre
of my corps, and General Grant had his bivouac behind a ravine to
my rear.  We estimated Pemberton's whole force in Vicksburg at
thirty thousand men, and it was well known that the rebel General
Joseph E. Johnston was engaged in collecting another strong force
near the Big Black, with the intention to attack our rear, and thus
to afford Pemberton an opportunity to escape with his men.  Even
then the ability of General Johnston was recognized, and General
Grant told me that he was about the only general on that side whom
he feared.  Each corps kept strong pickets well to the rear; but,
as the rumors of Johnston's accumulating force reached us, General
Grant concluded to take stronger measures.  He had received from
the North General J. G. Parker's corps (Ninth), which had been
posted at Haines's Bluff; then, detailing one division from each of
the three corps d'armee investing Vicksburg, he ordered me to go
out, take a general command of all, and to counteract any movement
on the part of General Johnston to relieve Vicksburg.  I
reconnoitred the whole country, from Haines's Bluff to the railroad
bridge, and posted the troops thus:

Parke's two divisions from Haines's Bluff out to the Benton or
ridge road; Tuttle's division, of my corps, joining on and
extending to a plantation called Young's, overlooking Bear Creek
valley, which empties into the Big Black above Messinger's Ferry;
then McArthurs division, of McPherson's corps, took up the line,
and reached to Osterhaus's division of McClernand's corps, which
held a strong fortified position at the railroad-crossing of the
Big Black River.  I was of opinion that, if Johnston should cross
the Big Black, he could by the favorable nature of the country be
held in check till a concentration could be effected by us at the
point threatened.  From the best information we could gather,
General Johnston had about thirty or forty thousand men.  I took
post near a plantation of one Trible, near Markham's, and
frequently reconnoitred the whole line, and could see the enemy
engaged in like manner, on the east aide of Big Black; but he never
attempted actually to cross over, except with some cavalry, just
above Bear Creek, which was easily driven back.  I was there from
June 20th to the 4th of July.  In a small log-house near Markham's
was the family of Mr. Klein, whose wife was the daughter of Mrs.
Day, of New Orleans, who in turn was the sister of Judge T. W.
Bartley, my brother-in-law.  I used frequently to drop in and take
a meal with them, and Mrs. Klein was generally known as the
general's cousin, which doubtless saved her and her family from
molestation, too common on the part of our men.

One day, as I was riding the line near a farm known as Parson
Fog's, I heard that the family of a Mr. Wilkinson, of New Orleans,
was "refugeeing" at a house near by.  I rode up, inquired, and
found two young girls of that name, who said they were the children
of General Wilkinson, of Louisiana, and that their brother had been
at the Military School at Alexandria.  Inquiring for their mother,
I was told she was spending the day at Parson Fox's.  As this house
was on my route, I rode there, went through a large gate into the
yard, followed by my staff and escort, and found quite a number of
ladies sitting on the porch.  I rode up and inquired if that were
Parson Fox's.  The parson, a fine-looking, venerable old man, rose,
and said that he was Parson Fox.  I then inquired for Mrs.
Wilkinson, when an elderly lady answered that she was the person.
I asked her if she were from Plaquemine Parish, Louisiana, and she
said she was.  I then inquired if she had a son who had been a
cadet at Alexandria when General Sherman was superintendent, and
she answered yes.  I then announced myself, inquired after the boy,
and she said he was inside of Vicksburg, an artillery lieutenant.
I then asked about her husband, whom I had known, when she burst
into tears, and cried out in agony, "You killed him at Bull Run,
where he was fighting for his country!"  I disclaimed killing
anybody at Bull Run; but all the women present (nearly a dozen)
burst into loud lamentations, which made it most uncomfortable for
me, and I rode away.  On the 3d of July, as I sat at my bivouac by
the road-side near Trible's, I saw a poor, miserable horse,
carrying a lady, and led by a little negro boy, coming across a
cotton-field toward me; as they approached I recognized poor Mrs.
Wilkinson, and helped her to dismount.  I inquired what had brought
her to me in that style, and she answered that she knew Vicksburg,
was going to surrender, and she wanted to go right away to see her
boy.  I had a telegraph-wire to General Grant's headquarters, and
had heard that there were symptoms of surrender, but as yet nothing
definite.  I tried to console and dissuade her, but she was
resolved, and I could not help giving her a letter to General
Grant, explaining to him who she was, and asking him to give her
the earliest opportunity to see her son.  The distance was fully
twenty miles, but off she started, and I afterward learned that my
letter had enabled her to see her son, who had escaped unharmed.
Later in the day I got by telegraph General Grant's notice of the
negotiations for surrender; and, by his directions, gave general
orders to my troops to be ready at a moment's notice to cross the
Big Black, and go for Joe Johnston.

The next day (July 4, 1863) Vicksburg surrendered, and orders were
given for at once attacking General Johnston.  The Thirteenth Corps
(General Ord) was ordered to march rapidly, and cross the Big Black
at the railroad-bridge; the Fifteenth by Mesainger's, and the Ninth
(General Parker) by Birdsong's Ferry-all to converge on Bolton.  My
corps crossed the Big Black during the 5th and 6th of July, and
marched for Bolton, where we came in with General Ord's troops; but
the Ninth Corps was delayed in crossing at Birdsong's.  Johnston
had received timely notice of Pemberton's surrender, and was in
full retreat for Jackson.  On the 8th all our troops reached the
neighborhood of Clinton, the weather fearfully hot, and water
scarce.  Johnston had marched rapidly, and in retreating had caused
cattle, hogs, and sheep, to be driven into the ponds of water, and
there shot down; so that we had to haul their dead and stinking
carcasses out to use the water.  On the 10th of July we had driven
the rebel army into Jackson, where it turned at bay behind the
intrenchments, which had been enlarged and strengthened since our
former visit in May.  We closed our lines about Jackson; my corps
(Fifteenth) held the centre, extending from the Clinton to the
Raymond road; Ord's (Thirteenth) on the right, reaching Pearl River
below the town; and Parker's (Ninth) the left, above the town.

On the 11th we pressed close in, and shelled the town from every
direction.  One of Ords brigades (Lauman's) got too close, and was
very roughly handled and driven back in disorder.  General Ord
accused the commander (General Lauman) of having disregarded his
orders, and attributed to him personally the disaster and heavy
loss of men.  He requested his relief, which I granted, and General
Lauman went to the rear, and never regained his division.  He died
after the war, in Iowa, much respected, as before that time he had
been universally esteemed a most gallant and excellent officer.
The weather was fearfully hot, but we continued to press the siege
day and night, using our artillery pretty freely; and on the
morning of July 17th the place was found evacuated.  General
Steele's division was sent in pursuit as far as Brandon (fourteen
miles), but General Johnston had carried his army safely off, and
pursuit in that hot weather would have been fatal to my command.

Reporting the fact to General Grant, he ordered me to return, to
send General Parkes's corps to Haines's Bluff, General Ord's back
to Vicksburg, and he consented that I should encamp my whole corps
near the Big Black, pretty much on the same ground we had occupied
before the movement, and with the prospect of a period of rest for
the remainder of the summer.  We reached our camps on the 27th of
July.

Meantime, a division of troops, commanded by Brigadier-General W.
Sooy Smith, had been added to my corps.  General Smith applied for
and received a sick-leave on the 20th of July; Brigadier-General
Hugh Ewing was assigned to its command; and from that time it
constituted the Fourth Division of the Fifteenth Army Corps.

Port Hudson had surrendered to General Banks on the 8th of July (a
necessary consequence of the fall of Vicksburg), and thus
terminated probably the most important enterprise of the civil
war--the recovery of the complete control of the Mississippi River,
from its source to its mouth--or, in the language of Mr. Lincoln,
the Mississippi went "unvexed to the sea."

I put my four divisions into handsome, clean camps, looking to
health and comfort alone, and had my headquarters in a beautiful
grove near the house of that same Parson Fox where I had found the
crowd of weeping rebel women waiting for the fate of their friends
in Vicksburg.

The loss sustained by the Fifteenth Corps in the assault of May
19th, at Vicksburg, was mostly confined to the battalion of the
Thirteenth Regulars, whose commanding officer, Captain Washington,
was mortally wounded, and afterward died in the hands of the enemy,
which battalion lost seventy-seven men out of the two hundred and
fifty engaged; the Eighty-third Indiana (Colonel Spooner), and the
One Hundred and Twenty seventh Illinois (Lieutenant-Colonel
Eldridge), the aggregate being about two hundred.

In the assaults of the 22d, the loss in the Fifteenth Corps was
about six hundred.

In the attack on Jackson, Mississippi, during the 11th-16th of
July, General Ord reported the loss in the Thirteenth Army Corps
seven hundred and sixty-two, of which five hundred and thirty-three
were confined to Lauman's division; General Parkes reported, in the
Ninth Corps, thirty-seven killed, two hundred and fifty-eight
wounded, and thirty-three missing: total, three hundred and
twenty-eight.  In the Fifteenth Corps the loss was less; so that,
in the aggregate, the loss as reported by me at the time was less
than a thousand men, while we took that number alone of prisoners.

In General Grant's entire army before Vicksburg, composed of the
Ninth, part of the Sixteenth, and the whole of the Thirteenth;
Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Corps, the aggregate loss, as stated by
Badeau, was:

Killed: .......................  1243
Wounded:.......................  7095
Missing: ......................   535

Total: ........................  8873


Whereas the Confederate loss, as stated by the same author,

Surrendered at Vicksburg ..............  32000
Captured at Champion Hills.............   3000
Captured at Big Black Bridge ..........   2000
Captured at Port Gibson................   2000
Captured with Loring ..................   4000
Killed and wounded ....................  10000
Stragglers.............................   3000

Total..................................  56000

Besides which, "a large amount of public property, consisting of
railroads, locomotives, cars, steamers, cotton, guns, muskets,
ammunition, etc., etc., was captured in Vicksburg."

The value of the capture of Vicksburg, however, was not measured by
the list of prisoners, guns, and small-arms, but by the fact that
its possession secured the navigation of the great central river of
the continent, bisected fatally the Southern Confederacy, and set
the armies which had been used in its conquest free for other
purposes; and it so happened that the event coincided as to time
with another great victory which crowned our arms far away, at
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.  That was a defensive battle, whereas
ours was offensive in the highest acceptation of the term, and the
two, occurring at the same moment of time, should have ended the
war; but the rebel leaders were mad, and seemed determined that
their people should drink of the very lowest dregs of the cup of
war, which they themselves had prepared.

The campaign of Vicksburg, in its conception and execution,
belonged exclusively to General Grant, not only in the great whole,
but in the thousands of its details.  I still retain many of his
letters and notes, all in his own handwriting, prescribing the
routes of march for divisions and detachments, specifying even the
amount of food and tools to be carried along.  Many persons gave
his adjutant general, Rawlins, the credit for these things, but
they were in error; for no commanding general of an army ever gave
more of his personal attention to details, or wrote so many of his
own orders, reports, and letters, as General Grant.  His success at
Vicksburg justly gave him great fame at home and abroad.  The
President conferred on him the rank of major-general in the regular
army, the highest grade then existing by law; and General McPherson
and I shared in his success by receiving similar commissions as
brigadier-generals in the regular army.

But our success at Vicksburg produced other results not so
favorable to our cause--a general relaxation of effort, and desire
to escape the hard drudgery of camp: officers sought leaves of
absence to visit their homes, and soldiers obtained furloughs and
discharges on the most slender pretexts; even the General
Government seemed to relax in its efforts to replenish our ranks
with new men, or to enforce the draft, and the politicians were
pressing their schemes to reorganize or patch up some form of civil
government, as fast as the armies gained partial possession of the
States.

In order to illustrate this peculiar phase of our civil war, I give
at this place copies of certain letters which have not heretofore
been published:

[Private.]

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1868.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Vicksburg, Mississippi

My DEAR GENERAL: The question of reconstruction in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Arkansas, will soon come up for decision of the
Government, and not only the length of the war, but our ultimate
and complete success, will depend upon its decision.  It is a
difficult matter, but I believe it can be successfully solved, if
the President will consult opinions of cool and discreet men, who
are capable of looking at it in all its bearings and effects.  I
think he is disposed to receive the advice of our generals who have
been in these States, and know much more of their condition than
gassy politicians in Congress.  General Banks has written pretty
fully, on the subject.  I wrote to General Grant, immediately,
after the fall of Vicksburg, for his views in regard to
Mississippi, but he has not yet answered.

I wish you would consult with Grant, McPherson, and others of cool,
good judgment, and write me your views fully, as I may wish to use
them with the President.  You had better write me unofficially, and
then your letter will not be put on file, and cannot hereafter be
used against you.  You have been in Washington enough to know how
every thing a man writes or says is picked up by his enemies and
misconstrued.  With kind wishes for your further success,

I am yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK


[Private and Confidential.]

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP ON BIG BLACK, MISSISSIPPI, September 17 1863
H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL: I have received your letter of August 29th, and with
pleasure confide to you fully my thoughts on the important matters
you suggest, with absolute confidence that you will use what is
valuable, and reject the useless or superfluous.

That part of the continent of North America known as Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Arkansas, is in my judgment the key to the whole
interior.  The valley of the Mississippi is America, and, although
railroads have changed the economy of intercommunication, yet the
water-channels still mark the lines of fertile land, and afford
cheap carriage to the heavy products of it.

The inhabitants of the country on the Monongahela, the Illinois,
the Minnesota, the Yellowstone, and Osage, are as directly
concerned in the security of the Lower Mississippi as are those who
dwell on its very banks in Louisiana; and now that the nation has
recovered its possession, this generation of men will make a
fearful mistake if they again commit its charge to a people liable
to misuse their position, and assert, as was recently done, that,
because they dwelt on the banks of this mighty stream, they had a
right to control its navigation.

I would deem it very unwise at this time, or for years to come, to
revive the State governments of Louisiana, etc., or to institute in
this quarter any civil government in which the local people have
much to say.  They had a government so mild and paternal that they
gradually forgot they had any at all, save what they themselves
controlled; they asserted an absolute right to seize public moneys,
forts, arms, and even to shut up the natural avenues of travel and
commerce.  They chose war--they ignored and denied all the
obligations of the solemn contract of government and appealed to
force.

We accepted the issue, and now they begin to realize that war is a
two-edged sword, and it may be that many of the inhabitants cry for
peace.  I know them well, and the very impulses of their nature;
and to deal with the inhabitants of that part of the South which
borders on the great river, we must recognize the classes into
which they have divided themselves:

First.  The large planters, owning lands, slaves, and all kinds of
personal property.  These are, on the whole, the ruling class.
They are educated, wealthy, and easily approached.  In some
districts they are bitter as gall, and have given up slaves,
plantations, and all, serving in the armies of the Confederacy;
whereas, in others, they are conservative.  None dare admit a
friendship for us, though they say freely that they were at the
outset opposed to war and disunion.  I know we can manage this
class, but only by action.  Argument is exhausted, and words have
lost their usual meaning.  Nothing but the logic of events touches
their understanding; but, of late, this has worked a wonderful
change.  If our country were like Europe, crowded with people, I
would say it would be easier to replace this class than to
reconstruct it, subordinate to the policy of the nation; but, as
this is not the case, it is better to allow the planters, with
individual exceptions, gradually to recover their plantations, to
hire any species of labor, and to adapt themselves to the new order
of things.  Still, their friendship and assistance to reconstruct
order out of the present ruin cannot be depended on.  They watch
the operations of our armies, and hope still for a Southern
Confederacy that will restore to them the slaves and privileges
which they feel are otherwise lost forever.  In my judgment, we
have two more battles to win before we should even bother our minds
with the idea of restoring civil order--viz., one near Meridian, in
November, and one near Shreveport, in February and March next, when
Red River is navigable by our gunboats.  When these are done, then,
and not until then, will the planters of Louisiana, Arkansas, and
Mississippi, submit.  Slavery is already gone, and, to cultivate
the land, negro or other labor must be hired.  This, of itself, is
a vast revolution, and time must be afforded to allow men to adjust
their minds and habits to this new order of things.  A civil
government of the representative type would suit this class far
less than a pure military role, readily adapting itself to actual
occurrences, and able to enforce its laws and orders promptly and
emphatically.

Second.  The smaller farmers, mechanics, merchants, and laborers.
This class will probably number three-quarters of the whole; have,
in fact, no real interest in the establishment of a Southern
Confederacy, and have been led or driven into war on the false
theory that they were to be benefited somehow--they knew not how.
They are essentially tired of the war, and would slink back home if
they could.  These are the real tiers etat of the South, and are
hardly worthy a thought; for they swerve to and fro according to
events which they do not comprehend or attempt to shape.  When the
time for reconstruction comes, they will want the old political
system of caucuses, Legislatures, etc., to amuse them and make them
believe they are real sovereigns; but in all things they will
follow blindly the lead of the planters.  The Southern politicians,
who understand this class, use them as the French do their masses
--seemingly consult their prejudices, while they make their orders
and enforce them.  We should do the same.

Third.  The Union men of the South.  I must confess I have little
respect for this class.  They allowed a clamorous set of demagogues
to muzzle and drive them as a pack of curs.  Afraid of shadows,
they submit tamely to squads of dragoons, and permit them, without
a murmur, to burn their cotton, take their horses, corn, and every
thing; and, when we reach them, they are full of complaints if our
men take a few fence-rails for fire, or corn to feed our horses.
They give us no assistance or information, and are loudest in their
complaints at the smallest excesses of our soldiers.  Their sons,
horses, arms, and every thing useful, are in the army against us,
and they stay at home, claiming all the exemptions of peaceful
citizens.  I account them as nothing in this great game of war.

Fourth.  The young bloods of the South: sons of planters, lawyers
about towns, good billiard-players and sportsmen, men who never did
work and never will.  War suits them, and the rascals are brave,
fine riders, bold to rashness, and dangerous subjects in every
sense.  They care not a sou for niggers, land, or any thing.  They
hate Yankees per se, and don't bother their brains about the past,
present, or future.  As long as they have good horses, plenty of
forage, and an open country, they are happy.  This is a larger
class than most men suppose, and they are the most dangerous set of
men that this war has turned loose upon the world.  They are
splendid riders, first-rate shots, and utterly reckless.  Stewart,
John Morgan, Forrest, and Jackson, are the types and leaders of
this class.  These men must all be killed or employed by us before
we can hope for peace.  They have no property or future, and
therefore cannot be influenced by any thing, except personal
considerations.  I have two brigades of these fellows in my front,
commanded by Cosby, of the old army, and Whitfield, of Texas.
Stephen D. Lee is in command of the whole.  I have frequent
interviews with their officers, a good understanding with them, and
am inclined to think, when the resources of their country are
exhausted, we must employ them.  They are the best cavalry in the
world, but it will tax Mr. Chase's genius for finance to supply
them with horses.  At present horses cost them nothing; for they
take where they find, and don't bother their brains as to who is to
pay for them; the same may be said of the cornfields, which have,
as they believe, been cultivated by a good-natured people for their
special benefit.  We propose to share with them the free use of
these cornfields, planted by willing hands, that will never gather
the crops.

Now that I have sketched the people who inhabit the district of
country under consideration, I will proceed to discuss the future.

A civil government now, for any part of it, would be simply
ridiculous.  The people would not regard it, and even the military
commanders of the antagonistic parties would treat it lightly.
Governors would be simply petitioners for military assistance, to
protect supposed friendly interests, and military commanders would
refuse to disperse and weaken their armies for military reasons.
Jealousies would arise between the two conflicting powers, and,
instead of contributing to the end of the war, would actually defer
it.  Therefore, I contend that the interests of the United States,
and of the real parties concerned, demand the continuance of the
simple military role, till after all the organized armies of the
South are dispersed, conquered, and subjugated.

The people of all this region are represented in the Army of
Virginia, at Charleston, Mobile, and Chattanooga.  They have sons
and relations in each of the rebel armies, and naturally are
interested in their fate.  Though we hold military possession of
the key-points of their country, still they contend, and naturally,
that should Lee succeed in Virginia, or Bragg at Chattanooga, a
change will occur here also.  We cannot for this reason attempt to
reconstruct parts of the South as we conquer it, till all idea of
the establishment of a Southern Confederacy is abandoned.  We
should avail ourselves of the present lull to secure the
strategical points that will give us an advantage in the future
military movements, and we should treat the idea of civil
government as one in which we as a nation have a minor or
subordinate interest.  The opportunity is good to impress on the
population the truth that they are more interested in civil
government than we are; and that, to enjoy the protection of laws,
they most not be passive observers of events, but must aid and
sustain the constituted authorities in enforcing the laws; they
must not only submit themselves, but should pay their share of
taxes, and render personal services when called on.

It seems to me, in contemplating the history of the past two years,
that all the people of our country, North, South, East, and West,
have been undergoing a salutary political schooling, learning
lessons which might have been acquired from the experience of other
people; but we had all become so wise in our own conceit that we
would only learn by actual experience of our own.  The people even
of small and unimportant localities, North as well as South, had
reasoned themselves into the belief that their opinions were
superior to the aggregated interest of the whole nation.  Half our
territorial nation rebelled, on a doctrine of secession that they
themselves now scout; and a real numerical majority actually
believed that a little State was endowed with such sovereignty that
it could defeat the policy of the great whole.  I think the present
war has exploded that notion, and were this war to cease now, the
experience gained, though dear, would be worth the expense.

Another great and important natural truth is still in contest, and
can only be solved by war.  Numerical majorities by vote have been
our great arbiter.  Heretofore all men have cheerfully submitted to
it in questions left open, but numerical majorities are not
necessarily physical majorities.  The South, though numerically
inferior, contend they can whip the Northern superiority of
numbers, and therefore by natural law they contend that they are
not bound to submit.  This issue is the only real one, and in my
judgment all else should be deferred to it.  War alone can decide
it, and it is the only question now left for us as a people to
decide.  Can we whip the South? If we can, our numerical majority
has both the natural and constitutional right to govern them.  If
we cannot whip them, they contend for the natural right to select
their own government, and they have the argument.  Our armies must
prevail over theirs; our officers, marshals, and courts, must
penetrate into the innermost recesses of their land, before we have
the natural right to demand their submission.

I would banish all minor questions, assert the broad doctrine that
as a nation the United States has the right, and also the physical
power, to penetrate to every part of our national domain, and that
we will do it--that we will do it in our own time and in our own
way; that it makes no difference whether it be in one year, or two,
or ten, or twenty; that we will remove and destroy every obstacle,
if need be, take every life, every acre of land, every particle of
property, every thing that to us seems proper; that we will not
cease till the end is attained; that all who do not aid us are
enemies, and that we will not account to them for our acts.  If the
people of the South oppose, they do so at their peril; and if they
stand by, mere lookers-on in this domestic tragedy, they have no
right to immunity, protection, or share in the final results.

I even believe and contend further that, in the North, every member
of the nation is bound by both natural and constitutional law to
"maintain and defend the Government against all its enemies and
opposers whomsoever."  If they fail to do it they are derelict, and
can be punished, or deprived of all advantages arising from the
labors of those who do.  If any man, North or South, withholds his
share of taxes, or his physical assistance in this, the crisis of
our history, he should be deprived of all voice in the future
elections of this country, and might be banished, or reduced to the
condition of a mere denizen of the land.

War is upon us, none can deny it.  It is not the choice of the
Government of the United States, but of a faction; the Government
was forced to accept the issue, or to submit to a degradation fatal
and disgraceful to all the inhabitants.  In accepting war, it
should be "pure and simple" as applied to the belligerents.  I
would keep it so, till all traces of the war are effaced; till
those who appealed to it are sick and tired of it, and come to the
emblem of our nation, and sue for peace.  I would not coax them, or
even meet them half-way, but make them so sick of war that
generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it.

I know what I say when I repeat that the insurgents of the South
sneer at all overtures looking to their interests.  They scorn the
alliance with the Copperheads; they tell me to my face that they
respect Grant, McPherson, and our brave associates who fight
manfully and well for a principle, but despise the Copperheads and
sneaks at the North, who profess friendship for the South and
opposition to the war, as mere covers for their knavery and
poltroonery.

God knows that I deplore this fratricidal war as much as any man
living, but it is upon us, a physical fact; and there is only one
honorable issue from it.  We must fight it out, army against army,
and man against man; and I know, and you know, and civilians begin
to realize the fact, that reconciliation and reconstruction will be
easier through and by means of strong, well-equipped, and organized
armies than through any species of conventions that can be framed.
The issues are made, and all discussion is out of place and
ridiculous.  The section of thirty-pounder Parrott rifles now
drilling before my tent is a more convincing argument than the
largest Democratic meeting the State of New York can possibly
assemble at Albany; and a simple order of the War Department to
draft enough men to fill our skeleton regiments would be more
convincing as to our national perpetuity than an humble pardon to
Jeff.  Davis and all his misled host.

The only government needed or deserved by the States of Louisiana,
Arkansas, and Mississippi, now exists in Grant's army.  This needs,
simply, enough privates to fill its ranks; all else will follow in
due season.  This army has its well-defined code of laws and
practice, and can adapt itself to the wants and necessities of a
city, the country, the rivers, the sea, indeed to all parts of this
land.  It better subserves the interest and policy of the General
Government, and the people here prefer it to any weak or servile
combination that would at once, from force of habit, revive sad
perpetuate local prejudices and passions.  The people of this
country have forfeited all right to a voice in the councils of the
nation.  They know it and feel it, and in after-years they will be
the better citizens from the dear bought experience of the present
crisis.  Let them learn now, and learn it well, that good citizens
must obey as well as command.  Obedience to law, absolute--yea,
even abject--is the lesson that this war, under Providence, will
teach the free and enlightened American citizen.  As a nation, we
shall be the better for it.

I never have apprehended foreign interference in our family
quarrel.  Of coarse, governments founded on a different and it may
be an antagonistic principle with ours naturally feel a pleasure at
our complications, and, it may be, wish our downfall; but in the
end England and France will join with us in jubilation at the
triumph of constitutional government over faction.  Even now the
English manifest this.  I do not profess to understand Napoleon's
design in Mexico, and I do not, see that his taking military
possession of Mexico concerns us.  We have as much territory now as
we want.  The Mexicans have failed in self-government, and it was a
question as to what nation she should fall a prey.  That is now
solved, and I don't see that we are damaged.  We have the finest
part of the North American Continent, all we can people and can
take care of; and, if we can suppress rebellion in our own land,
and compose the strife generated by it, we shall have enough
people, resources, and wealth, if well combined, to defy
interference from any and every quarter.

I therefore hope the Government of the United States will continue,
as heretofore, to collect, in well-organized armies, the physical
strength of the nation; applying it, as heretofore, in asserting
the national authority; and in persevering, without relaxation, to
the end.  This, whether near or far off, is not for us to say; but,
fortunately, we have no choice.  We must succeed--no other choice
is left us except degradation.  The South must be ruled by us, or
she will rule us.  We must conquer them, or ourselves be conquered.
There is no middle course.  They ask, and will have, nothing else,
and talk of compromise is bosh; for we know they would even scorn
the offer.

I wish the war could have been deferred for twenty years, till the
superabundant population of the North could flow in and replace the
losses sustained by war; but this could not be, and we are forced
to take things as they are.

All therefore I can now venture to advise is to raise the draft to
its maximum, fill the present regiments to as large a standard as
possible, and push the war, pure and simple.  Great attention
should be paid to the discipline of our armies, for on them may be
founded the future stability of the Government.

The cost of the war is, of course, to be considered, but finances
will adjust themselves to the actual state of affairs; and, even if
we would, we could not change the cost.  Indeed, the larger the
cost now, the less will it be in the end; for the end must be
attained somehow, regardless of loss of life and treasure, and is
merely a question of time.

Excuse so long a letter.  With great respect, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


General Halleck, on receipt of this letter, telegraphed me that Mr.
Lincoln had read it carefully, and had instructed him to obtain my
consent to have it published.  At the time, I preferred not to be
drawn into any newspaper controversy, and so wrote to General
Halleck; and the above letter has never been, to my knowledge,
published; though Mr. Lincoln more than once referred to it with
marks of approval.



HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS
CAMP ON BIG BLACK, September 17, 1863

Brigadier-General J. A. RAWLINS,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Vicksburg.

DEAR GENERAL: I inclose for your perusal, and for you to read to
General Grant such parts as you deem interesting, letters received
by me from Prof. Mahan and General Halleck, with my answers.  After
you have read my answer to General Halleck, I beg you to inclose it
to its address, and return me the others.

I think Prof. Mahan's very marked encomium upon the campaign of
Vicksburg is so flattering to General Grant, that you may offer to
let him keep the letter, if he values such a testimonial.  I have
never written a word to General Halleck since my report of last
December, after the affair at Chickasaw, except a short letter a
few days ago, thanking him for the kind manner of his transmitting
to me the appointment of brigadier-general.  I know that in
Washington I am incomprehensible, because at the outset of the war
I would not go it blind and rush headlong into a war unprepared and
with an utter ignorance of its extent and purpose.  I was then
construed unsound; and now that I insist on war pure and simple,
with no admixture of civil compromises, I am supposed vindictive.
You remember what Polonius said to his son Laertes: "Beware of
entrance to a quarrel; but, being in, bear it, that the opposed may
beware of thee."  What is true of the single man, is equally true
of a nation.  Our leaders seemed at first to thirst for the
quarrel, willing, even anxious, to array against us all possible
elements of opposition; and now, being in, they would hasten to
quit long before the "opposed" has received that lesson which he
needs.  I would make this war as severe as possible, and show no
symptoms of tiring till the South begs for mercy; indeed, I know,
and you know, that the end would be reached quicker by such a
course than by any seeming yielding on our part.  I don't want our
Government to be bothered by patching up local governments, or by
trying to reconcile any class of men.  The South has done her
worst, and now is the time for us to pile on our blows thick and
fast.

Instead of postponing the draft till after the elections, we ought
now to have our ranks full of drafted men; and, at best, if they
come at all, they will reach us when we should be in motion.

I think General Halleck would like to have the honest, candid
opinions of all of us, viz., Grant, McPherson, and Sherman.  I have
given mine, and would prefer, of course, that it should coincide
with the others.  Still, no matter what my opinion may be, I can
easily adapt my conduct to the plane of others, and am only too
happy when I find theirs better, than mine.

If no trouble, please show Halleck's letter to McPherson, and ask
him to write also.  I know his regiments are like mine (mere
squads), and need filling up.  Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.





CHAPTER XIV.

CHATTANOOGA AND KNOXVILLE.

JULY TO DECEMBER, 1863.


After the fall of Vicksburg, and its corollary, Port Hudson, the
Mississippi River was wholly in the possession of the Union forces,
and formed a perfect line of separation in the territories of our
opponents.  Thenceforth, they could not cross it save by stealth,
and the military affairs on its west bank became unimportant.
Grant's army had seemingly completed its share of the work of war,
and lay, as it were, idle for a time.  In person General Grant went
to New Orleans to confer with General Banks, and his victorious
army was somewhat dispersed.  Parke's corps (Ninth) returned to
Kentucky, and afterward formed part of the Army of the Ohio, under
General Burnside; Ord's corps (Thirteenth) was sent down to
Natchez, and gradually drifted to New Orleans and Texas; McPhersons
(Seventeenth) remained in and near Vicksburg; Hurlbut's (Sixteenth)
was at Memphis; and mine (Fifteenth) was encamped along the Big
Black, about twenty miles east of Vicksburg.  This corps was
composed of four divisions: Steele's (the First) was posted at and
near the railroad-bridge; Blair's (the Second), next in order, near
Parson Fox's; the Third Division (Tuttle's) was on the ridge about
the head of Bear Creek; and the Fourth (Ewing's) was at Messinger's
Ford.  My own headquarters were in tents in a fine grove of old
oaks near Parson Fox's house, and the battalion of the Thirteenth
Regulars was the headquarters guard.

All the camps were arranged for health, comfort, rest, and drill.
It being midsummer, we did not expect any change till the autumn
months, and accordingly made ourselves as comfortable as possible.
There was a short railroad in operation from Vicksburg to the
bridge across the Big Black, whence supplies in abundance were
hauled to our respective camps.  With a knowledge of this fact Mrs.
Sherman came down from Ohio with Minnie, Lizzie, Willie, and Tom,
to pay us a visit in our camp at Parson Fog's.  Willie was then
nine years old, was well advanced for his years, and took the most
intense interest in the affairs of the army.  He was a great
favorite with the soldiers, and used to ride with me on horseback
in the numerous drills and reviews of the time.  He then had the
promise of as long a life as any of my children, and displayed more
interest in the war than any of them.  He was called a "sergeant"
in the regular battalion, learned the manual of arms, and regularly
attended the parade and guard-mounting of the Thirteenth, back of
my camp.  We made frequent visits to Vicksburg, and always stopped
with General McPherson, who had a large house, and boarded with a
family (Mrs. Edwards's) in which were several interesting young
ladies.  General Grant occupied another house (Mrs. Lum's) in
Vicksburg during that summer, and also had his family with him.
The time passed very agreeably, diversified only by little events
of not much significance, among which I will recount only one.

While, we occupied the west bank of the Big Black, the east bank
was watched by a rebel cavalry-division, commanded by General
Armstrong.  He had four brigades, commanded by Generals Whitfield,
Stark, Cosby, and Wirt Adams.  Quite frequently they communicated
with us by flags of truce on trivial matters, and we reciprocated;
merely to observe them.  One day a flag of truce, borne by a
Captain B...., of Louisville, Kentucky, escorted by about
twenty-five men, was reported at Messinger's Ferry, and I sent
orders to let them come right into my tent.  This brought them
through the camps of the Fourth Division, and part of the Second;
and as they drew up in front of my tent, I invited Captain B....
and another officer with him (a major from Mobile) to dismount, to
enter my tent, and to make themselves at home.  Their escort was
sent to join mine, with orders to furnish them forage and every
thing they wanted.  B....  had brought a sealed letter for General
Grant at Vicksburg, which was dispatched to him.  In the evening we
had a good supper, with wine and cigars, and, as we sat talking,
B....  spoke of his father and mother, in Louisville, got leave to
write them a long letter without its being read by any one, and
then we talked about the war.  He said: "What is the use of your
persevering? It is simply impossible to subdue eight millions of
people;" asserting that "the feeling in the South had become so
embittered that a reconciliation was impossible."  I answered that,
"sitting as we then were, we appeared very comfortable, and surely
there was no trouble in our becoming friends."  "Yes," said he,
"that is very true of us, but we are gentlemen of education, and
can easily adapt ourselves to any condition of things; but this
would not apply equally well to the common people, or to the common
soldiers."  I took him out to the camp-fires behind the tent, and
there were the men of his escort and mine mingled together,
drinking their coffee, and happy as soldiers always seem.  I asked
B....  what he thought of that, and he admitted that I had the best
of the argument.  Before I dismissed this flag of truce, his
companion consulted me confidentially as to what disposition he
ought to make of his family, then in Mobile, and I frankly gave him
the best advice I could.

While we were thus lying idle in camp on the big Black, the Army of
the Cumberland, under General Rosecrans, was moving against Bragg
at Chattanooga; and the Army of the Ohio, General Burnside, was
marching toward East Tennessee.  General Rosecrans was so confident
of success that he somewhat scattered his command, seemingly to
surround and capture Bragg in Chattanooga; but the latter,
reenforced from Virginia, drew out of Chattanooga, concentrated his
army at Lafayette, and at Chickamauga fell on Rosecrans, defeated
him, and drove him into Chattanooga.  The whole country seemed
paralyzed by this unhappy event; and the authorities in Washington
were thoroughly stampeded.  From the East the Eleventh Corps
(Slocum), and the Twelfth Corps (Howard), were sent by rail to
Nashville, and forward under command of General Hooker; orders were
also sent to General Grant, by Halleck, to send what reenforcements
he could spare immediately toward Chattanooga.

Bragg had completely driven Rosecrans's army into Chattanooga; the
latter was in actual danger of starvation, and the railroad to his
rear seemed inadequate to his supply.  The first intimation which I
got of this disaster was on the 22d of September, by an order from
General Grant to dispatch one of my divisions immediately into
Vicksburg, to go toward Chattanooga, and I designated the First,
General Osterhaus--Steele meantime having been appointed to the
command of the Department of Arkansas, and had gone to Little Rock.
General Osterhaus marched the same day, and on the 23d I was
summoned to Vicksburg in person, where General Grant showed me the
alarming dispatches from General Halleck, which had been sent from
Memphis by General Hurlbut, and said, on further thought, that he
would send me and my whole corps.  But, inasmuch as one division of
McPherson's corps (John E. Smith's) had already started, he
instructed me to leave one of my divisions on the Big Black, and to
get the other two ready to follow at once.  I designated the
Second, then commanded by Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, and the
Fourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Corse.

On the 25th I returned to my camp on Big Black, gave all the
necessary orders for these divisions to move, and for the Third
(Tittle's) to remain, and went into Vicksburg with my family.  The
last of my corps designed for this expedition started from camp on
the 27th, reached Vicksburg the 28th, and were embarked on boats
provided for them.  General Halleck's dispatches dwelt upon the
fact that General Rosecrans's routes of supply were overtaxed, and
that we should move from Memphis eastward, repairing railroads as
we progressed, as far as Athens, Alabama, whence I was to report to
General Rosecrans, at Chattanooga, by letter.

I took passage for myself and family in the steamer Atlantic,
Captain Henry McDougall.  When the boat was ready to start, Willie
was missing.  Mrs. Sherman supposed him to have been with me,
whereas I supposed he was with her.  An officer of the Thirteenth
went up to General McPherson's house for him, and soon returned,
with Captain Clift leading him, carrying in his hands a small
double-barreled shot gun; and I joked him about carrying away
captured property.  In a short time we got off.  As we all stood on
the guards to look at our old camps at Young's Point, I remarked
that Willie was not well, and he admitted that he was sick.  His
mother put him to bed, and consulted Dr. Roler, of the Fifty-fifth
Illinois, who found symptoms of typhoid fever.  The river was low;
we made slow progress till above Helena; and, as we approached
Memphis, Dr. Roler told me that Willie's life was in danger, and he
was extremely anxious to reach Memphis for certain medicines and
for consultation.  We arrived at Memphis on the 2d of October,
carried Willie up to the Gayoso Hotel, and got the most experienced
physician there, who acted with Dr. Roler, but he sank rapidly, and
died the evening of the 3d of October.  The blow was a terrible one
to us all, so sudden and so unexpected, that I could not help
reproaching myself for having consented to his visit in that sickly
region in the summer-time.  Of all my children, he seemed the most
precious.  Born in San Francisco, I had watched with intense
interest his development, and he seemed more than any of the
children to take an interest in my special profession.  Mrs.
Sherman, Minnie, Lizzie, and Tom, were with him at the time, and we
all, helpless and overwhelmed, saw him die.  Being in the very
midst of an important military enterprise, I had hardly time to
pause and think of my personal loss.  We procured a metallic
casket, and had a military funeral, the battalion of the Thirteenth
United States Regulars acting as escort from the Gayoso Hotel to
the steamboat Grey Eagle, which conveyed him and my family up to
Cairo, whence they proceeded to our home at Lancaster, Ohio, where
he was buried.  I here give my letter to Captain C. C. Smith, who
commanded the battalion at the time, as exhibiting our intense
feelings:

GAYOSO HOUSE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
October 4, 1863, Midnight

Captain C. C. SMITH, commanding Battalion Thirteenth United States
Regulars.

MY DEAR FRIEND: I cannot sleep to-night till I record an expression
of the deep feelings of my heart to you, and to the officers and
soldiers of the battalion, for their kind behavior to my poor
child.  I realize that you all feel for my family the attachment of
kindred, and I assure you of full reciprocity.  Consistent with a
sense of duty to my profession and office, I could not leave my
post, and sent for the family to come to me in that fatal climate,
and in that sickly period of the year, and behold the result!  The
child that bore my name, and in whose future I reposed with more
confidence than I did in my own plan of life, now floats a mere
corpse, seeking a grave in a distant land, with a weeping mother,
brother, and sisters, clustered about him.  For myself, I ask no
sympathy.  On, on I must go, to meet a soldier's fate, or live to
see our country rise superior to all factions, till its flag is
adored and respected by ourselves and by all the powers of the
earth.

But Willie was, or thought he was, a sergeant in the Thirteenth.  I
have seen his eye brighten, his heart beat, as he beheld the
battalion under arms, and asked me if they were not real soldiers.
Child as he was, he had the enthusiasm, the pure love of truth,
honor, and love of country, which should animate all soldiers.

God only knows why he should die thus young.  He is dead, but will
not be forgotten till those who knew him in life have followed him
to that same mysterious end.

Please convey to the battalion my heart-felt thanks, and assure
each and all that if in after-years they call on me or mine, and
mention that they were of the Thirteenth Regulars when Willie was a
sergeant, they will have a key to the affections of my family that
will open all it has; that we will share with them our last
blanket, our last crust!  Your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-general.


Long afterward, in the spring of 1867, we had his body disinterred
and brought to St. Louis, where he is now buried in a beautiful
spot, in Calvary Cemetery, by the side of another child, "Charles,"
who was born at Lancaster, in the summer of 1864, died early, and
was buried at Notre Dame, Indiana.  His body was transferred at the
same time to the same spot.  Over Willie's grave is erected a
beautiful marble monument, designed and executed by the officers
and soldiers, of that battalion which claimed him as a sergeant and
comrade.

During the summer and fall of 1863 Major-General S. A. Hurlbut was
in command at Memphis.  He supplied me copies of all dispatches
from Washington, and all the information he possessed of the events
about Chattanooga.  Two of these dispatches cover all essential
points:

WASHINGTON CITY, September 15, 1863--5 p.m.

Major-General S. A. HURLBUT, Memphis:

All the troops that can possibly be spared in West Tennessee and on
the Mississippi River should be sent without delay to assist
General Rosecrans on the Tennessee River.

Urge Sherman to act with all possible promptness.

If you have boats, send them down to bring up his troops.

Information just received indicates that a part of Lee's army has
been sent to reenforce Bragg.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.


Washington, September 19, 1868--4 p.m.

Major-General S. A. HURLBUT, Memphis, Tennessee:

Give me definite information of the number of troops sent toward
Decatur, and where they are.  Also, what other troops are to
follow, and when.

Has any thing been heard from the troops ordered from Vicksburg?

No efforts must be spared to support Rosecrans's right, and to
guard the crossings of the Tennessee River.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.


My special orders were to repair the Memphis & Charleston Railroad
eastward as I progressed, as far as Athens, Alabama, to draw
supplies by that route, so that, on reaching Athens, we should not
be dependent on the roads back to Nashville, already overtaxed by
the demand of Rosecrans's army.

On reaching Memphis, October 2d, I found that Osterhaus's division
had already gone by rail as far as Corinth, and than John E.
Smith's division was in the act of starting by cars.  The Second
Division, then commanded by Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith,
reached Memphis at the same time with me; and the Fourth Division,
commanded by Brigadier-General John M. Corse, arrived a day or two
after.  The railroad was in fair condition as far as Corinth,
ninety-six miles, but the road was badly stocked with locomotives
and cars, so that it took until the 9th to get off the Second
Division, when I gave orders for the Fourth Division and
wagon-trains to march by the common road.

On Sunday morning, October 11th, with a special train loaded with
our orderlies and clerks, the horses of our staff, the battalion of
the Thirteenth United States Regulars, and a few officers going
forward to join their commands, among them Brigadier-General Hugh
Ewing, I started for Corinth.

At Germantown, eight miles, we passed Corse's division (Fourth) on
the march, and about noon the train ran by the depot at
Colliersville, twenty-six miles out.  I was in the rear car with my
staff, dozing, but observed the train slacking speed and stopping
about half a mile beyond the depot.  I noticed some soldiers
running to and fro, got out at the end of the car, and soon Colonel
Anthony (Silty-sixth Indiana), who commanded the post, rode up and
said that his pickets had just been driven in, and there was an
appearance of an attack by a large force of cavalry coming from the
southeast.  I ordered the men to get off the train, to form on the
knoll near the railroad-cut, and soon observed a rebel officer
riding toward us with a white flag.  Colonel Anthony and Colonel
Dayton (one of my aides) were sent to meet him, and to keep him in
conversation as long as possible.  They soon returned, saying it
was the adjutant of the rebel general Chalmers, who demanded the
surrender of the place.  I instructed them to return and give a
negative answer, but to delay him as much as possible, so as to
give us time for preparation.  I saw Anthony, Dayton, and the rebel
bearer of the flag, in conversation, and the latter turn his horse
to ride back, when I ordered Colonel McCoy to run to the station,
and get a message over the wires as quick as possible to Memphis
and Germantown, to hurry forward Corse's division.  I then ordered
the train to back to the depot, and drew back the battalion of
regulars to the small earth redoubt near it.  The depot-building
was of brick, and had been punctured with loop-holes.  To its east,
about two hundred yards, was a small square earthwork or fort, into
which were put a part of the regulars along with the company of the
Sixty-sixth Indiana already there.  The rest of the men were
distributed into the railroad-cut, and in some shallow
rifle-trenches near the depot.  We had hardly made these
preparations when the enemy was seen forming in a long line on the
ridge to the south, about four hundred yards off, and soon after two
parties of cavalry passed the railroad on both sides of us, cutting
the wires and tearing up some rails.  Soon they opened on us with
artillery (of which we had none), and their men were dismounting and
preparing to assault.  To the south of us was an extensive
cornfield, with the corn still standing, and on the other side was
the town of Colliersville.  All the houses near, that could give
shelter to the enemy, were ordered to be set on fire, and the men
were instructed to keep well under cover and to reserve their fire
for the assault, which seemed inevitable.  A long line of rebel
skirmishers came down through the cornfield, and two other parties
approached us along the railroad on both sides.  In the fort was a
small magazine containing some cartridges.  Lieutenant James, a
fine, gallant fellow, who was ordnance-officer on my staff, asked
leave to arm the orderlies and clerks with some muskets which he had
found in the depot, to which I consented; he marched them into the
magazine, issued cartridges, and marched back to the depot to assist
in its defense.  Afterward he came to me, said a party of the enemy
had got into the woods near the depot, and was annoying him, and he
wanted to charge and drive it away.  I advised him to be extremely
cautious, as our enemy vastly outnumbered us, and had every
advantage in position and artillery; but instructed him, if they got
too near, he might make a sally.  Soon after, I heard a rapid fire
in that quarter, and Lieutenant.  James was brought in on a
stretcher, with a ball through his breast, which I supposed to be
fatal.

[After the fight we sent him back to Memphis, where his mother and
father came from their home on the North River to nurse him.  Young
James was recovering from his wound, but was afterward killed by a
fall from his horse, near his home, when riding with the daughters
of Mr. Hamilton Fish, now Secretary of State.]

The enemy closed down on us several times, and got possession of
the rear of our train, from which they succeeded in getting five of
our horses, among them my favorite mare Dolly; but our men were
cool and practised shots (with great experience acquired at
Vicksburg), and drove them back.  With their artillery they knocked
to pieces our locomotive and several of the cars, and set fire to
the train; but we managed to get possession again, and extinguished
the fire.  Colonel Audenreid, aide-de-camp, was provoked to find
that his valise of nice shirts had been used to kindle the fire.
The fighting continued all round us for three or four hours, when
we observed signs of drawing off, which I attributed to the
rightful cause, the rapid approach of Corse's division, which
arrived about dark, having marched the whole distance from Memphis,
twenty-six miles, on the double-quick.  The next day we repaired
damages to the railroad and locomotive, and went on to Corinth.

At Corinth, on the 16th, I received the following important
dispatches:

MEMPHIS, October 14, 1863--11 a.m.

Arrived this morning.  Will be off in a few hours.  My orders are
only to go to Cairo, and report from there by telegraph.  McPherson
will be in Canton to-day.  He will remain there until Sunday or
Monday next, and reconnoitre as far eastward as possible with
cavalry, in the mean time.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


WASHINGTON, October 14, 1863--1 p.m.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Corinth

Yours of the 10th is received.  The important matter to be attended
to is that of supplies.  When Eastport can be reached by boats, the
use of the railroad can be dispensed with; but until that time it
must be guarded as far as need.  The Kentucky Railroad can barely
supply General Rosecrans.  All these matters must be left to your
judgment as circumstances may arise.  Should the enemy be so strong
as to prevent your going to Athena, or connecting with General
Rosecrans, you will nevertheless have assisted him greatly by
drawing away a part of the enemy's forces.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.


On the 18th, with my staff and a small escort, I rode forward to
Burnsville, and on the 19th to Iuka, where, on the next day, I was
most agreeably surprised to hear of the arrival at Eastport (only
ten miles off) of two gunboats, under the command of Captain
Phelps, which had been sent up the Tennessee River by Admiral
Porter, to help us.

Satisfied that, to reach Athens and to communicate with General
Rosecrans, we should have to take the route north of the Tennessee
River, on the 24th I ordered the Fourth Division to cross at
Eastport with the aid of the gunboats, and to move to Florence.
About the same time, I received the general orders assigning
General Grant to command the Military Division of the Mississippi,
authorizing him, on reaching Chattanooga, to supersede General
Rosecrans by General George H. Thomas, with other and complete
authority, as set, forth in the following letters of General
Halleck, which were sent to me by General Grant; and the same
orders devolved on me the command of the Department and Army of the
Tennessee.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., October 16, 1863

Major-General U. S. GRANT, Louisville.

GENERAL: You will receive herewith the orders of the President of
the United States, placing you in command of the Departments of the
Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee.  The organization of these
departments will be changed as you may deem most practicable.  You
will immediately proceed to Chattanooga, and relieve General
Rosecrans.  You can communicate with Generals Burnside and Sherman
by telegraph.  A summary of the orders sent to these officers will
be sent to you immediately.  It is left optional with you to
supersede General Rosecrans by General G. H. Thomas or not.  Any
other changes will be made on your request by telegram.

One of the first objects requiring your attention is the supply of
your armies.  Another is the security of the passes in the Georgia
mountains, to shut out the enemy from Tennessee and Kentucky.  You
will consult with General Meigs and Colonel Scott in regard to
transportation and supplies.

Should circumstances permit, I will visit you personally in a few
days for consultation.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., October 20, 1868.

Major-General GRANT, Louisville.

GENERAL: In compliance with my promise, I now proceed to give you
a brief statement of the objects aimed at by General Rosecrans and
General Burnside's movement into East Tennessee, and of the
measures directed to be taken to attain these objects.

It has been the constant desire of the government, from the
beginning of the war, to rescue the loyal inhabitants of East
Tennessee from the hands of the rebels, who fully appreciated the
importance of continuing their hold upon that country.  In addition
to the large amount of agricultural products drawn from the upper
valley of the Tennessee, they also obtained iron and other
materials from the vicinity of Chattanooga.  The possession of East
Tennessee would cut off one of their most important railroad
communications, and threaten their manufactories at Rome, Atlanta,
etc.

When General Buell was ordered into East Tennessee in the summer of
1882, Chattanooga was comparatively unprotected; but Bragg reached
there before Buell, and, by threatening his communications, forced
him to retreat on Nashville and Louisville.  Again, after the
battle of Perryville, General Buell was urged to pursue Bragg's
defeated army, and drive it from East Tennessee.  The same was
urged upon his successor, but the lateness of the season or other
causes prevented further operations after the battle of Stone
River.

Last spring, when your movements on the Mississippi River had drawn
out of Tennessee a large force of the enemy, I again urged General
Rosecrans to take advantage of that opportunity to carry out his
projected plan of campaign, General Burnside being ready to
cooperate, with a diminished but still efficient force.  But he
could not be persuaded to act in time, preferring to lie still till
your campaign should be terminated.  I represented to him, but
without avail, that by this delay Johnston might be able to
reenforce Bragg with the troops then operating against you.

When General Rosecrans finally determined to advance, he was
allowed to select his own lines and plans for carrying out the
objects of the expedition.  He was directed, however, to report his
movements daily, till he crossed the Tennessee, and to connect his
left, so far as possible, with General Burnside's right.  General
Burnside was directed to move simultaneously, connecting his right,
as far as possible, with General Rosecrans's left so that, if the
enemy concentrated upon either army, the other could move to its
assistance.  When General Burnside reached Kingston and Knoxville,
and found no considerable number of the enemy in East Tennessee, he
was instructed to move down the river and cooperate with General
Rosecrans.

These instructions were repeated some fifteen times, but were not
carried out, General Burnside alleging as an excuse that he
believed that Bragg was in retreat, and that General Rosecrans
needed no reenforcements.  When the latter had gained possession of
Chattanooga he was directed not to move on Rome as he proposed, but
simply to hold the mountain-passes, so as to prevent the ingress of
the rebels into East Tennessee.  That object accomplished, I
considered the campaign as ended, at least for the present.  Future
operations would depend upon the ascertained strength and;
movements of the enemy.  In other words, the main objects of the
campaign were the restoration of East Tennessee to the Union, and
by holding the two extremities of the valley to secure it from
rebel invasion.

The moment I received reliable information of the departure of
Longstreet's corps from the Army of the Potomac, I ordered forward
to General Rosecrans every available man in the Department of the
Ohio, and again urged General Burnside to move to his assistance.
I also telegraphed to Generals Hurlbut, Sherman, and yourself, to
send forward all available troops in your department.  If these
forces had been sent to General Rosecrans by Nashville, they could
not have been supplied; I therefore directed them to move by
Corinth and the Tennessee River.  The necessity of this has been
proved by the fact that the reinforcements sent to him from the
Army of the Potomac have not been able, for the want of railroad
transportation, to reach General Rosecrans's army in the field.

In regard to the relative strength of the opposing armies, it is
believed that General Rosecrans when he first moved against Bragg
had double, if not treble, his force.  General Burnside, also, had
more than double the force of Buckner; and, even when Bragg and
Buckner united, Rosecrans's army was very greatly superior in
number.  Even the eighteen thousand men sent from Virginia, under
Longstreet, would not have given the enemy the superiority.  It is
now ascertained that the greater part of the prisoners parolled by
you at Vicksburg, and General Banks at Port Hudson, were illegally
and improperly declared exchanged, and forced into the ranks to
swell the rebel numbers at Chickamauga.  This outrageous act, in
violation of the laws of war, of the cartel entered into by the
rebel authorities, and of all sense of honor, gives us a useful
lesson in regard to the character of the enemy with whom we are
contending.  He neither regards the rules of civilized warfare, nor
even his most solemn engagements.  You may, therefore, expect to
meet in arms thousands of unexchanged prisoners released by you and
others on parole, not to serve again till duly exchanged.

Although the enemy by this disgraceful means has been able to
concentrate in Georgia and Alabama a much larger force than we
anticipated, your armies will be abundantly able to defeat him.
Your difficulty will not be in the want of men, but in the means of
supplying them at this season of the year.  A single-track railroad
can supply an army of sixty or seventy thousand men, with the usual
number of cavalry and artillery; but beyond that number, or with a
large mounted force, the difficulty of supply is very great.

I do not know the present condition of the road from Nashville to
Decatur, but, if practicable to repair it, the use of that triangle
will be of great assistance to you.  I hope, also, that the recent
rise of water in the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers will enable
you to employ water transportation to Nashville, Eastport, or
Florence.

If you reoccupy the passes of Lookout Mountain, which should never
have been given up, you will be able to use the railroad and river
from Bridgeport to Chattanooga.  This seems to me a matter of vital
importance, and should receive your early attention.

I submit this summary in the hope that it will assist you in fully
understanding the objects of the campaign, and the means of
attaining these objects.  Probably the Secretary of War, in his
interviews with you at Louisville, has gone over the same ground.
Whatever measures you may deem proper to adopt under existing
circumstances, you will receive all possible assistance from the
authorities at Washington.  You have never, heretofore, complained
that such assistance has not been afforded you in your operations,
and I think you will have no cause of complaint in your present
campaign.  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief


General Frank P. Blair, who was then ahead with the two divisions
of Osterhaus and John E. Smith, was temporarily assigned to the
command of the Fifteenth Corps.  General Hurlbut remained at
Memphis in command of the Sixteenth Corps, and General McPherson at
Vicksburg with the Seventeenth.  These three corps made up the Army
of the Tennessee.  I was still busy in pushing forward the repairs
to the railroad bridge at Bear Creek, and in patching up the many
breaks between it and Tuscumbia, when on the 27th of October, as I
sat on the porch of a house, I was approached by a dirty,
black-haired individual with mixed dress and strange demeanor, who
inquired for me, and, on being assured that I was in fact the man,
he handed me a letter from General Blair at Tuscumbia, and another
short one, which was a telegraph-message from General Grant at
Chattanooga, addressed to me through General George Crook,
commanding at Huntsville, Alabama, to this effect:

Drop all work on Memphis & Charleston Railroad, cross the Tennessee
and hurry eastward with all possible dispatch toward Bridgeport,
till you meet further orders from me.

U. S. GRANT.


The bearer of this message was Corporal Pike, who described to me,
in his peculiar way, that General Crook had sent him in a canoe;
that he had paddled down the Tennessee River, over Muscle Shoals,
was fired at all the way by guerrillas, but on reaching Tuscumbia
he had providentially found it in possession of our troops.  He had
reported to General Blair, who sent him on to me at Iuka.  This
Pike proved to be a singular character; his manner attracted my
notice at once, and I got him a horse, and had him travel with us
eastward to about Elkton, whence I sent him back to General Crook
at Huntsville; but told him, if I could ever do him a personal
service, he might apply to me.  The next spring when I was in
Chattanooga, preparing for the Atlanta campaign, Corporal Pike made
his appearance and asked a fulfillment of my promise.  I inquired
what he wanted, and he said he wanted to do something bold,
something that would make him a hero.  I explained to him, that we
were getting ready to go for Joe Johnston at Dalton, that I
expected to be in the neighborhood of Atlanta about the 4th of
July, and wanted the bridge across the Savannah River at Augusta,
Georgia, to be burnt about that time, to produce alarm and
confusion behind the rebel army.  I explained to Pike that the
chances were three to one that he would be caught and hanged; but
the greater the danger the greater seemed to be his desire to
attempt it.  I told him to select a companion, to disguise himself
as an East Tennessee refugee, work his way over the mountains into
North Carolina, and at the time appointed to float down the
Savannah River and burn that bridge.  In a few days he had made his
preparations and took his departure.  The bridge was not burnt, and
I supposed that Pike had been caught and hanged.

When we reached Columbia, South Carolina, in February, 1865, just
as we were leaving the town, in passing near the asylum, I heard my
name called, and saw a very dirty fellow followed by a file of men
running toward me, and as they got near I recognized Pike.  He
called to me to identify him as one of my men; he was then a
prisoner under guard, and I instructed the guard to bring him that
night to my camp some fifteen miles up the road, which was done.
Pike gave me a graphic narrative of his adventures, which would
have filled a volume; told me how he had made two attempts to burn
the bridge, and failed; and said that at the time of our entering
Columbia he was a prisoner in the hands of the rebels, under trial
for his life, but in the confusion of their retreat he made his
escape and got into our lines, where he was again made a prisoner
by our troops because of his looks.  Pike got some clothes, cleaned
up, and I used him afterward to communicate with Wilmington, North
Carolina.  Some time after the war, he was appointed a lieutenant
of the Regular, Cavalry, and was killed in Oregon, by the
accidental discharge of a pistol.  Just before his death he wrote
me, saying that he was tired of the monotony of garrison-life, and
wanted to turn Indian, join the Cheyennes on the Plains, who were
then giving us great trouble, and, after he had gained their
confidence, he would betray them into our hands.  Of course I wrote
him that he must try and settle down and become a gentleman as well
as an officer, apply himself to his duties, and forget the wild
desires of his nature, which were well enough in time of war, but
not suited to his new condition as an officer; but, poor fellow I
he was killed by an accident, which probably saved him from a
slower but harder fate.

At Iuka I issued all the orders to McPherson and Hurlbut necessary
for the Department of the Tennessee during my absence, and,
further, ordered the collection of a force out of the Sixteenth
Corps, of about eight thousand men, to be commanded by General G.
M. Dodge, with orders to follow as far east as Athens, Tennessee,
there to await instructions.  We instantly discontinued all
attempts to repair the Charleston Railroad; and the remaining three
divisions of the Fifteenth Corps marched to Eastport, crossed the
Tennessee River by the aid of the gunboats, a ferry-boat, and a
couple of transports which had come up, and hurried eastward.

In person I crossed on the 1st of November, and rode forward to
Florence, where I overtook Ewing's division.  The other divisions
followed rapidly.  On the road to Florence I was accompanied by my
staff, some clerks, and mounted orderlies.  Major Ezra Taylor
was chief of artillery, and one of his sons was a clerk at
head-quarters.  The latter seems to have dropped out of the column,
and gone to a farm house near the road.  There was no organized
force of the rebel army north of the Tennessee River, but the
country was full of guerrillas.  A party of these pounced down on
the farm, caught young Taylor and another of the clerks, and after
reaching Florence, Major Taylor heard of the capture of his son, and
learned that when last seen he was stripped of his hat and coat, was
tied to the tail-board of a wagon, and driven rapidly to the north
of the road we had traveled.  The major appealed to me to do
something for his rescue.  I had no cavalry to send in pursuit, but
knowing that there was always an understanding between these
guerrillas and their friends who staid at home, I sent for three or
four of the principal men of Florence (among them a Mr. Foster, who
had once been a Senator in Congress), explained to them the capture
of young Taylor and his comrade, and demanded their immediate
restoration. They, of course, remonstrated, denied all knowledge of
the acts of these guerrillas, and claimed to be peaceful citizens of
Alabama, residing at home.  I insisted that these guerrillas were
their own sons and neighbors; that they knew their haunts, and could
reach them if they wanted, and they could effect the restoration to
us of these men; and I said, moreover, they must do it within
twenty-four hours, or I would take them, strip them of their hats
and coats, and tie them to the tail-boards of our wagons till they
were produced.  They sent off messengers at once, and young Taylor
and his comrade were brought back the next day.

Resuming our march eastward by the large road, we soon reached Elk
River, which was wide and deep, and could only be crossed by a
ferry, a process entirely too slow for the occasion; so I changed
the route more by the north, to Elkton, Winchester, and Deckerd.
At this point we came in communication with the Army of the
Cumberland, and by telegraph with General Grant, who was at
Chattanooga.  He reiterated his orders for me and my command to
hurry forward with all possible dispatch, and in person I reached
Bridgeport during the night of November 13th, my troops following
behind by several roads.  At Bridgeport I found a garrison guarding
the railroad-bridge and pontoon bridge there, and staid with the
quartermaster, Colonel William G. Le Due (who was my school-mate at
How's School in 1836).  There I received a dispatch from General
Grant, at Chattanooga, to come up in person, leaving my troops to
follow as fast as possible.  At that time there were two or three
small steamboats on the river, engaged in carrying stores up as far
as Kelly's Ferry.  In one of these I took passage, and on reaching
Kelly's Ferry found orderlies, with one of General Grant's private
horses, waiting for me, on which I rode into Chattanooga, November
14th.  Of course, I was heartily welcomed by Generals Grant,
Thomas, and all, who realized the extraordinary efforts we had made
to come to their relief.  The next morning we walked out to Fort
Wood, a prominent salient of the defenses of the place, and from
its parapet we had a magnificent view of the panorama.  Lookout
Mountain, with its rebel flags and batteries, stood out boldly, and
an occasional shot fired toward Wauhatchee or Moccasin Point gave
life to the scene.  These shots could barely reach Chattanooga, and
I was told that one or more shot had struck a hospital inside the
lines.  All along Missionary Ridge were the tents of the rebel
beleaguering force; the lines of trench from Lookout up toward the
Chickamauga were plainly visible; and rebel sentinels, in a
continuous chain, were walking their posts in plain view, not a
thousand yards off.  "Why," said I, "General Grant, you are
besieged;" and he said, "It is too true."  Up to that moment I had
no idea that things were so bad.  The rebel lines actually extended
from the river, below the town, to the river above, and the Army of
the Cumberland was closely held to the town and its immediate
defenses.  General Grant pointed out to me a house on Missionary
Ridge, where General Bragg's headquarters were known to be.  He
also explained the situation of affairs generally; that the mules
and horses of Thomas's army were so starved that they could not
haul his guns; that forage, corn, and provisions, were so scarce
that the men in hunger stole the few grains of corn that were given
to favorite horses; that the men of Thomas's army had been so
demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he feared they could
not be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive; that
Bragg had detached Longstreet with a considerable force up into
East Tennessee, to defeat and capture Burnside; that Burnside was
in danger, etc.; and that he (Grant) was extremely anxious to
attack Bragg in position, to defeat him, or at least to force him
to recall Longstreet.  The Army of the Cumberland had so long been
in the trenches that he wanted my troops to hurry up, to take the
offensive first; after which, he had no doubt the Cumberland army
would fight well.  Meantime the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, under
General Hooker, had been advanced from Bridgeport along the
railroad to Wauhatchee, but could not as yet pass Lookout Mountain.
A pontoon-bridge had been thrown across the Tennessee River at
Brown's Ferry, by which supplies were hauled into Chattanooga from
Kelly's and Wauhatchee..

Another bridge was in course of construction at Chattanooga, under
the immediate direction of Quartermaster-General Meigs, but at the
time all wagons, etc., had to be ferried across by a flying-bridge.
Men were busy and hard at work everywhere inside our lines, and
boats for another pontoon-bridge were being rapidly constructed
under Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, familiarly known as "Baldy
Smith," and this bridge was destined to be used by my troops, at a
point of the river about four miles above Chattanooga, just below
the mouth of the Chickamauga River.  General Grant explained to me
that he had reconnoitred the rebel line from Lookout Mountain up to
Chickamauga, and he believed that the northern portion of
Missionary Ridge was not fortified at all; and he wanted me, as
soon as my troops got up, to lay the new pontoon-bridge by night,
cross over, and attack Bragg's right flank on that part of the
ridge abutting on Chickamauga Creek, near the tunnel; and he
proposed that we should go at once to look at the ground.  In
company with Generals Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, we
crossed by the flying-bridge, rode back of the hills some four
miles, left our horses, and got on a hill overlooking the whole
ground about the mouth of the Chickamauga River, and across to the
Missionary Hills near the tunnel.  Smith and I crept down behind a
fringe of trees that lined the river-bank, to the very point
selected for the new bridge, where we sat for some time, seeing the
rebel pickets on the opposite bank, and almost hearing their words.

Having seen enough, we returned to Chattanooga; and in order to
hurry up my command, on which so much depended, I started back to
Kelly's in hopes to catch the steamboat that same evening; but on
my arrival the boat had gone.  I applied to the commanding officer,
got a rough boat manned by four soldiers, and started down the
river by night.  I occasionally took a turn at the oars to relieve
some tired man, and about midnight we reached Shell Mound, where
General Whittaker, of Kentucky, furnished us a new and good crew,
with which we reached Bridgeport by daylight.  I started Ewings
division in advance, with orders to turn aside toward Trenton, to
make the enemy believe we were going to turn Braggs left by pretty
much the same road Rosecrans had followed; but with the other three
divisions I followed the main road, via the Big Trestle at
Whitesides, and reached General Hooker's headquarters, just above
Wauhatchee, on the 20th; my troops strung all the way back to
Bridgeport.  It was on this occasion that the Fifteenth Corps
gained its peculiar badge: as the men were trudging along the
deeply-cut, muddy road, of a cold, drizzly day, one of our Western
soldiers left his ranks and joined a party of the Twelfth Corps at
their camp-fire.  They got into conversation, the Twelfth-Corps men
asking what troops we were, etc., etc.  In turn, our fellow (who
had never seen a corps-badge, and noticed that every thing was
marked with a star) asked if they were all brigadier-generals.  Of
course they were not, but the star was their corps-badge, and every
wagon, tent, hat, etc., had its star.  Then the Twelfth-Corps men
inquired what corps he belonged to, and he answered, "The Fifteenth
Corps."  "What is your badge?"  "Why," said he (and he was an
Irishman), suiting the action to the word, "forty rounds in the
cartridge-box, and twenty in the pocket."  At that time Blair
commanded the corps; but Logan succeeded soon after, and, hearing
the story, adopted the cartridge-box and forty rounds as the
corps-badge.

The condition of the roads was such, and the bridge at Brown's so
frail, that it was not until the 23d that we got three of my
divisions behind the hills near the point indicated above
Chattanooga for crossing the river.  It was determined to begin the
battle with these three divisions, aided by a division of Thomas's
army, commanded by General Jeff.  C. Davis, that was already near
that point.  All the details of the battle of Chattanooga, so far
as I was a witness, are so fully given in my official report
herewith, that I need add nothing to it.  It was a magnificent
battle in its conception, in its execution, and in its glorious
results; hastened somewhat by the supposed danger of Burnside, at
Knoxville, yet so completely successful, that nothing is left for
cavil or fault-finding.  The first day was lowering and overcast,
favoring us greatly, because we wanted to be concealed from Bragg,
whose position on the mountain-tops completely overlooked us and
our movements.  The second day was beautifully clear, and many a
time, in the midst of its carnage and noise, I could not help
stopping to look across that vast field of battle, to admire its
sublimity.

The object of General Hooker's and my attacks on the extreme flanks
of Bragg's position was, to disturb him to such an extent, that
he would naturally detach from his centre as against us, so that
Thomas's army could break through his centre.  The whole plan
succeeded admirably; but it was not until after dark that I learned
the complete success at the centre, and received General Grant's
orders to pursue on the north side of Chickamauga Creek:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, CHATTANOOGA,
TENNESSEE, Nov. 25, 1863

Major-General SHERMAN.

GENERAL: No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which
Thomas's troops carried Missionary Ridge this afternoon, and can
feel a just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under your
command in taking first so much of the same range of hills, and
then in attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to make
Thomas's part certain of success.  The neat thing now will be to
relieve Burnside.  I have heard from him to the evening of the 23d.
At that time he had from ten to twelve days' supplies, and spoke
hopefully of being able to hold out that length of time.

My plan is to move your forces out gradually until they reach the
railroad between Cleveland and Dalton.  Granger will move up the
south side of the Tennessee with a column of twenty thousand men,
taking no wagons, or but few, with him.  His men will carry four
days' rations, and the steamer Chattanooga, loaded with rations,
will accompany the expedition.

I take it for granted that Bragg's entire force has left.  If not,
of course, the first thing is to dispose of him.  If he has gone,
the only thing necessary to do to-morrow will be to send out a
reconnoissance to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy.  Yours
truly,

U. S.  GRANT, Major-General.

P. S.-On reflection, I think we will push Bragg with all our
strength to-morrow, and try if we cannot out off a good portion of
his rear troops and trains.  His men have manifested a strong
disposition to desert for some time past, and we will now give them
a chance.  I will instruct Thomas accordingly.  Move the advance
force early, on the most easterly road taken by the enemy.
U. S. G.


This compelled me to reverse our column, so as to use the bridge
across the Chickamauga at its mouth.  The next day we struck the
rebel rear at Chickamauga Station, and again near Graysville.
There we came in contact with Hooker's and Palmer's troops, who had
reached Ringgold.  There I detached Howard to cross Taylor's Ridge,
and strike the railroad which comes from the north by Cleveland to
Dalton.  Hooker's troops were roughly handled at Ringgold, and the
pursuit was checked.  Receiving a note from General Hooker, asking
help, I rode forward to Ringgold to explain the movement of Howard;
where I met General Grant, and learned that the rebels had again
retreated toward Dalton.  He gave orders to discontinue the
pursuit, as he meant to turn his attention to General Burnside,
supposed to be in great danger at Knoxville, about one hundred and
thirty miles northeast.  General Grant returned and spent part of
the night with me, at Graysville.  We talked over matters
generally, and he explained that he had ordered General Gordon
Granger, with the Fourth Corps, to move forward rapidly to
Burnsides help, and that he must return to Chattanooga to push him.
By reason of the scarcity of food, especially of forage, he
consented that, instead of going back, I might keep out in the
country; for in motion I could pick up some forage and food,
especially on the Hiawassee River, whereas none remained in
Chattanooga.

Accordingly, on the 29th of November, my several columns marched to
Cleveland, and the next day we reached the Hiawassee at Charleston,
where the Chattanooga & Knoxville Railroad crosses it.  The
railroad-bridge was partially damaged by the enemy in retreating,
but we found some abandoned stores.  There and thereabouts I
expected some rest for my weary troops and horses; but, as I rode
into town, I met Colonel J. H. Wilson and C. A. Dana (Assistant
Secretary of War), who had ridden out from Chattanooga to find me,
with the following letter from General Grant, and copies of several
dispatches from General Burnside, the last which had been received
from him by way of Cumberland Gap:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, CHATTANOOGA,
TENNESSEE, Nov.  29, 1863

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN

News are received from Knoxville to the morning of the 27th.  At
that time the place was still invested, but the attack on it was
not vigorous.  Longstreet evidently determined to starve the
garrison out.  Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but I
have lost all faith in his energy or capacity to manage an
expedition of the importance of this one.  I am inclined to think,
therefore, I shall have to send you.  Push as rapidly as you can to
the Hiawassee, and determine for yourself what force to take with
you from that point.  Granger has his corps with him, from which
you will select in conjunction with the force now with you.  In
plain words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving
up the Tennessee, including the garrison at Kingston, and from that
force, organize what you deem proper to relieve Burnside.  The
balance send back to Chattanooga.  Granger has a boat loaded with
provisions, which you can issue, and return the boat.  I will have
another loaded, to follow you.  Use, of course, as sparingly as
possible from the rations taken with you, and subsist off the
country all you can.

It is expected that Foster is moving, by this time, from Cumberland
Gap on Knoxville.  I do not know what force he will have with him,
but presume it will range from three thousand five hundred to five
thousand I leave this matter to you, knowing that you will do
better acting upon your discretion than you could trammeled with
instructions.  I will only add, that the last advices from Burnside
himself indicated his ability to hold out with rations only to
about the 3d of December.  Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General commanding,


This showed that, on the 27th of November, General Burnside was in
Knoxville, closely besieged by the rebel General Longstreet; that
his provisions were short, and that, unless relieved by December
3d, he might have to surrender.  General Grant further wrote that
General Granger, instead of moving with great rapidity as ordered,
seemed to move  "slowly, and with reluctance;" and, although he
(General Grant) hated to call on me and on my tired troops, there
was no alternative.  He wanted me to take command of every thing
within reach, and to hurry forward to Knoxville.

All the details of our march to Knoxville are also given in my
official report.  By extraordinary efforts Long's small brigade of
cavalry reached Knoxville during the night of the 3d, purposely to
let Burnside know that I was rapidly approaching with an adequate
force to raise the siege.

With the head of my infantry column I reached Marysville, about
fifteen miles short of Knoxville, on the 5th of December; when I
received official notice from Burnside that Longstreet had raised
the siege, and had started in retreat up the valley toward
Virginia.  Halting all the army, except Granger's two divisions, on
the morning of the 6th, with General Granger and some of my staff I
rode into Knoxville.  Approaching from the south and west, we
crossed the Holston on a pontoon bridge, and in a large pen on the
Knoxville side I saw a fine lot of cattle, which did not look much
like starvation.  I found General Burnside and staff domiciled in a
large, fine mansion, looking very comfortable, and in, a few words
he described to me the leading events, of the previous few days,
and said he had already given orders looking to the pursuit of
Longstreet.  I offered to join in the pursuit, though in fact my
men were worn out, and suffering in that cold season and climate.

Indeed, on our way up I personally was almost frozen, and had to
beg leave to sleep in the house of a family at Athens.

Burnside explained to me that, reenforced by Granger's two
divisions of ten thousand men, he would be able to push Longstreet
out of East Tennessee, and he hoped to capture much of his
artillery and trains.  Granger was present at our conversation, and
most unreasonably, I thought, remonstrated against being left;
complaining bitterly of what he thought was hard treatment to his
men and himself.  I know that his language and manner at that time
produced on my mind a bad impression, and it was one of the causes
which led me to relieve him as a corps commander in the campaign of
the next spring.  I asked General Burnside to reduce his wishes to
writing, which he did in the letter of December 7th, embodied in my
official report.  General Burnside and I then walked along his
lines and examined the salient, known as Fort Sanders, where, some
days before, Longstreet had made his assault, and had sustained a
bloody repulse.

Returning to Burnside's quarters, we all sat down to a good dinner,
embracing roast-turkey.  There was a regular dining table, with
clean tablecloth, dishes, knives, forks, spoons, etc., etc.  I had
seen nothing of this kind in my field experience, and could not
help exclaiming that I thought "they were starving," etc.; but
Burnside explained that Longstreet had at no time completely
invested the place, and that he had kept open communication with
the country on the south side of the river Holston, more especially
with the French Broad settlements, from whose Union inhabitants he
had received a good supply of beef, bacon, and corn meal.  Had I
known of this, I should not have hurried my men so fast; but until
I reached Knoxville I thought his troops there were actually in
danger of starvation.  Having supplied General Burnside all the
help he wanted, we began our leisurely return to Chattanooga, which
we reached on the 16th; when General Grant in person ordered me to
restore to General Thomas the divisions of Howard and Davis, which
belonged to his army, and to conduct my own corps (the Fifteenth)
to North Alabama for winter-quarters.


HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE, BRIDGEPORT,
ALABAMA December 19, 1863

Brigadier-General John A. RAWLINS, Chief of Staff to General GRANT,
Chattanooga.

GENERAL: For the first time, I am now at leisure to make an
official record of events with which the troops under my command
have been connected daring the eventful campaign which has just
closed.  Dating the month of September last, the Fifteenth Army
Corps, which I had the honor to command, lay in camps along the Big
Black, about twenty miles east of Vicksburg, Mississippi.  It
consisted of four divisions:

The First, commanded by Brigadier-General P. J. Osterhaus, was
composed of two brigades, led by Brigadier-General C. R. Woods and
Colonel J. A. Williamson (of the Fourth Iowa).

The Second, commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, was
composed of two brigades, led by Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith
and J. A. J. Lightburn.

The Third, commanded by Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle, was
composed of three brigades, led by Brigadier-Generals J. A. Mower
and R. P. Buckland, and Colonel J. J. Wood (of the Twelfth Iowa).

The Fourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Hugh Ewing, was composed
of three brigades, led by Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, Colonel
Loomis (Twenty-sixth Illinois), and Colonel J. R. Cockerill (of the
Seventieth Ohio).

On the 22d day of September I received a telegraphic dispatch from
General Grant, then at Vicksburg, commanding the Department of the
Tennessee, requiring me to detach one of my divisions to march to
Vicksburg, there to embark for Memphis, where it was to form a part
of an army to be sent to Chattanooga, to reenforce General
Rosecrans.  I designated the First Division, and at 4 a. m. the
same day it marched for Vicksburg, and embarked the neat day.

On the 23d of September I was summoned to Vicksburg by the general
commanding, who showed me several dispatches from the general-
in-chief, which led him to suppose he would have to send me and my
whole corps to Memphis and eastward, and I was instructed to
prepare for such orders.  It was explained to me that, in
consequence of the low stage of water in the Mississippi, boats had
arrived irregularly, and had brought dispatches that seemed to
conflict in their meaning, and that General John E. Smith's
division (of General McPherson's corps) had been ordered up to
Memphis, and that I should take that division and leave one of my
own in its stead, to hold the line of the Big Black.  I detailed
my third division (General Tuttle) to remain and report to
Major-General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, at
Vicksburg; and that of General John E. Smith, already started for
Memphis, was styled the Third Division, Fifteenth Corps, though  it
still belongs to the Seventeenth Army Corps.  This division is also
composed of three brigades, commanded by General Matthias, Colonel
J. B. Raum (of the Fifty-sixth Illinois), and Colonel J. I.
Alexander (of the Fifty-ninth Indiana).

The Second and Fourth Divisions were started for Vicksburg the
moment I was notified that boats were in readiness, and on the
27th of September I embarked in person in the steamer Atlantic,
for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats conveying these
two divisions.  Our progress was slow, on account of the
unprecedentedly low water in the Mississippi, and the scarcity of
coal and wood.  We were compelled at places to gather fence-rails,
and to land wagons and haul wood from the interior to the boats;
but I reached Memphis during the night of the 2d of October, and
the other boats came in on the 3d and 4th.

On arrival at Memphis I saw General Hurlbut, and read all the
dispatches and letters of instruction of General Halleck, and
therein derived my instructions, which I construed to be as
follows:

To conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, and all other troops which
could be spared from the line of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad,
to Athens, Alabama, and thence report by letter for orders to
General Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at
Chattanooga; to follow substantially the railroad eastward,
repairing it as I moved; to look to my own line for supplies; and
in no event to depend on General Rosecrans for supplies, as the
roads to his rear were already overtaxed to supply his present
army.

I learned from General Hurlbut that General Osterhaus's division
was already out in front of Corinth, and that General John E. Smith
was still at Memphis, moving his troops and material by railroad as
fast as its limited stock would carry them.  General J. D. Webster
was superintendent of the railroad, and was enjoined to work night
and day, and to expedite the movement as rapidly as possible; but
the capacity of the road was so small, that I soon saw that I could
move horses, mules, and wagons faster by land, and therefore I
dispatched the artillery and wagons by the road under escort, and
finally moved the entire Fourth Division by land.

The enemy seems to have had early notice of this movement, and he
endeavored to thwart us from the start.  A considerable force
assembled in a threatening attitude at Salem, south of Salisbury
Station; and General Carr, who commanded at Corinth, felt compelled
to turn back and use a part of my troops, that had already reached
Corinth, to resist the threatened attack.

On Sunday, October 11th, having put in motion my whole force, I
started myself for Corinth, in a special train, with the battalion
of the Thirteenth United States Regulars as escort.  We reached
Collierville Station about noon, just in time to take part in the
defense made of that station by Colonel D. C. Anthony, of the
Sixty-sixth Indiana, against an attack made by General Chalmers
with a force of about three thousand cavalry, with eight pieces of
artillery.  He was beaten off, the damage to the road repaired, and
we resumed our journey the next day, reaching Corinth at night.

I immediately ordered General Blair forward to Iuka, with the First
Division, and, as fast as I got troops up, pushed them forward of
Bear Creek, the bridge of which was completely destroyed, and an
engineer regiment, under command of Colonel Flag, was engaged in
its repairs.

Quite a considerable force of the enemy was assembled in our front,
near Tuscumbia, to resist our advance.  It was commanded by General
Stephen D. Lee, and composed of Roddy's and Ferguson's brigades,
with irregular cavalry, amounting in the aggregate to about five
thousand.

In person I moved from Corinth to Burnsville on the 18th, and to
Iuka on the 19th of October.

Osterhaus's division was in the advance, constantly skirmishing
with the enemy; he was supported by General Morgan L. Smith's, both
divisions under the general command of Major-General Blair.
General John E. Smith's division covered the working-party engaged
in rebuilding the railroad.

Foreseeing difficulty in crossing the Tennessee River, I had
written to Admiral Porter, at Cairo, asking him to watch the
Tennessee and send up some gunboats the moment the stage of water
admitted; and had also requested General Allen, quartermaster at
St. Louis, to dispatch to Eastport a steam ferry-boat.

The admiral, ever prompt and ready to assist us, had two fine
gunboats at Eastport, under Captain Phelps, the very day after my
arrival at Iuka; and Captain Phelps had a coal-barge decked over,
with which to cross our horses and wagons before the arrival of the
ferry-boat.

Still following literally the instructions of General Halleck, I
pushed forward the repairs of the railroad, and ordered General
Blair, with the two leading divisions, to drive the enemy beyond
Tuscumbia.  This he did successfully, after a pretty severe fight
at Cane Creek, occupying Tuscumbia on the 27th of October.

In the meantime many important changes in command had occurred,
which I must note here, to a proper understanding of the case.

General Grant had been called from Vicksburg, and sent to
Chattanooga to command the military division of the Mississippi,
composed of the three Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, and
Tennessee; and the Department of the Tennessee had been devolved on
me, with instructions, however, to retain command of the army in
the field.  At Iuka I made what appeared to me the best disposition
of matters relating to the department, giving General McPherson
full powers in Mississippi and General Hurlbut in West Tennessee,
and assigned General Blair to the command of the Fifteenth Army
Corps; and summoned General Hurlbut from Memphis, and General Dodge
from Corinth, and selected out of the Sixteenth Corps a force of
about eight thousand men, which I directed General Dodge to
organize with all expedition, and with it to follow me eastward.

On the 27th of October, when General Blair, with two divisions, was
at Tuscumbia, I ordered General Ewing, with the Fourth Division, to
cross the Tennessee (by means of the gunboats and scow) as rapidly
as possible at Eastport, and push forward to Florence, which he
did; and the same day a messenger from General Grant floated down
the Tennessee over Muscle Shoals, landed at Tuscumbia, and was sent
to me at Iuka.  He bore a short message from the general to this
effect: "Drop all work on the railroad east of Bear Creek; push
your command toward Bridgeport till you meet orders;" etc.
Instantly the order was executed; the order of march was reversed,
and all the columns were directed to Eastport, the only place where
we could cross the Tennessee.  At first we only had the gunboats
and coal-barge; but the ferry-boat and two transports arrived on
the 31st of October, and the work of crossing was pushed with all
the vigor possible.  In person I crossed, and passed to the head of
the column at Florence on the 1st of November, leaving the rear
divisions to be conducted by General Blair, and marched to
Rogersville and Elk River.  This was found impassable.  To ferry
would have consumed to much time, and to build a bridge still more;
so there was no alternative but to turn up Elk River by way of
Gilbertsboro, Elkton, etc., to the stone bridge at Fayetteville,
where we crossed the Elk, and proceeded to Winchester and Deckerd.

At Fayetteville I received orders from General Grant to come to
Bridgeport with the Fifteenth Army Corps, and to leave General
Dodge's command at Pulaski, and along the railroad from Columbia to
Decatur.  I instructed General Blair to follow with the Second and
First Divisions by way of New Market, Larkinsville, and Bellefonte,
while I conducted the other two divisions by way of Deckerd; the
Fourth Division crossing the mountain to Stevenson, and the Third
by University Place and Sweden's Cove.

In person I proceeded by Sweden's Cove and Battle Creek, reaching
Bridgeport on the night of November 13th.  I immediately
telegraphed to the commanding general my arrival, and the positions
of my several divisions, and was summoned to Chattanooga.  I took
the first steamboat daring the night of the 14th for Belly's Ferry,
and rode into Chattanooga on the 16th.  I then learned the part
assigned me in the coming drama, was supplied with the necessary
maps and information, and rode, during the 18th, in company with
Generals Grant, Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, to the
positions occupied on the west bank of the Tennessee, from which
could be seen the camps of the enemy, compassing Chattanooga and
the line of Missionary Hills, with its terminus on Chickamauga
Creek, the point that I was expected to take, hold, and fortify.
Pontoons, with a full supply of balks and chesses, had been
prepared for the bridge over the Tennessee, and all things had been
prearranged with a foresight that elicited my admiration.  From the
hills we looked down on the amphitheatre of Chattanooga as on a
map, and nothing remained but for me to put my troops in the
desired position.  The plan contemplated that, in addition to
crossing the Tennessee River and making a lodgment on the terminus
of Missionary Ridge, I should demonstrate against Lookout Mountain,
near Trenton, with a part of my command.

All in Chattanooga were impatient for action, rendered almost acute
by the natural apprehensions felt for the safety of General
Burnside in East Tennessee.

My command had marched from Memphis, three hundred and thirty
miles, and I had pushed them as fast as the roads and distance
would admit, but I saw enough of the condition of men and animals
in Chattanooga to inspire me with renewed energy.  I immediately
ordered my leading division (General Ewing's) to march via
Shellmound to Trenton, demonstrating against Lookout Ridge, but to
be prepared to turn quickly and follow me to Chattanooga and in
person I returned to Bridgeport, rowing a boat down the Tennessee
from Belly's Ferry, and immediately on arrival put in motion my
divisions in the order in which they had arrived.  The bridge of
boats at Bridgeport was frail, and, though used day and night, our
passage was slow; and the road thence to Chattanooga was dreadfully
cut up and encumbered with the wagons of the other troops stationed
along the road.  I reached General Hooker's headquarters during a
rain, in the afternoon of the 20th, and met General Grant's orders
for the general attack on the next day.  It was simply impossible
for me to fulfill my part in time; only one division (General John
E. Smith's) was in position.  General Ewing was still at Trenton,
and the other two were toiling along the terrible road from
Shellmound to Chattanooga.  No troops ever were or could be in
better condition than mine, or who labored harder to fulfill their
part.  On a proper representation, General Grant postponed the
attack.  On the 21st I got the Second Division over Brown's-Ferry
Bridge, and General Ewing got up; but the bridge broke repeatedly,
and delays occurred which no human sagacity could prevent.  All
labored night and day, and General Ewing got over on the 23d; but
my rear division was cut off by the broken bridge at Brown's Ferry,
and could not join me.  I offered to go into action with my three
divisions, supported by General Jeff.  C. Davis, leaving one of my
best divisions (Osterhaus's) to act with General Hooker against
Lookout Mountain.  That division has not joined me yet, but I know
and feel that it has served the country well, and that it has
reflected honor on the Fifteenth Army Corps and the Army of the
Tennessee.  I leave the record of its history to General Hooker, or
whomsoever has had its services during the late memorable events,
confident that all will do it merited honor.

At last, on the 28d of November, my three divisions lay behind the
hills opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga.  I dispatched the
brigade of the Second Division, commanded by General Giles A.
Smith, under cover of the hills, to North Chickamauga Creek, to man
the boats designed for the pontoon-bridge, with orders (at
midnight) to drop down silently to a point above the mouth of the
South Chickamauga, there land two regiments, who were to move along
the river-bank quietly, and capture the enemy's river-pickets.

General Giles A. Smith then was to drop rapidly below the month of
the Chickamauga, disembark the rest of his brigade, and dispatch
the boats across for fresh loads.  These orders were skillfully
executed, and every rebel picket but one was captured.  The balance
of General Morgan L. Smith's division was then rapidly ferried
across; that of General John E. Smith followed, and by daylight of
November 24th two divisions of about eight thousand men were on the
east bank of the Tennessee, and had thrown up a very respectable
rifle-trench as a tete du pont.  As soon as the day dawned, some of
the boats were taken from the use of ferrying, and a pontoon-bridge
was begun, under the immediate direction of Captain Dresser, the
whole planned and supervised by General William F. Smith in person.
A pontoon-bridge was also built at the same time over Chickamanga
Creek, near its mouth, giving communication with the two regiments
which had been left on the north side, and fulfilling a most
important purpose at a later stage of the drama.  I will here bear
my willing testimony to the completeness of this whole business.
All the officers charged with the work were present, and manifested
a skill which I cannot praise too highly.  I have never beheld any
work done so quietly, so well; and I doubt if the history of war
can show a bridge of that extent (viz., thirteen hundred and fifty
feet) laid so noiselessly and well, in so short a time.  I
attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General William F.
Smith.  The steamer Dunbar arrived up in the course of the morning,
and relieved Ewing's division of the labor of rowing across; but by
noon the pontoon-bridge was done, and my three divisions were
across, with men, horses, artillery, and every thing.

General Jeff. C. Davis's division was ready to take the bridge, and
I ordered the columns to form in order to carry the Missionary
Hills.  The movement had been carefully explained to all division
commanders, and at 1 p.m.  we marched from the river in three
columns in echelon: the left, General Morgan L. Smith, the column
of direction, following substantially Chickamauga Creek; the
centre, General, John E. Smith, in columns, doubled on the centre,
at one brigade interval to the right and rear; the right, General
Ewing, in column at the same distance to the right rear, prepared
to deploy to the right, on the supposition that we would meet an
enemy in that direction.  Each head of column was covered by a good
line of skirmishers, with supports.  A light drizzling rain
prevailed, and the clouds hung low, cloaking our movement from the
enemy's tower of observation on Lookout Mountain.  We soon gained
the foothills; our skirmishers crept up the face of the hills,
followed by their supports, and at 3.30 p.m. we had gained, with no
loss, the desired point.  A brigade of each division was pushed
rapidly to the top of the hill, and the enemy for the first time
seemed to realize the movement, but too late, for we were in
possession.  He opened with artillery, but General Ewing soon got
some of Captain Richardson's guns up that steep hill and gave back
artillery, and the enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectual
dashes at General Lightburn, who had swept round and got a farther
hill, which was the real continuation of the ridge.  From studying
all the maps, I had inferred that Missionary Ridge was a continuous
hill; but we found ourselves on two high points, with a deep
depression between us and the one immediately over the tunnel,
which was my chief objective point.  The ground we had gained,
however, was so important, that I could leave nothing to chance,
and ordered it to be fortified during the night.  One brigade of
each division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan L.
Smith's closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John E.
Smith's were drawn back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing's
right was extended down into the plain, thus crossing the ridge in
a general line, facing southeast.

The enemy felt our left flank about 4 p.m., and a pretty smart
engagement with artillery and muskets ensued, when he drew off; but
it cost us dear, for General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded,
and had to go to the rear; and the command of the brigade devolved
on Colonel Topper (One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois), who managed
it with skill during the rest of the operations.  At the moment of
my crossing the bridge, General Howard appeared, having come with
three regiments from Chattanooga, along the east bank of the
Tennessee, connecting my new position with that of the main army in
Chattanooga.  He left the three regiments attached temporarily to
Gen. Ewing's right, and returned to his own corps at Chattanooga.
As night closed in, I ordered General Jeff. C. Davis to keep one of
his brigades at the bridge, one close up to my position, and one
intermediate.  Thus we passed the night, heavy details being kept
busy at work on the intrenchments on the hill.  During the night
the sky cleared away bright, a cold frost filled the air, and our
camp-fires revealed to the enemy and to our friends in Chattanooga
our position on Missionary Ridge.  About midnight I received, at
the hands of Major Rowley (of General Grant's staff), orders to
attack the enemy at "dawn of day," with notice that General Thomas
would attack in force early in the day.  Accordingly, before day I
was in the saddle, attended by all my staff; rode to the extreme
left of our position near Chickamauga Creek; thence up the hill,
held by General Lightburn; and round to the extreme right of
General Ewing.

Catching as accurate an idea of the ground as possible by the dim
light of morning, I saw that our line of attack was in the
direction of Missionary Ridge, with wings supporting on either
flank.  Quite a valley lay between us and the next hill of the
series, and this hill presented steep sides, the one to the west
partially cleared, but the other covered with the native forest.
The crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded.  The farther point of
this hill was held-by the enemy with a breastwork of logs and fresh
earth, filled with men and two guns.  The enemy was also seen in
great force on a still higher hill beyond the tunnel, from which he
had a fine plunging fire on the hill in dispute.  The gorge
between, through which several roads and the railroad-tunnel pass,
could not be seen from our position, but formed the natural place
d'armes, where the enemy covered his masses to resist our
contemplated movement of turning his right flank and endangering
his communications with his depot at Chickamauga Station.

As soon as possible, the following dispositions were made: The
brigades of Colonels Cockrell and Alexander, and General Lightburn,
were to hold our hill as the key-point.  General Corse, with as
much of his brigade as could operate along the narrow ridge, was to
attack from our right centre.  General Lightburn was to dispatch a
good regiment from his position to cooperate with General Corse;
and General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the east base of
Missionary Ridge, connecting with General Corse; and Colonel
Loomis, in like manner, to move along the west bank, supported by
the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith.

The sun had hardly risen before General Corse had completed his
preparations and his bugle sounded the "forward!" The Fortieth
Illinois, supported by the Forty-sixth Ohio, on our right centre,
with the Thirtieth Ohio (Colonel Jones), moved down the face of our
hill, and up that held by the enemy.  The line advanced to within
about eighty yards of the intrenched position, where General Corse
found a secondary crest, which he gained and held.  To this point
he called his reserves, and asked for reenforcements, which were
sent; but the space was narrow, and it was not well to crowd the
men, as the enemy's artillery and musketry fire swept the approach
to his position, giving him great advantage.  As soon as General
Corse had made his preparations, he assaulted, and a close, severe
contest ensued, which lasted more than an hour, gaining and losing
ground, but never the position first obtained, from which the enemy
in vain attempted to drive him.  General Morgan L. Smith kept
gaining ground on the left spurs of Missionary Ridge, and Colonel
Loomis got abreast of the tunnel and railroad embankment on his
aide, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that extent relieving the
assaulting party on the hill-crest. Captain Callender had four of
his guns on General Ewing's hill, and Captain Woods his Napoleon
battery on General Lightburn's; also, two guns of Dillon's battery
were with Colonel Alexander's brigade.  All directed their fire as
carefully as possible, to clear the hill to our front, without
endangering our own men.  The fight raged furiously about 10 a.m.,
when General Corse received a severe wound, was brought off the
field, and the command of the brigade and of the assault at that
key-point devolved on that fine young, gallant officer, Colonel
Walcutt, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, who fulfilled his part manfully.
He continued the contest, pressing forward at all points.  Colonel
Loomis had made good progress to the right, and about 2 p.m.,
General John E. Smith, judging the battle to be most severe on the
hill, and being required to support General Ewing, ordered up
Colonel Raum's and General Matthias's brigades across the field to
the summit that was being fought for.  They moved up under a heavy
fire of cannon and musketry, and joined Colonel Walcutt; but the
crest was so narrow that they necessarily occupied the west face of
the hill.  The enemy, at the time being massed in great strength in
the tunnel-gorge, moved a large force under cover of the ground and
the thick bushes, and suddenly appeared on the right rear of this
command.  The suddenness of the attack disconcerted the men,
exposed as they were in the open field; they fell back in some
disorder to the lower edge of the field, and reformed.  These two
brigades were in the nature of supports, and did not constitute a
part of the real attack.

The movement, seen from Chattanooga (five miles off ) with
spy-glasses, gave rise to the report, which even General Meiga has
repeated, that we were repulsed on the left.  It was not so.  The
real attacking columns of General Corse, Colonel Loomis, and
General Smith, were not repulsed.  They engaged in a close struggle
all day persistently, stubbornly, and well.  When the two reserve
brigades of General John E. Smith fell back as described, the enemy
made a show of pursuit, but were in their turn caught in flank by
the well-directed fire of our brigade on the wooded crest, and
hastily sought cover behind the hill.  Thus matters stood about 3
p.m.  The day was bright and clear, and the amphitheatre of
Chattanooga sat in beauty at our feet.  I had watched for the
attack of General Thomas "early in the day."   Column after column
of the enemy was streaming toward me; gun after  gun poured its
concentric shot on us, from every hill and spur that gave a view of
any part of the ground held by us.  An occasional shot from Fort
Wood and Orchard Knob, and some musketry-fire and artillery over
about  Lookout Mountain, was all that I could detect on our side;
but about 3 p.m.  I noticed the white line of musketry-fire in
front of Orchard Knoll extending farther and farther right and left
and on.  We could only hear  a faint echo of sound, but enough was
seen to satisfy me that General Thomas was at last moving on the
centre.  I knew that our attack had drawn vast masses of the enemy
to our flank, and felt sure of the result.  Some guns which had
been firing on us all day were silent, or were turned in a
different direction.

The advancing line of musketry-fire from Orchard Knoll disappeared
to us behind a spar of the hill, and could no longer be seen; and
it was not until night closed in that I knew that the troops in
Chattanooga had swept across Missionary Ridge and broken the
enemy's centre.  Of course, the victory was won, and pursuit was
the next step.

I ordered General Morgan L. Smith to feel to the tunnel, and it was
found vacant, save by the dead and wounded of our own and the enemy
commingled.  The reserve of General Jeff. C. Davis was ordered to
march at once by the pontoon-bridge across Chickamauga Creek, at
its mouth, and push forward for the depot.

General Howard had reported to me in the early part of the day,
with the remainder of his army corps (the Eleventh), and had been
posted to connect my left with Chickamauga Creek.  He was ordered
to repair an old broken bridge about two miles up the Chickamauga,
and to follow General Davis at 4 a.m., and the Fifteenth Army Corps
was ordered to follow at daylight.  But General Howard found that
to repair the bridge was more of a task than was at first supposed,
and we were all compelled to cross the Chickamauga on the new
pontoon-bridge at its mouth.  By about 11 a.m.  General Jeff. C.
Davis's division reached the depot, just in time to see it in
flames.  He found the enemy occupying two hills, partially
intrenched, just beyond the depot.  These he soon drove away.
The depot presented a scene of desolation that war alone exhibits
--corn-meal and corn in huge burning piles, broken wagons, abandoned
caissons, two thirty-two-pounder rifled-guns with carriages burned,
pieces of pontoons, balks and chesses, etc., destined doubtless for
the famous invasion of Kentucky, and all manner of things, burning
and broken.  Still, the enemy kindly left us a good supply of forage
for our horses, and meal, beans, etc., for our men.

Pausing but a short while, we passed on, the road filled with
broken wagons and abandoned caissons, till night.  Just as the head
of the column emerged from a dark, miry swamp, we encountered the
rear-guard of the retreating enemy.  The fight was sharp, but the
night closed in so dark that we could not move.  General Grant came
up to us there.  At daylight we resumed the march, and at
Graysville, where a good bridge spanned the Chickamauga, we found
the corps of General Palmer on the south bank, who informed us that
General Hooker was on a road still farther south, and we could hear
his guns near Ringgold.

As the roads were filled with all the troops they could possibly
accommodate, I turned to the east, to fulfill another part of the
general plan, viz., to break up all communication between Bragg and
Longstreet.

We had all sorts of rumors as to the latter, but it was manifest
that we should interpose a proper force between these two armies.
I therefore directed General Howard to move to Parker's Gap, and
thence send rapidly a competent force to Red Clay, or the
Council-Ground, there to destroy a large section of the railroad
which connects Dalton and Cleveland.  This work was most
successfully and fully accomplished that day.  The division of
General Jeff. C. Davis was moved close up to Ringgold, to assist
General Hooker if needed, and the Fifteenth Corps was held at
Grayeville, for any thing that might turn up.  About noon I had a
message from General Hooker, saying he had had a pretty hard fight
at the mountain-pass just beyond Ringgold, and he wanted me to come
forward to turn the position.  He was not aware at the time that
Howard, by moving through Parker's Gap toward Red Clay, had already
turned it.  So I rode forward to Ringgold in person, and found the
enemy had already fallen back to Tunnel Hill.  He was already out
of the valley of the Chickamauga, and on ground whence the waters
flow to the Coosa.  He was out of Tennessee.

I found General Grant at Ringgold, and, after some explanations as
to breaking up the railroad from Ringgold back to the State line,
as soon as some cars loaded with wounded men could be pushed back
to Chickamauga depot, I was ordered to move slowly and leisurely
back to Chattanooga.

On the following day the Fifteenth Corps destroyed absolutely and
effectually the railroad from a point half-way between Ringgold and
Graysville, back to the State line; and General Grant, coming to
Graysville, consented that, instead of returning direct to
Chattanooga, I might send back all my artillery-wagons and
impediments, and make a circuit by the north as far as the
Hiawasaee River.

Accordingly, on the morning of November 29th, General Howard moved
from Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General Davis by way of McDaniel's
Gap, and General Blair with two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps by
way of Julien's Gap, all meeting at Cleveland that night.  Here
another good break was made in the Dalton & Cleveland road.  On the
30th the army moved to Charleston, General Howard approaching so
rapidly that the enemy evacuated with haste, leaving the bridge but
partially damaged, and five car-loads of flour and provisions on
the north bank of the Hiawassee.

This was to have been the limit of our operations.  Officers and
men had brought no baggage or provisions, and the weather was
bitter cold.  I had already reached the town of Charleston, when
General Wilson arrived with a letter from General Grant, at
Chattanooga, informing me that the latest authentic accounts from
Knoxville were to the 27th, at which time General Burnside was
completely invested, and had provisions only to include the 3d of
December; that General Granger had left Chattanooga for Knoxville,
by the river-road, with a steamboat following him in the river; but
he feared that General Granger could not reach Knoxville in time,
and ordered me to take command of all troops moving for the relief
of Knoxville, and hasten to General Burnside.  Seven days before,
we had left our camps on the other side of the Tennessee with two
days' rations, without a change of clothing--stripped for the
fight, with but a single blanket or coat per man, from myself to
the private included.

Of course, we then had no provisions save what we gathered by the
road, and were ill supplied for such a march.  But we learned that
twelve thousand of our fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in the
mountain town of Knoxville, eighty-four miles distant; that they
needed relief, and must have it in three days.  This was enough
--and it had to be done.  General Howard that night repaired and
planked the railroad-bridge, and at daylight the army passed over
the Hiawassee and marched to Athens, fifteen miles.  I had supposed
rightly that General Granger was about the mouth of the Hiawassee,
and had sent him notice of my orders; that General Grant had sent
me a copy of his written instructions, which were full and
complete, and that he must push for Kingston, near which we would
make a junction.  But by the time I reached Athens I had better
studied the geography, and sent him orders, which found him at
Decatur, that Kingston was out of our way; that he should send his
boat to Kingston, but with his command strike across to
Philadelphia, and report to me there.  I had but a small force of
cavalry, which was, at the time of my receipt of General Grant's
orders, scouting over about Benton and Columbus.  I left my aide,
Major McCoy, at Charleston, to communicate with this cavalry and
hurry it forward.  It overtook me in the night at Athens.

On the 2d of December the army moved rapidly north toward Loudon,
twenty-six miles distant.  About 11 a.m., the cavalry passed to the
head of the column, was ordered to push to London, and, if
possible, to save a pontoon-bridge across the Tennessee, held by a
brigade of the enemy commanded by General Vaughn.  The cavalry
moved with such rapidity as to capture every picket; but the
brigade of Vaughn had artillery in position, covered by earthworks,
and displayed a force too respectable to be carried by a cavalry
dash, so that darkness closed in before General Howard's infantry
got up.  The enemy abandoned the place in the night, destroying the
pontoons, running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into the
Tennessee River, and abandoned much provision, four guns, and other
material, which General Howard took at daylight.  But the bridge
was gone, and we were forced to turn east and trust to General
Burnside's bridge at Knoxville.  It was all-important that General
Burnside should have notice of our coming, and but one day of the
time remained.

Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the night of the 2d of
December, I sent my aide (Major Audenried) forward to Colonel Long,
commanding the brigade of cavalry at London, to explain to him how
all-important it was that notice of our approach should reach
General Burnside within twenty-four hours, ordering him to select
the best materials of his command, to start at once, ford the
Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville at whatever cost of life
and horse-flesh.  Major Audenried was ordered to go along.  The
distance to be traveled was about forty miles, and the roads
villainous.  Before day they were off, and at daylight the
Fifteenth Corps was turned from Philadelphia for the Little
Tennessee at Morgantown, where my maps represented the river as
being very shallow; but it was found too deep for fording, and the
water was freezing cold--width two hundred and forty yards, depth
from two to five feet; horses could ford, but artillery and men
could not.  A bridge was indispensable.  General Wilson (who
accompanied me) undertook to superintend the bridge, and I am under
many obligations to him, as I was without an engineer, having sent
Captain Jenny back from Graysville to survey our field of battle.
We had our pioneers, but only such tools as axes, picks, and
spades.  General Wilson, working partly with cut wood and partly
with square trestles (made of the houses of the late town of
Morgantown), progressed apace, and by dark of December 4th troops
and animals passed over the bridge, and by daybreak of the 5th the
Fifteenth Corps (General Blair's) was over, and Generals-Granger's
and Davis's divisions were ready to pass; but the diagonal bracing
was imperfect for, want of spikes, and the bridge broke, causing
delay.  I had ordered General Blair to move out on the Marysville
road five miles, there to await notice that General Granger was on
a parallel road abreast of him, and in person I was at a house
where the roads parted, when a messenger rode up, bringing me a few
words from General Burnside, to the effect that Colonel Long had
arrived at Knoxville with his cavalry, and that all was well with
him there; Longstreet still lay before the place, but there were
symptoms of his speedy departure.

I felt that I had accomplished the first great step in the problem
for the relief of General Burnside's army, but still urged on the
work.  As soon as the bridge was mended, all the troops moved
forward.  General Howard had marched from Loudon, had found a
pretty good ford for his horses and wagons at Davis's, seven miles
below Morgantown, and had made an ingenious bridge of the wagons
left by General Vaughn at London, on which to pass his men.  He
marched by Unitia and Louisville.  On the night of the 5th all the
heads of columns communicated at Marysville, where I met Major Van
Buren (of General Burnside's staff), who announced that Longstreet
had the night before retreated on the Rutledge, Rogersville, and
Bristol road, leading to Virginia; that General Burnside's cavalry
was on his heels; and that the general desired to see me in person
as soon as I could come to Knoxville.  I ordered all the troops to
halt and rest, except the two divisions of General Granger, which
were ordered to move forward to Little River, and General Granger
to report in person to General Burnside for orders.  His was the
force originally designed to reenforce General Burnside, and it was
eminently proper that it should join in the stern-chase after
Longstreet.

On the morning of December 6th I rode from Marysville into
Knoxville, and met General Burnside.  General Granger arrived later
in the day.  We examined his lines of fortifications, which were a
wonderful production for the short time allowed in their selection
of ground and construction of work.  It seemed to me that they were
nearly impregnable.  We examined the redoubt named "Sanders,"
where, on the Sunday previous, three brigades of the enemy had
assaulted and met a bloody repulse.  Now, all was peaceful and
quiet; but a few hours before, the deadly bullet sought its victim
all round about that hilly barrier.

The general explained to me fully and frankly what he had done, and
what he proposed to do.  He asked of me nothing but General
Granger's command; and suggested, in view of the large force I had
brought from Chattanooga, that I should return with due expedition
to the line of the Hiawasaee, lest Bragg, reenforced, might take
advantage of our absence to resume the offensive.  I asked him to
reduce this to writing, which he did, and I here introduce it as
part of my report:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE OHIO
KNOXVILLE, December 7, 1863

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding, etc.

GENERAL: I desire to express to you and your command my most hearty
thanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our relief
during the siege of Knoxville, and I am satisfied your approach
served to raise the siege.  The emergency having passed, I do not
deem, for the present, any other portion of your command but the
corps of General Granger necessary for operations in this section;
and, inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the forces immediately
with him in order to relieve us (thereby rendering the position of
General Thomas less secure), I deem it advisable that all the
troops now here, save those commanded by General Granger, should
return at once to within supporting distance of the forces in front
of Bragg's army.  In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank
you and your command for the kindness you have done us.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General commanding.


Accordingly, having seen General Burnside's forces move out of
Knoxville in pursuit of Longstreet, and General Granger's move in,
I put in motion my own command to return.  General Howard was
ordered to move, via Davis's Ford and Sweetwater, to Athena, with a
guard forward at Charleston, to hold and repair the bridge which
the enemy had retaken after our passage up.  General Jeff.  C.
Davis moved to Columbus, on the Hiawaesee, via Madisonville, and
the two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps moved to Tellico Plains,
to cover movement of cavalry across the mountains into Georgia, to
overtake a wagon-train which had dodged us on our way up, and had
escaped by way of Murphy.  Subsequently, on a report from General
Howard that the enemy held Charleston, I diverted General Ewing's
division to Athena, and went in person to Tellico with General
Morgan L. Smith's division.  By the 9th all our troops were in
position, and we held the rich country between the Little Tennessee
and the Hiawasaee.  The cavalry, under Colonel Long, passed the
mountain at Tellico, and proceeded about seventeen miles beyond
Murphy, when Colonel Long, deeming his farther pursuit of the
wagon-train useless, returned on the 12th to Tellico.  I then
ordered him and the division of General Morgan L. Smith to move to
Charleston, to which point I had previously ordered the corps of
General Howard.

On the 14th of December all of my command in the field lay along
the Hiawassee.  Having communicated to General Grant the actual
state of affairs, I received orders to leave, on the line of the
Hiawassee, all the cavalry, and come to Chattanooga with the rest
of my command.  I left the brigade of cavalry commanded by Colonel
Long, reenforced by the Fifth Ohio Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel
Heath)--the only cavalry properly belonging to the Fifteenth Army
Corps--at Charleston, and with the remainder moved by easy marches,
by Cleveland and Tyner's Depot, into Chattanooga, where I received
in person from General Grant orders to transfer back to their
appropriate commands the corps of General Howard and the division
commanded by General Jeff.  C. Davis, and to conduct the Fifteenth
Army Corps to its new field of operations.

It will thus appear that we have been constantly in motion since
our departure from the Big Black, in Mississippi, until the present
moment.  I have been unable to receive from subordinate commanders
the usual full, detailed reports of events, and have therefore been
compelled to make up this report from my own personal memory; but,
as soon as possible, subordinate reports will be received and duly
forwarded.

In reviewing the facts, I must do justice to the men of my command
for the patience, cheerfulness, and courage which officers and men
have displayed throughout, in battle, on the march, and in camp.
For long periods, without regular rations or supplies of any kind,
they have marched through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted,
without a murmur.  Without a moment's rest after a march of over
four hundred miles, without sleep for three successive nights, we
crossed the Tennessee, fought our part of the battle of
Chattanooga, pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned
more than a hundred and twenty miles north and compelled Longstreet
to raise the siege of Knoxville, which gave so much anxiety to the
whole country.  It is hard to realize the importance of these
events without recalling the memory of the general feeling which
pervaded all minds at Chattanooga prior to our arrival.  I cannot
speak of the Fifteenth Army Corps without a seeming vanity; but as
I am no longer its commander, I assert that there is no better body
of soldiers in America than it.  I wish all to feel a just pride in
its real honors.

To General Howard and his command, to General Jeff. C. Davis and
his, I am more than usually indebted for the intelligence of
commanders and fidelity of commands.  The brigade of Colonel
Bushbeck, belonging to the Eleventh Corps, which was the first to
come out of Chattanooga to my flank, fought at the Tunnel Hill, in
connection with General Ewing's division, and displayed a courage
almost amounting to rashness.  Following the enemy almost to the
tunnel-gorge, it lost many valuable lives, prominent among them
Lieutenant-Colonel Taft, spoken of as a most gallant soldier.

In General Howard throughout I found a polished and Christian
gentleman, exhibiting the highest and most chivalric traits of the
soldier.  General Davis handled his division with artistic skill,
more especially at the moment we encountered the enemy's
rear-guard, near Graysville, at nightfall.  I must award to this
division the credit of the best order during our movement through
East Tennessee, when long marches and the necessity of foraging to
the right and left gave some reason for disordered ranks:

Inasmuch as exception may be taken to my explanation of the
temporary confusion, during the battle of Chattanooga, of the two
brigades of General Matthias and Colonel Raum, I will here state
that I saw the whole; and attach no blame to any one.  Accidents
will happen in battle, as elsewhere; and at the point where they so
manfully went to relieve the pressure on other parts of our
assaulting line, they exposed themselves unconsciously to an enemy
vastly superior in force, and favored by the shape of the ground.
Had that enemy come out on equal terms, those brigades would have
shown their mettle, which has been tried more than once before and
stood the test of fire.  They reformed their ranks, and were ready
to support General Ewing's division in a very few minutes; and the
circumstance would have hardly called for notice on my part, had
not others reported what was seen from Chattanooga, a distance of
nearly five miles, from where could only be seen the troops in the
open field in which this affair occurred.

I now subjoin the best report of casualties I am able to compile
from the records thus far received:

Killed; Wounded; and Missing...............  1949

No report from General Davis's division, but loss is small.

Among the killed were some of our most valuable officers: Colonels
Putnam, Ninety-third Illinois; O'Meara, Ninetieth Illinois; and
Torrence, Thirtieth Iowa; Lieutenant-Colonel-Taft, of the Eleventh
Corps; and Major Bushnell, Thirteenth Illinois.

Among the wounded are Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith, Corse, and
Matthias; Colonel Raum; Colonel Waugelin, Twelfth Missouri;
Lieutenant-Colonel Partridge, Thirteenth Illinois; Major P. I.
Welsh, Fifty-sixth Illinois; and Major Nathan McAlla, Tenth Iowa.

Among the missing is Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, Seventeenth Iowa.

My report is already so long, that I must forbear mentioning acts
of individual merit.  These will be recorded in the reports of
division commanders, which I will cheerfully indorse; but I must
say that it is but justice that colonels of regiments, who have so
long and so well commanded brigades, as in the following cases,
should be commissioned to the grade which they have filled with so
much usefulness and credit to the public service, viz.: Colonel J.
R. Cockerell, Seventieth, Ohio; Colonel J. M. Loomis, Twenty-sixth
Illinois; Colonel C. C. Walcutt, Forty-sixth Ohio; Colonel J. A.
Williamson, Fourth Iowa; Colonel G. B. Raum, Fifty-sixth Illinois;
Colonel J. I. Alexander, Fifty-ninth Indiana.

My personal staff, as usual, have served their country with
fidelity, and credit to themselves, throughout these events, and
have received my personal thanks.

Inclosed you will please find a map of that part of the
battle-field of Chattanooga fought over by the troops under my
command, surveyed and drawn by Captain Jenney, engineer on my
staff.  I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


[General Order No. 68.]

WAR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON, February 21, 1884

Joint resolution tendering the thanks of Congress to Major-General
W. T. Sherman and others.

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of
Congress and of the people of the United States are due, and that
the same are hereby tendered, to Major-General W. T. Sherman,
commander of the Department and Army of the Tennessee, and the
officers and soldiers who served under him, for their gallant and
arduous services in marching to the relief of the Army of the
Cumberland, and for their gallantry and heroism in the battle of
Chattanooga, which contributed in a great degree to the success of
our arms in that glorious victory.

Approved February 19, 1864.
By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.



On the 19th of December I was at Bridgeport, and gave all the
orders necessary for the distribution of the four divisions of the
Fifteenth Corps along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, and
the part of the Sixteenth Corps; commanded by General Dodge, along
the railroad from Decatur to Nashville, to make the needed repairs,
and to be in readiness for the campaign of the succeeding year; and
on the 21st I went up to Nashville, to confer with General Grant
and conclude the arrangements for the winter.  At that time General
Grant was under the impression that the next campaign would be up
the valley of East Tennessee, in the direction of Virginia; and as
it was likely to be the last and most important campaign of the
war, it became necessary to set free as many of the old troops
serving along the Mississippi River as possible.  This was the real
object and purpose of the Meridian campaign, and of Banks's
expedition up Red River to Shreveport during that winter.




CHAPTER XV.

MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN.

JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1864.


The winter of 1863-'64 opened very cold and severe; and it was
manifest after the battle of Chattanooga, November 25, 1863, and
the raising of the siege of Knoxville, December 5th, that military
operations in that quarter must in a measure cease, or be limited
to Burnside's force beyond Knoxville.  On the 21st of December
General Grant had removed his headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee,
leaving General George H. Thomas at Chattanooga, in command of the
Department of the Cumberland, and of the army round about that
place; and I was at Bridgeport, with orders to distribute my troops
along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, Alabama, and from
Decatur up toward Nashville.

General G. M. Dodge, who was in command of the detachment of the
Sixteenth Corps, numbering about eight thousand men, had not
participated with us in the battle of Chattanooga, but had remained
at and near Pulaski, Tennessee, engaged in repairing that railroad,
as auxiliary to the main line which led from Nashville to
Stevenson, and Chattanooga.  General John A. Logan had succeeded to
the command of the Fifteenth Corps, by regular appointment of the
President of the United States, and had relieved General Frank P.
Blair, who had been temporarily in command of that corps during the
Chattanooga and Knoxville movement.

At that time I was in command of the Department of the Tennessee,
which embraced substantially the territory on the east bank of the
Mississippi River, from Natchez up to the Ohio River, and thence
along the Tennessee River as high as Decatur and Bellefonte,
Alabama.  General McPherson was at Vicksburg and General Hurlbut at
Memphis, and from them I had the regular reports of affairs in that
quarter of my command.  The rebels still maintained a considerable
force of infantry and cavalry in the State of Mississippi,
threatening the river, whose navigation had become to us so
delicate and important a matter.  Satisfied that I could check this
by one or two quick moves inland, and thereby set free a
considerable body of men held as local garrisons, I went up to
Nashville and represented the case to General Grant, who consented
that I might go down the Mississippi River, where the bulk of my
command lay, and strike a blow on the east of the river, while
General Banks from New Orleans should in like manner strike another
to the west; thus preventing any further molestation of the boats
navigating the main river, and thereby widening the gap in the
Southern Confederacy.

After having given all the necessary orders for the distribution,
during the winter months, of that part of my command which was in
Southern and Middle Tennessee, I went to Cincinnati and Lancaster,
Ohio, to spend Christmas with my family; and on my return I took
Minnie with me down to a convent at Reading, near Cincinnati, where
I left her, and took the cars for Cairo, Illinois, which I reached
January 3d, a very cold and bitter day.  The ice was forming fast,
and there was great danger that the Mississippi River, would become
closed to navigation.  Admiral Porter, who was at Cairo, gave me a
small gunboat (the Juliet), with which I went up to Paducah, to
inspect that place, garrisoned by a small force; commanded by
Colonel S. G. Hicks, Fortieth Illinois, who had been with me and
was severely wounded at Shiloh.  Returning to Cairo, we started
down the Mississippi River, which was full of floating ice.  With
the utmost difficulty we made our way through it, for hours
floating in the midst of immense cakes, that chafed and ground our
boat so that at times we were in danger of sinking.  But about the
10th of January we reached Memphis, where I found General Hurlbut,
and explained to him my purpose to collect from his garrisons and
those of McPherson about twenty thousand men, with which in
February to march out from Vicksburg as far as Meridian, break up
the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, and also the one leading from Vicksburg
to Selma, Alabama.  I instructed him to select two good divisions,
and to be ready with them to go along.  At Memphis I found
Brigadier-General W. Sooy Smith, with a force of about twenty-five
hundred cavalry, which he had by General Grant's orders brought
across from Middle Tennessee, to assist in our general purpose, as
well as to punish the rebel General Forrest, who had been most
active in harassing our garrisons in West Tennessee and
Mississippi.  After staying a couple of days at Memphis, we
continued on in the gunboat Silver Cloud to Vicksburg, where I
found General McPherson, and, giving him similar orders, instructed
him to send out spies to ascertain and bring back timely
information of the strength and location of the enemy.  The winter
continued so severe that the river at Vicksburg was full of
floating ice, but in the Silver Cloud we breasted it manfully, and
got back to Memphis by the 20th.  A chief part of the enterprise
was to destroy the rebel cavalry commanded by General Forrest, who
were a constant threat to our railway communications in Middle
Tennessee, and I committed this task to Brigadier-General W. Sooy
Smith.  General Hurlbut had in his command about seven thousand
five hundred cavalry, scattered from Columbus, Kentucky, to
Corinth, Mississippi, and we proposed to make up an aggregate
cavalry force of about seven thousand "effective," out of these and
the twenty-five hundred which General Smith had brought with him
from Middle Tennessee.  With this force General Smith was ordered
to move from Memphis straight for Meridian, Mississippi, and to
start by February 1st.  I explained to him personally the nature of
Forrest as a man, and of his peculiar force; told him that in his
route he was sure to encounter Forrest, who always attacked with a
vehemence for which he must be prepared, and that, after he had
repelled the first attack, he must in turn assume  the most
determined offensive, overwhelm him and utterly destroy his whole
force.  I knew that Forrest could not have more than four thousand
cavalry, and my own movement would give employment to every other
man of the rebel army not immediately present with him, so that he
(General Smith) might safely act on the hypothesis I have stated.

Having completed all these preparations in Memphis, being satisfied
that the cavalry force would be ready to start by the 1st of
February, and having seen General Hurlbut with his two divisions
embark in steamers for Vicksburg, I also reembarked for the same
destination on the 27th of January.

On the 1st of February we rendezvoused in Vicksburg, where I found
a spy who had been sent out two weeks before, had been to Meridian,
and brought back correct information of the state of facts in the
interior of Mississippi.  Lieutenant-General (Bishop) Polk was in
chief command, with headquarters at Meridian, and had two divisions
of infantry, one of which (General Loring's) was posted at Canton,
Mississippi, the other (General French's) at Brandon.  He had also
two divisions of cavalry--Armstrong's, composed of the three
brigades of Ross, Stark, and Wirt Adams, which were scattered from
the neighborhood of Yazoo City to Jackson and below; and Forrest's,
which was united, toward Memphis, with headquarters at Como.
General Polk seemed to have no suspicion of our intentions to
disturb his serenity.

Accordingly, on the morning of February 3d, we started in two
columns, each of two divisions, preceded by a light force of
cavalry, commanded by Colonel E. F. Winslow.  General McPherson
commanded the right column, and General Hurlbut the left.  The
former crossed the Big Black at the railroad-bridge, and the latter
seven miles above, at Messinger's.  We were lightly equipped as to
wagons, and marched without deployment straight for Meridian,
distant one hundred and fifty miles.  We struck the rebel cavalry
beyond the Big Black, and pushed them pell-mell into and beyond
Jackson during the 6th.  The next day we reached Brandon, and on
the 9th Morton, where we perceived signs of an infantry
concentration, but the enemy did not give us battle, and retreated
before us.  The rebel cavalry were all around us, so we kept our
columns compact and offered few or no chances for their dashes.  As
far as Morton we had occupied two roads, but there we were forced
into one.  Toward evening of the 12th, Hurlbut's column passed
through Decatur, with orders to go into camp four miles beyond at a
creek.  McPherson's head of column was some four miles behind, and
I personally detached one of Hurlbut's regiments to guard the
cross-roads at Decatur till the head of McPherson's column should
come in sight.  Intending to spend the night in Decatur, I went to
a double log-house, and arranged with the lady for some supper.  We
unsaddled our horses, tied them to the fence inside the yard, and,
being tired, I lay down on a bed and fell asleep.  Presently I
heard shouts and hallooing, and then heard pistol-shots close to
the house.  My aide, Major Audenried, called me and said we were
attacked by rebel cavalry, who were all around us.  I jumped up and
inquired where was the regiment of infantry I had myself posted at
the cross-roads.  He said a few moments before it had marched past
the house, following the road by which General Hurlbut had gone,
and I told him to run, overtake it, and bring it back.  Meantime, I
went out into the back-yard, saw wagons passing at a run down the
road, and horsemen dashing about in a cloud of dust, firing their
pistols, their shots reaching the house in which we were.
Gathering the few orderlies and clerks that were about, I was
preparing to get into a corn-crib at the back side of the lot,
wherein to defend ourselves, when I saw Audenried coming back with
the regiment, on a run, deploying forward as they came.  This
regiment soon cleared the place and drove the rebel cavalry back
toward the south, whence they had come.

It transpired that the colonel of this infantry regiment, whose
name I do not recall, had seen some officers of McPherson's staff
(among them Inspector-General Strong) coming up the road at a
gallop, raising a cloud of duet; supposing them to be the head of
McPherson's column, and being anxious to get into camp before dark,
he had called in his pickets and started down the road, leaving me
perfectly exposed.  Some straggling wagons, escorted by a New
Jersey regiment, were passing at the time, and composed the rear of
Hurlbut's train.  The rebel cavalry, seeing the road clear of
troops, and these wagons passing, struck them in flank, shot down
the mules of three or four wagons, broke the column, and began a
general skirmish.  The escort defended their wagons as well as they
could, and thus diverted their attention; otherwise I would surely
have been captured.  In a short time the head of McPherson's column
came up, went into camp, and we spent the night in Decatur.

The next day we pushed on, and on the 14th entered Meridian, the
enemy retreating before us toward Demopolis, Alabama.  We at once
set to work to destroy an arsenal, immense storehouses, and the
railroad in every direction.  We staid in Meridian five days,
expecting every hour to hear of General Sooy Smith, but could get
no tidings of him whatever.  A large force of infantry was kept at
work all the time in breaking up the Mobile & Ohio Railroad south
and north; also the Jackson & Selma Railroad, east and west.  I was
determined to damage these roads so that they could not be used
again for hostile purposes during the rest of the war.  I never had
the remotest idea of going to Mobile, but had purposely given out
that idea to the people of the country, so as to deceive the enemy
and to divert their attention.  Many persons still insist that,
because we did not go to Mobile on this occasion, I had failed; but
in the following letter to General Banks, of January 31st, written
from Vicksburg before starting for Meridian, it will be seen
clearly that I indicated my intention to keep up the delusion of an
attack on Mobile by land, whereas I promised him to be back to
Vicksburg by the 1st of March, so as to cooperate with him in his
contemplated attack on Shreveport:


HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
VICKSBURG, January 31, 1864

Major-General N. P. BANKS, commanding Department of the Gulf, New
Orleans.

GENERAL: I received yesterday, at the hands of Captain Durham,
aide-de-camp, your letter of the 25th inst., and hasten to reply.
Captain Durham has gone to the mouth of White River, en route for
Little Rock, and the other officers who accompanied him have gone
up to Cairo, as I understand, to charter twenty-five steamboats for
the Red River trip.  The Mississippi River, though low for the
season, is free of ice and in good boating order; but I understand
that Red River is still low.  I had a man in from Alexandria
yesterday, who reported the falls or rapids at that place
impassable save by the smallest boats.  My inland expedition is now
moving, and I will be off for Jackson and Meridian to-morrow.  The
only fear I have is in the weather.  All the other combinations are
good.  I want to keep up the delusion of an attack on Mobile and
the Alabama River, and therefore would be obliged if you would keep
up an irritating foraging or other expedition in that direction.

My orders from General Grant will not, as yet, justify me in
embarking for Red River, though I am very anxious to move in that
direction.  The moment I learned that you were preparing for it, I
sent a communication to Admiral Porter, and dispatched to General
Grant at Chattanooga, asking if he wanted me and Steele to
cooperate with you against Shreveport; and I will have his answer
in time, for you cannot do any thing till Red River has twelve feet
of water on the rapids at Alexandria.  That will be from March to
June.  I have lived on Red River, and know somewhat of the phases
of that stream.  The expedition on Shreveport should be made
rapidly, with simultaneous movements from Little Rock on
Shreveport, from Opelousas on Alexandria, and a combined force of
gunboats and transports directly up Red River.  Admiral Porter will
be able to have a splendid fleet by March 1st.  I think Steele
could move with ten thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry.  I
could take about ten thousand, and you could, I suppose, have the
same.  Your movement from Opelousas, simultaneous with mine up the
river, would compel Dick Taylor to leave Fort De Russy (near
Marksville), and the whole combined force could appear at
Shreveport about a day appointed beforehand.

I doubt if the enemy will risk a siege at Shreveport, although I am
informed they are fortifying the place, and placing many heavy guns
in position.  It would be better for us that they should stand
there, as we might make large and important captures.  But I do not
believe the enemy will fight a force of thirty thousand men, acting
in concert with gunboats.

I will be most happy to take part in the proposed expedition, and
hope, before you have made your final dispositions, that I will
have the necessary permission.  Half the Army of the Tennessee is
near the Tennessee River, beyond Huntsville, Alabama, awaiting the
completion of the railroad, and, by present orders, I will be
compelled to hasten there to command it in person, unless meantime
General Grant modifies the plan.  I have now in this department
only the force left to hold the river and the posts, and I am
seriously embarrassed by the promises made the veteran volunteers
for furlough.  I think, by March 1st, I can put afloat for
Shreveport ten thousand men, provided I succeed in my present
movement in cleaning out the State of Mississippi, and in breaking
up the railroads about Meridian.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, commanding.


The object of the Meridian expedition was to strike the roads
inland, so to paralyze the rebel forces that we could take from the
defense of the Mississippi River the equivalent of a corps of
twenty thousand men, to be used in the next Georgia campaign; and
this was actually done.  At the same time, I wanted to destroy
General Forrest, who, with an irregular force of cavalry, was
constantly threatening Memphis and the river above, as well as our
routes of supply in Middle Tennessee.  In this we failed utterly,
because General W. Sooy Smith did not fulfill his orders, which
were clear and specific, as contained in my letter of instructions
to him of January 27th, at Memphis, and my personal explanations to
him at the same time.  Instead of starting at the date ordered,
February 1st, he did not leave Memphis till the 11th, waiting for
Warings brigade that was ice-bound near Columbus, Kentucky; and
then, when he did start, he allowed General Forrest to head him off
and to defeat him with an inferior force, near West Point, below
Okalona, on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad.

We waited at Meridian till the 20th to hear from General Smith, but
hearing nothing whatever, and having utterly destroyed the
railroads in and around that junction, I ordered General McPherson
to move back slowly toward Canton.  With Winslow's cavalry, and
Hurlbut's infantry, I turned north to Marion, and thence to a place
called "Union," whence I dispatched the cavalry farther north to
Philadelphia and Louisville, to feel as it were for General Smith,
and then turned all the infantry columns toward Canton,
Mississippi.  On the 26th we all reached Canton, but we had not
heard a word of General Smith, nor was it until some time after (at
Vicksburg) that I learned the whole truth of General Smith's
movement and of his failure.  Of course I did not and could not
approve of his conduct, and I know that he yet chafes under the
censure.  I had set so much store on his part of the project that I
was disappointed, and so reported officially to General Grant.
General Smith never regained my confidence as a soldier, though I
still regard him as a most accomplished gentleman and a skillful
engineer.  Since the close of the war he has appealed to me to
relieve him of that censure, but I could not do it, because it
would falsify history.

Having assembled all my troops in and about Canton, on the 27th of
February I left them under the command of the senior major-general,
Hurlbut, with orders to remain till about the 3d of March, and then
to come into Vicksburg leisurely; and, escorted by Winslow's
cavalry, I rode into Vicksburg on the last day of February.  There
I found letters from General Grant, at Nashville, and General
Banks, at New Orleans, concerning his (General Banks's) projected
movement up Red River.  I was authorized by the former to
contribute aid to General Banks for a limited time; but General
Grant insisted on my returning in person to my own command about
Huntsville, Alabama, as soon as possible, to prepare for the spring
campaign.

About this time we were much embarrassed by a general order of the
War Department, promising a thirty-days furlough to all soldiers
who would  "veteranize"--viz., reenlist for the rest of the war.
This was a judicious and wise measure, because it doubtless secured
the services of a very large portion of the men who had almost
completed a three-years enlistment, and were therefore veteran
soldiers in feeling and in habit.  But to furlough so many of our
men at that instant of time was like disbanding an army in the very
midst of battle.

In order to come to a perfect understanding with General Banks, I
took the steamer Diana and ran down to New Orleans to see him.
Among the many letters which I found in Vicksburg on my return from
Meridian was one from Captain D. F. Boyd, of Louisiana, written
from the jail in Natchez, telling me that he was a prisoner of war
in our hands; had been captured in Louisiana by some of our scouts;
and he bespoke my friendly assistance.  Boyd was Professor of
Ancient Languages at the Louisiana Seminary of Learning during my
administration, in 1859-'60; was an accomplished scholar, of
moderate views in politics, but, being a Virginian, was drawn, like
all others of his kind, into the vortex of the rebellion by the
events of 1861, which broke up colleges and every thing at the
South.  Natchez, at this time, was in my command, and was held by a
strong division, commanded by Brigadier-General J. W. Davidson.  In
the Diana we stopped at Natchez, and I made a hasty inspection of
the place.  I sent for Boyd, who was in good health, but quite
dirty, and begged me to take him out of prison, and to effect his
exchange.  I receipted for him; took him along with me to New
Orleans; offered him money, which he declined; allowed him to go
free in the city; and obtained from General Banks a promise to
effect his exchange, which was afterward done.  Boyd is now my
legitimate successor in Louisiana, viz., President of the Louisiana
University, which is the present title of what had been the
Seminary of Learning.  After the war was over, Boyd went back to
Alexandria, reorganized the old institution, which I visited in
1866 but the building was burnt down by an accident or by an
incendiary about 1868, and the institution was then removed to
Baton Rouge, where it now is, under its new title of the University
of Louisiana.

We reached New Orleans on the 2d of March.  I found General Banks,
with his wife and daughter, living in a good house, and he
explained to me fully the position and strength of his troops, and
his plans of action for the approaching campaign.  I dined with
him, and, rough as I was--just out of the woods--attended, that
night, a very pleasant party at the house of a lady, whose name I
cannot recall, but who is now the wife of Captain Arnold, Fifth
United States Artillery.  At this party were also Mr. and Mrs.
Frank Howe.  I found New Orleans much changed since I had been
familiar with it in 1853 and in 1860-'61.  It was full of officers
and soldiers.  Among the former were General T. W. Sherman, who had
lost a leg at Port Hudson, and General Charles P: Stone, whom I
knew so well in California, and who is now in the Egyptian service
as chief of staff.  The bulk of General Banks's army was about
Opelousas, under command of General Franklin, ready to move on
Alexandria.  General Banks seemed to be all ready, but intended to
delay his departure a few days to assist in the inauguration of a
civil government for Louisiana, under Governor Hahn.  In Lafayette
Square I saw the arrangements of scaffolding for the fireworks and
benches for the audience.  General Banks urged me to remain over
the 4th of March, to participate in the ceremonies, which he
explained would include the performance of the "Anvil Chorus" by
all the bands of his army, and during the performance the
church-bells were to be rung, and cannons were to be fired by
electricity.  I regarded all such ceremonies as out of place at a
time when it seemed to me every hour and every minute were due to
the war.  General Banks's movement, however, contemplated my
sending a force of ten thousand men in boats up Red River from
Vicksburg, and that a junction should occur at Alexandria by March
17th.  I therefore had no time to wait for the grand pageant of the
4th of March, but took my departure from New Orleans in the Diana
the evening of March 3d.

On the next day, March 4th, I wrote to General Banks a letter,
which was extremely minute in conveying to him how far I felt
authorized to go under my orders from General Grant.  At that time
General Grant commanded the Military Division of the Mississippi,
embracing my own Department of the  Tennessee and that of General
Steele in Arkansas, but not that of General Banks in Louisiana.
General Banks was acting on his own powers, or under the
instructions of General Halleck in Washington, and our assistance
to him was designed as a loan of ten thousand men for a period of
thirty days.  The instructions of March 6th to General A. J. Smith,
who commanded this detachment, were full and explicit on this
point.  The Diana reached Vicksburg on the 6th, where I found that
the expeditionary army had come in from Canton.  One division of
five thousand men was made up out of Hurlbut's command, and placed
under Brigadier-General T. Kilby Smith; and a similar division was
made out of McPherson's and Hurlbut's troops, and placed under
Brigadier-General Joseph A. Mower; the whole commanded by
Brigadier-General A. J. Smith.  General Hurlbut, with the rest of
his command, returned to Memphis, and General McPherson remained at
Vicksburg.  General A. J. Smith's command was in due season
embarked, and proceeded to Red River, which it ascended, convoyed
by Admiral Porter's fleet.  General Mower's division was landed
near the outlet of the Atchafalaya, marched up by land and captured
the fort below Alexandria known as Fort De Russy, and the whole
fleet then proceeded up to Alexandria, reaching it on the day
appointed, viz., March 17th, where it waited for the arrival of
General Banks, who, however, did not come till some days after.
These two divisions participated in the whole of General Banks's
unfortunate Red River expedition, and were delayed so long up Red
River, and subsequently on the Mississippi, that they did not share
with their comrades the successes and glories of the Atlanta
campaign, for which I had designed them; and, indeed, they, did not
join our army till just in time to assist General George H. Thomas
to defeat General Hood before Nashville, on the 15th and 16th of
December, 1864.

General Grant's letter of instructions, which was brought me by
General Butterfield, who had followed me to New Orleans, enjoined
on me, after concluding with General Banks the details for his Red
River expedition, to make all necessary arrangements for
furloughing the men entitled to that privilege, and to hurry back
to the army at Huntsville, Alabama.  I accordingly gave the
necessary orders to General McPherson, at Vicksburg, and continued
up the river toward Memphis.  On our way we met Captain Badeau, of
General Grant's staff, bearing the following letter, of March 4th,
which I answered on the 10th, and sent the answer by General
Butterfield, who had accompanied me up from New Orleans.  Copies of
both were also sent to General McPherson, at Vicksburg:

[Private.]

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, March 4, 1864

DEAR SHERMAN: The bill reviving the grade of lieutenant-general in
the army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the Senate
for the place.

I now receive orders to report at Washington immediately, in
person, which indicates either a confirmation or a likelihood of
confirmation.  I start in the morning to comply with the order, but
I shall say very distinctly on my arrival there that I shall accept
no appointment which will require me to make that city my
headquarters.  This, however, is not what I started out to write
about.

While I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least
gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how
much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the
harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it
has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions
under me.

There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a
greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers;
but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as
the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I
have had of success.  How far your advice and suggestions have been
of assistance, you know.  How far your execution of whatever has
been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you
cannot know as well as I do.  I feel all the gratitude this letter
would express, giving it the most flattering construction.

The word you I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also.
I should write to him, and will some day, but, starting in the
morning, I do not know that I will find time just now.  Your
friend,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.



[PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL]

NEAR MEMPHIS, March 10, 1864

General GRANT.

DEAR GENERAL: I have your more than kind and characteristic letter
of the 4th, and will send a copy of it to General McPherson at
once.

You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to us
so large a share of the merits which have led to your high
advancement.  I know you approve the friendship I have ever
professed to you, and will permit me to continue as heretofore to
manifest it on all proper occasions.

You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a
position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue as
heretofore to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending, you
will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and the
homage of millions of human beings who will award to you a large
share for securing to them and their descendants a government of
law and stability.

I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor.  At
Belmont you manifested your traits, neither of us being near; at
Donelson also you illustrated your whole character.  I was not
near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to
influence you.

Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the
terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at
every point; but that victory admitted the ray of light which I
have followed ever since.

I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just, as the great
prototype Washington; as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest, as a
man should be; but the chief characteristic in your nature is the
simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I can
liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in his
Saviour.

This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg.  Also, when
you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle
without hesitation, as at Chattanooga--no doubts, no reserve; and I
tell you that it was this that made us act with confidence.  I knew
wherever I was that you thought of me, and if I got in a tight
place you would come--if alive.

My only points of doubt were as to your knowledge of grand
strategy, and of books of science and history; but I confess your
common-sense seems to have supplied all this.

Now as to the future.  Do not stay in Washington.  Halleck is
better qualified than you are to stand the buffets of intrigue and
policy.  Come out West; take to yourself the whole Mississippi
Valley; let us make it dead-sure, and I tell you the Atlantic slope
and Pacific shores will follow its destiny as sure as the limbs of
a tree live or die with the main trunk!  We have done much; still
much remains to be done.  Time and time's influences are all with
us; we could almost afford to sit still and let these influences
work.  Even in the seceded States your word now would go further
than a President's proclamation, or an act of Congress.

For God's sake and for your country's sake, come out of Washington!
I foretold to General Halleck, before he left Corinth, the
inevitable result to him, and I now exhort you to come out West.
Here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the West, when
our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and
Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic.  Your sincere
friend,

W. T. SHERMAN


We reached Memphis on the 13th, where I remained some days, but on
the 14th of March received from General Grant a dispatch to hurry
to Nashville in person by the 17th, if possible.  Disposing of all
matters then pending, I took a steamboat to Cairo, the cars thence
to Louisville and Nashville, reaching that place on the 17th of
March, 1864.

I found General Grant there.  He had been to Washington and back,
and was ordered to return East to command all the armies of the
United States, and personally the Army of the Potomac.  I was to
succeed him in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi,
embracing the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, Tennessee, and
Arkansas.  General Grant was of course very busy in winding up all
matters of business, in transferring his command to me, and in
preparing for what was manifest would be the great and closing
campaign of our civil war.  Mrs. Grant and some of their children
were with him, and occupied a large house in Nashville, which was
used as an office, dwelling, and every thing combined.

On the 18th of March I had issued orders assuming command of the
Military Division of the Mississippi, and was seated in the office,
when the general came in and said they were about to present him a
sword, inviting me to come and see the ceremony.  I went back into
what was the dining-room of the house; on the table lay a rose-wood
box, containing a sword, sash, spurs, etc., and round about the
table were grouped Mrs. Grant, Nelly, and one or two of the boys.
I was introduced to a large, corpulent gentleman, as the mayor, and
another citizen, who had come down from Galena to make this
presentation of a sword to their fellow-townsman.  I think that
Rawlins, Bowers, Badeau, and one or more of General Grant's
personal staff, were present.  The mayor rose and in the most
dignified way read a finished speech to General Grant, who stood,
as usual, very awkwardly; and the mayor closed his speech by
handing him the resolutions of the City Council engrossed on
parchment, with a broad ribbon and large seal attached.  After the
mayor had fulfilled his office so well, General Grant said: "Mr.
Mayor, as I knew that this ceremony was to occur, and as I am not
used to speaking, I have written something in reply."  He then
began to fumble in his pockets, first his breast-coat pocket, then
his pants, vest; etc., and after considerable delay he pulled out a
crumpled piece of common yellow cartridge-paper, which he handed to
the mayor.  His whole manner was awkward in the extreme, yet
perfectly characteristic, and in strong contrast with the elegant
parchment and speech of the mayor.  When read, however, the
substance of his answer was most excellent, short, concise, and, if
it had been delivered by word of mouth, would have been all that
the occasion required.

I could not help laughing at a scene so characteristic of the man
who then stood prominent before the country; and to whom all had
turned as the only one qualified to guide the nation in a war that
had become painfully critical.  With copies of the few letters
referred to, and which seem necessary to illustrate the
subject-matter, I close this chapter:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
STEAMER DIANA (UNDER WEIGH), March 4, 1864

Major-General N. P. BANKS, commanding Department of the Gulf, New
Orleans.

GENERAL: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 2d instant
yesterday at New Orleans, but was unable to answer, except
verbally, and I now reduce it to writing.

I will arrive at Vicksburg the 6th instant, and I expect to meet
there my command from Canton, out of which I will select two
divisions of about ten thousand men, embark them under a good
commander, and order him:

1st. To rendezvous at the mouth of Red River, and, in concert with
Admiral Porter (if he agree), to strike Harrisonburg a hard blow.

2d.  To return to Red River and ascend it, aiming to reach
Alexandria on the 17th of March, to report to you.

3d.  That, as this command is designed to operate by water, it will
not be encumbered with much land transportation, say two wagons to
a regiment, but with an ample supply of stores, including mortars
and heavy rifled guns, to be used against fortified places.

4th.  That I have calculated, and so reported to General Grant,
that this detachment of his forces in no event is to go beyond
Shreveport, and that you will spare them the moment you can, trying
to get them back to the Mississippi River in thirty days from the
time they actually enter Red River.

The year is wearing away fast, and I would like to carry to General
Grant at Huntsville, Alabama, every man of his military division,
as early in April as possible, for I am sure we ought to move from
the base of the Tennessee River to the south before the season is
too far advanced, say as early as April 15th next.

I feel certain of your complete success, provided you make the
concentration in time, to assure which I will see in person to the
embarkation and dispatch of my quota, and I will write to General
Steele, conveying to him my personal and professional opinion that
the present opportunity is the most perfect one that will ever
offer itself to him to clean out his enemies in Arkansas.

Wishing you all honor and success, I am, with respect, your friend
and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
VICKSBURG, March 6, 1864

Brigadier-General A. J. SMITH, commanding Expedition up Red River,
Vicksburg, Mississippi.

GENERAL: By an order this day issued, you are to command a strong,
well-appointed detachment of the Army of the Tennessee, sent to
reinforce a movement up Red River, but more especially against the
fortified position at Shreveport.

You will embark your command as soon as possible, little encumbered
with wagons or wheeled vehicles, but well supplied with fuel,
provisions, and ammunition.  Take with you the twelve mortars,
with their ammunition, and all the thirty-pound Parrotts the
ordnance-officer will supply.  Proceed to the mouth of Red River
and confer with Admiral Porter.  Consult with him, and in all the
expedition rely on him implicitly, as he is the approved friend of
the Army of the Tennessee, and has been associated with us from the
beginning. I have undertaken with General Banks that you will be at
Alexandria, Louisiana, on or before the 17th day of March; and you
will, if time allows, cooperate with the navy in destroying
Harrisonburg, up Black River; but as I passed Red River yesterday I
saw Admiral Porter, and he told me he had already sent an expedition
to Harrisonburg, so that I suppose that part of the plan will be
accomplished before you reach Red River; but, in any event, be
careful to reach Alexandria about the 17th of March.

General Banks will start by land from Franklin, in the Teche
country, either the 6th or 7th, and will march via Opelousas to
Alexandria.  You will meet him there, report to him, and act under
his orders.  My understanding with him is that his forces will move
by land, via Natchitoches, to Shreveport, while the gunboat-fleet
is to ascend the river with your transports in company.  Red River
is very low for the season, and I doubt if any of the boats can
pass the falls or rapids at Alexandria.  What General Banks
proposes to do in that event I do not know; but my own judgment is
that Shreveport ought not to be attacked until the gunboats can
reach it.  Not that a force marching by land cannot do it alone,
but it would be bad economy in war to invest the place with an army
so far from heavy guns, mortars, ammunition, and provisions, which
can alone reach Shreveport by water.  Still, I do not know about
General Banks's plans in that event; and whatever they may be, your
duty will be to conform, in the most hearty manner.

My understanding with General Banks is that he will not need the
cooperation of your force beyond thirty days from the date you
reach Red River.  As soon as he has taken Shreveport, or as soon as
he can spare you, return to Vicksburg with all dispatch, gather up
your detachments, wagons, tents, transportation, and all property
pertaining to so much of the command as belongs to the Sixteenth
Army Corps, and conduct it to Memphis, where orders will await you.
My present belief is your division, entire, will be needed with the
Army of the Tennessee, about Huntsville or Bridgeport.  Still, I
will leave orders with General, Hurlbut, at Memphis, for you on
your return.

I believe if water will enable the gunboats to cross the rapids at
Alexandria, you will be able to make a quick, strong, and effective
blow at our enemy in the West, thus widening the belt of our
territory, and making the breach between the Confederate Government
and its outlying trans-Mississippi Department more perfect.

It is understood that General Steele makes a simultaneous move from
Little Rock, on Shreveport or Natchitoches, with a force of about
ten thousand men.  Banks will have seventeen thousand, and you ten
thousand.  If these can act concentrically and simultaneously, you
will make short work of it, and then General Banks will have enough
force to hold as much of the Red River country as he deems wise,
leaving you to bring to General Grant's main army the seven
thousand five hundred men of the Sixteenth Corps now with you.
Having faith in your sound judgment and experience, I confide this
important and delicate command to you, with certainty that you will
harmonize perfectly with Admiral Porter and General Banks, with
whom you are to act, and thereby insure success.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
MEMPHIS, March 14, 1864

Major General McPHERSON, commanding, etc, Vicksburg, Mississippi

DEAR GENERAL: I wrote you at length on the 11th, by a special
bearer of dispatches, and now make special orders to cover the
movements therein indicated.  It was my purpose to await your
answer, but I am summoned by General Grant to be in Nashville on
the 17th, and it will keep me moving night and day to get there by
that date.  I must rely on you, for you understand that we must
reenforce the great army at the centre (Chattanooga) as much as
possible, at the same time not risking the safety of any point on
the Mississippi which is fortified and armed with heavy guns.  I
want you to push matters as rapidly as possible, and to do all you
can to put two handsome divisions of your own corps at Cairo, ready
to embark up the Tennessee River by the 20th or 30th of April at
the very furthest.  I wish it could be done quicker; but the
promise of those thirty-days furloughs in the States of enlistment,
though politic, is very unmilitary.  It deprives us of our ability
to calculate as to time; but do the best you can.  Hurlbut can do
nothing till A. J. Smith returns from Red River.  I will then order
him to occupy Grenada temporarily, and to try and get those
locomotives that we need here.  I may also order him with cavalry
and infantry to march toward Tuscaloosa, at the same time that we
move from the Tennessee River about Chattanooga.

I don't know as yet the grand strategy of the next campaign, but on
arrival at Nashville I will soon catch the main points, and will
advise you of them..

Steal a furlough and run to Baltimore incog.; but get back in time
to take part in the next grand move.

Write me fully and frequently of your progress.  I have ordered the
quartermaster to send down as many boats as he can get, to
facilitate your movements.  Mules, wagons, etc., can come up
afterward by transient boats.  I am truly your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.




[Special Field Order No. 28.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
MEMPHIS, March 14, 1864

1.  Major-General McPherson will organize two good divisions of his
corps (Seventeenth) of about five thousand men, each embracing in
part the reenlisted veterans of his corps whose furloughs will
expire in April, which he will command in person, and will
rendezvous at Cairo, Illinois, and report by telegraph and letter
to the general commanding at department headquarters, wherever they
may be.  These divisions will be provided with new arms and
accoutrements, and land transportation (wagons and mules) out of
the supplies now at Vicksburg, which will be conveyed to Cairo by
or before April 15th.

4.  During the absence of General McPherson from the district of
Vicksburg, Major-General Hurlbut will exercise command over all the
troops in the Department of the Tennessee from Cairo to Natchez,
inclusive, and will receive special instructions from department
headquarters.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.






APPENDIX TO VOLUME I.

CHICKASAW BAYOU.

Report of Brigadier-General G. W. Morgan.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, RIGHT WING, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
STEAMER EMPRESS,
January 8, 1868.

Major J. H. HAMMOND, Chief of Staff:

SIR: On the 1st instant, while pressed by many arduous duties, I
was requested to report to the commanding general the operations of
my division during the affair of the 27th, the action of the 28th,
and the battle of the 29th ult.

I had not received the report of subordinate commanders, nor had I
time to review the report I have the honor to submit.

Herewith I have the honor to forward these reports, connected with
which I will submit a few remarks.

Brigadier-General Blair speaks of having discovered, while on his
retreat from the enemy's works, a broad and easy road running from
the left of my position to the enemy's lines.  The road is neither
broad nor easy, and was advanced over by De Courcey when leading
his brigade to the charge.  The road General Blair speaks of is the
one running from Lake's Landing and intersecting with the Vicksburg
road on the Chickasaw Bluffs.  Its existence was known to me on the
28th ult., but it was left open intentionally by the enemy, and was
commanded by a direct and cross fire from batteries and rifle-pits.
The withdrawal of his brigade from the assault by Colonel De
Courcey was justified by the failure of the corps of A. J. Smith,
and the command of Colonel Lindsey, to advance simultaneously to
the assault.  Both had the same difficulties to encounter
--impassable bayous.  The enemy's line of battle was concave, and
De Courcey advanced against his centre--hence he sustained a
concentric fire, and the withdrawal of Steele from the front of the
enemy's right on the 28th ult. enabled the enemy on the following
day to concentrate his right upon his centre.

I regret to find, from the report of Brigadier-General Thayer, some
one regiment skulked; this I did not observe, nor is it mentioned
by General Blair, though his were the troops which occupied that
portion of the field.  As far as my observation extended, the
troops bore themselves nobly; but the Sixteenth Ohio Infantry was
peerless on the field, as it had ever been in camp or on the march.
Lieutenant-Colonel Kershner, commanding, was wounded and taken
prisoner.  He is an officer of rare merit, and deserves to command
a brigade.  Lieutenant-Colonel Dieter, commanding the Fifty-eighth
Ohio, was killed within the enemy's works; and Lieutenant-Colonel
Monroe, Twenty-second Kentucky, was struck down at the head of his
regiment.

I again express my profound acknowledgments to Brigadier-Generals
Blair and Thayer, and Colonels De Conrcey, Lindsey, and Sheldon,
brigade commanders.  Also to Major M. C. Garber, assistant
quartermaster; Captain S. S. Lyon, acting topographical engineer;
Lieutenant Burdick, acting ordnance officer; Lieutenant Hutchins,
acting chief of staff; Lieutenants H. G. Fisher and Smith, of
Signal Corps; Lieutenant E. D. Saunders, my acting assistant
adjutant-general; and Lieutenants English and Montgomery, acting
aides-de-camp, for the efficient services rendered me.

Nor can I close this report without speaking in terms of high
praise of the meritorious and gallant services of Captains Foster
and Lamphier.  Their batteries silenced several of the enemy's
works, and throughout the operations rendered good service.  My
sincere acknowledgments are also due to Captain Griffith,
commanding First Iowa Battery, and Captain Hoffman, commanding
Fourth Ohio Battery.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE W. MORGAN, Brigadier-General Volunteers.




CINCINNATI, February 8, 1876.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Regarding the attack at Chickasaw Bayou, my record
shows the position of Steele on the left; Morgan to his right;
Morgan L. Smith to his right, and A. J. Smith on the extreme right;
the latter not expected to accomplish much more than a diversion,
the result to come from the three other divisions, Morgan having
the best opportunity.  Saturday night they were in position; you
were at Lake's plantation, right and rear of Morgan.

The attack for lodgment on the hills was ordered for Sunday
morning, December 28th.  I was sent to A. J. Smith before daylight,
and returned to you soon after.  You were with Morgan.  You had
fully explained to him the importance of his success, and that he
should be present with the attacking column, which was to be a part
of his division, supported by the remainder, and by Blair's brigade
of Steele's division cooperating.  The attack was to be
simultaneous, by the four divisions, on a signal.

Morgan's answer to you was that, when the signal was given, he
would lead his attack, and with his life he would be on the bluffs
in fifteen minutes. He seemed of positive knowledge, and as sure of
success.  You then retired to a central point, to be in easy
communication with Steele and Morgan L. Smith.  The attack was
made, and developed, in the case of Steele, M. L. Smith, and A. J.
Smith, that to cross the bayou was impossible, if opposed by any
force, and in each they were by a strong one.  Morgan's attacking
force succeeded in getting across the causeway and marsh, but he
did not go with it, nor support it with more men, and a large
number were captured from Blair's brigade after gaining the enemy's
last line of works covering the bayou.  At the time everybody
blamed and criticised Morgan with the failure.  You felt from the
advance of his attack it must be successful, and, as it pushed
forward, you sent me to urge on M. L. Smith, as Morgan was over,
and he, Smith, must aid by persistent attack, and give Morgan as
good a chance as could be to make his lodgment....

I am, etc.,    L. M. DAYTON
Late Colonel of the Staff, now of Cincinnati, Ohio
General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri




[COPY.]

" .  .  .  .  The expedition was wonderfully well provided with
provisions, transportation, and munitions, and even axes, picks,
and shovels, so much in use later in the war, evidenced the
forethought that governed this force.  The boats, from their open
lower deck construction, proved admirable for transports, but their
tinder-box construction made fire-traps of them, requiring
unremitting vigilance.  These points were well understood, and the
readiness with which the troops adapted themselves to circumstances
was a constant source of wonder and congratulations.

"The fleet collected at Friar's Point for final orders, and there
the order of sailing was laid down with great minuteness, and
private instructions issued to commanders of divisions, all of whom
had personal interviews with the commanding general, and received
personal explanations on pretty much every point involved.  Our
headquarters boat, the Forest Queen, was not very comfortable, nor
well provided, but General Sherman submitted cheerfully, on the
grounds of duty, and thought Conway a fine fellow.  I was only able
to concede that he was a good steamboat captain....

"Our camp appointments were Spartan in the extreme, and in their
simplicity would have met the demands of any demagogue in the land.
The nights were cold and damp, and General Sherman uncomfortably
active in his preparations, so that the assistant adjutant-general
had no very luxurious  post just then.  We were surrounded with
sloughs.  The ground was wet, and the water, although in winter,
was very unwholesome.  Many of our men, to this day, have reminders
of the Yazoo in ague, fevers, and diseases of the bowels.  Cavalry
was useless.  One battalion of Illinois cavalry was strongly
suspected of camping in the timber, until time passed enough to
justify the suspicion of having been somewhere.  Really the
strength of Vicksburg was in being out of reach of attack....

"My orders were to learn and report what was going on on the right,
particularly to try and form an idea of the enemy's force in front
of M. L. Smith's division, and at the sand-bar.  Leaving my horse
close in the rear of the Sixth Missouri, when the fire became too
heavy for riding, I succeeded, by taking frequent cover, in
reaching unhurt the verge of the bayou among the drift-logs.
There, by concert of action with Lieutenant-Colonel Blood, of the
Sixth Missouri, his regiment, and the Thirteenth Regular Infantry,
kept up a heavy fire on everything that showed along the levee and
earthworks in front.  The enemy were behind the embankment, not
over one hundred and fifty yards across the bayou.  Several
officers, including Colonel Blood, Colonel Kilby Smith, and myself,
managed, by getting on the piles of drift, to see over the levee
through the cleared fields beyond, even to the foot of the bluff.
The chips and twigs flew around lively enough, but we staid up long
enough to make sure that the enemy had as many men behind the levee
as could get cover.  We saw, also, a line of rifle-pits in the
rear, commanding the rear of the levee, and still beyond, winding
along the foot of the bluff, a road worn by long use deep into the
side-hill, and with the side next us strengthened with a good
earthwork, affording a covered line of communication in the rear.
The fire of our men was so well maintained that we were able to see
all these things, say a minute or more.  Some of those who ventured
were wounded, but those mentioned and myself escaped unhurt.  I
advised that men enough to hold the position, once across--say
three hundred--should make a rush (protected as our lookout had
been by a heavy fire) across the sand-bar, and get a footing under
the other bank of the bayou, as the nucleus of an attacking force,
if General Sherman decided to attack there, or to make a strong
diversion if the attack was made at the head of Chickasaw Bayou, in
front of Morgan.  General A. J. Smith, commanding First and Second
Divisions, approved of this.  While returning to General Sherman, I
passed along the Second and part of the Third Division.  On the
left of the Second I found a new Illinois regiment, high up in
numbers, working its way into position.  The colonel, a brave but
inexperienced officer, was trying to lead his men according to the
popular pictorial idea, viz., riding in advance waving his sword.
I was leading my horse, and taking advantage of such cover as I
could find on my course, but this man acted so bravely that I tried
to save him.  He did not accept my expostulations with very good
grace, but was not rough about it.  While I was begging him to
dismount, he waved his sword and advanced.  In a second he was
shot, through the chest, and dropped from his horse, plucky to the
last. He died, I was told, within the hour.  Many of the regiments
were new and inexperienced, but as a rule behaved well.  The fire
along the bayou was severe, but not very fatal, on account of the
cover.  I was constantly asked what news from Grant, for from the
moment of our arrival in the Yazoo we were in expectation of either
hearing his guns in the rear, or of having communication with him.
This encouraged the men greatly, but the long waiting was
disappointing, as the enemy was evidently in large force in the
plenty of works, and a very strong position.  Careful estimates and
available information placed their force at fifteen to twenty
thousand men.  I returned to headquarters about the middle of the
afternoon, and made my report to the general.  We were busy till
after midnight, and again early in the morning of the 29th, in
preparing orders for the attack.  These were unusually minute in
detail.  It seemed as though no contingency was left unprovided
for.  Urgent orders and cautions as to rations and ammunition were
given.  Drawings of the line of attack, orders for supports, all
and everything was foreseen and given in writing, with personal
explanations to commanders of divisions, brigades, and even
commanders of regiments.  Indeed, the commanding general, always
careful as to detail, left nothing to chance, and with experienced
and ordinate officers we would have succeeded, for the troops were
good.  The general plan involved a feint on our left toward
Haines's Bluff, by the navy, under Admiral Porter, with whom we
were in constant communication, while between him and General
Sherman perfect harmony existed.  On the right a demonstration by
A. J. Smith was to be made.  The Second Division (Stuart's) was to
cross the sand-bar, and the Third (General Morgan's) was to cross
on a small bridge over the dough at the head of Chickasaw Bayou,
and, supported by Steele, was to push straight for the Bluff at the
nearest spur where there was a battery in position, and to effect
a lodgment there and in the earthworks.  General Sherman gave his
orders in person to Morgan and Steele.  I understood Morgan to
promise that he would lead his division in person, and he seemed to
expect an easy victory, and expressed himself freely to that
effect.  The aides were sent out, until I was left alone with the
general and a couple of orderlies.  He located himself in a
position easy of access, and the most convenient afforded to the
point of attack.  He directed me to see what I could, and report if
I met anything that he should know.  I galloped as fast as possible
to the right, and found part of the Sixth Missouri pushing over the
sand-bar covered by the Thirteenth Regulars with a heavy fire.  We
supposed, if once across, they could get up the bank and turn the
levee against the enemy, and left with that impression.  Being in
heavy timber, I was not quite sure of my way back to the general,
his location being new, and therefore pushed full gallop for
Morgan's front, catching a good many stray shots from the
sharpshooters behind the levee, as I was compelled to keep in sight
of the bayou to hold direction.  Something over half-way along
Morgan's division front, the commander of a Kentucky regiment
hailed me and said he must have support, as he was threatened by a
masked battery, and the enemy was in force in his front, and might
cross any moment.  I answered, rather shortly, 'How the devil do
you know there is a masked battery?  If you can't get over, how can
the rebels get at you?'  He insisted on the battery, and danger.  I
finally told him the bayou was utterly impassable there, but, if he
insisted the enemy could cross, I would insist on an advance on our
side at that point.  Hurrying on to make up lost time, I soon
reached Morgan.  He was making encouraging speeches in a general
way, but stopped to ask me questions as to Steele's rank, date of
commission, etc.  I was very much disturbed at this, fearing want
of harmony, and rode on to Steele, whom I found cursing Morgan so
fiercely that I could not exactly make out the source of the
trouble, or reason why; but saw want of concert clearly enough.  I
hastened back to General Sherman, and endeavored to impress my
ideas on him and my fears; but, while he admitted the facts, he
could not be made to believe that any jealousy or personal quarrel
could lead to a failure to support each other, and a neglect of
duty.  The signal for attack had already been given, and the
artillery had opened, when I left him again for Morgan's front.  I
found Morgan where I left him, and the troops advancing.  I had
understood that he was to lead his division, and asked about it,
but, getting no satisfaction, pushed for the front, crossing the
slough at the little bridge at the head of the bayou.  I found the
willows cut off eighteen inches or two feet long, with sharp points
above the mud, making it slow and difficult to pass, save at the
bridge.  I overtook the rear of the advance about two or three
hundred feet up the gentle slope, and was astonished to find how
small a force was making the attack.  I was also surprised to find
that they were Steele's men instead of Morgan's.  I also saw
several regiments across the bayou, but not advancing; they were
near the levee.  A heavy artillery and infantry fire was going on
all this time.  While making my way along the column, from which
there were very few falling back, a shell burst near me, and the
concussion confused me at the time and left me with a headache for
several months.  When I got my wits about me again I found a good
many coming back, but the main part of the force was compact and
keeping up the fight.  I did not get closer to the woods than about
five hundred feet, and found that a large number had penetrated
into the enemy's works.  When our men fell back, very few ran, but
came slowly and sullenly, far more angry than frightened.  I found
General Frank Blair on foot, and with him Colonel Sea, of Southwest
Missouri, and learned that Colonel Thomas Fletcher, afterward
Governor of Missouri, was captured with many of his men.  They both
insisted there on the spot, with those around us, that if all the
men ordered up had gone up, or even all that crossed the bayou had
moved forward, we could have readily established ourselves in the
enemy's works.  I was firmly of the same opinion at the time on the
ground; and, an entrance effected, we could have brought the whole
force on dry ground, and had a base of operations against
Vicksburg--though probably, in view of later events, we would have
had to stand a siege from Pemberton's army.  After explanations
with Blair, I rode to where the men were, who had crossed the
bayou, but had not advanced with the others.  I found them to be De
Courcey's brigade; of Morgan's division, which General Sherman
supposed to be in advance.  In fact, it was the intended support
that made the attack.  A correspondence and controversy followed
between General Blair and Colonel De Courcey, most of which I have,
but nothing came of it.  On reaching the bayou, I found that
Thayer's brigade, of Steele's division, had in some way lost its
direction and filed off to the right.  Remembering the masked
battery, I suspected that had something to do with the matter, and,
on following it up, I learned that the Kentucky colonel before
mentioned had appealed for aid against the masked battery and
invisible force of rebels, and that a regiment had been ordered to
him.  This regiment, filing off into the timber, had been followed
by Thayer's brigade, supposing it to be advancing to the front, and
thus left a single brigade to attack a superior force of the enemy
in an intrenched and naturally strong position.  By the time the
mistake could be rectified, it was too late.  Our loss was from one
hundred and fifty to two hundred killed, and about eleven hundred
prisoners and wounded.  During the afternoon I went with a flag of
truce, with reference to burying the dead.  I saw between eighty
and one hundred of our men dead, all stripped.  There were others
closer into the enemy's works than I was allowed to go.  On going
later to where the Sixth Missouri crossed, I found that they were
under the bank, and had dug in with their hands and bayonets, or
anything in reach, to protect themselves from a vertical fire from
the enemy overhead, who had a heavy force there.  With great
difficulty they were withdrawn at night.  Next day arrangements
were made to attempt a lodgment below Haines's Bluff: This was to
be done by Steele's command, while the rest of the force attacked
again where we had already tried.  During the day locomotives
whistled, and a great noise and fuss went on in our front, and we
supposed that Grant was driving in Pemberton, and expected firing
any moment up the Yazoo or in the rear of Vicksburg.  Not hearing
this, we concluded that Pemberton was throwing his forces into
Vicksburg.  A heavy fog prevented Steele from making his movement.
Rain began to fall, and our location was not good to be in after a
heavy rain, or with the river rising.  During the night (I think)
of January, 1, 1863, our troops were embarked, material and
provisions having been loaded during the day.  A short time before
daylight of the 2d, I went by order of the general commanding, to
our picket lines and carefully examined the enemy's lines, wherever
a camp-fire indicated their presence.  They were not very vigilant,
and I once got close enough to hear them talk, but could understand
nothing.  Early in the morning I came in with the rear-guard, the
enemy advancing his pickets and main guards only, and making no
effort at all to press us.  Once I couldn't resist the temptation
to fire into a squad that came bolder than the rest, and the two
shots were good ones.  We received a volley in return that did come
very close among us, but hurt none of my party.  Very soon after
our rear-guard was aboard, General Sherman learned from Admiral
Porter that McClernand had arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo.  He
went, taking me and one other staff-officer, to see McClernand, and
found that, under an order from the President, he had taken command
of the Army of the Mississippi.  He and his staff, of whom I only
remember two-Colonels Scates and Braham, assistant adjutant-general
and aide-de-camp--seemed to think they had a big thing, and, so far
as I could judge, they had just that.  All hands thought the
country expected them to cut their way to the Gulf; and to us, who
had just come out of the swamp, the cutting didn't seem such an
easy job as to the new-comers.  Making due allowance for the
elevation they seemed to feel in view of their job, everything
passed off pleasantly, and we learned that General Grant's
communications had been cut at Holly Springs by the capture of
Murphy and his force (at Holly Springs), and that he was either in
Memphis by that time or would soon be.  So that, everything
considered, it was about as well that we did not get our forces on
the bluff's of Walnut Hill."

The above statement was sent to General Sherman in a letter dated
"Chicago, February 5,1876," and signed "John H. Hammond."  Hammond
was General Sherman's assistant adjutant-general at the Chickasaw
Bayou.

J. E. TOURTELOTTE, Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.



On 29th December, 1862, at Chickasaw Bayou, I was in command of the
Thirty-first Missouri Volunteer Infantry, First Brigade, First
Division, Fifteenth Army Corps (Blair's brigade).  Colonel Wyman,
of the Thirteenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, having been killed,
I was the senior colonel of the brigade.  General Blair rode up to
where my regiment lay, and said to me:

"We are to make a charge here; we will charge in two lines; your
regiment will be in the first line, and the Twenty-ninth
(Cavender's) will support you.  Form here in the timber, and move
out across the bayou on a double-quick, and go right on to the top
of the heights in your front."  He then told me to await a signal.
I then attempted to make a reconnaissance of the ground over which
we would have to charge, and rode out to the open ground in my
front, and saw that there was water and soft mud in the bayou, and
was fired upon by the sharp-shooters of the enemy, and turned and
went back into the woods where my command lay.  Soon after that
General Blair came near me, and I told him there was water and mud
in the bayou, and I doubted if we could get across.  He answered me
that General Morgan told him there was no water nor mud to hinder
us.  I remarked that I had seen it myself, and General Morgan, or
any one else, could see it if he would risk being shot at pretty
lively.  I then told General Blair that it was certain destruction
to us if we passed over the abatis upon the open ground where there
had once been a corn-field; that we could never reach the base of
the hill.  He turned to me and said, "Can't you take your regiment
up there?"  I told him, "Yes, I can take my regiment anywhere,
because the men do not know any better than to go," but remarked
that old soldiers could not be got to go up there.  General Blair
then said,  "Tom, if we succeed, this will be a grand thing; you
will have the glory of leading the assault."  He then went on to
say that General Morgan's division would support us, and they were
heroes of many battles, and pointed to the Fifty-eighth Ohio, then
forming in the rear of the Thirteenth Illinois on my right, and
said: "See these men? They are a part of Morgan's division, and are
heroes of many battles."  I laughingly said that they might be
heroes, but the regiment did not number as many as one of my
companies.  He again assured me we would be supported by Morgan's
division, and all I had to do was to keep right on and  "keep going
till you get into Vicksburg."  I took my position in advance of my
regiment and awaited the signal.  When we heard it, we raised a
shout, and started at a double-quick, the Thirteenth Illinois on my
right.  I saw no troops on my left.  When we emerged from the
woods, the enemy opened upon us; crossing the bayou under fire, and
many of the men sinking in the mud and water, our line was very
much disordered, but we pretty well restored it before reaching the
abatis.  Here we were greatly disordered, but somewhat restored the
line on reaching the plateau or corn-field.  The Twenty-ninth
Missouri came on, gallantly supporting us.  The Thirteenth Illinois
came out upon the corn-field, and the Fifty-eighth Ohio followed
close upon it.  There was firing to my left, and as I afterward
learned was from the Fourth Iowa of Thayer's brigade (and I believe
of Steele's division).  I was struck and fell, and my regiment went
back in great disorder.  The fire was terrific.  I saw beyond the
Thirteenth Illinois, to my right, a disordered line, and learned
afterward it was the Sixteenth Ohio.  When I was taken from the
field by the enemy and taken into Vicksburg, I found among the
wounded and prisoners men and officers of the Sixteenth and
Fifty-eighth Ohio, and of the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first
Missouri, and Thirteenth Illinois.  After I was exchanged and
joined my command, General Blair laughingly remarked to me that I
had literally obeyed his order and gone "straight on to Vicksburg."
He lamented the cutting to pieces of our force on that day.  We
talked the whole matter over at his headquarters during the siege
of Vicksburg.  He said that if the charge had been made along our
whole line with the same vigor of attack made by his brigade, and
if we had been supported as Morgan promised to do, we might have
succeeded.  I dissented from the opinion that we could even then
have succeeded.  I asked him what excuse Morgan gave for failing to
support us, and he said that Colonel or General De Courcey was in
some manner to blame for that, but he said Morgan was mistaken as
to the nature of the ground and generally as to the feasibility of
the whole thing, and was responsible for the failure to afford us
the support he had promised; that he and General Sherman and all of
them were misled by the statements and opinions of Morgan as to the
situation in our front, and Morgan was, on his part, deceived by
the reports of his scouts about other matters as well as the matter
of the water in the bayou.

THOMAS C. FLETCHER




ARKANSAS POST.

Extracts from Admiral Porter's Journal.

Sherman and I had made arrangements to capture Arkansas Post.

On the 31st of December, while preparing to go out of the Yazoo, an
army officer called to see me, and said that he belonged to General
McClernand's staff, and that the general was at the mouth of the
Yazoo River, and desired to see me at once.  I sent word to the
general that if he wished to see me he could have an opportunity by
calling on board my flag-ship.

A few moments after I had heard the news of McClernand'a arrival, I
saw Sherman pulling about in a boat, and hailed him, informing him
that McClernand was at the mouth of the Yazoo.  Sherman then came
on board, and, in consequence of this unexpected news, determined
to postpone the movement out of the Yazoo River, and let McClernand
take that upon himself.

General McClernand took my hint and came on board the flag-ship,
but I soon discovered that any admiral, Grant, Sherman, or all the
generals in the army, were nobody in his estimation.  Sherman had
been at McClernand's headquarters to see him and state the
condition of affairs, and he then suggested to the latter the plan
of going to Arkansas Post.

I had a number of fine maps hanging up in my cabin, and when
McClernand came on board he examined them all with the eye of a
connoisseur.  He then stated to me as a new thing the plan he
proposed!!! of going to Arkansas Post and stirring up our troops,
which had been "demoralized by the late defeat" (Sherman was
present, looking daggers at him).  I answered, "Yes, General
Sherman and myself have already arranged for going to Arkansas
Post."  Sherman then made some remark about the disposition of the
troops in the coming expedition, when McClernand gave him rather a
curt answer.  McClernand then remarked, "If you will let me have
three gunboats, I will go and take the place."  Now General
McClernand had about as much idea of what a gunboat was, or could
do, as the man in the moon.  He did not know, the difference
between an ironclad and a "tin-clad."  He had heard that gunboats
had taken Fort Henry, and that was all he knew about them.  I said
to him: "I'll tell you what I will do, General McClernand.  If
General Sherman goes in command of the troops, I will go myself in
command of a proper force, and will insure the capture of the
post."  McClernand winced under this, and Sherman quietly walked
off into the after-cabin.  He beckoned me to come there, while
McClernand was apparently deeply engaged in studying out a chart,
making believe he was interested, in order to conceal his temper.
Sherman said to me: "Admiral, how could you make such a remark to
McClernand?  He hates me already, and you have made him an enemy
for life."

"I don't care," said I; "he shall not treat you rudely in my cabin,
and I was glad of the opportunity of letting him know my
sentiments."  By this time, General McClernand having bottled up
his wrath, or cooled down, I went in to him and we discussed the
matter.  He consented that Sherman should go in command of the
troops, and the interview ended pleasantly enough.

The above extracts from Admiral Porter's journal were sent by the
admiral to General Sherman, inclosed in a letter dated "Washington,
May 29, 1875," and signed "David D. Porter."

J. E. TOURTELOTTE.




After leaving the Yazoo, the Army of the Mississippi rendezvous was
at Milliken's Bend.  During the night of January 4th or 5th,
General McClernand came on board the Forest Queen, and with General
Sherman went to the Black Hawk flag-boat.  There an interview took
place, during which the expedition to Arkansas Post took shape.
General Sherman having asked leave to take the post, and Admiral
Porter having decided to go along, McClernand thought best to go
with his entire army, although the enemy were supposed to have only
about four or five thousand men, and the fort was little more than
a large earthwork commanding the river.

General Sherman's command was then entitled the Second Corps, Army
of the Mississippi, and was comprised of the First Division,
Blair's, Hovey's, and Thayer's brigades, commanded by Steele; and
the Second Division, commanded by David Stuart, with Colonels Giles
A. and Kilby Smith commanding brigades.

Our fleet was convoyed by three ironclads and several other
gunboats.  The weather was bitterly cold for that latitude; we were
four days getting into the Arkansas River, which we entered by the
White River cut-off; and my recollection is, that our passing the
mouth of the main river deceived the enemy as to our destination.
The entrance through the cut-off was feasible by reason of high
water, and I think made our appearance a surprise to the force at
the post.  We disembarked on the morning of the 10th of January.
Stuart's division first encountered the enemy behind an earthwork
about four miles from the fort, running across the solid ground
from the river to a swamp.  General Sherman in person took Steele's
division, and followed a road leading to the rear of the earthwork
just mentioned.  We had got fairly under way when the rebels fell
back to the fort, and McClernand, coming up, ordered us to fall
back, and march up the river.  It seemed to me then, and afterward,
that it would have been better to have marched straight to the rear
of the fort, as we started to do.  We soon overtook Stuart and
closed in, General Sherman on the right, Morgan's force on the
left, reaching to the river, where the gunboats were, while Sherman
reached from the road which connected the post with the back
country, toward where the earthworks reached the river above the
fort, and threatened their communications with Little Rock.  The
night was cold and cloudy, with some snow.  There were a good many
abandoned huts to our rear, but our forces in position lay on the
frozen ground, sheltered as best they could, among the bushes and
timber.  We were so close that they could have reached us any time
during the night with light artillery.  The gun-boats threw heavy
shells into the fort and behind the earthworks all night, keeping
the enemy awake and anxious.  The heavy boom of the artillery was
followed by the squeak, squeak of Admiral Porter's little tug, as
he moved around making his arrangements for the morrow.  The sounds
were ridiculous by comparison.  General Sherman and staff lay on
the roots of an old oak-tree, that kept them partly clear of mud.
The cold was sharp, my right boot being frozen solid in a puddle in
the morning.  About half-past two or three o'clock, General
Sherman, with another and myself, crept in as close as possible and
reconnoitred the position.  The general managed to creep in much
closer than the rest of us--in fact, so close as to cause us
anxiety.  The enemy worked hard all night on their abatis and
intrenchments, and in the morning we found a ditch and parapet
running clear across the point on which the post was situated.
This point was cut by a road from the back country, across which
was a heavy earthwork and a battery.  This road was at the
extremity of our left.  General McClernand kept his head-quarters
on his boat, the Tigress.  He came up in the morning to a place in
the woods in our rear.  One of his staff, a cavalry-officer,
climbed a tree to report movements; but from that point there was
very little to be seen.  Between ten and eleven o'clock the fire
opened from the fleet, and we opened along the whole line from
infantry and field-guns.  Our men soon worked in close enough to
keep down the fire of the enemy to a very marked degree.

After reporting to General Sherman, and while explaining the
position of the fleet, the smoke-stacks and flags appeared above
the fort.  What firing was going on in our immediate front ceased.
A good many rebels were in plain sight, running away from the fort
and scattering.  While we were still surprised, the cry was raised
that a white flag was hung out.  I did not see it, but in a few
minutes saw others along the line, and just as the general started
for the fort I saw the flag not far from the white house, near the
parapet.  Orders were given to cease firing.  Captain Dayton was
sent to the fort where the first flag was raised.  Some shots were
fired and some men hurt after this.  The first rebel officer we
encountered was Colonel or General Garland, commanding brigade, who
was ordered to put his men in line and stack arms, which was done.
I was directed to pass along the line to the right, and cause the
prisoners to stack arms and form our men in line, just outside the
work.  This I did till I reached Deshler's brigade, on our extreme
right, or nearly so, and who was opposed to the right of Steele's
force.  Steele's men had rushed up to the very foot of the parapet,
and some were on it, though they did not fire.  The commander of
the enemy (Deshler) refused to obey my orders to stack arms, and
asked a good many questions as to "how it happened;" said he was
not whipped, but held us in check, etc.  I told him there were
eight or nine thousand men right there, that a shot from me, or a
call, would bring down on him, and that we had entire possession of
the place.  After sending two officers from the nearest troops to
explain the condition to Steele, and to warn every officer they met
to pass the word for everybody to be on the sharp lookout, I
arranged with Deshler to keep quiet until I could bring his own
commander, or orders from him.  Returning to General Sherman, I
found a party of young rebel officers, including Robert Johnston's
son (rebel Senate) and Captain Wolf, quartermaster, of New Orleans,
who declined to surrender except to gentlemen.  Some German
Missouri soldiers didn't relish the distinction, and were about
clubbing them over the head, when I interfered and received their
surrender.  Hurrying back to the general, I reported the dangerous
condition of things.  He and General Churchill, commanding officer
of the enemy, started for Deshler's brigade; meeting Garland, a
quarrel and some recrimination followed between him and Churchill,
as to where the fault of the surrender belonged, which was rather
promptly silenced by General Sherman, who hurried to the scene of
trouble.  There, after some ill-natured talk, Deshler ordered his
men to lay down their arms.  I rode into the fort, and found the
parapet badly torn up by the fire from the fleet.  On going to the
embrasure where I had seen the gun while on the river-bank talking
to Captain Shirk, the piece was found split back about eighteen
inches, and the lower half of the muzzle dropped out.  A battered
but unexploded shell lying with the piece explained that it must
have struck the gun in the muzzle, almost squarely.  On passing
along the inside I saw from the torn condition of the earthworks
how tremendous our fire was, and how the fire of the enemy was kept
down.  The fire of the navy had partly torn down the side of the
fort next the river.  A good many sailors were in the fort.
General A. J. Smith, Admiral Porter, and General Burbridge were
there--all in high spirits, but in some contention as to who got in
first. Toward dark, or nearly so, an Arkansas regiment came in as
reenforcements, but surrendered without any trouble.  About the
same time General Sherman received orders to put General A. J.
Smith in charge of the fort, and stay outside with his men.  As his
troops were nearly all inside, and had four-fifths of the prisoners
in charge, these orders were not very clear, and the general left
for headquarters to find out what was meant.  I went on collecting
arms, and as our men were scattering a good deal and were greatly
excited, I took the precaution to pass along the line and march the
prisoners far enough from the stacked arms to be out of temptation.
I was especially urged to this by hearing several rebel officers
speak of their guns being still loaded.  It was dark before all the
prisoners were collected and under guard, including the regiment
that arrived after the fight.  I am confident that all the
prisoners were under guard by General Sherman's troops.

Everything being secure, the staff-officers, all of whom had been
busily engaged, scattered to compare notes and enjoy the victory.
I found my way onboard the Tigress, where every one was greatly
excited, and in high feather regarding our victory, the biggest
thing since Donelson.  I also obtained some food and small comforts
for a few rebel officers, including young Johnston, Wolfe, and the
Colonel Deshler already mentioned.  Then hunted up General Sherman,
whom I found sitting on a cracker-boa in the white house already
mentioned, near where the white flag first appeared.  Garland was
with him, and slept with him that night, while the rest of us laid
around wherever we could.  It was a gloomy, bloody house, and
suggestive of war.  Garland was blamed by the other Confederate
officers for the white flag, and remained with us for safety.  Next
day was very cold.  We worked hard at the lists of prisoners
--nearly five thousand in number--all of whom were sent to St.
Louis, in charge of our inspector-general, Major Sanger.  Our
loss was less than one hundred.  The enemy, although behind
intrenchments, lost more than double what we did.  Their wounded
were much worse hurt than ours, who were mostly hit around the head
and arms.

The losses were nearly all in General Sherman's wing of the army.
The loss in the fleet amounted to little, but their service was
very valuable, and deserved great credit, though they received
little.  There was a good deal of sympathy between our part of the
forces and the fleet people, and I then thought, and still think,
if we had been on the left next the river, that in connection with
the tremendous fire from the navy, we could have carried the work
in an hour after we opened on it.  Their missiles traversed the
whole fortification, clear through to the hospitals at the upper
end, and I stood five minutes in rifle-range of the fort next the
river--not hit, and but seldom shot at, and no one hit near me.

On the 18th we embarked, in a snow-storm; collected at Napoleon,
which seemed to be washing away; and steamed to Milliken's Bend,
were we arrived on January 21st, and soon after went to Young's
plantation, near Vicksburg.

The above statement from General Hammond was received by General
Sherman, inclosed in a letter dated "Chicago, February 5, 1876" and
signed "John H. Hammond," who was adjutant-general to General
Sherman during the winter of 1862-'83.

J. E. TOURTELLOTTE




CINCINNATI, February 3, 1876

MY DEAR GENERAL: At Arkansas Post the troops debarked from steamer
January 9th, from one o'clock to dark, in the vicinity of Notrib's
farm, and on the 10th moved out to get position; Steele to the
right, crossing the low ground to the north, to get a higher
ground, avoid crowding the moving columns, and gain the left (our
right) and rear of the "post," and the river-bank above the post.
Stuart took the river-road the movement commencing at 11 o'clock
a.m.. After crossing the low ground covered with water, you were
called back with Steele, as Stuart had driven out the enemy's
rifle-trench pickets, this giving more and feasible room for
moving.  Stuart was pushed forward, and by dark he and Steele were
well up to their expected positions.  Before daylight on the 11th
you directed me to accompany you for a personal inspection of the
ground to your front, which we made on foot, going so far forward
that we could easily hear the enemy at work and moving about.
Discovering the open fields, you at once directed Steele to move to
the right and front, and pushed Stuart out so as to fully command
them and the field-work of the enemy extending from the fort, to
prevent farther strengthening, as it was evident these works were
the product of a recent thought.  Stuart and Steele were prompt in
taking position, but Morgan's command (not under your control) did
not seem to work up, or keep in junction with you.  At ten o'clock
you sent me to McClernand to ascertain why the delay of attack.  He
attributed it to Admiral Porter, which was really unjust.  The
attack began at 1 p.m., by Admiral Porter, and the sound of his
first gun had not died till your men were engaged--Wood's,
Barrett's, and the Parrott batteries and infantry.  It was
lively for a time, and Stuart pushed clear up to the enemy's
rifle-trenches, and forced them to keep sheltered.  Hammond was
mostly with Steele; Sanger sent to McClernand, and McCoy, myself,
and John Taylor were with you and Stuart.  At about half-past three
I got your permission to go to Giles Smith's skirmish-line, and,
thinking I saw evidence of the enemy weakening, I hurried back to
you and reported my observations.  I was so confident that a demand
for it would bring a surrender, that I asked permission to make it,
and, as you granted me, but refused to let another member of your
staff, at his request, go with me, I rode directly down the road
with only an orderly.  Colonel Garland, commanding a brigade, was
the first officer I saw, to whom, for you, I made the demand.  All
firing ceased at once, or in a few moments.  I sent the orderly back
to you, and you rode forward.  It was then four o'clock.

During the attack, nobody seemed to think McClernand had any clear
idea of what or how it was to be done.  During the day he gave you
no directions, nor came where you were; he was well to the rear,
with his "man up a tree," who in the capacity of a lookout gave
McClernand information, from which he based such instructions as he
made to his subordinates.  He was free to express himself as being
a man of "destiny," and his "star" was in the ascendance.  I am,
etc.,

L. M. DAYTON, late Colonel of the Staff, now of Cincinnati, Ohio.

General W. T. SHERMAN.




MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN.

[Special Field Orders, No. 11.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
MEMPHIS, January 27, 1864


V. The expedition is one of celerity, and all things must tend to
that.  Corps commanders and staff-officers will see that our
movements are not encumbered by wheeled vehicles improperly loaded.
Not a tent, from the commander-in-chief down, will be carried.  The
sick will be left behind, and the surgeons can find houses and
sheds for all hospital purposes.

VI. All the cavalry in this department is placed under the orders
and command of Brigadier-General W. S. Smith, who will receive
special instructions.

By order of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.


NOTE.-That same evening I started in a steamboat for Vicksburg.
W. T. S.
St. Louis, 1885.





HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
MEMPHIS, January 27, 1864

Brigadier-General W. S. SMITH, commanding Cavalry, etc., present.

DEAR GENERAL: By an order issued this day I have placed all the
cavalry of this department subject to your command.  I estimate you
can make a force of full seven thousand men, which I believe to be
superior and better in all respects than the combined cavalry which
the enemy has in all the State of Mississippi.  I will in person
start for Vicksburg to-day, and with four divisions of infantry,
artillery, and cavalry move out for Jackson, Brandon, and Meridian,
aiming to reach the latter place by February 10th.  General Banks
will feign on Pascagoula and General Logan on Rome.  I want you
with your cavalry to move from Colliersville on Pontotoc and
Okolona; thence sweeping down near the Mobile & Ohio Railroad,
disable that road as much as possible, consume or destroy the
resources of the enemy along that road, break up the connection
with Columbus, Mississippi, and finally reach me at or near
Meridian as near the date I have mentioned as possible.  This will
call for great energy of action on your part, but I believe you are
equal to it, and you have the best and most experienced troops in
the service, and they will do anything that is possible.  General
Grierson is with you, and is familiar with the whole country.  I
will send up from Haines's Bluff an expedition of gunboats and
transports combined, to feel up the Yazoo as far as the present
water will permit.  This will disconcert the enemy.  My movement on
Jackson will also divide the enemy, so that by no combination can
he reach you with but a part of his force.  I wish you to attack
any force of cavalry you meet and follow them southward, but in no
event be drawn into the forks of the streams that make up the Yazoo
nor over into Alabama.  Do not let the enemy draw you into minor
affairs, but look solely to the greater object to destroy his
communication from Okolona to Meridian, and thence eastward to
Selma.  From Okolona south you will find abundance of forage
collected along the railroad, and the farmers have corn standing in
the fields.  Take liberally of all these, as well as horses, mules,
cattle, etc.  As a rule, respect dwellings and families as
something too sacred to be disturbed by soldiers, but mills, barns,
sheds, stables, and such like things use for the benefit or
convenience of your command.  If convenient, send into Columbus,
Mississippi, and destroy all machinery there, and the bridge across
the Tombigbee, which enables the enemy to draw the resources of the
east side of the valley, but this is not of sufficient importance
to delay your movement.  Try and communicate with me by scouts and
spies from the time you reach Pontotoc.  Avoid any large force of
infantry, leaving them to me.  We have talked over this matter so
much that the above covers all points not provided for in my
published orders of to-day.  I am, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Mayor-General, commanding.




MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, January 27, 1864.

Brigadier-General J. P. HATCH, in charge of Cavalry Bureau, St.
Louis, Missouri.

SIR: Your favor of the 21st inst. is just received.  Up to the
present time eight hundred and eighteen horses have arrived here
since Captain Hudson's visit to St. Louis.  I wrote you upon his
return several days ago that it would not be necessary to divert
shipments to this point which could not reach us before February
1st. We shall certainly get off on our contemplated expedition
before that time.  The number of horses estimated for in this
department by its chief quartermaster was two thousand, and this
number, including those already sent, will, I think, completely
mount all the dismounted cavalry of this department.  Recruits for
cavalry regiments are arriving freely, and this will swell our
requisitions for a couple of months to come.  I will as far as
possible procure horses from the regions of country traversed by
our cavalry.

Yours truly,   W. SOOY SMITH, Brigadier-General,

Chief of Cavalry, Military Division of the Mississippi.





MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, January 28, 1864

Brigadier-General GEORGE CROOK, commanding Second Cavalry Division,
Huntsville, Alabama.

I start in about three days with seven, thousand men to Meridian
via Pontotoc.  Demonstrate on Decatur, to hold Roddy.

W. SOOY SMITH, Brigadier-General,
Chief of Cavalry, Military Division of the Mississippi.




MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, July 9,1875
General W. T. SHERMAN, Commander-in-Chief, United States Army.

SIR: Your letter of July 7th is just received.

Your entire statement in the "Memoirs" concerning my part in the
Meridian campaign is incorrect.

You overstate my strength, placing it at seven thousand effective,
when it was but six.  The nominal strength of my command was seven
thousand.

You understate the strength of my enemy, putting Forrest's force at
four thousand.  On our return to Nashville, you stated it, in
General Grant's presence, to have been but twenty-five hundred.
Before and during my movement I positively knew Forrest's strength
to be full six thousand, and he has since told me so himself.

Instead of delaying from the 1st to the 11th of February for "some
regiment that was ice-bound near Columbus, Kentucky," it was an
entire brigade, Colonel Waring's, without which your orders to me
were peremptory not to move.  I asked you if I should wait its
arrival, and you answered: "Certainly; if you go without it, you
will be, too weak, and I want you strong enough to go where you
please."

The time set for our arrival at Meridian, the 10th of February, had
arrived before it was possible for me, under your orders, to move
from Memphis, and I would have been entirely justifiable if I had
not started at all.  But I was at that time, and at all times
during the war, as earnest and anxious to carry out my orders, and
do my full duty as you or any other officer could be, and I set out
to make a march of two hundred and fifty miles into the
Confederacy, having to drive back a rebel force equal to my own.
After the time had arrived for the full completion of my movement,
I drove this force before me, and penetrated one hundred and sixty
miles into the Confederacy--did more hard fighting, and killed,
wounded, and captured more of the enemy than you did during the
campaign--did my work most thoroughly, as far as I could go without
encountering the rebel cavalry set loose by your return from
Meridian, and brought off my command, with all the captured
property and rescued negroes, with very small loss, considering
that inflicted on the enemy, and the long-continued and very severe
fighting.  If I had disobeyed your orders, and started without
Waring's brigade, I would have been "too weak," would probably have
been defeated, and would  have been subjected to just censure.
Having awaited its arrival, as I was positively and distinctly
ordered to do, it only remained for me to start upon its arrival,
and accomplish all that I could of the work allotted to me.  To
have attempted to penetrate farther into the enemy's country, with
the cavalry of Polk's army coming up to reenforce Forrest, would
have insured the destruction of my entire command, situated as it
was.  I cannot now go into all the particulars, though I assure you
that they make the proof of the correctness of my conduct as
conclusive as I could desire it to be.  I was not headed off and
defeated by an inferior force near West Point.  We had the fighting
all our own way near West Point, and at all other points except at
Okalona, on our return, when we had the worst of it for a little
while, but finally checked the enemy handsomely, and continued our
return march, fighting at the rear and on both flanks, repulsing
all attacks and moving in perfect order.  And so my movement was
not a failure, except that I did not reach Meridian as intended,
for the reason stated, and for many more which it is not necessary
for me to detail here.  On the other hand, it was a very decided
success, inflicting a terrible destruction of supplies of every
kind, and a heavy loss of men upon the enemy.  You should have so
reported it in the beginning.  You should so amend your report, and
"Memoirs" now.  This, and no less than this, is due from one
soldier to another.  It is due to the exalted position which you
occupy, and, above all, it is due to that truthfulness in history
which you claim to revere.  If you desire it, I will endeavor to
visit you, and in a friendly manner "fight our battles o'er again,"
and endeavor to convince you that you have always been mistaken as
to the manner in which my part in the "Meridian campaign" was
performed.  But I will never rest until the wrong statements
regarding it are fully and fairly corrected.  Yours truly,

WILLIAM SOOY SMITH




HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES
St. Louis, Missouri, July 11, 1875.

General J. D. WEBSTER, Chicago, Illinois

DEAR GENERAL: General W. Sooy Smith feels aggrieved and wronged by
my account of his part in the Meridian campaign, in my "Memoirs,"
pages 394, 395, and properly appeals to me for correction.  I have
offered to modify any words or form of expression that he may point
out, but he asks me to completely change the whole that concerns
him.  This, of course, I will not do, as his part was material to
the whole, and cannot be omitted or materially altered without
changing the remainder, for his failure to reach Meridian by
February 10th was the reason for other movements distant from him.
I now offer him, what seems to me fair and liberal, that we submit
the points at issue to you as arbitrator.  You are familiar with
the ground, the coincident history, and most, if not all, the
parties.

I propose to supply you with

1.  Copy of my orders placing all the cavalry under General Smith's
orders (with returns).

2.  My letter of instructions to him of January 27th.

3.  My official report of the campaign, dated Vicksburg, March 7,
1864.

4.  General W. Sooy Smith's report of his operations, dated
Nashville, Tennessee, March 4, 1864.

After reading these, I further propose that you address us
questions which we will answer in writing, when you are to make us
a concise, written decision, which I will have published in close
connection with the subject in controversy.  If General Smith will
show you my letter to him of this date, and also deliver this with
his written assent, I will promptly furnish you the above
documents, and also procure from the official files a return of the
cavalry force available at and near Memphis on the date of my
orders, viz., January 27, 1864.

With great respect, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, General.

NOTE:--General Smith never submitted his case to the arbitration
offered.  The whole will be made clear by the publication of the
official records, which are already in print, though not yet
issued.  His orders were in writing, and I have no recollection of
the "peremptory" verbal orders to which he refers, and quotes as
from me.

ST. Louis, Missouri, 1895.    W. T. S.




MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, July 14, 1875.

General W. T. SHERMAN, Commander-in-Chief, etc.

DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 11th of July reaches me just as I
am starting to spend the first vacation I have ever allowed myself
--in the Territories, with my wife and son.

It indicates a spirit of fairness from which we have better things
than an arbitration to hope for.  Though, if we should reach such a
necessity, there is no one living to whom our differences might
more properly be referred than to General Webster.  I make no
objection to your writing your "Memoirs," and, as long as they
refer to your own conduct, you are at liberty to write them as you
like; but, when they refer to mine, and deal unjustly with my
reputation, I, of right, object.

Neither do I wish to write my "Memoirs," unless compelled to do so
to vindicate my good name.  There were certain commands which were
to make up mine.  These, Waring's brigade included, were spoken of
by us in the long conversation to which you refer.  This brigade we
knew was having a hard time of it in its movement from Columbus to
Memphis.  I asked you if I should move without it if it did not
arrive, and you answered me as stated in my last letter to you.
Those who immediately surrounded me during the painful delay that
occurred will inform you how sorely I chafed under the restraint of
that peremptory order.

In the conversation that occurred between us at Nashville, while
all the orders, written and verbal, were still fresh in your
memory, you did not censure me for waiting for Waring, but for
allowing myself to be encumbered with fugitive negroes to such an
extent that my command was measurably unfit for active movement or
easy handling, and for turning back from West Point, instead of
pressing on toward Meridian.  Invitations had been industriously
circulated, by printed circulars and otherwise, to the negroes to
come into our lines, and to seek our protection wherever they could
find it, and I considered ourselves pledged to receive and protect
them.  Your censure for so doing, and your remarks on that subject
to me in Nashville, are still fresh in my memory, and of a
character which you would now doubtless gladly disavow.

But we must meet and talk the whole matter over, and I will be at
any trouble to see you when I return.

Meantime I will not let go the hope that I will convince you
absolutely of your error, for the facts are entirely on my side.
Yours truly,

WILLIAM SOOY SMITH






MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN

By William T. Sherman


VOLUME II




CHAPTER XVI.


ATLANTA CAMPAIGN-NASHVILLE AND CHATTANOOGA TO BENEBAW.


MARCH, APRIL, AND MAY, 1864.


On the 18th day of March, 1864, at Nashville, Tennessee, I relieved
Lieutenant-General Grant in command of the Military Division of the
Mississippi, embracing the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland,
Tennessee, and Arkansas, commanded respectively by Major-Generals
Schofield, Thomas, McPherson, and Steele.  General Grant was in the
act of starting East to assume command of all the armies of the
United States, but more particularly to give direction in person to
the Armies of the Potomac and James, operating against Richmond;
and I accompanied him as far as Cincinnati on his way, to avail
myself of the opportunity to discuss privately many little details
incident to the contemplated changes, and of preparation for the
great events then impending.  Among these was the intended
assignment to duty of many officers of note and influence, who had,
by the force of events, drifted into inactivity and discontent.
Among these stood prominent Generals McClellan, Burnside, and
Fremont, in, the East; and Generals Buell, McCook, Negley, and
Crittenden, at the West. My understanding was that General Grant
thought it wise and prudent to give all these officers appropriate
commands, that would enable them to regain the influence they had
lost; and, as a general reorganization of all the armies was then
necessary, he directed me to keep in mind especially the claims of
Generals Buell, McCook, and Crittenden, and endeavor to give them
commands that would be as near their rank and dates of commission
as possible; but I was to do nothing until I heard further from
him on the subject, as he explained that he would have to consult
the Secretary of War before making final orders.  General Buell and
his officers had been subjected to a long ordeal by a court of
inquiry, touching their conduct of the campaign in Tennessee and
Kentucky, that resulted in the battle of Perryville, or Chaplin's
Hills, October 8,1862, and they had been substantially acquitted;
and, as it was manifest that we were to have some hard fighting, we
were anxious to bring into harmony every man and every officer of
skill in the profession of arms.  Of these, Generals Buell and
McClellan were prominent in rank, and also by reason of their fame
acquired in Mexico, as well as in the earlier part of the civil
war.

After my return to Nashville I addressed myself to the task of
organization and preparation, which involved the general security
of the vast region of the South which had been already conquered,
more especially the several routes of supply and communication with
the active armies at the front, and to organize a large army to
move into Georgia, coincident with the advance of the Eastern
armies against Richmond.  I soon received from Colonel J. B. Fry
--now of the Adjutant-General's Department, but then at Washington in
charge of the Provost-Marshal-General's office--a letter asking me to
do something for General Buell.  I answered him frankly, telling him
of my understanding with General Grant, and that I was still awaiting
the expected order of the War Department, assigning General Buell to
my command.  Colonel Fry, as General Buell's special friend, replied
that he was very anxious that I should make specific application for
the services of General Buell by name, and inquired what I proposed
to offer him.  To this I answered that, after the agreement with
General Grant that he would notify me from Washington, I could not
with propriety press the matter, but if General Buell should be
assigned to me specifically I was prepared to assign him to command
all the troops on the Mississippi River from Cairo to Natchez,
comprising about three divisions, or the equivalent of a corps
d'armee.  General Grant never afterward communicated to me on the
subject at all; and I inferred that Mr. Stanton, who was notoriously
vindictive in his prejudices, would not consent to the employment of
these high officers.  General Buell, toward the close of the war,
published a bitter political letter, aimed at General Grant,
reflecting on his general management of the war, and stated that both
Generals Canby and Sherman had offered him a subordinate command,
which he had declined because he had once outranked us.  This was not
true as to me, or Canby either, I think, for both General Canby and I
ranked him at West Point and in the old army, and he (General Buell)
was only superior to us in the date of his commission as
major-general, for a short period in 1862.  This newspaper
communication, though aimed at General Grant, reacted on himself, for
it closed his military career.  General Crittenden afterward obtained
authority for service, and I offered him a division, but he declined
it for the reason, as I understood it, that he had at one time
commanded a corps.  He is now in the United States service,
commanding the Seventeenth Infantry.  General McCook obtained a
command under General Canby, in the Department of the Gulf, where he
rendered good service, and he is also in the regular service,
lieutenant-colonel Tenth Infantry.

I returned to Nashville from Cincinnati about the 25th of March,
and started at once, in a special car attached to the regular
train, to inspect my command at the front, going to Pulaski,
Tennessee, where I found General G. M. Dodge; thence to Huntsville,
Alabama, where I had left a part of my personal staff and the
records of the department during the time we had been absent at
Meridian; and there I found General McPherson, who had arrived from
Vicksburg, and had assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee.
General McPherson accompanied me, and we proceeded by the cars to
Stevenson, Bridgeport, etc., to Chattanooga, where we spent a day
or two with General George H.  Thomas, and then continued on to
Knoxville, where was General Schofield.  He returned with us to
Chattanooga, stopping by the way a few hours at Loudon, where were
the headquarters of the Fourth Corps (Major-General Gordon
Granger).  General Granger, as usual, was full of complaints at the
treatment of his corps since I had left him with General Burnside,
at Knoxville, the preceding November; and he stated to me
personally that he had a leave of absence in his pocket, of which
he intended to take advantage very soon.  About the end of March,
therefore, the three army commanders and myself were together at
Chattanooga.  We had nothing like a council of war, but conversed
freely and frankly on all matters of interest then in progress or
impending.  We all knew that, as soon as the spring was fairly
open, we should have to move directly against our antagonist,
General Jos. E. Johnston, then securely intrenched at Dalton,
thirty miles distant; and the purpose of our conference at the time
was to ascertain our own resources, and to distribute to each part
of the army its appropriate share of work.  We discussed every
possible contingency likely to arise, and I simply instructed each
army commander to make immediate preparations for a hard campaign,
regulating the distribution of supplies that were coming up by rail
from Nashville as equitably as possible.  We also agreed on some
subordinate changes in the organization of the three separate
armies which were destined to take the field; among which was the
consolidation of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps (Howard and Slocum)
into a single corps, to be commanded by General Jos. Hooker.
General Howard was to be transferred to the Fourth Corps, vice
Gordon Granger to avail himself of his leave of absence; and
General Slocum was to be ordered down the Mississippi River, to
command the District of Vicksburg.  These changes required the
consent of the President, and were all in due time approved.

The great question of the campaign was one of supplies.  Nashville,
our chief depot, was itself partially in a hostile country, and
even the routes of supply from Louisville to Nashville by rail, and
by way of the Cumberland River, had to be guarded.  Chattanooga
(our starting-point) was one hundred and thirty-six miles in front
of Nashville, and every foot of the way, especially the many
bridges, trestles, and culverts, had to be strongly guarded against
the acts of a local hostile population and of the enemy's cavalry.
Then, of course, as we advanced into Georgia, it was manifest that
we should have to repair the railroad, use it, and guard it
likewise: General Thomas's army was much the largest of the three,
was best provided, and contained the best corps of engineers,
railroad managers, and repair parties, as well as the best body of
spies and provost-marshals.  On him we were therefore compelled in a
great measure to rely for these most useful branches of service.  He
had so long exercised absolute command and control over the railroads
in his department, that the other armies were jealous, and these
thought the Army of the Cumberland got the lion's share of the
supplies and other advantages of the railroads.  I found a good deal
of feeling in the Army of the Tennessee on this score, and therefore
took supreme control of the roads myself, placed all the army
commanders on an equal footing, and gave to each the same control, so
far as orders of transportation for men and stores were concerned.
Thomas's spies brought him frequent and accurate reports of Jos. E.
Johnston's army at Dalton, giving its strength anywhere between forty
and fifty thousand men, and these were being reenforced by troops
from Mississippi, and by the Georgia militia, under General G. W.
Smith.  General Johnston seemed to be acting purely on the defensive,
so that we had time and leisure to take all our measures deliberately
and fully.  I fixed the date of May 1st, when all things should be in
readiness for the grand forward movement, and then returned to
Nashville; General Schofield going back to Knoxville, and McPherson
to Huntsville, Thomas remaining at Chattanooga.

On the 2d of April, at Nashville, I wrote to General Grant, then at
Washington, reporting to him the results of my visit to the several
armies, and asked his consent to the several changes proposed,
which was promptly given by telegraph.  I then addressed myself
specially to the troublesome question of transportation and
supplies.  I found the capacity of the railroads from Nashville
forward to Decatur, and to Chattanooga, so small, especially in the
number of locomotives and care, that it was clear that they were
barely able to supply the daily wants of the armies then dependent
on them, with no power of accumulating a surplus in advance.  The
cars were daily loaded down with men returning from furlough, with
cattle, horses, etc.; and, by reason of the previous desolation of
the country between Chattanooga and Knoxville, General Thomas had
authorized the issue of provisions to the suffering inhabitants.

We could not attempt an advance into Georgia without food,
ammunition, etc.; and ordinary prudence dictated that we should
have an accumulation at the front, in case of interruption to the
railway by the act of the enemy, or by common accident.
Accordingly, on the 6th of April, I issued a general order,
limiting the use of the railroad-cars to transporting only the
essential articles of food, ammunition, and supplies for the army
proper, forbidding any further issues to citizens, and cutting off
all civil traffic; requiring the commanders of posts within thirty
miles of Nashville to haul out their own stores in wagons;
requiring all troops destined for the front to march, and all
beef-cattle to be driven on their own legs.  This was a great help,
but of course it naturally raised a howl.  Some of the poor Union
people of East Tennessee appealed to President Lincoln, whose kind
heart responded promptly to their request. He telegraphed me to know
if I could not modify or repeal my orders; but I answered him that a
great campaign was impending, on which the fate of the nation hung;
that our railroads had but a limited capacity, and could not provide
for the necessities of the army and of the people too; that one or
the other must quit, and we could not until the army of Jos. Johnston
was conquered, etc., etc.  Mr. Lincoln seemed to acquiesce, and I
advised the people to obtain and drive out cattle from Kentucky, and
to haul out their supplies by the wagon-road from the same quarter,
by way of Cumberland Gap.  By these changes we nearly or quite
doubled our daily accumulation of stores at the front, and yet even
this was not found enough.

I accordingly called together in Nashville the master of
transportation, Colonel Anderson, the chief quartermaster, General
J. L. Donaldson, and the chief commissary, General Amos Beckwith,
for conference.  I assumed the strength of the army to move from
Chattanooga into Georgia at one hundred thousand men, and the
number of animals to be fed, both for cavalry and draught, at
thirty-five thousand; then, allowing for occasional wrecks of
trains, which were very common, and for the interruption of the
road itself by guerrillas and regular raids, we estimated it would
require one hundred and thirty cars, of ten tons each, to reach
Chattanooga daily, to be reasonably certain of an adequate supply.
Even with this calculation, we could not afford to bring forward
hay for the horses and mules, nor more than five pounds of oats or
corn per day for each animal.  I was willing to risk the question
of forage in part, because I expected to find wheat and corn
fields, and a good deal of grass, as we advanced into Georgia at
that season of the year.  The problem then was to deliver at
Chattanooga and beyond one hundred and thirty car-loads daily,
leaving the beef-cattle to be driven on the hoof, and all the
troops in excess of the usual train-guards to march by the ordinary
roads.  Colonel Anderson promptly explained that he did not possess
cars or locomotives enough to do this work.  I then instructed and
authorized him to hold on to all trains that arrived at Nashville
from Louisville, and to allow none to go back until he had secured
enough to fill the requirements of our problem.  At the time he
only had about sixty serviceable locomotives, and about six hundred
cars of all kinds, and he represented that to provide for all
contingencies he must have at least one hundred locomotives and one
thousand cars.  As soon as Mr. Guthrie, the President of the
Louisville & Nashville Railroad, detected that we were holding on
to all his locomotives and cars, he wrote me, earnestly
remonstrating against it, saying that he would not be able with
diminished stock to bring forward the necessary stores from
Louisville to Nashville.  I wrote to him, frankly telling him
exactly how we were placed, appealed to his patriotism to stand by
us, and advised him in like manner to hold on to all trains coming
into Jeffersonville, Indiana.  He and General Robert Allen, then
quartermaster-general at Louisville, arranged a ferry-boat so as to
transfer the trains over the Ohio River from Jeffersonville, and in
a short time we had cars and locomotives from almost every road at
the North; months afterward I was amused to see, away down in
Georgia, cars marked "Pittsburg & Fort Wayne," "Delaware &
Lackawanna," "Baltimore & Ohio," and indeed with the names of
almost every railroad north of the Ohio River.  How these railroad
companies ever recovered their property, or settled their
transportation accounts, I have never heard, but to this fact, as
much as to any other single fact, I attribute the perfect success
which afterward attended our campaigns; and I have always felt
grateful to Mr. Guthrie, of Louisville, who had sense enough and
patriotism enough to subordinate the interests of his railroad
company to the cause of his country.

About this time, viz., the early part of April, I was much
disturbed by a bold raid made by the rebel General Forrest up
between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers.  He reached the Ohio
River at Paducah, but was handsomely repulsed by Colonel Hicks.  He
then swung down toward Memphis, assaulted and carried Fort Pillow,
massacring a part of its garrison, composed wholly of negro troops.
At first I discredited the story of the massacre, because, in
preparing for the Meridian campaign, I had ordered Fort Pillow to
be evacuated, but it transpired afterward that General Hurlbut had
retained a small garrison at Fort Pillow to encourage the
enlistment of the blacks as soldiers, which was a favorite
political policy at that day.  The massacre at Fort Pillow occurred
April 12, 1864, and has been the subject of congressional inquiry.
No doubt Forrest's men acted like a set of barbarians, shooting
down the helpless negro garrison after the fort was in their
possession; but I am told that Forrest personally disclaims any
active participation in the assault, and that he stopped the firing
as soon as he could.  I also take it for granted that Forrest did
not lead the assault in person, and consequently that he was to the
rear, out of sight if not of hearing at the time, and I was told by
hundreds of our men, who were at various times prisoners in
Forrest's possession, that he was usually very kind to them.  He
had a desperate set of fellows under him, and at that very time
there is no doubt the feeling of the Southern people was fearfully
savage on this very point of our making soldiers out of their late
slaves, and Forrest may have shared the feeling.

I also had another serious cause of disturbance about that time.  I
wanted badly the two divisions of troops which had been loaned to
General Banks in the month of March previously, with the express
understanding that their absence was to endure only one month, and
that during April they were to come out of Red River, and be again
within the sphere of my command.  I accordingly instructed one of
my inspector-generals, John M.  Corse, to take a fleet steamboat at
Nashville, proceed via Cairo, Memphis, and Vicksburg, to General
Banks up the Red River, and to deliver the following letter of
April 3d, as also others, of like tenor, to Generals A. J. Smith
and Fred Steele, who were supposed to be with him:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 3, 1864

Major-General N. P. BANKS, commanding Department of the Gulf, Red
River.

GENERAL: The thirty days for which I loaned you the command of
General A. J. Smith will expire on the 10th instant.  I send with
this Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, to carry orders to General A.
J. Smith, and to give directions for a new movement, which is
preliminary to the general campaign.  General Corse may see you and
explain in full, but, lest he should not find you in person, I will
simply state that Forrest, availing himself of the absence of our
furloughed men and of the detachment with you, has pushed up
between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, even to the Ohio.  He
attacked Paducah, but got the worst of it, and he still lingers
about the place.  I hope that he will remain thereabouts till
General A. J. Smith can reach his destined point, but this I can
hardly expect; yet I want him to reach by the Yazoo a position near
Grenada, thence to operate against Forrest, after which to march
across to Decatur, Alabama.  You will see that he has a big job,
and therefore should start at once.  From all that I can learn, my
troops reached Alexandria, Louisiana, at the time agreed on, viz.,
March 17th, and I hear of them at Natchitoches, but cannot hear of
your troops being above Opelousas.

Steele is also moving.  I leave Steele's entire force to cooperate
with you and the navy, but, as I before stated, I must have A. T.
Smith's troops now as soon as possible.

I beg you will expedite their return to Vicksburg, if they have not
already started, and I want them if possible to remain in the same
boats they have used up Red River, as it will save the time
otherwise consumed in transfer to other boats.

All is well in this quarter, and I hope by the time you turn
against Mobile our forces will again act toward the same end,
though from distant points.  General Grant, now having lawful
control, will doubtless see that all minor objects are disregarded,
and that all the armies act on a common plan.

Hoping, when this reaches you, that you will be in possession of
Shreveport, I am, with great respect, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


Rumors were reaching us thick and fast of defeat and disaster in
that quarter; and I feared then, what afterward actually happened,
that neither General Banks nor Admiral Porter could or would spare
those two divisions.  On the 23d of April, General Corse returned,
bringing full answers to my letters, and I saw that we must go on
without them.  This was a serious loss to the Army of the
Tennessee, which was also short by two other divisions that were on
their veteran furlough, and were under orders to rendezvous at
Cairo, before embarking for Clifton, on the Tennessee River.

On the 10th of April, 1864, the headquarters of the three Armies of
the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, were at Chattanooga.,
Huntsville, and Knoxville, and the tables on page 16, et seq., give
their exact condition and strength.

The Department of the Arkansas was then subject to my command, but
General Fred Steele, its commander, was at Little Rock, remote from
me, acting in cooperation with General Banks, and had full
employment for every soldier of his command; so that I never
depended on him for any men, or for any participation in the
Georgia campaign.  Soon after, viz., May 8th, that department was
transferred to the Military Division of "the Gulf," or "Southwest,"
Major-General E.  R. S. Canby commanding, and General Steele served
with him in the subsequent movement against Mobile.

In Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, I had three generals
of education and experience, admirably qualified for the work
before us.  Each has made a history of his own, and I need not here
dwell on their respective merits as men, or as commanders of
armies, except that each possessed special qualities of mind and of
character which fitted them in the highest degree for the work then
in contemplation.

By the returns of April 10, 1864, it will be seen that the
Army of the Cumberland had on its muster-rolls--

                                       Men.
Present and absent...................171,450
Present for duty..................... 88,883


The Army of the Tennessee--
Present and absent....................134,763
Present for duty...................... 64,957

The Army of the Ohio--
Present and absent ................... 46,052
Present for duty ..................... 26,242


The department and army commanders had to maintain strong garrisons
in their respective departments, and also to guard their respective
lines of supply.  I therefore, in my mind, aimed to prepare out of
these three armies, by the 1st of May, 1864, a compact army for
active operations in Georgia, of about the following numbers:

Army of the Cumberland................ 50,000
Army of the Tennessee................. 35,000
Army of the Ohio ..................... 15,000

Total ............................... 100,000

and, to make these troops as mobile as possible, I made the
strictest possible orders in relation to wagons and all species of
incumbrances and impedimenta whatever.  Each officer and soldier
was required to carry on his horse or person food and clothing
enough for five days.  To each regiment was allowed but one wagon
and one ambulance, and to the officers of each company one pack
horse or mule.

Each division and brigade was provided a fair proportion of wagons
for a supply train, and these were limited in their loads to carry
food, ammunition, and clothing.  Tents were forbidden to all save
the sick and wounded, and one tent only was allowed to each
headquarters for use as an office.  These orders were not
absolutely enforced, though in person I set the example, and did
not have a tent, nor did any officer about me have one; but we had
wall tent-flies, without poles, and no tent-furniture of any kind.
We usually spread our flies over saplings, or on fence-rails or
posts improvised on the spot.  Most of the general officers, except
Thomas, followed my example strictly; but he had a regular
headquarters-camp.  I frequently called his attention to the orders
on this subject, rather jestingly than seriously.  He would break
out against his officers for having such luxuries, but, needing a
tent himself, and being good-natured and slow to act, he never
enforced my orders perfectly.  In addition to his regular
wagon-train, he had a big wagon which could be converted into an
office, and this we used to call "Thomas's circus." Several times
during the campaign I found quartermasters hid away in some
comfortable nook to the rear, with tents and mess-fixtures which
were the envy of the passing soldiers; and I frequently broke them
up, and distributed the tents to the surgeons of brigades.  Yet my
orders actually reduced the transportation, so that I doubt if any
army ever went forth to battle with fewer impedimenta, and where
the regular and necessary supplies of food, ammunition, and
clothing, were issued, as called for, so regularly and so well.

My personal staff was then composed of Captain J. C. McCoy,
aide-de-camp; Captain L. M. Dayton, aide-de-camp; Captain J. C.
Audenried, aide-de-camp; Brigadier-General J. D. Webster, chief of
staff; Major R. M. Sawyer, assistant adjutant-general; Captain
Montgomery Rochester, assistant adjutant-general.  These last three
were left at Nashville in charge of the office, and were empowered
to give orders in my name, communication being generally kept up by
telegraph.

Subsequently were added to my staff, and accompanied me in the
field, Brigadier-General W. F. Barry, chief of artillery; Colonel
O. M. Poe, chief of engineers; Colonel L. C. Easton, chief
quartermaster; Colonel Amos Beckwith, chief commissary; Captain
Thos. G. Baylor, chief of ordnance; Surgeon E. D.  Kittoe, medical
director; Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, inspector-general;
Lieutenant-Colonel C. Ewing, inspector-general; and Lieutenant-
Colonel Willard Warner, inspector-general.

These officers constituted my staff proper at the beginning of the
campaign, which remained substantially the same till the close of
the war, with very few exceptions; viz.: Surgeon John Moore, United
States Army, relieved Surgeon Kittoe of the volunteers (about
Atlanta) as medical director; Major Henry Hitchcock joined as
judge-advocate, and Captain G. Ward Nichols reported as an extra
aide-de-camp (after the fall of Atlanta) at Gaylesville, just
before we started for Savannah.

During the whole month of April the preparations for active war
were going on with extreme vigor, and my letter-book shows an
active correspondence with Generals Grant, Halleck, Thomas,
McPherson, and Schofield on thousands of matters of detail and
arrangement, most of which are embraced in my testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., Appendix.

When the time for action approached, viz., May 1,1864, the actual
armies prepared to move into Georgia resulted as follows, present
for battle:
                                   Men.
Army of the Cumberland, Major-General THOMAS.
Infantry ....................... 54,568
Artillery ......................  2,377
Cavalry.........................  3,828
        Aggregate............... 60,773
Number of field-guns, 130.

Army of the Tennessee, Major-General McPHERSON.

Infantry ....................... 22,437
Artillery ......................  1,404
Cavalry ........................    624
         Aggregate ............. 24,465
Guns, 96


Army of the Ohio, Major-General SCHOFIELD.

Infantry ....................... 11,183
Artillery.......................    679
Cavalry.........................  1,697
        Aggregate .............. 13,559
Guns, 28.

Grand aggregate, 98,797 men and 254 guns


These figures do not embrace the cavalry divisions which were still
incomplete, viz., of General Stoneman, at Lexington, Kentucky, and
of General Garrard, at Columbia, Tennessee, who were then rapidly
collecting horses, and joined us in the early stage of the
campaign.  General Stoneman, having a division of about four
thousand men and horses, was attached to Schofield's Army of the
Ohio.  General Garrard's division, of about four thousand five
hundred men and horses, was attached to General Thomas's command;
and he had another irregular division of cavalry, commanded by
Brigadier-General E.  McCook.  There was also a small brigade of
cavalry, belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, attached
temporarily to the Army of the Tennessee, which was commanded by
Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick.  These cavalry commands
changed constantly in strength and numbers, and were generally used
on the extreme flanks, or for some special detached service, as
will be herein-after related.  The Army of the Tennessee was still
short by the two divisions detached with General Banks, up Red
River, and two other divisions on furlough in Illinois, Indiana,
and Ohio, but which were rendezvousing at Cairo, under Generals
Leggett and Crocker, to form a part of the Seventeenth Corps, which
corps was to be commanded by Major-General Frank P. Blair, then a
member of Congress, in Washington.  On the 2d of April I notified
him by letter that I wanted him to join and to command these two
divisions, which ought to be ready by the 1st of May.  General
Blair, with these two divisions, constituting the Seventeenth Army
Corps, did not actually overtake us until we reached Acworth and
Big Shanty, in Georgia, about the 9th of June, 1864.

In my letter of April 4th to General John A. Rawains, chief of
staff to General Grant at Washington, I described at length all the
preparations that were in progress for the active campaign thus
contemplated, and therein estimated Schofield at twelve thousand,
Thomas at forty-five thousand, and McPherson at thirty thousand.
At first I intended to open the campaign about May 1st, by moving
Schofield on Dalton from Cleveland, Thomas on the same objective
from Chattanooga, and McPherson on Rome and Kingston from Gunter's
Landing.  My intention was merely to threaten Dalton in front, and
to direct McPherson to act vigorously against the railroad below
Resaca, far to the rear of the enemy.  But by reason of his being
short of his estimated strength by the four divisions before
referred to, and thus being reduced to about twenty-four thousand
men, I did not feel justified in placing him so far away from the
support of the main body of the army, and therefore subsequently
changed the plan of campaign, so far as to bring that army up to
Chattanooga, and to direct it thence through Ship's Gap against the
railroad to Johnston's rear, at or near Resaca, distant from Dalton
only eighteen miles, and in full communication with the other
armies by roads behind Rocky face Ridge, of about the same length.

On the 10th of April I received General Grant's letter of April 4th
from Washington, which formed the basis of all the campaigns of the
year 1864, and subsequently received another of April 19th, written
from Culpepper, Virginia, both of which are now in my possession,
in his own handwriting, and are here given entire.  These letters
embrace substantially all the orders he ever made on this
particular subject, and these, it will be seen, devolved on me the
details both as to the plan and execution of the campaign by the
armies under my immediate command.  These armies were to be
directed against the rebel army commanded by General Joseph E.
Johnston, then lying on the defensive, strongly intrenched at
Dalton, Georgia; and I was required to follow it up closely and
persistently, so that in no event could any part be detached to
assist General Lee in Virginia; General Grant undertaking in like
manner to keep Lee so busy that he could not respond to any calls
of help by Johnston.  Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta, nor Savannah,
was the objective, but the "army of Jos. Johnston," go where it
might.


[PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON D. C., April 4, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to
take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of
the army together, and somewhat toward a common centre.  For your
information I now write you my programme, as at present determined
upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his
present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn
over the defense of Red River to General Steels and the navy, and
to return your troops to you, and his own to New Orleans; to
abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with
not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on
the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to
collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men.
To this I will add five thousand from Missouri.  With this force he
is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can.  It
will be impossible for him to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate
against Richmond from the south aide of James River.  This will
give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W. F. Smith
commanding the right wing of his forces, and Gillmore the left
wing.  I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by
Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective
men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be
found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under
Ord and Averill, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other,
under Crook, to start from Charleston, on the Kanawha, to move
against the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about
Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord.  His force will be
all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of
all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and
to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can,
inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply
to lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you
free to execute it in your own way.  Submit to me, however, as
early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he
can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th
inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable.  Sigel is
concentrating now.  None will move from their places of rendezvous
until I direct, except Banks.  I want to be ready to move by the
25th inst., if possible; but all I can now direct is that you get
ready as soon as possible.  I know you will have difficulties to
encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are
abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not
calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can take
troops from there.  With the long line of railroad Sigel has to
protect, he can spare no troops, except to move directly to his
front.  In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on
the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large
force to prevent it.  In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself,
he can hold a leg while some one else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 10, 1864

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D.

DEAR GENERAL: Your two letters of April 4th are now before me, and
afford me infinite satisfaction.  That we are now all to act on a
common plan, converging on a common centre, looks like enlightened
war.

Like yourself, you take the biggest load, and from me you shall
have thorough and hearty cooperation.  I will not let side issues
draw me off from your main plans in which I am to knock Jos.
Johnston, and to do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as
possible.  I have heretofore written to General Rawlins and to
Colonel Comstock (of your staff) somewhat of the method in which I
propose to act.  I have seen all my army, corps, and division
commanders, and have signified only to the former, viz., Schofield,
Thomas, and McPherson, our general plans, which I inferred from the
purport of our conversation here and at Cincinnati.

First, I am pushing stores to the front with all possible dispatch,
and am completing the army organization according to the orders
from Washington, which are ample and perfectly satisfactory.

It will take us all of April to get in our furloughed veterans, to
bring up A. J. Smith's command, and to collect provisions and
cattle on the line of the Tennessee.  Each of the armies will
guard, by detachments of its own, its rear communications.

At the signal to be given by you, Schofield, leaving a select
garrison at Knoxville and London, with twelve thousand men will
drop down to the Hiawassee, and march against Johnston's right by
the old Federal road.  Stoneman, now in Kentucky, organizing the
cavalry forces of the Army of the Ohio, will operate with Schofield
on his left front--it may be, pushing a select body of about two
thousand cavalry by Ducktown or Elijah toward Athens, Georgia.

Thomas will aim to have forty-five thousand men of all arms, and
move straight against Johnston, wherever he may be, fighting him
cautiously, persistently, and to the best advantage.  He will have
two divisions of cavalry, to take advantage of any offering.

McPherson will have nine divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, if
A. J. Smith gets here, in which case he will have full thirty
thousand of the best men in America.  He will cross the Tennessee
at Decatur and Whitesburg, march toward Rome, and feel for Thomas.
If Johnston falls behind the Coosa, then McPherson will push for
Rome; and if Johnston falls behind the Chattahoochee, as I believe
he will, then McPherson will cross over and join Thomas.

McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas's
divisions, viz., Garrard's, six thousand strong, which is now at
Colombia, mounting, equipping, and preparing.  I design this
division to operate on McPherson's right, rear, or front, according
as the enemy appears.  But the moment I detect Johnston falling
behind the Chattahoochee, I propose to cast off the effective part
of this cavalry division, after crossing the Coosa, straight for
Opelika, West Point, Columbus, or Wetumpka, to break up the road
between Montgomery and Georgia.  If Garrard can do this work well,
he can return to the Union army; but should a superior force
interpose, then he will seek safety at Pensacola and join Banks,
or, after rest, will act against any force that he can find east of
Mobile, till such time as he can reach me.

Should Johnston fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will feign to the
right, but pass to the left and act against Atlanta or its eastern
communications, according to developed facts.

This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed, to look, but I will
ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy
that he cannot in any event send any part of his command against
you or Banks.

If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama
River, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my
problem, viz., "provisions." But in that I must venture.  Georgia
has a million of inhabitants.  If they can live, we should not
starve.  If the enemy interrupt our communications, I will be
absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, and
will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever we
can find. I will inspire my command, if successful, with the
feeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely necessary to
life, and that parched corn once fed General Jackson's army on that
very ground.
As ever, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.




HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CULPEPPER COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA, April 19, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: Since my letter to you of April 4th I have seen no reason
to change any portion of the general plan of campaign, if the enemy
remain still and allow us to take the initiative.  Rain has
continued so uninterruptedly until the last day or two that it will
be impossible to move, however, before the 27th, even if no more
should fall in the meantime.  I think Saturday, the 30th, will
probably be the day for our general move.

Colonel Comstock, who will take this, can spend a day with you, and
fill up many little gaps of information not given in any of my
letters.

What I now want more particularly to say is, that if the two main
attacks, yours and the one from here, should promise great success,
the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their
line of defense, and throw their whole strength upon the other,
believing a single defeat without any victory to sustain them
better than a defeat all along their line, and hoping too, at the
same time, that the army, meeting with no resistance, will rest
perfectly satisfied with their laurels, having penetrated to a
given point south, thereby enabling them to throw their force first
upon one and then on the other.

With the majority of military commanders they might do this.

But you have had too much experience in traveling light, and
subsisting upon the country, to be caught by any such ruse.  I hope
my experience has not been thrown away.  My directions, then, would
be, if the enemy in your front show signs of joining Lee, follow
him up to the full extent of your ability.  I will prevent the
concentration of Lee upon your front, if it is in the power of this
army to do it.

The Army of the Potomac looks well, and, so far as I can judge,
officers and men feel well.  Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 24, 1864

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief,
Culpepper, Virginia

GENERAL: I now have, at the hands of Colonel Comstock, of your
staff, the letter of April 19th, and am as far prepared to assume
the offensive as possible.  I only ask as much time as you think
proper, to enable me to get up McPherson's two divisions from
Cairo.  Their furloughs will expire about this time, and some of
them should now be in motion for Clifton, whence they will march to
Decatur, to join General Dodge.

McPherson is ordered to assemble the Fifteenth Corps near Larkin's,
and to get the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps (Dodge and Blair) at
Decatur at the earliest possible moment.  From these two points he
will direct his forces on Lebanon, Summerville, and Lafayette,
where he will act against Johnston, if he accept battle at Dalton;
or move in the direction of Rome, if the enemy give up Dalton, and
fall behind the Oostenaula or Etowah.  I see that there is some
risk in dividing our forces, but Thomas and Schofield will have
strength enough to cover all the valleys as far as Dalton; and,
should Johnston turn his whole force against McPherson, the latter
will have his bridge at Larkin's, and the route to Chattanooga via
Willa's Valley and the Chattanooga Creek, open for retreat; and if
Johnston attempt to leave Dalton, Thomas will have force enough to
push on through Dalton to Kingston, which will checkmate him.  My
own opinion is that Johnston will be compelled to hang to his
railroad, the only possible avenue of supply to his army, estimated
at from forty-five to sixty thousand men.

At Lafayette all our armies will be together, and if Johnston
stands at Dalton we must attack him in position.  Thomas feels
certain that he has no material increase of force, and that he has
not sent away Hardee, or any part of his army.  Supplies are the
great question.  I have materially increased the number of cars
daily.  When I got here, the average was from sixty-five to eighty
per day.  Yesterday the report was one hundred and ninety-three;
to-day, one hundred and thirty-four; and my estimate is that one
hundred and forty-five cars per day will give us a day's supply and
a day's accumulation.

McPherson is ordered to carry in wagons twenty day's rations, and
to rely on the depot at Ringgold for the renewal of his bread.
Beeves are now being driven on the hoof to the front; and the
commissary, Colonel Beckwith, seems fully alive to the importance
of the whole matter.

Our weakest point will be from the direction of Decatur, and I will
be forced to risk something from that quarter, depending on the
fact that the enemy has no force available with which to threaten
our communications from that direction.

Colonel Comstock will explain to you personally much that I cannot
commit to paper.  I am, with great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


On the 28th of April I removed my headquarters to Chattanooga, and
prepared for taking the field in person.  General Grant had first
indicated the 30th of April as the day for the simultaneous
advance, but subsequently changed the day to May 5th.  McPhersons
troops were brought forward rapidly to Chattanooga, partly by rail
and partly by marching.  Thomas's troops were already in position
(his advance being out as far as Ringgold-eighteen miles), and
Schofield was marching down by Cleveland to Red Clay and Catoosa
Springs.  On the 4th of May, Thomas was in person at Ringgold, his
left at Catoosa, and his right at Leet's Tan-yard.  Schofield was
at Red Clay, closing upon Thomas's left; and McPherson was moving
rapidly into Chattanooga, and out toward Gordon's Mill.

On the 5th I rode out to Ringgold, and on the very day appointed by
General Grant from his headquarters in Virginia the great campaign
was begun.  To give all the minute details will involve more than
is contemplated, and I will endeavor only to trace the principal
events, or rather to record such as weighed heaviest on my own mind
at the time, and which now remain best fixed in my memory.

My general headquarters and official records remained back at
Nashville, and I had near me only my personal staff and
inspectors-general, with about half a dozen wagons, and a single
company of Ohio sharp-shooters (commanded by Lieutenant McCrory) as
headquarters or camp guard.  I also had a small company of
irregular Alabama cavalry (commanded by Lieutenant Snelling), used
mostly as orderlies and couriers.  No wall-tents were allowed, only
the flies.  Our mess establishment was less in bulk than that of
any of the brigade commanders; nor was this from an indifference to
the ordinary comforts of life, but because I wanted to set the
example, and gradually to convert all parts of that army into a
mobile machine, willing and able to start at a minute's notice, and
to subsist on the scantiest food.  To reap absolute success might
involve the necessity even of dropping all wagons, and to subsist
on the chance food which the country was known to contain.  I had
obtained not only the United States census-tables of 1860, but a
compilation made by the Controller of the State of Georgia for the
purpose of taxation, containing in considerable detail the
"population and statistics" of every county in Georgia.  One of my
aides (Captain Dayton) acted as assistant adjutant general, with an
order-book, letter-book, and writing-paper, that filled a small
chest not much larger than an ordinary candle-boa.  The only
reports and returns called for were the ordinary tri-monthly
returns of "effective strength."  As these accumulated they were
sent back to Nashville, and afterward were embraced in the archives
of the Military Division of the Mississippi, changed in 1865 to the
Military Division of the Missouri, and I suppose they were burned
in the Chicago fire of 1870.  Still, duplicates remain of all
essential papers in the archives of the War Department.

The 6th of May was given to Schofield and McPherson to get into
position, and on the 7th General Thomas moved in force against
Tunnel Hill, driving off a mere picket-guard of the enemy, and I
was agreeably surprised to find that no damage had been done to the
tunnel or the railroad.  From Tunnel Hill I could look into the
gorge by which the railroad passed through a straight and
well-defined range of mountains, presenting sharp palisade faces,
and known as "Rocky Face."  The gorge itself was called the
"Buzzard Roost."  We could plainly see the enemy in this gorge and
behind it, and Mill Creek which formed the gorge, flowing toward
Dalton, had been dammed up, making a sort of irregular lake,
filling the road, thereby obstructing it, and the enemy's batteries
crowned the cliffs on either side.  The position was very strong,
and I knew that such a general as was my antagonist (Jos.
Johnston), who had been there six months, had fortified it to the
maximum.  Therefore I had no intention to attack the position
seriously in front, but depended on McPherson to capture and hold
the railroad to its rear, which would force Johnston to detach
largely against him, or rather, as I expected, to evacuate his
position at Dalton altogether.  My orders to Generals Thomas and
Schofield were merely to press strongly at all points in front,
ready to rush in on the first appearance of "let go," and, if
possible, to catch our enemy in the confusion of retreat.

All the movements of the 7th and 8th were made exactly as ordered,
and the enemy seemed quiescent, acting purely on the defensive.

I had constant communication with all parts of the army, and on the
9th McPherson's head of column entered and passed through Snake
Creek, perfectly undefended, and accomplished a complete surprise
to the enemy.  At its farther debouche he met a cavalry brigade,
easily driven, which retreated hastily north toward Dalton, and
doubtless carried to Johnston the first serious intimation that a
heavy force of infantry and artillery was to his rear and within a
few miles of his railroad.  I got a short note from McPherson that
day (written at 2 p.m., when he was within a mile and a half of the
railroad, above and near Resaca), and we all felt jubilant.  I
renewed orders to Thomas and Schofield to be ready for the instant
pursuit of what I expected to be a broken and disordered army,
forced to retreat by roads to the east of Resaca, which were known
to be very rough and impracticable.

That night I received further notice from McPherson that he had
found Resaca too strong for a surprise; that in consequence he had
fallen back three miles to the month of Snake Creek Gap, and was
there fortified.  I wrote him the next day the following letters,
copies of which are in my letter-book; but his to me were mere
notes in pencil, not retained.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, TUNNEL HILL, GEORGIA, May 11, 1864

Major-General McPHERSON, commanding army of the Tennessee,
Sugar Valley, Georgia.


GENERAL: I received by courier (in the night) yours of 5 and 8.30
P. M. of yesterday.

You now have your twenty-three thousand men, and General Hooker is
in close support, so that you can hold all of Jos. Johnston's army
in check should he abandon Dalton.  He cannot afford to abandon
Dalton, for he has fixed it up on purpose to receive us, and he
observes that we are close at hand, waiting for him to quit.  He
cannot afford a detachment strong enough to fight you, as his army
will not admit of it.

Strengthen your position; fight any thing that comes; and threaten
the safety of the railroad all the time.  But, to tell the truth, I
would rather the enemy would stay in Dalton two more days, when he
may find in his rear a larger party than he expects in an open
field.  At all events, we can then choose our own ground, and he
will be forced to move out of his works.  I do not intend to put a
column into Buzzard-Roost Gap at present.

See that you are in easy communication with me and with all
head-quarters.  After to-day the supplies will be at Ringgold.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, TUNNEL HILL, GEORGIA, May 11, 1864-Evening

Major-General McPHERSON, commanding army of the Tennessee,
Sugar Valley, Georgia

GENERAL: The indications are that Johnston is evacuating Dalton.
In that event, Howard's corps and the cavalry will pursue; all the
rest will follow your route.  I will be down early in the morning.

Try to strike him if possible about the forks of the road.

Hooker must be with you now, and you may send General Garrard by
Summerville to threaten Rome and that flank.  I will cause all the
lines to be felt at once.

W. T. SHERMAN, major-general commanding.



McPherson had startled Johnston in his fancied security, but had
not done the full measure of his work.  He had in hand twenty-three
thousand of the best men of the army, and could have walked into
Resaca (then held only by a small brigade), or he could have placed
his whole force astride the railroad above Resaca, and there have
easily withstood the attack of all of Johnston's army, with the
knowledge that Thomas and Schofield were on his heels.  Had he done
so, I am certain that Johnston would not have ventured to attack
him in position, but would have retreated eastward by Spring Place,
and we should have captured half his army and all his artillery and
wagons at the very beginning of the campaign.

Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life, but at
the critical moment McPherson seems to have been a little cautious.
Still, he was perfectly justified by his orders, and fell back and
assumed an unassailable defensive position in Sugar Valley, on the
Resaca side of Snake-Creek Gap.  As soon as informed of this, I
determined to pass the whole army through Snake-Creek Gap, and to
move on Resaca with the main army.

But during the 10th, the enemy showed no signs of evacuating
Dalton, and I was waiting for the arrival of Garrard's and
Stoneman's cavalry, known to be near at hand, so as to secure the
full advantages of victory, of which I felt certain.  Hooker's
Twentieth Corps was at once moved down to within easy supporting
distance of McPherson; and on the 11th, perceiving signs of
evacuation of Dalton, I gave all the orders for the general
movement, leaving the Fourth Corps (Howard) and Stoneman's cavalry
in observation in front of Buzzard-Roost Gap, and directing all the
rest of the army to march through Snake-Creek Gap, straight on
Resaca.  The roads were only such as the country afforded, mere
rough wagon-ways, and these converged to the single narrow track
through Snake-Creek Gap; but during the 12th and 13th the bulk of
Thomas's and Schofield's armies were got through, and deployed
against Resaca, McPherson on the right, Thomas in the centre, and
Schofield on the left.  Johnston, as I anticipated, had abandoned
all his well-prepared defenses at Dalton, and was found inside of
Resaca with the bulk of his army, holding his divisions well in
hand, acting purely on the defensive, and fighting well at all
points of conflict.  A complete line of intrenchments was found
covering the place, and this was strongly manned at all points.  On
the 14th we closed in, enveloping the town on its north and west,
and during the 15th we had a day of continual battle and skirmish.
At the same time I caused two pontoon-bridges to be laid across the
Oostenaula River at Lay's Ferry, about three miles below the town,
by which we could threaten Calhoun, a station on the railroad seven
miles below Resaca.  At the same time, May 14th, I dispatched
General Garrard, with his cavalry division, down the Oostenaula by
the Rome road, with orders to cross over, if possible, and to
attack or threaten the railroad at any point below Calhoun and
above Kingston.

During the 15th, without attempting to assault the fortified works,
we pressed at all points, and the sound of cannon and musketry rose
all day to the dignity of a battle.  Toward evening McPherson moved
his whole line of battle forward, till he had gained a ridge
overlooking the town, from which his field-artillery could reach
the railroad-bridge across the Oostenaula.  The enemy made several
attempts to drive him away, repeating the sallies several times,
and extending them into the night; but in every instance he was
repulsed with bloody loss.

Hooker's corps had also some heavy and handsome fighting that
afternoon and night on the left, where the Dalton roan entered the
intrenchments, capturing a four-gun intrenched battery, with its
men and guns; and generally all our men showed the finest fighting
qualities.

Howard's corps had followed Johnston down from Dalton, and was in
line; Stoneman's division of cavalry had also got up, and was on
the extreme left, beyond the Oostenaula.

On the night of May 15th Johnston got his army across the bridges,
set them on fire, and we entered Resaca at daylight.  Our loss up
to that time was about six hundred dead and thirty-three hundred
and seventy-five wounded--mostly light wounds that did not
necessitate sending the men to the rear for treatment.  That
Johnston had deliberately designed in advance to give up such
strong positions as Dalton and Resaca, for the purpose of drawing
us farther south, is simply absurd.  Had he remained in Dalton
another hour, it would have been his total defeat, and he only
evacuated Resaca because his safety demanded it.  The movement by
us through Snake-Creek Gap was a total surprise to him.  My army
about doubled his in size, but he had all the advantages of natural
positions, of artificial forts and roads, and of concentrated
action.  We were compelled to grope our way through forests, across
mountains, with a large army, necessarily more or less dispersed.
Of course, I was disappointed not to have crippled his, army more
at that particular stage of the game; but, as it resulted, these
rapid successes gave us the initiative, and the usual impulse of a
conquering army.

Johnston having retreated in the night of May 15th, immediate
pursuit was begun.  A division of infantry (Jeff. C. Davis's) was
at once dispatched down the valley toward Rome, to support
Garrard's cavalry, and the whole army was ordered to pursue,
McPherson by Lay's Ferry, on the right, Thomas directly by the
railroad, and Schofield by the left, by the old road that crossed
the Oostenaula above Echota or Newtown.

We hastily repaired the railroad bridge at Resaca, which had been
partially burned, and built a temporary floating bridge out of
timber and materials found on the spot; so that Thomas got his
advance corps over during the 16th, and marched as far as Calhoun,
where he came into communication with McPherson's troops, which had
crossed the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry by our pontoon-bridges,
previously laid.  Inasmuch as the bridge at Resaca was overtaxed,
Hooker's Twentieth Corps was also diverted to cross by the fords
and ferries above Resaca, in the neighborhood of Echota.

On the 17th, toward evening, the head of Thomas's column, Newton's
division, encountered the rear-guard of Johnston's army near
Adairsville.  I was near the head of column at the time, trying to
get a view of the position of the enemy from an elevation in an
open field.  My party attracted the fire of a battery; a shell
passed through the group of staff-officers and burst just beyond,
which scattered us promptly.  The next morning the enemy had
disappeared, and our pursuit was continued to Kingston, which we
reached during Sunday forenoon, the 19th.

From Resaca the railroad runs nearly due south, but at Kingston it
makes junction with another railroad from Rome, and changes
direction due east. At that time McPherson's head of column was
about four miles to the west of Kingston, at a country place called
"Woodlawn;" Schofield and Hooker were on the direct roads leading
from Newtown to Casaville, diagonal to the route followed by
Thomas.  Thomas's head of column, which had followed the country
roads alongside of the railroad, was about four miles east of
Kingston, toward Cassville, when about noon I got a message from
him that he had found the enemy, drawn up in line of battle, on
some extensive, open ground, about half-way between Kingston and
Cassville, and that appearances indicated a willingness and
preparation for battle.

Hurriedly sending orders to McPherson to resume the march, to
hasten forward by roads leading to the south of Kingston, so as to
leave for Thomas's troops and trains the use of the main road, and
to come up on his right, I rode forward rapidly, over some rough
gravel hills, and about six miles from Kingston found General
Thomas, with his troops deployed; but he reported that the enemy
had fallen back in echelon of divisions, steadily and in superb
order, into Cassville.  I knew that the roads by which Generals
Hooker and Schofield were approaching would lead them to a seminary
near Cassville, and that it was all-important to secure the point
of junction of these roads with the main road along which we were
marching.  Therefore I ordered General Thomas to push forward his
deployed lines as rapidly as possible; and, as night was
approaching, I ordered two field-batteries to close up at a gallop
on some woods which lay between us and the town of Cassville.  We
could not see the town by reason of these woods, but a high range
of hills just back of the town was visible over the tree-tops.  On
these hills could be seen fresh-made parapets, and the movements of
men, against whom I directed the artillery to fire at long range.
The stout resistance made by the enemy along our whole front of a
couple of miles indicated a purpose to fight at Cassville; and, as
the night was closing in, General Thomas and I were together, along
with our skirmish-lines near the seminary, on the edge of the town,
where musket-bullets from the enemy were cutting the leaves of the
trees pretty thickly about us.  Either Thomas or I remarked that
that was not the place for the two senior officers of a great army,
and we personally went back to the battery, where we passed the
night on the ground.  During the night I had reports from
McPherson, Hooker, and Schofield.  The former was about five miles
to my right rear, near the "nitre-caves;" Schofield was about six
miles north, and Hooker between us, within two miles.  All were
ordered to close down on Cassville at daylight, and to attack the
enemy wherever found.  Skirmishing was kept up all night, but when
day broke the next morning, May 20th, the enemy was gone, and our
cavalry was sent in pursuit.  These reported him beyond the Etowah
River.  We were then well in advance of our railroad-trains, on
which we depended for supplies; so I determined to pause a few days
to repair the railroad, which had been damaged but little, except
at the bridge at Resaca, and then to go on.

Nearly all the people of the country seemed to have fled with
Johnston's army; yet some few families remained, and from one of
them I procured the copy of an order which Johnston had made at
Adairsville, in which he recited that he had retreated as far as
strategy required, and that his army must be prepared for battle at
Cassville.  The newspapers of the South, many of which we found,
were also loud in denunciation of Johnston's falling back before us
without a serious battle, simply resisting by his skirmish-lines
and by his rear-guard.  But his friends proclaimed that it was all
strategic; that he was deliberately drawing us farther and farther
into the meshes, farther and farther away from our base of
supplies, and that in due season he would not only halt for battle,
but assume the bold offensive.  Of course it was to my interest to
bring him to battle as soon as possible, when our numerical
superiority was at the greatest; for he was picking up his
detachments as he fell back, whereas I was compelled to make
similar and stronger detachments to repair the railroads as we
advanced, and to guard them.  I found at Cassville many evidences
of preparation for a grand battle, among them a long line of fresh
intrenchments on the hill beyond the town, extending nearly three
miles to the south, embracing the railroad-crossing.  I was also
convinced that the whole of Polk's corps had joined Johnston from
Mississippi, and that he had in hand three full corps, viz.,
Hood's, Polk's, and Hardee's, numbering about sixty thousand men,
and could not then imagine why he had declined battle, and did not
learn the real reason till after the war was over, and then from
General Johnston himself.

In the autumn of 1865, when in command of the Military Division of
the Missouri, I went from St. Louis to Little Rock, Arkansas, and
afterward to Memphis.  Taking a steamer for Cairo, I found as
fellow-passengers Generals Johnston and Frank Blair.  We were, of
course, on the most friendly terms, and on our way up we talked
over our battles again, played cards, and questioned each other as
to particular parts of our mutual conduct in the game of war.  I
told Johnston that I had seen his order of preparation, in the
nature of an address to his army, announcing his purpose to retreat
no more, but to accept battle at Cassville.  He answered that such
was his purpose; that he had left Hardee's corps in the open fields
to check Thomas, and gain time for his formation on the ridge, just
behind Cassville; and it was this corps which General Thomas had
seen deployed, and whose handsome movement in retreat he had
reported in such complimentary terms.  Johnston described how he
had placed Hood's corps on the right, Polk's in the centre, and
Hardee's on the left.  He said he had ridden over the ground, given
to each corps commander his position, and orders to throw up
parapets during the night; that he was with Hardee on his extreme
left as the night closed in, and as Hardee's troops fell back to
the position assigned them for the intended battle of the next day;
and that, after giving Hardee some general instructions, he and his
staff rode back to Cassville.  As he entered the town, or village,
he met Generals Hood and Polk.  Hood inquired of him if he had had
any thing to eat, and he said no, that he was both hungry and
tired, when Hood invited him to go and share a supper which had
been prepared for him at a house close by.  At the supper they
discussed the chances of the impending battle, when Hood spoke of
the ground assigned him as being enfiladed by our (Union)
artillery, which Johnston disputed, when General Polk chimed in
with the remark that General Hood was right; that the cannon-shots
fired by us at nightfall had enfiladed their general line of
battle, and that for this reason he feared they could not hold
their men.  General Johnston was surprised at this, for he
understood General Hood to be one of those who professed to
criticise his strategy, contending that, instead of retreating, he
should have risked a battle.  General Johnston said he was
provoked, accused them of having been in conference, with being
beaten before battle, and added that he was unwilling to engage in
a critical battle with an army so superior to his own in numbers,
with two of his three corps commanders dissatisfied with the ground
and positions assigned them.  He then and there made up his mind to
retreat still farther south, to put the Etowah River and the
Allatoona range between us; and he at once gave orders to resume
the retrograde movement.

This was my recollection of the substance of the conversation, of
which I made no note at the time; but, at a meeting of the Society
of the Army of the Cumberland some years after, at Cleveland, Ohio,
about 1868, in a short after-dinner speech, I related this
conversation, and it got into print.  Subsequently, in the spring
of 1870, when I was at New Orleans, on route for Texas, General
Hood called to see me at the St. Charles Hotel, explained that he
had seen my speech reprinted in the newspapers and gave me his
version of the same event, describing the halt at Cassville, the
general orders for battle on that ground, and the meeting at supper
with Generals Johnston and Polk, when the chances of the battle to
be fought the next day were freely and fully discussed; and he
stated that he had argued against fighting the battle purely on the
defensive, but had asked General Johnston to permit him with his
own corps and part of Polk's to quit their lines, and to march
rapidly to attack and overwhelm Schofield, who was known to be
separated from Thomas by an interval of nearly five miles, claiming
that he could have defeated Schofield, and got back to his position
in time to meet General Thomas's attack in front.  He also stated
that he had then contended with Johnston for the "offensive-
defensive" game, instead of the "pure defensive," as proposed by
General Johnston; and he said that it was at this time that General
Johnston had taken offense, and that it was for this reason he had
ordered the retreat that night.  As subsequent events estranged
these two officers, it is very natural they should now differ on
this point; but it was sufficient for us that the rebel army did
retreat that night, leaving us masters of all the country above the
Etowah River.

For the purposes of rest, to give time for the repair of the
railroads, and to replenish supplies, we lay by some few days in
that quarter--Schofield with Stoneman's cavalry holding the ground
at Cassville Depot, Cartersville, and the Etowah Bridge; Thomas
holding his ground near Cassville, and McPherson that near
Kingston.  The officer intrusted with the repair of the railroads
was Colonel W. W. Wright, a railroad-engineer, who, with about two
thousand men, was so industrious and skillful that the bridge at
Resaca was rebuilt in three days, and cars loaded with stores came
forward to Kingston on the 24th.  The telegraph also brought us the
news of the bloody and desperate battles of the Wilderness, in
Virginia, and that General Grant was pushing his operations against
Lee with terrific energy.  I was therefore resolved to give my
enemy no rest.

In early days (1844), when a lieutenant of the Third Artillery, I
had been sent from Charleston, South Carolina, to Marietta,
Georgia, to assist Inspector-General Churchill to take testimony
concerning certain losses of horses and accoutrements by the
Georgia Volunteers during the Florida War; and after completing the
work at Marietta we transferred our party over to Bellefonte,
Alabama.  I had ridden the distance on horseback, and had noted
well the topography of the country, especially that about Kenesaw,
Allatoona, and the Etowah River.  On that occasion I had stopped
some days with a Colonel Tumlin, to see some remarkable Indian
mounds on the Etowah River, usually called the "Hightower:" I
therefore knew that the Allatoona Pass was very strong, would be
hard to force, and resolved not even to attempt it, but to turn the
position, by moving from Kingston to Marietta via. Dallas;
accordingly I made orders on the 20th to get ready for the march to
begin on the 23d.  The Army of the Cumberland was ordered to march
for Dallas, by Euharlee and Stilesboro; Davis's division, then in
Rome, by Van Wert; the Army of the Ohio to keep on the left of
Thomas, by a place called Burnt Hickory; and the Army of the
Tennessee to march for a position a little to the south, so as to
be on the right of the general army, when grouped about Dallas.

The movement contemplated leaving our railroad, and to depend for
twenty days on the contents of our wagons; and as the country was
very obscure, mostly in a state of nature, densely wooded, and with
few roads, our movements were necessarily slow.  We crossed the
Etowah by several bridges and fords, and took as many roads as
possible, keeping up communication by cross-roads, or by couriers
through the woods.  I personally joined General Thomas, who had the
centre, and was consequently the main column, or "column of
direction."  The several columns followed generally the valley of
the Euharlee, a tributary coming into the Etowah from the south,
and gradually crossed over a ridge of mountains, parts of which had
once been worked over for gold, and were consequently full of paths
and unused wagon-roads or tracks.  A cavalry picket of the enemy at
Burnt Hickory was captured, and had on his person an order from
General Johnston, dated at Allatoona, which showed that he had
detected my purpose of turning his position, and it accordingly
became necessary to use great caution, lest some of the minor
columns should fall into ambush, but, luckily the enemy was not
much more familiar with that part of the country than we were.  On
the other side of the Allatoona range, the Pumpkin-Vine Creek, also
a tributary of the Etowah, flowed north and west; Dallas, the point
aimed at, was a small town on the other or east side of this creek,
and was the point of concentration of a great many roads that led
in every direction.  Its possession would be a threat to Marietta
and Atlanta, but I could not then venture to attempt either, till I
had regained the use of the railroad, at least as far down as its
debouche from the Allatoona range of mountains.  Therefore, the
movement was chiefly designed to compel Johnston to give up
Allatoona.

On the 25th all the columns were moving steadily on Dallas
--McPherson and Davis away off to the right, near Van Wert; Thomas on
the main road in the centre, with Hooker's Twentieth Corps ahead,
toward Dallas; and Schofield to the left rear.  For the convenience
of march, Hooker had his three divisions on separate roads, all
leading toward Dallas, when, in the afternoon, as he approached a
bridge across Pumpkin-Vine Creek, he found it held by a cavalry
force, which was driven off, but the bridge was on fire.  This fire
was extinguished, and Hooker's leading division (Geary's) followed
the retreating cavalry on a road leading due east toward Marietta,
instead of Dallas.  This leading division, about four miles out from
the bridge, struck a heavy infantry force, which was moving down from
Allatoona toward Dallas, and a sharp battle ensued.  I came up in
person soon after, and as my map showed that we were near an
important cross-road called "New Hope," from a Methodist
meeting-house there of that name, I ordered General Hooker to secure
it if possible that night.  He asked for a short delay, till he could
bring up his other two divisions, viz., of Butterfield and Williams,
but before these divisions had got up and were deployed, the enemy
had also gained corresponding strength.  The woods were so dense, and
the resistance so spirited, that Hooker could not carry the position,
though the battle was noisy, and prolonged far into the night.  This
point, "New Hope," was the accidental intersection of the road
leading from Allatoona to Dallas with that from Van Wert to Marietta,
was four miles northeast of Dallas, and from the bloody fighting
there for the next week was called by the soldiers "Hell-Hole."

The night was pitch-dark, it rained hard, and the convergence of
our columns toward Dallas produced much confusion.  I am sure
similar confusion existed in the army opposed to us, for we were
all mixed up.  I slept on the ground, without cover, alongside of a
log, got little sleep, resolved at daylight to renew the battle,
and to make a lodgment on the Dallas and Allatoona road if
possible, but the morning revealed a strong line of intrenchments
facing us, with a heavy force of infantry and guns.  The battle was
renewed, and without success.  McPherson reached Dallas that
morning, viz., the 26th, and deployed his troops to the southeast
and east of the town, placing Davis's division of the Fourteenth
Corps, which had joined him on the road from Rome, on his left; but
this still left a gap of at least three miles between Davis and
Hooker.  Meantime, also, General Schofield was closing up on
Thomas's left.

Satisfied that Johnston in person was at New Hope with all his
army, and that it was so much nearer my "objective;" the railroad,
than Dallas, I concluded to draw McPherson from Dallas to Hooker's
right, and gave orders accordingly; but McPherson also was
confronted with a heavy force, and, as he began to withdraw
according to his orders, on the morning of the 28th he was fiercely
assailed on his right; a bloody battle ensued, in which he repulsed
the attack, inflicting heavy loss on his assailants, and it was not
until the 1st of June that he was enabled to withdraw from Dallas,
and to effect a close junction with Hooker in front of New Hope.
Meantime Thomas and Schofield were completing their deployments,
gradually overlapping Johnston on his right, and thus extending our
left nearer and nearer to the railroad, the nearest point of which
was Acworth, about eight miles distant.  All this time a continual
battle was in progress by strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage
of every species of cover, and both parties fortifying each night
by rifle-trenches, with head-logs, many of which grew to be as
formidable as first-class works of defense.  Occasionally one party
or the other would make a dash in the nature of a sally, but
usually it sustained a repulse with great loss of life.  I visited
personally all parts of our lines nearly every day, was constantly
within musket-range, and though the fire of musketry and cannon
resounded day and night along the whole line, varying from six to
ten miles, I rarely saw a dozen of the enemy at any one time; and
these were always skirmishers dodging from tree to tree, or behind
logs on the ground, or who occasionally showed their heads above
the hastily-constructed but remarkably strong rifle-trenches.  On
the occasion of my visit to McPherson on the 30th of May, while
standing with a group of officers, among whom were Generals
McPherson, Logan, Barry, and Colonel Taylor, my former chief of
artillery, a Minie-ball passed through Logan's coat-sleeve,
scratching the skin, and struck Colonel Taylor square in the
breast; luckily he had in his pocket a famous memorandum-book, in
which he kept a sort of diary, about which we used to joke him a
good deal; its thickness and size saved his life, breaking the
force of the ball, so that after traversing the book it only
penetrated the breast to the ribs, but it knocked him down and
disabled him for the rest of the campaign.  He was a most competent
and worthy officer, and now lives in poverty in Chicago, sustained
in part by his own labor, and in part by a pitiful pension recently
granted.

On the 1st of June General McPherson closed in upon the right, and,
without attempting further to carry the enemy's strong position at
New Hope Church, I held our general right in close contact with it,
gradually, carefully, and steadily working by the left, until our
strong infantry-lines had reached and secured possession of all the
wagon-roads between New Hope, Allatoona, and Acworth, when I
dispatched Generals Garrard's and Stoneman's divisions of cavalry
into Allatoona, the first around by the west end of the pass, and
the latter by the direct road.  Both reached their destination
without opposition, and orders were at once given to repair the
railroad forward from Kingston to Allatoona, embracing the bridge
across the Etowah River.  Thus the real object of my move on Dallas
was accomplished, and on the 4th of June I was preparing to draw
off from New Hope Church, and to take position on the railroad in
front of Allatoona, when, General Johnston himself having evacuated
his position, we effected the change without further battle, and
moved to the railroad, occupying it from Allatoona and Acworth
forward to Big Shanty, in sight of the famous Kenesaw Mountain.

Thus, substantially in the month of May, we had steadily driven our
antagonist from the strong positions of Dalton, Resaea, Cassville,
Allatoona, and Dallas; had advanced our lines in strong, compact
order from Chattanooga to Big Shanty, nearly a hundred miles of as
difficult country as was ever fought over by civilized armies; and
thus stood prepared to go on, anxious to fight, and confident of
success as soon as the railroad communications were complete to
bring forward the necessary supplies.  It is now impossible to
state accurately our loss of life and men in any one separate
battle; for the fighting was continuous, almost daily, among trees
and bushes, on ground where one could rarely see a hundred yards
ahead.

The aggregate loss in the several corps for the month of May is
reported-as follows in the usual monthly returns sent to the
Adjutant-General's office, which are, therefore, official:

Casualties during the Month of May, 1864
(Major-General SHERMAN commanding).

            Killed and Missing.      Wounded.       Total.
                1,863                 7,436         9,299



General Joseph E.  Johnston, in his "Narrative of his Military
Operations," just published (March 27, 1874), gives the effective
strength of his army at and about Dalton on the 1st of May, 1864
(page 302), as follows:

Infantry..................... 37,652
Artillery....................  2,812
Cavalry......................  2,392

    Total ................... 42,856



During May, and prior to reaching Cassville, he was further
reenforced (page 352)

Polk's corps of three divisions....... 12,000
Martin's division of cavalry..........  3,500
Jackson's division of cavalry.........  3,900

And at New Hope Church, May 26th

Brigade of Quarles....................  2,200

         Grand-total.................. 64,456


His losses during the month of May are stated by him, as taken from
the report of Surgeon Foard (page 325)


            Killed       Wounded       Total
             721          4,672        5,393


These figures include only the killed and wounded, whereas my
statement of losses embraces the "missing," which are usually
"prisoners," and of these we captured, during the whole campaign of
four and a half months, exactly 12,983, whose names, rank, and
regiments, were officially reported to the Commissary-General of
Prisoners; and assuming a due proportion for the month of May,
viz., one-fourth, makes 3,245 to be added to the killed and wounded
given above, making an aggregate loss in Johnston's army, from
Dalton to New Hope, inclusive, of 8,638, against ours of 9,299.

Therefore General Johnston is greatly in error, in his estimates on
page 357, in stating our loss, as compared with his, at six or ten
to one.

I always estimated my force at about double his, and could afford
to lose two to one without disturbing our relative proportion; but
I also reckoned that, in the natural strength of the country, in
the abundance of mountains, streams, and forests, he had a fair
offset to our numerical superiority, and therefore endeavored to
act with reasonable caution while moving on the vigorous
"offensive."

With the drawn battle of New Hope Church, and our occupation of the
natural fortress of Allatoona, terminated the month of May, and the
first stage of the campaign.




CHAPTER XVII.

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN--BATTLES ABOUT KENESAW MOUNTAIN.

JUNE, 1864.


On the 1st of June our three armies were well in hand, in the
broken and densely-wooded country fronting the enemy intrenched at
New Hope Church, about five miles north of Dallas.  General
Stoneman's division of cavalry had occupied Allatoona, on the
railroad, and General Garrard's division was at the western end of
the pass, about Stilesboro.  Colonel W. W. Wright, of the
Engineers, was busily employed in repairing the railroad and
rebuilding the bridge across the Etowah (or High tower) River,
which had been destroyed by the enemy on his retreat; and the
armies were engaged in a general and constant skirmish along a
front of about six miles--McPherson the right, Thomas the centre,
and Schofield on the left.  By gradually covering our front with
parapet, and extending to the left, we approached the railroad
toward Acworth and overlapped the enemy's right.  By the 4th of
June we had made such progress that Johnston evacuated his lines in
the night, leaving us masters of the situation, when I deliberately
shifted McPherson's army to the extreme left, at and in front of
Acworth, with Thomas's about two miles on his right, and
Schofield's on his right all facing east. Heavy rains set in about
the 1st of June, making the roads infamous; but our marches were
short, as we needed time for the repair of the railroad, so as to
bring supplies forward to Allatoona Station.  On the 6th I rode
back to Allatoona, seven miles, found it all that was expected, and
gave orders for its fortification and preparation as a "secondary
base."

General Blair arrived at Acworth on the 8th with his two divisions
of the Seventeenth Corps--the same which had been on veteran
furlough--had come up from Cairo by way of Clifton, on the
Tennessee River, and had followed our general route to Allatoona,
where he had left a garrison of about fifteen hundred men.  His
effective strength, as reported, was nine thousand.  These, with
new regiments and furloughed men who had joined early in the month
of May, equaled our losses from battle, sickness, and by
detachments; so that the three armies still aggregated about one
hundred thousand effective men.

On the 10th of June the whole combined army moved forward six
miles, to "Big Shanty," a station on the railroad, whence we had a
good view of the enemy's position, which embraced three prominent
hills known as Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain.  On each
of these hills the enemy had signal-stations and fresh lines of
parapets.  Heavy masses of infantry could be distinctly seen with
the naked eye, and it was manifest that Johnston had chosen his
ground well, and with deliberation had prepared for battle; but his
line was at least ten miles in extent--too long, in my judgment, to
be held successfully by his force, then estimated at sixty
thousand.  As his position, however, gave him a perfect view over
our field, we had to proceed with due caution.  McPherson had the
left, following the railroad, which curved around the north base of
Kenesaw; Thomas the centre, obliqued to the right, deploying below
Kenesaw and facing Pine Hill; and Schofield, somewhat refused, was
on the general right, looking south, toward Lost Mountain.

On the 11th the Etowah bridge was done; the railroad was repaired
up to our very skirmish line, close to the base of Kenesaw, and a
loaded train of cars came to Big Shanty.  The locomotive, detached,
was run forward to a water-tank within the range of the enemy's
guns on Kenesaw, whence the enemy opened fire on the locomotive;
but the engineer was not afraid, went on to the tank, got water,
and returned safely to his train, answering the guns with the
screams of his engine, heightened by the cheers and shouts of our
men.

The rains continued to pour, and made our developments slow and
dilatory, for there were no roads, and these had to be improvised
by each division for its own supply train from the depot in Big
Shanty to the camps.  Meantime each army was deploying carefully
before the enemy, intrenching every camp, ready as against a sally.
The enemy's cavalry was also busy in our rear, compelling us to
detach cavalry all the way  back as far as Resaca, and to
strengthen all the infantry posts  as far as Nashville.  Besides,
there was great danger, always in my mind, that Forrest would
collect a heavy cavalry command in Mississippi, cross the Tennessee
River, and break up our railroad below Nashville.  In anticipation
of this very danger, I had sent General Sturgis to Memphis to take
command of all the cavalry in that quarter, to go out toward
Pontotoc, engage Forrest and defeat him; but on the 14th of June I
learned that General Sturgis had himself been defeated on the 10th
of June, and had been driven by Forrest back into Memphis in
considerable confusion.  I expected that this would soon be
followed by a general raid on all our roads in Tennessee.  General
G. J. Smith, with the two divisions of the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Corps which had been with General Banks up Red River,
had returned from that ill-fated expedition, and had been ordered
to General Canby at New Orleans, who was making a diversion about
Mobile; but, on hearing of General Sturgis's defeat, I ordered
General Smith to go out from Memphis and renew the offensive, so as
to keep Forrest off our roads.  This he did finally, defeating
Forrest at Tupelo, on the 13th, 14th, and 15th  days of July; and
he so stirred up matters in North Mississippi that Forrest could
not leave for Tennessee.  This, for a time, left me only the task
of covering the roads against such minor detachments of cavalry as
Johnston could spare from his immediate army, and I proposed to
keep these too busy in their own defense to spare detachments.  By
the 14th the rain slackened, and we occupied a continuous line of
ten miles, intrenched, conforming to the irregular position of the
enemy, when I reconnoitred, with a view to make a break in their
line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain.  When abreast of Pine
Mountain I noticed a rebel battery on its crest, with a continuous
line of fresh rifle-trench about half-way down the hill.  Our
skirmishers were at the time engaged in the woods about the base of
this hill between the lines, and I estimated the distance to the
battery on the crest at about eight hundred yards.  Near it, in
plain view, stood a group of the enemy, evidently observing us with
glasses.  General Howard, commanding the Fourth Corps, was near by,
and I called his attention to this group, and ordered him to compel
it to keep behind its cover.  He replied that his orders from
General Thomas were to spare artillery-ammunition.  This was right,
according to the general policy, but I explained to him that we
must keep up the morale of a bold offensive, that he must use his
artillery, force the enemy to remain on the timid defensive, and
ordered him to cause a battery close by to fire three volleys.  I
continued to ride down our line, and soon heard, in quick
succession, the three volleys.  The next division in order was
Geary's, and I gave him similar orders.  General Polk, in my
opinion, was killed by the second volley fired from the first
battery referred to.

In a conversation with General Johnston, after the war, he
explained that on that day he had ridden in person from Marietta to
Pine Mountain, held by Bates's division, and was accompanied by
Generals Hardee and Polk.  When on Pine Mountain, reconnoitring,
quite a group of soldiers, belonging to the battery close by,
clustered about him.  He noticed the preparations of our battery to
fire, and cautioned these men to scatter.  They did so, and he
likewise hurried behind the parapet, from which he had an equally
good view of our position but General Polk, who was dignified and
corpulent, walked back slowly, not wishing to appear too hurried or
cautious in the presence of the men, and was struck across the
breast by an unexploded shell, which killed him instantly.  This is
my memory of the conversation, and it is confirmed by Johnston
himself in his "Narrative," page 337, except that he calculated the
distance of our battery at six hundred yards, and says that Polk
was killed by the third shot; I know that our guns fired by volley,
and believe that he was hit by a shot of the second volley.  It has
been asserted that I fired the gun which killed General Polk, and
that I knew it was directed against that general.  The fact is, at
that distance we could not even tell that the group were officers
at all; I was on horseback, a couple of hundred yards off, before
my orders to fire were executed, had no idea that our shot had
taken effect, and continued my ride down along the line to
Schofield's extreme flank, returning late in the evening to my
head-quarters at Big Shanty, where I occupied an abandoned house.
In a cotton-field back of that house was our signal-station, on the
roof of an old gin-house.  The signal-officer reported that by
studying the enemy's signals he had learned the key, and that he
could read their signals.  He explained to me that he had
translated a signal about noon, from Pine Mountain to Marietta,
"Send an ambulance for General Polk's body;" and later in the day
another, "Why don't you send an ambulance for General Polk?"  From
this we inferred that General Polk had been killed, but how or
where we knew not; and this inference was confirmed later in the
same day by the report of some prisoners who had been captured.

On the 15th we advanced our general lines, intending to attack at
any weak point discovered between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain; but
Pine Mountain was found to be abandoned, and Johnston had
contracted his front somewhat, on a direct line, connecting Kenesaw
with Lost Mountain.  Thomas and Schofield thereby gained about two
miles of most difficult, country, and McPherson's left lapped well
around the north end of Kenesaw.  We captured a good many
prisoners, among them a whole infantry regiment, the Fourteenth
Alabama, three hundred and twenty strong.

On the 16th the general movement was continued, when Lost Mountain
was abandoned by the enemy.  Our right naturally swung round, so as
to threaten the railroad below Marietta, but Johnston had still
further contracted and strengthened his lines, covering Marietta
and all the roads below.

On the 17th and 18th the rain again fell in torrents, making army
movements impossible, but we devoted the time to strengthening our
positions, more especially the left and centre, with a view
gradually to draw from the left to add to the right; and we had to
hold our lines on the left extremely strong, to guard against a
sally from Kenesaw against our depot at Big Shanty.  Garrard's
division of cavalry was kept busy on our left, McPherson had
gradually extended to his right, enabling Thomas to do the same
still farther; but the enemy's position was so very strong, and
everywhere it was covered by intrenchments, that we found it as
dangerous to assault as a permanent fort.  We in like manner
covered our lines of battle by similar works, and even our
skirmishers learned to cover their bodies by the simplest and best
forms of defensive works, such as rails or logs, piled in the form
of a simple lunette, covered on the outside with earth thrown up at
night.

The enemy and ourselves used the same form of rifle-trench, varied
according to the nature of the ground, viz.: the trees and bushes
were cut away for a hundred yards or more in front, serving as an
abatis or entanglement; the parapets varied from four to six feet
high, the dirt taken from a ditch outside and from a covered way
inside, and this parapet was surmounted by a "head-log," composed
of the trunk of a tree from twelve to twenty inches at the butt,
lying along the interior crest of the parapet and resting in
notches cut in other trunks which extended back, forming an
inclined plane, in case the head-log should be knocked inward by a
cannon-shot.  The men of both armies became extremely skillful in
the construction of these works, because each man realized their
value and importance to himself, so that it required no orders for
their construction.  As soon as a regiment or brigade gained a
position within easy distance for a sally, it would set to work
with a will, and would construct such a parapet in a single night;
but I endeavored to spare the soldiers this hard labor by
authorizing each division commander to organize out of the freedmen
who escaped to us a pioneer corps of two hundred men, who were fed
out of the regular army supplies, and I promised them ten dollars a
month, under an existing act of Congress.  These pioneer
detachments became very useful to us during the rest of the war,
for they could work at night while our men slept; they in turn were
not expected to fight, and could therefore sleep by day.  Our
enemies used their slaves for a similar purpose, but usually kept
them out of the range of fire by employing them to fortify and
strengthen the position to their rear next to be occupied in their
general retrograde.  During this campaign hundreds if not thousands
of miles of similar intrenchments were built by both armies, and,
as a rule, whichever party attacked got the worst of it.

On the 19th of June the rebel army again fell back on its flanks,
to such an extent that for a time I supposed it had retreated to
the Chattahoochee River, fifteen miles distant; but as we pressed
forward we were soon undeceived, for we found it still more
concentrated, covering Marietta and the railroad.  These successive
contractions of the enemy's line encouraged us and discouraged him,
but were doubtless justified by sound reasons.  On the 20th
Johnston's position was unusually strong.  Kenesaw Mountain was his
salient; his two flanks were refused and covered by parapets and by
Noonday and Nose's Creeks.  His left flank was his weak point, so
long as he acted on the "defensive," whereas, had he designed to
contract the extent of his line for the purpose of getting in
reserve a force with which to strike "offensively" from his right,
he would have done a wise act, and I was compelled to presume that
such was his object: We were also so far from Nashville and
Chattanooga that we were naturally sensitive for the safety of our
railroad and depots, so that the left (McPherson) was held very
strong.

About this time came reports that a large cavalry force of the
enemy had passed around our left flank, evidently to strike this
very railroad somewhere below Chattanooga.  I therefore reenforced
the cavalry stationed from Resaca to Casaville, and ordered forward
from Huntsville, Alabama, the infantry division of General John E.
Smith, to hold Kingston securely.

While we were thus engaged about Kenesaw, General Grant had his
hands full with Lee, in Virginia.  General Halleck was the chief of
staff at Washington, and to him I communicated almost daily.  I
find from my letter-book that on the 21st of June I reported to him
tersely and truly the condition of facts on that day: "This is the
nineteenth day of rain, and the prospect of fair weather is as far
off as ever.  The roads are impassable; the fields and woods become
quagmire's after a few wagons have crossed over.  Yet we are at
work all the time.  The left flank is across Noonday Creek, and the
right is across Nose's Creek.  The enemy still holds Kenesaw, a
conical mountain, with Marietta behind it, and has his flanks
retired, to cover that town and the railroad behind.  I am all
ready to attack the moment the weather and roads will permit troops
and artillery to move with any thing like life."

The weather has a wonderful effect on troops: in action and on the
march, rain is favorable; but in the woods, where all is blind and
uncertain, it seems almost impossible for an army covering ten
miles of front to act in concert during wet and stormy weather.
Still I pressed operations with the utmost earnestness, aiming
always to keep our fortified lines in absolute contact with the
enemy, while with the surplus force we felt forward, from one flank
or the other, for his line of communication and retreat.  On the
22d of June I rode the whole line, and ordered General Thomas in
person to advance his extreme right corps (Hooker's); and
instructed General Schofield, by letter, to keep his entire army,
viz., the Twenty-third Corps, as a strong right flank in close
support of Hooker's deployed line.  During this day the sun came
out, with some promise of clear weather, and I had got back to my
bivouac about dark, when a signal message was received, dated--

KULP HOUSE, 5.30 P.M.

General SHERMAN:
We have repulsed two heavy attacks, and feel confident, our only
apprehension being from our extreme right flank.  Three entire
corps are in front of us.

Major-General HOOKER.

Hooker's corps (the Twentieth) belonged to Thomas's army; Thomas's
headquarters were two miles nearer to Hooker than mine; and Hooker,
being an old army officer, knew that he should have reported this
fact to Thomas and not to me; I was, moreover, specially disturbed
by the assertion in his report that he was uneasy about his right
flank, when Schofield had been specially ordered to protect that.
I first inquired of my adjutant, Dayton, if he were certain that
General Schofield had received his orders, and he answered that the
envelope in which he had sent them was receipted by General
Schofield himself.  I knew, therefore, that General Schofield must
be near by, in close support of Hooker's right flank.  General
Thomas had before this occasion complained to me of General
Hooker's disposition to "switch off," leaving wide gaps in his
line, so as to be independent, and to make glory on his own
account.  I therefore resolved not to overlook this breach of
discipline and propriety.  The rebel army was only composed of
three corps; I had that very day ridden six miles of their lines,
found them everywhere strongly occupied, and therefore Hooker could
not have encountered "three entire corps."  Both McPherson and
Schofield had also complained to me of this same tendency of Hooker
to widen the gap between his own corps and his proper army
(Thomas's), so as to come into closer contact with one or other of
the wings, asserting that he was the senior by commission to both
McPherson and Schofield, and that in the event of battle he should
assume command over them, by virtue of his older commission.

They appealed to me to protect them.  I had heard during that day
some cannonading and heavy firing down toward the "Kulp House,"
which was about five miles southeast of where I was, but this was
nothing unusual, for at the same moment there was firing along our
lines full ten miles in extent.  Early the next day (23d) I rode
down to the "Kulp House," which was on a road leading from Powder
Springs to Marietta, about three miles distant from the latter.  On
the way I passed through General Butterfield's division of Hooker's
corps, which I learned had not been engaged at all in the battle of
the day before; then I rode along Geary's and Williams's divisions,
which occupied the field of battle, and the men were engaged in
burying the dead.  I found General Schofield's corps on the Powder
Springs road, its head of column abreast of Hooker's right,
therefore constituting "a strong right flank," and I met Generale
Schofield and Hooker together.  As rain was falling at the moment,
we passed into a little church standing by the road-side, and I
there showed General Schofield Hooker's signal-message of the day
before.  He was very angry, and pretty sharp words passed between
them, Schofield saying that his head of column (Hascall's division)
had been, at the time of the battle, actually in advance of
Hooker's line; that the attack or sally of the enemy struck his
troops before it did Hooker's; that General Hooker knew of it at
the time; and he offered to go out and show me that the dead men of
his advance division (Hascall's) were lying farther out than any of
Hooker's.  General Hooker pretended not to have known this fact.  I
then asked him why he had called on me for help, until he had used
all of his own troops; asserting that I had just seen Butterfield's
division, and had learned from him that he had not been engaged the
day before at all; and I asserted that the enemy's sally must have
been made by one corps (Hood's), in place of three, and that it had
fallen on Geary's and Williams's divisions, which had repulsed the
attack handsomely.  As we rode away from that church General Hooker
was by my side, and I told him that such a thing must not occur
again; in other words, I reproved him more gently than the occasion
demanded, and from that time he began to sulk.  General Hooker had
come from the East with great fame as a "fighter," and at
Chattanooga he was glorified by his "battle above the clouds,"
which I fear turned his head.  He seemed jealous of all the army
commanders, because in years, former rank, and experience, he
thought he was our superior.

On the 23d of June I telegraphed to General Halleck this summary,
which I cannot again better state:

We continue to press forward on the principle of an advance against
fortified positions.  The whole country is one vast fort, and
Johnston must have at least fifty miles of connected trenches, with
abatis and finished batteries.  We gain ground daily, fighting all
the time.  On the 21st General Stanley gained a position near the
south end of Kenesaw, from which the enemy attempted in vain to
drive him; and the same day General T. J. Wood's division took a
hill, which the enemy assaulted three times at night without
success, leaving more than a hundred dead on the ground.  Yesterday
the extreme right (Hooker and Schofield) advanced on the Powder
Springs road to within three miles of Marietta.  The enemy made a
strong effort to drive them away, but failed signally, leaving more
than two hundred dead on the field.  Our lines are now in close
contact, and the fighting is incessant, with a good deal of
artillery-fire.  As fast as we gain one position the enemy has
another all ready, but I think he will soon have to let go Kenesaw,
which is the key to the whole country.  The weather is now better,
and the roads are drying up fast. Our losses are light, and,
not-withstanding the repeated breaks of the road to our rear,
supplies are ample.

During the 24th and 25th of June General Schofield extended his
right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his
lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong
assaults at points where success would give us the greatest
advantage.  I had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson, and
Schofield, and we all agreed that we could not with prudence
stretch out any more, and therefore there was no alternative but to
attack "fortified lines," a thing carefully avoided up to that
time.  I reasoned, if we could make a breach anywhere near the
rebel centre, and thrust in a strong head of column, that with the
one moiety of our army we could hold in check the corresponding
wing of the enemy, and with the other sweep in flank and overwhelm
the other half.  The 27th of June was fixed as the day for the
attempt, and in order to oversee the whole, and to be in close
communication with all parts of the army, I had a place cleared on
the top of a hill to the rear of Thomas's centre, and had the
telegraph-wires laid to it.  The points of attack were chosen, and
the troops were all prepared with as little demonstration as
possible.  About 9 A.M.  Of the day appointed, the troops moved to
the assault, and all along our lines for ten miles a furious fire
of artillery and musketry was kept up.  At all points the enemy met
us with determined courage and in great force.  McPherson's
attacking column fought up the face of the lesser Kenesaw, but
could not reach the summit.  About a mile to the right (just below
the Dallas road) Thomas's assaulting column reached the parapet,
where Brigadier-General Barker was shot down mortally wounded, and
Brigadier-General Daniel McCook (my old law-partner) was
desperately wounded, from the effects of which he afterward died.
By 11.30 the assault was in fact over, and had failed.  We had not
broken the rebel line at either point, but our assaulting columns
held their ground within a few yards of the rebel trenches, and
there covered themselves with parapet.  McPherson lost about five
hundred men and several valuable officers, and Thomas lost nearly
two thousand men.  This was the hardest fight of the campaign up to
that date, and it is well described by Johnston in his "Narrative"
(pages 342, 343), where he admits his loss in killed and wounded
as

        Total ............. 808

This, no doubt, is a true and fair statement; but, as usual,
Johnston overestimates our loss, putting it at six thousand,
whereas our entire loss was about twenty-five hundred, killed and
wounded.

While the battle was in progress at the centre, Schofield crossed
Olley's Creek on the right, and gained a position threatening
Johnston's line of retreat; and, to increase the effect, I ordered
Stoneman's cavalry to proceed rapidly still farther to the right,
to Sweetwater.  Satisfied of the bloody cost of attacking
intrenched lines, I at once thought of moving the whole army to the
railroad at a point (Fulton) about ten miles below Marietta, or to
the Chattahoochee River itself, a movement similar to the one
afterward so successfully practised at Atlanta.  All the orders
were issued to bring forward supplies enough to fill our wagons,
intending to strip the railroad back to Allatoona, and leave that
place as our depot, to be covered as well as possible by Garrard's
cavalry.  General Thomas, as usual, shook his head, deeming it
risky to leave the railroad; but something had to be done, and I
had resolved on this move, as reported in my dispatch to General
Halleck on July 1st:

General Schofield is now south of Olley's Creek, and on the head of
Nickajack.  I have been hurrying down provisions and forage, and
tomorrow night propose to move McPherson from the left to the
extreme right, back of General Thomas.  This will bring my right
within three miles of the Chattahoochee River, and about five miles
from the railroad.  By this movement I think I can force Johnston
to move his whole army down from Kenesaw to defend his railroad and
the Chattahoochee, when I will (by the left flank) reach the
railroad below Marietta; but in this I must cut loose from the
railroad with ten days' supplies in wagons.  Johnston may come out
of his intrenchments to attack Thomas, which is exactly what I
want, for General Thomas is well intrenched on a line parallel with
the enemy south of Kenesaw.  I think that Allatoona and the line of
the Etowah are strong enough for me to venture on this move.  The
movement is substantially down the Sandtown road straight for
Atlanta.

McPherson drew out of his lines during the night of July 2d,
leaving Garrard's cavalry, dismounted, occupying his trenches, and
moved to the rear of the Army of the Cumberland, stretching down
the Nickajack; but Johnston detected the movement, and promptly
abandoned Marietta and Kenesaw.  I expected as much, for, by the
earliest dawn of the 3d of July, I was up at a large spy-glass
mounted on a tripod, which Colonel Poe, United States Engineers,
had at his bivouac close by our camp.  I directed the glass on
Kenesaw, and saw some of our pickets crawling up the hill
cautiously; soon they stood upon the very top, and I could plainly
see their movements as they ran along the crest just abandoned by
the enemy.  In a minute I roused my staff, and started them off
with orders in every direction for a pursuit by every possible
road, hoping to catch Johnston in the confusion of retreat,
especially at the crossing of the Chattahoochee River.

I must close this chapter here, so as to give the actual losses
during June, which are compiled from the official returns by
months.  These losses, from June 1st to July 3d, were all
substantially sustained about Kenesaw and Marietta, and it was
really a continuous battle, lasting from the 10th day of June till
the 3d of July, when the rebel army fell back from Marietta toward
the Chattahoochee River.  Our losses were:

                      Killed and Missing      Wounded     Total
Loss in June Aggregate      1,790              5,740      7,530


Johnston makes his statement of losses from the report of his
surgeon Foard, for pretty much the same period, viz., from June 4th
to July 4th (page 576):
                            Killed           Wounded     Total
         Total............   468               3,480      3,948


In the tabular statement the "missing" embraces the prisoners; and,
giving two thousand as a fair proportion of prisoners captured by
us for the month of June (twelve thousand nine hundred and
eighty-three in all the campaign), makes an aggregate loss in the
rebel army of fifty-nine hundred and forty-eight, to ours of
seventy-five hundred and thirty--a less proportion than in the
relative strength of our two armies, viz., as six to ten, thus
maintaining our relative superiority, which the desperate game
of war justified.




CHAPTER XVIII.

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN--BATTLES ABOUT ATLANTA

JULY, 1864.


As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving McPherson's
entire army from the extreme left, at the base of Kenesaw to the
right, below Olley's Creek, and stretching it down the Nickajack
toward Turner's Ferry of the Chattahoochee, we forced Johnston to
choose between a direct assault on Thomas's intrenched position, or
to permit us to make a lodgment on his railroad below Marietta, or
even to cross the Chattahoochee.  Of course, he chose to let go
Kenesaw and Marietta, and fall back on an intrenched camp prepared
by his orders in advance on the north and west bank of the
Chattahoochee, covering the railroad-crossing and his several
pontoon-bridges.  I confess I had not learned beforehand of the
existence of this strong place, in the nature of a tete-du-pont,
and had counted on striking him an effectual blow in the expected
confusion of his crossing the Chattahoochee, a broad and deep river
then to his rear.  Ordering every part of the army to pursue
vigorously on the morning of the 3d of July, I rode into Marietta,
just quitted by the rebel rear-guard, and was terribly angry at the
cautious pursuit by Garrard's cavalry, and even by the head of our
infantry columns.  But Johnston had in advance cleared and
multiplied his roads, whereas ours had to cross at right angles
from the direction of Powder Springs toward Marrietta, producing
delay and confusion.  By night Thomas's head of column ran up
against a strong rear-guard intrenched at Smyrna camp-ground, six
miles below Marietta, and there on the next day we celebrated our
Fourth of July, by a noisy but not a desperate battle, designed
chiefly to hold the enemy there till Generals McPherson and
Schofield could get well into position below him, near the
Chattahoochee crossings.

It was here that General Noyes, late Governor of Ohio, lost his
leg.  I came very near being shot myself while reconnoitring in the
second story of a house on our picket-line, which was struck
several times by cannon-shot, and perfectly riddled with
musket-balls.

During the night Johnston drew back all his army and trains inside
the tete-du-pont at the Chattahoochee, which proved one of the
strongest pieces of field-fortification I ever saw.  We closed up
against it, and were promptly met by a heavy and severe fire.
Thomas was on the main road in immediate pursuit; next on his right
was Schofield; and McPherson on the extreme right, reaching the
Chattahoochee River below Turner's Ferry.  Stoneman's cavalry was
still farther to the right, along down the Chattahoochee River as
far as opposite Sandtown; and on that day I ordered Garrard's
division of cavalry up the river eighteen miles, to secure
possession of the factories at Roswell, as well as to hold an
important bridge and ford at that place.

About three miles out from the Chattahoochee the main road forked,
the right branch following substantially the railroad, and the left
one leading straight for Atlanta, via Paice's Ferry and Buckhead.
We found the latter unoccupied and unguarded, and the Fourth Corps
(Howard's) reached the river at Paice's Ferry.  The right-hand road
was perfectly covered by the tete-du-pont before described, where
the resistance was very severe, and for some time deceived me, for
I was pushing Thomas with orders to fiercely assault his enemy,
supposing that he was merely opposing us to gain time to get his
trains and troops across the Chattahoochee; but, on personally
reconnoitring, I saw the abatis and the strong redoubts, which
satisfied me of the preparations that had been made by Johnston in
anticipation of this very event.  While I was with General Jeff. C.
Davis, a poor negro came out of the abatis, blanched with fright,
said he had been hidden under a log all day, with a perfect storm
of shot, shells, and musket-balls, passing over him, till a short
lull had enabled him to creep out and make himself known to our
skirmishers, who in turn had sent him back to where we were.  This
negro explained that he with about a thousand slaves had been at
work a month or more on these very lines, which, as he explained,
extended from the river about a mile above the railroad-bridge to
Turner's Ferry below,--being in extent from five to six miles.

Therefore, on the 5th of July we had driven our enemy to cover in
the valley of the Chattahoochee, and we held possession of the
river above for eighteen miles, as far as Roswell, and below ten
miles to the mouth of the Sweetwater.  Moreover, we held the high
ground and could overlook his movements, instead of his looking
down on us, as was the case at Kenesaw.

From a hill just back of Mining's Station I could see the houses in
Atlanta, nine miles distant, and the whole intervening valley of
the Chattahoochee; could observe the preparations for our reception
on the other side, the camps of men and large trains of covered
wagons; and supposed, as a matter of course, that Johnston had
passed the river with the bulk of his army, and that he had only
left on our side a corps to cover his bridges; but in fact he had
only sent across his cavalry and trains.  Between Howard's corps at
Paice's Ferry and the rest of Thomas's army pressing up against
this tete-du-pont, was a space concealed by dense woods, in
crossing which I came near riding into a detachment of the enemy's
cavalry; and later in the same day Colonel Frank Sherman, of
Chicago, then on General Howard's staff, did actually ride straight
into the enemy's camp, supposing that our lines were continuous.
He was carried to Atlanta, and for some time the enemy supposed
they were in possession of the commander-in-chief of the opposing
army.

I knew that Johnston would not remain long on the west bank of the
Chattahoochee, for I could easily practise on that ground to better
advantage our former tactics of intrenching a moiety in his front,
and with the rest of our army cross the river and threaten either
his rear or the city of Atlanta itself, which city was of vital
importance to the existence not only of his own army, but of the
Confederacy itself.  In my dispatch of July 6th to General Halleck,
at Washington, I state that:


Johnston (in his retreat from Kenesaw) has left two breaks in the
railroad--one above Marietta and one near Mining's Station.  The
former is already repaired, and Johnston's army has heard the sound
of our locomotives.  The telegraph is finished to Mining's Station,
and the field-wire has just reached my bivouac, and will be ready
to convey this message as soon as it is written and translated into
cipher.

I propose to study the crossings of the Chattahoochee, and, when
all is ready, to move quickly.  As a beginning, I will keep the
troops and wagons well back from the river, and only display to the
enemy our picket-line, with a few field-batteries along at random.
I have already shifted Schofield to a point in our left rear,
whence he can in a single move reach the Chattahoochee at a point
above the railroad-bridge, where there is a ford.  At present the
waters are turbid and swollen from recent rains; but if the present
hot weather lasts, the water will run down very fast. We have
pontoons enough for four bridges, but, as our crossing will be
resisted, we must manoeuvre some.  All the regular crossing-places
are covered by forts, apparently of long construction; but we shall
cross in due time, and, instead of attacking Atlanta direct, or any
of its forts, I propose to make a circuit, destroying all its
railroads.  This is a delicate movement, and must be done with
caution.  Our army is in good condition and full of confidence; but
the weather is intensely hot, and a good many men have fallen with
sunstroke.  The country is high and healthy, and the sanitary
condition of the army is good.

At this time Stoneman was very active on our extreme right,
pretending to be searching the river below Turner's Ferry for a
crossing, and was watched closely by the enemy's cavalry on the
other side, McPherson, on the right, was equally demonstrative at
and near Turner's Ferry.  Thomas faced substantially the intrenched
tete-du-pont, and had his left on the Chattahoochee River, at
Paice's Ferry.  Garrard's cavalry was up at Roswell, and McCook's
small division of cavalry was intermediate, above Soap's Creek.
Meantime, also, the railroad-construction party was hard at work,
repairing the railroad up to our camp at Vining's Station.

Of course, I expected every possible resistance in crossing the
Chattahoochee River, and had made up my mind to feign on the right,
but actually to cross over by the left.  We had already secured a
crossing place at Roswell, but one nearer was advisable; General
Schofield had examined the river well, found a place just below the
mouth of Soap's Creek which he deemed advantageous, and was
instructed to effect an early crossing there, and to intrench a
good position on the other side, viz., the east bank.  But,
preliminary thereto, I had ordered General Rousseau, at Nashville,
to collect, out of the scattered detachments of cavalry in
Tennessee, a force of a couple of thousand men, to rendezvous at
Decatur, Alabama, thence to make a rapid march for Opelika, to
break up the railroad links between Georgia and Alabama, and then
to make junction with me about Atlanta; or, if forced, to go on to
Pensacola, or even to swing across to some of our posts in
Mississippi.  General Rousseau asked leave to command this
expedition himself, to which I consented, and on the 6th of July he
reported that he was all ready at Decatur, and I gave him orders to
start.  He moved promptly on the 9th, crossed the Coosa below the
"Ten Islands" and the Tallapoosa below "Horseshoe Bend," having
passed through Talladega.  He struck the railroad west of Opelika,
tore it up for twenty miles, then turned north and came to Marietta
on the 22d of July, whence he reported to me.  This expedition was
in the nature of a raid, and must have disturbed the enemy
somewhat; but, as usual, the cavalry did not work hard, and their
destruction of the railroad was soon repaired.  Rousseau, when he
reported to me in person before Atlanta, on the 28d of July, stated
his entire loss to have been only twelve killed and thirty wounded.
He brought in four hundred captured mules and three hundred horses,
and also told me a good story.  He said he was far down in Alabama,
below Talladega, one hot, dusty day, when the blue clothing of his
men was gray with dust; he had halted his column along a road, and
he in person, with his staff, had gone to the house of a planter,
who met him kindly on the front-porch.  He asked for water, which
was brought, and as the party sat on the porch in conversation he
saw, in a stable-yard across the road, quite a number of good
mules. He remarked to the planter, "My good sir, I fear I must take
some of your mules."  The planter remonstrated, saying he had
already contributed liberally to the good cause; that it was only
last week he had given to General Roddy ten mules.  Rousseau
replied, "Well, in this war you should be at least neutral--that
is, you should be as liberal to us as to Roddy" (a rebel cavalry
general).  "Well, ain't you on our side?"  "No," said Rousseau; "I
am General Rousseau, and all these men you see are Yanks."  "Great
God! is it possible!  Are these Yanks!  Who ever supposed they
would come away down here in Alabama?"   Of course, Rousseau took
his ten mules.

Schofield effected his crossing at Soap's Creek very handsomely on
the 9th, capturing the small guard that was watching the crossing.
By night he was on the high ground beyond, strongly intrenched,
with two good pontoon-bridges finished, and was prepared, if
necessary, for an assault by the whole Confederate army.  The same
day Garrard's cavalry also crossed over at Roswell, drove away the
cavalry-pickets, and held its ground till relieved by Newton's
division of Howard's corps, which was sent up temporarily, till it
in turn was relieved by Dodge's corps (Sixteenth) of the Army of
the Tennessee, which was the advance of the whole of that army.

That night Johnston evacuated his trenches, crossed over the
Chattahoochee, burned the railroad bridge and his pontoon and
trestle bridges, and left us in full possession of the north or
west bank-besides which, we had already secured possession of the
two good crossings at Roswell and Soap's Creek.  I have always
thought Johnston neglected his opportunity there, for he had lain
comparatively idle while we got control of both banks of the river
above him.

On the 13th I ordered McPherson, with the Fifteenth Corps, to move
up to Roswell, to cross over, prepare good bridges, and to make a
strong tete-du-pont on the farther side.  Stoneman had been sent
down to Campbellton, with orders to cross over and to threaten the
railroad below Atlanta, if he could do so without too much risk;
and General Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, was to remain at
Turner's Ferry, demonstrating as much as possible, thus keeping up
the feint below while we were actually crossing above.  Thomas was
also ordered to prepare his bridges at Powers's and Paice's
Ferries.  By crossing the Chattahoochee above the railroad bridge,
we were better placed to  cover our railroad and depots than below,
though a movement across the river below the railroad, to the south
of Atlanta, might have been more decisive.  But we were already so
far from home, and would be compelled to accept battle whenever
offered, with the Chattahoochee to our rear, that it became
imperative for me to take all prudential measures the case admitted
of, and I therefore determined to pass the river above the
railroad-bridge-McPherson on the left, Schofield in the  centre,
and Thomas on the right. On the 13th I reported to General Halleck
as follows:


All is well.  I have now accumulated stores at Allatoona and
Marietta, both fortified and garrisoned points.  Have also three
places at which to cross the Chattahoochee in our possession, and
only await General Stoneman's return from a trip down the river, to
cross the army in force and move on Atlanta.

Stoneman is now out two days, and had orders to be back on the
fourth or fifth day at furthest.


From the 10th to the 15th we were all busy in strengthening the
several points for the proposed passage of the Chattahoochee, in
increasing the number and capacity of the bridges, rearranging the
garrisons to our rear, and in bringing forward supplies.  On the
15th General Stoneman got back to Powder Springs, and was ordered
to replace General Blair at Turner's Ferry, and Blair, with the
Seventeenth Corps, was ordered up to Roswell to join McPherson.  On
the 17th we began the general movement against Atlanta, Thomas
crossing the Chattahoochee at Powers's and Paice's, by pontoon-
bridges; Schofield moving out toward Cross Keys, and McPherson
toward Stone Mountain.  We encountered but little opposition except
by cavalry.  On the 18th all the armies moved on a general right
wheel, Thomas to Buckhead, forming line of  battle facing
Peach-Tree Creek; Schofield was on his left, and McPherson well
over toward the railroad between Stone Mountain and Decatur, which
he reached at 2 p.m.  of that day, about four miles from Stone
Mountain, and seven miles east of Decatur, and there he turned
toward Atlanta, breaking up the railroad as he progressed, his
advance-guard reaching Ecatur about night, where he came into
communication with Schofield's troops, which had also reached
Decatur.  About 10 A.M. of that day (July 18th), when the armies
were all in motion, one of General Thomas's staff-officers brought
me a citizen, one of our spies, who had just come out of Atlanta,
and had brought a newspaper of the same day, or of the day before,
containing Johnston's order relinquishing the command of the
Confederate forces in Atlanta, and Hood's order assuming the
command.  I immediately inquired of General Schofield, who was his
classmate at West Point, about Hood, as to his general character,
etc., and learned that he was bold even to rashness, and courageous
in the extreme; I inferred that the change of commanders meant
"fight."  Notice of this important change was at once sent to all
parts of the army, and every division commander was cautioned to be
always prepared for battle in any shape.  This was just what we
wanted, viz., to fight in open ground, on any thing like equal
terms, instead of being forced to run up against prepared
intrenchments; but, at the same time, the enemy having Atlanta
behind him, could choose the time and place of attack, and could at
pleasure mass a superior force on our weakest points.  Therefore,
we had to be constantly ready for sallies.

On the 19th the three armies were converging toward Atlanta,
meeting such feeble resistance that I really thought the enemy
intended to evacuate the place.  McPherson was moving astride of
the railroad, near Decatur; Schofield along a road leading toward
Atlanta, by Colonel Howard's house and the distillery; and Thomas
was crossing "Peach-Tree" in line of battle, building bridges for
nearly every division as deployed.  There was quite a gap between
Thomas and Schofield, which I endeavored to close by drawing two of
Howard's divisions nearer Schofield.  On the 20th I was with
General Schofield near the centre, and soon after noon heard heavy
firing in front of Thomas's right, which lasted an hour or so, and
then ceased.

I soon learned that the enemy had made a furious sally, the blow
falling on Hooker's corps (the Twentieth), and partially on
Johnson's division of the Fourteenth, and Newton's of the Fourth.
The troops had crossed Peach-Tree Creek, were deployed, but at the
time were resting for noon, when, without notice, the enemy came
pouring out of their trenches down upon them, they became
commingled, and fought in many places hand to hand.  General Thomas
happened to be near the rear of Newton's division, and got some
field-batteries in a good position, on the north side of Peach-Tree
Creek, from which he directed a furious fire on a mass of the
enemy, which was passing around Newton's left and exposed flank.
After a couple of hours of hard and close conflict, the enemy
retired slowly within his trenches, leaving his dead and many
wounded on the field. Johnson's and Newton's losses were light, for
they had partially covered their fronts with light parapet; but
Hooker's whole corps fought in open ground, and lost about fifteen
hundred men.  He reported four hundred rebel dead left on the
ground, and that the rebel wounded would number four thousand; but
this was conjectural, for most of them got back within their own
lines.  We had, however, met successfully a bold sally, had
repelled it handsomely, and were also put on our guard; and the
event illustrated the future tactics of our enemy.  This sally came
from the Peach-Tree line, which General Johnston had carefully
prepared in advance, from which to fight us outside of Atlanta.  We
then advanced our lines in compact order, close up to these
finished intrenchments, overlapping them on our left. From various
parts of our lines the houses inside of Atlanta were plainly
visible, though between us were the strong parapets, with ditch,
fraise, chevaux-de-frise, and abatis, prepared long in advance by
Colonel Jeremy F. Gilmer, formerly of the United States Engineers.
McPherson had the Fifteenth Corps astride the Augusta Railroad, and
the Seventeenth deployed on its left.  Schofield was next on his
right, then came Howard's, Hooker's, and Palmer's corps, on the
extreme right.  Each corps was deployed with strong reserves, and
their trains were parked to their rear.  McPherson's trains were in
Decatur, guarded by a brigade commanded by Colonel Sprague of the
Sixty-third Ohio.  The Sixteenth Corps (Dodge's) was crowded out of
position on the right of McPherson's line, by the contraction of
the circle of investment; and, during the previous afternoon, the
Seventeenth Corps (Blair's) had pushed its operations on the
farther side of the Augusta Railroad, so as to secure possession of
a hill, known as Leggett's Hill, which Leggett's and Force's
divisions had carried by assault.  Giles A. Smith's division was on
Leggett's left, deployed with a weak left flank "in air," in
military phraseology.  The evening before General Gresham, a great
favorite, was badly wounded; and there also Colonel Tom Reynolds,
now of Madison, Wisconsin, was shot through the leg.  When the
surgeons were debating the propriety of amputating it in his
hearing, he begged them to spare the leg, as it was very valuable,
being an "imported leg."  He was of Irish birth, and this
well-timed piece of wit saved his leg, for the surgeons thought, if
he could perpetrate a joke at such a time, they would trust to his
vitality to save his limb.

During the night, I had full reports from all parts of our line,
most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally, and
finding that McPherson was stretching out too much on his left
flank, I wrote him a note early in the morning not to extend so
much by his left; for we had not troops enough to completely invest
the place, and I intended to destroy utterly all parts of the
Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, then to withdraw from the
left flank and add to the right.  In that letter I ordered
McPherson not to extend any farther to the left, but to employ
General Dodge's corps (Sixteenth), then forced out of position, to
destroy every rail and tie of the railroad, from Decatur up to his
skirmish-line, and I wanted him (McPherson) to be ready, as soon as
General Garrard returned from Covington (whither I had sent him),
to move to the extreme right of Thomas, so as to reach if possible
the railroad below Atlanta, viz., the Macon road.  In the morning
we found the strong line of parapet, "Peach-Tree line," to the
front of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our lines were
advanced rapidly close up to Atlanta.  For some moments I supposed
the enemy intended to evacuate, and in person was on horseback at
the head of Schofield's troops, who had advanced in front of the
Howard House to some open ground, from which we could plainly see
the whole rebel line of parapets, and I saw their men dragging up
from the intervening valley, by the distillery, trees and saplings
for abatis.  Our skirmishers found the enemy down in this valley,
and we could see the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns in
position at intervals.  Schofield was dressing forward his lines,
and I could hear Thomas farther to the right engaged, when General
McPherson and his staff rode up.  We went back to the Howard House,
a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on the steps,
discussing the chances of battle, and of Hood's general character.
McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood,
Schofield, and Sheridan.  We agreed that we ought to be unusually
cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard
fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of
great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and
rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis
argued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the
cautious but prudent conduct of General Jos. Johnston.

McPherson was in excellent spirits, well pleased at the progress of
events so far, and had come over purposely to see me about the
order I had given him to use Dodge's corps to break up the
railroad, saying that the night before he had gained a position on
Leggett's Hill from which he could look over the rebel parapet, and
see the high smoke-stack of a large foundery in Atlanta; that
before receiving my order he had diverted Dodge's two divisions
(then in motion) from the main road, along a diagonal one that led
to his extreme left flank, then held by Giles A. Smith's division
(Seventeenth Corps), for the purpose of strengthening that flank;
and that he had sent some intrenching-tools there, to erect some
batteries from which he intended to knock down that foundery, and
otherwise to damage the buildings inside of Atlanta.  He said he
could put all his pioneers to work, and do with them in the time
indicated all I had proposed to do with General Dodge's two
divisions.  Of course I assented at once, and we walked down the
road a short distance, sat down by the foot of a tree where I had
my map, and on it pointed out to him Thomas's position and his own.
I then explained minutely that, after we had sufficiently broken up
the Augusta road, I wanted to shift his whole army around by the
rear to Thomas's extreme right, and hoped thus to reach the other
railroad at East Point.  While we sat there we could hear lively
skirmishing going on near us (down about the distillery), and
occasionally round-shot from twelve or twenty-four pound guns came
through the trees in reply to those of Schofield, and we could hear
similar sounds all along down the lines of Thomas to our right, and
his own to the left; but presently the firing appeared a little
more brisk (especially over about Giles G. Smith's division), and
then we heard an occasional gun back toward Decatur.  I asked him
what it meant.  We took my pocket-compass (which I always carried),
and by noting the direction of the sound, we became satisfied that
the firing was too far to our left rear to be explained by known
facts, and he hastily called for his horse, his staff, and his
orderlies.

McPherson was then in his prime (about thirty-four years old), over
six feet high, and a very handsome man in every way, was
universally liked, and had many noble qualities.  He had on his
boots outside his pantaloons, gauntlets on his hands, had on his
major-general's uniform, and wore a sword-belt, but no sword.  He
hastily gathered his papers (save one, which I now possess) into a
pocket-book, put it in his breast-pocket, and jumped on his horse,
saying he would hurry down his line and send me back word what
these sounds meant.  His adjutant-general, Clark, Inspector-General
Strong, and his aides, Captains Steele and Gile, were with him.
Although the sound of musketry on our left grew in volume, I was
not so much disturbed by it as by the sound of artillery back
toward Decatur.  I ordered Schofield at once to send a brigade back
to Decatur (some five miles) and was walking up and down the porch
of the Howard House, listening, when one of McPherson's staff, with
his horse covered with sweat, dashed up to the porch, and reported
that General McPherson was either "killed or a prisoner."  He
explained that when they had left me a few minutes before, they had
ridden rapidly across to the railroad, the sounds of battle
increasing as they neared the position occupied by General Giles A.
Smith's division, and that McPherson had sent first one, then
another of his staff to bring some of the reserve brigades of the
Fifteenth Corps over to the exposed left flank; that he had reached
the head of Dodge's corps (marching by the flank on the diagonal
road as described), and had ordered it to hurry forward to the same
point; that then, almost if not entirely alone, he had followed
this road leading across the wooded valley behind the Seventeenth
Corps, and had disappeared in these woods, doubtless with a sense
of absolute security.  The sound of musketry was there heard, and
McPherson's horse came back, bleeding, wounded, and riderless.  I
ordered the staff-officer who brought this message to return at
once, to find General Logan (the senior officer present with the
Army of the Tennessee), to report the same facts to him, and to
instruct him to drive back this supposed small force, which had
evidently got around the Seventeenth Corps through the blind woods
in rear of our left flank.  I soon dispatched one of my own staff
(McCoy, I think) to General Logan with similar orders, telling him
to refuse his left flank, and to fight the battle (holding fast to
Leggett's Hill) with the Army of the Tennessee; that I would
personally look to Decatur and to the safety of his rear, and would
reenforce him if he needed it.  I dispatched orders to General
Thomas on our right, telling him of this strong sally, and my
inference that the lines in his front had evidently been weakened
by reason thereof, and that he ought to take advantage of the
opportunity to make a lodgment in Atlanta, if possible.

Meantime the sounds of the battle rose on our extreme left more and
more furious, extending to the place where I stood, at the Howard
House.  Within an hour an ambulance came in (attended by Colonels
Clark and Strong, and Captains Steele and Gile), bearing
McPherson's body.  I had it carried inside of the Howard House, and
laid on a door wrenched from its hinges.  Dr. Hewitt, of the army,
was there, and I asked him to examine the wound.  He opened the
coat and shirt, saw where the ball had entered and where it came
out, or rather lodged under the skin, and he reported that
McPherson must have died in a few seconds after being hit; that the
ball had ranged upward across his body, and passed near the heart.
He was dressed just as he left me, with gauntlets and boots on, but
his pocket-book was gone.  On further inquiry I learned that his
body must have been in possession of the enemy some minutes, during
which time it was rifled of the pocket-book, and I was much
concerned lest the letter I had written him that morning should
have fallen into the hands of some one who could read and
understand its meaning.  Fortunately the spot in the woods where
McPherson was shot was regained by our troops in a few minutes, and
the pocket-book found in the haversack of a prisoner of war
captured at the time, and it and its contents were secured by one
of McPherson's staff.

While we were examining the body inside the house, the battle was
progressing outside, and many shots struck the building, which I
feared would take fire; so I ordered Captains Steele and Gile to
carry the body to Marietta.  They reached that place the same
night, and, on application, I ordered his personal staff to go on
and escort the body to his home, in Clyde, Ohio, where it was
received with great honor, and it is now buried in a small
cemetery, close by his mother's house, which cemetery is composed
in part of the family orchard, in which he used to play when a boy.
The foundation is ready laid for the equestrian monument now in
progress, under the auspices of the Society of the Army of the
Tennessee.

The reports that came to me from all parts of the field revealed
clearly what was the game of my antagonist, and the ground somewhat
favored him.  The railroad and wagon-road from Decatur to Atlanta
lie along the summit, from which the waters flow, by short, steep
valleys, into the "Peach-Tree" and Chattahoochee, to the west, and
by other valleys, of gentler declivity, toward the east (Ocmulgee).
The ridges and level ground were mostly cleared, and had been
cultivated as corn or cotton fields; but where the valleys were
broken, they were left in a state of nature--wooded, and full of
undergrowth.  McPherson's line of battle was across this railroad,
along a general ridge, with a gentle but cleared valley to his
front, between him and the defenses of Atlanta; and another valley,
behind him, was clear of timber in part, but to his left rear the
country was heavily wooded.  Hood, during the night of July 21st,
had withdrawn from his Peach-Tree line, had occupied the fortified
line of Atlanta, facing north and east, with Stewart's--formerly
Polk's--corps and part of Hardee's, and with G. W. Smith's division
of militia.  His own corps, and part of Hardee's, had marched out
to the road leading from McDonough to Decatur, and had turned so as
to strike the left and, rear of McPherson's line "in air."  At the
same time he had sent Wheeler's division of cavalry against the
trains parked in Decatur.  Unluckily for us, I had sent away the
whole of Garrard's division of cavalry during the night of the
20th, with orders to proceed to Covington, thirty miles east, to
burn two important bridges across the Ulcofauhatchee and Yellow
Rivers, to tear up the railroad, to damage it as much as possible
from Stone Mountain eastward, and to be gone four days; so that
McPherson had no cavalry in hand to guard that flank.

The enemy was therefore enabled, under cover or the forest, to
approach quite near before he was discovered; indeed, his
skirmish-line had worked through the timber and got into the field to
the rear of Giles A. Smith's division of the Seventeenth Corps
unseen, had captured Murray's battery of regular artillery, moving
through these woods entirely unguarded, and had got possession of
several of the hospital camps.  The right of this rebel line struck
Dodge's troops in motion; but, fortunately, this corps (Sixteenth)
had only to halt, face to the left, and was in line of battle; and
this corps not only held in check the enemy, but drove him back
through the woods.  About the same time this same force had struck
General Giles A. Smith's left flank, doubled it back, captured four
guns in position and the party engaged in building the very battery
which was the special object of McPherson's visit to me, and almost
enveloped the entire left flank.  The men, however, were skillful and
brave, and fought for a time with their backs to Atlanta.  They
gradually fell back, compressing their own line, and gaining strength
by making junction with Leggett's division of the Seventeenth Corps,
well and strongly posted on the hill.  One or two brigades of the
Fifteenth Corps, ordered by McPherson, came rapidly across the open
field to the rear, from the direction of the railroad, filled up the
gap from Blair's new left to the head of Dodge's column--now facing
to the general left--thus forming a strong left flank, at right
angles to the original line of battle. The enemy attacked, boldly and
repeatedly, the whole of this flank, but met an equally fierce
resistance; and on that ground a bloody battle raged from little
after noon till into the night.  A part of Hood's plan of action was
to sally from Atlanta at the same moment; but this sally was not, for
some reason, simultaneous, for the first attack on our extreme left
flank had been checked and repulsed before the sally came from the
direction of Atlanta. Meantime, Colonel Sprague, in Decatur, had got
his teams harnessed up, and safely conducted his train to the rear of
Schofield's position, holding in check Wheeler's cavalry till he had
got off all his trains, with the exception of three or four wagons.
I remained near the Howard House, receiving reports and sending
orders, urging Generals Thomas and Schofield to take advantage of the
absence from their front of so considerable a body as was evidently
engaged on our left, and, if possible, to make a lodgment in Atlanta
itself; but they reported that the lines to their front, at all
accessible points, were strong, by nature and by art, and were fully
manned.  About 4 p.m. the expected, sally came from Atlanta, directed
mainly against Leggett's Hill and along the Decatur road.  At
Leggett's Hill they were met and bloodily repulsed.  Along the
railroad they were more successful.  Sweeping over a small force with
two guns, they reached our main line, broke through it, and got
possession of De Gress's battery of four twenty-pound Parrotts,
killing every horse, and turning the guns against us.  General
Charles R. Wood's division of the Fifteenth Corps was on the extreme
right of the Army of the Tennessee, between the railroad and the
Howard House, where he connected with Schofield's troops.  He
reported to me in person that the line on his left had been swept
back, and that his connection with General Logan, on Leggett's Hill,
was broken.  I ordered him to wheel his brigades to the left, to
advance in echelon, and to catch the enemy in flank.  General
Schofield brought forward all his available batteries, to the number
of twenty guns, to a position to the left front of the Howard House,
whence we could overlook the field of action, and directed a heavy
fire over the heads of General Wood's men against the enemy; and we
saw Wood's troops advance and encounter the enemy, who had secured
possession of the old line of parapet which had been held by our men.
His right crossed this parapet, which he swept back, taking it in
flank; and, at the same time, the division which had been driven back
along the railroad was rallied by General Logan in person, and fought
for their former ground.  These combined forces drove the enemy into
Atlanta, recovering the twenty pound Parrott guns but one of them was
found "bursted" while in the possession of the enemy.  The two
six-pounders farther in advance were, however, lost, and had been
hauled back by the enemy into Atlanta.  Poor Captain de Gress came to
me in tears, lamenting the loss of his favorite guns; when they were
regained he had only a few men left, and not a single horse. He asked
an order for a reequipment, but I told him he must beg and borrow of
others till he could restore his battery, now reduced to three guns.
How he did so I do not know, but in a short time he did get horses,
men, and finally another gun, of the same special pattern, and served
them with splendid effect till the very close of the war.  This
battery had also been with me from Shiloh till that time.

The battle of July 22d is usually called the battle of Atlanta.  It
extended from the Howard House to General Giles A. Smith's
position, about a mile beyond the Augusta Railroad, and then back
toward Decatur, the whole extent of ground being fully seven miles.
In part the ground was clear and in part densely wooded.  I rode
over the whole of it the next day, and it bore the marks of a
bloody conflict.  The enemy had retired during the night inside of
Atlanta, and we remained masters of the situation outside.  I
purposely allowed the Army of the Tennessee to fight this battle
almost unaided, save by demonstrations on the part of General
Schofield and Thomas against the fortified lines to their immediate
fronts, and by detaching, as described, one of Schofield's brigades
to Decatur, because I knew that the attacking force could only be a
part of Hood's army, and that, if any assistance were rendered by
either of the other armies, the Army of the Tennessee would be
jealous.  Nobly did they do their work that day, and terrible was
the slaughter done to our enemy, though at sad cost to ourselves,
as shown by the following reports:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD NEAR ATLANTA, July 23,1864.

General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.

Yesterday morning the enemy fell back to the intrenchments proper
of the city of Atlanta, which are in a general circle, with a
radius of one and a half miles, and we closed in.  While we were
forming our lines, and selecting positions for our batteries, the
enemy appeared suddenly out of the dense woods in heavy masses on
our extreme left, and struck the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair)
in flank, and was forcing it back, when the Sixteenth Corps
(General Dodge) came up and checked the movement, but the enemy's
cavalry got well to our rear, and into Decatur, and for some hours
our left flank was completely enveloped.  The fight that resulted
was continuous until night, with heavy loss on both sides.  The
enemy took one of our batteries (Murray's, of the Regular Army)
that was marching in its place in column in the road, unconscious
of danger.  About 4 p.m. the enemy sallied against the division of
General Morgan L. Smith, of the Fifteenth Corps, which occupied an
abandoned line of rifle-trench near the railroad east of the city,
and forced it back some four hundred yards, leaving in his hands
for the time two batteries, but the ground and batteries were
immediately after recovered by the same troops reenforced.  I
cannot well approximate our loss, which fell heavily on the
Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, but count it as three thousand; I
know that, being on the defensive, we have inflicted equally heavy
loss on the enemy.

General McPherson, when arranging his troops about 11.00 A.M., and
passing from one column to another, incautiously rode upon an
ambuscade without apprehension, at some distance ahead of his staff
and orderlies, and was shot dead.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD NEAR ATLANTA, July 26,1864.

Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I find it difficult to make prompt report of results,
coupled with some data or information, without occasionally making
mistakes.  McPherson's sudden death, and Logan succeeding to the
command as it were in the midst of battle, made some confusion on
our extreme left; but it soon recovered and made sad havoc with the
enemy, who had practised one of his favorite games of attacking our
left when in motion, and before it had time to cover its weak
flank.  After riding over the ground and hearing the varying
statements of the actors, I directed General Logan to make an
official report of the actual result, and I herewith inclose it.

Though the number of dead rebels seems excessive, I am disposed to
give full credit to the report that our loss, though only
thirty-five hundred and twenty-one killed, wounded, and missing, the
enemy's dead alone on the field nearly equaled that number, viz.,
thirty-two hundred and twenty.  Happening at that point of the line
when a flag of truce was sent in to ask permission for each party to
bury its dead, I gave General Logan authority to permit a temporary
truce on that flank alone, while our labors and fighting proceeded at
all others.

I also send you a copy of General Garrard's report of the breaking
of the railroad toward Augusta.  I am now grouping my command to
attack the Macon road, and with that view will intrench a strong
line of circumvallation with flanks, so as to have as large an
infantry column as possible, with all the cavalry to swing round to
the south and east, to strike that road at or below East Point.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
BEFORE ATLANTA GEORGIA, July 24, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following general summary
of the result of the attack of the enemy on this army on the 22d
inst.

Total loss, killed, wounded, and missing, thirty-five hundred and
twenty-one, and ten pieces of artillery.

We have buried and delivered to the enemy, under a flag of truce
sent in by them, in front of the Third Division, Seventeenth Corps,
one thousand of their killed.

The number of their dead in front of the Fourth Division of the
same corps, including those on the ground not now occupied by our
troops, General Blair reports, will swell the number of their dead
on his front to two thousand.

The number of their dead buried in front of the Fifteenth Corps, up
to this hour, is three hundred and sixty, and the commanding
officer reports that at least as many more are yet unburied;
burying-parties being still at work.

The number of dead buried in front of the Sixteenth Corps is four
hundred and twenty-two.  We have over one thousand of their wounded
in our hands, the larger number of the wounded being carried off
during the night, after the engagement, by them.

We captured eighteen stands of colors, and have them now.  We also
captured five thousand stands of arms.

The attack was made on our lines seven times, and was seven times
repulsed.  Hood's and Hardee's corps and Wheeler's cavalry engaged
us.

We have sent to the rear one thousand prisoners, including
thirty-three commissioned officers of high rank.

We still occupy the field, and the troops are in fine spirits.  A
detailed and full report will be furnished as soon as completed.

Recapitulation.

Our total loss............................ 3,521
Enemy's dead, thus far reported, buried,
and delivered to them..................... 3,220
Total prisoners sent North................ 1,017
Total prisoners, wounded, in our hands.... 1,000
Estimated loss of the enemy, at least.... 10,000

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Joan A.  Logan, Major-General.


On the 22d of July General Rousseau reached Marietta, having
returned from his raid on the Alabama road at Opelika, and on the
next day General Garrard also returned from Covington, both having
been measurably successful.  The former was about twenty-five
hundred strong, the latter about four thousand, and both reported
that their horses were jaded and tired, needing shoes and rest.
But, about this time, I was advised by General Grant (then
investing Richmond) that the rebel Government had become aroused to
the critical condition of things about Atlanta, and that I must
look out for Hood being greatly reenforced.  I therefore was
resolved to push matters, and at once set about the original
purpose of transferring the whole of the Army of the Tennessee to
our right flank, leaving Schofield to stretch out so as to rest his
left on the Augusta road, then torn up for thirty miles eastward;
and, as auxiliary thereto, I ordered all the cavalry to be ready to
pass around Atlanta on both flanks, to break up the Macon road at
some point below, so as to cut off all supplies to the rebel army
inside, and thus to force it to evacuate, or come out and fight us
on equal terms.

But it first became necessary to settle the important question of
who should succeed General McPherson?  General Logan had taken
command of the Army of the Tennessee by virtue of his seniority,
and had done well; but I did not consider him equal to the command
of three corps.  Between him and General Blair there existed a
natural rivalry.  Both were men of great courage and talent, but
were politicians by nature and experience, and it may be that for
this reason they were mistrusted by regular officers like Generals
Schofield, Thomas, and myself.  It was all-important that there
should exist a perfect understanding among the army commanders, and
at a conference with General George H. Thomas at the headquarters
of General Thomas J. Woods, commanding a division in the Fourth
Corps, he (Thomas) remonstrated warmly against my recommending that
General Logan should be regularly assigned to the command of the
Army of the Tennessee by reason of his accidental seniority.  We
discussed fully the merits and qualities of every officer of high
rank in the army, and finally settled on Major-General O. O. Howard
as the best officer who was present and available for the purpose;
on the 24th of July I telegraphed to General Halleck this
preference, and it was promptly ratified by the President.  General
Howard's place in command of the Fourth Corps was filled by General
Stanley, one of his division commanders, on the recommendation of
General Thomas.  All these promotions happened to fall upon
West-Pointers, and doubtless Logan and Blair had some reason to
believe that we intended to monopolize the higher honors of the war
for the regular officers.  I remember well my own thoughts and
feelings at the time, and feel sure that I was not intentionally
partial to any class, I wanted to succeed in taking Atlanta, and
needed commanders who were purely and technically soldiers, men who
would obey orders and execute them promptly and on time; for I knew
that we would have to execute some most delicate manoeuvres,
requiring the utmost skill, nicety, and precision.  I believed that
General Howard would do all these faithfully and well, and I think
the result has justified my choice.  I regarded both Generals Logan
and Blair as "volunteers," that looked to personal fame and glory
as auxiliary and secondary to their political ambition, and not as
professional soldiers.

As soon as it was known that General Howard had been chosen to
command the Army of the Tennessee; General Hooker applied to
General Thomas to be relieved of the command of the Twentieth
Corps, and General Thomas forwarded his application to me approved
and heartily recommended.  I at once telegraphed to General
Halleck, recommending General Slocum (then at Vicksburg) to be his
successor, because Slocum had been displaced from the command of
his corps at the time when the Eleventh and Twelfth were united and
made the Twentieth.

General Hooker was offended because he was not chosen to succeed
McPherson; but his chances were not even considered; indeed, I had
never been satisfied with him since his affair at the Gulp House,
and had been more than once disposed to relieve him of his corps,
because of his repeated attempts to interfere with Generals
McPherson and Schofield.  I had known Hooker since 1836, and was
intimately associated with him in California, where we served
together on the staff of General Persifer F. Smith.  He had come to
us from the East with a high reputation as a "fighter," which he
had fully justified at Chattanooga and Peach-Tree Creek; at which
latter battle I complimented him on the field for special
gallantry, and afterward in official reports.  Still, I did feel a
sense of relief when he left us.  We were then two hundred and
fifty miles in advance of our base, dependent on a single line of
railroad for our daily food.  We had a bold, determined foe in our
immediate front, strongly intrenched, with communication open to
his rear for supplies and reenforcements, and every soldier
realized that we had plenty of hard fighting ahead, and that all
honors had to be fairly earned.

Until General Slocum joined (in the latter part of August), the
Twentieth Corps was commanded by General A. S. Williams, the senior
division commander present.  On the 25th of July the army,
therefore, stood thus: the Army of the Tennessee (General O. O.
Howard commanding) was on the left, pretty much on the same ground
it had occupied during the battle of the 22d, all ready to move
rapidly by the rear to the extreme right beyond Proctor's Creek;
the Army of the Ohio (General Schofield) was next in order, with
its left flank reaching the Augusta Railroad; next in order,
conforming closely with the rebel intrenchments of Atlanta, was
General Thomas's Army of the Cumberland, in the order of--the
Fourth Corps (Stanley's), the Twentieth Corps (Williams's), and the
Fourteenth Corps (Palmer's).  Palmer's right division (Jefferson C.
Davis's) was strongly refused along Proctor's Creek.  This line was
about five miles long, and was intrenched as against a sally about
as strong as was our enemy.  The cavalry was assembled in two
strong divisions; that of McCook (including the brigade of Harrison
which had been brought in from Opelika by General Rousseau)
numbered about thirty-five hundred effective cavalry, and was
posted to our right rear, at Turner's Ferry, where we had a good
pontoon-bridge; and to our left rear, at and about Decatur, were
the two cavalry divisions of Stoneman, twenty-five hundred, and
Garrard, four thousand, united for the time and occasion under the
command of Major-General George Stoneman, a cavalry-officer of high
repute.  My plan of action was to move the Army of the Tennessee to
the right rapidly and boldly against the railroad below Atlanta,
and at the same time to send all the cavalry around by the right
and left to make a lodgment on the Macon road about Jonesboro.

All the orders were given, and the morning of the 27th was fixed
for commencing the movement.  On the 26th I received from General
Stoneman a note asking permission (after having accomplished his
orders to break up the railroad at Jonesboro) to go on to Macon to
rescue our prisoners of war known to be held there, and then to
push on to Andersonville, where was the great depot of Union
prisoners, in which were penned at one time as many as twenty-three
thousand of our men, badly fed and harshly treated.  I wrote him an
answer consenting substantially to his proposition, only modifying
it by requiring him to send back General Garrard's division to its
position on our left flank after he had broken up the railroad at
Jonesboro.  Promptly, and on time, all got off, and General Dodge's
corps (the Sixteenth, of the Army of the Tennessee) reached its
position across Proctor's Creek the same evening, and early the
next morning (the 28th) Blair's corps (the Seventeenth) deployed on
his right, both corps covering their front with the usual parapet;
the Fifteenth Corps (General Logan's) came up that morning on the
right of Blair, strongly refused, and began to prepare the usual
cover.  As General Jeff. C. Davis's division was, as it were, left
out of line, I ordered it on the evening before to march down
toward Turner's Ferry, and then to take a road laid down on our
maps which led from there toward East Point, ready to engage any
enemy that might attack our general right flank, after the same
manner as had been done to the left flank on the 22d.

Personally on the morning of the 28th I followed the movement, and
rode to the extreme right, where we could hear some skirmishing and
an occasional cannon-shot.  As we approached the ground held by the
Fifteenth Corps, a cannon-ball passed over my shoulder and killed
the horse of an orderly behind; and seeing that this gun enfiladed
the road by which we were riding, we turned out of it and rode down
into a valley, where we left our horses and walked up to the hill
held by Morgan L. Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps.  Near a
house I met Generals Howard and Logan, who explained that there was
an intrenched battery to their front, with the appearance of a
strong infantry support.  I then walked up to the ridge, where I
found General Morgan L. Smith.  His men were deployed and engaged
in rolling logs and fence-rails, preparing a hasty cover.  From
this ridge we could overlook the open fields near a meeting-house
known as "Ezra Church," close by the Poor-House.  We could see the
fresh earth of a parapet covering some guns (that fired an
occasional shot), and there was also an appearance of activity
beyond.  General Smith was in the act of sending forward a regiment
from, his right flank to feel the position of the enemy, when I
explained to him and to Generals Logan and Howard that they must
look out for General Jeff. C. Davis's division, which was coming
up from the direction of Turner's Ferry.

As the skirmish-fire warmed up along the front of Blair's corps, as
well as along the Fifteenth Corps (Logan's), I became convinced
that Hood designed to attack this right flank, to prevent, if
possible, the extension of our line in that direction.  I regained
my horse, and rode rapidly back to see that Davis's division had
been dispatched as ordered.  I found General Davis in person, who
was unwell, and had sent his division that morning early, under the
command of his senior brigadier, Morgan; but, as I attached great
importance to the movement, he mounted his horse, and rode away to
overtake and to hurry forward the movement, so as to come up on the
left rear of the enemy, during the expected battle.

By this time the sound of cannon and musketry denoted a severe
battle as in progress, which began seriously at 11.30 a.m., and
ended substantially by 4 p.m.  It was a fierce attack by the enemy
on our extreme right flank, well posted and partially covered.  The
most authentic account of the battle is given by General Logan, who
commanded the Fifteenth Corps, in his official report to the
Adjutant-General of the Army of the Tennessee, thus:


HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS
BEFORE ATLANTA, GEORGIA, July 29, 1864

Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM T. CLARK, Assistant Adjutant-General,
Army of the Tennessee, present.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of orders, I
moved my command into position on the right of the Seventeenth
Corps, which was the extreme right of the army in the field, during
the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th; and, while advancing
in line of battle to a more favorable position, we were met by the
rebel infantry of Hardee's and Lee's corps, who made a determined
and desperate attack on us at 11 A.M. of the 28th (yesterday).

My lines were only protected by logs and rails, hastily thrown up
in front of them.

The first onset was received and checked, and the battle commenced
and lasted until about three o'clock in the evening.  During that
time six successive charges were made, which were six times
gallantly repulsed, each time with fearful loss to the enemy.

Later in the evening my lines were several times assaulted
vigorously, but each time with like result.  The worst of the
fighting occurred on General Harrow's and Morgan L. Smith's fronts,
which formed the centre and right of the corps.  The troops could
not have displayed greater courage, nor greater determination not
to give ground; had they shown less, they would have been driven
from their position.

Brigadier-Generals C. R. Woods, Harrow, and Morgan L. Smith,
division commanders, are entitled to equal credit for gallant
conduct and skill in repelling the assault.  My thanks are due to
Major-Generals Blair and Dodge for sending me reenforeements at a
time when they were much needed.  My losses were fifty killed, four
hundred and forty-nine wounded, and seventy-three missing:
aggregate, five hundred and seventy-two.

The division of General Harrow captured five battle-flags.  There
were about fifteen hundred or two thousand muskets left on the
ground. One hundred and six prisoners were captured, exclusive of
seventy-three wounded, who were sent to our hospital, and are being
cared for by our surgeons.  Five hundred and sixty-five rebels have
up to this time been buried, and about two hundred are supposed to
be yet unburied.  A large number of their wounded were undoubtedly
carried away in the night, as the enemy did not withdraw till near
daylight.  The enemy's loss could not have been less than six or
seven thousand men.  A more detailed report will hereafter be made.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

JOHN A.  LOGAN,
Major-General, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.


General Howard, in transmitting this report, added:

I wish to express my high gratification with the conduct of the
troops engaged.  I never saw better conduct in battle.  General
Logan, though ill and much worn out, was indefatigable, and the
success of the day is as much attributable to him as to any one
man.


This was, of coarse, the first fight in which General Howard had
commanded the Army of the Tennessee, and he evidently aimed to
reconcile General Logan in his disappointment, and to gain the
heart of his army, to which he was a stranger.  He very properly
left General Logan to fight his own corps, but exposed himself
freely; and, after the firing had ceased, in the afternoon he
walked the lines; the men, as reported to me, gathered about him in
the most affectionate way, and he at once gained their respect and
confidence.  To this fact I at the time attached much importance,
for it put me at ease as to the future conduct of that most
important army.

At no instant of time did I feel the least uneasiness about the
result on the 28th, but wanted to reap fuller results, hoping that
Davis's division would come up at the instant of defeat, and catch
the enemy in flank; but the woods were dense, the roads obscure,
and as usual this division got on the wrong road, and did not come
into position until about dark.  In like manner, I thought that
Hood had greatly weakened his main lines inside of Atlanta, and
accordingly sent repeated orders to Schofield and Thomas to make an
attempt to break in; but both reported that they found the parapets
very strong and full manned.

Our men were unusually encouraged by this day's work, for they
realized that we could compel Hood to come out from behind his
fortified lines to attack us at a disadvantage.  In conversation
with me, the soldiers of the Fifteenth Corps, with whom I was on
the most familiar terms, spoke of the affair of the 28th as the
easiest thing in the world; that, in fact, it was a common
slaughter of the enemy; they pointed out where the rebel lines had
been, and how they themselves had fired deliberately, had shot down
their antagonists, whose bodies still lay unburied, and marked
plainly their lines of battle, which must have halted within easy
musket-range of our men, who were partially protected by their
improvised line of logs and fence-rails.  All bore willing
testimony to the courage and spirit of the foe, who, though
repeatedly repulsed, came back with increased determination some
six or more times.

The next morning the Fifteenth Corps wheeled forward to the left
over the battle-field of the day before, and Davis's division still
farther prolonged the line, which reached nearly to the
ever-to-be-remembered "Sandtown road."

Then, by further thinning out Thomas's line, which was well
entrenched, I drew another division of Palmer's corps (Baird's)
around to the right, to further strengthen that flank.  I was
impatient to hear from the cavalry raid, then four days out, and
was watching for its effect, ready to make a bold push for the
possession of East Point.  General Garrard's division returned to
Decatur on the 31st, and reported that General Stoneman had posted
him at Flat Rock, while he (Stoneman) went on.  The month of July
therefore closed with our infantry line strongly entrenched, but
drawn out from the Augusta road on the left to the Sandtown road on
the right, a distance of full ten measured miles.

The enemy, though evidently somewhat intimidated by the results of
their defeats on the 22d and 28th, still presented a bold front at
all points, with fortified lines that defied a direct assault.  Our
railroad was done to the rear of our camps, Colonel W. P. Wright
having reconstructed the bridge across the Chattahoochee in six
days; and our garrisons and detachments to the rear had so
effectually guarded the railroad that the trains from Nashville
arrived daily, and our substantial wants were well supplied.

The month, though hot in the extreme, had been one of constant
conflict, without intermission, and on four several occasions
--viz., July 4th, 20th, 22d, and 28th--these affairs had amounted to
real battles, with casualty lists by the thousands.  Assuming the
correctness of the rebel surgeon Foard's report, on page 577 of
Johnston's "Narrative," commencing with July 4th and terminating
with July 31st, we have:

        Aggregate loss of the enemy......... 10,841

Our losses, as compiled from the official returns for July,
1864, are:
                     Killed and Missing.    Wounded.    Total.

Aggregate loss of July....... 3,804          5,915      9,719


In this table the column of "killed and missing" embraces the
prisoners that fell into the hands of the enemy, mostly lost in the
Seventeenth Corps, on the 22d of July, and does not embrace the
losses in the cavalry divisions of Garrard and McCook, which,
however, were small for July.  In all other respects the statement
is absolutely correct.  I am satisfied, however, that Surgeon Foard
could not have been in possession of data sufficiently accurate to
enable him to report the losses in actual battle of men who never
saw the hospital.  During the whole campaign I had rendered to me
tri-monthly statements of "effective strength," from which I
carefully eliminated the figures not essential for my conduct, so
that at all times I knew the exact fighting-strength of each corps,
division, and brigade, of the whole army, and also endeavored to
bear in mind our losses both on the several fields of battle and by
sickness, and well remember that I always estimated that during the
month of July we had inflicted heavier loss on the enemy than we
had sustained ourselves, and the above figures prove it
conclusively.  Before closing this chapter, I must record one or
two minor events that occurred about this time, that may prove of
interest.

On the 24th of July I received a dispatch from Inspector-General
James A. Hardie, then on duty at the War Department in Washington,
to the effect that Generals Osterhaus and Alvan P. Hovey had been
appointed major-generals.  Both of these had begun the campaign
with us in command of divisions, but had gone to the rear--the
former by reason of sickness, and the latter dissatisfied with
General Schofield and myself about the composition of his division
of the Twenty-third Corps.  Both were esteemed as first-class
officers, who had gained special distinction in the Vicksburg
campaign.  But up to that time, when the newspapers announced daily
promotions elsewhere, no prominent officers serving with me had
been advanced a peg, and I felt hurt.  I answered Hardie on the
25th, in a dispatch which has been made public, closing with this
language: "If the rear be the post of honor, then we had better all
change front on Washington."  To my amazement, in a few days I
received from President Lincoln himself an answer, in which he
caught me fairly.  I have not preserved a copy of that dispatch,
and suppose it was burned up in the Chicago fire; but it was
characteristic of Mr. Lincoln, and was dated the 26th or 27th day
of July, contained unequivocal expressions of respect for those who
were fighting hard and unselfishly, offering us a full share of the
honors and rewards of the war, and saying that, in the cases of
Hovey and Osterhaus, he was influenced mainly by the
recommendations of Generals Grant and Sherman.  On the 27th I
replied direct, apologizing somewhat for my message to General
Hardie, saying that I did not suppose such messages ever reached
him personally, explaining that General Grant's and Sherman's
recommendations for Hovey and Osterhaus had been made when the
events of the Vicksburg campaign were fresh with us, and that my
dispatch of the 25th to General Hardie had reflected chiefly the
feelings of the officers then present with me before Atlanta.  The
result of all this, however, was good, for another dispatch from
General Hardie, of the 28th, called on me to nominate eight
colonels for promotion as brigadier-generals.  I at once sent a
circular note to the army-commanders to nominate two colonels from
the Army of the Ohio and three from each of the others; and the
result was, that on the 29th of July I telegraphed the names of--

Colonel William Gross, Thirty-sixth Indiana; Colonel Charles C.
Walcutt, Forty-sixth Ohio; Colonel James W. Riley, One Hundred and
Fourth Ohio; Colonel L. P. Bradley, Fifty-first Illinois; Colonel
J. W. Sprague, Sixty-third Ohio; Colonel Joseph A. Cooper, Sixth
East Tennessee; Colonel John T. Croxton, Fourth Kentucky; Colonel
William W. Belknap, Fifteenth Iowa.  These were promptly appointed
brigadier-generals, were already in command of brigades or
divisions; and I doubt if eight promotions were ever made fairer,
or were more honestly earned, during the whole war.




CHAPTER XIX.

CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1864


The month of August opened hot and sultry, but our position before
Atlanta was healthy, with ample supply of wood, water, and
provisions.  The troops had become habituated to the slow and
steady progress of the siege; the skirmish-lines were held close up
to the enemy, were covered by rifle-trenches or logs, and kept up a
continuous clatter of musketry.  The mainlines were held farther
back, adapted to the shape of the ground, with muskets loaded and
stacked for instant use.  The field-batteries were in select
positions, covered by handsome parapets, and occasional shots from
them gave life and animation to the scene.  The men loitered about
the trenches carelessly, or busied themselves in constructing
ingenious huts out of the abundant timber, and seemed as snug,
comfortable, and happy, as though they were at home.  General
Schofield was still on the extreme left, Thomas in the centre, and
Howard on the right.  Two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps
(Baird's and Jeff.  C. Davis's) were detached to the right rear,
and held in reserve.

I thus awaited the effect of the cavalry movement against the
railroad about Jonesboro, and had heard from General Garrard that
Stoneman had gone on to Mason; during that day (August 1st) Colonel
Brownlow, of a Tennessee cavalry regiment, came in to Marietta from
General McCook, and reported that McCook's whole division had been
overwhelmed, defeated, and captured at Newnan.  Of course, I was
disturbed by this wild report, though I discredited it, but made
all possible preparations to strengthen our guards along the
railroad to the rear, on the theory that the force of cavalry which
had defeated McCook would at once be on the railroad about
Marietta.  At the same time Garrard was ordered to occupy the
trenches on our left, while Schofield's whole army moved to the
extreme right, and extended the line toward East Point.  Thomas was
also ordered still further to thin out his lines, so as to set free
the other division (Johnson's) of the Fourteenth Corps (Palmer's),
which was moved to the extreme right rear, and held in reserve
ready to make a bold push from that flank to secure a footing on
the Mason Railroad at or below East Point.

These changes were effected during the 2d and 3d days of August,
when General McCook came in and reported the actual results of his
cavalry expedition.  He had crossed the Chattahoochee River below
Campbellton, by his pontoon-bridge; had then marched rapidly across
to the Mason Railroad at Lovejoy's Station, where he had reason to
expect General Stoneman; but, not hearing of him, he set to work,
tore up two miles of track, burned two trains of cars, and cut away
five miles of telegraph-wire.  He also found the wagon-train
belonging to the rebel army in Atlanta, burned five hundred wagons,
killed eight hundred mules; and captured seventy-two officers and
three hundred and fifty men.  Finding his progress eastward, toward
McDonough, barred by a superior force, he turned back to Newnan,
where he found himself completely surrounded by infantry and
cavalry.  He had to drop his prisoners and fight his way out,
losing about six hundred men in killed and captured, and then
returned with the remainder to his position at Turner's Ferry.
This was bad enough, but not so bad as had been reported by Colonel
Brownlow.  Meantime, rumors came that General Stoneman was down
about Mason, on the east bank of the Ocmulgee.  On the 4th of
August Colonel Adams got to Marietta with his small brigade of nine
hundred men belonging to Stoneman's cavalry, reporting, as usual,
all the rest lost, and this was partially confirmed by a report
which came to me all the way round by General Grant's headquarters
before Richmond.  A few days afterward Colonel Capron also got in,
with another small brigade perfectly demoralized, and confirmed the
report that General Stoneman had covered the escape of these two
small brigades, himself standing with a reserve of seven hundred
men, with which he surrendered to a Colonel Iverson.  Thus another
of my cavalry divisions was badly damaged, and out of the fragments
we hastily reorganized three small divisions under
Brigadier-Generals Garrard, McCook, and Kilpatrick.

Stoneman had not obeyed his orders to attack the railroad first
before going to Macon and Andersonville, but had crossed the
Ocmulgee River high up near Covington, and had gone down that river
on the east bank.  He reached Clinton, and sent out detachments
which struck the railroad leading from Macon to Savannah at
Griswold Station, where they found and destroyed seventeen
locomotives and over a hundred cars; then went on and burned the
bridge across the Oconee, and reunited the division before Macon.
Stoneman shelled the town across the river, but could not cross
over by the bridge, and returned to Clinton, where he found his
retreat obstructed, as he supposed, by a superior force.  There he
became bewildered, and sacrificed himself for the safety of his
command.  He occupied the attention of his enemy by a small force
of seven hundred men, giving Colonels Adams and Capron leave, with
their brigades, to cut their way back to me at Atlanta.  The former
reached us entire, but the latter was struck and scattered at some
place farther north, and came in by detachments.  Stoneman
surrendered, and remained a prisoner until he was exchanged some
time after, late in September, at Rough and Ready.

I now became satisfied that cavalry could not, or would not, make a
sufficient lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, and that nothing
would suffice but for us to reach it with the main army.  Therefore
the most urgent efforts to that end were made, and to Schofield, on
the right, was committed the charge of this special object.  He had
his own corps (the Twenty-third), composed of eleven thousand and
seventy-five infantry and eight hundred and eighty-five artillery,
with McCook's broken division of cavalry, seventeen hundred and
fifty-four men and horses.  For this purpose I also placed the
Fourteenth Corps (Palmer) under his orders.  This corps numbered at
the time seventeen thousand two hundred and eighty-eight infantry
and eight hundred and twenty-six artillery; but General Palmer
claimed to rank General Schofield in the date of his commission as
major-general, and denied the latter's right to exercise command
over him.  General Palmer was a man of ability, but was not
enterprising.  His three divisions were compact and strong, well
commanded, admirable on the defensive, but slow to move or to act
on the offensive.  His corps (the Fourteenth) had sustained, up to
that time, fewer hard knocks than any other corps in the whole
army, and I was anxious to give it a chance.  I always expected to
have a desperate fight to get possession of the Macon road, which
was then the vital objective of the campaign.  Its possession by us
would, in my judgment, result in the capture of Atlanta, and give
us the fruits of victory, although the destruction of Hood's army
was the real object to be desired.  Yet Atlanta was known as the
"Gate-City of the South," was full of founderies, arsenals, and
machine-shops, and I knew that its capture would be the death-knell
of the Southern Confederacy.

On the 4th of August I ordered General Schofield to make a bold
attack on the railroad, anywhere about East Point, and ordered
General Palmer to report to him for duty.  He at once denied
General Schofield's right to command him; but, after examining the
dates of their respective commissions, and hearing their arguments,
I wrote to General Palmer.


August 4th.-10.45 p.m.

From the statements made by yourself and General Schofield to-day,
my decision is, that he ranks you as a major-general, being of the
same date of present commission, by reason of his previous superior
rank as brigadier-general.  The movements of to-morrow are so
important that the orders of the superior on that flank must be
regarded as military orders, and not in the nature of cooperation.
I did hope that there would be no necessity for my making this
decision; but it is better for all parties interested that no
question of rank should occur in actual battle.  The Sandtown road,
and the railroad, if possible, must be gained to-morrow, if it
costs half your command.  I regard the loss of time this afternoon
as equal to the loss of two thousand men.


I also communicated the substance of this to General Thomas, to
whose army Palmer's corps belonged, who replied on the 5th:


I regret to hear that Palmer has taken the course he has, and I
know that he intends to offer his resignation as soon as he can
properly do so.  I recommend that his application be granted.


And on the 5th I again wrote to General Palmer, arguing the point
with him, advising him, as a friend, not to resign at that crisis
lest his motives might be misconstrued, and because it might damage
his future career in civil life; but, at the same time, I felt it
my duty to say to him that the operations on that flank, during the
4th and 5th, had not been satisfactory--not imputing to him,
however, any want of energy or skill, but insisting that "the
events did not keep pace with my desires."  General Schofield had
reported to me that night:


I am compelled to acknowledge that I have totally failed to make
any aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps.  I have ordered
General Johnson's division to replace General Hascall's this
evening, and I propose to-morrow to take my own troops
(Twenty-third Corps) to the right, and try to recover what has been
lost by two days' delay.  The force may likely be too small.


I sanctioned the movement, and ordered two of Palmers divisions
--Davis's and Baird's--to follow en echelon in support of Schofield,
and summoned General Palmer to meet me in person: He came on the
6th to my headquarters, and insisted on his resignation being
accepted, for which formal act I referred him to General Thomas.
He then rode to General Thomas's camp, where he made a written
resignation of his office as commander of the Fourteenth Corps, and
was granted the usual leave of absence to go to his home in
Illinois, there to await further orders.  General Thomas
recommended that the resignation be accepted; that Johnson, the
senior division commander of the corps, should be ordered back to
Nashville as chief of cavalry, and that Brigadier-General Jefferson
C. Davis, the next in order, should be promoted major general, and
assigned to command the corps.  These changes had to be referred to
the President, in Washington, and were, in due time, approved and
executed; and thenceforward I had no reason to complain of the
slowness or inactivity of that splendid corps. It had been
originally formed by General George H. Thomas, had been commanded
by him in person, and had imbibed some what his personal character,
viz., steadiness, good order, and deliberation nothing hasty or
rash, but always safe, "slow, and sure."  On August 7th I
telegraphed to General Halleck:


Have received to-day the dispatches of the Secretary of War and of
General Grant, which are very satisfactory.  We keep hammering away
all the time, and there is no peace, inside or outside of Atlanta.
To-day General Schofield got round the line which was assaulted
yesterday by General Reilly's brigade, turned it and gained the
ground where the assault had been made, and got possession of all
our dead and wounded.  He continued to press on that flank, and
brought on a noisy but not a bloody battle.  He drove the enemy
behind his main breastworks, which cover the railroad from Atlanta
to East Point, and captured a good many of the skirmishers, who are
of his best troops--for the militia hug the breastworks close.  I
do not deem it prudent to extend any more to the right, but will
push forward daily by parallels, and make the inside of Atlanta too
hot to be endured.  I have sent back to Chattanooga for two
thirty-pound Parrotts, with which we can pick out almost any house in
town.  I am too impatient for a siege, and don't know but this is as
good a place to fight it out on, as farther inland.  One thing is
certain, whether we get inside of Atlanta or not, it will be a
used-up community when we are done with it.


In Schofield's extension on the 5th, General Reilly's brigade had
struck an outwork, which he promptly attacked, but, as usual, got
entangled in the trees and bushes which had been felled, and lost
about five hundred men, in killed and wounded; but, as above
reported, this outwork was found abandoned the next day, and we
could see from it that the rebels were extending their lines,
parallel with the railroad, about as fast as we could add to our
line of investment.  On the 10th of August the Parrott
thirty-pounders were received and placed in Position; for a couple
of days we kept up a sharp fire from all our batteries converging
on Atlanta, and at every available point we advanced our
infantry-lines, thereby shortening and strengthening the
investment; but I was not willing to order a direct assault, unless
some accident or positive neglect on the part of our antagonist
should reveal an opening.  However, it was manifest that no such
opening was intended by Hood, who felt secure behind his strong
defenses.  He had repelled our cavalry attacks on his railroad, and
had damaged us seriously thereby, so I expected that he would
attempt the same game against our rear.  Therefore I made
extraordinary exertions to recompose our cavalry divisions, which
were so essential, both for defense and offense.  Kilpatrick was
given that on our right rear, in support of Schofield's exposed
flank; Garrard retained that on our general left; and McCook's
division was held somewhat in reserve, about Marietta and the
railroad.  On the 10th, having occasion to telegraph to General
Grant, then in Washington, I used this language:


Since July 28th Hood has not attempted to meet us outside his
parapets.  In order to possess and destroy effectually his
communications, I may have to leave a corps at the railroad-bridge,
well intrenched, and cut loose with the balance to make a circle of
desolation around Atlanta.  I do not propose to assault the works,
which are too strong, nor to proceed by regular approaches.  I have
lost a good many regiments, and will lose more, by the expiration
of service; and this is the only reason why I want reenforcements.
We have killed, crippled, and captured more of the enemy than we
have lost by his acts.


On the 12th of August I heard of the success of Admiral Farragut in
entering Mobile Bay, which was regarded as a most valuable
auxiliary to our operations at Atlanta; and learned that I had been
commissioned a major-general in the regular army, which was
unexpected, and not desired until successful in the capture of
Atlanta.  These did not change the fact that we were held in check
by the stubborn defense of the place, and a conviction was forced
on my mind that our enemy would hold fast, even though every house
in the town should be battered down by our artillery.  It was
evident that we most decoy him out to fight us on something like
equal terms, or else, with the whole army, raise the siege and
attack his communications.  Accordingly, on the 13th of August, I
gave general orders for the Twentieth Corps to draw back to the
railroad-bridge at the Chattahoochee, to protect our trains,
hospitals, spare artillery, and the railroad-depot, while the rest
of the army should move bodily to some point on the Macon Railroad
below East Point.

Luckily, I learned just then that the enemy's cavalry, under
General Wheeler, had made a wide circuit around our left flank, and
had actually reached our railroad at Tilton Station, above Resaca,
captured a drove of one thousand of our beef-cattle, and was strong
enough to appear before Dalton, and demand of its commander,
Colonel Raum, the surrender of the place.  General John E. Smith,
who was at Kingston, collected together a couple of thousand men,
and proceeded in cars to the relief of Dalton when Wheeler
retreated northward toward Cleveland.  On the 16th another
detachment of the enemy's cavalry appeared in force about Allatoona
and the Etowah bridge, when I became fully convinced that Hood had
sent all of his cavalry to raid upon our railroads.  For some days
our communication with Nashville was interrupted by the destruction
of the telegraph-lines, as well as railroad.  I at once ordered
strong reconnoissances forward from our flanks on the left by
Garrard, and on the right by Kilpatrick.  The former moved with so
much caution that I was displeased; but Kilpatrick, on the
contrary, displayed so much zeal and activity that I was attracted
to him at once.  He reached Fairburn Station, on the West Point
road, and tore it up, returning safely to his position on our right
flank.  I summoned him to me, and was so pleased with his spirit
and confidence, that I concluded to suspend the general movement of
the main army, and to send him with his small division of cavalry
to break up the Macon road about Jonesboro, in the hopes that it
would force Hood to evacuate Atlanta, and that I should thereby not
only secure possession of the city itself, but probably could catch
Hood in the confusion of retreat; and, further to increase the
chances of success.

I ordered General Thomas to detach two brigades of Garrard's
division of cavalry from the left to the right rear, to act as a
reserve in support of General Kilpatrick.  Meantime, also, the
utmost activity was ordered along our whole front by the infantry
and artillery.  Kilpatrick got off during the night of the 18th,
and returned to us on the 22d, having made the complete circuit of
Atlanta.  He reported that he had destroyed three miles of the
railroad about Jonesboro, which he reckoned would take ten days to
repair; that he had encountered a division of infantry and a
brigade of cavalry (Ross's); that he had captured a battery and
destroyed three of its guns, bringing one in as a trophy, and he
also brought in three battle-flags and seventy prisoners.  On the
23d, however, we saw trains coming into Atlanta from the south,
when I became more than ever convinced that cavalry could not or
would not work hard enough to disable a railroad properly, and
therefore resolved at once to proceed to the execution of my
original plan.  Meantime, the damage done to our own railroad and
telegraph by Wheeler, about Resaca and Dalton, had been repaired,
and Wheeler himself was too far away to be of any service to his
own army, and where he could not do us much harm, viz., up about
the Hiawaesee.  On the 24th I rode down to the Chattahoochee
bridge, to see in person that it could be properly defended by the
single corps proposed to be left there for that purpose, and found
that the rebel works, which had been built by Johnston to resist
us, could be easily utilized against themselves; and on returning
to my camp, at   that same evening, I telegraphed to General
Halleck as follows:


Heavy fires in Atlanta all day, caused by our artillery.  I will be
all ready, and will commence the movement around Atlanta by the
south, tomorrow night, and for some time you will hear little of
us.  I will keep open a courier line back to the Chattahoochee
bridge, by way of Sandtown.  The Twentieth Corps will hold the
railroad-bridge, and I will move with the balance of the army,
provisioned for twenty days.


Meantime General Dodge (commanding the Sixteenth Corps) had been
wounded in the forehead, had gone to the rear, and his two
divisions were distributed to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps.
The real movement commenced on the 25th, at night.  The Twentieth
Corps drew back and took post at the railroad-bridge, and the
Fourth Corps (Stanley) moved to his right rear, closing up with the
Fourteenth Corps (Jeff. C. Davis) near Utoy Creek; at the same time
Garrard's cavalry, leaving their horses out of sight, occupied the
vacant trenches, so that the enemy did not detect the change at
all.  The next night (26th) the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps,
composing the Army of the Tennessee (Howard), drew out of their
trenches, made a wide circuit, and came up on the extreme right of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland
(Thomas) along Utoy Creek, facing south.  The enemy seemed to
suspect something that night, using his artillery pretty freely;
but I think he supposed we were going to retreat altogether.  An
artillery-shot, fired at random, killed one man and wounded
another, and the next morning some of his infantry came out of
Atlanta and found our camps abandoned.  It was afterward related
that there was great rejoicing in Atlanta "that the Yankees were
gone;" the fact was telegraphed all over the South, and several
trains of cars (with ladies) came up from Macon to assist in the
celebration of their grand victory.

On the 28th (making a general left-wheel, pivoting on Schofield)
both Thomas and Howard reached the West Point Railroad, extending
from East Point to Red-Oak Station and Fairburn, where we spent the
next day (29th) in breaking it up thoroughly.  The track was heaved
up in sections the length of a regiment, then separated rail by
rail; bonfires were made of the ties and of fence-rails on which
the rails were heated, carried to trees or telegraph-poles, wrapped
around and left to cool.  Such rails could not be used again; and,
to be still more certain, we filled up many deep cuts with trees,
brush, and earth, and commingled with them loaded shells, so
arranged that they would explode on an attempt to haul out the
bushes.  The explosion of one such shell would have demoralized a
gang of negroes, and thus would have prevented even the attempt to
clear the road.

Meantime Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, presented a bold
front toward East Point, daring and inviting the enemy to sally out
to attack him in position.  His first movement was on the 30th, to
Mount Gilead Church, then to Morrow's Mills, facing Rough and
Ready.  Thomas was on his right, within easy support, moving by
cross-roads from Red Oak to the Fayetteville road, extending from
Couch's to Renfrew's; and Howard was aiming for Jonesboro.

I was with General Thomas that day, which was hot but otherwise
very pleasant.  We stopped for a short noon-rest near a little
church (marked on our maps as Shoal-Creek Church), which stood back
about a hundred yards from the road, in a grove of native oaks.
The infantry column had halted in the road, stacked their arms, and
the men were scattered about--some lying in the shade of the trees,
and others were bringing corn-stalks from a large corn-field across
the road to feed our horses, while still others had arms full of
the roasting-ears, then in their prime.  Hundreds of fires were
soon started with the fence-rails, and the men were busy roasting
the ears.  Thomas and I were walking up and down the road which led
to the church, discussing the chances of the movement, which he
thought were extra-hazardous, and our path carried us by a fire at
which a soldier was roasting his corn.  The fire was built
artistically; the man was stripping the ears of their husks,
standing them in front of his fire, watching them carefully, and
turning each ear little by little, so as to roast it nicely.  He
was down on his knees intent on his business, paying little heed to
the stately and serious deliberations of his leaders.  Thomas's
mind was running on the fact that we had cut loose from our base of
supplies, and that seventy thousand men were then dependent for
their food on the chance supplies of the country (already
impoverished by the requisitions of the enemy), and on the contents
of our wagons.  Between Thomas and his men there existed a most
kindly relation, and he frequently talked with them in the most
familiar way.  Pausing awhile, and watching the operations of this
man roasting his corn, he said, "What are you doing?"  The man
looked up smilingly "Why, general, I am laying in a supply of
provisions."  "That is right, my man, but don't waste your
provisions."  As we resumed our walk, the man remarked, in a sort
of musing way, but loud enough for me to hear: "There he goes,
there goes the old man, economizing as usual."  "Economizing" with
corn, which cost only the labor of gathering and roasting!

As we walked, we could hear General Howard's guns at intervals,
away off to our right front, but an ominous silence continued
toward our left, where I was expecting at each moment to hear the
sound of battle.  That night we reached Renfrew's, and had reports
from left to right (from General Schofield, about Morrow's Mills,
to General Howard, within a couple of miles of Jonesboro).  The
next morning (August 31st) all moved straight for the railroad.
Schofield reached it near Rough and Ready, and Thomas at two points
between there and Jonesboro.  Howard found an intrenched foe
(Hardee's corps) covering Jonesboro, and his men began at once to
dig their accustomed rifle-pits.  Orders were sent to Generals
Thomas and Schofield to turn straight for Jonesboro, tearing up the
railroad-track as they advanced.  About 3.00 p.m.  the enemy
sallied from Jonesboro against the Fifteenth corps, but was easily
repulsed, and driven back within his lines.  All hands were kept
busy tearing up the railroad, and it was not until toward evening
of the 1st day of September that the Fourteenth Corps (Davis)
closed down on the north front of Jonesboro, connecting on his
right with Howard, and his left reaching the railroad, along which
General Stanley was moving, followed by Schofield.  General Davis
formed his divisions in line about 4 p.m., swept forward over some
old cotton-fields in full view, and went over the rebel parapet
handsomely, capturing the whole of Govan's brigade, with two
field-batteries of ten guns.  Being on the spot, I checked Davis's
movement, and ordered General Howard to send the two divisions of
the Seventeenth Corps (Blair) round by his right rear, to get below
Jonesboro, and to reach the railroad, so as to cut off retreat in
that direction.  I also dispatched orders after orders to hurry
forward Stanley, so as to lap around Jonesboro on the east, hoping
thus to capture the whole of Hardee's corps.  I sent first Captain
Audenried (aide-de-camp), then Colonel Poe, of the Engineers, and
lastly General Thomas himself (and that is the only time during the
campaign I can recall seeing General Thomas urge his horse into a
gallop).  Night was approaching, and the country on the farther
side of the railroad was densely wooded.  General Stanley had come
up on the left of Davis, and was deploying, though there could not
have been on his front more than a skirmish-line.  Had he moved
straight on by the flank, or by a slight circuit to his left, he
would have inclosed the whole ground occupied by Hardee's corps,
and that corps could not have escaped us; but night came on, and
Hardee did escape.

Meantime General Slocum had reached his corps (the Twentieth),
stationed at the Chattahoochee bridge, had relieved General A. S.
Williams in command, and orders had been sent back to him to feel
forward occasionally toward Atlanta, to observe the effect when we
had reached the railroad.  That night I was so restless and
impatient that I could not sleep, and about midnight there arose
toward Atlanta sounds of shells exploding, and other sound like
that of musketry.  I walked to the house of a farmer close by my
bivouac, called him out to listen to the reverberations which came
from the direction of Atlanta (twenty miles to the north of us),
and inquired of him if he had resided there long.  He said he had,
and that these sounds were just like those of a battle.  An
interval of quiet then ensued, when again, about 4 a.m., arose
other similar explosions, but I still remained in doubt whether the
enemy was engaged in blowing up his own magazines, or whether
General Slocum had not felt forward, and become engaged in a real
battle.

The next morning General Hardee was gone, and we all pushed forward
along the railroad south, in close pursuit, till we ran up against
his lines at a point just above Lovejoy's Station.  While bringing
forward troops and feeling the new position of our adversary,
rumors came from the rear that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, and
that General Slocum was in the city.  Later in the day I received a
note in Slocum's own handwriting, stating that he had heard during
the night the very sounds that I have referred to; that he had
moved rapidly up from the bridge about daylight, and had entered
Atlanta unopposed.  His letter was dated inside the city, so there
was no doubt of the fact.  General Thomas's bivouac was but a short
distance from mine, and, before giving notice to the army in
general orders, I sent one of my staff-officers to show him the
note.  In a few minutes the officer returned, soon followed by
Thomas himself, who again examined the note, so as to be perfectly
certain that it was genuine.  The news seemed to him too good to be
true.  He snapped his fingers, whistled, and almost danced, and, as
the news spread to the army, the shouts that arose from our men,
the wild hallooing and glorious laughter, were to us a full
recompense for the labor and toils and hardships through which we
had passed in the previous three months.

A courier-line was at once organized, messages were sent back and
forth from our camp at Lovejoy's to Atlanta, and to our
telegraph-station at the Chattahoochee bridge.  Of course, the glad
tidings flew on the wings of electricity to all parts of the North,
where the people had patiently awaited news of their husbands, sons,
and brothers, away down in "Dixie Land;" and congratulations came
pouring back full of good-will and patriotism.  This victory was most
opportune; Mr. Lincoln himself told me afterward that even he had
previously felt in doubt, for the summer was fast passing away; that
General Grant seemed to be checkmated about Richmond and Petersburg,
and my army seemed to have run up against an impassable barrier,
when, suddenly and unexpectedly, came the news that "Atlanta was
ours, and fairly won."  On this text many a fine speech was made, but
none more eloquent than that by Edward Everett, in Boston.  A
presidential election then agitated the North.  Mr. Lincoln
represented the national cause, and General McClellan had accepted
the nomination of the Democratic party, whose platform was that the
war was a failure, and that it was better to allow the South to go
free to establish a separate government, whose corner-stone should be
slavery.  Success to our arms at that instant was therefore a
political necessity; and it was all-important that something
startling in our interest should occur before the election in
November.  The brilliant success at Atlanta filled that requirement,
and made the election of Mr. Lincoln certain.  Among the many letters
of congratulation received, those of Mr. Lincoln and General Grant
seem most important:


EXECUTIVE MANSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. September 3, 1864.

The national thanks are rendered by the President to Major-General
W. T. Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of his command
before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability and perseverance
displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine favor,
has resulted in the capture of Atlanta.  The marches, battles,
sieges, and other military operations, that have signalized the
campaign, must render it famous in the annals of war, and have
entitled those who have participated therein to the applause and
thanks of the nation.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN
President of the United States


CITY POINT VIRGINIA, September 4, 1864-9 P.M.

Major-General SHERMAN:
I have just received your dispatch announcing the capture of
Atlanta.  In honor of your great victory, I have ordered a salute
to be fired with shotted guns from every battery bearing upon the
enemy.  The salute will be fired within an hour, amid great
rejoicing.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


These dispatches were communicated to the army in general orders,
and we all felt duly encouraged and elated by the praise of those
competent to bestow it.

The army still remained where the news of success had first found
us, viz., Lovejoy's; but, after due refection, I resolved not to
attempt at that time a further pursuit of Hood's army, but slowly
and deliberately to move back, occupy Atlanta, enjoy a short period
of rest, and to think well over the next step required in the
progress of events.  Orders for this movement were made on the 5th
September, and three days were given for each army to reach the
place assigned it, viz.: the Army of the Cumberland in and about
Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee at East Point; and the Army of
the Ohio at Decatur.

Personally I rode back to Jonesboro on the 6th, and there inspected
the rebel hospital, full of wounded officers and men left by Hardee
in his retreat.  The next night we stopped at Rough and Ready, and
on the 8th of September we rode into Atlanta, then occupied by the
Twentieth Corps (General Slocum).  In the Court-House Square was
encamped a brigade, embracing the Massachusetts Second and
Thirty-third Regiments, which had two of the finest bands of the
army, and their music was to us all a source of infinite pleasure
during our sojourn in that city.  I took up my headquarters in the
house of Judge Lyons, which stood opposite one corner of the
Court-House Square, and at once set about a measure already ordered,
of which I had thought much and long, viz., to remove the entire
civil population, and to deny to all civilians from the rear the
expected profits of civil trade.  Hundreds of sutlers and traders
were waiting at Nashville and Chattanooga, greedy to reach Atlanta
with their wares and goods, with, which to drive a profitable trade
with the inhabitants.  I gave positive orders that none of these
traders, except three (one for each separate army), should be
permitted to come nearer than Chattanooga; and, moreover, I
peremptorily required that all the citizens and families resident in
Atlanta should go away, giving to each the option to go south or
north, as their interests or feelings dictated.  I was resolved to
make Atlanta a pure military garrison or depot, with no civil
population to influence military measures.  I had seen Memphis,
Vicksburg, Natchez, and New Orleans, all captured from the enemy, and
each at once was garrisoned by a full division of troops, if not
more; so that success was actually crippling our armies in the field
by detachments to guard and protect the interests of a hostile
population.

I gave notice of this purpose, as early as the 4th of September, to
General Halleck, in a letter concluding with these words:

If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will
answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking.  If they want
peace, they and their relatives most stop the war.

I knew, of course, that such a measure would be strongly
criticised, but made up my mind to do it with the absolute
certainty of its justness, and that time would sanction its wisdom.
I knew that the people of the South would read in this measure two
important conclusions: one, that we were in earnest; and the other,
if they were sincere in their common and popular clamor "to die in
the last ditch," that the opportunity would soon come.

Soon after our reaching Atlanta, General Hood had sent in by a flag
of truce a proposition, offering a general exchange of prisoners,
saying that he was authorized to make such an exchange by the
Richmond authorities, out of the vast number of our men then held
captive at Andersonville, the same whom General Stoneman had hoped
to rescue at the time of his raid.  Some of these prisoners had
already escaped and got in, had described the pitiable condition of
the remainder, and, although I felt a sympathy for their hardships
and sufferings as deeply as any man could, yet as nearly all the
prisoners who had been captured by us during the campaign had been
sent, as fast as taken, to the usual depots North, they were then
beyond my control.  There were still about two thousand, mostly
captured at Jonesboro, who had been sent back by cars, but had not
passed Chattanooga.  These I ordered back, and offered General Hood
to exchange them for Stoneman, Buell, and such of my own army as
would make up the equivalent; but I would not exchange for his
prisoners generally, because I knew these would have to be sent to
their own regiments, away from my army, whereas all we could give
him could at once be put to duty in his immediate army.  Quite an
angry correspondence grew up between us, which was published at the
time in the newspapers, but it is not to be found in any book of
which I have present knowledge, and therefore is given here, as
illustrative of the events referred to, and of the feelings of the
actors in the game of war at that particular crisis, together with
certain other original letters of Generals Grant and Halleck, never
hitherto published.


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 12, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi

GENERAL: I send Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, of my staff, with
this.  Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of
affairs here, better than I can do in the limits of a letter.
Although I feel myself strong enough now for offensive operations,
I am holding on quietly, to get advantage of recruits and
convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly.  My lines are
necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom, north of the
James, across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James,
and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon road.  This line is very
strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men;
but, from its great length, necessarily takes many in the
aggregate.  I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to
control what is known as the Southside, or Lynchburg & Petersburg
road; then, if possible, to keep the Danville road out.  At the
same time this move is made, I want to send a force of from six to
ten thousand men against Wilmington.  The way I propose to do this
is to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point.  At
the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the
iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile.  This will
give us the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now
have of the harbor of Mobile.  What you are to do with the forces
at your command, I do not exactly see.  The difficulties of
supplying your army, except when they are constantly moving beyond
where you are, I plainly see.  If it had not been for Price's
movement, Canby could have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile.
From your command on the Mississippi, an equal number could have
been taken.  With these forces, my idea would have been to divide
them, sending one-half to Mobile, and the other half to Savannah.
You could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten
Macon and Augusta equally.  Whichever one should be abandoned by
the enemy, you could take and open up a new base of supplies.  My
object now in sending a staff-officer to you is not so much to
suggest operations for you as to get your views, and to have plans
matured by the time every thing can be got ready.  It would
probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans here
indicated will be executed.  If you have any promotions to
recommend, send the names forward, and I will approve them.

In conclusion, it is hardly necessary for me to say that I feel you
have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any
general in this war, and with a skill and ability that will be
acknowledged in history as unsurpassed, if not unequaled.  It gives
me as much pleasure to record this in your favor as it world in
favor of any living man, myself included.
Truly yours,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 20, 1864.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point,
Virgina.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge, at the hands of
Lieutenant  Colonel Porter, of your staff, your letter of September
12th, and accept with thanks the honorable and kindly mention
of the services of this army in the great cause in which we are all
engaged.

I send by Colonel Porter all official reports which are completed,
and will in a few days submit a list of names which are deemed
worthy of promotion.

I think we owe it to the President to save him the invidious task
of selection among the vast number of worthy applicants, and have
ordered my army commanders to prepare their lists with great care,
and to express their preferences, based upon claims of actual
capacity and services rendered.

These I will consolidate, and submit in such a form that, if
mistakes are made, they will at least be sanctioned by the best
contemporaneous evidence of merit, for I know that vacancies do not
exist equal in number to that of the officers who really deserve
promotion.

As to the future, I am pleased to know that your army is being
steadily reinforced by a good class of men, and I hope it will go
on until you have a force that is numerically double that of your
antagonist, so that with one part you can watch him, and with the
other push out boldly from your left flank, occupy the Southside
Railroad, compel him to attack you in position, or accept battle on
your own terms.

We ought to ask our country for the largest possible armies that
can be raised, as so important a thing as the self-existence of a
great nation should not be left to the fickle chances of war.

Now that Mobile is shut out to the commerce of our enemy, it calls
for no further effort on our part, unless the capture of the city
can be followed by the occupation of the Alabama River and the
railroad to Columbus, Georgia, when that place would be a
magnificent auxiliary to my further progress into Georgia; but,
until General Canby is much reinforced, and until he can more
thoroughly subdue the scattered armies west of the Mississippi, I
suppose that much cannot be attempted by him against the Alabama
River and Columbus, Georgia.

The utter destruction of Wilmington, North Carolina, is of
importance only in connection with the necessity of cutting off all
foreign trade to our enemy, and if Admiral Farragut can get across
the bar, and move quickly, I suppose he will succeed.  From my
knowledge of the mouth of Cape Fear River, I anticipate more
difficulty in getting the heavy ships across the bar than in
reaching the town of Wilmington; but, of course, the soundings of
the channel are well known at Washington, as well as the draught of
his iron-clads, so that it must be demonstrated to be feasible, or
else it would not be attempted.  If successful, I suppose that Fort
Caswell will be occupied, and the fleet at once sent to the
Savannah River.  Then the reduction of that city is the next
question.  It once in our possession, and the river open to us, I
would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with sixty
thousand men, hauling some stores, and depending on the country for
the balance.  Where a million of people find subsistence, my army
won't starve; but, as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few
roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force can so delay an
army and harass it, that it would not be a formidable object; but
if the enemy knew that we had our boats in the Savannah River I
could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of
corn and meat, and could so threaten Macon and Augusta that the
enemy world doubtless give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move
so as to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to
give us Augusta, with the only powder-mills and factories remaining
in the South, or let us have the use of the Savannah River.  Either
horn of the dilemma will be worth a battle.  I would prefer his
holding Augusta (as the probabilities are); for then, with the
Savannah River in our possession, the taking of Augusta would be a
mere matter of time.  This campaign can be made in the winter.

But the more I study the game, the more am I convinced that it
would be wrong for us to penetrate farther into Georgia without an
objective beyond.  It would not be productive of much good.  I can
start east and make a circuit south and back, doing vast damage to
the State, but resulting in no permanent good; and by mere
threatening to do so, I hold a rod over the Georgians, who are not
over-loyal to the South.  I will therefore give it as my opinion
that your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the maximum;
that, after you get Wilmington, you should strike for Savannah and
its river; that General Canby should hold the Mississippi River,
and send a force to take Columbus, Georgia, either by way of the
Alabama or Appalachicola River; that I should keep Hood employed
and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and
Charleston; and start as soon as Wilmington is sealed to commerce,
and the city of Savannah is in our possession.

I think it will be found that the movements of Price and Shelby,
west of the Mississippi, are mere diversions.  They cannot hope to
enter Missouri except as raiders; and the truth is, that General
Rosecrans should be ashamed to take my troops for such a purpose.
If you will secure Wilmington and the city of Savannah from your
centre, and let General Canby leave command over the Mississippi
River and country west of it, I will send a force to the Alabama
and Appalachicola, provided you give me one hundred thousand of the
drafted men to fill up my old regiments; and if you will fix a day
to be in Savannah, I will insure our possession of Macon and a
point on the river below Augusta.  The possession of the Savannah
River is more than fatal to the possibility of Southern
independence.  They may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all
Georgia.

I will have a long talk with Colonel Porter, and tell him every
thing that may occur to me of interest to you.

In the mean time, know that I admire your dogged perseverance and
pluck more than ever.  If you can whip Lee and I can march to the
Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave of
absence to see the young folks.

Yours as ever,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, September 16, 1864.

General W. T. SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

My DEAR GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 4th is just
received.  Its perusal has given me the greatest pleasure.  I have
not written before to congratulate you on the capture of Atlanta,
the objective point of your brilliant campaign, for the reason that
I have been suffering from my annual attack of "coryza," or
hay-cold.  It affects my eyes so much that I can scarcely see to
write.  As you suppose, I have watched your movements most
attentively and critically, and I do not hesitate to say that your
campaign has been the most brilliant of the war.  Its results are
less striking and less complete than those of General Grant at
Vicksburg, but then you have had greater difficulties to encounter,
a longer line of communications to keep up, and a longer and more
continuous strain upon yourself and upon your army.

You must have been very considerably annoyed by the State negro
recruiting-agents.  Your letter was a capital one, and did much
good.  The law was a ridiculous one; it was opposed by the War
Department, but passed through the influence of Eastern
manufacturers, who hoped to escape the draft in that way.  They
were making immense fortunes out of the war, and could well afford
to purchase negro recruits, and thus save their employees at home.

I fully agree with you in regard to the policy of a stringent
draft; but, unfortunately, political influences are against us, and
I fear it will not amount to much.  Mr. Seward's speech at Auburn,
again prophesying, for the twentieth time, that the rebellion would
be crushed in a few months, and saying that there would be no
draft, as we now had enough soldiers to end the war, etc., has done
much harm, in a military point of view.  I have seen enough of
politics here to last me for life.  You are right in avoiding them.
McClellan may possibly reach the White House, but he will lose the
respect of all honest, high-minded patriots, by his affiliation
with such traitors and Copperheads as B---, V---, W---, S---, & Co.
He would not stand upon the traitorous Chicago platform, but he had
not the manliness to oppose it.  A major-general in the United
States Army, and yet not one word to utter against rebels or the
rebellion!  I had much respect for McClellan before he became a
politician, but very little after reading his letter accepting the
nomination.

Hooker certainly made a mistake in leaving before the capture of
Atlanta.  I understand that, when here, he said that you would
fail; your army was discouraged and dissatisfied, etc., etc.  He is
most unmeasured in his abuse of me.  I inclose you a specimen of
what he publishes in Northern papers, wherever he goes.  They are
dictated by himself and written by W. B.  and such worthies.  The
funny part of the business is, that I had nothing whatever to do
with his being relieved on either occasion.  Moreover, I have never
said any thing to the President or Secretary of War to injure him
in the slightest degree, and he knows that perfectly well.  His
animosity arises from another source.  He is aware that I know some
things about his character and conduct in California, and, fearing
that I may use that information against him, he seeks to ward off
its effect by making it appear that I am his personal enemy, am
jealous of him, etc.  I know of no other reason for his hostility
to me.  He is welcome to abuse me as much as he pleases; I don't
think it will do him much good, or me much harm.  I know very
little of General Howard, but believe him to be a true, honorable
man.  Thomas is also a noble old war-horse.  It is true, as you
say, that he is slow, but he is always sure.

I have not seen General Grant since the fall of Atlanta, and do not
know what instructions he has sent you.  I fear that Canby has not
the means to do much by way of Mobile.  The military effects of
Banks's disaster are now showing themselves by the threatened
operations of Price & Co. toward Missouri, thus keeping in check
our armies west of the Mississippi.

With many thanks for your kind letter, and wishes for your future
success, yours truly,

H. W.  HALLECK.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 20, 1864.

Major General HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington D.C.

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to submit copies of a
correspondence between General Hood, of the Confederate Army, the
Mayor of Atlanta, and myself, touching the removal of the
inhabitants of Atlanta.

In explanation of the tone which marks some of these letters, I
will only call your attention to the fact that, after I had
announced my determination, General Hood took upon himself to
question my motives.  I could not tamely submit to such
impertinence; and I have also seen that, in violation of all
official usage, he has published in the Macon newspapers such parts
of the correspondence as suited his purpose.  This could have had
no other object than to create a feeling on the part of the people;
but if he expects to resort to such artifices, I think I can meet
him there too.

It is sufficient for my Government to know that the removal of the
inhabitants has been made with liberality and fairness, that it has
been attended with no force, and that no women or children have
suffered, unless for want of provisions by their natural protectors
and friends.

My real reasons for this step were:

We want all the houses of Atlanta for military storage and
occupation.

We want to contract the lines of defense, so as to diminish the
garrison to the limit necessary to defend its narrow and vital
parts, instead of embracing, as the lines now do, the vast suburbs.
This contraction of the lines, with the necessary citadels and
redoubts, will make it necessary to destroy the very houses used by
families as residences.

Atlanta is a fortified town, was stubbornly defended, and fairly
captured.  As captors, we have a right to it.

The residence here of a poor population would compel us, sooner or
later, to feed them or to see them starve under our eyes.

The residence here of the families of our enemies would be a
temptation and a means to keep up a correspondence dangerous and
hurtful to our cause; a civil population calls for provost-guards,
and absorbs the attention of officers in listening to everlasting
complaints and special grievances that are not military.

These are my reasons; and, if satisfactory to the Government of the
United States, it makes no difference whether it pleases General
Hood and his people or not.  I am, with respect, your obedient
servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 7, 1864.

General HOOD, commanding Confederate Army.

GENERAL: I have deemed it to the interest of the United States that
the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove, those who
prefer it to go south, and the rest north.  For the latter I can
provide food and transportation to points of their election in
Tennessee, Kentucky, or farther north.  For the former I can
provide transportation by cars as far as Rough and Ready, and also
wagons; but, that their removal may be made with as little
discomfort as possible, it will be necessary for you to help the
families from Rough and Ready to the care at Lovejoy's.  If you
consent, I will undertake to remove all the families in Atlanta who
prefer to go south to Rough and Ready, with all their movable
effects, viz., clothing, trunks, reasonable furniture, bedding,
etc., with their servants, white and black, with the proviso that
no force shall be used toward the blacks, one way or the other.  If
they want to go with their masters or mistresses, they may do so;
otherwise they will be sent away, unless they be men, when they may
be employed by our quartermaster.  Atlanta is no place for families
or non-combatants, and I have no desire to send them north if you
will assist in conveying them south.  If this proposition meets
your views, I will consent to a truce in the neighborhood of Rough
and Ready, stipulating that any wagons, horses, animals, or persons
sent there for the purposes herein stated, shall in no manner be
harmed or molested; you in your turn agreeing that any care,
wagons, or carriages, persons or animals sent to the same point,
shall not be interfered with.  Each of us might send a guard of,
say, one hundred men, to maintain order, and limit the truce to,
say, two days after a certain time appointed.

I have authorized the mayor to choose two citizens to convey to you
this letter, with such documents as the mayor may forward in
explanation, and shall await your reply.  I have the honor to be
your obedient servant.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


Major General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding United States Forces in
Georgia

GENERAL: Your letter of yesterday's date, borne by James M. Ball
and James R. Crew, citizens of Atlanta, is received.  You say
therein, "I deem it to be to the interest of the United States that
the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove," etc.  I do not
consider that I have any alternative in this matter.  I therefore
accept your proposition to declare a truce of two days, or such
time as may be necessary to accomplish the purpose mentioned, and
shall render all assistance in my power to expedite the
transportation of citizens in this direction.  I suggest that a
staff-officer be appointed by you to superintend the removal from
the city to Rough and Ready, while I appoint a like officer to
control their removal farther south; that a guard of one hundred
men be sent by either party as you propose, to maintain order at
that place, and that the removal begin on Monday next.

And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you
propose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever
before brought to my attention in the dark history of war.

In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you will
find that you are expelling from their homes and firesides the
wives and children of a brave people.  I am, general, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, General.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 10, 1864.

General J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of Tennessee, Confederate Army.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
of this date, at the hands of Messrs.  Ball and Crew, consenting to
the arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the removal south of
the people of Atlanta, who prefer to go in that direction.  I
inclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied,
accomplish my purpose perfectly.

You style the measures proposed "unprecedented," and appeal to the
dark history of war for a parallel, as an act of "studied and
ingenious cruelty."  It is not unprecedented; for General Johnston
himself very wisely and properly removed the families all the way
from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should be
excepted.  Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark history of
war, when recent and modern examples are so handy.  You yourself
burned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-day
fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable because they
stood in the way of your forts and men.  You defended Atlanta on a
line so close to town that every cannon-shot and many musket-shots
from our line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into
the habitations of women and children.  General Hardee did the same
at Jonesboro, and General Johnston did the same, last summer, at
Jackson, Mississippi.  I have not accused you of heartless cruelty,
but merely instance these cases of very recent occurrence, and
could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any
fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the
families of a "brave people."

I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove
them now, at once, from scenes that women and children should not
be exposed to, and the "brave people" should scorn to commit their
wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say,
violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of its dark
history.

In the name of common-sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just God
in such a sacrilegious manner.  You who, in the midst of peace and
prosperity, have plunged a nation into war--dark and cruel war--who
dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our
arsenals and forts that were left in the honorable custody of
peaceful ordnance-sergeants, seized and made "prisoners of war" the
very garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes and
Indians, long before any overt act was committed by the (to you)
hated Lincoln Government; tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into
rebellion, spite of themselves; falsified the vote of Louisiana;
turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expelled
Union families by the thousands, burned their houses, and declared,
by an act of your Congress, the confiscation of all debts due
Northern men for goods had and received!  Talk thus to the marines,
but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this day
make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the
best-born Southerner among you! If we must be enemies, let us be
men, and fight it out as we propose to do, and not deal in arch
hypocritical appeals to God and humanity.  God will judge us in due
time, and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with
a town full of women and the families of a brave people at our back
or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own
friends and people.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
September 12, 1864

Major-General W. T, SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.


GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
of the 9th inst., with its inclosure in reference to the women,
children, and others, whom you have thought proper to expel from
their homes in the city of Atlanta.  Had you seen proper to let the
matter rest there, I would gladly have allowed your letter to close
this correspondence, and, without your expressing it in words,
would have been willing to believe that, while "the interests of
the United States," in your opinion, compelled you to an act of
barbarous cruelty, you regretted the necessity, and we would have
dropped the subject; but you have chosen to indulge in statements
which I feel compelled to notice, at least so far as to signify my
dissent, and not allow silence in regard to them to be construed as
acquiescence.

I see nothing in your communication which induces me to modify the
language of condemnation with which I characterized your order.  It
but strengthens me in the opinion that it stands "preeminent in the
dark history of war for studied and ingenious cruelty."  Your
original order was stripped of all pretenses; you announced the
edict for the sole reason that it was "to the interest of the
United States."  This alone you offered to us and the civilized
world as an all-sufficient reason for disregarding the laws of God
and man.  You say that "General Johnston himself very wisely and
properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down."  It is
due to that gallant soldier and gentleman to say that no act of his
distinguished career gives the least color to your unfounded
aspersions upon his conduct.  He depopulated no villages, nor
towns, nor cities, either friendly or hostile.  He offered and
extended friendly aid to his unfortunate fellow-citizens who
desired to flee from your fraternal embraces.  You are equally
unfortunate in your attempt to find a justification for this act of
cruelty, either in the defense of Jonesboro, by General Hardee, or
of Atlanta, by myself.  General Hardee defended his position in
front of Jonesboro at the expense of injury to the houses; an
ordinary, proper, and justifiable act of war.  I defended Atlanta
at the same risk and cost. If there was any fault in either case,
it was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case of
Atlanta, of your purpose to shell the town, which is usual in war
among civilized nations.  No inhabitant was expelled from his home
and fireside by the orders of General Hardee or myself, and
therefore your recent order can find no support from the conduct of
either of us.  I feel no other emotion other than pain in reading
that portion of your letter which attempts to justify your shelling
Atlanta without notice under pretense that I defended Atlanta upon
a line so close to town that every cannon-shot and many
musket-balls from your line of investment, that overshot their mark,
went into the habitations of women and children.  I made no complaint
of your firing into Atlanta in any way you thought proper.  I make
none now, but there are a hundred thousand witnesses that you fired
into the habitations of women and children for weeks, firing far
above and miles beyond my line of defense.  I have too good an
opinion, founded both upon observation and experience, of the skill
of your artillerists, to credit the insinuation that they for several
weeks unintentionally fired too high for my modest field-works, and
slaughtered women and children by accident and want of skill.

The residue of your letter is rather discussion.  It opens a wide
field for the discussion of questions which I do not feel are
committed to me.  I am only a general of one of the armies of the
Confederate States, charged with military operations in the field,
under the direction of my superior officers, and I am not called
upon to discuss with you the causes of the present war, or the
political questions which led to or resulted from it.  These grave
and important questions have been committed to far abler hands than
mine, and I shall only refer to them so far as to repel any unjust
conclusion which might be drawn from my silence.  You charge my
country with "daring and badgering you to battle."  The truth is,
we sent commissioners to you, respectfully offering a peaceful
separation, before the first gun was fired on either aide.  You say
we insulted your flag.  The truth is, we fired upon it, and those
who fought under it, when you came to our doors upon the mission of
subjugation.  You say we seized upon your forts and arsenals, and
made prisoners of the garrisons sent to protect us against negroes
and Indians.  The truth is, we, by force of arms, drove out
insolent intruders and took possession of our own forts and
arsenals, to resist your claims to dominion over masters, slaves,
and Indians, all of whom are to this day, with a unanimity
unexampled in the history of the world, warring against your
attempts to become their masters.  You say that we tried to force
Missouri and Kentucky into rebellion in spite of themselves.  The
truth is, my Government, from the beginning of this struggle to
this hour, has again and again offered, before the whole world, to
leave it to the unbiased will of these States, and all others, to
determine for themselves whether they will cast their destiny with
your Government or ours; and your Government has resisted this
fundamental principle of free institutions with the bayonet, and
labors daily, by force and fraud, to fasten its hateful tyranny
upon the unfortunate freemen of these States.  You say we falsified
the vote of Louisiana.  The truth is, Louisiana not only separated
herself from your Government by nearly a unanimous vote of her
people, but has vindicated the act upon every battle-field from
Gettysburg to the Sabine, and has exhibited an heroic devotion to
her decision which challenges the admiration and respect of every
man capable of feeling sympathy for the oppressed or admiration for
heroic valor.  You say that we turned loose pirates to plunder your
unarmed ships.  The truth is, when you robbed us of our part of the
navy, we built and bought a few vessels, hoisted the flag of our
country, and swept the seas, in defiance of your navy, around the
whole circumference of the globe.  You say we have expelled Union
families by thousands.  The truth is, not a single family has been
expelled from the Confederate States, that I am aware of; but, on
the contrary, the moderation of our Government toward traitors has
been a fruitful theme of denunciation by its enemies and
well-meaning friends of our cause.  You say my Government, by acts
of Congress, has confiscated "all debts due Northern men for goods
sold and delivered."  The truth is, our Congress gave due and ample
time to your merchants and traders to depart from our shores with
their ships, goods, and effects, and only sequestrated the property
of our enemies in retaliation for their acts--declaring us
traitors, and confiscating our property wherever their power
extended, either in their country or our own.  Such are your
accusations, and such are the facts known of all men to be true.

You order into exile the whole population of a city; drive men,
women and children from their homes at the point of the bayonet,
under the plea that it is to the interest of your Government, and
on the claim that it is "an act of kindness to these families of
Atlanta."  Butler only banished from New Orleans the registered
enemies of his Government, and acknowledged that he did it as a
punishment.  You issue a sweeping edict, covering all the
inhabitants of a city, and add insult to the injury heaped upon the
defenseless by assuming that you have done them a kindness.  This
you follow by the assertion that you will "make as much sacrifice
for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner."
And, because I characterize what you call as kindness as being real
cruelty, you presume to sit in judgment between me and my God; and
you decide that my earnest prayer to the Almighty Father to save
our women and children from what you call kindness, is a
"sacrilegious, hypocritical appeal."

You came into our country with your army, avowedly for the purpose
of subjugating free white men, women, and children, and not only
intend to rule over them, but you make negroes your allies, and
desire to place over us an inferior race, which we have raised from
barbarism to its present position, which is the highest ever
attained by that race, in any country, in all time.  I must,
therefore, decline to accept your statements in reference to your
kindness toward the people of Atlanta, and your willingness to
sacrifice every thing for the peace and honor of the South, and
refuse to be governed by your decision in regard to matters between
myself, my country, and my God.

You say, "Let us fight it out like men."  To this my reply is--for
myself, and I believe for all the free men, ay, and women and
children, in my country--we will fight you to the death!  Better
die a thousand deaths than submit to live under you or your
Government and your negro allies!

Having answered the points forced upon me by your letter of the 9th
of September, I close this correspondence with you; and,
notwithstanding your comments upon my appeal to God in the cause of
humanity, I again humbly and reverently invoke his almighty aid in
defense of justice and right. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, General.


ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 11, 1864
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN.

Sir: We the undersigned, Mayor and two of the Council for the city
of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people
of the said city, to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most
earnestly but respectfully to petition you to reconsider the order
requiring them to leave Atlanta.

At first view, it struck us that the measure world involve
extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the
practical execution of it so far as it has progressed, and the
individual condition of the people, and heard their statements as
to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attending it, we are
satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the aggregate
consequences appalling and heart-rending.

Many poor women are in advanced state of pregnancy, others now
having young children, and whose husbands for the greater part are
either in the army, prisoners, or dead.  Some say: "I have such a
one sick at my house; who will wait on them when I am gone?"
Others say: "What are we to do? We have no house to go to, and no
means to buy, build, or rent any; no parents, relatives, or
friends, to go to."  Another says: "I will try and take this or
that article of property, but such and such things I must leave
behind, though I need them much."  We reply to them: "General
Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready, and General
Hood will take it thence on."  And they will reply to that: "But I
want to leave the railroad at such a place, and cannot get
conveyance from there on."

We only refer to a few facts, to try to illustrate in part how this
measure will operate in practice.  As you advanced, the people
north of this fell back; and before your arrival here, a large
portion of the people had retired south, so that the country south
of this is already crowded, and without houses enough to
accommodate the people, and we are informed that many are now
staying in churches and other out-buildings.

This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly
women and children) to find any shelter?  And how can they live
through the winter in the woods--no shelter or subsistence, in the
midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to
assist them much, if they were willing to do so?

This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure.
You know the woe, the horrors, and the suffering, cannot be
described by words; imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask
you to take these things into consideration.

We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the duties
of your command, which almost deters us from asking your attention
to this matter, but thought it might be that you had not considered
this subject in all of its awful consequences, and that on more
reflection you, we hope, would not make this people an exception to
all mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred
--surely never in the United States--and what has this helpless
people done, that they should be driven from their homes, to wander
strangers and outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity?

We do not know as yet the number of people still here; of those who
are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed to
remain at home, could subsist for several months without
assistance, and a respectable number for a much longer time, and
who might not need assistance at any time.

In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to
reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate
people to remain at home, and enjoy what little means they have.
Respectfully submitted
JAMES M.  CALHOUN, Mayor.
E.  E.  RAWSON, Councilman.
S.  C.  Warns, Councilman.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 12, 1864.

JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor, E. E. RAWSON and S. C. Wares, representing
City Council of Atlanta.

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a
petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from
Atlanta.  I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your
statements of the distress that will be occasioned, and yet shall
not revoke my orders, because they were not designed to meet the
humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in
which millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep
interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all
America.  To secure this, we must stop the war that now desolates
our once happy and favored country.  To stop war, we must defeat
the rebel armies which are arrayed against the laws and
Constitution that all must respect and obey.  To defeat those
armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses,
provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to
accomplish our purpose.  Now, I know the vindictive nature of our
enemy, that we may have many years of military operations from this
quarter; and, therefore, deem it wise and prudent to prepare in
time.  The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with
its character as a home for families.  There will be no
manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here, for the maintenance of
families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to
go.  Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed for
the transfer,--instead of waiting till the plunging shot of
contending armies will renew the scenes of the past months.  Of
course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you
do not suppose this army will be here until the war is over.  I
cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot
impart to you what we propose to do, but I assert that our military
plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can
only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any
direction as easy and comfortable as possible.

You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will.  War is
cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into
our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can
pour out.  I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I
will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace.
But you cannot have peace and a division of our country.  If the
United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will
go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war.  The
United States does and must assert its authority, wherever it once
had power; for, if it relaxes one bit to pressure, it is gone, and
I believe that such is the national feeling.  This feeling assumes
various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union.  Once admit
the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the national
Government, and, instead of devoting your houses and streets and
roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army become at once your
protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come
from what quarter it may.  I know that a few individuals cannot
resist a torrent of error and passion, such as swept the South into
rebellion, but you can point out, so that we may know those who
desire a government, and those who insist on war and its
desolation.

You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these
terrible hardships of war.  They are inevitable, and the only way
the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet
at home, is to stop the war, which can only be done by admitting
that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride.

We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your
lands, or any thing you have, but we do want and will have a just
obedience to the laws of the United States.  That we will have,
and, if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot
help it.

You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that
live by falsehood and excitement; and the quicker you seek for
truth in other quarters, the better.  I repeat then that, by the
original compact of Government, the United States had certain
rights in Georgia, which have never been relinquished and never
will be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals,
mints, custom-houses, etc., etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was
installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of
provocation.  I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee,
and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children
fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding
feet.  In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands
upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands,
and whom we could not see starve.  Now that war comes home to you;
you feel very different.  You deprecate its horrors, but did not
feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and
moulded shells and shot, to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee,
to desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people who
only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the
Government of their inheritance.  But these comparisons are idle.
I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through union and
war, and I will ever conduct war with a view to perfect and early
success.

But, my dear sirs, when peace does come, you may call on me for any
thing.  Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with
you to shield your homes and families against danger from every
quarter.

Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed and
nurse them, and build for them, in more quiet places, proper
habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad
passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more
to settle over your old homes at Atlanta.  Yours in haste,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 14, 1864.

General J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of the Tennessee, Confederate
Army.

GENERAL: Yours of September 12th is received, and has been
carefully perused.  I agree with you that this discussion by two
soldiers is out of place, and profitless; but you must admit that
you began the controversy by characterizing an official act of mine
in unfair and improper terms.  I reiterate my former answer, and to
the only new matter contained in your rejoinder add: We have no
"negro allies" in this army; not a single negro soldier left
Chattanooga with this army, or is with it now.  There are a few
guarding Chattanooga, which General Steedman sent at one time to
drive Wheeler out of Dalton.

I was not bound by the laws of war to give notice of the shelling
of Atlanta, a "fortified town, with magazines, arsenals,
founderies, and public stores;" you were bound to take notice.  See
the books.

This is the conclusion of our correspondence, which I did not
begin, and terminate with satisfaction.  I am, with respect, your
obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, September 28, 1864,

Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

GENERAL: Your communications of the 20th in regard to the removal
of families from Atlanta, and the exchange of prisoners, and also
the official report of your campaign, are just received.  I have
not had time as yet to examine your report.  The course which you
have pursued in removing rebel families from Atlanta, and in the
exchange of prisoners, is fully approved by the War Department.
Not only are you justified by the laws and usages of war in
removing these people, but I think it was your duty to your own
army to do so.  Moreover, I am fully of opinion that the nature of
your position, the character of the war, the conduct of the enemy
(and especially of non-combatants and women of the territory which
we have heretofore conquered and occupied), will justify you in
gathering up all the forage and provisions which your army may
require, both for a siege of Atlanta and for your supply in your
march farther into the enemy's country.  Let the disloyal families
of the country, thus stripped, go to their husbands, fathers, and
natural protectors, in the rebel ranks; we have tried three years
of conciliation and kindness without any reciprocation; on the
contrary, those thus treated have acted as spies and guerrillas in
our rear and within our lines.  The safety of our armies, and a
proper regard for the lives of our soldiers, require that we apply
to our inexorable foes the severe rules of war.  We certainly are
not required to treat the so-called non-combatant rebels better
than they themselves treat each other.  Even herein Virginia,
within fifty miles of Washington, they strip their own families of
provisions, leaving them, as our army advances, to be fed by us, or
to starve within our lines.  We have fed this class of people long
enough.  Let them go with their husbands and fathers in the rebel
ranks; and if they won't go, we must send them to their friends and
natural protectors.  I would destroy every mill and factory within
reach which I did not want for my own use.  This the rebels have
done, not only in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but also in Virginia
and other rebel States, when compelled to fall back before our
armies.  In many sections of the country they have not left a mill
to grind grain for their own suffering families, lest we might use
them to supply our armies.  We most do the same.

I have endeavored to impress these views upon our commanders for
the last two years.  You are almost the only one who has properly
applied them.  I do not approve of General Hunter's course in
burning private homes or uselessly destroying private property.
That is barbarous.  But I approve of taking or destroying whatever
may serve as supplies to us or to the enemy's army.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief of Staff


In order to effect the exchange of prisoners, to facilitate the
exodus of the people of Atlanta, and to keep open communication
with the South, we established a neutral camp, at and about the
railroad-station next south of Atlanta, known as "Rough and Ready,"
to which point I dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Willard Warner, of
my staff, with a guard of one hundred men, and General Hood sent
Colonel Clare, of his staff, with a similar guard; these officers
and men harmonized perfectly, and parted good friends when their
work was done.  In the mean time I also had reconnoitred the entire
rebel lines about Atlanta, which were well built, but were entirely
too extensive to be held by a single corps or division of troops,
so I instructed Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, on my staff,
to lay off an inner and shorter line, susceptible of defense by a
smaller garrison.

By the middle of September all these matters were in progress, the
reports of the past campaign were written up and dispatched to
Washington, and our thoughts began to turn toward the future.
Admiral Farragut had boldly and successfully run the forts at the
entrance to Mobile Bay, which resulted in the capture of Fort
Morgan, so that General Canby was enabled to begin his regular
operations against Mobile City, with a view to open the Alabama
River to navigation.  My first thoughts were to concert operations
with him, either by way of Montgomery, Alabama, or by the
Appalachicula; but so long a line, to be used as a base for further
operations eastward, was not advisable, and I concluded to await
the initiative of the enemy, supposing that he would be forced to
resort to some desperate campaign by the clamor raised at the South
on account of the great loss to them of the city of Atlanta.

General Thomas occupied a house on Marietta Streets which had a
veranda with high pillars.  We were sitting there one evening,
talking about things generally, when General Thomas asked leave to
send his trains back to Chattanooga, for the convenience and
economy of forage.  I inquired of him if he supposed we would be
allowed much rest at Atlanta, and he said he thought we would, or
that at all events it would not be prudent for us to go much
farther into Georgia because of our already long line of
communication, viz., three hundred miles from Nashville.  This was
true; but there we were, and we could not afford to remain on the
defensive, simply holding Atlanta and fighting for the safety of
its railroad.  I insisted on his retaining all trains, and on
keeping all his divisions ready to move at a moment's warning.  All
the army, officers and men, seemed to relax more or less, and sink
into a condition of idleness.  General Schofield was permitted to
go to Knoxville, to look after matters in his Department of the
Ohio; and Generals Blair and Logan went home to look after
politics.  Many of the regiments were entitled to, and claimed,
their discharge, by reason of the expiration of their term of
service; so that with victory and success came also many causes of
disintegration.

The rebel General Wheeler was still in Middle Tennessee,
threatening our railroads, and rumors came that Forrest was on his
way from Mississippi to the same theatre, for the avowed purpose of
breaking up our railroads and compelling us to fall back from our
conquest. To prepare for this, or any other emergency, I ordered
Newton's division of the Fourth Corps back to Chattanooga, and
Corse's division of the Seventeenth Corps to Rome, and instructed
General Rousseau at Nashville, Granger at Decatur, and Steadman at
Chattanooga, to adopt the most active measures to protect and
insure the safety of our roads.

Hood still remained about Lovejoy's Station, and, up to the 15th of
September, had given no signs of his future plans; so that with
this date I close the campaign of Atlanta, with the following
review of our relative losses during the months of August and
September, with a summary of those for the whole campaign,
beginning May 6 and ending September 15, 1864.  The losses for
August and September are added together, so as to include those
about Jonesboro:


                       Killed and Missing    Wounded    Total
        Grand Aggregate..... 1,408             3,731    5,139



Hood's losses, as reported for the same period, page 577,
Johnston's "Narrative:"

                         Killed             Wounded     Total
                           482               3,223      3,705

To which should be added:

       Prisoners captured by us:............ 3,738

       Giving his total loss ............... 7,440


On recapitulating the entire losses of each army during the entire
campaign, from May to September, inclusive, we have, in the Union
army, as per table appended:

Killed ........................  4,423
Wounded ....................... 22,822
Missing........................  4,442
       Aggregate Loss ......... 31,627


In the Southern army, according to the reports of Surgeon Foard
(pp.  576, 577, Johnston's "Narrative ")

        Total killed ................  3,044
        Total killed and wounded..... 21,996
        Prisoners captured by us .... 12,983

        Aggregate loss to the
             Southern Army .......... 34,979


The foregoing figures are official, and are very nearly correct.  I
see no room for error save in the cavalry, which was very much
scattered, and whose reports are much less reliable than of the
infantry and artillery; but as Surgeon Foard's tables do not
embrace Wheeler's, Jackson's, and Martin's divisions of cavalry, I
infer that the comparison, as to cavalry losses, is a "stand-off."

I have no doubt that the Southern officers flattered themselves
that they had filled and crippled of us two and even six to one, as
stated by Johnston; but they were simply mistaken, and I herewith
submit official tabular statements made up from the archives of the
War Department, in proof thereof.


I have also had a careful tabular statement compiled from official
records in the adjutant-general's office, giving the "effective
strength" of the army under my command for each of the months of
May, June, July, August, and September, 1864, which enumerate every
man (infantry, artillery, and cavalry) for duty.  The
recapitulation clearly exhibits the actual truth.  We opened the
campaign with 98,797 (ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and
ninety-seven) men.  Blair's two divisions joined us early in June,
giving 112,819 (one hundred and twelve thousand eight hundred and
nineteen), which number gradually became reduced to 106,070 (one
hundred and six thousand and seventy men), 91,675 (ninety-one
thousand six hundred and seventy-five), and 81,758 (eighty-one
thousand seven hundred and fifty-eight) at the end of the campaign.
This gradual reduction was not altogether owing to death and
wounds, but to the expiration of service, or by detachments sent to
points at the rear.




CHAPTER XX

ATLANTA AND AFTER--PURSUIT OF HOOD.

SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1864.


By the middle of September, matters and things had settled down in
Atlanta, so that we felt perfectly at home.  The telegraph and
railroads were repaired, and we had uninterrupted communication to
the rear.  The trains arrived with regularity and dispatch, and
brought us ample supplies.  General Wheeler had been driven out of
Middle Tennessee, escaping south across the Tennessee River at
Bainbridge; and things looked as though we were to have a period of
repose.

One day, two citizens, Messrs. Hill and Foster, came into our lines
at Decatur, and were sent to my headquarters.  They represented
themselves as former members of Congress, and particular friends of
my brother John Sherman; that Mr. Hill had a son killed in the
rebel army as it fell back before us somewhere near Cassville, and
they wanted to obtain the body, having learned from a comrade where
it was buried.  I gave them permission to go by rail to the rear,
with a note to the commanding officer, General John E. Smith, at
Cartersville, requiring him to furnish them an escort and an
ambulance for the purpose.  I invited them to take dinner with our
mess, and we naturally ran into a general conversation about
politics and the devastation and ruin caused by the war.  They had
seen a part of the country over which the army had passed, and
could easily apply its measure of desolation to the remainder of
the State, if necessity should compel us to go ahead.

Mr. Hill resided at Madison, on the main road to Augusta, and
seemed to realize fully the danger; said that further resistance on
the part of the South was madness, that he hoped Governor Brown, of
Georgia, would so proclaim it, and withdraw his people from the
rebellion, in pursuance of what was known as the policy of
"separate State action."  I told him, if he saw Governor Brown, to
describe to him fully what he had seen, and to say that if he
remained inert, I would be compelled to go ahead, devastating the
State in its whole length and breadth; that there was no adequate
force to stop us, etc.; but if he would issue his proclamation
withdrawing his State troops from the armies of the Confederacy, I
would spare the State, and in our passage across it confine the
troops to the main roads, and would, moreover, pay for all the corn
and food we needed.  I also told Mr. Hill that he might, in my
name, invite Governor Brown to visit Atlanta; that I would give him
a safeguard, and that if he wanted to make a speech, I would
guarantee him as full and respectable an audience as any he had
ever spoken to.  I believe that Mr. Hill, after reaching his home
at Madison, went to Milledgeville, the capital of the State, and
delivered the message to Governor Brown.  I had also sent similar
messages by Judge Wright of Rome, Georgia, and by Mr. King, of
Marietta.  On the 15th of September I telegraphed to General
Halleck as follows:


My report is done, and will be forwarded as soon as I get in a few
more of the subordinate reports.  I am awaiting a courier from
General Grant.  All well; the troops are in good, healthy camps,
and supplies are coming forward finely.  Governor Brown has
disbanded his militia, to gather the corn and sorghum of the State.
I have reason to believe that he and Stephens want to visit me, and
have sent them hearty invitation.  I will exchange two thousand
prisoners with Hood, but no more.


Governor Brown's action at that time is fully explained by the
following letter, since made public, which was then only known to
us in part by hearsay:


EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA, September 10, 1864

General J. B. HOOD, commanding army of Tennessee.

GENERAL: As the militia of the State were called out for the
defense of Atlanta during the campaign against it, which has
terminated by the fall of the city into the hands of the enemy, and
as many of these left their homes without preparation (expecting to
be gone but a few weeks), who have remained in service over three
months (most of the time in the trenches), justice requires that
they be permitted, while the enemy are preparing for the winter
campaign, to return to their homes, and look for a time after
important interests, and prepare themselves for such service as may
be required when another campaign commences against other important
points in the State.  I therefore hereby withdraw said organization
from your command .  .  .  .

JOSEPH C. BROWN


This militia had composed a division under command of Major-General
Gustavus W.  Smith, and were thus dispersed to their homes, to
gather the corn and sorghum, then ripe and ready for the
harvesters.

On the 17th I received by telegraph from President Lincoln this
dispatch:


WASHINGTON, D.C., September 17, 1864

Major-General SHERMAN:

I feel great interest in the subjects of your dispatch, mentioning
corn and sorghum, and the contemplated visit to you.

A. LINCOLN, President of the United States.


I replied at once:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 17, 1864.

President LINCOLN, Washington., D. C.:

I will keep the department fully advised of all developments
connected with the subject in which you feel interested.


Mr. Wright, former member of Congress from Rome, Georgia, and Mr.
King, of Marietta, are now going between Governor Brown and myself.
I have said to them that some of the people of Georgia are engaged
in rebellion, began in error and perpetuated in pride, but that
Georgia can now save herself from the devastations of war preparing
for her, only by withdrawing her quota out of the Confederate Army,
and aiding me to expel Hood from the borders of the State; in which
event, instead of desolating the land as we progress, I will keep
our men to the high-roads and commons, and pay for the corn and
meat we need and take.

I am fully conscious of the delicate nature of such assertions, but
it would be a magnificent stroke of policy if we could, without
surrendering principle or a foot of ground, arouse the latent
enmity of Georgia against Davis.

The people do not hesitate to say that Mr. Stephens was and is a
Union man at heart; and they say that Davis will not trust him or
let him have a share in his Government.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


I have not the least doubt that Governor Brown, at that time,
seriously entertained the proposition; but he hardly felt ready to
act, and simply gave a furlough to the militia, and called a
special session of the Legislature, to meet at Milledgeville, to
take into consideration the critical condition of affairs in the
State.

On the 20th of September Colonel Horace Porter arrived from General
Grant, at City Point, bringing me the letter of September 12th,
asking my general views as to what should next be done.  He staid
several days at Atlanta, and on his return carried back to
Washington my full reports of the past campaign, and my letter of
September 20th to General Grant in answer to his of the 12th.

About this time we detected signs of activity on the part of the
enemy.  On the 21st Hood shifted his army across from the Mason
road, at Lovejoy's, to the West Point road, at Palmetto Station,
and his cavalry appeared on the west side of the Chattahoochee,
toward Powder Springs; thus, as it were, stepping aside, and
opening wide the door for us to enter Central Georgia.  I inferred,
however, that his real purpose was to assume the offensive against
our railroads, and on the 24th a heavy force of cavalry from
Mississippi, under General Forrest, made its appearance at Athena,
Alabama, and captured its garrison.

General Newton's division (of the Fourth Corps), and Corse's (of
the Seventeenth), were sent back by rail, the former to
Chattanooga, and the latter to Rome.  On the 25th I telegraphed to
General Halleck:

Hood seems to be moving, as it were, to the Alabama line, leaving
open the road to Mason, as also to Augusta; but his cavalry is busy
on all our roads.  A force, number estimated as high as eight
thousand, are reported to have captured Athena, Alabama; and a
regiment of three hundred and fifty men sent to its relief.  I have
sent Newton's division up to Chattanooga in cars, and will send
another division to Rome.  If I were sure that Savannah would soon
be in our possession, I should be tempted to march for
Milledgeville and Augusta; but I must first secure what I have.
Jeff. Davis is at Macon.

On the next day I telegraphed further that Jeff. Davis was with
Hood at Palmetto Station.  One of our spies was there at the time,
who came in the next night, and reported to me the substance of his
speech to the soldiers.  It was a repetition of those he had made
at Colombia, South Carolina, and Mason, Georgia, on his way out,
which I had seen in the newspapers.  Davis seemed to be perfectly
upset by the fall of Atlanta, and to have lost all sense and
reason.  He denounced General Jos. Johnston and Governor Brown as
little better than traitors; attributed to them personally the many
misfortunes which had befallen their cause, and informed the
soldiers that now the tables were to be turned; that General
Forrest was already on our roads in Middle Tennessee; and that
Hood's army would soon be there.  He asserted that the Yankee army
would have to retreat or starve, and that the retreat would prove
more disastrous than was that of Napoleon from Moscow.  He promised
his Tennessee and Kentucky soldiers that their feet should soon
tread their "native soil," etc., etc.  He made no concealment of
these vainglorious boasts, and thus gave us the full key to his
future designs.  To be forewarned was to be forearmed, and I think
we took full advantage of the occasion.

On the 26th I received this dispatch.


CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,September 26,1864-10 a.m.

Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta
It will be better to drive Forrest out of Middle Tennessee as a
first step, and do any thing else you may feel your force
sufficient for.  When a movement is made on any part of the
sea-coast, I will advise you.  If Hood goes to the Alabama line,
will it not be impossible for him to subsist his army?
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Answer:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 26, 1864.

GENERAL: I have your dispatch of to-day. I have already sent one
division (Newton's) to Chattanooga, and another (Corse's) to Rome.

Our armies are much reduced, and if I send back any more, I will
not be able to threaten Georgia much.  There are men enough to the
rear to whip Forrest, but they are necessarily scattered to defend
the roads.

Can you expedite the sending to Nashville of the recruits that are
in Indiana and Ohio? They could occupy the forts.

Hood is now on the West Point road, twenty-four miles south of
this, and draws his supplies by that road.  Jefferson Davis is
there to-day, and superhuman efforts will be made to break my road.

Forrest is now lieutenant-general, and commands all the enemy's
cavalry.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


General Grant first thought I was in error in supposing that Jeff.
Davis was at Macon and Palmetto, but on the 27th I received a
printed copy of his speech made at Macon on the 22d, which was so
significant that I ordered it to be telegraphed entire as far as
Louisville, to be sent thence by mail to Washington, and on the
same day received this dispatch:


WASHINGTON, D. C., September 27, 1864-9 a.m.
Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta:
You say Jeff Davis is on a visit to General Hood.  I judge that
Brown and Stephens are the objects of his visit.
A. LINCOLN, President of the United States.

To which I replied:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 28, 1864.

President LINCOLN, Washington, D. C.:

I have positive knowledge that Mr. Davis made a speech at Macon, on
the 22d, which I mailed to General Halleck yesterday.  It was
bitter against General Jos. Johnston and Governor Brown.  The
militia are on furlough.  Brown is at Milledgeville, trying to get
a Legislature to meet next month, but he is afraid to act unless in
concert with other Governors, Judge Wright, of Rome, has been here,
and Messrs. Hill and Nelson, former members of Congress, are here
now, and will go to meet Wright at Rome, and then go back to
Madison and Milledgeville.

Great efforts are being made to reenforce Hood's army, and to break
up my railroads, and I should have at once a good reserve force at
Nashville.  It would have a bad effect, if I were forced to send
back any considerable part of my army to guard roads, so as to
weaken me to an extent that I could not act offensively if the
occasion calls for it.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


All this time Hood and I were carrying on the foregoing
correspondence relating to the exchange of prisoners, the removal
of the people from Atlanta, and the relief of our prisoners of war
at Andersonville.  Notwithstanding the severity of their
imprisonment, some of these men escaped from Andersonville, and got
to me at Atlanta.  They described their sad condition: more than
twenty-five thousand prisoners confined in a stockade designed for
only ten thousand; debarred the privilege of gathering wood out of
which to make huts; deprived of sufficient healthy food, and the
little stream that ran through their prison pen poisoned and
polluted by the offal from their cooking and butchering houses
above.  On the 22d of September I wrote to General Hood, describing
the condition of our men at Andersonville, purposely refraining
from casting odium on him or his associates for the treatment of
these men, but asking his consent for me to procure from our
generous friends at the North the articles of clothing and comfort
which they wanted, viz., under-clothing, soap, combs, scissors,
etc.--all needed to keep them in health--and to send these stores
with a train, and an officer to issue them.  General Hood, on the
24th, promptly consented, and I telegraphed to my friend Mr. James
E. Yeatman, Vice-President of the Sanitary Commission at St. Louis,
to send us all the under-clothing and soap he could spare,
specifying twelve hundred fine-tooth combs, and four hundred pairs
of shears to cut hair.  These articles indicate the plague that
most afflicted our prisoners at Andersonville.

Mr. Yeatman promptly responded to my request, expressed the
articles, but they did not reach Andersonville in time, for the
prisoners were soon after removed; these supplies did, however,
finally overtake them at Jacksonville, Florida, just before the war
closed.

On the 28th I received from General Grant two dispatches


CITY POINT, VIRGINIA; September 27, 1864-8.30 a.m.
Major-General SHERMAN:
It is evident, from the tone of the Richmond press and from other
sources of information, that the enemy intend making a desperate
effort to drive you from where you are.  I have directed all new
troops from the West, and from the East too, if necessary, in case
none are ready in the West, to be sent to you.  If General
Burbridge is not too far on his way to Abingdon, I think he had
better be recalled and his surplus troops sent into Tennessee.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


CITY POINT, VIRGINIA; September 27, 1864-10.30 a.m.
Major-General SHERMAN:
I have directed all recruits and new troops from all the Western
States to be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders
from you.  I was mistaken about Jeff. Davis being in Richmond on
Thursday last.  He was then on his way to Macon.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


Forrest having already made his appearance in Middle Tennessee, and
Hood evidently edging off in that direction, satisfied me that the
general movement against our roads had begun.  I therefore
determined to send General Thomas back to Chattanooga, with another
division (Morgan's, of the Fourteenth Corps), to meet the danger in
Tennessee.  General Thomas went up on the 29th, and Morgan's
division followed the same day, also by rail.  And I telegraphed to
General Halleck

I take it for granted that Forrest will cut our road, but think we
can prevent him from making a serious lodgment.  His cavalry will
travel a hundred miles where ours will ten.  I have sent two
divisions up to Chattanooga and one to Rome, and General Thomas
started to-day to drive Forrest out of Tennessee.  Our roads should
be watched from the rear, and I am glad that General Grant has
ordered reserves to Nashville.  I prefer for the future to make the
movement on Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah.  Hood now rests
twenty-four miles south, on the Chattahoochee, with his right on
the West Point road.  He is removing the iron of the Macon road.  I
can whip his infantry, but his cavalry is to be feared.

There was great difficulty in obtaining correct information about
Hood's movements from Palmetto Station.  I could not get spies to
penetrate his camps, but on the 1st of October I was satisfied that
the bulk of his infantry was at and across the Chattahoochee River,
near Campbellton, and that his cavalry was on the west side, at
Powder Springs.  On that day I telegraphed to General Grant:

Hood is evidently across the Chattahoochee, below Sweetwater.  If
he tries to get on our road, this side of the Etowah, I shall
attack him; but if he goes to the Selma & Talladega road, why will
it not do to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has, and
the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy
Atlanta and march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston,
breaking roads and doing irreparable damage? We cannot remain on
the defensive.

The Selma & Talladega road herein referred to was an unfinished
railroad from Selma, Alabama, through Talladega, to Blue Mountain,
a terminus sixty-five miles southwest of Rome and about fifteen
miles southeast of Gadsden, where the rebel army could be supplied
from the direction of Montgomery and Mobile, and from which point
Hood could easily threaten Middle Tennessee.  My first impression
was, that Hood would make for that point; but by the 3d of October
the indications were that he would strike our railroad nearer us,
viz., about Kingston or Marietta.

Orders were at once made for the Twentieth Corps (Slocum's) to hold
Atlanta and the bridges of the Chattahoochee, and the other corps
were put in motion for Marietta.

The army had undergone many changes since the capture of Atlanta.
General Schofield had gone to the rear, leaving General J. D. Cog
in command of the Army of the Ohio (Twenty-third Corps).  General
Thomas, also, had been dispatched to Chattanooga, with Newton's
division of the Fourth Corps and Morgan's of the Fourteenth Corps,
leaving General D. S. Stanley, the senior major-general of the two
corps of his Army of the Cumberland, remaining and available for
this movement, viz., the Fourth and Fourteenth, commanded by
himself and Major-General Jeff. C. Davis; and after General Dodge
was wounded, his corps (the Sixteenth) had been broken up, and its
two divisions were added to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps,
constituting the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Major-General
O. O. Howard.  Generals Logan and Blair had gone home to assist in
the political canvass, leaving their corps, viz., the Fifteenth and
Seventeenth, under the command of Major-Generals Osterhaus and T.
E. G. Ransom.

These five corps were very much reduced in strength, by detachments
and by discharges, so that for the purpose of fighting Hood I had
only about sixty thousand infantry and artillery, with two small
divisions of cavalry (Kilpatrick's and Garrard's).  General Elliott
was the chief of cavalry to the Army of the Cumberland, and was the
senior officer of that arm of service present for duty with me.

We had strong railroad guards at Marietta and Kenesaw, Allatoona,
Etowah Bridge, Kingston, Rome, Resaca, Dalton, Ringgold, and
Chattanooga.  All the important bridges were likewise protected by
good block-houses, admirably constructed, and capable of a strong
defense against cavalry or infantry; and at nearly all the regular
railroad-stations we had smaller detachments intrenched.  I had
little fear of the enemy's cavalry damaging our roads seriously,
for they rarely made a break which could not be repaired in a few
days; but it was absolutely necessary to keep General Hood's
infantry off our main route of communication and supply.  Forrest
had with him in Middle Tennessee about eight thousand cavalry, and
Hood's army was estimated at from thirty-five to forty thousand
men, infantry and artillery, including Wheeler's cavalry, then
about three thousand strong.

We crossed the Chattahoochee River during the 3d and 4th of
October, rendezvoused at the old battle-field of Smyrna Camp, and
the next day reached Marietta and Kenesaw.  The telegraph-wires had
been cut above Marietta, and learning that heavy masses of
infantry, artillery, and cavalry, had been seen from Kenesaw
(marching north), I inferred that Allatoona was their objective
point; and on the 4th of October I signaled from Mining's Station
to Kenesaw, and from Kenesaw to Allatoona, over the heads of the
enemy, a message for General Corse, at Rome, to hurry back to the
assistance of the garrison at Allatoona.  Allatoona was held by, a
small brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tourtellotte, my
present aide-de-camp.  He had two small redoubts on either side of
the railroad, overlooking the village of Allatoona, and the
warehouses, in which were stored over a million rations of bread.

Reaching Kenesaw Mountain about 8 a.m. of October 5th (a beautiful
day), I had a superb view of the vast panorama to the north and
west.  To the southwest, about Dallas, could be seen the smoke of
camp-fires, indicating the presence of a large force of the enemy,
and the whole line of railroad from Big Shanty up to Allatoona
(full fifteen miles) was marked by the fires of the burning
railroad.  We could plainly see the smoke of battle about,
Allatoona, and hear the faint reverberation of the cannon.

From Kenesaw I ordered the Twenty-third Corps (General Cox) to
march due west on the Burnt Hickory road, and to burn houses or
piles of brush as it progressed, to indicate the head of column,
hoping to interpose this corps between Hood's main army at Dallas
and the detachment then assailing Allatoona.  The rest of the army
was directed straight for Allatoona, northwest, distant eighteen
miles.  The signal-officer on Kenesaw reported that since daylight
he had failed to obtain any answer to his call for Allatoona; but,
while I was with him, he caught a faint glimpse of the tell-tale
flag through an embrasure, and after much time he made out these
letters-" C.," "R.," "S.," "E.," "H.," "E.," "R.," and translated
the message--"Corse is here."  It was a source of great relief, for
it gave me the first assurance that General Corse had received his
orders, and that the place was adequately garrisoned.

I watched with painful suspense the indications of the battle
raging there, and was dreadfully impatient at the slow progress of
the relieving column, whose advance was marked by the smokes which
were made according to orders, but about 2 p.m.  I noticed with
satisfaction that the smoke of battle about Allatoona grew less and
less, and ceased altogether about 4 p.m.  For a time I attributed
this result to the effect of General Cog's march, but later in the
afternoon the signal-flag announced the welcome tidings that the
attack had been fairly repulsed, but that General Corse was
wounded.  The next day my aide, Colonel Dayton, received this
characteristic dispatch:

ALLATOONA, GEORGIA, October 6, 1884-2 P.M.
Captain L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp:
I am short a cheek-bone and an ear, but am able to whip all h--l
yet!  My losses are very heavy.  A force moving from Stilesboro' to
Kingston gives me some anxiety.  Tell me where Sherman is.
JOHN M. CORSE, Brigadier-General.

Inasmuch as the enemy had retreated southwest, and would probably
next appear at Rome, I answered General Corse with orders to get
back to Rome with his troops as quickly as possible.

General Corse's report of this fight at Allatoona is very full and
graphic.  It is dated Rome, October 27, 1864; recites the fact that
he received his orders by signal to go to the assistance of
Allatoona on the 4th, when he telegraphed to Kingston for cars, and
a train of thirty empty cars was started for him, but about ten of
them got off the track and caused delay.  By 7 p.m. he had at Rome
a train of twenty cars, which he loaded up with Colonel Rowett's
brigade, and part of the Twelfth Illinois Infantry; started at 8
p.m., reached  Allatoona (distant thirty-five miles) at 1 a.m.  of
the 5th, and sent the train back for more men; but the road was in
bad order, and no more men came in time.  He found Colonel
Tourtellotte's garrison composed of eight hundred and ninety men;
his reenforcement was one thousand and fifty-four: total for the
defense, nineteen hundred and forty-four.  The outposts were
already engaged, and as soon as daylight came he drew back the men
from the village to the ridge on which the redoubts were built.

The enemy was composed of French's division of three brigades,
variously reported from four to five thousand strong.  This force
gradually surrounded the place by 8 a.m., when General French sent
in by flag of truce this note:


AROUND ALLATOONA, October 5, 1884.

Commanding Officer, United States Forces, Allatoona:

I have placed the forces under my command in such positions that
you are surrounded, and to avoid a needless effusion of blood I
call on you to surrender your forces at once, and unconditionally.

Five minutes will be allowed you to decide.  Should you accede to
this, you will be treated in the most honorable manner as prisoners
of war.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully yours,

S.  G.  FRENCH,
Major-General commanding forces Confederate States.


General Corse answered immediately:

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH CORPS
ALLATOONA, GEORGIA, October 5, 1864.

Major-General S. G. FRENCH, Confederate States, etc:

Your communication demanding surrender of my command I acknowledge
receipt of, and respectfully reply that we are prepared for the
"needless effusion of blood" whenever it is agreeable to you.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. CORSE,
Brigadier-General commanding forces United States.


Of course the attack began at once, coming from front, flank, and
rear.  There were two small redoubts, with slight parapets and
ditches, one on each side of the deep railroad-cut.  These redoubts
had been located by Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, at the
time of our advance on Kenesaw, the previous June.  Each redoubt
overlooked the storehouses close by the railroad, and each could
aid the other defensively by catching in flank the attacking force
of the other.  Our troops at first endeavored to hold some ground
outside the redoubts, but were soon driven inside, when the enemy
made repeated assaults, but were always driven back.  About 11 a.m.,
Colonel Redfield, of the Thirty-ninth Iowa, was killed, and Colonel
Rowett was wounded, but never ceased to fight and encourage his
men.  Colonel Tourtellotte was shot through the hips, but continued
to command.  General Corse was, at 1 p.m., shot across the face,
the ball cutting his ear, which stunned him, but he continued to
encourage his men and to give orders.  The enemy (about 1.30 p.m.)
made a last and desperate effort to carry one of the redoubts, but
was badly cut to pieces by the artillery and infantry fire from the
other, when he began to draw off, leaving his dead and wounded on
the ground.

Before finally withdrawing, General French converged a heavy fire
of his cannon on the block-house at Allatoona Creek, about two
miles from the depot, set it on fire, and captured its garrison,
consisting of four officers and eighty-five men.  By 4 p.m.  he was
in full retreat south, on the Dallas road, and got by before the
head of General Cox's column had reached it; still several
ambulances and stragglers were picked up by this command on that
road.  General Corse reported two hundred and thirty-one rebel
dead, four hundred and eleven prisoners, three regimental colors,
and eight hundred muskets captured.

Among the prisoners was a Brigadier-General Young, who thought that
French's aggregate loss would reach two thousand.  Colonel
Tourtellotte says that, for days after General Corse had returned
to Rome, his men found and buried at least a hundred more dead
rebels, who had doubtless been wounded, and died in the woods near
Allatoona.  I know that when I reached Allatoona, on the 9th, I saw
a good many dead men, which had been collected for burial.

Corse's entire loss, officially reported, was:

        Killed.    Wounded.    Missing.     Total.
         142         353         212         707


I esteemed this defense of Allatoona so handsome and important,
that I made it the subject of a general order, viz., No. 86, of
October 7, 1864:


The general commanding avails himself of the opportunity, in the
handsome defense made of Allatoona, to illustrate the most
important principle in war, that fortified posts should be defended
to the last, regardless of the relative numbers of the party
attacking and attacked .  .  .  .  The thanks of this army are due
and are hereby accorded to General Corse, Colonel Tourtellotte,
Colonel Rowett, officers, and men, for their determined and gallant
defense of Allatoona, and it is made an example to illustrate the
importance of preparing in time, and meeting the danger, when
present, boldly, manfully, and well.

Commanders and garrisons of the posts along our railroad are hereby
instructed that they must hold their posts to the last minute, sure
that the time gained is valuable and necessary to their comrades at
the front.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,
L.  M.  DAYTON, Aide-A-Camp.


The rebels had struck our railroad a heavy blow, burning every tie,
bending the rails for eight miles, from Big Shanty to above
Acworth, so that the estimate for repairs called for thirty-five
thousand new ties, and six miles of iron.  Ten thousand men were
distributed along the break to replace the ties, and to prepare the
road-bed, while the regular repair-party, under Colonel W. W.
Wright, came down from Chattanooga with iron, spikes, etc., and in
about seven days the road was all right again.  It was by such acts
of extraordinary energy that we discouraged our adversaries, for
the rebel soldiers felt that it was a waste of labor for them to
march hurriedly, on wide circuits, day and night, to burn a bridge
and tear up a mile or so of track, when they knew that we could lay
it back so quickly.  They supposed that we had men and money
without limit, and that we always kept on hand, distributed along
the road, duplicates of every bridge and culvert of any importance.

A good story is told of one who was on Kenesaw Mountain during our
advance in the previous June or July.  A group of rebels lay in the
shade of a tree, one hot day, overlooking our camps about Big
Shanty.  One soldier remarked to his fellows:

"Well, the Yanks will have to git up and git now, for I heard
General Johnston himself say that General Wheeler had blown up the
tunnel near Dalton, and that the Yanks would have to retreat,
because they could get no more rations."

"Oh, hell!" said a listener, "don't you know that old Sherman
carries a duplicate tunnel along?"

After the war was over, General Johnston inquired of me who was our
chief railroad-engineer.  When I told him that it was Colonel W. W.
Wright, a civilian, he was much surprised, said that our feats of
bridge-building and repairs of roads had excited his admiration;
and he instanced the occasion at Kenesaw in June, when an officer
from Wheeler's cavalry had reported to him in person that he had
come from General Wheeler, who had made a bad break in our road
about Triton Station, which he said would take at least a fortnight
to repair; and, while they were talking, a train was seen coming
down the road which had passed that very break, and had reached me
at Big Shanty as soon as the fleet horseman had reached him
(General Johnston) at Marietta

I doubt whether the history of war can furnish more examples of
skill and bravery than attended the defense of the railroad from
Nashville to Atlanta during the year 1864.

In person I reached Allatoona on the 9th of October, still in doubt
as to Hood's immediate intentions.  Our cavalry could do little
against his infantry in the rough and wooded country about Dallas,
which masked the enemy's movements; but General Corse, at Rome,
with Spencer's First Alabama Cavalry and a mounted regiment of
Illinois Infantry, could feel the country south of Rome about
Cedartown and Villa Rica; and reported the enemy to be in force at
both places.  On the 9th I telegraphed to General Thomas, at
Nashville, as follows:


I came up here to relieve our road.  The Twentieth Corps remains at
Atlanta.  Hood reached the road and broke it up between Big Shanty
and Acworth.  He attacked Allatoona, but was repulsed.  We have
plenty of bread and meat, but forage is scarce.  I want to destroy
all the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and to make for
the sea-coast. We cannot defend this long line of road.


And on the same day I telegraphed to General Grant, at City Point:


It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that
Hood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils, are turned
loose without home or habitation.  I think Hood's movements
indicate a diversion to the end of the Selma & Talladega road, at
Blue Mountain, about sixty miles southwest of Rome, from which he
will threaten Kingston, Bridgeport, and Decatur, Alabama.  I
propose that we break up the railroad from Ohattanooga forward, and
that we strike out with our wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and
Savannah.  Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless for us to
occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and
people, will cripple their military resources.  By attempting to
hold the roads, we will lose a thousand men each month, and will
gain no result.  I can make this march, and make Georgia howl!  We
have on hand over eight thousand head of cattle and three million
rations of bread, but no corn.  We can find plenty of forage in the
interior of the State.


Meantime the rebel General Forrest had made a bold circuit in
Middle Tennessee, avoiding all fortified points, and breaking up
the railroad at several places; but, as usual, he did his work so
hastily and carelessly that our engineers soon repaired the
damage--then, retreating before General Rousseau, he left the State
of Tennessee, crossing the river near Florence, Alabama, and got
off unharmed.

On the 10th of October the enemy appeared south of the Etowah River
at Rome, when I ordered all the armies to march to Kingston, rode
myself to Cartersville with the Twenty-third Corps (General Cox),
and telegraphed from there to General Thomas at Nashville:

It looks to me as though Hood was bound for Tuscumbia.  He is now
crossing the Coosa River below Rome, looking west. Let me know if
you can hold him with your forces now in Tennessee and the expected
reenforeements, as, in that event, you know what I propose to do.

I will be at Kingston to-morrow.  I think Rome is strong enough to
resist any attack, and the rivers are all high. If he turns up by
Summerville, I will get in behind him.


And on the same day to General Grant, at City Point:

Hood is now crossing the Coosa, twelve miles below Rome, bound
west. If he passes over to the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, had I not
better execute the plan of my letter sent you by Colonel Porter,
and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, to
defend the State? He will have an ample force when the
reenforcements ordered reach Nashville.


I found General John E.  Smith at Cartersville, and on the 11th
rode on to Kingston, where I had telegraphic communications in all
directions.

From General Corse, at Rome, I learned that Hood's army had
disappeared, but in what direction he was still in doubt; and I was
so strongly convinced of the wisdom of my proposition to change the
whole tactics of the campaign, to leave Hood to General Thomas, and
to march across Georgia for Savannah or Charleston, that I again
telegraphed to General Grant:

We cannot now remain on the defensive.  With twenty-five thousand
infantry and the bold cavalry he has, Hood can constantly break my
road.  I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of
the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city;
send back all my wounded and unserviceable men, and with my
effective army move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea.
Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be
forced to follow me.  Instead of being on the defensive, I will be
on the offensive.  Instead of my guessing at what he means to do,
he will have to guess at my plans.  The difference in war would be
fully twenty-five per pent.  I can make Savannah, Charleston, or
the month of the Chattahoochee (Appalachicola).  Answer quick, as I
know we will not have the telegraph long.


I received no answer to this at the time, and the next day went on
to Rome, where the news came that Hood had made his appearance at
Resaca, and had demanded the surrender of the place, which was
commanded by Colonel Weaver, reenforced by Brevet Brigadier-General
Raum.  General Hood had evidently marched with rapidity up the
Chattooga Valley, by Summerville, Lafayette, Ship's Gap, and
Snake-Creek Gap, and had with him his whole army, except a small
force left behind to watch Rome.  I ordered Resaca to be further
reenforced by rail from Kingston, and ordered General Cox to make a
bold reconnoissance down the Coosa Valley, which captured and
brought into Rome some cavalrymen and a couple of field-guns, with
their horses and men.  At first I thought of interposing my whole
army in the Chattooga Valley, so as to prevent Hood's escape south;
but I saw at a glance that he did not mean to fight, and in that
event, after damaging the road all he could, he would be likely to
retreat eastward by Spring Place, which I did not want him to do;
and, hearing from General Raum that he still held Resaca safe, and
that General Edward McCook had also got there with some cavalry
reenforcements, I turned all the heads of columns for Resaca, viz.,
General Cox's, from Rome; General Stanley's, from McGuire's; and
General Howard's, from Kingston.  We all reached Resaca during that
night, and the next morning (13th) learned that Hood's whole army
had passed up the valley toward Dalton, burning the railroad and
doing all the damage possible.

On the 12th he had demanded the surrender of Resaca in the
following letter:


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE
IN THE FIELD, October 12,1861.

To the officer commanding the United Stales Forces at Resaca,
Georgia.

SIR: I demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the post
and garrison under your command, and, should this be acceded to,
all white officers and soldiers will be parolled in a few days.  If
the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken.  Most
respectfully, your obedient servant,

J.  B.  HOOD, General.


To this Colonel Weaver, then in command, replied:

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION, FIFTEENTH CORPS
RESACA, GEORGIA,  October 12, 1884.

To General J. B. HOOD

Your communication of this date just received.  In reply, I have to
state that I am somewhat surprised at the concluding paragraph, to
the effect that, if the place is carried by assault, no prisoners
will be taken.  In my opinion I can hold this post. If you want it,
come and take it.

I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

CLARK R. WEAVER, Commanding Officer.


This brigade  was very small, and as Hood's investment extended
only from the Oostenaula, below the town, to the Connesauga above,
he left open the approach from the south, which enabled General
Raum and the cavalry of Generals McCook and Watkins to reenforce
from Kingston.  In fact, Hood, admonished by his losses at
Allatoona, did not attempt an assault at all, but limited his
attack to the above threat, and to some skirmishing, giving his
attention chiefly to the destruction of the railroad, which he
accomplished all the way up to Tunnel Hill, nearly twenty miles,
capturing en route the regiment of black troops at Dalton
(Johnson's Forty-fourth United States colored).  On the 14th, I
turned General Howard through Snake-Creek Gap, and sent General
Stanley around by Tilton, with orders to cross the mountain to the
west, so as to capture, if possible, the force left by the enemy in
Snake-Creek Gap.  We found this gap very badly obstructed by fallen
timber, but got through that night, and the next day the main army
was at Villanow.  On the morning of the 16th, the leading division
of General Howard's column, commanded by General Charles R. Woods,
carried Ship's Gap, taking prisoners part of the Twenty-fourth
South Carolina Regiment, which had been left there to hold us in
check.

The best information there obtained located Hood's army at
Lafayette, near which place I hoped to catch him and force him to
battle; but, by the time we had got enough troops across the
mountain at Ship's Gap, Hood had escaped down the valley of the
Chattooga, and all we could do was to follow him as closely as
possible.  From Ship's Gap I dispatched couriers to Chattanooga,
and received word back that General Schofield was there,
endeavoring to cooperate with me, but Hood had broken up the
telegraph, and thus had prevented quick communication.  General
Schofield did not reach me till the army had got down to
Gaylesville, about the 21st of October.

It was at Ship's Gap that a courier brought me the cipher message
from General Halleck which intimated that the authorities in
Washington were willing I should undertake the march across Georgia
to the sea.  The translated dispatch named "Horse-i-bar Sound" as
the point where the fleet would await my arrival.  After much time
I construed it to mean, "Ossabaw Sound," below Savannah, which was
correct.

On the 16th I telegraphed to General Thomas, at Nashville:

Send me Morgan's and Newton's old divisions.  Reestablish the road,
and I will follow Hood wherever he may go.  I think he will move to
Blue Mountain.  We can maintain our men and animals on the country.


General Thomas's reply was:

NASHVILLE, October 17, 1864--10.30 a.m.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch from Ship's Gap, 5 p.m. of the 16th, just received.
Schofield, whom I placed in command of the two divisions (Wagner's
and Morgan's), was to move up Lookout Valley this A.M., to
intercept Hood, should he be marching for Bridgeport.  I will order
him to join you with the two divisions, and will reconstruct the
road as soon as possible.  Will also reorganize the guards for
posts and block-houses ....  Mower and Wilson have arrived, and are
on their way to join you.  I hope you will adopt Grant's idea of
turning Wilson loose, rather than undertake the plan of a march
with the whole force through Georgia to the sea, inasmuch as
General Grant cannot cooperate with you as at first arranged.

GEORGE H.  THOMAS, Major-General.


So it is clear that at that date neither General Grant nor General
Thomas heartily favored my proposed plan of campaign.  On the same
day, I wrote to General Schofield at Chattanooga:

Hood is not at Dear Head Cove.  We occupy Ship's Gap and Lafayette.
Hood is moving south via Summerville, Alpine, and Gadsden.  If he
enters Tennessee, it will be to the west of Huntsville, but I think
he has given up all such idea.  I want the road repaired to
Atlanta; the sick and wounded men sent north of the Tennessee; my
army recomposed; and I will then make the interior of Georgia feel
the weight of war.  It is folly for us to be moving our armies on
the reports of scouts and citizens.  We must maintain the
offensive.  Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head was right
--the move to defend Caperton's Ferry is wrong.  Notify General
Thomas of these my views.  We must follow Hood till he is beyond
the reach of mischief, and then resume the offensive.


The correspondence between me and the authorities at Washington, as
well as with the several army commanders, given at length in the
report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, is full on all
these points.

After striking our road at Dalton, Hood was compelled to go on to
Chattanooga and Bridgeport, or to pass around by Decatur and
abandon altogether his attempt to make us let go our hold of
Atlanta by attacking our communications.  It was clear to me that
he had no intention to meet us in open battle, and the lightness
and celerity of his army convinced me that I could not possibly
catch him on a stern-chase.  We therefore quietly followed him down
the Chattooga Valley to the neighborhood of Gadsden, but halted the
main armies near the Coosa River, at the mouth of the Chattooga,
drawing our supplies of corn and meat from the farms of that
comparatively rich valley and of the neighborhood.

General Slocum, in Atlanta, had likewise sent out, under strong
escort, large trains of wagons to the east, and brought back corn,
bacon, and all kinds of provisions, so that Hood's efforts to cut
off our supplies only reacted on his own people.  So long as the
railroads were in good order, our supplies came full and regular
from the North; but when the enemy broke our railroads we were
perfectly justified in stripping the inhabitants of all they had.
I remember well the appeal of a very respectable farmer against our
men driving away his fine flock of sheep.  I explained to him that
General Hood had broken our railroad; that we were a strong, hungry
crowd, and needed plenty of food; that Uncle Sam was deeply
interested in our continued health and would soon repair these
roads, but meantime we must eat; we preferred Illinois beef, but
mutton would have to answer.  Poor fellow!  I don't believe he was
convinced of the wisdom or wit of my explanation.  Very soon after
reaching Lafayette we organized a line of supply from Chattanooga
to Ringgold by rail, and thence by wagons to our camps about
Gaylesville.  Meantime, also, Hood had reached the neighborhood of
Gadsden, and drew his supplies from the railroad at Blue Mountain.

On the 19th of October I telegraphed to General Halleck, at
Washington:

Hood has retreated rapidly by all the roads leading south.  Our
advance columns are now at Alpine and Melville Post-Office.  I
shall pursue him as far as Gaylesville.  The enemy will not venture
toward Tennessee except around by Decatur.  I propose to send the
Fourth Corps back to General Thomas, and leave him, with that
corps, the garrisons, and new troops, to defend the line of the
Tennessee River; and with the rest I will push into the heart of
Georgia and come out at Savannah, destroying all the railroads of
the State.  The break in our railroad at Big Shanty is almost
repaired, and that about Dalton should be done in ten days.  We
find abundance of forage in the country.


On the same day I telegraphed to General L. C. Easton,
chief-quartermaster, who had been absent on a visit to Missouri,
but had got back to Chattanooga:

Go in person to superintend the repairs of the railroad, and make
all orders in my name that will expedite its completion.  I want it
finished, to bring back from Atlanta to Chattanooga the sick and
wounded men and surplus stores.  On the 1st of November I want
nothing in front of Chattanooga except what we can use as food and
clothing and haul in our wagons.  There is plenty of corn in the
country, and we only want forage for the posts.  I allow ten days
for all this to be done, by which time I expect to be at or near
Atlanta.


I telegraphed also to General Amos Beckwith, chief-commissary in
Atlanta, who was acting as chief-quartermaster during the absence
of General Easton:

Hood will escape me.  I want to prepare for my big raid.  On the
1st of November I want nothing in Atlanta but what is necessary for
war.  Send all trash to the rear at once, and have on hand thirty
days' food and but little forage.  I propose to abandon Atlanta,
and the railroad back to Chattanooga, to sally forth to ruin
Georgia and bring up on the seashore.  Make all dispositions
accordingly.  I will go down the Coosa until I am sure that Hood
has gone to Blue Mountain.


On the 21st of October I reached Gaylesville, had my bivouac in an
open field back of the village, and remained there till the 28th.
During that time General Schofield arrived, with the two divisions
of Generals Wagner (formerly Newton's) and Morgan, which were
returned to their respective corps (the Fourth and Fourteenth), and
General Schofield resumed his own command of the Army of the Ohio,
then on the Coosa River, near Cedar Bluff.  General Joseph A. Mower
also arrived, and was assigned to command a division in the
Seventeenth Corps; and General J. H. Wilson came, having been sent
from Virginia by General Grant, for the purpose of commanding all
my cavalry.  I first intended to organize this cavalry into a corps
of three small divisions, to be commanded by General Wilson; but
the horses were well run down, and, at Wilson's instance, I
concluded to retain only one division of four thousand five hundred
men, with selected horses, under General Kilpatrick, and to send
General Wilson back with all the rest to Nashville, to be
reorganized and to act under General Thomas in the defense of
Tennessee.  Orders to this effect were made on the 24th of October.

General Grant, in designating General Wilson to command my cavalry,
predicted that he would, by his personal activity, increase the
effect of that arm "fifty per cent.," and he advised that he should
be sent south, to accomplish all that I had proposed to do with the
main army; but I had not so much faith in cavalry as he had, and
preferred to adhere to my original intention of going myself with a
competent force.

About this time I learned that General Beauregard had reached
Hood's army at Gadsden; that, without assuming direct command of
that army, he had authority from the Confederate Government to
direct all its movements, and to call to his assistance the whole
strength of the South.  His orders, on assuming command, were full
of alarm and desperation, dated:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST
October 17, 1864

In assuming command, at this critical juncture, of the Military
Division of the West, I appeal to my countrymen, of all classes and
sections, for their generous support.  In assigning me to this
responsible position, the President of the Confederate States has
extended to me the assurance of his earnest support.  The
Executives of your States meet me with similar expressions of their
devotion to our cause.  The noble army in the field, composed of
brave men and gallant officers, are strangers to me, but I know
they will do all that patriots can achieve.....

The army of Sherman still defiantly holds Atlanta.  He can and must
be driven from it.  It is only for the good people of Georgia and
surrounding states to speak the word, and the work is done, we have
abundant provisions.  There are men enough in the country, liable
to and able for service, to accomplish the result.....

My countrymen, respond to this call as you have done in days that
are past, and, with the blessing of a kind and overruling
Providence, the enemy shall be driven from your soil.  The security
of your wives and daughters from the insults and outrages of a
brutal foe shall be established soon, and be followed by a
permanent and honorable peace.  The claims of home and country,
wife and children, uniting with the demands of honor and
patriotism, summon us to the field.  We cannot, dare not, will not
fail to respond.  Full of hope and confidence, I come to join you
in your struggles, sharing your privations, and, with your brave
and true men, to strike the blow that shall bring success to our
arms, triumph to our cause, and peace to our country! . . .

G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.


Notwithstanding this somewhat boastful order or appeal, General
Beauregard did not actually accompany General Hood on his
disastrous march to Nashville, but took post at Corinth,
Mississippi, to control the movement of his supplies and to watch
me.

At Gaylesville the pursuit of Hood by the army under my immediate
command may be said to have ceased.  During this pursuit, the
Fifteenth Corps was commanded by its senior major-general present,
P. J. Osterhaus, in the absence of General John A. Logan; and the
Seventeenth Corps was commanded by Brigadier-General T. E. G.
Ransom, the senior officer present, in the absence of General Frank
P.  Blair.

General Ransom was a young, most gallant, and promising officer,
son of the Colonel Ransom who was killed at Chapultepec, in the
Mexican War.  He had served with the Army of the Tennessee in 1862
and 1863, at Vicksburg, where he was severely wounded.  He was not
well at the time we started from Atlanta, but he insisted on going
along with his command.  His symptoms became more aggravated on the
march, and when we were encamped near Gaylesville, I visited him in
company with Surgeon John Moors, United States Army, who said that
the case was one of typhoid fever, which would likely prove fatal.
A few days after, viz., the 28th, he was being carried on a litter
toward Rome; and as I rode from Gaylesville to Rome, I passed him
by the way, stopped, and spoke with him, but did not then suppose
he was so near his end.  The next day, however, his escort reached
Rome, bearing his dead body.  The officer in charge reported that,
shortly after I had passed, his symptoms became so much worse that
they stopped at a farmhouse by the road-side, where he died that
evening.  His body was at once sent to Chicago for burial, and a
monument has been ordered by the Society of the Army of the
Tennessee to be erected in his memory.

On the 26th of October I learned that Hood's whole army had made
its appearance about Decatur, Alabama, and at once caused a strong
reconnoissance to be made down the Coosa to near Gadsden, which
revealed the truth that the enemy was gone except a small force of
cavalry, commanded by General Wheeler, which had been left to watch
us.  I then finally resolved on my future course, which was to
leave Hood to be encountered by General Thomas, while I should
carry into full effect the long-contemplated project of marching
for the sea-coast, and thence to operate toward Richmond.  But it
was all-important to me and to our cause that General Thomas should
have an ample force, equal to any and every emergency.

He then had at Nashville about eight or ten thousand new troops,
and as many more civil employs of the Quartermaster's Department,
which were not suited for the field, but would be most useful in
manning the excellent forts that already covered Nashville.  At
Chattanooga, he had General Steedman's division, about five
thousand men, besides garrisons for Chattanooga, Bridgeport, and
Stevenson; at Murfreesboro' he also had General Rousseau's
division, which was full five thousand strong, independent of the
necessary garrisons for the railroad.  At Decatur and Huntsville,
Alabama, was the infantry division of General R. S. Granger,
estimated at four thousand; and near Florence, Alabama, watching
the crossings of the Tennessee, were General Edward Hatch's
division of cavalry, four thousand; General Croxton's brigade,
twenty-five hundred; and Colonel Capron's brigade, twelve hundred;
besides which, General J.  H.  Wilson had collected in Nashville
about ten thousand dismounted cavalry, for which he was rapidly
collecting the necessary horses for a remount.  All these
aggregated about forty-five thousand men.  General A. J. Smith at
that time was in Missouri, with the two divisions of the Sixteenth
Corps which had been diverted to that quarter to assist General
Rosecrans in driving the rebel General Price out of Missouri.  This
object had been accomplished, and these troops, numbering from
eight to ten thousand, had been ordered to Nashville.  To these I
proposed at first to add only the Fourth Corps (General Stanley),
fifteen thousand; and that corps was ordered from Gaylesville to
march to Chattanooga, and thence report for orders to General
Thomas; but subsequently, on the 30th of October, at Rome, Georgia,
learning from General Thomas that the new troops promised by
General Grant were coming forward very slowly, I concluded to
further reenforce him by General Schofield's corps (Twenty-third),
twelve thousand, which corps accordingly marched for Resaca, and
there took the cars for Chattanooga.  I then knew that General
Thomas would have an ample force with which to encounter General
Hood anywhere in the open field, besides garrisons to secure the
railroad to his rear and as far forward as Chattanooga.  And,
moreover, I was more than convinced that he would have ample time
for preparation; for, on that very day, General R. S. Granger had
telegraphed me from Decatur, Alabama:

I omitted to mention another reason why Hood will go to Tusomnbia
before crossing the Tennessee River.  He was evidently out of
supplies.  His men were all grumbling; the first thing the
prisoners asked for was something to eat.  Hood could not get any
thing if he should cross this side of Rogersville.


I knew that the country about Decatur and Tuscumbia, Alabama, was
bare of provisions, and inferred that General Hood would have to
draw his supplies, not only of food, but of stores, clothing, and
ammunition, from Mobile, Montgomery, and Selma, Alabama, by the
railroad around by Meridian and Corinth, Mississippi, which we had
most effectually disabled the previous winter.

General Hood did not make a serious attack on Decatur, but hung
around it from October 26th to the 30th, when he drew off and
marched for a point on the south side of the Tennessee River,
opposite Florence, where he was compelled to remain nearly a month,
to collect the necessary supplies for his contemplated invasion of
Tennessee and Kentucky.

The Fourth Corps (Stanley) had already reached Chattanooga, and had
been transported by rail to Pulaski, Tennessee; and General Thomas
ordered General Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, to
Columbia, Tennessee, a place intermediate between Hood (then on the
Tennessee River, opposite Florence) and Forrest, opposite
Johnsonville.

On the 31st of October General Croxton, of the cavalry, reported
that the enemy had crossed the Tennessee River four miles above
Florence, and that he had endeavored to stop him, but without
success.  Still, I was convinced that Hood's army was in no
condition to march for Nashville, and that a good deal of further
delay might reasonably be counted on.  I also rested with much
confidence on the fact that the Tennessee River below Muscle Shoals
was strongly patrolled by gunboats, and that the reach of the river
above Muscle Shoals, from Decatur as high up as our railroad at
Bridgeport, was also guarded by gunboats, so that Hood, to cross
over, would be compelled to select a point inaccessible to these
gunboats.  He actually did choose such a place, at the old
railroad-piers, four miles above Florence, Alabama, which is below
Muscle Shoals and above Colbert Shoals.

On the 31st of October Forrest made his appearance on the Tennessee
River opposite Johnsonville (whence a new railroad led to
Nashville), and with his cavalry and field pieces actually crippled
and captured two gunboats with five of our transports, a feat of
arms which, I confess, excited my admiration.

There is no doubt that the month of October closed to us looking
decidedly squally; but, somehow, I was sustained in the belief that
in a very few days the tide would turn.

On the 1st of November I telegraphed very fully to General Grant,
at City Point, who must have been disturbed by the wild rumors that
filled the country, and on the 2d of November received (at Rome)
this dispatch:

CITY POINT,  November 1, 1864--6 P.M.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north,
to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign?
With Hood's army destroyed, you can go where you please with
impunity.  I believed and still believe, if you had started south
while Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have been
forced to go after you.  Now that he is far away he might look upon
the chase as useless, and he will go in one direction while you are
pushing in the other.  If you can see a chance of destroying Hood's
army, attend to that first, and make your other move secondary.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


My answer is dated

ROME, GEORGIA, November 2, 1864.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia:

Your dispatch is received.  If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I
would turn against him with my whole force; then he would retreat
to the south west, drawing me as a decoy away from Georgia, which
is his chief object. If he ventures north of the Tennessee River, I
may turn in that direction, and endeavor to get below him on his
line of retreat; but thus far he has not gone above the Tennessee
River.  General Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent
his reaching any country in which we have an interest; and he has
orders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma, Alabama.  No
single army can catch Hood, and I am convinced the best results
will follow from our defeating Jeff. Davis's cherished plea of
making me leave Georgia by manoeuvring.  Thus far I have confined
my efforts to thwart this plan, and have reduced baggage so that I
can pick up and start in any direction; but I regard the pursuit of
Hood as useless.  Still, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee,
I will hold Decatur, and be prepared to move in that direction;
but, unless I let go of Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


By this date, under the intelligent and energetic action of Colonel
W. W. Wright, and with the labor of fifteen hundred men, the
railroad break of fifteen miles about Dalton was repaired so far as
to admit of the passage of cars, and I transferred my headquarters
to Kingston as more central; and from that place, on the same day
(November 2d), again telegraphed to General Grant:

KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 2, 1884.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia:
If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By my
movements I have thrown Beauregard (Hood) well to the west, and
Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until
the reenforcements from Missouri reach him.  We have now ample
supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta, and can stand a month's
interruption to our communications.  I do not believe the
Confederate army can reach our railroad-lines except by
cavalry-raids, and Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate
them.  I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow my
contemplated movement through Georgia.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


That same day I received, in answer to the Rome dispatch, the
following:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, November 2,1864--11.30 a.m.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch of 9 A.M. yesterday is just received.  I dispatched
you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had
worked so far north, ought to be looked upon now as the "object."
With the force, however, that you have left with General Thomas, he
must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him.

I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow
Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory.  I say,
then, go on as you propose.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General,


This was the first time that General Grant ordered the "march to
the sea," and, although many of his warm friends and admirers
insist that he was the author and projector of that march, and that
I simply executed his plans, General Grant has never, in my
opinion, thought so or said so.  The truth is fully given in an
original letter of President Lincoln, which I received at Savannah,
Georgia, and have at this instant before me, every word of which is
in his own familiar handwriting.  It is dated--


WASHINGTON, December 26, 1864.

When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was
anxious, if not fearful; but, feeling that you were the better
judge, and remembering "nothing risked, nothing gained," I did not
interfere.  Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all
yours; for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce;
and, taking the work of General Thomas into account, as it should
be taken, it is indeed a great success.  Not only does it afford
the obvious and immediate military advantages, but, in showing to
the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger
part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to
vanquish the old opposing force of the whole, Hood's army, it
brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light.  But what
next?  I suppose it will be safer if I leave General Grant and
yourself to decide.

A. LINCOLN


Of course, this judgment; made after the event, was extremely
flattering and was all I ever expected, a recognition of the truth
and of its importance.  I have often been asked, by well-meaning
friends, when the thought of that march first entered my mind.  I
knew that an army which had penetrated Georgia as far as Atlanta
could not turn back.  It must go ahead, but when, how, and where,
depended on many considerations.  As soon as Hood had shifted
across from Lovejoy's to Palmetto, I saw the move in my "mind's
eye;" and, after Jeff. Davis's speech at Palmetto, of September
26th, I was more positive in my conviction, but was in doubt as to
the time and manner.  When General Hood first struck our railroad
above Marietta, we were not ready, and I was forced to watch his
movements further, till he had "carromed" off to the west of
Decatur.  Then I was perfectly convinced, and had no longer a
shadow of doubt.  The only possible question was as to Thomas's
strength and ability to meet Hood in the open field.  I did not
suppose that General Hood, though rash, would venture to attack
fortified places like Allatoona, Resaca, Decatur, and Nashville;
but he did so, and in so doing he played into our hands perfectly.

On the 2d of November I was at Kingston, Georgia, and my four
corps--the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth--with
one division of cavalry, were strung from Rome to Atlanta.  Our
railroads and telegraph had been repaired, and I deliberately
prepared for the march to Savannah, distant three hundred miles
from Atlanta.  All the sick and wounded men had been sent back by
rail to Chattanooga; all our wagon-trains had been carefully
overhauled and loaded, so as to be ready to start on an hour's
notice, and there was no serious enemy in our front.

General Hood remained still at Florence, Alabama, occupying both
banks of the Tennessee River, busy in collecting shoes and clothing
for his men, and the necessary ammunition and stores with which to
invade Tennessee, most of which had to come from Mobile, Selma, and
Montgomery, Alabama, over railroads that were still broken.
Beauregard was at Corinth, hastening forward these necessary
preparations.

General Thomas was at Nashville, with Wilson's dismounted cavalry
and a mass of new troops and quartermaster's employs amply
sufficient to defend the place.  The Fourth and Twenty-third Corps,
under Generals Stanley and Schofield were posted at Pulaski,
Tennessee, and the cavalry of Hatch, Croxton, and Capron, were
about Florence, watching Hood.  Smith's (A. J.) two divisions of
the Sixteenth Corps were still in Missouri, but were reported as
ready to embark at Lexington for the Cumberland River and
Nashville.  Of course, General Thomas saw that on him would likely
fall the real blow, and was naturally anxious.  He still kept
Granger's division at Decatur, Rousseau's at Murfreesboro', and
Steedman's at Chattanooga, with strong railroad guards at all the
essential points intermediate, confident that by means of this very
railroad he could make his concentration sooner than Hood could
possibly march up from Florence.

Meantime, General F. P. Blair had rejoined his corps (Seventeenth),
and we were receiving at Kingston recruits and returned
furlough-men, distributing them to their proper companies.
Paymasters had come down to pay off our men before their departure to
a new sphere of action, and commissioners were also on hand from the
several States to take the vote of our men in the presidential
election then agitating the country.

On the 6th of November, at Kingston, I wrote and telegraphed to
General Grant, reviewing the whole situation, gave him my full plan
of action, stated that I was ready to march as soon as the election
was over, and appointed November 10th as the day for starting.  On
the 8th I received this dispatch:


CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, November 7, 1864-10.30 P.M.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch of this evening received.  I see no present reason
for changing your plan.  Should any arise, you will see it, or if I
do I will inform you.  I think everything here is favorable now.
Great good fortune attend you! I believe you will be eminently
successful, and, at worst, can only make a march less fruitful of
results than hoped for.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


Meantime trains of cars were whirling by, carrying to the rear an
immense amount of stores which had accumulated at Atlanta, and at
the other stations along the railroad; and General Steedman had
come down to Kingston, to take charge of the final evacuation and
withdrawal of the several garrisons below Chattanooga.

On the 10th of November the movement may be said to have fairly
begun.  All the troops designed for the campaign were ordered to
march for Atlanta, and General Corse, before evacuating his post at
Rome, was ordered to burn all the mills, factories, etc., etc.,
that could be useful to the enemy, should he undertake to pursue
us, or resume military possession of the country.  This was done on
the night of the 10th, and next day Corse reached Kingston.  On the
11th General Thomas and I interchanged full dispatches.  He had
heard of the arrival of General A. J. Smith's two divisions at
Paducah, which would surely reach Nashville much sooner than
General Hood could possibly do from Florence, so that he was
perfectly satisfied with his share of the army.

On the 12th, with a full staff, I started from Kingston for
Atlanta; and about noon of that day we reached Cartersville, and
sat on the edge of a porch to rest, when the telegraph operator,
Mr. Van Valkenburg, or Eddy, got the wire down from the poles to
his lap, in which he held a small pocket instrument.  Calling
"Chattanooga," he received this message from General Thomas,
dated--


NASHVILLE, November 12, 1884--8.80 A.M.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch of twelve o'clock last night is received.  I have no
fears that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and, if he attempts
to follow you, I will follow him as far as possible.  If he does
not follow you, I will then thoroughly organize my troops, and
believe I shall have men enough to ruin him unless he gets out of
the way very rapidly.

The country of Middle Alabama, I learn, is teeming with supplies
this year, which will be greatly to our advantage.  I have no
additional news to report from the direction of Florence.
I am now convinced that the greater part of Beauregard's army is
near Florence and Tuscumbia, and that you will have at least a
clear road before you for several days, and that your success will
fully equal your expectations.

George H.  THOMAS, Major-General.


I answered simply: "Dispatch received--all right."  About that
instant of time, some of our men burnt a bridge, which severed the
telegraph-wire, and all communication with the rear ceased
thenceforth.

As we rode on toward Atlanta that night, I remember the railroad-
trains going to the rear with a furious speed; the engineers and
the few men about the trains waving us an affectionate adieu.  It
surely was a strange event--two hostile armies marching in opposite
directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final
and conclusive result in a great war; and I was strongly inspired
with the feeling that the movement on our part was a direct attack
upon the rebel army and the rebel capital at Richmond, though a
full thousand miles of hostile country intervened, and that, for
better or worse, it would end the war.




CHAPTER XXI.

THE MARCH TO THE SEA FROM ATLANTA TO SAVANNAH.

NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1864.


On the 12th of November the railroad and telegraph communications
with the rear were broken, and the army stood detached from all
friends, dependent on its own resources and supplies.  No time was
to be lost; all the detachments were ordered to march rapidly for
Atlanta, breaking up the railroad en route, and generally to so
damage the country as to make it untenable to the enemy.  By the
14th all the troops had arrived at or near Atlanta, and were,
according to orders, grouped into two wings, the right and left,
commanded respectively by Major-Generals O. O. Howard and H. W.
Slocum, both comparatively young men, but educated and experienced
officers, fully competent to their command.

The right wing was composed of the Fifteenth Corps, Major-General
P. J. Osterhaus commanding, and the Seventeenth Corps,
Major-General Frank P. Blair commanding.

The left wing was composed of the Fourteenth Corps, Major-General
Jefferson C. Davis commanding, and the Twentieth Corps,
Brigadier-General A. S. Williams commanding.

The Fifteenth Corps had four divisions, commanded by
Brigadier-Generals Charles R. Woods, W. B. Hazen, John E. Smith,
and John M. Gorse.

The Seventeenth Corps had three divisions, commanded by
Major-General J. A. Mower, and Brigadier-Generals M. D. Leggett
and Giles A. Smith.

The Fourteenth Corps had three divisions, commanded by
Brigadier-Generals W. P. Carlin, James D. Morgan, and A. Baird.

The Twentieth Corps had also three divisions, commanded by
Brigadier-Generals N. J. Jackson, John W. Geary, and W. T. Ward.

The cavalry division was held separate, subject to my own orders.
It was commanded by Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick, and was
composed of two brigades, commanded by Colonels Eli H. Murray, of
Kentucky, and Smith D. Atkins, of Illinois.

The strength of the army, as officially reported, is given in the
following tables, and shows an aggregate of fifty-five thousand
three hundred and twenty-nine infantry, five thousand and
sixty-three cavalry, and eighteen hundred and twelve artillery in
all, sixty-two thousand two hundred and four officers and men.

The most extraordinary efforts had been made to purge this army of
non-combatants and of sick men, for we knew well that there was to
be no place of safety save with the army itself; our wagons were
loaded with ammunition, provisions, and forage, and we could ill
afford to haul even sick men in the ambulances, so that all on this
exhibit may be assumed to have been able-bodied, experienced
soldiers, well armed, well equipped and provided, as far as human
foresight could, with all the essentials of life, strength, and
vigorous action.

The two general orders made for this march appear to me, even at
this late day, so clear, emphatic, and well-digested, that no
account of that historic event is perfect without them, and I give
them entire, even at the seeming appearance of repetition; and,
though they called for great sacrifice and labor on the part of the
officers and men, I insist that these orders were obeyed as well as
any similar orders ever were, by an army operating wholly in an
enemy's country, and dispersed, as we necessarily were, during the
subsequent period of nearly six months.


[Special Field Orders, No. 119.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 8, 1864

The general commanding deems it proper at this time to inform the
officers and men of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Twentieth Corps, that he has organized them into an army for a
special purpose, well known to the War Department and to General
Grant.  It is sufficient for you to know that it involves a
departure from our present base, and a long and difficult march to
a new one.  All the chances of war have been considered and
provided for, as far as human sagacity can.  All he asks of you is
to maintain that discipline, patience, and courage, which have
characterized you in the past; and he hopes, through you, to strike
a blow at our enemy that will have a material effect in producing
what we all so much desire, his complete overthrow.  Of all things,
the most important is, that the men, during marches and in camp,
keep their places and do not scatter about as stragglers or
foragers, to be picked up by a hostile people in detail.  It is
also of the utmost importance that our wagons should not be loaded
with any thing but provisions and ammunition.  All surplus
servants, noncombatants, and refugees, should now go to the rear,
and none should be encouraged to encumber us on the march.  At some
future time we will be able to provide for the poor whites and
blacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they are now
suffering.  With these few simple cautions, he hopes to lead you to
achievements equal in importance to those of the past.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,
L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.




[Special Field Orders, No. 120.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 9, 1864


1.  For the purpose of military operations, this army is divided
into two wings viz.:

The right wing, Major-General O. O. Howard commanding, composed of
the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, Major-General
H. W. Slocum commanding, composed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth
Corps.

2.  The habitual order of march will be, wherever practicable, by
four roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at
points hereafter to be indicated in orders.  The cavalry,
Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive special
orders from the commander-in-chief.

3.  There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps will
have its ammunition-train and provision-train, distributed
habitually as follows: Behind each regiment should follow one wagon
and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due
proportion of ammunition-wagons, provision-wagons, and ambulances.
In case of danger, each corps commander should change this order of
march, by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered by
wheels.  The separate columns will start habitually at 7 a.m., and
make about fifteen miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders.

4.  The army will forage liberally on the country during the march.
To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and
sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more
discreet officers, who will gather, near the route traveled, corn
or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, or
whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in
the wagons at least ten days' provisions for his command, and three
days' forage.  Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the
inhabitants, or commit any trespass; but, during a halt or camp,
they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other
vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp.  To
regular foraging-parties must be intrusted the gathering of
provisions and forage, at any distance from the road traveled.

6.  To corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to destroy
mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc.; and for them this general
principle is laid down:

In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no
destruction of each property should be permitted; but should
guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the
inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest
local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a
devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of
such hostility.

6.  As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the
inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and
without limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are
usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or
friendly.  Foraging-parties may also take mules or horses, to
replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as
pack-mules for the regiments or brigades.  In all foraging, of
whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or
threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks
proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts;
and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable
portion for their maintenance,

7.  Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the
several columns may be taken along; but each army commander will
bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one,
and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms.

8.  The organization, at once, of a good pioneer battalion for each
army corps, composed if possible of negroes, should be attended to.
This battalion should follow the advance-guard, repair roads and
double them if possible, so that the columns will not be delayed
after reaching bad places.  Also, army commanders should practise
the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, marching
their troops on one side, and instruct their troops to assist
wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams.

9.  Captain O. M. Poe, chief-engineer, will assign to each wing of
the army a pontoon-train, fully equipped and organized; and the
commanders thereof will see to their being properly protected at
all times.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.


The greatest possible attention had been given to the artillery and
wagon trains.  The number of guns had been reduced to sixty-five,
or about one gun to each thousand men, and these were generally in
batteries of four guns each.

Each gun, caisson, and forges was drawn by four teams of horses.
We had in all about twenty-five hundred wagons, with teams of six
mules to each, and six hundred ambulances, with two horses to each.
The loads were made comparatively light, about twenty-five hundred
pounds net; each wagon carrying in addition the forage needed by
its own team: Each soldier carried on his person forty rounds of
ammunition, and in the wagons were enough cartridges to make up
about two hundred rounds per man, and in like manner two hundred
rounds of assorted ammunition were carried for each gun.

The wagon-trains were divided equally between the four corps, so
that each had about eight hundred wagons, and these usually on the
march occupied five miles or more of road.  Each corps commander
managed his own train; and habitually the artillery and wagons had
the road, while the men, with the exception of the advance and rear
guards, pursued paths improvised by the aide of the wagons, unless
they were forced to use a bridge or causeway in common.

I reached Atlanta during the afternoon of the 14th, and found that
all preparations had been made-Colonel Beckwith, chief commissary,
reporting one million two hundred thousand rations in possession of
the troops, which was about twenty days' supply, and he had on hand
a good supply of beef-cattle to be driven along on the hoof.  Of
forage, the supply was limited, being of oats and corn enough for
five days, but I knew that within that time we would reach a
country well stocked with corn, which had been gathered and stored
in cribs, seemingly for our use, by Governor Brown's militia.

Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, of my staff, had been busy in
his special task of destruction.  He had a large force at work, had
leveled the great depot, round house, and the machine-shops of the
Georgia Railroad, and had applied fire to the wreck.  One of these
machine-shops had been used by the rebels as an arsenal, and in it
were stored piles of shot and shell, some of which proved to be
loaded, and that night was made hideous by the bursting of shells,
whose fragments came uncomfortably, near Judge Lyon's house, in
which I was quartered. The fire also reached the block of stores
near the depot, and the heart of the city was in flames all night,
but the fire did not reach the parts of Atlanta where the
court-house was, or the great mass of dwelling houses.

The march from Atlanta began on the morning of November 15th, the
right wing and cavalry following the railroad southeast toward
Jonesboro', and General Slocum with the Twentieth Corps leading off
to the east by Decatur and Stone Mountain, toward Madison.  These
were divergent lines, designed to threaten both Mason and Augusta
at the same time, so as to prevent a concentration at our intended
destination, or "objective," Milledgeville, the capital of Georgia,
distant southeast about one hundred miles.  The time allowed each
column for reaching Milledgeville was seven days.  I remained in
Atlanta during the 15th with the Fourteenth Corps, and the
rear-guard of the right wing, to complete the loading of the trains,
and the destruction of the buildings of Atlanta which could be
converted to hostile uses, and on the morning of the 16th started
with my personal staff, a company of Alabama cavalry, commanded by
Lieutenant Snelling, and an infantry company, commanded by Lieutenant
McCrory, which guarded our small train of wagons.

My staff was then composed of Major L. M. Dayton, aide-de-camp and
acting adjutant-general, Major J. C. McCoy, and Major J. C.
Audenried, aides.  Major Ward Nichols had joined some weeks before
at Gaylesville, Alabama, and was attached as an acting
aide-de-camp.  Also Major Henry Hitchcock had joined at the same
time as judge-advocate.  Colonel Charles Ewing was
inspector-general, and Surgeon John Moore medical director.  These
constituted our mess.  We had no tents, only the flies, with which
we nightly made bivouacs with the assistance of the abundant
pine-boughs, which made excellent shelter, as well as beds.

Colonel L. C. Easton was chief-quartermaster; Colonel Amos
Beckwith, chief-commissary; Colonel O. M. Poe, chief-engineer; and
Colonel T. G. Baylor, chief of ordnance.  These invariably rode
with us during the day, but they had a separate camp and mess at
night.

General William F.  Barry had been chief of artillery in the
previous campaign, but at Kingston his face was so swollen with
erysipelas that he was reluctantly compelled to leave us for the
rear; and he could not, on recovering, rejoin us till we had
reached Savannah.

About 7 a.m. of November 16th we rode out of Atlanta by the Decatur
road, filled by the marching troops and wagons of the Fourteenth
Corps; and reaching the hill, just outside of the old rebel works,
we naturally paused to look back upon the scenes of our past
battles.  We stood upon the very ground whereon was fought the
bloody battle of July 22d, and could see the copse of wood where
McPherson fell.  Behind us lay Atlanta, smouldering and in ruins,
the black smoke rising high in air, and hanging like a pall over
the ruined city.  Away off in the distance, on the McDonough road,
was the rear of Howard's column, the gun-barrels glistening in the
sun, the white-topped wagons stretching away to the south; and
right before us the Fourteenth Corps, marching steadily and
rapidly, with a cheery look and swinging pace, that made light of
the thousand miles that lay between us and Richmond.  Some band, by
accident, struck up the anthem of "John Brown's soul goes marching
on;" the men caught up the strain, and never before or since have I
heard the chorus of "Glory, glory, hallelujah!" done with more
spirit, or in better harmony of time and place.

Then we turned our horses' heads to the east; Atlanta was soon lost
behind the screen of trees, and became a thing of the past.  Around
it clings many a thought of desperate battle, of hope and fear,
that now seem like the memory of a dream; and I have never seen the
place since.  The day was extremely beautiful, clear sunlight, with
bracing air, and an unusual feeling of exhilaration seemed to
pervade all minds--a feeling of something to come, vague and
undefined, still full of venture and intense interest.  Even the
common soldiers caught the inspiration, and many a group called out
to me as I worked my way past them, "Uncle Billy, I guess Grant is
waiting for us at Richmond!"  Indeed, the general sentiment was
that we were marching for Richmond, and that there we should end
the war, but how and when they seemed to care not; nor did they
measure the distance, or count the cost in life, or bother their
brains about the great rivers to be crossed, and the food required
for man and beast, that had to be gathered by the way.  There was a
"devil-may-care" feeling pervading officers and men, that made me
feel the full load of responsibility, for success would be accepted
as a matter of course, whereas, should we fail, this "march" would
be adjudged the wild adventure of a crazy fool.  I had no purpose
to march direct for Richmond by way of Augusta and Charlotte, but
always designed to reach the sea-coast first at Savannah or Port
Royal, South Carolina, and even kept in mind the alternative of
Pensacola.

The first night out we camped by the road-side near Lithonia.
Stone Mountain, a mass of granite, was in plain view, cut out in
clear outline against the blue sky; the whole horizon was lurid
with the bonfires of rail-ties, and groups of men all night were
carrying the heated rails to the nearest trees, and bending them
around the trunks.  Colonel Poe had provided tools for ripping up
the rails and twisting them when hot; but the best and easiest way
is the one I have described, of heating the middle of the
iron-rails on bonfires made of the cross-ties, and then winding
them around a telegraph-pole or the trunk of some convenient
sapling.  I attached much importance to this destruction of the
railroad, gave it my own personal attention, and made reiterated
orders to others on the subject.

The next day we passed through the handsome town of Covington, the
soldiers closing up their ranks, the color-bearers unfurling their
flags, and the bands striking up patriotic airs.  The white people
came out of their houses to behold the sight, spite of their deep
hatred of the invaders, and the negroes were simply frantic with
joy.  Whenever they heard my name, they clustered about my horse,
shouted and prayed in their peculiar style, which had a natural
eloquence that would have moved a stone.  I have witnessed
hundreds, if not thousands, of such scenes; and can now see a poor
girl, in the very ecstasy of the Methodist "shout," hugging the
banner of one of the regiments, and jumping up to the "feet of
Jesus."

I remember, when riding around by a by-street in Covington, to
avoid the crowd that followed the marching column, that some one
brought me an invitation to dine with a sister of Sam. Anderson,
who was a cadet at West Point with me; but the messenger reached me
after we had passed the main part of the town.  I asked to be
excused, and rode on to a place designated for camp, at the
crossing of the Ulcofauhachee River, about four miles to the east
of the town.  Here we made our bivouac, and I walked up to a
plantation-house close by, where were assembled many negroes, among
them an old, gray-haired man, of as fine a head as I ever saw.  I
asked him if he understood about the war and its progress.  He said
he did; that he had been looking for the "angel of the Lord" ever
since he was knee-high, and, though we professed to be fighting for
the Union, he supposed that slavery was the cause, and that our
success was to be his freedom.  I asked him if all the negro slaves
comprehended this fact, and he said they surely did.  I then
explained to him that we wanted the slaves to remain where they
were, and not to load us down with useless mouths, which would eat
up the food needed for our fighting men; that our success was their
assured freedom; that we could receive a few of their young, hearty
men as pioneers; but that, if they followed us in swarms of old and
young, feeble and helpless, it would simply load us down and
cripple us in our great task.  I think Major Henry Hitchcock was
with me on that occasion, and made a note of the conversation, and
I believe that old man spread this message to the slaves, which was
carried from mouth to mouth, to the very end of our journey, and
that it in part saved us from the great danger we incurred of
swelling our numbers so that famine would have attended our
progress.  It was at this very plantation that a soldier passed me
with a ham on his musket, a jug of sorghum-molasses under his arm,
and a big piece of honey in his hand, from which he was eating,
and, catching my eye, he remarked sotto voce and carelessly to a
comrade, "Forage liberally on the country," quoting from my general
orders.  On this occasion, as on many others that fell under my
personal observation, I reproved the man, explained that foraging
must be limited to the regular parties properly detailed, and that
all provisions thus obtained must be delivered to the regular
commissaries, to be fairly distributed to the men who kept their
ranks.

From Covington the Fourteenth Corps (Davis's), with which I was
traveling, turned to the right for Milledgeville, via Shady Dale.
General Slocum was ahead at Madison, with the Twentieth Corps,
having torn up the railroad as far as that place, and thence had
sent Geary's division on to the Oconee, to burn the bridges across
that stream, when this corps turned south by Eatonton, for
Milledgeville, the common "objective" for the first stage of the
"march."  We found abundance of corn, molasses, meal, bacon, and
sweet-potatoes.  We also took a good many cows and oxen, and a
large number of mules.  In all these the country was quite rich,
never before having been visited by a hostile army; the recent crop
had been excellent, had been just gathered and laid by for the
winter.  As a rule, we destroyed none, but kept our wagons full,
and fed our teams bountifully.

The skill and success of the men in collecting forage was one of
the features of this march.  Each brigade commander had authority
to detail a company of foragers, usually about fifty men, with one
or two commissioned officers selected for their boldness and
enterprise.  This party would be dispatched before daylight with a
knowledge of the intended day's march and camp; would proceed on
foot five or six miles from the route traveled by their brigade,
and then visit every plantation and farm within range.  They would
usually procure a wagon or family carriage, load it with bacon,
corn-meal, turkeys, chickens, ducks, and every thing that could be
used as food or forage, and would then regain the main road,
usually in advance of their train.  When this came up, they would
deliver to the brigade commissary the supplies thus gathered by the
way.  Often would I pass these foraging-parties at the roadside,
waiting for their wagons to come up, and was amused at their
strange collections--mules, horses, even cattle, packed with old
saddles and loaded with hams, bacon, bags of cornmeal, and poultry
of every character and description.  Although this foraging was
attended with great danger and hard work, there seemed to be a
charm about it that attracted the soldiers, and it was a privilege
to be detailed on such a party.  Daily they returned mounted on all
sorts of beasts, which were at once taken from them and
appropriated to the general use; but the next day they would start
out again on foot, only to repeat the experience of the day before.
No doubt, many acts of pillage, robbery, and violence, were
committed by these parties of foragers, usually called "bummers;"
for I have since heard of jewelry taken from women, and the plunder
of articles that never reached the commissary; but these acts were
exceptional and incidental.  I never heard of any cases of murder
or rape; and no army could have carried along sufficient food and
forage for a march of three hundred miles; so that foraging in some
shape was necessary.  The country was sparsely settled, with no
magistrates or civil authorities who could respond to requisitions,
as is done in all the wars of Europe; so that this system of
foraging was simply indispensable to our success.  By it our men
were well supplied with all the essentials of life and health,
while the wagons retained enough in case of unexpected delay, and
our animals were well fed.  Indeed, when we reached Savannah, the
trains were pronounced by experts to be the finest in flesh and
appearance ever seen with any army.

Habitually each corps followed some main road, and the foragers,
being kept out on the exposed flank, served all the military uses
of flankers.  The main columns gathered, by the roads traveled,
much forage and food, chiefly meat, corn, and sweet-potatoes, and
it was the duty of each division and brigade quartermaster to fill
his wagons as fast as the contents were issued to the troops.  The
wagon-trains had the right to the road always, but each wagon was
required to keep closed up, so as to leave no gaps in the column.
If for any purpose any wagon or group of wagons dropped out of
place, they had to wait for the rear.  And this was always dreaded,
for each brigade commander wanted his train up at camp as soon
after reaching it with his men as possible.

I have seen much skill and industry displayed by these
quarter-masters on the march, in trying to load their wagons with
corn and fodder by the way without losing their place in column.
They would, while marching, shift the loads of wagons, so as to have
six or ten of them empty.  Then, riding well ahead, they would secure
possession of certain stacks of fodder near the road, or cribs of
corn, leave some men in charge, then open fences and a road back for
a couple of miles, return to their trains, divert the empty wagons
out of column, and conduct them rapidly to their forage, load up and
regain their place in column without losing distance. On one occasion
I remember to have seen ten or a dozen wagons thus loaded with corn
from two or three full cribs, almost without halting.  These cribs
were built of logs, and roofed.  The train-guard, by a lever, had
raised the whole side of the crib a foot or two; the wagons drove
close alongside, and the men in the cribs, lying on their backs,
kicked out a wagon-load of corn in the time I have taken to describe
it.

In a well-ordered and well-disciplined army, these things might be
deemed irregular, but I am convinced that the ingenuity of these
younger officers accomplished many things far better than I could
have ordered, and the marches were thus made, and the distances
were accomplished, in the most admirable way.  Habitually we
started from camp at the earliest break of dawn, and usually
reached camp soon after noon.  The marches varied from ten to
fifteen miles a day, though sometimes on extreme flanks it was
necessary to make as much as twenty, but the rate of travel was
regulated by the wagons; and, considering the nature of the roads,
fifteen miles per day was deemed the limit.

The pontoon-trains were in like manner distributed in about equal
proportions to the four corps, giving each a section of about nine
hundred feet.  The pontoons were of the skeleton pattern, with
cotton-canvas covers, each boat, with its proportion of balks and
cheeses, constituting a load for one wagon.  By uniting two such
sections together, we could make a bridge of eighteen hundred feet,
enough for any river we had to traverse; but habitually the leading
brigade would, out of the abundant timber, improvise a bridge
before the pontoon-train could come up, unless in the cases of
rivers of considerable magnitude, such as the Ocmulgee, Oconee,
Ogeechee, Savannah, etc.

On the 20th of November I was still with the Fourteenth Corps, near
Eatonton Factory, waiting to hear of the Twentieth Corps; and on
the 21st we camped near the house of a man named Mann; the next
day, about 4 p.m., General Davis had halted his head of column on a
wooded ridge, overlooking an extensive slope of cultivated country,
about ten miles short of Milledgeville, and was deploying his
troops for camp when I got up.  There was a high, raw wind blowing,
and I asked him why he had chosen so cold and bleak a position.  He
explained that he had accomplished his full distance for the day,
and had there an abundance of wood and water.  He explained further
that his advance-guard was a mile or so ahead; so I rode on, asking
him to let his rear division, as it came up, move some distance
ahead into the depression or valley beyond.  Riding on some
distance to the border of a plantation, I turned out of the main
road into a cluster of wild-plum bushes, that broke the force of
the cold November wind, dismounted, and instructed the staff to
pick out the place for our camp.

The afternoon was unusually raw and cold.  My orderly was at hand
with his invariable saddle-bags, which contained a change of
under-clothing, my maps, a flask of whiskey, and bunch of cigars.
Taking a drink and lighting a cigar, I walked to a row of
negro-huts close by, entered one and found a soldier or two warming
themselves by a wood-fire.  I took their place by the fire,
intending to wait there till our wagons had got up, and a camp made
for the night.  I was talking to the old negro woman, when some one
came and explained to me that, if I would come farther down the
road, I could find a better place.  So I started on foot, and found
on the main road a good double-hewed-log house, in one room of
which Colonel Poe, Dr. Moore, and others, had started a fire.  I
sent back orders to the "plum-bushes" to bring our horses and
saddles up to this house, and an orderly to conduct our headquarter
wagons to the same place.  In looking around the room, I saw a
small box, like a candle-box, marked "Howell Cobb," and, on
inquiring of a negro, found that we were at the plantation of
General Howell Cobb, of Georgia, one of the leading rebels of the
South, then a general in the Southern army, and who had been
Secretary of the United States Treasury in Mr. Buchanan's time.  Of
course, we confiscated his property, and found it rich in corn,
beans, pea-nuts, and sorghum-molasses.  Extensive fields were all
round the house; I sent word back to General David to explain whose
plantation it was, and instructed him to spare nothing.  That night
huge bonfires consumed the fence-rails, kept our soldiers warm, and
the teamsters and men, as well as the slaves, carried off an
immense quantity of corn and provisions of all sorts.

In due season the headquarter wagons came up, and we got supper.
After supper I sat on a chair astride, with my back to a good fire,
musing, and became conscious that an old negro, with a
tallow-candle in his hand, was scanning my face closely.  I inquired,
"What do you want, old man!"  He answered, "Dey say you is Massa
Sherman."  I answered that such was the case, and inquired what he
wanted.  He only wanted to look at me, and kept muttering, "Dis
nigger can't sleep dis night."  I asked him why he trembled so, and
he said that he wanted to be sure that we were in fact "Yankees,"
for on a former occasion some rebel cavalry had put on light-blue
overcoats, personating Yankee troops, and many of the negroes were
deceived thereby, himself among the number had shown them sympathy,
and had in consequence been unmercifully beaten therefor.  This
time he wanted to be certain before committing himself; so I told
him to go out on the porch, from which he could see the whole
horizon lit up with camp-fires, and he could then judge whether he
had ever seen any thing like it before.  The old man became
convinced that the "Yankees" had come at last, about whom he had
been dreaming all his life; and some of the staff officers gave him
a strong drink of whiskey, which set his tongue going.  Lieutenant
Spelling, who commanded my escort, was a Georgian, and recognized
in this old negro a favorite slave of his uncle, who resided about
six miles off; but the old slave did not at first recognize his
young master in our uniform.  One of my staff-officers asked him
what had become of his young master, George.  He did not know, only
that he had gone off to the war, and he supposed him killed, as a
matter of course.  His attention was then drawn to Spelling's face,
when he fell on his knees and thanked God that he had found his
young master alive and along with the Yankees.  Spelling inquired
all about his uncle and the family, asked my permission to go and
pay his uncle a visit, which I granted, of course, and the next
morning he described to me his visit.  The uncle was not cordial,
by any means, to find his nephew in the ranks of the host that was
desolating the land, and Spelling came back, having exchanged his
tired horse for a fresher one out of his uncle's stables,
explaining that surely some of the "bummers" would have got the
horse had he not.

The next morning, November 23d, we rode into Milledgeville, the
capital of the State, whither the Twentieth Corps had preceded us;
and during that day the left wing was all united, in and around
Milledgeville.  From the inhabitants we learned that some of
Kilpatrick's cavalry had preceded us by a couple of days, and that
all of the right wing was at and near Gordon, twelve miles off,
viz., the place where the branch railroad came to Milledgeville
from the Mason & Savannah road.  The first stage of the journey
was, therefore, complete, and absolutely successful.

General Howard soon reported by letter the operations of his right
wing, which, on leaving Atlanta, had substantially followed the two
roads toward Mason, by Jonesboro' and McDonough, and reached the
Ocmulgee at Planters' Factory, which they crossed, by the aid of
the pontoon-train, during the 18th and 19th of November.  Thence,
with the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair's) he (General Howard)
had marched via Monticello toward Gordon, having dispatched
Kilpatrick's cavalry, supported by the Fifteenth Corps
(Osterhaus's), to feign on Mason.  Kilpatrick met the enemy's
cavalry about four miles out of Mason, and drove them rapidly back
into the bridge-defenses held by infantry.  Kilpatrick charged
these, got inside the parapet, but could not hold it, and retired
to his infantry supports, near Griswold Station.  The Fifteenth
Corps tore up the railroad-track eastward from Griswold, leaving
Charles R.  Wood's division behind as a rear-guard-one brigade of
which was intrenched across the road, with some of Kilpatrick's
cavalry on the flanks.  On the 22d of November General G. W. Smith,
with a division of troops, came out of Mason, attacked this brigade
(Walcutt's) in position, and was handsomely repulsed and driven
back into Mason.  This brigade was in part armed with Spencer
repeating-rifles, and its fire was so rapid that General Smith
insists to this day that he encountered a whole division; but he is
mistaken; he was beaten by one brigade (Walcutt's), and made no
further effort to molest our operations from that direction.
General Walcutt was wounded in the leg, and had to ride the rest of
the distance to Savannah in a carriage.

Therefore, by the 23d, I was in Milledgeville with the left wing,
and was in full communication with the right wing at Gordon.  The
people of Milledgeville remained at home, except the Governor
(Brown), the State officers, and Legislature, who had ignominiously
fled, in the utmost disorder and confusion; standing not on the
order of their going, but going at once--some by rail, some by
carriages, and many on foot.  Some of the citizens who remained
behind described this flight of the "brave and patriotic" Governor
Brown.  He had occupied a public building known as the "Governor's
Mansion," and had hastily stripped it of carpets, curtains, and
furniture of all sorts, which were removed to a train of
freight-cars, which carried away these things--even the cabbages and
vegetables from his kitchen and cellar--leaving behind muskets,
ammunition, and the public archives.  On arrival at Milledgeville I
occupied the same public mansion, and was soon overwhelmed with
appeals for protection.  General Slocum had previously arrived with
the Twentieth Corps, had taken up his quarters at the Milledgeville
Hotel, established a good provost-guard, and excellent order was
maintained.  The most frantic appeals had been made by the Governor
and Legislature for help from every quarter, and the people of the
State had been called out en masse to resist and destroy the invaders
of their homes and firesides.  Even the prisoners and convicts of the
penitentiary were released on condition of serving as soldiers, and
the cadets were taken from their military college for the same
purpose.  These constituted a small battalion, under General Harry
Wayne, a former officer of the United States Army, and son of the
then Justice Wayne of the Supreme Court.  But these hastily retreated
east across the Oconee River, leaving us a good bridge, which we
promptly secured.


At Milledgeville we found newspapers from all the South, and
learned the consternation which had filled the Southern mind at our
temerity; many charging that we were actually fleeing for our lives
and seeking safety at the hands of our fleet on the sea-coast.  All
demanded that we should be assailed, "front, flank, and rear;" that
provisions should be destroyed in advance, so that we would starve;
that bridges should be burned, roads obstructed, and no mercy shown
us.  Judging from the tone of the Southern press of that day, the
outside world must have supposed us ruined and lost.  I give a few
of these appeals as samples, which to-day must sound strange to the
parties who made them:


Corinth, Mississippi, November 18, 1884.

To the People of Georgia:


Arise for the defense of your native soil!  Rally around your
patriotic Governor and gallant soldiers!  Obstruct and destroy all
the roads in Sherman's front, flank, and rear, and his army will
soon starve in your midst. Be confident.  Be resolute.  Trust in an
overruling Providence, and success will soon crown your efforts.  I
hasten to join you in the defense of your homes and firesides.

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD.



RICHMOND, November 18, 1884.

To the People of Georgia:

You have now the best opportunity ever yet presented to destroy the
enemy.  Put every thing at the disposal of our generals; remove all
provisions from the path of the invader, and put all obstructions
in his path.

Every citizen with his gun, and every negro with his spade and axe,
can do the work of a soldier.  You can destroy the enemy by
retarding his march.

Georgians, be firm!  Act promptly, and fear not!

B. H. Hill, Senator.

I most cordially approve the above.
James A. SEDDON, Secretary of War.



Richmond, November 19,1864.

To the People of Georgia:


We have had a special conference with President Davis and the
Secretary of War, and are able to assure you that they have done
and are still doing all that can be done to meet the emergency that
presses upon you.  Let every man fly to arms! Remove your negroes,
horses, cattle, and provisions from Sherman's army, and burn what
you cannot carry.  Burn all bridges, and block up the roads in his
route.  Assail the invader in front, flank, and rear, by night and
by day.  Let him have no rest.

JULIAN HARTRIDGE
MARK BLANDFORD,
J. H. ECHOLS
GEO. N. LESTER
JOHN T. SHUEMAKER
JAS. M. SMITH,

Members of Congress.


Of course, we were rather amused than alarmed at these threats, and
made light of the feeble opposition offered to our progress.  Some
of the officers (in the spirit of mischief) gathered together in
the vacant hall of Representatives, elected a Speaker, and
constituted themselves the Legislature of the State of Georgia!  A
proposition was made to repeal the ordinance of secession, which
was well debated, and resulted in its repeal by a fair vote!  I was
not present at these frolics, but heard of them at the time, and
enjoyed the joke.

Meantime orders were made for the total destruction of the arsenal
and its contents, and of such public buildings as could be easily
converted to hostile uses.  But little or no damage was done to
private property, and General Slocum, with my approval, spared
several mills, and many thousands of bales of cotton, taking what
he knew to be worthless bonds, that the cotton should not be used
for the Confederacy.  Meantime the right wing continued its
movement along the railroad toward Savannah, tearing up the track
and destroying its iron.  At the Oconee was met a feeble resistance
from Harry Wayne's troops, but soon the pontoon-bridge was laid,
and that wing crossed over.  Gilpatrick's cavalry was brought into
Milledgeville, and crossed the Oconee by the bridge near the town;
and on the 23d I made the general orders for the next stage of the
march as far as Millen.  These were, substantially, for the right
wing to follow the Savannah Railroad, by roads on its south; the
left wing was to move to Sandersville, by Davisboro' and
Louisville, while the cavalry was ordered by a circuit to the
north, and to march rapidly for Millen, to rescue our prisoners of
war confined there.  The distance was about a hundred miles.

General Wheeler, with his division of rebel cavalry, had succeeded
in getting ahead of us between Milledgeville and Augusta, and
General P. J. Hardee had been dispatched by General Beauregard from
Hood's army to oppose our progress directly in front.  He had,
however, brought with him no troops, but relied on his influence
with the Georgians (of whose State he was a native) to arouse the
people, and with them to annihilate Sherman's army!

On the 24th we renewed the march, and I accompanied the Twentieth
Corps, which took the direct road to Sandersville, which we reached
simultaneously with the Fourteenth Corps, on the 26th.  A brigade
of rebel cavalry was deployed before the town, and was driven in
and through it by our skirmish-line.  I myself saw the rebel cavalry
apply fire to stacks of fodder standing in the fields at
Sandersville, and gave orders to burn some unoccupied dwellings
close by.  On entering the town, I told certain citizens (who would
be sure to spread the report) that, if the enemy attempted to carry
out their threat to burn their food, corn, and fodder, in our
route, I would most undoubtedly execute to the letter the general
orders of devastation made at the outset of the campaign.  With
this exception, and one or two minor cases near Savannah, the
people did not destroy food, for they saw clearly that it would be
ruin to themselves.

At Sandersville I halted the left wing until I heard that the right
wing was abreast of us on the railroad.  During the evening a negro
was brought to me, who had that day been to the station (Tenille),
about six miles south of the town.  I inquired of him if there were
any Yankees there, and he answered, "Yes."  He described in his own
way what he had seen.

"First, there come along some cavalry-men, and they burned the
depot; then come along some infantry-men, and they tore up the
track, and burned it;" and just before he left they had "sot fire
to the well."

The next morning, viz., the 27th, I rode down to the station, and
found General Corse's division (of the Fifteenth Corps) engaged in
destroying the railroad, and saw the well which my negro informant
had seen "burnt."  It was a square pit about twenty-five feet deep,
boarded up, with wooden steps leading to the bottom, wherein was a
fine copper pump, to lift the water to a tank above.  The soldiers
had broken up the pump, heaved in the steps and lining, and set
fire to the mass of lumber in the bottom of the well, which
corroborated the negro's description.

From this point Blair's corps, the Seventeenth, took up the work of
destroying the railroad, the Fifteenth Corps following another road
leading eastward, farther to the south of the railroad.  While the
left wing was marching toward Louisville, north of the railroad,
General Kilpatrick had, with his cavalry division, moved rapidly
toward Waynesboro', on the branch railroad leading from Millen to
Augusta.  He found Wheeler's division of rebel cavalry there, and
had considerable skirmishing with it; but, learning that our
prisoners had been removed two days before from Millen, he returned
to Louisville on the 29th, where he found the left wing.  Here he
remained a couple of days to rest his horses, and, receiving orders
from me to engage Wheeler and give him all the fighting he wanted,
he procured from General Slocum the assistance of the infantry
division of General Baird, and moved back for Waynesboro' on the 2d
of December, the remainder of the left wing continuing its march on
toward Millers.  Near Waynesboro' Wheeler was again encountered,
and driven through the town and beyond Brier Creek, toward Augusta,
thus keeping up the delusion that the main army was moving toward
Augusta.  General Kilpatrick's fighting and movements about
Waynesboro' and Brier Creek were spirited, and produced a good
effect by relieving the infantry column and the wagon-trains of all
molestation during their march on Millen.  Having thus covered that
flank, he turned south and followed the movement of the Fourteenth
Corps to Buckhead Church, north of Millen and near it.

On the 3d of December I entered Millen with the Seventeenth Corps
(General Frank P.  Blair), and there paused one day, to communicate
with all parts of the army.  General Howard was south of the
Ogeechee River, with the Fifteenth Corps, opposite Scarboro'.
General Slocum was at Buckhead Church, four miles north of Millen,
with the Twentieth Corps.  The Fourteenth (General Davis) was at
Lumpkin's Station, on the Augusta road, about ten miles north of
Millen, and the cavalry division was within easy support of this
wing.  Thus the whole army was in good position and in good
condition.  We had largely subsisted on the country; our wagons
were full of forage and provisions; but, as we approached the
sea-coast, the country became more sandy and barren, and food
became more scarce; still, with little or no loss, we had traveled
two-thirds of our distance, and I concluded to push on for
Savannah.  At Millen I learned that General Bragg was in Augusta,
and that General Wade Hampton had been ordered there from Richmond,
to organize a large cavalry force with which to resist our
progress.

General Hardee was ahead, between us and Savannah, with McLaw's
division, and other irregular troops, that could not, I felt
assured, exceed ten thousand men.  I caused the fine depot at
Millen to be destroyed, and other damage done, and then resumed the
march directly on Savannah, by the four main roads.  The Seventeenth
Corps (General Blair) followed substantially the railroad,
and, along with it, on the 5th of December, I reached Ogeechee
Church, about fifty miles from Savannah, and found there fresh
earthworks, which had been thrown up by McLaw's division; but he
must have seen that both his flanks were being turned, and
prudently retreated to Savannah without a fight.  All the columns
then pursued leisurely their march toward Savannah, corn and forage
becoming more and more scarce, but rice-fields beginning to occur
along the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers, which proved a good
substitute, both as food and forage.  The weather was fine, the
roads good, and every thing seemed to favor us.  Never do I recall
a more agreeable sensation than the sight of our camps by night,
lit up by the fires of fragrant pine-knots.  The trains were all in
good order, and the men seemed to march their fifteen miles a day
as though it were nothing.  No enemy opposed us, and we could only
occasionally hear the faint reverberation of a gun to our left
rear, where we knew that General Kilpatrick was skirmishing with
Wheeler's cavalry, which persistently followed him.  But the
infantry columns had met with no opposition whatsoever.  McLaw's
division was falling back before us, and we occasionally picked up
a few of his men as prisoners, who insisted that we would meet with
strong opposition at Savannah.

On the 8th, as I rode along, I found the column turned out of the
main road, marching through the fields.  Close by, in the corner of
a fence, was a group of men standing around a handsome young
officer, whose foot had been blown to pieces by a torpedo planted
in the road.  He was waiting for a surgeon to amputate his leg, and
told me that he was riding along with the rest of his brigade-staff
of the Seventeenth Corps, when a torpedo trodden on by his horse
had exploded, killing the horse and literally blowing off all the
flesh from one of his legs.  I saw the terrible wound, and made
full inquiry into the facts.  There had been no resistance at that
point, nothing to give warning of danger, and the rebels had
planted eight-inch shells in the road, with friction-matches to
explode them by being trodden on.  This was not war, but murder,
and it made me very angry.  I immediately ordered a lot of rebel
prisoners to be brought from the provost-guard, armed with picks
and spades, and made them march in close order along the road, so
as to explode their own torpedoes, or to discover and dig them up.
They begged hard, but I reiterated the order, and could hardly help
laughing at their stepping so gingerly along the road, where it was
supposed sunken torpedoes might explode at each step, but they
found no other torpedoes till near Fort McAllister.  That night we
reached Pooler's Station, eight miles from Savannah, and during the
next two days, December 9th and 10th, the several corps reached the
defenses of Savannah--the Fourteenth Corps on the left, touching
the river; the Twentieth Corps next; then the Seventeenth; and the
Fifteenth on the extreme right; thus completely investing the city.
Wishing to reconnoitre the place in person, I rode forward by the
Louisville road, into a dense wood of oak, pine, and cypress, left
the horses, and walked down to the railroad-track, at a place where
there was a side-track, and a cut about four feet deep.  From that
point the railroad was straight, leading into Savannah, and about
eight hundred yards off were a rebel parapet and battery.  I could
see the cannoneers preparing to fire, and cautioned the officers
near me to scatter, as we would likely attract a shot.  Very soon I
saw the white puff of smoke, and, watching close, caught sight of
the ball as it rose in its flight, and, finding it coming pretty
straight, I stepped a short distance to one side, but noticed a
negro very near me in the act of crossing the track at right
angles.  Some one called to him to look out; but, before the poor
fellow understood his danger, the ball (a thirty-two-pound round
shot) struck the ground, and rose in its first ricochet, caught the
negro under the right jaw, and literally carried away his head,
scattering blood and brains about.  A soldier close by spread an
overcoat over the body, and we all concluded to get out of that
railroad-cut.  Meantime, General Mower's division of the Seventeenth
Corps had crossed the canal to the right of the Louisville
road, and had found the line of parapet continuous; so at Savannah
we had again run up against the old familiar parapet, with its deep
ditches, canals, and bayous, full of water; and it looked as though
another siege was inevitable.  I accordingly made a camp or bivouac
near the Louisville road, about five miles from Savannah, and
proceeded to invest the place closely, pushing forward
reconnoissances at every available point.

As soon as it was demonstrated that Savannah was well fortified,
with a good garrison, commanded by General William J. Hardee, a
competent soldier, I saw that the first step was to open
communication with our fleet, supposed to be waiting for us with
supplies and clothing in Ossabaw Sound.

General Howard had, some nights previously, sent one of his best
scouts, Captain Duncan, with two men, in a canoe, to drift past
Fort McAllister, and to convey to the fleet a knowledge of our
approach.  General Kilpatrick's cavalry had also been transferred
to the south bank of the Ogeechee, with orders to open
communication with the fleet.  Leaving orders with General Slocum
to press the siege, I instructed General Howard to send a division
with all his engineers to Grog's Bridge, fourteen and a half miles
southwest from Savannah, to rebuild it.  On the evening of the 12th
I rode over myself, and spent the night at Mr. King's house, where
I found General Howard, with General Hazen's division of the
Fifteenth Corps.  His engineers were hard at work on the bridge,
which they finished that night, and at sunrise Hazen's division
passed over.  I gave General Hazen, in person, his orders to march
rapidly down the right bank of the Ogeechee, and without hesitation
to assault and carry Fort McAllister by storm.  I knew it to be
strong in heavy artillery, as against an approach from the sea, but
believed it open and weak to the rear.  I explained to General
Hazen, fully, that on his action depended the safety of the whole
army, and the success of the campaign.  Kilpatrick had already felt
the fort, and had gone farther down the coast to Kilkenny Bluff, or
St. Catharine's Sound, where, on the same day, he had communication
with a vessel belonging to the blockading fleet; but, at the time,
I was not aware of this fact, and trusted entirely to General Hazen
and his division of infantry, the Second of the Fifteenth Corps,
the same old division which I had commanded at Shiloh and
Vicksburg, in which I felt a special pride and confidence.

Having seen General Hazen fairly off, accompanied by General
Howard, I rode with my staff down the left bank of the Ogeechee,
ten miles to the rice-plantation of a Mr. Cheevea, where General
Howard had established a signal-station to overlook the lower
river, and to watch for any vessel of the blockading squadron,
which the negroes reported to be expecting us, because they nightly
sent up rockets, and daily dispatched a steamboat up the Ogeechee
as near to Fort McAllister as it was safe.

On reaching the rice-mill at Cheevea's, I found a guard and a
couple of twenty-pound Parrott gone, of De Gres's battery, which
fired an occasional shot toward Fort McAllister, plainly seen over
the salt-marsh, about three miles distant.  Fort McAllister had the
rebel flag flying, and occasionally sent a heavy shot back across
the marsh to where we were, but otherwise every thing about the
place looked as peaceable and quiet as on the Sabbath.

The signal-officer had built a platform on the ridge-pole of
the rice-mill.  Leaving our horses behind the stacks of rice-straw,
we all got on the roof of a shed attached to the mill, wherefrom I
could communicate with the signal-officer above, and at the same
time look out toward Ossabaw Sound, and across the Ogeechee River
at Fort McAllister.  About 2 p.m.  we observed signs of commotion
in the fort, and noticed one or two guns fired inland, and some
musket-skirmishing in the woods close by.

This betokened the approach of Hazen's division, which had been
anxiously expected, and soon thereafter the signal-officer
discovered about three miles above the fort a signal-flag, with
which he conversed, and found it to belong to General Hazen, who
was preparing to assault the fort, and wanted to know if I were
there.  On being assured of this fact, and that I expected the fort
to be carried before night, I received by signal the assurance of
General Hazen that he was making his preparations, and would soon
attempt the assault.  The sun was rapidly declining, and I was
dreadfully impatient.  At that very moment some one discovered a
faint cloud of smoke, and an object gliding, as it were, along the
horizon above the tops of the sedge toward the sea, which little by
little grew till it was pronounced to be the smoke-stack of a
steamer coming up the river.  "It must be one of our squadron!"
Soon the flag of the United States was plainly visible, and our
attention was divided between this approaching steamer and the
expected assault.  When the sun was about an hour high, another
signal-message came from General Hazen that he was all ready, and I
replied to go ahead, as a friendly steamer was approaching from
below.  Soon we made out a group of officers on the deck of this
vessel, signaling with a flag, "Who are you!"  The answer went back
promptly, "General Sherman."  Then followed the question, "Is Fort
McAllister taken?"  "Not yet, but it will be in a minute!"  Almost
at that instant of time, we saw Hazen's troops come out of the dark
fringe of woods that encompassed the fort, the lines dressed as on
parade, with colors flying, and moving forward with a quick, steady
pace.  Fort McAllister was then all alive, its big guns belching
forth dense clouds of smoke, which soon enveloped our assaulting
lines.  One color went down, but was up in a moment.  On the lines
advanced, faintly seen in the white, sulphurous smoke; there was a
pause, a cessation of fire; the smoke cleared away, and the
parapets were blue with our men, who fired their muskets in the
air, and shouted so that we actually heard them, or felt that we
did.  Fort McAllister was taken, and the good news was instantly
sent by the signal-officer to our navy friends on the approaching
gunboat, for a point of timber had shut out Fort McAllister from
their view, and they had not seen the action at all, but must have
heard the cannonading.

During the progress of the assault, our little group on Cheeves's
mill hardly breathed; but no sooner did we see our flags on the
parapet than I exclaimed, in the language of the poor negro at
Cobb's plantation, "This nigger will have no sleep this night!"

I was resolved to communicate with our fleet that night, which
happened to be a beautiful moonlight one.  At the wharf belonging
to Cheeves's mill was a small skiff, that had been used by our men
in fishing or in gathering oysters.  I was there in a minute,
called for a volunteer crew, when several young officers, Nichols
and Merritt among the number; said they were good oarsmen, and
volunteered to pull the boat down to Fort McAllister.  General
Howard asked to accompany me; so we took seats in the stern of the
boat, and our crew of officers pulled out with a will.  The tide
was setting in strong, and they had a hard pull, for, though the
distance was but three miles in an air-line, the river was so
crooked that the actual distance was fully six miles.  On the way
down we passed the wreck of a steamer which had been sunk some
years before, during a naval attack on Fort McAllister.

Night had fairly set in when we discovered a soldier on the beach.
I hailed him, and inquired if he knew where General Hazen was.  He
answered that the general was at the house of the overseer of the
plantation (McAllister's), and that he could guide me to it.  We
accordingly landed, tied our boat to a driftlog, and followed our
guide through bushes to a frame-house, standing in a grove of
live-oaks, near a row of negro quarters.

General Hazen was there with his staff, in the act of getting
supper; he invited us to join them, which we accepted promptly, for
we were really very hungry.  Of course, I congratulated Hazen most
heartily on his brilliant success, and praised its execution very
highly, as it deserved, and he explained to me more in detail the
exact results.  The fort was an inclosed work, and its land-front
was in the nature of a bastion and curtains, with good parapet,
ditch, fraise, and chevaux-de-frise, made out of the large branches
of live-oaks.  Luckily, the rebels had left the larger and unwieldy
trunks on the ground, which served as a good cover for the
skirmish-line, which crept behind these logs, and from them kept
the artillerists from loading and firing their guns accurately.

The assault had been made by three parties in line, one from below,
one from above the fort, and the third directly in rear, along the
capital.  All were simultaneous, and had to pass a good abatis and
line of torpedoes, which actually killed more of the assailants
than the heavy guns of the fort, which generally overshot the mark.
Hazen's entire loss was reported, killed and wounded, ninety-two.
Each party reached the parapet about the same time, and the
garrison inside, of about two hundred and fifty men (about fifty of
them killed or wounded), were in his power.  The commanding
officer, Major Anderson, was at that moment a prisoner, and
General Hazen invited him in to take supper with us, which he did.

Up to this time General Hazen did not know that a gunboat was in
the river below the fort; for it was shut off from sight by a point
of timber, and I was determined to board her that night, at
whatever risk or cost, as I wanted some news of what was going on
in the outer world.  Accordingly, after supper, we all walked down
to the fort, nearly a mile from the house where we had been,
entered Fort McAllister, held by a regiment of Hazen's troops, and
the sentinel cautioned us to be very careful, as the ground outside
the fort was full of torpedoes.  Indeed, while we were there, a
torpedo exploded, tearing to pieces a poor fellow who was hunting
for a dead comrade.  Inside the fort lay the dead as they had
fallen, and they could hardly be distinguished from their living
comrades, sleeping soundly side by side in the pale moonlight.  In
the river, close by the fort, was a good yawl tied to a stake, but
the tide was high, and it required some time to get it in to the
bank; the commanding officer, whose name I cannot recall, manned
the boat with a good crew of his men, and, with General Howard, I
entered, and pulled down-stream, regardless of the warnings all
about the torpedoes.

The night was unusually bright, and we expected to find the gunboat
within a mile or so; but, after pulling down the river fully three
miles, and not seeing the gunboat, I began to think she had turned
and gone back to the sound; but we kept on, following the bends of
the river, and about six miles below McAllister we saw her light,
and soon were hailed by the vessel at anchor.  Pulling alongside,
we announced ourselves, and were received with great warmth and
enthusiasm on deck by half a dozen naval officers, among them
Captain Williamson, United States Navy.  She proved to be the
Dandelion, a tender of the regular gunboat Flag, posted at the
mouth of the Ogeechee.  All sorts of questions were made and
answered, and we learned that Captain Duncan had safely reached the
squadron, had communicated the good news of our approach, and they
had been expecting us for some days.  They explained that Admiral
Dahlgren commanded the South-Atlantic Squadron, which was then
engaged in blockading the coast from Charleston south, and was on
his flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, lying in Wassaw Sound; that
General J. G. Foster was in command of the Department of the South,
with his headquarters at Hilton Head; and that several ships loaded
with stores for the army were lying in Tybee Roads and in Port
Royal Sound.  From these officers I also learned that General Grant
was still besieging Petersburg and Richmond, and that matters and
things generally remained pretty much the same as when we had left
Atlanta.  All thoughts seemed to have been turned to us in Georgia,
cut off from all communication with our friends; and the rebel
papers had reported us to be harassed, defeated, starving, and
fleeing for safety to the coast.  I then asked for pen and paper,
and wrote several hasty notes to General Foster, Admiral Dahlgren,
General Grant, and the Secretary of War, giving in general terms
the actual state of affairs, the fact of the capture of Fort
McAllister, and of my desire that means should be taken to
establish a line of supply from the vessels in port up the Ogeechee
to the rear of the army.  As a sample, I give one of these notes,
addressed to the Secretary of War, intended for publication to
relieve the anxiety of our friends at the North generally:


ON BOARD DANDELION, OSSABAW SOUND, December 13, 1864--11.50 p.m.


To Hon. E.  M.  STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

To-day, at 6 p. m., General Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps
carried Fort McAllister by assault, capturing its entire garrison
and stores.  This opened to us Ossabaw Sound, and I pushed down to
this gunboat to communicate with the fleet.  Before opening
communication we had completely destroyed all the railroads leading
into Savannah, and invested the city.  The left of the army is on
the Savannah River three miles above the city, and the right on the
Ogeechee, at King's Bridge.  The army is in splendid order, and
equal to any thing.  The weather has been fine, and supplies were
abundant.  Our march was most agreeable, and we were not at all
molested by guerrillas.

We reached Savannah three days ago, but, owing to Fort McAllister,
could not communicate; but, now that we have McAllister, we can go
ahead.

We have already captured two boats on the Savannah river and
prevented their gunboats from coming down.

I estimate the population of Savannah at twenty-five thousand, and
the garrison at fifteen thousand.  General Hardee commands.

We have not lost a wagon on the trip; but have gathered a large
supply of negroes, mules, horses, etc., and our teams are in far
better condition than when we started.

My first duty will be to clear the army of surplus negroes, mules,
and horses.  We have utterly destroyed over two hundred miles of
rails, and consumed stores and provisions that were essential to
Lee's and Hood's armies.

The quick work made with McAllister, the opening of communication
with our fleet, and our consequent independence as to supplies,
dissipate all their boasted threats to head us off and starve the
army.


I regard Savannah as already gained.
Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


By this time the night was well advanced, and the tide was running
ebb-strong; so I asked.  Captain Williamson to tow us up as near
Fort McAllister as he would venture for the torpedoes, of which the
navy-officers had a wholesome dread.  The Dandelion steamed up some
three or four miles, till the lights of Fort McAllister could be
seen, when she anchored, and we pulled to the fort in our own boat.
General Howard and I then walked up to the McAllister House, where
we found General Hazen and his officers asleep on the floor of one
of the rooms.  Lying down on the floor, I was soon fast asleep, but
shortly became conscious that some one in the room was inquiring
for me among the sleepers.  Calling out, I was told that an officer
of General Fosters staff had just arrived from a steamboat anchored
below McAllister; that the general was extremely anxious to see me
on important business, but that he was lame from an old Mexican-War
wound, and could not possibly come to me.  I was extremely weary
from the incessant labor of the day and night before, but got up,
and again walked down the sandy road to McAllister, where I found a
boat awaiting us, which carried us some three miles down the river,
to the steamer W.  W.  Coit (I think), on board of which we found
General Foster.  He had just come from Port Royal, expecting to
find Admiral Dahlgren in Ossabaw Sound, and, hearing of the capture
of Fort McAllister, he had come up to see me.  He described fully
the condition of affairs with his own command in South Carolina.
He had made several serious efforts to effect a lodgment on the
railroad which connects Savannah with Charleston near Pocotaligo,
but had not succeeded in reaching the railroad itself, though he
had a full division of troops, strongly intrenched, near Broad
River, within cannon-range of the railroad.  He explained,
moreover, that there were at Port Royal abundant supplies of bread
and provisions, as well as of clothing, designed for our use.  We
still had in our wagons and in camp abundance of meat, but we
needed bread, sugar, and coffee, and it was all-important that a
route of supply should at once be opened, for which purpose the
assistance of the navy were indispensable.  We accordingly
steamed down the Ogeechee River to Ossabaw Sound, in hopes to meet
Admiral Dahlgren, but he was not there, and we continued on by the
inland channel to Warsaw Sound, where we found the Harvest Moon,
and Admiral Dahlgren.  I was not personally acquainted with him at
the time, but he was so extremely kind and courteous that I was at
once attracted to him.  There was nothing in his power, he said,
which he would not do to assist us, to make our campaign absolutely
successful.  He undertook at once to find vessels of light draught
to carry our supplies from Port Royal to Cheeves's Mill, or to
Grog's Bridge above, whence they could be hauled by wagons to our
several camps; he offered to return with me to Fort McAllister, to
superintend the removal of the torpedoes, and to relieve me of all
the details of this most difficult work.  General Foster then
concluded to go on to Port Royal, to send back to us six hundred
thousand rations, and all the rifled guns of heavy calibre, and
ammunition on hand, with which I thought we could reach the city of
Savannah, from the positions already secured.  Admiral Dahlgren
then returned with me in the Harvest Moon to Fort McAllister.  This
consumed all of the 14th of December; and by the 15th I had again
reached Cheeves's Mill, where my horse awaited me, and rode on to
General Howard's headquarters at Anderson's plantation, on the
plank-road, about eight miles back of Savannah.  I reached this
place about noon, and immediately sent orders to my own
head-quarters, on the Louisville road, to have them brought over to
the plank-road, as a place more central and convenient; gave written
notice to Generals Slocum and Howard of all the steps taken, and
ordered them to get ready to receive the siege-guns, to put them in
position to bombard Savannah, and to prepare for the general assault.
The country back of Savannah is very low, and intersected with
innumerable saltwater creeks, swamps, and rice-fields. Fortunately
the weather was good and the roads were passable, but, should the
winter rains set in, I knew that we would be much embarrassed.
Therefore, heavy details of men were at once put to work to prepare a
wharf and depot at Grog's Bridge, and the roads leading thereto were
corduroyed in advance.  The Ogeechee Canal was also cleared out for
use; and boats, such as were common on the river plantations, were
collected, in which to float stores from our proposed base on the
Ogeechee to the points most convenient to the several camps.

Slocum's wing extended from the Savannah River to the canal, and
Howard's wing from the canal to the extreme right, along down the
Little Ogeechee.  The enemy occupied not only the city itself, with
its long line of outer works, but the many forts which had been
built to guard the approaches from the sea-such as at Beaulieu,
Rosedew, White Bluff, Bonaventura, Thunderbolt, Cansten's Bluff,
Forts Tatnall, Boggs, etc., etc.  I knew that General Hardee could
not have a garrison strong enough for all these purposes, and I was
therefore anxious to break his lines before he could receive
reenforcements from Virginia or Augusta.  General Slocum had
already captured a couple of steamboats trying to pass down the
Savannah River from Augusta, and had established some of his men on
Argyle and Hutchinson Islands above the city, and wanted to
transfer a whole corps to the South Carolina bank; but, as the
enemy had iron-clad gunboats in the river, I did not deem it
prudent, because the same result could be better accomplished from
General Fosters position at Broad River.

Fort McAllister was captured as described, late in the evening of
December 13th, and by the 16th many steamboats had passed up as
high as King's Bridge; among them one which General Grant had
dispatched with the mails for the army, which had accumulated since
our departure from Atlanta, under charge of Colonel A. H. Markland.
These mails were most welcome to all the officers and soldiers of
the army, which had been cut off from friends and the world for two
months, and this prompt receipt of letters from home had an
excellent effect, making us feel that home was near.  By this
vessel also came Lieutenant Dune, aide-de-camp, with the following
letter of December 3d, from General Grant, and on the next day
Colonel Babcock, United States Engineers, arrived with the letter
of December 6th, both of which are in General Grant's own
handwriting, and are given entire:



HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,  December 3, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Armies near Savannah,
Georgia.

GENERAL: The little information gleaned from the Southern press
indicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your
mails (which had been previously collected in Baltimore by Colonel
Markland, special-agent of the Post-Office Department) to be sent
as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to
you as soon as heard from on the coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from
congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has
been struck.  I have never had a fear, however, for the result.

Since you left Atlanta no very great progress has been made here.
The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented from
detaching against you.  I think not one man has gone from here,
except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry.  Bragg
has gone from Wilmington.  I am trying to take advantage of his
absence to get possession of that place.  Owing to some
preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blow
up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do not believe
a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off.  I
hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will
not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you any thing like
directions for future action, but will state a general idea I have,
and will get your views after you have established yourself on the
sea-coast.  With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only
two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before
the fall of Atlanta.  The condition will be filled by holding
Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of
Savannah and Branchville.  If Wilmington falls, a force from there
can cooperate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with Hood close
upon him.  Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads,
except the main one leading to Chattanooga.  Part of this falling
back was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been.  It
did not look so, however, to me.  In my opinion, Thomas far
outnumbers Hood in infantry.  In cavalry Hood has the advantage in
morale and numbers.  I hope yet that Hood will be badly crippled,
if not destroyed.  The general news you will learn from the papers
better than I can give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there
is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run
down the coast to see you.  If you desire it, I will ask Mrs.
Sherman to go with me.
Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi

GENERAL: On reflection since sending my letter by the hands of
Lieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operation
toward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his
army.

You have now destroyed the roads of the South so that it will
probably take them three months without interruption to reestablish
a through line from east to west.  In that time I think the job here
will be effectually completed.

My idea now is that you establish a base on the sea-coast, fortify
and leave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry
to protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior that
the militia of the South will have to be kept at home.  With the
balance of your command come here by water with all dispatch.
Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in
person.  Unless you see objections to this plan which I cannot see,
use every vessel going to you for purposes of transportation.

Hood has Thomas close in Nashville.  I have said all I can to force
him to attack, without giving the positive order until to-day.
To-day, however, I could stand it no longer, and gave the order
without any reserve.  I think the battle will take place to-morrow.
The result will probably be known in New York before Colonel
Babcock (the bearer of this) will leave it.  Colonel Babcock will
give you full information of all operations now in progress.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


The contents of these letters gave me great uneasiness, for I had
set my heart on the capture of Savannah, which I believed to be
practicable, and to be near; for me to embark for Virginia by sea
was so complete a change from what I had supposed would be the
course of events that I was very much concerned.  I supposed, as a
matter of course, that a fleet of vessels would soon pour in, ready
to convey the army to Virginia, and as General Grant's orders
contemplated my leaving the cavalry, trains, and artillery, behind,
I judged Fort McAllister to be the best place for the purpose, and
sent my chief-engineer, Colonel Poe, to that fort, to reconnoitre
the ground, and to prepare it so as to make a fortified camp large
enough to accommodate the vast herd of mules and horses that would
thus be left behind.  And as some time might be required to collect
the necessary shipping, which I estimated at little less than a
hundred steamers and sailing-vessels, I determined to push
operations, in hopes to secure the city of Savannah before the
necessary fleet could be available.  All these ideas are given in
my answer to General Grant's letters (dated December 16, 1864)
herewith, which is a little more full than the one printed in the
report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, because in that
copy I omitted the matter concerning General Thomas, which now need
no longer be withheld:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 16, 1864.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point,
Virginia.

GENERAL: I received, day before yesterday, at the hands of
Lieutenant Dunn, your letter of December 8d, and last night, at the
hands of Colonel Babcock, that of December 6th.  I had previously
made you a hasty scrawl from the tugboat Dandelion, in Ogeechee
River, advising you that the army had reached the sea-coast,
destroying all the railroads across the State of Georgia, investing
closely the city of Savannah, and had made connection with the
fleet.

Since writing that note, I have in person met and conferred with
General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, and made all the arrangements
which were deemed essential for reducing the city of Savannah to
our possession.  But, since the receipt of yours of the 6th, I have
initiated measures looking principally to coming to you with fifty
or Sixty thousand infantry, and incidentally to capture Savannah,
if time will allow.

At the time we carried Fort McAllister by assault so handsomely,
with its twenty-two guns and entire garrison, I was hardly aware
of its importance; but, since passing down the river with General
Foster and up with Admiral Dahlgren, I realize how admirably
adapted are Ossabaw Sound and Ogeechee River to supply an army
operating against Savannah.  Seagoing vessels can easily come to
King's Bridge, a point on Ogeechee River, fourteen and a half miles
due west of Savannah, from which point we have roads leading to all
our camps.  The country is low and sandy, and cut up with marshes,
which in wet weather will be very bad, but we have been so favored
with weather that they are all now comparatively good, and heavy
details are constantly employed in double-corduroying the marshes,
so that I have no fears even of bad weather.  Fortunately, also, by
liberal and judicious foraging, we reached the sea-coast abundantly
supplied with forage and provisions, needing nothing on arrival
except bread.  Of this we started from Atlanta, with from eight to
twenty days' supply per corps and some of the troops only had one
day's issue of bread during the trip of thirty days; yet they did
not want, for sweet-potatoes were very abundant, as well as
corn-meal, and our soldiers took to them naturally.  We started
with about five thousand head of cattle, and arrived with over ten
thousand, of course consuming mostly turkeys, chickens, sheep,
hogs, and the cattle of the country.  As to our mules and horses,
we left Atlanta with about twenty-five hundred wagons, many of
which were drawn by mules which had not recovered from the
Chattanooga starvation, all of which were replaced, the poor mules
shot, and our transportation is now in superb condition.  I have no
doubt the State of Georgia has lost, by our operations, fifteen
thousand first-rate mules.  As to horses, Kilpatrick collected all
his remounts, and it looks to me, in riding along our
columns, as though every officer had three or four led horses, and
each regiment seems to be followed by at least fifty negroes and
foot-sore soldiers, riding on horses and mules.  The custom was for
each brigade to send out daily a foraging-party of about fifty men,
on foot, who invariably returned mounted, with several wagons
loaded with poultry, potatoes, etc., and as the army is composed of
about forty brigades, you can estimate approximately the number of
horses collected.  Great numbers of these were shot by my order,
because of the disorganizing effect on our infantry of having too
many idlers mounted.  General Euston is now engaged in collecting
statistics on this subject, but I know the Government will never
receive full accounts of our captures, although the result aimed at
was fully attained, viz., to deprive our enemy of them.  All these
animals I will have sent to Port Royal, or collected behind Fort
McAllister, to be used by General Saxton in his farming operations,
or by the Quartermaster's Department, after they are systematically
accounted for.  While General Easton is collecting transportation
for my troops to James River, I will throw to Port Royal Island all
our means of transportation I can, and collect the rest near Fort
McAllister, covered by the Ogeeehee River and intrenchments to be
erected, and for which Captain Poe, my chief-engineer, is now
reconnoitring the ground, but in the mean time will act as I have
begun, as though the city of Savannah were my objective: namely,
the troops will continue to invest Savannah closely, making attacks
and feints wherever we have fair ground to stand upon, and I will
place some thirty-pound Parrotts, which I have got from General
Foster, in position, near enough to reach the centre of the city,
and then will demand its surrender.  If General Hardee is alarmed,
or fears starvation, he may surrender; otherwise I will bombard the
city, but not risk the lives of our men by assaults across the
narrow causeways, by which alone I can now reach it.

If I had time, Savannah, with all its dependent fortifications,
would surely fall into our possession, for we hold all its avenues
of supply.

The enemy has made two desperate efforts to get boats from above to
the city, in both of which he has been foiled-General Slocum (whose
left flank rests on the river) capturing and burning the first
boat, and in the second instance driving back two gunboats and
capturing the steamer Resolute, with seven naval officers and a
crew of twenty-five seamen.  General Slocum occupies Argyle Island
and the upper end of Hutchinson Inland, and has a brigade on the
South Carolina shore opposite, and is very urgent to pass one of
his corps over to that shore.  But, in view of the change of plan
made necessary by your order of the 6th, I will maintain things in
statu quo till I have got all my transportation to the rear and out
of the way, and until I have sea-transportation for the troops you
require at James River, which I will accompany and command in
person.  Of course, I will leave Kilpatrick, with his cavalry (say
five thousand three hundred), and, it may be, a division of the
Fifteenth Corps; but, before determining on this, I must see
General Foster, and may arrange to shift his force (now over above
the Charleston Railroad, at the head of Broad River) to the
Ogeeohee, where, in cooperation with Kilpatrick's cavalry, he can
better threaten the State of Georgia than from the direction of
Port Royal.  Besides, I would much prefer not to detach from my
regular corps any of its veteran divisions, and would even prefer
that other less valuable troops should be sent to reenforce Foster
from some other quarter.  My four corps, full of experience and
full of ardor, coming to you en masse, equal to sixty thousand
fighting men, will be a reenforcement that Lee cannot disregard.
Indeed, with my present command, I had expected, after reducing
Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina; thence to
Raleigh, and thence to report to you.  But this would consume, it
may be, six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah; whereas, by
sea, I can probably reach you with my men and arms before the
middle of January.

I myself am somewhat astonished at the attitude of things in
Tennessee.  I purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomas
assured me that he was all ready, and my last dispatch from him of
the 12th of November was full of confidence, in which he promised
me that he would ruin Hood if he dared to advance from Florence,
urging me to go ahead, and give myself no concern about Hood's army
in Tennessee.

Why he did not turn on him at Franklin, after checking and
discomfiting him, surpasses my understanding.  Indeed, I do not
approve of his evacuating Decatur, but think he should have assumed
the offensive against Hood from Pulaski, in the direction of
Waynesburg.
I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action;
but he is judicious and brave and the troops feel great confidence
in him.  I still hope he will out-manoeuvre and destroy Hood.

As to matters in the Southeast, I think Hardee, in Savannah, has
good  artillerists, some five or six thousand good infantry, and,
it may be, a mongrel mass of eight to ten thousand militia.  In all
our marching through Georgia, he has not forced us to use any thing
but a skirmish-line, though at several points he had erected
fortifications and tried to alarm us by bombastic threats.  In
Savannah he has taken refuge in a line constructed behind swamps
and overflowed rice-fields, extending from a point on the Savannah
River about three miles above the city, around by a branch of the
Little Ogeechee, which stream is impassable from its salt-marshes
and boggy swamps, crossed only by narrow causeways or common
corduroy-roads.

There must be twenty-five thousand citizens, men, women, and
children, in Savannah, that must also be fed, and how he is to feed
them beyond a few days I cannot imagine.  I know that his
requisitions for corn on the interior counties were not filled, and
we are in possession of the rice-fields and mills, which could
alone be of service to him in this neighborhood.  He can draw
nothing from South Carolina, save from a small corner down in the
southeast, and that by a disused wagon-road.  I could easily get
possession of this, but hardly deem it worth the risk of making a
detachment, which would be in danger by its isolation from the main
army.  Our whole army is in fine condition as to health, and the
weather is splendid.  For that reason alone I feel a personal
dislike to turning northward.  I will keep Lieutenant Dunn here
until I know the result of my demand for the surrender of Savannah,
but, whether successful or not, shall not delay my execution of
your order of the 6th, which will depend alone upon the time it
will require to obtain transportation by sea.

I am, with respect, etc., your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army.


Having concluded all needful preparations, I rode from my
headquarters, on the plank-road, over to General Slocum's
headquarters, on the Macon road, and thence dispatched (by flag of
truce) into Savannah, by the hands of Colonel Ewing,
inspector-general, a demand for the surrender of the place.  The
following letters give the result.  General Hardee refused to
surrender, and I then resolved to make the attempt to break his
line of defense at several places, trusting that some one would
succeed.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 17, 1864.

General WILLIAM J. HARDEE, commanding Confederate Forces in
Savannah.

GENERAL: You have doubtless observed, from your station at Rosedew
that sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and up the
Ogeechee to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of all
kinds, and more especially heavy ordnance necessary for the
reduction of Savannah.  I have already received guns that can cast
heavy and destructive shot as far as the heart of your city; also,
I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the
people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied, and I am therefore
justified in demanding the surrender of the city of Savannah, and
its dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time for your
answer, before opening with heavy ordnance.  Should you entertain
the proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the
inhabitants and garrison; but should I be forced to resort to
assault, or the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall
then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and
shall make little effort to restrain my army--burning to avenge the
national wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large cities
which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil
war.  I inclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the
surrender of the town of Resaoa, to be used by you for what it is
worth. I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 17, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Federal Forces near
Savannah, Georgia.

GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from
you of this date, in which you demand "the surrender of Savannah
and its dependent forts," on the ground that you "have received
guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot into the heart of the
city," and for the further reason that you "have, for some days,
held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison
can be supplied."  You add that, should you be "forced to resort to
assault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, you will
then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and will
make little effort to restrain your army," etc., etc.  The position
of your forces (a half-mile beyond the outer line for the
land-defense of Savannah) is, at the nearest point, at least four
miles from the heart of the city.  That and the interior line are
both intact.

Your statement that you have, for some days, held and controlled
every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied, is
incorrect.  I am in free and constant communication with my
department.

Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts
is refused.

With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraphs of
your letter (of what may be expected in case your demand is not
complied with), I have to say that I have hitherto conducted the
military operations intrusted to my direction in strict accordance
with the rules of civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret the
adoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate from
them in future.  I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your
obedient servant,

W.  J.  HARDEE, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 18, 1864 8 p.m.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL: I wrote you at length (by Colonel Babcock) on the 16th
instant.  As I therein explained my purpose, yesterday I made a
demand on General Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah,
and to-day received his answer--refusing; copies of both letters
are herewith inclosed.  You will notice that I claim that my lines
are within easy cannon-range of the heart of Savannah; but General
Hardee asserts that we are four and a half miles distant.  But I
myself have been to the intersection of the Charleston and Georgia
Central Railroads, and the three-mile post is but a few yards
beyond, within the line of our pickets.  The enemy has no pickets
outside of his fortified line (which is a full quarter of a mile
within the three-mile post), and I have the evidence of Mr. R. R.
Cuyler, President of the Georgia Central Railroad (who was a
prisoner in our hands), that the mile-posts are measured from the
Exchange, which is but two squares back from the river.  By
to-morrow morning I will have six thirty-pound Parrotts in
position, and General Hardee will learn whether I am right or not.
From the left of our line, which is on the Savannah River, the
spires can be plainly seen; but the country is so densely wooded
with pine and live-oak, and lies so flat, that we can see nothing
from any other portion of our lines.  General Slocum feels
confident that he can make a successful assault at one or two
points in front of General Davis's (Fourteenth) corps.  All of
General Howard's troops (the right wing) lie behind the Little
Ogeechee, and I doubt if it can be passed by troops in the face of
an enemy.  Still, we can make strong feints, and if I can get a
sufficient number of boats, I shall make a cooperative
demonstration up Vernon River or Wassaw Sound.  I should like very
much indeed to take Savannah before coming to you; but, as I wrote
to you before, I will do nothing rash or hasty, and will embark for
the James River as soon as General Easton (who is gone to Port
Royal for that purpose) reports to me that he has an approximate
number of vessels for the transportation of the contemplated force.
I fear even this will cost more delay than you anticipate, for
already the movement of our transports and the gunboats has
required more time than I had expected.  We have had dense fogs;
there are more mud-banks in the Ogeechee than were reported, and
there are no pilots whatever.  Admiral Dahlgren promised to have
the channel buoyed and staked, but it is not done yet.  We find
only six feet of water up to King's Bridge at low tide, about ten
feet up to the rice-mill, and sixteen to Fort McAllister.  All
these points may be used by us, and we have a good, strong bridge
across Ogeechee at King's, by which our wagons can go to Fort
McAllister, to which point I am sending all wagons not absolutely
necessary for daily use, the negroes, prisoners of war, sick, etc.,
en route for Port Royal.  In relation to Savannah, you will remark
that General Hardee refers to his still being in communication with
his department.  This language he thought would deceive me; but I
am confirmed in the belief that the route to which he refers (the
Union Plank-road on the South Carolina shore) is inadequate to feed
his army and the people of Savannah, and General Foster assures me
that he has his force on that very road, near the head of Broad
River, so that cars no longer run between Charleston and Savannah.
We hold this end of the Charleston Railroad, and have destroyed it
from the three-mile post back to the bridge (about twelve miles).
In anticipation of leaving this country, I am continuing the
destruction of their railroads, and at this moment have two
divisions and the cavalry at work breaking up the Gulf Railroad
from the Ogeechee to the Altamaha; so that, even if I do not take
Savannah, I will leave it in a bad way.  But I still hope that
events will give me time to take Savannah, even if I have to
assault with some loss.  I am satisfied that, unless we take it,
the gunboats never will, for they can make no impression upon the
batteries which guard every approach from the sea.  I have a faint
belief that, when Colonel Babcock reaches you, you will delay
operations long enough to enable me to succeed here.  With Savannah
in our possession, at some future time if not now, we can punish
South Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of the people in
Georgia hoped we would do.  I do sincerely believe that the whole
United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army
turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that State in the
manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direst and
immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army.


As soon as the army had reached Savannah, and had opened
communication with the fleet, I endeavored to ascertain what had
transpired in Tennessee since our departure.  We received our
letters and files of newspapers, which contained full accounts of
all the events there up to about the 1st of December.  As before
described, General Hood had three full corps of infantry--S. D.
Lee's, A. P. Stewart's, and Cheatham's, at Florence, Alabama--with
Forrest's corps of cavalry, numbering in the aggregate about
forty-five thousand men.  General Thomas was in Nashville, Tennessee,
quietly engaged in reorganizing his army out of the somewhat broken
forces at his disposal.  He had posted his only two regular corps,
the Fourth and Twenty-third, under the general command of
Major-General J. M. Schofield, at Pulaski, directly in front of
Florence, with the three brigades of cavalry (Hatch, Croxton, and
Capron), commanded by Major-General Wilson, watching closely for
Hood's initiative.

This force aggregated about thirty thousand men, was therefore
inferior to the enemy; and General Schofield was instructed, in
case the enemy made a general advance, to fall back slowly toward
Nashville, fighting, till he should be reenforced by General Thomas
in person.  Hood's movement was probably hurried by reason of my
advance into Georgia; for on the 17th his infantry columns marched
from Florence in the direction of Waynesboro', turning, Schofield's
position at Pulaski.  The latter at once sent his trains to the
rear, and on the 21st fell back to Columbia, Tennessee.  General
Hood  followed up this movement, skirmished lightly with Schofield
at Columbia, began the passage of Duck River, below the town, and
Cheatham's corps reached the vicinity of Spring Hill, whither
General Schofield had sent General Stanley, with two of his
divisions, to cover the movement of his trains.  During the night
of November 29th General Schofield passed Spring Hill with his
trains and army, and took post at Franklin, on the south aide of
Harpeth River.  General Hood now attaches serious blame to General
Cheatham for not attacking General Schofield in flank while in
motion at Spring Hill, for he was bivouacked within eight hundred
yards of the road at the time of the passage of our army.  General
Schofield reached Franklin on the morning of November 30th, and
posted his army in front of the town, where some
rifle-intrenchments had been constructed in advance.  He had the
two corps of Stanley and Cox (Fourth and Twenty-third), with
Wilson's cavalry on his flanks, and sent his trains behind the
Harpeth.

General Hood closed upon him the same day, and assaulted his
position with vehemence, at one time breaking the line and wounding
General Stanley seriously; but our men were veterans, cool and
determined, and fought magnificently.  The rebel officers led their
men in person to the several persistent assaults, continuing the
battle far into the night, when they drew off, beaten and
discomfited.

Their loss was very severe, especially in general officers; among
them Generals Cleburn and Adams, division commanders.  Hood's loss
on that day was afterward ascertained to be (Thomas's report):
Buried on the field, seventeen hundred and fifty; left in hospital
at Franklin, thirty-eight hundred; and seven hundred and two
prisoners captured and held: aggregate, six thousand two hundred
and fifty-two.  General Schofields lose, reported officially, was
one hundred and eighty-nine killed, one thousand and thirty-three
wounded, and eleven hundred and four prisoners or missing:
aggregate, twenty-three hundred and twenty-six.  The next day
General Schofield crossed the Harpeth without trouble, and fell
back to the defenses of Nashville.

Meantime General Thomas had organized the employees of the
Quartermaster's Department into a corps, commanded by the
chief-quartermaster, General J. Z. Donaldson, and placed them in the
fortifications of Nashville, under the general direction of
Major-General Z. B. Tower, now of the United States Engineers.  He
had also received the two veteran divisions of the Sixteenth Corps,
under General A. J. Smith, long absent and long expected; and he
had drawn from Chattanooga and Decatur (Alabama) the divisions of
Steedman and of R. S. Granger.  These, with General Schofields army
and about ten thousand good cavalry, under General J.  H.  Wilson,
constituted a strong army, capable not only of defending Nashville,
but of beating Hood in the open field.  Yet Thomas remained inside
of Nashville, seemingly passive, until General Hood had closed upon
him and had entrenched his position.

General Thomas had furthermore held fast to the railroad leading
from Nashville to Chattanooga, leaving strong guards at its
principal points, as at Murfreesboro', Deckerd, Stevenson,
Bridgeport, Whitesides, and Chattanooga.  At Murfreesboro' the
division of Rousseau was reenforced and strengthened up to about
eight thousand men.

At that time the weather was cold and sleety, the ground was
covered with ice and snow, and both parties for a time rested on
the defensive.  Those matters stood at Nashville, while we were
closing down on Savannah, in the early part of December, 1864; and
the country, as well as General Grant, was alarmed at the seeming
passive conduct of General Thomas; and General Grant at one time
considered the situation so dangerous that he thought of going to
Nashville in person, but General John A. Logan, happening to be at
City Point, was sent out to supersede General Thomas; luckily for
the latter, he acted in time, gained a magnificent victory, and
thus escaped so terrible a fate.

On the 18th of December, at my camp by the side of the plank-road,
eight miles back of Savannah, I received General Hardee's letter
declining to surrender, when nothing remained but to assault.  The
ground was difficult, and, as all former assaults had proved so
bloody, I concluded to make one more effort to completely surround
Savannah on all aides, so as further to excite Hardee's fears, and,
in case of success, to capture the whole of his army.  We had
already completely invested the place on the north, west, and
south, but there remained to the enemy, on the east, the use of the
old dike or plank-road leading into South Carolina, and I knew that
Hardee would have a pontoon-bridge across the river.  On examining
my maps, I thought that the division of John P. Hatch, belonging to
General Fosters command, might be moved from its then position at
Broad River, by water, down to Bluffton, from which it could reach
this plank-road, fortify and hold it--at some risk, of course,
because Hardee could avail himself of his central position to fall
on this detachment with his whole army.  I did not want to make a
mistake like "Ball's Bluff" at that period of the war; so, taking
one or two of my personal staff, I rode back to Grog's Bridge,
leaving with Generals Howard and Slocum orders to make all
possible preparations, but not to attack, during my two or three
days' absence; and there I took a boat for Wassaw Sound, whence
Admiral Dahlgren conveyed me in his own boat (the Harvest Moon) to
Hilton Head, where I represented the matter to General Foster, and
he promptly agreed to give his personal attention to it.  During
the night of the 20th we started back, the wind blowing strong,
Admiral Dahlgren ordered the pilot of the Harvest Moon to run into
Tybee, and to work his way through to Wassaw Sound and the Ogeechee
River by the Romney Marshes.  We were caught by a low tide and
stuck in the mud.  After laboring some time, the admiral ordered
out his barge; in it we pulled through this intricate and shallow
channel, and toward evening of December 21st we discovered, coming
toward us, a tug, called the Red Legs, belonging to the
Quarter-master's Department, with a staff-officer on board, bearing
letters from Colonel Dayton to myself and the admiral, reporting that
the city of Savannah had been found evacuated on the morning of
December 21st, and was then in our possession.  General Hardee had
crossed the Savannah River by a pontoon-bridge, carrying off his men
and light artillery, blowing up his iron-clads and navy-yard, but
leaving for us all the heavy guns, stores, cotton, railway-cars,
steamboats, and an immense amount of public and private property.
Admiral Dahlgren concluded to go toward a vessel (the Sonoma) of his
blockading fleet, which lay at anchor near Beaulieu, and I
transferred to the Red Legs, and hastened up the Ogeechee River to
Grog's Bridge, whence I rode to my camp that same night. I there
learned that, early on the morning of December 21st, the skirmishers
had detected the absence of the enemy, and had occupied his lines
simultaneously along their whole extent; but the left flank (Slocum),
especially Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, claimed to have
been the first to reach the heart of the city.

Generals Slocum and Howard moved their headquarters at once into
the city, leaving the bulk of their troops in camps outside.  On
the morning of December 22d I followed with my own headquarters,
and rode down Bull Street to the custom-house, from the roof of
which we had an extensive view over the city, the river, and the
vast extent of marsh and rice-fields on the South Carolina side.
The navy-yard, and the wreck of the iron-clad ram Savannah, were
still smouldering, but all else looked quiet enough.  Turning back,
we rode to the Pulaski Hotel, which I had known in years long gone,
and found it kept by a Vermont man with a lame leg, who used to be
a clerk in the St. Louis Hotel, New Orleans, and I inquired about
the capacity of his hotel for headquarters.  He was very anxious to
have us for boarders, but I soon explained to him that we had a
full mess equipment along, and that we were not in the habit of
paying board; that one wing of the building would suffice for our
use, while I would allow him to keep an hotel for the accommodation
of officers and gentlemen in the remainder.  I then dispatched an
officer to look around for a livery-stable that could accommodate
our horses, and, while waiting there, an English gentleman, Mr.
Charles Green, came and said that he had a fine house completely
furnished, for which he had no use, and offered it as headquarters.
He explained, moreover, that General Howard had informed him, the
day before, that I would want his house for headquarters.  At first
I felt strongly disinclined to make use of any private dwelling,
lest complaints should arise of damage and lose of furniture, and
so expressed myself to Mr. Green; but, after riding about the city,
and finding his house so spacious, so convenient, with large yard
and stabling, I accepted his offer, and occupied that house during
our stay in Savannah.  He only reserved for himself the use of a
couple of rooms above the dining-room, and we had all else, and a
most excellent house it was in all respects.

I was disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his army, but on
the whole we had reason to be content with the substantial fruits
of victory.  The Savannah River was found to be badly obstructed by
torpedoes, and by log piers stretched across the channel below the
city, which piers were filled with the cobble stones that formerly
paved the streets.  Admiral Dahlgren was extremely active, visited
me repeatedly in the city, while his fleet still watched
Charleston, and all the avenues, for the blockade-runners that
infested the coast, which were notoriously owned and managed by
Englishmen, who used the island of New Providence (Nassau) as a
sort of entrepot.  One of these small blockade-runners came into
Savannah after we were in full possession, and the master did not
discover his mistake till he came ashore to visit the custom-house.
Of coarse his vessel fell a prize to the navy.  A heavy force was
at once set to work to remove the torpedoes and obstructions in the
main channel of the river, and, from that time forth, Savannah
became the great depot of supply for the troops operating in that
quarter.

Meantime, on the 15th and 16th of December, were fought, in front
of Nashville, the great battles in which General Thomas so nobly
fulfilled his promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fully
given in his own official reports, long-since published.  Rumors of
these great victories reached us at Savannah by piecemeal, but his
official report came on the 24th of December, with a letter from
General Grant, giving in general terms the events up to the 18th,
and I wrote at once through my chief of staff, General Webster, to
General Thomas, complimenting him in the highest terms.  His
brilliant victory at Nashville was necessary to mine at Savannah to
make a complete whole, and this fact was perfectly comprehended by
Mr. Lincoln, who recognized it fully in his personal letter of
December 26th, hereinbefore quoted at length, and which is also
claimed at the time, in my Special Field Order No. 6, of January 8,
1865, here given:

(Special Field Order No. 6.)

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 8, 1864.

The general commanding announces to the troops composing the
Military Division of the Mississippi that he has received from the
President of the United States, and from Lieutenant-General Grant,
letters conveying their high sense and appreciation of the campaign
just closed, resulting in the capture of Savannah and the defeat of
Hood's army in Tennessee.

In order that all may understand the importance of events, it is
proper to revert to the situation of affairs in September last.  We
held Atlanta, a city of little value to us, but so important to the
enemy that Mr. Davis, the head of the rebellious faction in the
South, visited his army near Palmetto, and commanded it to regain
the place and also to ruin and destroy us, by a series of measures
which he thought would be effectual.  That army, by a rapid march,
gained our railroad near Big Shanty, and afterward about Dalton.
We pursued it, but it moved so rapidly that we could not overtake
it, and General Hood led his army successfully far over toward
Mississippi, in hope to decoy us out of Georgia.  But we were not
thus to be led away by him, and preferred to lead and control
events ourselves.  Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the
departments to our rear, returned to their posts and prepared to
decoy General Hood into their meshes, while we came on to complete
the original journey.  We quietly and deliberately destroyed
Atlanta, and all the railroads which the enemy had used to carry on
war against us, occupied his State capital, and then captured his
commercial capital, which had been so strongly fortified from the
sea as to defy approach from that quarter.  Almost at the moment of
our victorious entry into Savannah came the welcome and expected
news that our comrades in Tennessee had also fulfilled nobly and
well their part, had decoyed General Hood to Nashville and then
turned on him, defeating his army thoroughly, capturing all his
artillery, great numbers of prisoners, and were still pursuing the
fragments down in Alabama.  So complete success in military
operations, extending over half a continent, is an achievement that
entitles it to a place in the military history of the world.  The
armies serving in Georgia and Tennessee, as well as the local
garrisons of Decatur, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, and Murfreesboro',
are alike entitled to the common honors, and each regiment may
inscribe on its colors, at pleasure, the word "Savannah" or
"Nashville."  The general commanding embraces, in the same general
success, the operations of the cavalry under Generals Stoneman,
Burbridge, and Gillem, that penetrated into Southwest Virginia, and
paralyzed the efforts of the enemy to disturb the peace and safety
of East Tennessee.  Instead of being put on the defensive, we have
at all points assumed the bold offensive, and have completely
thwarted the designs of the enemies of our country.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,
L.  M.  DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.


Here terminated the "March to the Sea," and I only add a few
letters, selected out of many, to illustrate the general feeling of
rejoicing throughout the country at the time.  I only regarded the
march from Atlanta to Savannah as a "shift of base," as the
transfer of a strong army, which had no opponent, and had finished
its then work, from the interior to a point on the sea-coast, from
which it could achieve other important results.  I considered this
march as a means to an end, and not as an essential act of war.
Still, then, as now, the march to the sea was generally regarded as
something extraordinary, something anomalous, something out of the
usual order of events; whereas, in fact, I simply moved from
Atlanta to Savannah, as one step in the direction of Richmond, a
movement that had to be met and defeated, or the war was
necessarily at an end.

Were I to express my measure of the relative importance of the
march to the sea, and of that from Savannah northward, I would
place the former at one, and the latter at ten, or the maximum.

I now close this long chapter by giving a tabular statement of the
losses during the march, and the number of prisoners captured.  The
property captured consisted of horses and mules by the thousand,
and of quantities of subsistence stores that aggregate very large,
but may be measured with sufficient accuracy by assuming that
sixty-five thousand men obtained abundant food for about forty
days, and thirty-five thousand animals were fed for a like period,
so as to reach Savannah in splendid flesh and condition.  I also
add a few of the more important letters that passed between
Generals Grant, Halleck, and myself, which illustrate our opinions
at that stage of the war:

STATEMENT OF CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE ARMY IN THE
FIELD, CAMPAIGN OF GEORGIA.

   Killed        Wounded         Missing       Captured
Officers/Men   Officers/Men   Officers/Men   Officers/Men
   10    93        24   404       1    277       77  1,261



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 16, 1864

Major-General SHERMAN (via Hilton Head).


GENERAL: Lieutenant-General Grant informs me that, in his last
dispatch sent to you, he suggested the transfer of your infantry to
Richmond.  He now wishes me to say that you will retain your entire
force, at least for the present, and, with such assistance as may
be given you by General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, operate from
such base as you may establish on the coast.  General Foster will
obey such instructions as may be given by you.

Should you have captured Savannah, it is thought that by
transferring the water-batteries to the land side that place may be
made a good depot and base of operations on Augusta, Branchville,
or Charleston.  If Savannah should not be captured, or if captured
and not deemed suitable for this purpose, perhaps Beaufort would
serve as a depot.  As the rebels have probably removed their most
valuable property from Augusta, perhaps Branchville would be the
most important point at which to strike in order to sever all
connection between Virginia and the Southwestern Railroad.

General Grant's wishes, however, are, that this whole matter of
your future actions should be entirely left to your discretion.

We can send you from here a number of complete batteries of
field-artillery, with or without horses, as you may desire; also, as
soon as General Thomas can spare them, all the fragments,
convalescents, and furloughed men of your army.  It is reported that
Thomas defeated Hood yesterday, near Nashville, but we have no
particulars nor official reports, telegraphic communication being
interrupted by a heavy storm.

Our last advises from you was General Howard's note, announcing his
approach to Savannah.  Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 18, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah (via Hilton Head).

My DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 13th, by Major Anderson, is just
received.  I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shall
very soon expect to hear of the crowning work of your campaign--the
capture of Savannah.  Your march will stand out prominently as the
great one of this great war.  When Savannah falls, then for another
wide swath through the centre of the Confederacy.  But I will not
anticipate.  General Grant is expected here this morning, and will
probably write you his own views.

I do not learn from your letter, or from Major Anderson, that you
are in want of any thing which we have not provided at Hilton Head.
Thinking it probable that you might want more field-artillery, I
had prepared several batteries, but the great difficulty of
foraging horses on the sea-coast will prevent our sending any
unless you actually need them.  The hay-crop this year is short,
and the Quartermaster's Department has great difficulty in
procuring a supply for our animals.

General Thomas has defeated Hood, near Nashville, and it is hoped
that he will completely, crush his army.  Breckenridge, at last
accounts, was trying to form a junction near Murfreesboro', but, as
Thomas is between them, Breckenridge must either retreat or be
defeated.

General Rosecrans made very bad work of it in Missouri, allowing
Price with a small force to overrun the State and destroy millions
of property.

Orders have been issued for all officers and detachments having
three months or more to serve, to rejoin your army via Savannah.
Those having less than three months to serve, will be retained by
General Thomas.

Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the
place may be destroyed, and, if a little salt should be sown upon
its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of
nullification and secession.
Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 18, 1864.

To Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

My DEAR GENERAL: I have just received and read, I need not tell you
with how mush gratification, your letter to General Halleck.  I
congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command
on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign.  I
never had a doubt of the result.  When apprehensions for your
safety were expressed by the President, I assured him with the army
you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but you
would strike bottom on salt-water some place; that I would not feel
the same security--in fact, would not have intrusted the expedition
to any other living commander.

It has been very hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood.  I gave
him the most peremptory order, and had started to go there myself,
before he got off.  He has done magnificently, however, since he
started.  Up to last night, five thousand prisoners and forty-nine
pieces of captured artillery, besides many wagons and innumerable
small-arms, had been received in Nashville.  This is exclusive of
the enemy's loss at Franklin, which amounted to thirteen general
officers killed, wounded, and captured.  The enemy probably lost
five thousand men at Franklin, and ten thousand in the last three
days' operations.  Breckenridge is said to be making for
Murfreesboro'.

I think he is in a most excellent place.  Stoneman has nearly wiped
out John Morgan's old command, and five days ago entered Bristol.
I did think the best thing to do was to bring the greater part of
your army here, and wipe out Lee.  The turn affairs now seem to be
taking has shaken me in that opinion.  I doubt whether you may not
accomplish more toward that result where you are than if brought
here, especially as I am informed, since my arrival in the city,
that it would take about two months to get you here with all the
other calls there are for ocean transportation.

I want to get your views about what ought to be done, and what can
be done.  If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it certainly
will compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly the
whole South.  My own opinion is that Lee is averse to going out of
Virginia, and if the cause of the South is lost he wants Richmond
to be the last place surrendered.  If he has such views, it may be
well to indulge him until we get every thing else in our hands.

Congratulating you and the army again upon the splendid results of
your campaign, the like of which is not read of in past history, I
subscribe myself, more than ever, if possible, your friend,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.




HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 26, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah, Georgia.

GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 22d inst., brought by
Major Grey of General Foster's staff; is fast at hand.  As the
major starts back at once, I can do no more at present than simply
acknowledge its receipt.  The capture of Savannah, with all its
immense stores, must tell upon the people of the South.  All well
here.
Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL: Your letter of December 18th is just received.  I feel
very much gratified at receiving the handsome commendation you pay
my army.  I will, in general orders, convey to the officers and men
the substance of your note.

I am also pleased that you have modified your former orders, for I
feared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb the
unity and morale of my army, now so perfect.

The occupation of Savannah, which I have heretofore reported,
completes the first part of our game, and fulfills a great part of
your instructions; and we are now engaged in dismantling the rebel
forts which bear upon the sea-channels, and transferring the heavy
ordnance and ammunition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where they
can be more easily guarded than if left in the city.

The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and with
slight modifications can be held by a comparatively small force;
and in about ten days I expect to be ready to sally forth again.  I
feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans.  I have thought them
over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight.  I
left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in
doubt as to my objective point, after we cross the Savannah River,
whether it be Augusta or Charleston, and will naturally divide his
forces.  I will then move either on Branchville or Colombia, by any
curved line that gives us the best supplies, breaking up in our
course as much railroad as possible; then, ignoring Charleston and
Augusta both, I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing there
long enough to observe the effect.  I would then strike for the
Charleston & Wilmington Railroad, somewhere between the Santee and
Cape Fear Rivers, and, if possible, communicate with the fleet
under Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a most agreeable gentleman,
accommodating himself to our wishes and plans).  Then I would favor
an attack on Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler will
fail in their present undertaking.  Charleston is now a mere
desolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take to
starve it out.  Still, I am aware that, historically and
politically, much importance is attached to the place, and it may
be that, apart from its military importance, both you and the
Administration may prefer I should give it more attention; and it
would be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject,
for otherwise I would treat it as I have expressed, as a point of
little importance, after all its railroads leading into the
interior have been destroyed or occupied by us.  But, on the
hypothesis of ignoring Charleston and taking Wilmington, I would
then favor a movement direct on Raleigh.  The game is then up with
Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me; in
which case I should reckon on your being on his heels.  Now that
Hood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter to
an issue as quick as possible.  I feel confident that I can break
up the whole railroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina,
and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time
spring fairly opens; and, if you feel confident that you can whip
Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that I
can handle him in the open country.

One reason why I would ignore Charleston is this: that I believe
Hardee will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty of
provisions; I know that the neck back of Charleston can be made
impregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siege
operations.

I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas can
spare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents,
etc., belonging to these four corps, sent forward at once.  I do
not want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations as
all-important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down into
Alabama, trusting to the country for supplies.

I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review the
whole army.  I do not like to boast, but believe this army has a
confidence in itself that makes it almost invincible.  I wish you
could run down and see us; it would have a good effect, and show to
both armies that they are acting on a common plan.  The weather is
now cool and pleasant, and the general health very good. Your true
friend,

W. T. SHERMAN Major-General.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, Chief-of-Staff; Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I had the pleasure of receiving your two letters of the
16th and 18th instant to-day, and feel more than usually flattered
by the high encomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, which
is now complete by the occupation of Savannah.

I am also very glad that General Grant has changed his mind about
embarking my troops for James River, leaving me free to make the
broad swath you describe through South and North Carolina; and
still more gratified at the news from Thomas, in Tennessee, because
it fulfills my plans, which contemplated his being able to dispose
of Hood, in case he ventured north of the Tennessee River.  So, I
think, on the whole, I can chuckle over Jeff. Davis's
disappointment in not turning my Atlanta campaign into a "Moscow
disaster."

I have just finished a long letter to General Grant, and have
explained to him that we are engaged in shifting our base from the
Ogeeohee to the Savannah River, dismantling all the forts made by
the enemy to bear upon the salt-water channels, transferring the
heavy ordnance, etc., to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, and in
remodeling the enemy's interior lines to suit our future plans and
purposes.  I have also laid down the programme for a campaign which
I can make this winter, and which will put me in the spring on the
Roanoke, in direct communication with General Grant on James River.
In general terms, my plan is to turn over to General Foster the
city of Savannah, to sally forth with my army resupplied, cross the
Savannah, feign on Charleston and Augusta, but strike between,
breaking en route the Charleston & Augusta Railroad, also a large
part of that from Branchville and Camden toward North Carolina, and
then rapidly to move for some point of the railroad from Charleston
to Wilmington, between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers; then,
communicating with the fleet in the neighborhood of Georgetown, I
would turn upon Wilmington or Charleston, according to the
importance of either.  I rather prefer Wilmington, as a live place,
over Charleston, which is dead and unimportant when its railroad
communications are broken.  I take it for granted that the present
movement on Wilmington will fail.  If I should determine to take
Charleston, I would turn across the country (which I have hunted
over many a time) from Santee to Mount Pleasant, throwing one wing
on the peninsula between the Ashley and Cooper.  After
accomplishing one or other of these ends, I would make a bee-line
for Raleigh or Weldon, when Lee world be forced to come out of
Richmond, or acknowledge himself beaten. He would, I think, by the
use of the Danville Railroad, throw himself rapidly between me and
Grant, leaving Richmond in the hands of the latter.  This would not
alarm me, for I have an army which I think can maneuver, and I
world force him to attack me at a disadvantage, always under the
supposition that Grant would be on his heels; and, if the worst
come to the worst, I can fight my way down to Albermarle Sound, or
Newbern.

I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest
moves, and my experience is, that they are easier of execution than
more timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them--as, for
instance, my recent campaign.

I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain extent,
for the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can be
brought to bear in any one battle, and I do not believe that any
one general can handle more than sixty thousand men in battle.

I think our campaign of the last month, as well as every step I
take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon
Lee's army as though we were operating within the sound of his
artillery.

I am very anxious that Thomas should follow up his success to the
very utmost point. My orders to him before I left Kingston were,
after beating Hood, to follow him as far as Columbus, Mississippi,
or Selma, Alabama, both of which lie in districts of country which
are rich in corn and meat.

I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy's
country, because this war differs from European wars in this
particular: we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile
people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard
hand of war, as well as their organized armies.  I know that this
recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect
in this respect.  Thousands who had been deceived by their lying
newspapers to believe that we were being whipped all the time now
realize the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the
same experience.  To be sure, Jeff. Davis has his people under
pretty good discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken in
Georgia, and before we have done with her South Carolina will not
be quite so tempestuous.

I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and do not think
"salt" will be necessary.  When I move, the Fifteenth Corps will be
on the right of the right wing, and their position will naturally
bring them into Charleston first; and, if you have watched the
history of that corps, you will have remarked that they generally
do their work pretty well.  The truth is, the whole army is burning
with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina.
I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that
seems in store for her.

Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go to
South Carolina; and, when I answered that we were enroute for that
State, the invariable reply was, "Well, if you will make those
people feel the utmost severities of war, we will pardon you for
your desolation of Georgia."

I look upon Colombia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if
we shall spare the public buildings there as we did at
Milledgeville.

I have been so busy lately that I have not yet made my official
report, and I think I had better wait until I get my subordinate
reports before attempting it, as I am anxious to explain clearly
not only the reasons for every step, but the amount of execution
done, and this I cannot do until I get the subordinate reports; for
we marched the whole distance in four or more columns, and, of
course, I could only be present with one, and generally that one
engaged in destroying railroads.  This work of destruction was
performed better than usual, because I had an engineer-regiment,
provided with claws to twist the bars after being heated.  Such
bars can never be used again, and the only way in which a railroad
line can be reconstructed across Georgia is, to make a new road
from Fairburn Station (twenty-four miles southwest of Atlanta) to
Madison, a distance of one hundred miles; and, before that can be
done, I propose to be on the road from Augusta to Charleston, which
is a continuation of the same.  I felt somewhat disappointed at
Hardee's escape, but really am not to blame.  I moved as quickly as
possible to close up the "Union Causeway," but intervening
obstacles were such that, before I could get troops on the road,
Hardee had slipped out.  Still, I know that the men that were in
Savannah will be lost in a measure to Jeff. Davis, for the Georgia
troops, under G. W. Smith, declared they would not fight in South
Carolina, and they have gone north, en route for Augusta, and I
have reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone to
Wilmington; in other words, they are scattered.  I have reason to
believe that Beauregard was present in Savannah at the time of its
evacuation, and think that he and Hardee are now in Charleston,
making preparations for what they suppose will be my next step.

Please say to the President that I have received his kind message
(through Colonel Markland), and feel thankful for his high favor.
If I disappoint him in the future, it shall not be from want of
zeal or love to the cause.

From you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for the
future, which may enable me to correct errors before it is too
late.  I do not wish to be rash, but want to give my rebel friends
no chance to accuse us of want of enterprise or courage.

Assuring you of my high personal respect, I remain, as ever, your
friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.




[General Order No. 3.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON, January 14, 1865.

The following resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives
is published to the army:

[PUBLIC RESOLUTION--No. 4.]

Joint resolution tendering the thanks of the people and of Congress
to Major-General William T. Sherman, and the officers and soldiers
of his command, for their gallant conduct in their late brilliant
movement through Georgia.

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of
the people and of the Congress of the United States are due and are
hereby tendered to Major-General William T. Sherman, and through
him to the officers and men under his command, for their gallantry
and good conduct in their late campaign from Chattanooga to
Atlanta, and the triumphal march thence through Georgia to
Savannah, terminating in the capture and occupation of that city;
and that the President cause a copy of this joint resolution to be
engrossed and forwarded to Major-General Sherman.

Approved, January 10, 1865.

By order of the Secretary of War,
W. A. NICHOLS, Assistant Adjutant-General.




CHAPTER XXII.

SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO.

DECEMBER, 1884, AND JANUARY, 1885.

The city of Savannah was an old place, and usually accounted a
handsome one.  Its houses were of brick or frame, with large yards,
ornamented with shrubbery and flowers; its streets perfectly
regular, crossing each other at right angles; and at many of the
intersections were small inclosures in the nature of parks.  These
streets and parks were lined with the handsomest shade-trees of
which I have knowledge, viz., the Willow-leaf live-oak, evergreens
of exquisite beauty; and these certainly entitled Savannah to its
reputation as a handsome town more than the houses, which, though
comfortable, would hardly make a display on Fifth Avenue or the
Boulevard Haussmann of Paris.  The city was built on a plateau of
sand about forty feet above the level of the sea, abutting against
the river, leaving room along its margin for a street of stores and
warehouses.  The customhouse, court-house, post-office, etc., were
on the plateau above.  In rear of Savannah was a large park, with a
fountain, and between it and the court-house was a handsome
monument, erected to the memory of Count Pulaski, who fell in 1779
in the assault made on the city at the time it was held by the
English during the Revolutionary War.  Outside of Savannah there
was very little to interest a stranger, except the cemetery of
Bonaventura, and the ride along the Wilmington Channel by way of
Thunderbolt, where might be seen some groves of the majestic
live-oak trees, covered with gray and funereal moss, which were
truly sublime in grandeur, but gloomy after a few days' camping
under them:

Within an hour of taking up my quarters in Mr. Green's house, Mr.
A. G. Browne, of Salem, Massachusetts, United States Treasury agent
for the Department of the South, made his appearance to claim
possession, in the name of the Treasury Department, of all captured
cotton, rice, buildings, etc.  Having use for these articles
ourselves, and having fairly earned them, I did not feel inclined
to surrender possession, and explained to him that the
quartermaster and commissary could manage them more to my liking
than he; but I agreed, after the proper inventories had been
prepared, if there remained any thing for which we had no special
use, I would turn it over to him.  It was then known that in the
warehouses were stored at least twenty-five thousand bales of
cotton, and in the forts one hundred and fifty large, heavy
sea-coast guns: although afterward, on a more careful count, there
proved to be more than two hundred and fifty sea-coast or siege
guns, and thirty-one thousand bales of cotton.  At that interview
Mr. Browne, who was a shrewd, clever Yankee, told me that a vessel
was on the point of starting for Old Point Comfort, and, if she had
good weather off Cape Hatteras, would reach Fortress Monroe by
Christmas-day, and he suggested that I might make it the occasion
of sending a welcome Christmas gift to the President, Mr. Lincoln,
who peculiarly enjoyed such pleasantry.  I accordingly sat down and
wrote on a slip of paper, to be left at the telegraph-office at
Fortress Monroe for transmission, the following:


SAVANNAH GEORGIA, December 22, 1884.
To His Excellency President Lincoln, Washington, D. C.:

I beg to present you as a Christmas-gift the city of Savannah, with
one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, also
about twenty five thousand bales of cotton.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


This message actually reached him on Christmas-eve, was extensively
published in the newspapers, and made many a household unusually
happy on that festive day; and it was in the answer to this
dispatch that Mr. Lincoln wrote me the letter of December 28th,
already given, beginning with the words, "many, many thanks," etc.,
which he sent at the hands of General John A.  Logan, who happened
to be in Washington, and was coming to Savannah, to rejoin his
command.

On the 23d of December were made the following general orders for
the disposition of the troops in and about Savannah:

[Special Field Order No. 139.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 23, 1864.

Savannah, being now in our possession, the river partially cleared
out, and measures having been taken to remove all obstructions,
will at once be made a grand depot for future operations:

1.  The chief-quartermaster, General Euston, will, after giving the
necessary orders touching the transports in Ogeechee River and
Oasabaw Sound, come in person to Savannah, and take possession of
all public buildings, vacant storerooms, warehouses, etc., that may
be now or hereafter needed for any department of the army.  No
rents will be paid by the Government of the United States during
the war, and all buildings must be distributed according to the
accustomed rates of the Quartermaster's Department, as though they
were public property.

2.  The chief commissary of subsistence, Colonel A.  Beckwith, will
transfer the grand depot of the army to the city of Savannah,
secure possession of the needful buildings and offices, and give
the necessary orders, to the end that the army may be supplied
abundantly and well.

S.  The chief-engineer, Captain Poe, will at once direct which of
the enemy's forts are to be retained for our use, and which
dismantled and destroyed.  The chief ordnance-officer, Captain
Baylor, will in like manner take possession of all property
pertaining to his department captured from the enemy, and cause the
same to be collected and conveyed to points of security; all the
heavy coast-guns will be dismounted and carried to Fort Pulaski.

4.  The troops, for the present, will be grouped about the city of
Savannah, looking to convenience of camps; General Slocum taking
from the Savannah River around to the seven-mile post on the Canal,
and General Howard thence to the sea; General Kilpatrick will hold
King's Bridge until Fort McAllister is dismantled, and the troops
withdrawn from the south side of the Ogeechee, when he will take
post about Anderson's plantation, on the plank-road, and picket all
the roads leading from the north and west.

5.  General Howard will keep a small guard at Forts Rosedale,
Beaulieu, Wimberley, Thunderbolt, and Bonaventura, and he will
cause that shore and Skidaway Island to be examined very closely,
with a view to finding many and convenient points for the
embarkation of troops and wagons on seagoing vessels.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L.  M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.



[Special Field Order No. 143.]


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 26, 1864.

The city of Savannah and surrounding country will be held as a
military post, and adapted to future military uses, but, as it
contains a population of some twenty thousand people, who must be
provided for, and as other citizens may come, it is proper to lay
down certain general principles, that all within its military
jurisdiction may understand their relative duties and obligations.

1.  During war, the military is superior to civil authority, and,
where interests clash, the civil must give way; yet, where there is
no conflict, every encouragement should be given to well-disposed
and peaceful inhabitants to resume their usual pursuits.  Families
should be disturbed as little as possible in their residences, and
tradesmen allowed the free use of their shops, tools, etc.;
churches, schools, and all places of amusement and recreation,
should be encouraged, and streets and roads made perfectly safe to
persons in their pursuits.  Passes should not be exacted within the
line of outer pickets, but if any person shall abuse these
privileges by communicating with the enemy, or doing any act of
hostility to the Government of the United States, he or she will be
punished with the utmost rigor of the law.  Commerce with the outer
world will be resumed to an extent commensurate with the wants of
the citizens, governed by the restrictions and rules of the
Treasury Department.

2.  The chief quartermaster and commissary of the army may give
suitable employment to the people, white and black, or transport
them to such points as they may choose where employment can be had;
and may extend temporary relief in the way of provisions and vacant
houses to the worthy and needy, until such time as they can help
themselves.  They will select first the buildings for the necessary
uses of the army; next, a sufficient number of stores, to be turned
over to the Treasury agent for trade-stores.  All vacant
store-houses or dwellings, and all buildings belonging to absent
rebels, will be construed and used as belonging to the United States,
until such time as their titles can be settled by the courts of the
United States.

8.  The Mayor and City Council of Savannah will continue to
exercise their functions, and will, in concert with the commanding
officer of the post and the chief-quartermaster, see that the
fire-companies are kept in organization, the streets cleaned and
lighted, and keep up a good understanding between the citizens and
soldiers.  They will ascertain and report to the chief commissary
of subsistence, as soon as possible, the names and number of worthy
families that need assistance and support.  The mayor will forth
with give public notice that the time has come when all must choose
their course, viz., remain within our lines, and conduct themselves
as good citizens, or depart in peace.  He will ascertain the names
of all who choose to leave Savannah, and report their names and
residence to the chief-quartermaster, that measures may be taken to
transport them beyond our lines.

4.  Not more than two newspapers will be published in Savannah;
their editors and proprietors will be held to the strictest
accountability, and will be punished severely, in person and
property, for any libelous publication, mischievous matter,
premature news, exaggerated statements, or any comments whatever
upon the acts of the constituted authorities; they will be held
accountable for such articles, even though copied from other
papers.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L.  M.  DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.


It was estimated that there were about twenty thousand inhabitants
in Savannah, all of whom had participated more or less in the war,
and had no special claims to our favor, but I regarded the war as
rapidly drawing to a close, and it was becoming a political
question as to what was to be done with the people of the South,
both white and black, when the war was actually over.  I concluded
to give them the option to remain or to join their friends in
Charleston or Augusta, and so announced in general orders.  The
mayor, Dr. Arnold, was completely "subjugated," and, after
consulting with him, I authorized him to assemble his City Council
to take charge generally of the interests of the people; but warned
all who remained that they must be strictly subordinate to the
military law, and to the interests of the General Government.
About two hundred persona, mostly the families of men in the
Confederate army, prepared to follow the fortunes of their husbands
and fathers, and these were sent in a steamboat under a flag of
truce, in charge of my aide Captain Audenried, to Charleston
harbor, and there delivered to an officer of the Confederate army.
But the great bulk of the inhabitants chose to remain in Savannah,
generally behaved with propriety, and good social relations at once
arose between them and the army.  Shortly after our occupation of
Savannah, a lady was announced at my headquarters by the orderly or
sentinel at the front-door, who was ushered into the parlor, and
proved to be the wife of General G. W. Smith, whom I had known
about 1850, when Smith was on duty at West Point.  She was a native
of New London, Connecticut, and very handsome.  She began her
interview by presenting me a letter from her husband, who then
commanded a division of the Georgia militia in the rebel army,
which had just quitted Savannah, which letter began, "DEAR SHERMAN:
The fortunes of war, etc-., compel me to leave my wife in Savannah,
and I beg for her your courteous protection," etc., etc.  I
inquired where she lived, and if anybody was troubling her.  She
said she was boarding with a lady whose husband had, in like manner
with her own, gone off with Hardee's army; that a part of the house
had been taken for the use of Major-General Ward, of Kentucky; that
her landlady was approaching her confinement, and was nervous at
the noise which the younger staff-officers made at night; etc.  I
explained to her that I could give but little personal attention to
such matters, and referred her to General Slocum, whose troops
occupied the city.  I afterward visited her house, and saw,
personally, that she had no reason to complain.  Shortly afterward
Mr. Hardee, a merchant of Savannah, came to me and presented a
letter from his brother, the general, to the same effect, alleging
that his brother was a civilian, had never taken up arms, and asked
of me protection for his family, his cotton, etc.  To him I gave
the general assurance that no harm was designed to any of the
people of Savannah who would remain quiet and peaceable, but that I
could give him no guarantee as to his cotton, for over it I had no
absolute control; and yet still later I received a note from the
wife of General A. P. Stewart (who commanded a corps in Hood's
army), asking me to come to see her.  This I did, and found her to
be a native of Cincinnati, Ohio, wanting protection, and who was
naturally anxious about the fate of her husband, known to be with
General Hood, in Tennessee, retreating before General Thomas.  I
remember that I was able to assure her that he had not been killed
or captured, up to that date, and think that I advised her, instead
of attempting to go in pursuit of her husband, to go to Cincinnati,
to her uncle, Judge Storer, there await the issue of events.

Before I had reached Savannah, and during our stay there, the rebel
officers and newspapers represented the conduct of the men of our
army as simply infamous; that we respected neither age nor sex;
that we burned every thing we came across--barns, stables,
cotton-gins, and even dwelling-houses; that we ravished the women
and killed the men, and perpetrated all manner of outrages on the
inhabitants.  Therefore it struck me as strange that Generals
Hardee and Smith should commit their, families to our custody, and
even bespeak our personal care and attention.  These officers knew
well that these reports were exaggerated in the extreme, and yet
tacitly assented to these publications, to arouse the drooping
energies of the people of the South.

As the division of Major-General John W. Geary, of the Twentieth
Corps, was the first to enter Savannah, that officer was appointed
to command the place, or to act as a sort of governor.  He very
soon established a good police, maintained admirable order, and I
doubt if Savannah, either before or since, has had a better
government than during our stay.  The guard-mountings and parades,
as well as the greater reviews, became the daily resorts of the
ladies, to hear the music of our excellent bands; schools were
opened, and the churches every Sunday were well filled with most
devout and respectful congregations; stores were reopened, and
markets for provisions, meat, wood, etc., were established, so that
each family, regardless of race, color, or opinion, could procure
all the necessaries and even luxuries of life, provided they had
money.  Of course, many families were actually destitute of this,
and to these were issued stores from our own stock of supplies.  I
remember to have given to Dr. Arnold, the mayor, an order for the
contents of a large warehouse of rice, which he confided to a
committee of gentlemen, who went North (to Boston), and soon
returned with one or more cargoes of flour, hams, sugar, coffee,
etc., for gratuitous distribution, which relieved the most pressing
wants until the revival of trade and business enabled the people to
provide for themselves.

A lady, whom I had known in former years as Miss Josephine Goodwin,
told me that, with a barrel of flour and some sugar which she had
received gratuitously from the commissary, she had baked cakes and
pies, in the sale of which she realized a profit of fifty-six
dollars.

Meantime Colonel Poe had reconnoitred and laid off new lines of
parapet, which would enable a comparatively small garrison to hold
the place, and a heavy detail of soldiers was put to work thereon;
Generals Easton and Beckwith had organized a complete depot of
supplies; and, though vessels arrived almost daily with mails and
provisions, we were hardly ready to initiate a new and hazardous
campaign.  I had not yet received from General Grant or General
Halleck any modification of the orders of December 6,1864, to
embark my command for Virginia by sea; but on the 2d of January,
1865, General J. G. Barnard, United States Engineers, arrived
direct from General Grant's headquarters, bearing the following
letter, in the general's own handwriting, which, with my answer, is
here given:



HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 27, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: Before writing you definite instructions for the next
campaign, I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written from
Washington.  Your confidence in being able to march up and join
this army pleases me, and I believe it can be done.  The effect of
such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the
organization of new armies from their broken fragments.  Hood is
now retreating, with his army broken and demoralized.  His loss in
men has probably not been far from twenty thousand, besides
deserters.  If time is given, the fragments may be collected
together and many of the deserters reassembled.  If we can, we
should act to prevent this.  Your spare army, as it were, moving as
proposed, will do it.

In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an intrenched
camp ought to be held on the railroad between Savannah and
Charleston.  Your movement toward Branchville will probably enable
Foster to reach this with his own force.  This will give us a
position in the South from which we can threaten the interior
without marching over long, narrow causeways, easily defended, as
we have heretofore been compelled to do.  Could not such a camp be
established about Pocotaligo or Coosawhatchie?

I have thought that, Hood being so completely wiped out for present
harm, I might bring A. J. Smith here, with fourteen to fifteen
thousand men.  With this increase I could hold my lines, and move
out with a greater force than Lee has.  It would compel Lee to
retain all his present force in the defenses of Richmond or abandon
them entirely.  This latter contingency is probably the only danger
to the easy success of your expedition.  In the event you should
meet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it or find the
sea-coast.  Of course, I shall not let Lee's army escape if I can
help it, and will not let it go without following to the best of my
ability.

Without waiting further directions, than, you may make your
preparations to start on your northern expedition without delay.
Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the
armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can.  I will leave
out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that
your information, gained daily in the course of events, will be
better than any that can be obtained now.

It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg;
but, failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast
ports in North Carolina held by us.  From there you could take
shipping.  It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you could
march the whole distance.

From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty in
supplying your army until you cross the Roanoke.  From there here
is but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected south of
the river to bring you through.  I shall establish communication
with you there, by steamboat and gunboat.  By this means your wants
can be partially supplied.  I shall hope to hear from you soon, and
to hear your plan, and about the time of starting.

Please instruct Foster to hold on to all the property in Savannah,
and especially the cotton.  Do not turn it over to citizens or
Treasury agents, without orders of the War Department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 2, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point.

GENERAL: I have received, by the hands of General Barnard, your
note of 26th and letter of 27th December.

I herewith inclose to you a copy of a projet which I have this
morning, in strict confidence, discussed with my immediate
commanders.

I shall need, however, larger supplies of stores, especially grain.
I will inclose to you, with this, letters from General Easton,
quartermaster, and Colonel Beckwith, commissary of subsistence,
setting forth what will be required, and trust you will forward
them to Washington with your sanction, so that the necessary steps
may be taken at once to enable me to carry out this plan on time.

I wrote you very fully on the 24th, and have nothing to add.  Every
thing here is quiet, and if I can get the necessary supplies in our
wagons, shall be ready to start at the time indicated in my projet
(January 15th).  But, until those supplies are in hand, I can do
nothing; after they are, I shall be ready to move with great
rapidity.

I have heard of the affair at Cape Fear.  It has turned out as you
will remember I expected.

I have furnished General Easton a copy of the dispatch from the
Secretary of War.  He will retain possession of all cotton here,
and ship it as fast as vessels can be had to New York.

I shall immediately send the Seventeenth Corps over to Port Royal,
by boats, to be furnished by Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster
(without interfering with General Easton's vessels), to make a
lodgment on the railroad at Pocotaligo.

General Barnard will remain with me a few days, and I send this by
a staff-officer, who can return on one of the vessels of the
supply-fleet.  I suppose that, now that General Butler has got
through with them, you can spare them to us.

My report of recent operations is nearly ready, and will be sent
you in a day or two, as soon as some farther subordinate reports
come in.

I am, with great respect, very truly, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



[Entirely confidential]

PROJET FOR JANUARY.

1.  Right wing to move men and artillery by transports to head of
Broad River and Beaufort; reestablish Port Royal Ferry, and mass
the wing at or in the neighborhood of Pocotaligo.

Left wing and cavalry to work slowly across the causeway toward
Hardeeville, to open a road by which wagons can reach their corps
about Broad River; also, by a rapid movement of the left, to secure
Sister's Ferry, and Augusta road out to Robertsville.

In the mean time, all guns, shot, shell, cotton, etc., to be moved
to a safe place, easy to guard, and provisions and wagons got ready
for another swath, aiming to have our army in hand about the head
of Broad River, say Pocotaligo, Robertsville, and Coosawhatchie, by
the 15th January.

2.  The whole army to move with loaded wagons by the roads leading
in the direction of Columbia, which afford the best chance of
forage and provisions.  Howard to be at Pocotaligo by the 15th
January, and Slocum to be at Robertsville, and Kilpatrick at or
near Coosawhatchie about the same date.  General Fosters troops to
occupy Savannah, and gunboats to protect the rivers as soon as
Howard gets Pocotaligo.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


Therefore, on the 2d of January, I was authorized to march with my
entire army north by land, and concluded at once to secure a
foothold or starting-point on the South Carolina side, selecting
Pocotaligo and Hardeeville as the points of rendezvous for the two
wings; but I still remained in doubt as to the wishes of the
Administration, whether I should take Charleston en route, or
confine my whole attention to the incidental advantages of breaking
up the railways of South and North Carolina, and the greater object
of uniting my army with that of General Grant before Richmond.

General Barnard remained with me several days, and was regarded
then, as now, one of the first engineers of the age, perfectly
competent to advise me on the strategy and objects of the new
campaign.  He expressed himself delighted with the high spirit of
the army, the steps already taken, by which we had captured
Savannah, and he personally inspected some of the forts, such as
Thunderbolt and Causten's Bluff, by which the enemy had so long
held at bay the whole of our navy, and had defeated the previous
attempts made in April, 1862, by the army of General Gillmore,
which had bombarded and captured Fort Pulaski, but had failed to
reach the city of Savannah.  I think General Barnard expected me to
invite him to accompany us northward in his official capacity; but
Colonel Poe, of my staff, had done so well, and was so perfectly
competent, that I thought it unjust to supersede him by a senior in
his own corps.  I therefore said nothing of this to General
Barnard, and soon after he returned to his post with General Grant,
at City Point, bearing letters and full personal messages of our
situation and wants.

We were very much in want of light-draught steamers for navigating
the shallow waters of the coast, so that it took the Seventeenth
Corps more than a week to transfer from Thunderbolt to Beaufort,
South Carolina.  Admiral Dahlgren had supplied the Harvest Moon and
the Pontiac, and General Foster gave us a couple of hired steamers;
I was really amused at the effect this short sea-voyage had on our
men, most of whom had never before looked upon the ocean.  Of
course, they were fit subjects for sea-sickness, and afterward they
begged me never again to send them to sea, saying they would rather
march a thousand miles on the worst roads of the South than to
spend a single night on the ocean.  By the 10th General Howard had
collected the bulk of the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair) on
Beaufort Island, and began his march for Pocotaligo, twenty-five
miles inland.  They crossed the channel between the island and
main-land during Saturday, the 14th of January, by a pontoon-
bridge, and marched out to Garden's Corners, where there was some
light skirmishing; the next day, Sunday, they continued on to
Pocotaligo, finding the strong fort there abandoned, and
accordingly made a lodgment on the railroad, having lost only two
officers and eight men.

About the same time General Slocum crossed two divisions of the
Twentieth Corps over the Savannah River, above the city, occupied
Hardeeville by one division and Purysburg by another.  Thus, by the
middle of January, we had effected a lodgment in South Carolina,
and were ready to resume the march northward; but we had not yet
accumulated enough provisions and forage to fill the wagons, and
other causes of delay occurred, of which I will make mention in due
order.

On the last day of December, 1864, Captain Breese, United States
Navy, flag-officer to Admiral Porter, reached Savannah, bringing
the first news of General Butler's failure at Fort Fisher, and that
the general had returned to James River with his land-forces,
leaving Admiral Porter's fleet anchored off Cape Fear, in that
tempestuous season.  Captain Breese brought me a letter from the
admiral, dated December 29th, asking me to send him from Savannah
one of my old divisions, with which he said he would make short
work of Fort Fisher; that he had already bombarded and silenced its
guns, and that General Butler had failed because he was afraid to
attack, or even give the order to attack, after (as Porter
insisted) the guns of Fort Fisher had been actually silenced by the
navy.

I answered him promptly on the 31st of December, that I proposed to
march north inland, and that I would prefer to leave the rebel
garrisons on the coast, instead of dislodging and piling them up in
my front as we progressed.  From the chances, as I then understood
them, I supposed that Fort Fisher was garrisoned by a comparatively
small force, while the whole division of General Hoke remained
about the city of Wilmington; and that, if Fort Fisher were
captured, it would leave General Hoke free to join the larger force
that would naturally be collected to oppose my progress northward.
I accordingly answered  Admiral Porter to this effect, declining to
loan him the use of one of my divisions.  It subsequently
transpired, however, that, as soon as General Butler reached City
Point, General Grant was unwilling to rest under a sense of
failure, and accordingly dispatched back the same troops,
reenforced and commanded by General A. H. Terry, who, on the 15th
day of January, successfully assaulted and captured Fort Fisher,
with its entire garrison.  After the war was over, about the 20th
of May, when I was giving my testimony before the Congressional
Committee on the Conduct of the War, the chairman of the committee,
Senator B. F. Wade, of Ohio, told me that General Butler had been
summoned before that committee during the previous January, and had
just finished his demonstration to their entire satisfaction that
Fort Fisher could not be carried by assault, when they heard the
newsboy in the hall crying out an "extra" Calling him in, they
inquired the news, and he answered, "Fort Fisher done took!"  Of
course, they all laughed, and none more heartily than General
Butler himself.

On the 11th of January there arrived at Savannah a revenue-cutter,
having on board Simeon Draper, Esq., of New York City, the Hon. E.
M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Quartermaster-General Meigs,
Adjutant-General Townsend, and a retinue of civilians, who had come
down from the North to regulate the civil affairs of Savannah....

I was instructed by Mr. Stanton to transfer to Mr. Draper the
custom house, post-office, and such other public buildings as these
civilians needed in the execution of their office, and to cause to
be delivered into their custody the captured cotton.  This was
accomplished by--


[Special Field Orders, No. 10.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 12, 1865.

1.  Brevet Brigadier-General Euston, chief-quartermaster, will turn
over to Simeon Draper, Esq., agent of the United States Treasury
Department, all cotton now in the city of Savannah, prize of war,
taking his receipt for the same in gross, and returning for it to
the quartermaster-general.  He will also afford Mr. Draper all the
facilities in his power in the way of transportation, labor, etc.,
to enable him to handle the cotton with expedition.

2.  General Euston will also turn over to Mr. Draper the
custom-house, and such other buildings in the city of Savannah as
he may need in the execution of his office.

By order of General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.


Up to this time all the cotton had been carefully guarded, with
orders to General Euston to ship it by the return-vessels to New
York, for the adjudication of the nearest prize-court, accompanied
with invoices and all evidence of title to ownership.  Marks,
numbers, and other figures, were carefully preserved on the bales,
so that the court might know the history of each bale.  But Mr.
Stanton, who surely was an able lawyer, changed all this, and
ordered the obliteration of all the marks; so that no man, friend
or foe, could trace his identical cotton.  I thought it strange at
the time, and think it more so now; for I am assured that claims,
real and fictitious, have been proved up against this identical
cotton of three times the quantity actually captured, and that
reclamations on the Treasury have been allowed for more than the
actual quantity captured, viz., thirty-one thousand bales.

Mr. Stanton staid in Savannah several days, and seemed very curious
about matters and things in general.  I walked with him through the
city, especially the bivouacs of the several regiments that
occupied the vacant squares, and he seemed particularly pleased at
the ingenuity of the men in constructing their temporary huts.
Four of the "dog-tents," or tentes d'abri, buttoned together,
served for a roof, and the sides were made of clapboards, or rough
boards brought from demolished houses or fences.  I remember his
marked admiration for the hut of a soldier who had made his door
out of a handsome parlor mirror, the glass gone and its gilt frame
serving for his door.

He talked to me a great deal about the negroes, the former slaves,
and I told him of many interesting incidents, illustrating their
simple character and faith in our arms and progress.  He inquired
particularly about General Jeff. C. Davis, who, he said, was a
Democrat, and hostile to the negro.  I assured him that General
Davis was an excellent soldier, and I did not believe he had any
hostility to the negro; that in our army we had no negro soldiers,
and, as a rule, we preferred white soldiers, but that we employed a
large force of them as servants, teamsters, and pioneers, who had
rendered admirable service.  He then showed me a newspaper account
of General Davis taking up his pontoon-bridge across Ebenezer
Creek, leaving sleeping negro men, women, and children, on the
other side, to be slaughtered by Wheeler's cavalry.  I had heard
such a rumor, and advised Mr. Stanton, before becoming prejudiced,
to allow me to send for General Davis, which he did, and General
Davis explained the matter to his entire satisfaction.  The truth
was, that, as we approached the seaboard, the freedmen in droves,
old and young, followed the several columns to reach a place of
safety.  It so happened that General Davis's route into Savannah
followed what was known as the "River-road," and he had to make
constant use of his pontoon-train--the head of his column reaching
some deep, impassable creek before the rear was fairly over
another.  He had occasionally to use the pontoons both day and
night.  On the occasion referred to, the bridge was taken up from
Ebenezer Creek while some of the camp-followers remained asleep on
the farther side, and these were picked up by Wheeler's cavalry.
Some of them, in their fright, were drowned in trying to swim over,
and others may have been cruelly killed by Wheeler's men, but this
was a mere supposition.  At all events, the same thing might have
resulted to General Howard, or to any other of the many most humane
commanders who filled the army.  General Jeff. C. Davis was
strictly a soldier, and doubtless hated to have his wagons and
columns encumbered by these poor negroes, for whom we all felt
sympathy, but a sympathy of a different sort from that of Mr.
Stanton, which was not of pure humanity, but of politics.  The
negro question was beginning to loom up among the political
eventualities of the day, and many foresaw that not only would the
slaves secure their freedom, but that they would also have votes.
I did not dream of such a result then, but knew that slavery, as
such, was dead forever, and did not suppose that the former slaves
would be suddenly, without preparation, manufactured into voters,
equal to all others, politically and socially.  Mr. Stanton seemed
desirous of coming into contact with the negroes to confer with
them, and he asked me to arrange an interview for him.  I
accordingly sent out and invited the most intelligent of the
negroes, mostly Baptist and Methodist preachers, to come to my
rooms to meet the Secretary of War.  Twenty responded, and were
received in my room up-stairs in Mr. Green's house, where Mr.
Stanton and Adjutant-General Townsend took down the conversation in
the form of questions and answers.  Each of the twenty gave his
name and partial history, and then selected Garrison Frazier as
their spokesman:

First Question.  State what your understanding is in regard to the
acts of Congress and President Lincoln's proclamation touching the
colored people in the rebel States?

Answer.  So far as I understand President Lincoln's proclamation to
the rebel States, it is, that if they will lay down their arms and
submit to the laws of the United States, before the 1st of January,
1863, all should be well; but if they did not, then all the slaves
in the Southern States should be free, henceforth and forever.
That is what I understood.

Second Question.  State what you understand by slavery, and the
freedom that was to be given by the President's proclamation?

Answer.  Slavery is receiving by irresistible power the work of
another man, and not by his consent.  The freedom, as I understand
it, promised by the proclamation, is taking us from under the yoke
of bondage and placing us where we can reap the fruit of our own
labor, and take care of ourselves and assist the Government in
maintaining our freedom.

Fourth Question.  State in what manner you would rather live
--whether scattered among the whites, or in colonies by yourselves?

Answer.  I would prefer to live by ourselves, for there is a
prejudice against us in the South that will take years to get over;
but I do not know that I can answer for my brethren.

(All but Mr. Lynch, a missionary from the North, agreed with
Frazier, but he thought they ought to live together, along with the
whites.)

Eighth Question.  If the rebel leaders were to arm the slaves, what
would be its effect?

Answer.  I think they would fight as long as they were before the
"bayonet," and just as soon as they could get away they would
desert, in my opinion.

Tenth Question.  Do you understand the mode of enlistment of
colored persons in the rebel States by State agents, under the act
of Congress; if yea, what is your understanding?

Answer.  My understanding is, that colored persons enlisted by
State agents are enlisted as substitutes, and give credit to the
State and do not swell the army, because every black man enlisted
by a State agent leaves a white man at home; and also that larger
bounties are given, or promised, by the State agents than are given
by the United States.  The great object should be to push through
this rebellion the shortest way; and there seems to be something
wanting in the enlistment by State agents, for it don't strengthen
the army, but takes one away for every colored man enlisted.

Eleventh Question.  State what, in your opinion, is the best way to
enlist colored men as soldiers?

Answer.  I think, sir, that all compulsory operations should be put
a stop to.  The ministers would talk to them, and the young men
would enlist.  It is my opinion that it world be far better for the
State agents to stay at home and the enlistments be made for the
United States under the direction of General Sherman.

Up to this time I was present, and, on Mr. Stanton's intimating
that he wanted to ask some questions affecting me, I withdrew, and
then he put the twelfth and last question.

Twelfth Question.  State what is the feeling of the colored people
toward General Sherman, and how far do they regard his sentiments
and actions as friendly to their rights and interests, or
otherwise.

Answer.  We looked upon General Sherman, prior to his arrival, as a
man, in the providence of God, specially set apart to accomplish
this work, and we unanimously felt inexpressible gratitude to him,
looking upon him as a man who should be honored for the faithful
performance of his duty.  Some of us called upon him immediately
upon his arrival, and it is probable he did not meet the secretary
with more courtesy than he did us.  His conduct and deportment
toward us characterized him as a friend and gentleman.  We have
confidence in General Sherman, and think what concerns us could not
be in better hands.  This is our opinion now, from the short
acquaintance and intercourse we have had.


It certainly was a strange fact that the great War Secretary should
have catechized negroes concerning the character of a general who
had commanded a hundred thousand men in battle, had captured cities
conducted sixty-five thousand men successfully across four hundred
miles of hostile territory, and had just brought tens of thousands
of freedmen to a place of security; but because I had not loaded
down my army by other hundreds of thousands of poor negroes, I was
construed by others as hostile to the black race.  I had received
from General Halleck, at Washington, a letter warning me that there
were certain influential parties near the President who were
torturing him with suspicions of my fidelity to him and his negro
policy; but I shall always believe that Mr. Lincoln, though a
civilian, knew better, and appreciated my motives and character.
Though this letter of General Halleck has always been treated by me
as confidential, I now insert it here at length:



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., December 30, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah.


MY DEAR GENERAL: I take the liberty of calling your attention, in
this private and friendly way, to a matter which may possibly
hereafter be of more importance to you than either of us may now
anticipate.

While almost every one is praising your great march through
Georgia, and the capture of Savannah, there is a certain class
having now great influence with the President, and very probably
anticipating still more on a change of cabinet, who are decidedly
disposed to make a point against you.  I mean in regard to
"inevitable Sambo."  They say that you have manifested an almost
criminal dislike to the negro, and that you are not willing to
carry out the wishes of the Government in regard to him, but
repulse him with contempt! They say you might have brought with you
to Savannah more than fifty thousand, thus stripping Georgia of
that number of laborers, and opening a road by which as many more
could have escaped from their masters; but that, instead of this,
you drove them from your ranks, prevented their following you by
cutting the bridges in your rear, and thus caused the massacre of
large numbers by Wheeler's cavalry.

To those who know you as I do, such accusation will pass as the
idle winds, for we presume that you discouraged the negroes from
following you because you had not the means of supporting them, and
feared they might seriously embarrass your march.  But there are
others, and among them some in high authority, who think or pretend
to think otherwise, and they are decidedly disposed to make a point
against you.

I do not write this to induce you to conciliate this class of men
by doing any thing which you do not deem right and proper, and for
the interest of the Government and the country; but simply to call
your attention to certain things which are viewed here somewhat
differently than from your stand-point.  I will explain as briefly
as possible:

Some here think that, in view of the scarcity of labor in the
South, and the probability that a part, at least, of the
able-bodied slaves will be called into the military service of the
rebels, it is of the greatest importance to open outlets by which
these slaves can escape into our lines, and they say that the route
you have passed over should be made the route of escape, and
Savannah the great place of refuge.  These, I know, are the views
of some of the leading men in the Administration, and they now
express dissatisfaction that you did not carry them out in your
great raid.

Now that you are in possession of Savannah, and there can be no
further fears about supplies, would it not be possible for you to
reopen these avenues of escape for the negroes, without interfering
with your military operations? Could not such escaped slaves find
at least a partial supply of food in the rice-fields about
Savannah, and cotton plantations on the coast?

I merely throw out these suggestions.  I know that such a course
would be approved by the Government, and I believe that a
manifestation on your part of a desire to bring the slaves within
our lines will do much to silence your opponents.  You will
appreciate my motives in writing this private letter.
Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK.




There is no doubt that Mr. Stanton, when he reached Savannah,
shared these thoughts, but luckily the negroes themselves convinced
him that he was in error, and that they understood their own
interests far better than did the men in Washington, who tried to
make political capital out of this negro question.  The idea that
such men should have been permitted to hang around Mr. Lincoln, to
torture his life by suspicions of the officers who were toiling
with the single purpose to bring the war to a successful end, and
thereby to liberate all slaves, is a fair illustration of the
influences that poison a political capital.

My aim then was, to whip the rebels, to humble their pride, to
follow them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dread
us.  "Fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom."  I did not want
them to cast in our teeth what General Hood had once done in
Atlanta, that we had to call on their slaves to help us to subdue
them.  But, as regards kindness to the race, encouraging them to
patience and forbearance, procuring them food and clothing, and
providing them with land whereon to labor, I assert that no army
ever did more for that race than the one I commanded in Savannah.
When we reached Savannah, we were beset by ravenous State agents
from Hilton Head, who enticed and carried away our servants, and
the corps of pioneers which we had organized, and which had done
such excellent service.  On one occasion, my own aide-de-camp,
Colonel Audenried, found at least a hundred poor negroes shut up in
a house and pen, waiting for the night, to be conveyed stealthily
to Hilton Head.  They appealed to him for protection, alleging that
they had been told that they must be soldiers, that "Massa Lincoln"
wanted them, etc.  I never denied the slaves a full opportunity for
voluntary enlistment, but I did prohibit force to be used, for I
knew that the State agents were more influenced by the profit they
derived from the large bounties then being paid than by any love of
country or of the colored race.  In the language of Mr. Frazier,
the enlistment of every black man "did not strengthen the army, but
took away one white man from the ranks."

During Mr. Stanton's stay in Savannah we discussed this negro
question very fully; he asked me to draft an order on the subject,
in accordance with my own views, that would meet the pressing
necessities of the case, and I did so.  We went over this order,
No. 15, of January 16, 1865, very carefully.  The secretary made
some verbal modifications, when it was approved by him in all its
details, I published it, and it went into operation at once.  It
provided fully for the enlistment of colored troops, and gave the
freedmen certain possessory rights to land, which afterward became
matters of judicial inquiry and decision.  Of course, the military
authorities at that day, when war prevailed, had a perfect right to
grant the possession of any vacant land to which they could extend
military protection, but we did not undertake to give a fee-simple
title; and all that was designed by these special field orders was
to make temporary provisions for the freedmen and their families
during the rest of the war, or until Congress should take action in
the premises.  All that I now propose to assert is, that Mr.
Stanton, Secretary of War, saw these orders in the rough, and
approved every paragraph thereof, before they were made public:

[Special Field Orders, No. 15.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 16, 1865.

1.  The islands from Charleston south, the abandoned rice-fields
along the rivers for thirty miles back from the sea, and the
country bordering the St. John's River, Florida, are reserved and
set apart for the settlement of the negroes now made free by the
acts of war and the proclamation of the President of the United
States.

2.  At Beaufort, Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina, St. Augustine,
and Jacksonville, the blacks may remain in their chosen or
accustomed vocations; but on the islands, and in the settlements
hereafter to be established, no white person whatever, unless
military officers and soldiers detailed for duty, will be permitted
to reside; and the sole and exclusive management of affairs will be
left to the freed people themselves, subject only to the United
States military authority, and the acts of Congress.  By the laws
of war, and orders of the President of the United States, the negro
is free, and must be dealt with as such.  He cannot be subjected to
conscription, or forced military service, save by the written
orders of the highest military authority of the department, under
such regulations as the President or Congress may prescribe.
Domestic servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other mechanics,
will be free to select their own work and residence, but the young
and able-bodied negroes must be encouraged to enlist as soldiery in
the service of the United States, to contribute their share toward
maintaining their own freedom, and securing their rights as
citizens of the United States.

Negroes so enlisted will be organized into companies, battalions,
and regiments, under the orders of the United States military
authorities, and will be paid, fed, and clothed; according to law.
The bounties paid on enlistment may, with the consent of the
recruit, go to assist his family and settlement in procuring
agricultural implements, seed, tools, boots, clothing, and other
articles necessary for their livelihood.

8.  Whenever three respectable negroes, heads of families, shall
desire to settle on land, and shall have selected for that purpose
an island or a locality clearly defined within the limits above
designated, the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations will
himself, or, by such subordinate officer as he may appoint, give
them a license to settle such island or district, and afford them
such assistance as he can to enable them to establish a peaceable
agricultural settlement.  The three parties named will subdivide
the land, under the supervision of the inspector, among themselves,
and such others as may choose to settle near them, so that each
family shall have a plot of not more than forty acres of tillable
ground, and, when it borders on some water-channel, with not more
than eight hundred feet water-front, in the possession of which
land the military authorities will afford them protection until
such time as they can protect themselves, or until Congress shall
regulate their title.  The quartermaster may, on the requisition of
the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations, place at the disposal
of the inspector one or more of the captured steamers to ply
between the settlements and one or more of the commercial points
heretofore named, in order to afford the settlers the opportunity
to supply their necessary wants, and to sell the products of their
land and labor.

4.  Whenever a negro has enlisted in the military service of the
United States, he may locate his family in any one of the
settlements at pleasure, and acquire a homestead, and all other
rights and privileges of a settler, as though present in person.
In like manner, negroes may settle their families and engage on
board the gunboats, or in fishing, or in the navigation of the
inland waters, without losing any claim to land or other advantages
derived from this system.  But no one, unless an actual settler as
above defined, or unless absent on Government service, will be
entitled to claim any right to land or property in any settlement
by virtue of these orders.

5.  In order to carry out this system of settlement, a general
officer will be detailed as Inspector of Settlements and
Plantations, whose duty it shall be to visit the settlements, to
regulate their police and general arrangement, and who will furnish
personally to each head of a family, subject to the approval of the
President of the United States, a possessory title in writing,
giving as near as possible the description of boundaries; and who
shall adjust all claims or conflicts that may arise under the same,
subject to the like approval, treating such titles altogether as
possessory.  The same general officer will also be charged with the
enlistment and organization of the negro recruits, and protecting
their interests while absent from their settlements; and will be
governed by the rules and regulations prescribed by the War
Department for such purposes.

6.  Brigadier-General R.  Saxton is hereby appointed Inspector of
Settlements and Plantations, and will at once enter on the
performance of his duties.  No change is intended or desired in the
settlement now on Beaufort Island, nor will any rights to property
heretofore acquired be affected thereby.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,
L.  M.  DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.


I saw a good deal of the secretary socially, during the time of his
visit to Savannah.  He kept his quarters on the revenue-cutter with
Simeon Draper, Esq., which cutter lay at a wharf in the river, but
he came very often to my quarters at Mr. Green's house.  Though
appearing robust and strong, he complained a good deal of internal
pains, which he said threatened his life, and would compel him soon
to quit public office.  He professed to have come from Washington
purposely for rest and recreation, and he spoke unreservedly of the
bickerings and jealousies at the national capital; of the
interminable quarrels of the State Governors about their quotas,
and more particularly of the financial troubles that threatened the
very existence of the Government itself.  He said that the price of
every thing had so risen in comparison with the depreciated money,
that there was danger of national bankruptcy, and he appealed to
me, as a soldier and patriot, to hurry up matters so as to bring
the war to a close.

He left for Port Royal about the 15th of January, and promised to
go North without delay, so as to hurry back to me the supplies I
had called for, as indispensable for the prosecution of the next
stage of the campaign.  I was quite impatient to get off myself,
for a city-life had become dull and tame, and we were all anxious
to get into the pine-woods again, free from the importunities of
rebel women asking for protection, and of the civilians from the
North who were coming to Savannah for cotton and all sorts of
profit.

On the 18th of January General Slocum was ordered to turn over the
city of Savannah to General J. G. Foster, commanding the Department
of the South, who proposed to retain his own headquarters at Hilton
Head, and to occupy Savannah by General Grovers division of the
Nineteenth Corps, just arrived from James River; and on the next
day, viz., January 19th, I made the first general orders for the
move.

These were substantially to group the right wing of the army at
Pocotaligo, already held by the Seventeenth Corps, and the left
wing and cavalry at or near Robertsville, in South Carolina.  The
army remained substantially the same as during the march from
Atlanta, with the exception of a few changes in the commanders of
brigades and divisions, the addition of some men who had joined
from furlough, and the loss of others from the expiration of their
term of service.  My own personal staff remained the same, with the
exception that General W. F. Barry had rejoined us at Savannah,
perfectly recovered from his attack of erysipelas, and continued
with us to the end of the war.  Generals Easton and Beckwith
remained at Savannah, in charge of their respective depots, with
orders to follow and meet us by sea with supplies when we should
reach the coast at Wilmington or Newbern, North Carolina.

Of course, I gave out with some ostentation, especially among the
rebels, that we were going to Charleston or Augusta; but I had long
before made up my mind to waste no time on either, further than to
play off on their fears, thus to retain for their protection a
force of the enemy which would otherwise concentrate in our front,
and make the passage of some of the great rivers that crossed our
route more difficult and bloody.

Having accomplished all that seemed necessary, on the 21st of
January, with my entire headquarters, officers, clerks, orderlies,
etc., with wagons and horses, I embarked in a steamer for Beaufort,
South Carolina, touching at Hilton Head, to see General Foster.
The weather was rainy and bad, but we reached Beaufort safely on
the 23d, and found some of General Blair's troops there.  The pink
of his corps (Seventeenth) was, however, up on the railroad about
Pocotaligo, near the head of Broad River, to which their supplies
were carried from Hilton Head by steamboats.  General Hatch's
division (of General Foster's command) was still at Coosawhatchie
or Tullafinny, where the Charleston & Savannah Railroad crosses the
river of that name.  All the country between Beaufort and
Pocotaligo was low alluvial land, cut up by an infinite number of
salt-water sloughs and freshwater creeks, easily susceptible of
defense by a small force; and why the enemy had allowed us to make
a lodgment at Pocotaligo so easily I did not understand, unless it
resulted from fear or ignorance.  It seemed to me then that the
terrible energy they had displayed in the earlier stages of the war
was beginning to yield to the slower but more certain industry and
discipline of our Northern men.  It was to me manifest that the
soldiers and people of the South entertained an undue fear of our
Western men, and, like children, they had invented such ghostlike
stories of our prowess in Georgia, that they were scared by their
own inventions.  Still, this was a power, and I intended to utilize
it.  Somehow, our men had got the idea that South Carolina was the
cause of all our troubles; her people were the first to fire on
Fort Sumter, had been in a great hurry to precipitate the country
into civil war; and therefore on them should fall the scourge of
war in its worst form.  Taunting messages had also come to us, when
in Georgia, to the effect that, when we should reach South
Carolina, we would find a people less passive, who would fight us
to the bitter end, daring us to come over, etc.; so that I saw and
felt that we would not be able longer to restrain our men as we had
done in Georgia.

Personally I had many friends in Charleston, to whom I would gladly
have extended protection and mercy, but they were beyond my
personal reach, and I would not restrain the army lest its vigor
and energy should be impaired; and I had every reason to expect
bold and strong resistance at the many broad and deep rivers that
lay across our path.

General Foster's Department of the South had been enlarged to
embrace the coast of North Carolina, so that the few troops serving
there, under the command of General Innis N. Palmer, at Newbern,
became subject to my command.  General A. H. Terry held Fort
Fisher, and a rumor came that he had taken the city of Wilmington;
but this was premature.  He had about eight thousand men.  General
Schofield was also known to be en route from Nashville for North
Carolina, with the entire Twenty-third Corps, so that I had every
reason to be satisfied that I would receive additional strength as
we progressed northward, and before I should need it.

General W. J. Hardee commanded the Confederate forces in
Charleston, with the Salkiehatchie River as his line of defense.
It was also known that General Beauregard had come from the
direction of Tennessee, and had assumed the general command of all
the troops designed to resist our progress.

The heavy winter rains had begun early in January, rendered the
roads execrable, and the Savannah River became so swollen that it
filled its many channels, overflowing the vast extent of
rice-fields that lay on the east bank.  This flood delayed our
departure two weeks; for it swept away our pontoon-bridge at
Savannah, and came near drowning John E. Smith's division of the
Fifteenth Corps, with several heavy trains of wagons that were en
route from Savannah to Pocotaligo by the old causeway.

General Slocum had already ferried two of his divisions across the
river, when Sister's Ferry, about forty miles above Savannah, was
selected for the passage of the rest of his wing and of
Kilpatrick's cavalry.  The troops were in motion for that point
before I quitted Savannah, and Captain S. B. Luce, United States
Navy, had reported to me with a gunboat (the Pontiac) and a couple
of transports, which I requested him to use in protecting Sister's
Ferry during the passage of Slocum's wing, and to facilitate the
passage of the troops all he could.  The utmost activity prevailed
at all points, but it was manifest we could not get off much before
the 1st day of February; so I determined to go in person to
Pocotaligo, and there act as though we were bound for Charleston.
On the 24th of January I started from Beaufort with a part of my
staff, leaving the rest to follow at leisure, rode across the
island to a pontoon-bridge that spanned the channel between it and
the main-land, and thence rode by Garden's Corners to a plantation
not far from Pocotaligo, occupied by General Blair.  There we found
a house, with a majestic avenue of live-oaks, whose limbs had been
cut away by the troops for firewood, and desolation marked one of
those splendid South Carolina estates where the proprietors
formerly had dispensed a hospitality that distinguished the old
regime of that proud State.  I slept on the floor of the house, but
the night was so bitter cold that I got up by the fire several
times, and when it burned low I rekindled it with an old
mantel-clock and the wreck of a bedstead which stood in a corner of
the room--the only act of vandalism that I recall done by myself
personally during the war.

The next morning I rode to Pocotaligo, and thence reconnoitred our
entire line down to Coosawhatchie.  Pocotaligo Fort was on low,
alluvial ground, and near it began the sandy pine-land which
connected with the firm ground extending inland, constituting the
chief reason for its capture at the very first stage of the
campaign.  Hatch's division was ordered to that point from
Coosawhatchie, and the whole of Howard's right wing was brought
near by, ready to start by the 1st of February.  I also
reconnoitred the point of the Salkiehatchie River, where the
Charleston Railroad crossed it, found the bridge protected by a
rebel battery on the farther side, and could see a few men about
it; but the stream itself was absolutely impassable, for the whole
bottom was overflowed by its swollen waters to the breadth of a
full mile.  Nevertheless, Force's and Mower's divisions of the
Seventeenth Corps were kept active, seemingly with the intention to
cross over in the direction of Charleston, and thus to keep up the
delusion that that city was our immediate "objective."  Meantime, I
had reports from General Slocum of the terrible difficulties he had
encountered about Sister's Ferry, where the Savannah River was
reported nearly three miles wide, and it seemed for a time almost
impossible for him to span it at all with his frail pontoons.
About this time (January 25th), the weather cleared away bright and
cold, and I inferred that the river would soon run down, and enable
Slocum to pass the river before February 1st.  One of the divisions
of the Fifteenth Corps (Corse's) had also been cut off by the loss
of the pontoon-bridge at Savannah, so that General Slocum had with
him, not only his own two corps, but Corse's division and
Kilpatrick's cavalry, without which it was not prudent for me to
inaugurate the campaign.  We therefore rested quietly about
Pocotaligo, collecting stores and making final preparations, until
the 1st of February, when I learned that the cavalry and two
divisions of the Twentieth Corps were fairly across the river, and
then gave the necessary orders for the march northward.

Before closing this chapter, I will add a few original letters that
bear directly on the subject, and tend to illustrate it:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C.  January 21, 1866.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at
City Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me,
however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on
all points of recommendation.  As I arrived here at 1 p.m., and
must leave at 6 p.m., having in the mean time spent over three
hours with the secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief.
Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into the
heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Maryland,
with his corps.  The advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard
by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad
transportation can be procured from Cincinnati.  The corps numbers
over twenty-one thousand men.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force, surplus to go to
Selma under an energetic leader.  He has been telegraphed to, to
know whether he could go, and, if so, by which of several routes he
would select.  No reply is yet received.  Canby has been ordered to
set offensively from the seacoast to the interior, toward
Montgomery and Selma.  Thomas's forces will move from the north at
an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby.  Without
further reenforcement Canby will have a moving column of twenty
thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured.  We have a force
there of eight thousand effective.  At Newbern about half the
number.  It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has
fallen.  I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we
knew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and
that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there.  If not, he
will be sent to Newbern.  In either event, all the surplus forces
at the two points will move to the interior, toward Goldsboro', in
cooperation with your movements.  From either point, railroad
communications can be run out, there being here abundance of
rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army
south.  Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if
Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher
having overtaken about two thousand.

All other troops are subject to your orders as you come in
communication with them.  They will be so instructed.  From about
Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches many men, or
attempts to evacuate, will pitch in.  In the meantime, should you
be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty
thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about
Richmond.

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the
Gulf.  A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful.
A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will cooperate with you
from Newbern or Wilmington, or both.  You can call for
reenforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will
return with any message you may have for me.  If there is any thing
I can do for you in the way of having supplies on shipboard, at any
point on the seacoast, ready for you, let me know it.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 29, 1885.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

DEAR GENERAL: Captain Hudson has this moment arrived with your
letter of January 21st, which I have read with interest.

The capture of Fort Fisher has a most important bearing on my
campaign, and I rejoice in it for many reasons, because of its
intrinsic importance, and because it gives me another point of
security on the seaboard.  I hope General Terry will follow it up
by the capture of Wilmington, although I do not look for it, from
Admiral Porter's dispatch to me.  I rejoice that Terry was not a
West-Pointer, that he belonged to your army, and that he had the
same troops with which Butler feared to make the attempt.

Admiral Dahlgren, whose fleet is reenforced by some more ironclads,
wants to make an assault a la Fisher on Fort Moultrie, but I
withhold my consent, for the reason that the capture of all
Sullivan's Island is not conclusive as to Charleston; the capture
of James Island would be, but all pronounce that impossible at this
time.  Therefore, I am moving (as hitherto designed) for the
railroad west of Branchville, then will swing across to Orangeburg,
which will interpose my army between Charleston and the interior.
Contemporaneous with this, Foster will demonstrate up the Edisto,
and afterward make a lodgment at Bull's Bay, and occupy the common
road which leads from Mount Pleasant toward Georgetown.  When I get
to Columbia, I think I shall move straight for Goldsboro', via
Fayetteville.  By this circuit I cut all roads, and devastate the
land; and the forces along the coast, commanded by Foster, will
follow my movement, taking any thing the enemy lets go, or so
occupy his attention that he cannot detach all his forces against
me.  I feel sure of getting Wilmington, and may be Charleston, and
being at Goldsboro', with its railroads finished back to Morehead
City and Wilmington, I can easily take Raleigh, when it seems that
Lee must come out.  If Schofield comes to Beaufort, he should be
pushed out to Kinston, on the Neuse, and may be Goldsboro' (or,
rather, a point on the Wilmington road, south of Goldsboro').  It
is not necessary to storm Goldsboro', because it is in a distant
region, of no importance in itself, and, if its garrison is forced
to draw supplies from its north, it, will be eating up the same
stores on which Lee depends for his command.

I have no doubt Hood will bring his army to Augusta.  Canby and
Thomas should penetrate Alabama as far as possible, to keep
employed at least a part of Hood's army; or, what would accomplish
the same thing, Thomas might reoccupy the railroad from Chattanooga
forward to the Etowah, viz., Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, thereby
threatening Georgia.  I know that the Georgia troops are
disaffected.  At Savannah I met delegates from several counties of
the southwest, who manifested a decidedly hostile spirit to the
Confederate cause.  I nursed the feeling as far as possible, and
instructed Grower to keep it up.

My left wing must now be at Sister's Ferry, crossing the Savannah
River to the east bank.  Slocum has orders to be at Robertsville
to-morrow, prepared to move on Barnwell.  Howard is here, all ready
to start for the Augusta Railroad at Midway.

We find the enemy on the east aide of the Salkiehatchie, and
cavalry in our front; but all give ground on our approach, and seem
to be merely watching us.  If we start on Tuesday, in one week we
shall be near Orangeburg, having broken up the Augusta road from
the Edisto westward twenty or twenty-five miles.  I will be sure
that every rail is twisted.  Should we encounter too much
opposition near Orangeburg, then I will for a time neglect that
branch, and rapidly move on Columbia, and fill up the triangle
formed by the Congaree and Wateree (tributaries of the Santee),
breaking up that great centre of the Carolina roads.  Up to that
point I feel full confidence, but from there may have to manoeuvre
some, and will be guided by the questions of weather and supplies.

You remember we had fine weather last February for our Meridian
trip, and my memory of the weather at Charleston is, that February
is usually a fine month.  Before the March storms come we should be
within striking distance of the coast. The months of April and May
will be the best for operations from Goldsboro' to Raleigh and the
Roanoke.  You may rest assured that I will keep my troops well in
hand, and, if I get worsted, will aim to make the enemy pay so
dearly that you will have less to do.  I know that this trip is
necessary; it must be made sooner or later; I am on time, and in
the right position for it.  My army is large enough for the
purpose, and I ask no reinforcement, but simply wish the utmost
activity to be kept up at all other points, so that concentration
against me may not be universal.

I suspect that Jeff. Davis will move heaven and earth to catch me,
for success to this column is fatal to his dream of empire.
Richmond is not more vital to his cause than Columbia and the heart
of South Carolina.

If Thomas will not move on Selma, order him to occupy Rome,
Kingston, and Allatoona, and again threaten Georgia in the
direction of Athena.

I think the "poor white trash" of the South are falling out of
their ranks by sickness, desertion, and every available means; but
there is a large class of vindictive Southerners who will fight to
the last.  The squabbles in Richmond, the howls in Charleston, and
the disintegration elsewhere, are all good omens for us; we must
not relax one iota, but, on the contrary, pile up our efforts: I
world, ere this, have been off, but we had terrific rains, which
caught us in motion, and nearly drowned some of the troops in the
rice-fields of the Savannah, swept away our causeway (which had
been carefully corduroyed), and made the swamps hereabout mere
lakes of slimy mud.  The weather is now good, and I have the army
on terra firma.  Supplies, too, came for a long time by daily
driblets instead of in bulk; this is now all remedied, and I hope
to start on Tuesday.

I will issue instructions to General Foster, based on the
reenforcements of North Carolina; but if Schofield comes, you had
better relieve Foster, who cannot take the field, and needs an
operation on his leg.  Let Schofield take command, with his
headquarters at Beaufort, North Carolina, and with orders to secure
Goldsboro' (with its railroad communication back to Beaufort and
Wilmington).  If Lee lets us get that position, he is gone up.

I will start with my Atlanta army (sixty thousand), supplied as
before, depending on the country for all food in excess of thirty
days.  I will have less cattle on the hoof, but I hear of hogs,
cows, and calves, in Barnwell and the Colombia districts.  Even
here we have found some forage.  Of course, the enemy will carry
off and destroy some forage, but I will burn the houses where the
people burn their forage, and they will get tired of it.

I must risk Hood, and trust to you to hold Lee or be on his heels
if he comes south.  I observe that the enemy has some respect for
my name, for they gave up Pocotaligo without a fight when they
heard that the attacking force belonged to my army.  I will try and
keep up that feeling, which is a real power.  With respect, your
friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-general commanding.

P. S.--I leave my chief-quartermaster and commissary behind to
follow coastwise.
W. T. S.




[Dispatch No. 6.]

FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIA
SAVANNAH RIVER, January 4, 1865.

HON. GIDEON WELLS, Secretary of the Navy.

SIR: I have already apprised the Department that the army of
General Sherman occupied the city of Savannah on the 21st of
December.

The rebel army, hardly respectable in numbers or condition, escaped
by crossing the river and taking the Union Causeway toward the
railroad.

I have walked about the city several times, and can affirm that its
tranquillity is undisturbed.  The Union soldiers who are stationed
within its limits are as orderly as if they were in New York or
Boston....  One effect of the march of General Sherman through
Georgia has been to satisfy the people that their credulity has
been imposed upon by the lying assertions of the rebel Government,
affirming the inability of the United States Government to
withstand the armies of rebeldom.  They have seen the old flag of
the United States carried by its victorious legions through their
State, almost unopposed, and placed in their principal city without
a blow.

Since the occupation of the city General Sherman has been occupied
in making arrangements for its security after he leaves it for the
march that he meditates.  My attention has been directed to such
measures of cooperation as the number and quality of my force
permit.

On the 2d I arrived here from Charleston, whither, as I stated in
my dispatch of the 29th of December, I had gone in consequence of
information from the senior officer there that the rebels
contemplated issuing from the harbor, and his request for my
presence.  Having placed a force there of seven monitors,
sufficient to meet each an emergency, and not perceiving any sign
of the expected raid, I returned to Savannah, to keep in
communication with General Sherman and be ready to render any
assistance that might be desired.  General Sherman has fully
informed me of his plans, and, so far as my means permit, they
shall not lack assistance by water.

On the 3d the transfer of the right wing to Beaufort was began, and
the only suitable vessel I had at hand (the Harvest Moon) was sent
to Thunderbolt to receive the first embarkation.  This took place
about 3 p.m., and was witnessed by General Sherman and General
Bernard (United States Engineers) and myself.  The Pontiac is
ordered around to assist, and the army transports also followed the
first move by the Harvest Moon.

I could not help remarking the unbroken silence that prevailed in
the large array of troops; not a voice was to be heard, as they
gathered in masses on the bluff to look at the vessels.  The notes
of a solitary bugle alone came from their midst.

General Barnard made a brief visit to one of the rebel works
(Cansten's Bluff) that dominated this water-course--the best
approach of the kind to Savannah.

I am collecting data that will fully exhibit to the Department the
powerful character of the defenses of the city and its approaches.
General Sherman will not retain the extended limits they embrace.
but will contract the line very much.

General Foster still holds the position near the Tullifinny.  With
his concurrence I have detached the fleet brigade, and the men
belonging to it have returned to their vessels.  The excellent
service performed by this detachment has fully realized my wishes,
and exemplified the efficiency of the organization--infantry and
light artillery handled as skirmishers.  The howitzers were always
landed as quickly as the men, and were brought into action before
the light pieces of the land-service could be got ashore.

I regret very much that the reduced complements of the vessels
prevent me from maintaining the force in constant organization.
With three hundred more marines and five hundred seamen I could
frequently operate to great advantage, at the present time, when
the attention of the rebels is so engrossed by General Sherman.

It is said that they have a force at Hardeeville, the pickets of
which were retained on the Union Causeway until a few days since,
when some of our troops crossed the river and pushed them back.
Concurrently with this, I caused the Sonoma to anchor so as to
sweep the ground in the direction of the causeway.

The transfer of the right-wing (thirty thousand men) to Beaufort
will so imperil the rebel force at Hardeeville that it will be cut
off or dispersed, if not moved in season.

Meanwhile I will send the Dai-Ching to St. Helena, to meet any want
that may arise in that quarter, while the Mingo and Pontiac will be
ready to act from Broad River.

The general route of the army will be northward; but the exact
direction must be decided more or less by circumstances which it
may not be possible to foresee....

My cooperation will be confined to assistance in attacking
Charleston, or in establishing communication at Georgetown, in case
the army pushes on without attacking Charleston, and time alone
will show which of these will eventuate.

The weather of the winter first, and the condition of the ground in
spring, would permit little advantage to be derived from the
presence of the army at Richmond until the middle of May.  So that
General Sherman has no reason to move in haste, but can choose such
objects as he prefers, and take as much time as their attainment
may demand.  The Department will learn the objects in view of
General Sherman more precisely from a letter addressed by him to
General Halleck, which he read to me a few days since.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral, commanding South-Atlantic Blockading Squadron.




HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 29, 1885.

Major-General J. G. FOSTER, commanding Department of the South.

GENERAL: I have just received dispatches from General Grant,
stating that Schofield's corps (the Twenty-third), twenty-one
thousand strong, is ordered east from Tennessee, and will be sent
to Beaufort, North Carolina.  That is well; I want that force to
secure a point on the railroad about Goldsboro', and then to build
the railroad out to that point.  If Goldsboro' be too strong to
carry by a rapid movement, then a point near the Neuse, south of
Goldsboro', will answer, but the bridge and position about Kinston,
should be held and fortified strong.  The movement should be masked
by the troops already at Newbern.  Please notify General Palmer
that these troops are coming, and to be prepared to receive them.
Major-General Schofield will command in person, and is admirably
adapted for the work.  If it is possible, I want him to secure
Goldsboro', with the railroad back to Morehead City and Wilmington.
As soon as General Schofield reaches Fort Macon, have him to meet
some one of your staff, to explain in full the details of the
situation of affairs with me; and you can give him the chief
command of all troops at Cape Fear and in North Carolina.  If he
finds the enemy has all turned south against me, he need not
follow, but turn his attention against Raleigh; if he can secure
Goldsboro' and Wilmington, it will be as much as I expect before I
have passed the Santee.  Send him all detachments of men that have
come to join my army.  They can be so organized and officered as to
be efficient, for they are nearly all old soldiers who have been
detached or on furlough.  Until I pass the Santee, you can better
use these detachments at Bull's Bay, Georgetown, etc.

I will instruct General McCallum, of the Railroad Department, to
take his men up to Beaufort, North Carolina, and employ them on the
road out.  I do not know that he can use them on any road here.  I
did instruct him, while awaiting information from North Carolina,
to have them build a good trestle-bridge across Port Royal ferry;
but I now suppose the pontoon-bridge will do.  If you move the
pontoons, be sure to make a good road out to Garden's Corners, and
mark it with sign-boards--obstructing the old road, so that, should
I send back any detachments, they would not be misled.

I prefer that Hatch's force should not be materially weakened until
I am near Columbia, when you may be governed by the situation of
affairs about Charleston.  If you can break the railroad between
this and Charleston, then this force could be reduced.

I am, with respect, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 18, 1865.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

SIR: When you left Savannah a few days ago, you forgot the map
which General Geary had prepared for you, showing the route by
which his division entered the city of Savannah, being the first
troops to occupy that city.  I now send it to you.

I avail myself of the opportunity also to inclose you copies of all
my official orders touching trade and intercourse with the people
of Georgia, as well as for the establishment of the negro
settlements.

Delegations of the people of Georgia continue to come in, and I am
satisfied that, by judicious handling and by a little respect shown
to their prejudices, we can create a schism in Jeff. Davis's
dominions.  All that I have conversed with realize the truth that
slavery as an institution is defunct, and the only questions that
remain are what disposition shall be made of the negroes
themselves.  I confess myself unable to offer a complete solution
for these questions, and prefer to leave it to the slower
operations of time.  We have given the initiative, and can afford
to await the working of the experiment.

As to trade-matters, I also think it is to our interest to keep the
Southern people somewhat dependent on the articles of commerce to
which they have hitherto been accustomed.  General Grover is now
here, and will, I think, be able to handle this matter judiciously,
and may gradually relax, and invite cotton to come in in large
quantities.  But at first we should manifest no undue anxiety on
that score; for the rebels would at once make use of it as a power
against us.  We should assume, a tone of perfect contempt for
cotton and every thing else in comparison with the great object of
the war--the restoration of the Union, with all its rights and
power.  It the rebels burn cotton as a war measure, they simply
play into our hands by taking away the only product of value they
have to exchange in foreign ports for war-ships and munitions.  By
such a course, also, they alienate the feelings of a large class of
small farmers who look to their little parcels of cotton to
exchange for food and clothing for their families.  I hope the
Government will not manifest too much anxiety to obtain cotton in
large quantities, and especially that the President will not
indorse the contracts for the purchase of large quantities of
cotton.  Several contracts, involving from six to ten thousand
bales, indorsed by Mr. Lincoln, have been shown me, but were not in
such a form as to amount to an order to compel me to facilitate
their execution.

As to Treasury agents, and agents to take charge of confiscated and
abandoned property, whose salaries depend on their fees, I can only
say that, as a general rule, they are mischievous and disturbing
elements to a military government, and it is almost impossible for
us to study the law and regulations so as to understand fully their
powers and duties.  I rather think the Quartermaster's Department
of the army could better fulfill all their duties and accomplish
all that is aimed at by the law.  Yet on this subject I will leave
Generals Foster and Grover to do the best they can.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.




HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 2, 1865.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have just received from Lieutenant-General Grant a copy of
that part of your telegram to him of December 26th relating to
cotton, a copy of which has been immediately furnished to General
Easton, chief-quartermaster, who will be strictly governed by it.

I had already been approached by all the consuls and half the
people of Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariable
answer was that all the cotton in Savannah was prize of war,
belonged to the United States, and nobody should recover a bale of
it with my consent; that, as cotton had been one of the chief
causes of this war, it should help to pay its expenses; that all
cotton became tainted with treason from the hour the first act of
hostility was committed against the United States some time in
December, 1860; and that no bill of sale subsequent to that date
could convey title.

My orders were that an officer of the Quartermaster's Department,
United States Army, might furnish the holder, agent, or attorney, a
mere certificate of the fact of seizure, with description of the
bales' marks, etc., the cotton then to be turned over to the agent
of the Treasury Department, to be shipped to New York for sale.
But, since the receipt of your dispatch, I have ordered General
Easton to make the shipment himself to the quartermaster at New
York, where you can dispose of it at pleasure.  I do not think the
Treasury Department ought to bother itself with the prizes or
captures of war.

Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York, representing Mr. Molyneux,
former consul here, but absent a long time, called on me with
reference to cotton claimed by English subjects.  He seemed amazed
when I told him I should pay no respect to consular certificates,
that in no event would I treat an English subject with more favor
than one of our own deluded citizens, and that for my part I was
unwilling to fight for cotton for the benefit of Englishmen openly
engaged in smuggling arms and instruments of war to kill us; that,
on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to conduct
my army to Nassau, and wipe out that nest of pirates.  I explained
to him, however, that I was not a diplomatic agent of the General
Government of the United States, but that my opinion, so frankly
expressed, was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him to
heed.  It appeared, also, that he owned a plantation on the line of
investment of Savannah, which, of course, was pillaged, and for
which he expected me to give some certificate entitling him to
indemnification, which I declined emphatically.

I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property--severe but
just--founded upon the laws of nations and the practice of
civilized governments, and am clearly of opinion that we should
claim all the belligerent rights over conquered countries, that the
people may realize the truth that war is no child's play.

I embrace in this a copy of a letter, dated December 31, 1864, in
answer to one from Solomon Cohen (a rich lawyer) to General Blair,
his personal friend, as follows:

Major-General F. P. BLAIR, commanding Seventeenth Army Corps.

GENERAL: Your note, inclosing Mr. Cohen's of this date, is
received, and I answer frankly through you his inquiries.

1.  No one can practise law as an attorney in the United States
without acknowledging the supremacy of our Government.  If I am not
in error, an attorney is as much an officer of the court as the
clerk, and it would be a novel thing in a government to have a
court to administer law which denied the supremacy of the
government itself.

2.  No one will be allowed the privileges of a merchant, or,
rather, to trade is a privilege which no one should seek of the
Government without in like manner acknowledging its supremacy.

3.  If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property,
real and personal, will not be disturbed unless its temporary use
be necessary for the military authorities of the city.  The title
to property will not be disturbed in any event, until adjudicated
by the courts of the United States.

4.  If Mr. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order No. 148, it
is a public acknowledgment that he "adheres to the enemies of the
United States," and all his property becomes forfeited to the
United States.  But, as a matter of favor, he will be allowed to
carry with him clothing and furniture for the use of himself, his
family, and servants, and will be trans ported within the enemy's
lines, but not by way of Port Royal.

These rules will apply to all parties, and from them no exception
will be made.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


This letter was in answer to specific inquiries; it is clear, and
covers all the points, and, should I leave before my orders are
executed, I will endeavor to impress upon my successor, General
Foster, their wisdom and propriety.

I hope the course I have taken in these matters will meet your
approbation, and that the President will not refund to parties
claiming cotton or other property, without the strongest evidence
of loyalty and friendship on the part of the claimant, or unless
some other positive end is to be gained.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.




CHAPTER XXIII.

CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS.

FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1865.

On the 1st day of February, as before explained, the army designed
for the active campaign from Savannah northward was composed of two
wings, commanded respectively by Major-Generals Howard and Slocum,
and was substantially the same that had marched from Atlanta to
Savannah.  The same general orders were in force, and this campaign
may properly be classed as a continuance of the former.

The right wing, less Corse's division, Fifteenth Corps, was grouped
at or near Pocotaligo, South Carolina, with its wagons filled with
food, ammunition, and forage, all ready to start, and only waiting
for the left wing, which was detained by the flood in the Savannah
River.  It was composed as follows:

Fifteenth Corps, Major-General JOHN A. LOGAN.

First Division, Brigadier-General Charles R. Woods;
Second Division, Major-General W. B. Hazen;
Third Division, Brigadier-General John E. Smith;
Fourth Division, Brigadier-General John M. Corse.
Artillery brigade, eighteen guns, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Ross,
First Michigan Artillery.


Seventeenth.  Corps, Major-General FRANK P. BLAIR, JR.

First Division, Major-General Joseph A.  Mower;
Second Division, Brigadier-General M.  F.  Force;
Fourth Division, Brigadier-General Giles A.  Smith.
Artillery brigade, fourteen guns, Major A.  C.  Waterhouse, First
Illinois Artillery.


The left wing, with Corse's division and Kilpatrick's cavalry,
was at and near Sister's Ferry, forty miles above the city of
Savannah, engaged in crossing the river, then much swollen.
It was composed as follows:

Fourteenth Corps, Major-General JEFF. C. DAVIS.

First Division, Brigadier-General W.  P.  Carlin;
Second Division, Brigadier-General John D.  Morgan;
Third Division, Brigadier-General A.  Baird.
Artillery brigade, sixteen guns, Major Charles Houghtaling, First
Illinois Artillery.


Twentieth Corps, Brigadier-General A. S. WILLIAMS.

First Division, Brigadier-General N. I. Jackson;
Second Division, Brigadier-General J. W. Geary;
Third Division, Brigadier-General W. T. Ward.
Artillery brigade, Sixteen gnus, Major J. A. Reynolds, First New
York Artillery.


Cavalry Division, Brigadier-General JUDSON KILPATRICK.

First Brigade, Colonel T. J. Jordan, Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry;
Second Brigade, Colonel S. D. Atkins, Ninety-second Illinois Vol.;
Third Brigade, Colonel George E.  Spencer, First Alabama Cavalry.
One battery of four guns.


The actual strength of the army, as given in the following official
tabular statements, was at the time sixty thousand and seventy-nine
men, and sixty-eight guns.  The trains were made up of about
twenty-five hundred wagons, with six mules to each wagon, and about
six hundred ambulances, with two horses each.  The contents of the
wagons embraced an ample supply of ammunition for a great battle;
forage for about seven days, and provisions for twenty days, mostly
of bread, sugar, coffee, and salt, depending largely for fresh meat
on beeves driven on the hoof and such cattle, hogs, and poultry, as
we expected to gather along our line of march.

RECAPITULATION-CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS.

      February 1.    March 1.    April 1.    April 10
Pers:  60,079         57,676      81,150      88,948


The enemy occupied the cities of Charleston and Augusta, with
garrisons capable of making a respectable if not successful
defense, but utterly unable to meet our veteran columns in the open
field.  To resist or delay our progress north, General Wheeler had
his division of cavalry (reduced to the size of a brigade by his
hard and persistent fighting ever since the beginning of the
Atlanta campaign), and General Wade Hampton had been dispatched
from the Army of Virginia to his native State of South Carolina,
with a great flourish of trumpets, and extraordinary powers to
raise men, money, and horses, with which "to stay the progress of
the invader," and "to punish us for our insolent attempt to invade
the glorious State of South Carolina!"  He was supposed at the time
to have, at and near Columbia, two small divisions of cavalry
commanded by himself and General Butler.

Of course, I had a species of contempt for these scattered and
inconsiderable forces, knew that they could hardly delay us an
hour; and the only serious question that occurred to me was, would
General Lee sit down in Richmond (besieged by General Grant), and
permit us, almost unopposed, to pass through the States of South
and North Carolina, cutting off and consuming the very supplies on
which he depended to feed his army in Virginia, or would he make an
effort to escape from General Grant, and endeavor to catch us
inland somewhere between Columbia and Raleigh?  I knew full well at
the time that the broken fragments of Hood's army (which had
escaped from Tennessee) were being hurried rapidly across Georgia,
by Augusta, to make junction in my front; estimating them at the
maximum twenty-five thousand men, and Hardee's, Wheeler's, and
Hampton's forces at fifteen thousand, made forty thousand; which,
if handled with spirit and energy, would constitute a formidable
force, and might make the passage of such rivers as the Santee and
Cape Fear a difficult undertaking.  Therefore, I took all possible
precautions, and arranged with Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster
to watch our progress inland by all the means possible, and to
provide for us points of security along the coast; as, at Bull's
Bay, Georgetown, and the mouth of Cape Fear River.  Still, it was
extremely desirable in one march to reach Goldsboro' in the State
of North Carolina (distant four hundred and twenty-five miles), a
point of great convenience for ulterior operations, by reason of
the two railroads which meet there, coming from the seacoast at
Wilmington and Newbern.  Before leaving Savannah I had sent to
Newbern Colonel W. W. Wright, of the Engineers, with orders to look
to these railroads, to collect rolling-stock, and to have the roads
repaired out as far as possible in six weeks--the time estimated as
necessary for us to march that distance.

The question of supplies remained still the one of vital
importance, and I reasoned that we might safely rely on the country
for a considerable quantity of forage and provisions, and that, if
the worst came to the worst, we could live several months on the
mules and horses of our trains.  Nevertheless, time was equally
material, and the moment I heard that General Slocum had finished
his pontoon-bridge at Sister's Ferry, and that Kilpatrick's cavalry
was over the river, I gave the general orders to march, and
instructed all the columns to aim for the South Carolina Railroad
to the west of Branchville, about Blackville and Midway.

The right wing moved up the Salkiehatchie, the Seventeenth Corps on
the right, with orders on reaching Rivers's Bridge to cross over,
and the Fifteenth Corps by Hickory Hill to Beaufort's Bridge.
Kilpatrick was instructed to march by way of Barnwell; Corse's
division and the Twentieth Corps to take such roads as would bring
them into communication with the Fifteenth Corps about Beaufort's
Bridge.  All these columns started promptly on the 1st of February.
We encountered Wheeler's cavalry, which had obstructed the road by
felling trees, but our men picked these up and threw them aside, so
that this obstruction hardly delayed us an hour.  In person I
accompanied the Fifteenth Corps (General Logan) by McPhersonville
and Hickory Hill, and kept couriers going to and fro to General
Slocum with instructions to hurry as much as possible, so as to
make a junction of the whole army on the South Carolina Railroad
about Blackville.

I spent the night of February 1st at Hickory Hill Post-Office, and
that of the 2d at Duck Branch Post-Office, thirty-one miles out
from Pocotaligo.  On the 3d the Seventeenth Corps was opposite
Rivers's Bridge, and the Fifteenth approached Beaufort's Bridge.
The Salkiehatchie was still over its banks, and presented a most
formidable obstacle.  The enemy appeared in some force on the
opposite bank, had cut away all the bridges which spanned the many
deep channels of the swollen river, and the only available passage
seemed to be along the narrow causeways which constituted the
common roads.  At Rivers's Bridge Generals Mower and Giles A.
Smith led, their heads of column through this swamp, the water up
to their shoulders, crossed over to the pine-land, turned upon the
rebel brigade which defended the passage, and routed it in utter
disorder.  It was in this attack that General Wager Swayne lost his
leg, and he had to be conveyed back to Pocotaligo.  Still, the loss
of life was very small, in proportion to the advantages gained, for
the enemy at once abandoned the whole line of the Salkiehatchie,
and the Fifteenth Corps passed over at Beaufort's Bridge, without
opposition.

On the 5th of February I was at Beaufort's Bridge, by which time
General A. S. Williams had got up with five brigades' of the
Twentieth Corps; I also heard of General Kilpatrick's being abreast
of us, at Barnwell, and then gave orders for the march straight for
the railroad at Midway.  I still remained with the Fifteenth Corps,
which, on the 6th of February, was five miles from Bamberg.  As a
matter of course, I expected severe resistance at this railroad,
for its loss would sever all the communications of the enemy in
Charleston with those in Augusta.

Early on the 7th, in the midst of a rain-storm, we reached the
railroad; almost unopposed, striking it at several points.  General
Howard told me a good story concerning this, which will bear
repeating: He was with the Seventeenth Corps, marching straight for
Midway, and when about five miles distant he began to deploy the
leading division, so as to be ready for battle.  Sitting on his
horse by the road-side, while the deployment was making, he saw a
man coming down the road, riding as hard as he could, and as he
approached he recognized him as one of his own "foragers," mounted
on a white horse, with a rope bridle and a blanket for saddle.  As
he came near he called out, "Hurry up, general; we have got the
railroad!"  So, while we, the generals, were proceeding
deliberately to prepare for a serious battle, a parcel of our
foragers, in search of plunder, had got ahead and actually captured
the South Carolina Railroad, a line of vital importance to the
rebel Government.

As soon as we struck the railroad, details of men were set to work
to tear up the rails, to burn the ties and twist the bars.  This
was a most important railroad, and I proposed to destroy it
completely for fifty miles, partly to prevent a possibility of its
restoration and partly to utilize the time necessary for General
Slocum to get up.

The country thereabouts was very poor, but the inhabitants mostly
remained at home.  Indeed, they knew not where to go.  The enemy's
cavalry had retreated before us, but his infantry was reported in
some strength at Branchville, on the farther side of the Edisto;
yet on the appearance of a mere squad of our men they burned their
own bridges the very thing I wanted, for we had no use for them,
and they had.

We all remained strung along this railroad till the 9th of
February--the Seventeenth Corps on the right, then the Fifteenth,
Twentieth, and cavalry, at Blackville.  General Slocum reached
Blackville that day, with Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps,
and reported the Fourteenth Corps (General Jeff. C. Davis's) to be
following by way of Barnwell.  On the 10th I rode up to Blackville,
where I conferred with Generals Slocum and Kilpatrick, became
satisfied that the whole army would be ready within a day, and
accordingly made orders for the next movement north to Columbia,
the right wing to strike Orangeburg en route.  Kilpatrick was
ordered to demonstrate strongly toward Aiken, to keep up the
delusion that we might turn to Augusta; but he was notified that
Columbia was the next objective, and that he should cover the left
flank against Wheeler, who hung around it.  I wanted to reach
Columbia before any part of Hood's army could possibly get there.
Some of them were reported as having reached Augusta, under the
command of General Dick Taylor.

Having sufficiently damaged the railroad, and effected the junction
of the entire army, the general march was resumed on the 11th, each
corps crossing the South Edisto by separate bridges, with orders to
pause on the road leading from Orangeberg to Augusta, till it was
certain that the Seventeenth Corps had got possession of
Orangeburg.  This place was simply important as its occupation
would sever the communications between Charleston and Columbia.
All the heads of column reached this road, known as the Edgefield
road, during the 12th, and the Seventeenth Corps turned to the
right, against Orangeburg.  When I reached the head of column
opposite Orangeburg, I found Giles A. Smith's division halted, with
a battery unlimbered, exchanging shots with a party on the opposite
side of the Edisto.  He reported that the bridge was gone, and that
the river was deep and impassable.  I then directed General Blair
to send a strong division below the town, some four or five miles,
to effect a crossing there.  He laid his pontoon-bridge, but the
bottom on the other side was overflowed, and the men had to wade
through it, in places as deep as their waists.  I was with this
division at the time, on foot, trying to pick my way across the
overflowed bottom; but, as soon as the head of column reached the
sand-hills, I knew that the enemy would not long remain in
Orangeburg, and accordingly returned to my horse, on the west bank,
and rode rapidly up to where I had left Giles A. Smith.  I found
him in possession of the broken bridge, abreast of the town, which
he was repairing, and I was among the first to cross over and enter
the town.  By and before the time either Force's or Giles A.
Smith's skirmishers entered the place, several stores were on fire,
and I am sure that some of the towns-people told me that a Jew
merchant had set fire to his own cotton and store, and from this
the fire had spread.  This, however, was soon put out, and the
Seventeenth Corps (General Blair) occupied the place during that
night.  I remember to have visited a large hospital, on the hill
near the railroad depot, which was occupied by the orphan children
who had been removed from the asylum in Charleston.  We gave them
protection, and, I think, some provisions.  The railroad and depot
were destroyed by order, and no doubt a good deal of cotton was
burned, for we all regarded cotton as hostile property, a thing to
be destroyed.  General Blair was ordered to break up this railroad,
forward to the point where it crossed the Santee, and then to turn
for Columbia.  On the morning of the 13th I again joined the
Fifteenth Corps, which crossed the North Edisto by Snilling's
Bridge, and moved straight for Columbia, around the head of Caw-Caw
Swamp.  Orders were sent to all the columns to turn for Columbia,
where it was supposed the enemy had concentrated all the men they
could from Charleston, Augusta, and even from Virginia.  That night
I was with the Fifteenth Corps, twenty-one miles from Columbia,
where my aide, Colonel Audenried, picked up a rebel officer on the
road, who, supposing him to be of the same service with himself,
answered all his questions frankly, and revealed the truth that
there was nothing in Columbia except Hampton's cavalry.  The fact
was, that General Hardee, in Charleston, took it for granted that
we were after Charleston; the rebel troops in Augusta supposed they
were "our objective;" so they abandoned poor Columbia to the care
of Hampton's cavalry, which was confused by the rumors that poured
in on it, so that both Beauregard and Wade Hampton, who were in
Columbia, seem to have lost their heads.

On the 14th the head of the Fifteenth Corps, Charles R. Woods's
division, approached the Little Congaree, a broad, deep stream,
tributary to the Main Congaree; six or eight miles below Columbia.
On the opposite side of this stream was a newly-constructed fort,
and on our side--a wide extent of old cotton-fields, which, had been
overflowed, and was covered with a deep slime.  General Woods had
deployed his leading brigade, which was skirmishing forward, but he
reported that the bridge was gone, and that a considerable force of
the enemy was on the other side.  I directed General Howard or
Logan to send a brigade by a circuit to the left, to see if this
stream could not be crossed higher up, but at the same time knew
that General Slocum's route world bring him to Colombia behind this
stream, and that his approach would uncover it.  Therefore, there
was no need of exposing much life.  The brigade, however, found
means to cross the Little Congaree, and thus uncovered the passage
by the main road, so that General Woods's skirmishers at once
passed over, and a party was set to work to repair the bridge,
which occupied less than an hour, when I passed over with my whole
staff.  I found the new fort unfinished and unoccupied, but from
its parapet could see over some old fields bounded to the north and
west by hills skirted with timber.  There was a plantation to our
left, about half a mile, and on the edge of the timber was drawn up
a force of rebel cavalry of about a regiment, which advanced, and
charged upon some, of our foragers, who were plundering the
plantation; my aide, Colonel Audenried, who had ridden forward,
came back somewhat hurt and bruised, for, observing this charge of
cavalry, he had turned for us, and his horse fell with him in
attempting to leap a ditch.  General Woods's skirmish-line met this
charge of cavalry, and drove it back into the woods and beyond.  We
remained on that ground during the night of the 15th, and I camped
on the nearest dry ground behind the Little Congaree, where on the
next morning were made the written' orders for the government of
the troops while occupying Columbia.  These are dated February 16,
1865, in these words:

General Howard will cross the Saluda and Broad Rivers as near their
mouths as possible, occupy Columbia, destroy the public buildings,
railroad property, manufacturing and machine shops; but will spare
libraries, asylums, and private dwellings.  He will then move to
Winnsboro', destroying en route utterly that section of the
railroad.  He will also cause all bridges, trestles, water-tanks,
and depots on the railroad back to the Wateree to be burned,
switches broken, and such other destruction as he can find time to
accomplish consistent with proper celerity.

These instructions were embraced in General Order No. 26, which
prescribed the routes of march for the several columns as far as
Fayetteville, North Carolina, and is conclusive that I then
regarded Columbia as simply one point on our general route of
march, and not as an important conquest.

During the 16th of February the Fifteenth Corps reached the point
opposite Columbia, and pushed on for the Saluda Factory three miles
above, crossed that stream, and the head of column reached Broad
River just in time to find its bridge in flames, Butler's cavalry
having just passed over into Columbia.  The head of Slocum's column
also reached the point opposite Columbia the same morning, but the
bulk of his army was back at Lexington.  I reached this place early
in the morning of the 16th, met General Slocum there; and explained
to him the purport of General Order No. 26, which contemplated the
passage of his army across Broad River at Alston, fifteen miles
above Columbia.  Riding down to the river-bank, I saw the wreck of
the large bridge which had been burned by the enemy, with its many
stone piers still standing, but the superstructure gone.  Across
the Congaree River lay the city of Columbia, in plain, easy view.
I could see the unfinished State-House, a handsome granite
structure, and the ruins of the railroad depot, which were still
smouldering.  Occasionally a few citizens or cavalry could be seen
running across the streets, and quite a number of negroes were
seemingly busy in carrying off bags of grain or meal, which were
piled up near the burned depot.

Captain De Gres had a section of his twenty-pound Parrott guns
unlimbered, firing into the town.  I asked him what he was firing
for; he said he could see some rebel cavalry occasionally at the
intersections of the streets, and he had an idea that there was a
large force of infantry concealed on the opposite bank, lying low,
in case we should attempt to cross over directly into the town.  I
instructed him not to fire any more into the town, but consented to
his bursting a few shells near the depot, to scare away the negroes
who were appropriating the bags of corn and meal which we wanted,
also to fire three shots at the unoccupied State-House.  I stood by
and saw these fired, and then all firing ceased.  Although this
matter of firing into Columbia has been the subject of much abuse
and investigation, I have yet to hear of any single person having
been killed in Columbia by our cannon.  On the other hand, the
night before, when Woods's division was in camp in the open fields
at Little Congaree, it was shelled all night by a rebel battery
from the other aide of the river.  This provoked me much at the
time, for it was wanton mischief, as Generals Beauregard and
Hampton must have been convinced that they could not prevent our
entrance into Columbia.  I have always contended that I would have
been justified in retaliating for this unnecessary act of war, but
did not, though I always characterized it as it deserved.

The night of the 16th I camped near an old prison bivouac opposite
Columbia, known to our prisoners of war as "Camp Sorghum," where
remained the mud-hovels and holes in the ground which our prisoners
had made to shelter themselves from the winter's cold and the
summer's heat.  The Fifteenth Corps was then ahead, reaching to
Broad River, about four miles above Columbia; the Seventeenth Corps
was behind, on the river-bank opposite Columbia; and the left wing
and cavalry had turned north toward Alston.

The next morning, viz., February 17th, I rode to the head of
General Howard's column, and found that during the night he had
ferried Stone's brigade of Woods's division of the Fifteenth
Corps across by rafts made of the pontoons, and that brigade was
then deployed on the opposite bank to cover the construction of a
pontoon-bridge nearly finished.

I sat with General Howard on a log, watching the men lay this
bridge; and about 9 or 10 A.M.  a messenger came from Colonel Stone
on the other aide, saying that the Mayor of Columbia had come out
of the city to surrender the place, and asking for orders.  I
simply remarked to General Howard that he had his orders, to let
Colonel Stone go on into the city, and that we would follow as soon
as the bridge was ready.  By this same messenger I received a note
in pencil from the Lady Superioress of a convent or school in
Columbia, in which she claimed to have been a teacher in a convent
in Brown County, Ohio, at the time my daughter Minnie was a pupil
there, and therefore asking special protection.  My recollection
is, that I gave the note to my brother-in-law, Colonel Ewing, then
inspector-general on my staff, with instructions to see this lady,
and assure her that we contemplated no destruction of any private
property in Columbia at all.

As soon as the bridge was done, I led my horse over it, followed by
my whole staff.  General Howard accompanied me with his, and
General Logan was next in order, followed by General C.  R.  Woods,
and the whole of the Fifteenth Corps.  Ascending the hill, we soon
emerged into a broad road leading into Columbia, between old fields
of corn and cotton, and, entering the city, we found seemingly all
its population, white and black, in the streets.  A high and
boisterous wind was prevailing from the north, and flakes of cotton
were flying about in the air and lodging in the limbs of the trees,
reminding us of a Northern snow-storm.  Near the market-square we
found Stone's brigade halted, with arms stacked, and a large detail
of his men, along with some citizens, engaged with an old
fire-engine, trying to put out the fire in a long pile of burning
cotton-bales, which I was told had been fired by the rebel cavalry
on withdrawing from the city that morning.  I know that, to avoid
this row of burning cotton-bales, I had to ride my horse on the
sidewalk.  In the market-square had collected a large crowd of
whites and blacks, among whom was the mayor of the city, Dr.
Goodwin, quite a respectable old gentleman, who was extremely
anxious to protect the interests of the citizens.  He was on foot,
and I on horseback, and it is probable I told him then not to be
uneasy, that we did not intend to stay long, and had no purpose to
injure the private citizens or private property.  About this time I
noticed several men trying to get through the crowd to speak with
me, and called to some black people to make room for them; when
they reached me, they explained that they were officers of our
army, who had been prisoners, had escaped from the rebel prison and
guard, and were of course overjoyed to find themselves safe with
us.  I told them that, as soon as things settled down, they should
report to General Howard, who would provide for their safety, and
enable them to travel with us.  One of them handed me a paper,
asking me to read it at my leisure; I put it in my breast-pocket
and rode on.  General Howard was still with me, and, riding down
the street which led by the right to the Charleston depot, we found
it and a large storehouse burned to the ground, but there were, on
the platform and ground near by, piles of cotton bags filled with
corn and corn-meal, partially burned.

A detachment of Stone's brigade was guarding this, and separating
the good from the bad.  We rode along the railroad-track, some
three or four hundred yards, to a large foundery, when some man
rode up and said the rebel cavalry were close by, and he warned us
that we might get shot.  We accordingly turned back to the
market-square, and en route noticed that, several of the men were
evidently in liquor, when I called General Howard's attention to
it.  He left me and rode toward General Woods's head of column,
which was defiling through the town.  On reaching the
market-square, I again met Dr. Goodwin, and inquired where he
proposed to quarter me, and he said that he had selected the house
of Blanton Duncan, Esq., a citizen of Louisville, Kentucky, then a
resident there, who had the contract for manufacturing the
Confederate money, and had fled with Hampton's cavalry.  We all
rode some six or eight squares back from the new State-House, and
found a very good modern house, completely furnished, with stabling
and a large yard, took it as our headquarters, and occupied it
during our stay.  I considered General Howard as in command of the
place, and referred the many applicants for guards and protection
to him.  Before our headquarters-wagons had got up, I strolled
through the streets of Columbia, found sentinels posted at the
principal intersections, and generally good order prevailing, but
did not again return to the main street, because it was filled with
a crowd of citizens watching the soldiers marching by.

During the afternoon of that day, February 17th, the whole of the
Fifteenth Corps passed through the town and out on the Camden and
Winnsboro' roads.  The Seventeenth Corps did not enter the city at
all, but crossed directly over to the Winnsboro' road from the
pontoon bridge at Broad River, which was about four miles above the
city.

After we had got, as it were, settled in Blanton Duncan's house,
say about 2 p.m., I overhauled my pocket according to custom, to
read more carefully the various notes and memoranda received during
the day, and found the paper which had been given me, as described,
by one of our escaped prisoners.  It proved to be the song of
"Sherman's March to the Sea," which had been composed by Adjutant
S. H. M. Byers, of the Fifth Iowa Infantry, when a prisoner in the
asylum at Columbia, which had been beautifully written off by a
fellow-prisoner, and handed to me in person.  This appeared to me
so good that I at once sent for Byers, attached him to my staff,
provided him with horse and equipment, and took him as far as
Fayetteville, North Carolina, whence he was sent to Washington as
bearer of dispatches.  He is now United States consul at Zurich,
Switzerland, where I have since been his guest. I insert the song
here for convenient reference and preservation.  Byers said that
there was an excellent glee-club among the prisoners in Columbia,
who used to sing it well, with an audience often of rebel ladies:


SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA.

Composed by Adjutant Byers, Fifth Iowa Infantry.  Arranged and sung
by the Prisoners in Columbia Prison.


I

Our camp-fires shone bright on the mountain
That frowned on the river below,
As we stood by our guns in the morning,
And eagerly watched for the foe;
When a rider came out of the darkness
That hung over mountain and tree,
And shouted, "Boys, up and be ready!
For Sherman will march to the sea!"


CHORUS:

Then sang we a song of our chieftain,
That echoed over river and lea;
And the stars of our banner shone brighter
When Sherman marched down to the sea!


II

Then cheer upon cheer for bold Sherman
Went up from each valley and glen,
And the bugles reechoed the music
That came from the lips of the men;
For we knew that the stars in our banner
More bright in their splendor would be,
And that blessings from Northland world greet us,
When Sherman marched down to the sea!
             Then sang we a song, etc.

III

Then forward, boys! forward to battle!
We marched on our wearisome way,
We stormed the wild hills of Resacar
God bless those who fell on that day!
Then Kenesaw frowned in its glory,
Frowned down on the flag of the free;
But the East and the West bore our standard,
And Sherman marched on to the sea!
        Then sang we a song, etc.


IV

Still onward we pressed, till our banners
Swept out from Atlanta's grim walls,
And the blood of the patriot dampened
The soil where the traitor-flag falls;
But we paused not to weep for the fallen,
Who slept by each river and tree,
Yet we twined them a wreath of the laurel,
As Sherman marched down to the sea!
        Then sang we a song, etc.

V

Oh, proud was our army that morning,
That stood where the pine darkly towers,
When Sherman said, "Boys, you are weary,
But to-day fair Savannah is ours!"
Then sang we the song of our chieftain,
That echoed over river and lea,
And the stars in our banner shone brighter
When Sherman camped down by the sea!


Toward evening of February 17th, the mayor, Dr. Goodwin, came to my
quarters at Duncan's house, and remarked that there was a lady in
Columbia who professed to be a special friend of mine.  On his
giving her name, I could not recall it, but inquired as to her
maiden or family name.  He answered Poyas.  It so happened that,
when I was a lieutenant at Fort Moultrie, in 1842-'46, I used very
often to visit a family of that name on the east branch of Cooper
River, about forty miles from Fort Moultrie, and to hunt with the
son, Mr. James Poyas, an elegant young fellow and a fine sportsman.
His father, mother, and several sisters, composed the family, and
were extremely hospitable.  One of the ladies was very fond of
painting in water-colors, which was one of my weaknesses, and on
one occasion I had presented her with a volume treating of
water-colors.  Of course, I was glad to renew the acquaintance, and
proposed to Dr. Goodwin that we should walk to her house and visit
this lady, which we did.  The house stood beyond the Charlotte
depot, in a large lot, was of frame, with a high porch, which was
reached by a set of steps outside.  Entering this yard, I noticed
ducks and chickens, and a general air of peace and comfort that was
really pleasant to behold at that time of universal desolation; the
lady in question met us at the head of the steps and invited us
into a parlor which was perfectly neat and well furnished.  After
inquiring about her father, mother, sisters, and especially her
brother James, my special friend, I could not help saying that I
was pleased to notice that our men had not handled her house and
premises as roughly as was their wont.  "I owe it to you, general,"
she answered.  "Not at all.  I did not know you were here till a
few minutes ago."  She reiterated that she was indebted to me for
the perfect safety of her house and property, and added, "You
remember, when you were at our house on Cooper River in 1845, you
gave me a book;" and she handed me the book in question, on the fly
leaf of which was written: "To Miss Poyas, with the compliments of
W. T. Sherman, First-lieutenant Third Artillery."  She then
explained that, as our army approached Columbia, there was a doubt
in her mind whether the terrible Sherman who was devastating the
land were W. T. Sherman or T. W. Sherman, both known to be generals
in the Northern army; but, on the supposition that he was her old
acquaintance, when Wade Hampton's cavalry drew out of the city,
calling out that the Yankees were coming, she armed herself with
this book, and awaited the crisis.  Soon the shouts about the
markethouse announced that the Yankees had come; very soon men were
seen running up and down the streets; a parcel of them poured over
the fence, began to chase the chickens and ducks, and to enter her
house.  She observed one large man, with full beard, who exercised
some authority, and to him she appealed in the name of "his
general."  "What do you know of Uncle Billy?"  "Why," she said,
"when he was a young man he used to be our friend in Charleston,
and here is a book he gave me."  The officer or soldier took the
book, looked at the inscription, and, turning to his fellows, said:
"Boys, that's so; that's Uncle Billy's writing, for I have seen it
often before."  He at once commanded the party to stop pillaging,
and left a man in charge of the house, to protect her until the
regular provost-guard should be established.  I then asked her if
the regular guard or sentinel had been as good to her.  She assured
me that he was a very nice young man; that he had been telling her
all about his family in Iowa; and that at that very instant of time
he was in another room minding her baby.  Now, this lady had good
sense and tact, and had thus turned aside a party who, in five
minutes more, would have rifled her premises of all that was good
to eat or wear.  I made her a long social visit, and, before
leaving Columbia, gave her a half-tierce of rice and about one
hundred pounds of ham from our own mess-stores.

In like manner, that same evening I found in Mrs. Simons another
acquaintance--the wife of the brother of Hon. James Simons, of
Charleston, who had been Miss Wragg.  When Columbia was on fire
that night, and her house in danger, I had her family and effects
carried to my own headquarters, gave them my own room and bed, and,
on leaving Columbia the next day, supplied her with a half-barrel
of hams and a half-tierce of rice.  I mention these specific facts
to show that, personally, I had no malice or desire to destroy that
city or its inhabitants, as is generally believed at the South.

Having walked over much of the suburbs of Columbia in the
afternoon, and being tired, I lay down on a bed in Blanton Duncan's
house to rest. Soon after dark I became conscious that a bright
light was shining on the walls; and, calling some one of my staff
(Major Nichols, I think) to inquire the cause, he said there seemed
to be a house on fire down about the market-house.  The same high
wind still prevailed, and, fearing the consequences, I bade him go
in person to see if the provost-guard were doing its duty.  He soon
returned, and reported that the block of buildings directly
opposite the burning cotton of that morning was on fire, and that
it was spreading; but he had found General Woods on the ground,
with plenty of men trying to put the fire out, or, at least, to
prevent its extension.  The fire continued to increase, and the
whole heavens became lurid.  I dispatched messenger after messenger
to Generals Howard, Logan, and Woods, and received from them
repeated assurances that all was being done that could be done, but
that the high wind was spreading the flames beyond all control.
These general officers were on the ground all night, and Hazen's
division had been brought into the city to assist Woods's division,
already there.  About eleven o'clock at night I went down-town
myself, Colonel Dayton with me; we walked to Mr. Simons's house,
from which I could see the flames rising high in the air, and could
hear the roaring of the fire.  I advised the ladies to move to my
headquarters, had our own headquarter-wagons hitched up, and their
effects carried there, as a place of greater safety.  The whole air
was full of sparks and of flying masses of cotton, shingles, etc.,
some of which were carried four or five blocks, and started new
fires.  The men seemed generally under good control, and certainly
labored hard to girdle the fire, to prevent its spreading; but, so
long as the high wind prevailed, it was simply beyond human
possibility.  Fortunately, about 3 or 4 a.m., the wind moderated,
and gradually the fire was got under control; but it had burned out
the very heart of the city, embracing several churches, the old
State-House, and the school or asylum of that very Sister of
Charity who had appealed for my personal protection.  Nickerson's
Hotel, in which several of my staff were quartered, was burned
down, but the houses occupied by myself, Generals Howard and Logan,
were not burned at all.  Many of the people thought that this fire
was deliberately planned and executed.  This is not true.  It was
accidental, and in my judgment began with the cotton which General
Hampton's men had set fire to on leaving the city (whether by his
orders or not is not material), which fire was partially subdued
early in the day by our men; but, when night came, the high wind
fanned it again into full blaze, carried it against the
frame-houses, which caught like tinder, and soon spread beyond our
control.

This whole subject has since been thoroughly and judicially
investigated, in some cotton cases, by the mixed commission on
American and British claims, under the Treaty of Washington, which
commission failed to award a verdict in favor of the English
claimants, and thereby settled the fact that the destruction of
property in Columbia, during that night, did not result from the
acts of the General Government of the United States--that is to
say, from my army.  In my official report of this conflagration, I
distinctly charged it to General Wade Hampton, and confess I did so
pointedly, to shake the faith of his people in him, for he was in
my opinion boastful, and professed to be the special champion of
South Carolina.

The morning sun of February 18th rose bright and clear over a
ruined city.  About half of it was in ashes and in smouldering
heaps.  Many of the people were houseless, and gathered in groups
in the suburbs, or in the open parks and spaces, around their
scanty piles of furniture.  General Howard, in concert with the
mayor, did all that was possible to provide other houses for them;
and by my authority he turned over to the Sisters of Charity the
Methodist College, and to the mayor five hundred beef-cattle; to
help feed the people; I also gave the mayor (Dr.  Goodwin) one
hundred muskets, with which to arm a guard to maintain order after
we should leave the neighborhood.  During the 18th and 19th we
remained in Columbia, General Howard's troops engaged in tearing up
and destroying the railroad, back toward the Wateree, while a
strong detail, under the immediate supervision of Colonel O. M.
Poe, United States Engineers, destroyed the State Arsenal, which
was found to be well supplied with shot, shell, and ammunition.
These were hauled in wagons to the Saluda River, under the
supervision of Colonel Baylor, chief of ordnance, and emptied into
deep water, causing a very serious accident by the bursting of a
percussion-shell, as it struck another on the margin of the water.
The flame followed back a train of powder which had sifted out,
reached the wagons, still partially loaded, and exploded them,
killing sixteen men and destroying several wagons and teams of
mules.  We also destroyed several valuable founderies and the
factory of Confederate money.  The dies had been carried away, but
about sixty handpresses remained.  There was also found an immense
quantity of money, in various stages of manufacture, which our men
spent and gambled with in the most lavish manner.

Having utterly ruined Columbia, the right wing began its march
northward, toward Winnsboro', on the 20th, which we reached on the
21st, and found General Slocum, with the left wing, who had come by
the way of Alston.  Thence the right wing was turned eastward,
toward Cheraw, and Fayetteville, North Carolina, to cross the
Catawba River at Peay's Ferry.  The cavalry was ordered to follow
the railroad north as far as Chester, and then to turn east to
Rocky Mount, the point indicated for the passage of the left wing.
In person I reached Rocky Mount on the 22d, with the Twentieth
Corps, which laid its pontoon-bridge and crossed over during the
23d.  Kilpatrick arrived the next day, in the midst of heavy rain,
and was instructed to cross the Catawba at once, by night, and to
move up to Lancaster, to make believe we were bound for Charlotte,
to which point I heard that Beauregard had directed all his
detachments, including a corps of Hood's old army, which had been
marching parallel with us, but had failed to make junction with,
the forces immediately opposing us.  Of course, I had no purpose of
going to Charlotte, for the right wing was already moving rapidly
toward Fayetteville, North Carolina.  The rain was so heavy and
persistent that the Catawba, River rose fast, and soon after I had
crossed the pontoon bridge at Rocky Mount it was carried away,
leaving General Davis, with the Fourteenth Corps, on the west bank.
The roads were infamous, so I halted the Twentieth Corps at Hanging
Rock for some days, to allow time for the Fourteenth to get over.

General Davis had infinite difficulty in reconstructing his bridge,
and was compelled to use the fifth chains of his wagons for
anchor-chains, so that we were delayed nearly a week in that
neighborhood. While in camp at Hanging Rock two prisoners were
brought to me--one a chaplain, the other a boy, son of Richard Bacot,
of Charleston, whom I had known as a cadet at West Point.  They were
just from Charleston, and had been sent away by General Hardee in
advance, because he was, they said, evacuating Charleston.  Rumors to
the same effect had reached me through the negroes, and it was,
moreover, reported that Wilmington, North Carolina, was in possession
of the Yankee troops; so that I had every reason to be satisfied that
our march was fully reaping all the fruits we could possibly ask for.
Charleston was, in fact, evacuated by General Hardee on the 18th of
February, and was taken possession of by a brigade of General Fosters
troops, commanded by General Schimmelpfennig, the same day.  Hardee
had availed himself of his only remaining railroad, by Florence to
Cheraw; had sent there much of his ammunition and stores, and reached
it with the effective part of the garrison in time to escape across
the Pedee River before our arrival.  Wilmington was captured by
General Terry on the 22d of February; but of this important event we
only knew by the vague rumors which reached us through rebel sources.

General Jeff. C. Davis got across the Catawba during the 27th, and
the general march was resumed on Cheraw.  Kilpatrick remained near
Lancaster, skirmishing with Wheeler's and Hampton's cavalry,
keeping up the delusion that we proposed to move on Charlotte and
Salisbury, but with orders to watch the progress of the Fourteenth
Corps, and to act in concert with it, on its left rear.  On the 1st
of March I was at Finlay's Bridge across Lynch's Creek, the roads
so bad that we had to corduroy nearly every foot of the way; but I
was in communication with all parts of the army, which had met no
serious opposition from the enemy.  On the 2d of March we entered
the village of Chesterfield, skirmishing with Butler's cavalry,
which gave ground rapidly.  There I received a message from General
Howard, who, reported that he was already in Cheraw with the
Seventeenth Corps, and that the Fifteenth was near at hand.

General Hardee had retreated eastward across the Pedee, burning the
bridge.  I therefore directed the left wing to march for
Sneedsboro', about ten miles above Cheraw, to cross the Pedee
there, while I in person proposed to cross over and join the right
wing in Cheraw.  Early in the morning of the 3d of March I rode out
of Chesterfield along with the Twentieth Corps, which filled the
road, forded Thompson's Creek, and, at the top of the hill beyond,
found a road branching off to the right, which corresponded with
the one, on my map leading to Cheraw.  Seeing a negro standing by
the roadside, looking at the troops passing, I inquired of him what
road that was.  "Him lead to Cheraw, master!"  "Is it a good road,
and how far?"  "A very good road, and eight or ten miles."  "Any
guerrillas?"

"Oh! no, master, dey is gone two days ago; you could have played
cards on der coat-tails, dey was in sich a hurry!"  I was on my
Lexington horse, who was very handsome and restive, so I made
signal to my staff to follow, as I proposed to go without escort.
I turned my horse down the road, and the rest of the staff
followed.  General Barry took up the questions about the road, and
asked the same negro what he was doing there.  He answered, "Dey
say Massa Sherman will be along soon!"  "Why," said General Barry,
"that was General Sherman you were talking to."  The poor negro,
almost in the attitude of prayer, exclaimed: "De great God! just
look at his horse!"  He ran up and trotted by my side for a mile or
so, and gave me all the information he possessed, but he seemed to
admire the horse more than the rider.

We reached Cheraw in a couple of hours in a drizzling rain, and,
while waiting for our wagons to come up, I staid with General Blair
in a large house, the property of a blockade-runner, whose family
remained.  General Howard occupied another house farther down-town.
He had already ordered his pontoon-bridge to be laid across the
Pedee, there a large, deep, navigable stream, and Mower's division
was already across, skirmishing with the enemy about two miles out.
Cheraw was found to be full of stores which had been sent up from
Charleston prior to its evacuation, and which could not be removed.
I was satisfied, from inquiries, that General Hardee had with him
only the Charleston garrison, that the enemy had not divined our
movements, and that consequently they were still scattered from
Charlotte around to Florence, then behind us.  Having thus secured
the passage of the Pedee, I felt no uneasiness about the future,
because there remained no further great impediment between us and
Cape Fear River, which I felt assured was by that time in
possession of our friends.  The day was so wet that we all kept
in-doors; and about noon General Blair invited us to take lunch
with him.  We passed down into the basement dining-room, where the
regular family table was spread with an excellent meal; and during
its progress I was asked to take some wine, which stood upon the
table in venerable bottles.  It was so very good that I inquired
where it came from.  General Blair simply asked, "Do you like it?"
but I insisted upon knowing where he had got it; he only replied by
asking if I liked it, and wanted some.  He afterward sent to my
bivouac a case containing a dozen bottles of the finest madeira I
ever tasted; and I learned that he had captured, in Cheraw, the
wine of some of the old aristocratic families of Charleston, who
had sent it up to Cheraw for safety, and heard afterward that Blair
had found about eight wagon-loads of this wine, which he
distributed to the army generally, in very fair proportions.

After finishing our lunch, as we passed out of the dining room,
General Blair asked me, if I did not want some saddle-blankets, or
a rug for my tent, and, leading me into the hall to a space under
the stairway, he pointed out a pile of carpets which had also been
sent up from Charleston for safety.  After our headquarter-wagons
got up, and our bivouac was established in a field near by, I sent
my orderly (Walter) over to General Blair, and he came back
staggering under a load of carpets, out of which the officers and
escort made excellent tent-rugs, saddle-cloths, and blankets.
There was an immense amount of stores in Cheraw, which were used or
destroyed; among them twenty-four guns, two thousand muskets, and
thirty-six hundred barrels of gunpowder.  By the carelessness of a
soldier, an immense pile of this powder was exploded, which shook
the town badly; and killed and maimed several of our men.

We remained in or near Cheraw till the 6th of March, by which time
the army was mostly across the Pedee River, and was prepared to
resume the march on Fayetteville.  In a house where General Hardee
had been, I found a late New York Tribune, of fully a month later
date than any I had seen.  It contained a mass of news of great
interest to us, and one short paragraph which I thought extremely
mischievous.  I think it was an editorial, to the effect that at
last the editor had the satisfaction to inform his readers that
General Sherman would next be heard from about Goldsboro', because
his supply-vessels from Savannah were known to be rendezvousing at
Morehead City:--Now, I knew that General Hardee had read that same
paper, and that he would be perfectly able to draw his own
inferences.  Up to, that moment I had endeavored so to feign to our
left that we had completely, misled our antagonists; but this was
no longer possible, and I concluded that we must be ready, for the
concentration in our front of all the force subject to General Jos.
Johnston's orders, for I was there also informed that he had been
restored to the full command of the Confederate forces in South and
North Carolina.

On the 6th of March I crossed the Pedee, and all the army marched
for Fayetteville: the Seventeenth Corps kept well to the right, to
make room; the Fifteenth Corps marched by a direct road; the
Fourteenth Corps also followed a direct road from Sneedsboro',
where it had crossed the Pedee; and the Twentieth Corps, which had
come into Cheraw for the convenience of the pontoon-bridge,
diverged to the left, so as to enter Fayetteville next after the
Fourteenth Corps, which was appointed to lead into Fayetteville.
Kilpatrick held his cavalry still farther to the left rear on the
roads from Lancaster, by way of Wadesboro' and New Gilead, so as to
cover our trains from Hampton's and Wheeler's cavalry, who had
first retreated toward the north.  I traveled with the Fifteenth
Corps, and on the 8th of March reached Laurel Hill, North Carolina.
Satisfied that our troops must be at Wilmington, I determined to
send a message there; I called for my man, Corporal Pike, whom I
had rescued as before described, at Columbia, who was then
traveling with our escort, and instructed him in disguise to work
his way to the Cape Fear River, secure a boat, and float down to
Wilmington to convey a letter, and to report our approach.  I also
called on General Howard for another volunteer, and he brought me a
very clever young sergeant, who is now a commissioned officer in
the regular army.  Each of these got off during the night by
separate routes, bearing the following message, reduced to the same
cipher we used in telegraphic messages:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, LAUREL HILL, Wednesday, March 8, 1865.

Commanding Officer, Wilmington, North Carolina:

We are marching for Fayetteville, will be there Saturday, Sunday,
and Monday, and will then march for Goldsboro'.

If possible, send a boat up Cape Fear River, and have word conveyed
to General Schofield that I expect to meet him about Goldsboro'.
We are all well and have done finely.  The rains make our roads
difficult, and may delay us about Fayetteville, in which case I
would like to have some bread, sugar, and coffee.  We have
abundance of all else.  I expect to reach Goldsboro' by the 20th
instant.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


On the 9th I was with the Fifteenth Corps, and toward evening
reached a little church called Bethel, in the woods, in which we
took refuge in a terrible storm of rain, which poured all night,
making the roads awful.  All the men were at work corduroying the
roads, using fence-rails and split saplings, and every foot of the
way had thus to be corduroyed to enable the artillery and wagons to
pass.  On the 10th we made some little progress; on the 11th I
reached Fayetteville, and found that General Hardee, followed by
Wade Hampton's cavalry, had barely escaped across Cape Fear River,
burning the bridge which I had hoped to save.  On reaching
Fayetteville I found General Slocum already in possession with the
Fourteenth Corps, and all the rest of the army was near at hand.  A
day or two before, General Kilpatrick, to our left rear, had
divided his force into two parts, occupying roads behind the
Twentieth Corps, interposing between our infantry columns and Wade
Hampton's cavalry.  The latter, doubtless to make junction with
General Hardee, in Fayetteville, broke across this line, captured
the house in which General Kilpatrick and the brigade-commander,
General Spencer, were, and for a time held possession of the camp
and artillery of the brigade.  However, General Kilpatrick and most
of his men escaped into a swamp with their arms, reorganized and
returned, catching Hampton's men--in turn, scattered and drove them
away, recovering most of his camp and artillery; but Hampton got
off with Kilpatrick's private horses and a couple hundred
prisoners, of which he boasted much in passing through
Fayetteville.

It was also reported that, in the morning after Hardee's army was
all across the bridge at Cape Fear River, Hampton, with a small
bodyguard, had remained in town, ready to retreat and burn the
bridge as soon as our forces made their appearance.  He was getting
breakfast at the hotel when the alarm was given, when he and his
escort took saddle, but soon realized that the alarm came from a
set of our foragers, who, as usual, were extremely bold and rash.
On these he turned, scattered them, killing some and making others
prisoners; among them General Howard's favorite scout, Captain
Duncan.  Hampton then crossed the bridge and burned it.

I took up my quarters at the old United States Arsenal, which was
in fine order, and had been much enlarged by the Confederate
authorities, who never dreamed that an invading army would reach it
from the west; and I also found in Fayetteville the widow and
daughter of my first captain (General Childs), of the Third
Artillery, learned that her son Fred had been the ordnance-officer
in charge of the arsenal, and had of course fled with Hardee's
army.

During the 11th. the whole army closed down upon Fayetteville, and
immediate preparations were made to lay two pontoon bridges, one
near the burned bridge, and another about four miles lower down.

Sunday, March 12th, was a day of Sabbath stillness in Fayetteville.
The people generally attended their churches, for they were a very
pious people, descended in a large measure from the old Scotch
Covenanters, and our men too were resting from the toils and labors
of six weeks of as hard marching as ever fell to the lot of
soldiers.  Shortly after noon was heard in the distance the shrill
whistle of a steamboat, which came nearer and nearer, and soon a
shout, long and continuous, was raised down by the river, which
spread farther and farther, and we all felt that it meant a
messenger from home.  The effect was electric, and no one can
realize the feeling unless, like us, he has been for months cut off
from all communication with friends, and compelled to listen to the
croakings and prognostications of open enemies.  But in a very few
minutes came up through the town to the arsenal on the plateau
behind a group of officers, among whom was a large, florid
seafaring man, named Ainsworth, bearing a small mail-bag from
General Terry, at Wilmington, having left at 2 p.m.  the day
before.  Our couriers had got through safe from Laurel Hill, and
this was the prompt reply.

As in the case of our former march from Atlanta, intense anxiety
had been felt for our safety, and General Terry had been prompt to
open communication.  After a few minutes' conference with Captain
Ainsworth about the capacity of his boat, and the state of facts
along the river, I instructed him to be ready to start back at 6
p.m., and ordered Captain Byers to get ready to carry dispatches to
Washington.  I also authorized General Howard to send back by this
opportunity some of the fugitives who had traveled with his army
all the way from Columbia, among whom were Mrs. Feaster and her two
beautiful daughters.

I immediately prepared letters for Secretary Stanton, Generals
Halleck and Grant, and Generals Schofield, Foster, Easton, and
Beckwith, all of which have been published, but I include here only
those to the Secretary of War, and Generals Grant and Terry, as
samples of the whole:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD,
FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March.  12, 1885.

Hon. E.  M.  STANTON, Secretary of War.

DEAR SIR: I know you will be pleased to hear that my army has
reached this point, and has opened communication with Wilmington.
A tug-boat came up this morning, and will start back at 6 P. M.

I have written a letter to General Grant, the substance of which he
will doubtless communicate, and it must suffice for me to tell you
what I know will give you pleasure--that I have done all that I
proposed, and the fruits seem to me ample for the time employed.
Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington, are incidents, while the
utter demolition of the railroad system of South Carolina, and the
utter destruction of the enemy's arsenals of Columbia, Cheraw, and
Fayetteville, are the principals of the movement.  These points
were regarded as inaccessible to us, and now no place in the
Confederacy is safe against the army of the West.  Let Lee hold on
to Richmond, and we will destroy his country; and then of what use
is Richmond.  He must come out and fight us on open ground, and for
that we must ever be ready.  Let him stick behind his parapets, and
he will perish.

I remember well what you asked me, and think I am on the right
road, though a long one.  My army is as united and cheerful as
ever, and as full of confidence in itself and its leaders.  It is
utterly impossible for me to enumerate what we have done, but I
inclose a slip just handed me, which is but partial.  At Columbia
and Cheraw we destroyed nearly all the gunpowder and cartridges
which the Confederacy had in this part of the country.  This
arsenal is in fine order, and has been much enlarged.  I cannot
leave a detachment to hold it, therefore shall burn it, blow it up
with gunpowder, and then with rams knock down its walls.  I take it
for granted the United States will never again trust North Carolina
with an arsenal to appropriate at her pleasure.

Hoping that good fortune may still attend my army.  I remain your
servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD,
FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March.  12, 1885.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, commanding United States Army,
City Point, Virginia.

DEAR GENERAL: We reached this place yesterday at noon; Hardee, as
usual, retreating across the Cape Fear, burning his bridges; but
our pontoons will be up to-day, and, with as little delay as
possible, I will be after him toward Goldsboro'.

A tug has just come up from Wilmington, and before I get off from
here, I hope to get from Wilmington some shoes and stockings,
sugar, coffee, and flour.  We are abundantly supplied with all
else, having in a measure lived off the country.

The army is in splendid health, condition, and spirits, though we
have had foul weather, and roads that would have stopped travel to
almost any other body of men I ever heard of.

Our march, was substantially what I designed--straight on Columbia,
feigning on Branchville and Augusta.  We destroyed, in passing, the
railroad from the Edisto nearly up to Aiken; again, from Orangeburg
to the Congaree; again, from Colombia down to Kingsville on the
Wateree, and up toward Charlotte as far as the Chester line; thence
we turned east on Cheraw and Fayetteville.  At Colombia we
destroyed immense arsenals and railroad establishments, among which
wore forty-three cannon.  At Cheraw we found also machinery and
material of war sent from Charleston, among which were twenty-five
guns and thirty-six hundred barrels of powder; and here we find
about twenty guns and a magnificent United States' arsenal.

We cannot afford to leave detachments, and I shall therefore
destroy this valuable arsenal, so the enemy shall not have its use;
and the United States should never again confide such valuable
property to a people who have betrayed a trust.

I could leave here to-morrow, but want to clear my columns of the
vast crowd of refugees and negroes that encumber us.  Some I will
send down the river in boats, and the rest to Wilmington by land,
under small escort, as soon as we are across Cape Fear River.

I hope you have not been uneasy about us, and that the fruits of
this march will be appreciated.  It had to be made not only to
destroy the valuable depots by the way, but for its incidents in
the necessary fall of Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington.  If I
can now add Goldsboro' without too much cost, I will be in a
position to aid you materially in the spring campaign.

Jos. Johnston may try to interpose between me here and Schofield
about Newbern; but I think he will not try that, but concentrate
his scattered armies at Raleigh, and I will go straight at him as
soon as I get our men reclothed and our wagons reloaded.

Keep everybody busy, and let Stoneman push toward Greensboro' or
Charlotte from Knoxville; even a feint in that quarter will be most
important.

The railroad from Charlotte to Danville is all that is left to the
enemy, and it will not do for me to go there, on account of the
red-clay hills which are impassable to wheels in wet weather.

I expect to make a junction with General Schofield in ten days.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD,
FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March.  12, 1885.

Major-General TERRY, commanding United States Forces,
Wilmington, North Carolina.

GENERAL: I have just received your message by the tug which left
Wilmington at 2 p.m.  yesterday, which arrived here without
trouble.  The scout who brought me your cipher-message started back
last night with my answers, which are superseded by the fact of
your opening the river.

General Howard just reports that he has secured one of the enemy's
steamboats below the city, General Slocum will try to secure two
others known to be above, and we will load them with refugees
(white and black) who have clung to our skirts, impeded our
movements, and consumed our food.

We have swept the country well from Savannah to here, and the men
and animals are in fine condition.  Had it not been for the foul
weather, I would have caught Hardee at Cheraw or here; but at
Columbia, Cheraw, and here, we have captured immense stores, and
destroyed machinery, guns, ammunition, and property, of inestimable
value to our enemy.  At all points he has fled from us, "standing
not on the order of his going."

The people of South Carolina, instead of feeding Lee's army, will
now call on Lee to feed them.

I want you to send me all the shoes, stockings, drawers, sugar,
coffee, and flour, you can spare; finish the loads with oats or
corn: Have the boats escorted, and let them run at night at any
risk.  We must not give time for Jos. Johnston to concentrate at
Goldsboro'.  We cannot prevent his concentrating at Raleigh, but he
shall have no rest. I want General Schofield to go on with his
railroad from Newbern as far as he can, and you should do the same
from Wilmington.  If we can get the roads to and secure Goldsboro'
by April 10th, it will be soon enough; but every day now is worth a
million of dollars.  I can whip Jos. Johnston provided he does not
catch one of my corps in flank, and I will see that the army
marches hence to Goldsboro' in compact form.

I must rid our army of from twenty to thirty thousand useless
mouths; as many to go down Cape Fear as possible, and the rest to
go in vehicles or on captured horses via Clinton to Wilmington.

I thank you for the energetic action that has marked your course,
and shall be most happy to meet you.  I am, truly your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

In quick succession I received other messages from General Terry,
of older date, and therefore superseded by that brought by the tug
Davidson, viz., by two naval officers, who had come up partly by
canoes and partly by land; General Terry had also sent the
Thirteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry to search for us, under Colonel
Kerwin, who had dispatched Major Berks with fifty men, who reached
us at Fayetteville; so that, by March 12th, I was in full
communication with General Terry and the outside world.  Still, I
was anxious to reach Goldsboro', there to make junction with
General Schofield, so as to be ready for the next and last stage of
the war.  I then knew that my special antagonist, General Jos. E.
Johnston, was back, with part of his old army; that he would not be
misled by feints and false reports, and would somehow compel me to
exercise more caution than I had hitherto done.  I then
over-estimated his force at thirty-seven thousand infantry,
supposed to be made up of S. D.  Lee's corps, four thousand;
Cheatham's, five thousand; Hoke's, eight thousand; Hardee's, ten
thousand; and other detachments, ten thousand; with Hampton's,
Wheeler's, and Butler's cavalry, about eight thousand.  Of these,
only Hardee and the cavalry were immediately in our front, while
the bulk of Johnston's army was supposed to be collecting at or
near Raleigh.  I was determined, however, to give him as little
time for organization as possible, and accordingly crossed Cape
Fear River, with all the army, during the 13th and 14th, leaving
one division as a rearguard, until the arsenal could be completely
destroyed.  This was deliberately and completely leveled on the
14th, when fire was applied to the wreck.  Little other damage was
done at Fayetteville.

On the 14th the tug Davidson again arrived from Wilmington, with
General Dodge, quartermaster, on board, reporting that there was no
clothing to be had at Wilmington; but he brought up some sugar and
coffee, which were most welcome, and some oats.  He was followed by
a couple of gunboats, under command of Captain Young, United States
Navy, who reached Fayetteville after I had left, and undertook to
patrol the river as long as the stage of water would permit; and
General Dodge also promised to use the captured steamboats for a
like purpose.  Meantime, also, I had sent orders to General
Schofield, at Newbern, and to General Terry, at Wilmington, to move
with their effective forces straight for Goldsboro', where I
expected to meet them by the 20th of March.

On the 15th of March the whole army was across Cape Fear River, and
at once began its march for Goldsboro'; the Seventeenth Corps still
on the right, the Fifteenth next in order, then the Fourteenth and
Twentieth on the extreme left; the cavalry, acting in close concert
with the left flank.  With almost a certainty of being attacked on
this flank, I had instructed General Slocum to send his
corps-trains under strong escort by an interior road, holding four
divisions ready for immediate battle.  General Howard was in like
manner ordered to keep his trains well to his right, and to have
four divisions unencumbered, about six miles ahead of General
Slocum, within easy support.

In the mean time, I had dispatched by land to Wilmington a train of
refugees who had followed the army all the way from Columbia, South
Carolina, under an escort of two hundred men, commanded by Major
John A.  Winson (One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois Infantry), so
that we were disencumbered, and prepared for instant battle on our
left and exposed flank.

In person I accompanied General Slocum, and during the night of
March 15th was thirteen miles out on the Raleigh road.  This flank
followed substantially a road along Cape Fear River north,
encountered pretty stubborn resistance by Hardee's infantry,
artillery, and cavalry, and the ground favored our enemy; for the
deep river, Cape Fear, was on his right, and North River on his
left, forcing us to attack him square in front.  I proposed to
drive Hardee well beyond Averysboro', and then to turn to the right
by Bentonville for Goldsboro'.  During the day it rained very
hard, and I had taken refuge in an old cooper-shop, where a
prisoner of war was brought to me (sent back from the skirmish-line
by General Kilpatrick), who proved to be Colonel Albert Rhett,
former commander of Fort Sumter.  He was a tall, slender, and
handsome young man, dressed in the most approved rebel uniform,
with high jackboots beautifully stitched, and was dreadfully
mortified to find himself a prisoner in our hands.  General Frank
Blair happened to be with me at the moment, and we were much amused
at Rhett's outspoken disgust at having been captured without a
fight.  He said he was a brigade commander, and that his brigade
that day was Hardee's rear-guard; that his command was composed
mostly of the recent garrisons of the batteries of Charleston
Harbor, and had little experience in woodcraft; that he was giving
ground to us as fast as Hardee's army to his rear moved back, and
during this operation he was with a single aide in the woods, and
was captured by two men of Kilpatrick's skirmish-line that was
following up his retrograde movement.  These men called on him to
surrender, and ordered him, in language more forcible than polite,
to turn and ride back.  He first supposed these men to be of
Hampton's cavalry, and threatened to report them to General Hampton
for disrespectful language; but he was soon undeceived, and was
conducted to Kilpatrick, who sent him back to General Slocum's
guard.

The rain was falling heavily, and, our wagons coming up, we went
into camp there, and had Rhett and General Blair to take supper
with us, and our conversation was full and quite interesting.  In
due time, however, Rhett was passed over by General Slocum to his
provost-guard, with orders to be treated with due respect,--and was
furnished with a horse to ride.

The next day (the 16th) the opposition continued stubborn, and near
Averysboro' Hardee had taken up a strong position, before which
General Slocum deployed Jackson's division (of the Twentieth
Corps), with part of Ward's.  Kilpatrick was on his right front.
Coming up, I advised that a brigade should make a wide circuit by
the left, and, if possible, catch this line in flank.  The movement
was completely successful, the first line of the enemy was swept
away, and we captured the larger part of Rhett's brigade, two
hundred and seventeen men, including Captain Macbeth's battery of
three guns, and buried one hundred and eight dead.

The deployed lines (Ward's and Jackson's) pressed on, and found
Hardee again intrenched; but the next morning he was gone, in full
retreat toward Smithfield.  In this action, called the battle of
Averysboro', we lost twelve officers and sixty-five men killed, and
four hundred and seventy-seven men wounded; a serious loss, because
every wounded man had to be carried in an ambulance.  The rebel
wounded (sixty-eight) were carried to a house near by, all surgical
operations necessary were performed by our surgeons, and then these
wounded men were left in care of an officer and four men of the
rebel prisoners, with a scanty supply of food, which was the best
we could do for them.  In person I visited this house while the
surgeons were at work, with arms and legs lying around loose, in
the yard and on the porch; and in a room on a bed lay a pale,
handsome young fellow, whose left arm had just been cut off near
the shoulder.  Some one used my name, when he asked, in a feeble
voice, if I were General Sherman.  He then announced himself as
Captain Macbeth, whose battery had just been captured; and said
that he remembered me when I used to visit his father's house, in
Charleston.  I inquired about his family, and enabled him to write
a note to his mother, which was sent her afterward from Goldsboro'.
I have seen that same young gentleman since in St. Louis, where he
was a clerk in an insurance-office.

While the battle of Averysboro' was in progress, and I was sitting
on my horse, I was approached by a man on foot, without shoes or
coat, and his head bandaged by a handkerchief.  He announced
himself as the Captain Duncan who had been captured by Wade Hampton
in Fayetteville, but had escaped; and, on my inquiring how he
happened to be in that plight, he explained that when he was a
prisoner Wade Hampton's men had made him "get out of his coat, hat,
and shoes," which they appropriated to themselves.  He said Wade
Hampton had seen them do it, and he had appealed to him personally
for protection, as an officer, but Hampton answered him with a
curse.  I sent Duncan to General Kilpatrick, and heard afterward
that Kilpatrick had applied to General Slocum for his prisoner,
Colonel Rhett, whom he made march on foot the rest of the way to
Goldsboro', in retaliation.  There was a story afloat that
Kilpatrick made him get out of those fine boots, but restored them
because none of his own officers had feet delicate enough to wear
them.  Of course, I know nothing of this personally, and have never
seen Rhett since that night by the cooper-shop; and suppose that he
is the editor who recently fought a duel in New Orleans.

From Averysboro' the left wing turned east, toward Goldsboro', the
Fourteenth Corps leading.  I remained with this wing until the
night of the 18th, when we were within twenty-seven miles of
Goldsboro' and five from Bentonsville; and, supposing that all
danger was over, I crossed over to join Howard's column, to the
right, so as to be nearer to Generals Schofield and Terry, known to
be approaching Goldsboro'.  I overtook General Howard at
Falling-Creek Church, and found his column well drawn out, by reason
of the bad roads.  I had heard some cannonading over about Slocum's
head of column, and supposed it to indicate about the same measure of
opposition by Hardee's troops and Hampton's cavalry before
experienced; but during the day a messenger overtook me, and notified
me that near Bentonsville General Slocum had run up against
Johnston's whole army.  I sent back orders for him to fight
defensively to save time, and that I would come up with
reenforcements from the direction of Cog's Bridge, by the road which
we had reached near Falling-Creek Church.  The country was very
obscure, and the maps extremely defective.

By this movement I hoped General Slocum would hold Johnston's army
facing west, while I would come on his rear from the east. The
Fifteenth Corps, less one division (Hazen's), still well to the
rear, was turned at once toward Bentonsville; Hazen's division was
ordered to Slocum's flank, and orders were also sent for General
Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, to come to the same destination.
Meantime the sound of cannon came from the direction of
Bentonsville.

The night of the 19th caught us near Falling-Creek Church; but
early the next morning the Fifteenth Corps, General C. R. Woods's
division leading, closed down on Bentonsville, near which it was
brought up by encountering a line of fresh parapet, crossing the
road and extending north, toward Mill Creek.

After deploying, I ordered General Howard to proceed with due
caution, using skirmishers alone, till he had made junction with
General Slocum, on his left.  These deployments occupied all day,
during which two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps also got up.
At that time General Johnston's army occupied the form of a V, the
angle reaching the road leading from Averysboro' to Goldsboro', and
the flanks resting on Mill Creek, his lines embracing the village
of Bentonsville.

General Slocum's wing faced one of these lines and General Howard's
the other; and, in the uncertainty of General Johnston's strength,
I did not feel disposed to invite a general battle, for we had been
out from Savannah since the latter part of January, and our
wagon-trains contained but little food.  I had also received messages
during the day from General Schofield, at Kinston, and General
Terry, at Faison's Depot, approaching Goldsboro', both expecting to
reach it by March 21st.  During the 20th we simply held our ground
and started our trains back to Kinston for provisions, which would
be needed in the event of being forced to fight a general battle at
Bentonsville.  The next day (21st) it began to rain again, and we
remained quiet till about noon, when General Mower, ever rash,
broke through the rebel line on his extreme left flank, and was
pushing straight for Bentonsville and the bridge across Mill Creek.
I ordered him back to connect with his own corps; and, lest the
enemy should concentrate on him, ordered the whole rebel line to be
engaged with a strong skirmish-fire.

I think I made a mistake there, and should rapidly have followed
Mower's lead with the whole of the right wing, which would have
brought on a general battle, and it could not have resulted
otherwise than successfully to us, by reason of our vastly superior
numbers; but at the moment, for the reasons given, I preferred to
make junction with Generals Terry and Schofield, before engaging
Johnston's army, the strength of which was utterly unknown.  The
next day he was gone, and had retreated on Smithfield; and, the
roads all being clear, our army moved to Goldsboro'.  The heaviest
fighting at Bentonsville was on the first day, viz., the 19th, when
Johnston's army struck the head of Slocum's columns, knocking back
Carlin's division; but, as soon as General Slocum had brought up
the rest of the Fourteenth Corps into line, and afterward the
Twentieth on its left, he received and repulsed all attacks, and
held his ground as ordered, to await the coming back of the right
wing.  His loss, as reported, was nine officers and one hundred and
forty-five men killed, eight hundred and sixteen wounded, and two
hundred and twenty-six missing.  He reported having buried of the
rebel dead one hundred and sixty-seven, and captured three hundred
and thirty-eight prisoners.

The loss of the right wing was two officers and thirty-five men
killed, twelve officers and two hundred and eighty-nine men
wounded, and seventy missing.  General Howard reported that he had
buried one hundred of the rebel dead, and had captured twelve
hundred and eighty-seven prisoners.

Our total loss, therefore, at Bentonsville was: 1,604

General Johnston, in his "Narrative" (p. 392), asserts that his
entire force at Bentonsville, omitting Wheeler's and Butler's
cavalry, only amounted to fourteen thousand one hundred infantry
and artillery; and (p. 393) states his losses as: 2,343


Wide discrepancies exist in these figures: for instance, General
Slocum accounts for three hundred and thirty-eight prisoners
captured, and General Howard for twelve hundred and eighty-seven,
making sixteen hundred and twenty-five in all, to Johnston's six
hundred and fifty three--a difference of eight hundred and
seventy-two.  I have always accorded to General Johnston due credit
for boldness in his attack on our exposed flank at Bentonville,
but I think he understates his strength, and doubt whether at the
time he had accurate returns from his miscellaneous army, collected
from Hoke, Bragg, Hardee, Lee, etc.  After the first attack on
Carlin's division, I doubt if the fighting was as desperate as
described by him, p. 385, et seq.  I was close up with the
Fifteenth Corps, on the 20th and 21st, considered the fighting as
mere skirmishing, and know that my orders were to avoid a general
battle, till we could be sure of Goldsboro', and of opening up a
new base of supply.  With the knowledge now possessed of his small
force, of course I committed an error in not overwhelming
Johnston's army on the 21st of March, 1865.  But I was content then
to let him go, and on the 22d of March rode to Cog's Bridge, where
I met General Terry, with his two divisions of the Tenth Corps; and
the next day we rode into Goldsboro', where I found General
Schofield with the Twenty-third Corps, thus effecting a perfect
junction of all the army at that point, as originally contemplated.
During the 23d and 24th the whole army was assembled at Goldsboro';
General Terry's two divisions encamped at Faison's Depot to the
south, and General Kilpatrick's cavalry at Mount Olive Station,
near him, and there we all rested, while I directed my special
attention to replenishing the army for the next and last stage of
the campaign.  Colonel W. W. Wright had been so indefatigable, that
the Newbern Railroad was done, and a locomotive arrived in
Goldsboro' on the 25th of March.

Thus was concluded one of the longest and most important marches
ever made by an organized army in a civilized country.  The
distance from Savannah to Goldsboro' is four hundred and
twenty-five miles, and the route traversed embraced five large
navigable rivers, viz., the Edisto, Broad, Catawba, Pedee, and Cape
Fear, at either of which a comparatively small force, well-handled,
should have made the passage most difficult, if not impossible.
The country generally was in a state of nature, with innumerable
swamps, with simply mud roads, nearly every mile of which had to be
corduroyed.  In our route we had captured Columbia, Cheraw, and
Fayetteville, important cities and depots of supplies, had
compelled the evacuation of Charleston City and Harbor, had utterly
broken up all the railroads of South Carolina, and had consumed a
vast amount of food and forage, essential to the enemy for the
support of his own armies.  We had in mid-winter accomplished the
whole journey of four hundred and twenty-five miles in fifty days,
averaging ten miles per day, allowing ten lay-days, and had reached
Goldsboro' with the army in superb order, and the trains almost as
fresh as when we had started from Atlanta.

It was manifest to me that we could resume our march, and come
within the theatre of General Grant's field of operations in all
April, and that there was no force in existence that could delay
our progress, unless General Lee should succeed in eluding General
Grant at Petersburg, make junction with General Johnston, and thus
united meet me alone; and now that we had effected a junction with
Generals Terry and Schofield, I had no fear even of that event.  On
reaching Goldsboro, I learned from General Schofield all the
details of his operations about Wilmington and Newbern; also of the
fight of the Twenty-third Corps about Kinston, with General Bragg.
I also found Lieutenant Dunn, of General Grant's staff, awaiting
me, with the general's letter of February 7th, covering
instructions to Generals Schofield and Thomas; and his letter of
March 16th, in answer to mine of the 12th, from Fayetteville.

These are all given here to explain the full reasons for the events
of the war then in progress, with two or three letters from myself,
to fill out the picture.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, February 7, 1865



Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: Without much expectation of it reaching you in time to be
of any service, I have mailed to you copies of instructions to
Schofield and Thomas.  I had informed Schofield by telegraph of the
departure of Mahone's division, south from the Petersburg front.
These troops marched down the Weldon road, and, as they apparently
went without baggage, it is doubtful whether they have not
returned.  I was absent from here when they left.  Just returned
yesterday morning from Cape Fear River.  I went there to determine
where Schofield's corps had better go to operate against Wilmington
and Goldsboro'.  The instructions with this will inform you of the
conclusion arrived at.

Schofield was with me, and the plan of the movement against
Wilmington fully determined before we started back; hence the
absence of more detailed instructions to him.  He will land one
division at Smithville, and move rapidly up the south side of the
river, and secure the Wilmington & Charlotte Railroad, and with his
pontoon train cross over to the island south of the city, if he
can.  With the aid of the gunboats, there is no doubt but this move
will drive the enemy from their position eight miles east of the
city, either back to their line or away altogether.  There will be
a large force on the north bank of Cape Fear River, ready to follow
up and invest the garrison, if they should go inside.

The railroads of North Carolina are four feet eight and one-half
inches gauge.  I have sent large parties of railroad-men there to
build them up, and have ordered stock to run them.  We have
abundance of it idle from the non-use of the Virginia roads.  I
have taken every precaution to have supplies ready for you wherever
you may turn up.  I did this before when you left Atlanta, and
regret that they did not reach you promptly when you reached
salt-water....

Alexander Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and Judge Campbell, are now at
my headquarters, very desirous of going to Washington to see Mr.
Lincoln, informally, on the subject of peace.  The peace feeling
within the rebel lines is gaining ground rapidly.  This, however,
should not relax our energies in the least, but should stimulate us
to greater activity.

I have received your very kind letters, in which you say you would
decline, or are opposed to, promotion.  No one world be more
pleased at your advancement than I, and if you should be placed in
my position, and I put subordinate, it would not change our
personal relations in the least. I would make the same exertions to
support you that you have ever done to support me, and would do all
in my power to make our cause win.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865.

Major-General G. H. THOMAS, commanding Army of the Cumberland.

GENERAL: With this I send you a letter from General Sherman.  At
the time of writing it, General Sherman was not informed of the
depletion of your command by my orders.  It will, be impossible at
present for you to move south as he contemplated, with the force of
infantry indicated.  General Slocum is advised before this of the
changes made, and that for the winter you will be on the defensive.
I think, however, an expedition from East Tennessee, under General
Stoneman might penetrate South Carolina, well down toward Columbia,
destroying the railroad and military resources of the country, thus
visiting a portion of the State which will not be reached by
Sherman's forces.  He might also be able to return to East
Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, thus releasing home
our prisoners of war in rebel hands.

Of the practicability of doing this, General Stoneman will have to
be the judge, making up his mind from information obtained while
executing the first part of his instructions.  Sherman's movements
will attract the attention of all the force the enemy can collect,
thus facilitating the execution of this.

Three thousand cavalry would be a sufficient force to take.  This
probably can be raised in the old Department of the Ohio, without
taking any now under General Wilson.  It would require, though, the
reorganization of the two regiments of Kentucky Cavalry, which
Stoneman had in his very successful raid into Southwestern
Virginia.

It will be necessary, probably, for you to send, in addition to the
force now in East Tennessee, a small division of infantry, to
enable General Gillem to hold the upper end of Holston Valley, and
the mountain-passes in rear of Stevenson.

You may order such an expedition.  To save time, I will send a copy
of this to General Stoneman, so that he can begin his preparations
without loss of time, and can commence his correspondence with you
as to these preparations.

As this expedition goes to destroy and not to fight battles, but to
avoid them when practicable, particularly against any thing like
equal forces, or where a great object is to be gained, it should go
as light as possible.  Stoneman's experience, in raiding will teach
him in this matter better than he can be directed.

Let there be no delay in the preparations for this expedition, and
keep me advised of its progress.  Very respectfully, your obedient
servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865.

Major-General J. M. SCHOFIELD, commanding army of the Ohio.

GENERAL: I have requested by telegraph that, for present purposes,
North Carolina be erected into a department, and that you be placed
in command of it, subject to Major-General Sherman's orders.  Of
course, you will receive orders from me direct until such time as
General Sherman gets within communicating distance of you.  This
obviates the necessity of my publishing the order which I informed
you would meet you at Fortress Monroe.  If the order referred to
should not be published from the Adjutant-General's office, you
will read these instructions as your authority to assume command of
all the troops in North Carolina, dating all official
communications, "Headquarters Army of the Ohio."  Your headquarters
will be in the field, and with the portion of the army where you
feel yourself most needed.  In the first move you will go to Cape
Fear River.

Your movements are intended as cooperative with Sherman's movement
through the States of South and North Carolina.  The first point to
be obtained is to secure Wilmington.  Goldsboro' will then be your
objective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both,
as you may deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro',
you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that
place with the sea-coast, as near to it as you can, building the
road behind you.  The enterprise under you has two objects: the
first is, to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his
march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on the
line of his march.  As soon, therefore, as you can determine which
of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use for
throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the
accumulation of twenty days rations and forage for sixty thousand
men and twenty thousand animals.  You will get of these as many as
you can house and protect, to such point in the interior as you may
be able to occupy.

I believe General Innis N. Palmer has received some instructions
directly from General Sherman, on the subject of securing supplies
for his army.  You can learn what steps he has taken, and be
governed in your requisitions accordingly.  A supply of
ordnance-stores will also be necessary.

Make all your requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective
departments, in the field, with me at City Point.  Communicate with
me by every opportunity, and, should you deem it necessary at any
time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you
can communicate by telegraph.

The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of
those required by your own command.

The movements of the enemy may justify you, or even make it your
imperative duty, to cut loose from your base and strike for the
interior, to aid Sherman.  In such case you will act on your own
judgment, without waiting for instructions.  You will report,
however, what you propose doing.  The details for carrying out
these instructions are necessarily left to you.  I would urge,
however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the
importance of it, prompt action.  Sherman may be looked for in the
neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of
February.  This limits your time very materially.

If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it
can be supplied from Washington: A large force of railroad-men has
already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort
Fisher in a day or two.  On this point I have informed you by
telegraph.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 16, 1865.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: Your interesting letter of the 12th inst. is just
received.  I have never felt any uneasiness for your safety, but I
have felt great anxiety to know just how you were progressing.  I
knew, or thought I did, that, with the magnificent army with you,
you would come out safely somewhere.

To secure certain success, I deemed the capture of Wilmington of
the greatest importance.  Butler came near losing that prize to us.
But Terry and Schofield have since retrieved his blunders, and I do
not know but the first failure has been as valuable a success for
the country as the capture of Fort Fisher.  Butler may not see it
in that light.

Ever since you started on the last campaign, and before, I have
been attempting to get something done in the West, both to
cooperate with you and to take advantage of the enemy's weakness
there--to accomplish results favorable to us.  Knowing Thomas to be
slow beyond excuse, I depleted his army to reinforce Canby, so that
he might act from Mobile Bay on the interior.  With all I have
said, he has not moved at last advices.  Canby was sending a
cavalry force, of about seven thousand, from Vicksburg toward
Selma.  I ordered Thomas to send Wilson from Eastport toward the
same point, and to get him off as soon after the 20th of February
as possible.  He telegraphed me that he would be off by that date.
He has not yet started, or had not at last advices.  I ordered him
to send Stoneman from East Tennessee into Northwest South Carolina,
to be there about the time you would reach Columbia.  He would
either have drawn off the enemy's cavalry from you, or would have
succeeded in destroying railroads, supplies, and other material,
which you could not reach.  At that time the Richmond papers were
full of the accounts of your movements, and gave daily accounts of
movements in West North Carolina.  I supposed all the time it was
Stoneman.  You may judge my surprise when I afterward learned that
Stoneman was still in Louisville, Kentucky, and that the troops in
North Carolina were Kirk's forces!  In order that Stoneman might
get off without delay, I told Thomas that three thousand men would
be sufficient for him to take.  In the mean time I had directed
Sheridan to get his cavalry ready, and, as soon as the snow in the
mountains melted sufficiently, to start for Staunton, and go on and
destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and canal.  Time advanced,
until he set the 28th of February for starting.  I informed Thomas,
and directed him to change the course of Stoneman toward Lynchburg,
to destroy the road in Virginia up as near to that place as
possible.  Not hearing from Thomas, I telegraphed to him about the
12th, to know if Stoneman was yet off.  He replied not, but that he
(Thomas) would start that day for Knoxville, to get him off as soon
as possible.

Sheridan has made his raid, and with splendid success, so far as
heard.  I am looking for him at "White House" to-day.  Since about
the 20th of last month the Richmond papers have been prohibited
from publishing accounts of army movements.  We are left to our own
resources, therefore, for information.  You will see from the
papers what Sheridan has done; if you do not, the officer who bears
this will tell you all.

Lee has depleted his army but very little recently, and I learn of
none going south.  Some regiments may have been detached, but I
think no division or brigade.  The determination seems to be to
hold Richmond as long as possible.  I have a force sufficient to
leave enough to hold our lines (all that is necessary of them), and
move out with plenty to whip his whole army.  But the roads are
entirely impassable.  Until they improve, I shall content myself
with watching Lee, and be prepared to pitch into him if he attempts
to evacuate the place.  I may bring Sheridan over--think I will
--and break up the Danville and Southside Railroads.  These are the
last avenues left to the enemy.

Recruits have come in so rapidly at the West that Thomas has now
about as much force as he had when he attacked Hood.  I have
stopped all who, under previous orders, would go to him, except
those from Illinois.

Fearing the possibility of the enemy falling back to Lynchburg, and
afterward attempting to go into East Tennessee or Kentucky, I have
ordered Thomas to move the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap, and to
fortify there, and to hold out to the Virginia line, if he can.  He
has accumulated a large amount of supplies in Knoxville, and has
been ordered not to destroy any of the railroad west of the
Virginia Hue.  I told him to get ready for a campaign toward
Lynchburg, if it became necessary.  He never can make one there or
elsewhere; but the steps taken will prepare for any one else to
take his troops and come east or go toward Rome, whichever may be
necessary.  I do not believe either will.

When I hear that you and Schofield are together, with your back
upon the coast, I shall feel that you are entirely safe against any
thing the enemy can do.  Lee may evacuate Richmond, but he cannot
get there with force enough to touch you.  His army is now
demoralized and deserting very fast, both to us and to their homes.
A retrograde movement would cost him thousands of men, even if we
did not follow.

Five thousand men, belonging to the corps with you, are now on
their way to join you.  If more reenforcements are necessary, I
will send them.  My notion is, that you should get Raleigh as soon
as possible, and hold the railroad from there back.  This may take
more force than you now have.

From that point all North Carolina roads can be made useless to the
enemy, without keeping up communications with the rear.

Hoping to hear soon of your junction with the forces from
Wilmington and Newborn, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD,
COX'S BRIGADE, NEUSE RIVER, NORTH CAROLINA, March 22, 1865

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point,
Virginia.

GENERAL: I wrote you from Fayetteville, North Carolina, on Tuesday,
the 14th instant, that I was all ready to start for Goldsboro', to
which point I had also ordered General Schofield, from Newborn, and
General Terry, from Wilmington.  I knew that General Jos. Johnston
was supreme in command against me, and that he would have time to
concentrate a respectable army to oppose the last stage of this
march.  Accordingly, General Slocum was ordered to send his main
supply-train, under escort of two divisions, straight for
Bentonsville, while he, with his other four divisions,
disencumbered of all unnecessary wagons, should march toward
Raleigh, by way of threat, as far as Averysboro'.  General Howard,
in like manner, sent his trains with the Seventeenth Corps, well to
the right, and, with the four divisions of the Fifteenth Corps,
took roads which would enable him to come promptly to the exposed
left flank.  We started on the 16th, but again the rains set in,
and the roads, already bad enough, became horrible.

On Tuesday, the 16th, General Slocum found Hardee's army, from
Charleston, which had retreated before us from Cheraw, in position
across the narrow, swampy neck between Cape Fear and North Rivers,
where the road branches off to Goldsboro'.  There a pretty severe
fight occurred, in which General Slocum's troops carried handsomely
the advanced line, held by a South Carolina brigade, commanded by a
Colonel Butler.  Its Commander, Colonel Rhett, of Fort Sumter
notoriety, with one of his staff, had the night before been
captured, by Kilpatrick's scouts, from his very skirmish-line.  The
next morning Hardee was found gone, and was pursued through and
beyond Averysboro'.  General Slocum buried one hundred and eight
dead rebels, and captured and destroyed three guns.  Some eighty
wounded rebels were left in our hands, and, after dressing their
wounds, we left them in a house, attended by a Confederate officer
and four privates, detailed out of our prisoners and paroled for
the purpose.

We resumed the march toward Goldsboro'.  I was with the left wing
until I supposed all danger had passed; but, when General Slocum's
head of column was within four miles of Bentonsville, after
skirmishing as usual with cavalry, he became aware that there was
infantry in his front.  He deployed a couple of brigades, which, on
advancing, sustained a partial repulse, but soon rallied, when he
formed a line of the two leading divisions (Morgan's and Carlin's)
of Jeff. C. Davis's corps.  The enemy attacked these with violence,
but was repulsed.  This was in the forenoon of Sunday, the 19th.
General Slocum brought forward the two divisions of the Twentieth
Corps, hastily disposed of them for defense, and General Kilpatrick
massed his cavalry on the left.

General Jos. Johnston had, the night before, marched his whole army
(Bragg, Cheatham, S. D. Lee, Hardee, and all the troops he had
drawn from every quarter), determined, as he told his men, to crash
one of our corps, and then defeat us in detail.  He attacked
General Slocum in position from 3 P. M.  on the 19th till dark; but
was everywhere repulsed, and lost heavily.  At the time, I was with
the Fifteenth Corps, marching on a road more to the right; but, on
hearing of General Slocum's danger, directed that corps toward
Cox's Bridge, in the night brought Blair's corps over, and on the
20th marched rapidly on Johnston's flank and rear.  We struck him
about noon, forced him to assume the defensive, and to fortify.
Yesterday we pushed him hard, and came very near crushing him, the
right division of the Seventeenth Corps (Mower's) having broken in
to within a hundred yards of where Johnston himself was, at the
bridge across Mill Creek.  Last night he retreated, leaving us in
possession of the field, dead, and wounded.  We have over two
thousand prisoners from this affair and the one at Averysboro', and
I am satisfied that Johnston's army was so roughly handled
yesterday that we could march right on to Raleigh; but we have now
been out six weeks, living precariously upon the collections of our
foragers, our men dirty, ragged, and saucy, and we must rest and
fix up a little.  Our entire losses thus far (killed, wounded, and
prisoners) will be covered by twenty-five hundred, a great part of
which are, as usual, slight wounds.  The enemy has lost more than
double as many, and we have in prisoners alone full two thousand.

I limited the pursuit, this morning, to Mill Creek, and will
forthwith march the army to Goldsboro', there to rest, reclothe,
and get some rations.

Our combinations were such that General Schofield entered
Goldsboro' from Newborn; General Terry got Cox's Bridge, with
pontoons laid, and a brigade across Neuse River intrenched; and we
whipped Jos. Johnston--all on the same day.

After riding over the field of battle to-day, near Bentonsville,
and making the necessary orders, I have ridden down to this place
(Cox's Bridge) to see General Terry, and to-morrow shall ride into
Goldsboro.

I propose to collect there my army proper; shall post General Terry
about Faison's Depot, and General Schofield about Kinston, partly
to protect the road, but more to collect such food and forage as
the country affords, until the railroads are repaired leading into
Goldsboro'.

I fear these have not been pushed with the vigor I had expected;
but I will soon have them both going.  I shall proceed at once to
organize three armies of twenty-five thousand men each, and will
try and be all ready to march to Raleigh or Weldon, as we may
determine, by or before April 10th.

I inclose you a copy of my orders of to-day.  I would like to be
more specific, but have not the data.  We have lost no general
officers nor any organization.  General Slocum took three guns at
Averysboro', and lost three others at the first dash on him at
Bentonsville.  We have all our wagons and trains in good order.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD,
COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, March 23, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, commanding the Armies of the United
States, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL:  On reaching Goldsboro' this morning, I found Lieutenant
Dunn awaiting me with your letter of March 18th and dispatch of the
17th.  I wrote you fully from Cox's Bridge yesterday, and since
reaching Goldsboro' have learned that my letter was sent punctually
to Newborn, whence it will be dispatched to you.

I am very glad to hear that General Sheridan did such good service
between Richmond and Lynchburg, and hope he will keep the ball
moving, I know that these raids and dashes disconcert our enemy and
discourage him much.

General Slocum's two corps (Fourteenth and Twentieth) are now
coming in.  I will dispose of them north of Goldsboro', between the
Weldon road and Little River.  General Howard to-day is marching
south of the Nenae, and to-morrow will come in and occupy ground
north of Goldsboro', extending from the Weldon Railroad to that
leading to Kinston.

I have ordered all the provisional divisions, made up of troops
belonging to the regular corps, to be broken up, and the men to
join their proper regiments and organizations; and have ordered
General Schofield to guard the railroads back to Newborn and
Wilmington, and to make up a movable column equal to twenty-five
thousand men, with which to take the field.  His army will be the
centre, as on the Atlanta campaign.  I do not think I want any more
troops (other than absentees and recruits) to fill up the present
regiments, and I can make up an army of eighty thousand men by
April 10th.  I will post General Kilpatrick at Mount Olive Station
on the Wilmington road, and then allow the army some rest.

We have sent all our empty wagons, under escort, with the proper
staff-officers, to bring up from Kinston clothing and provisions.
As long as we move we can gather food and forage; but, the moment
we stop, trouble begins.

I feel sadly disappointed that our railroads are not done.  I do
not like to say there has been any neglect until I make inquiries;
but it does seem to me the repairs should have been made ere this,
and the road properly stocked.  I can only hear of one locomotive
(besides the four old ones) on the Newbern road, and two damaged
locomotives (found by General Terry) on the Wilmington road.  I
left Generals Easton and Beckwith purposely to make arrangements in
anticipation of my arrival, and have heard from neither, though I
suppose them both to be at Morehead City.

At all events, we have now made a junction of all the armies, and
if we can maintain them, will, in a short time, be in a position to
march against Raleigh, Gaston, Weldon, or even Richmond, as you may
determine.

If I get the troops all well planed, and the supplies working well,
I may run up to see you for a day or two before diving again into
the bowels of the country.

I will make, in a very short time, accurate reports of our
operations for the past two months.  Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD,
COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, March 24, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL: I have kept Lieutenant Dunn over to-day that I might
report farther.  All the army is now in, save the cavalry (which I
have posted at Mount Olive Station, south of the Nenae) and General
Terry's command (which--to-morrow will move from Cog's Ferry to
Faison's Depot, also on the Wilmington road).  I send you a copy of
my orders of this morning, the operation of which will, I think,
soon complete our roads.  The telegraph is now done to Morehead
City, and by it I learn that stores have been sent to Kinston in
boats, and that our wagons are loading with rations and clothing.
By using the Neuse as high up as Kinston, hauling from there
twenty-six miles, and by equipping the two roads to Morehead City
and Wilmington, I feel certain we can not only feed and equip the
army, but in a short time fill our wagons for another start.  I
feel certain, from the character of the fighting, that we have got
Johnston's army afraid of us.  He himself acts with timidity and
caution.  His cavalry alone manifests spirit, but limits its
operations to our stragglers and foraging-parties.  My marching
columns of infantry do not pay the cavalry any attention, but walk
right through it.

I think I see pretty clearly how, in one more move, we can
checkmate Lee, forcing him to unite Johnston with him in the defense
of Richmond, or to abandon the cause.  I feel certain, if he leaves
Richmond, Virginia leaves the Confederacy.  I will study my maps a
little more before giving my positive views.  I want all possible
information of the Roanoke as to navigability, how far up, and with
what draught.

We find the country sandy, dry, with good roads, and more corn and
forage than I had expected.  The families remain, but I will
gradually push them all out to Raleigh or Wilmington.  We will need
every house in the town.  Lieutenant Dunn can tell you of many
things of which I need not write.  Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD,
COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, April 5,1865

Major-General George H. Thomas, commanding Department of the
Cumberland.

DEAR GENERAL: I can hardly help smiling when I contemplate my
command--it is decidedly mixed.  I believe, but am not certain,
that you are in my jurisdiction, but I certainly cannot help you in
the way of orders or men; nor do I think you need either.  General
Cruft has just arrived with his provisional division, which will at
once be broken up and the men sent to their proper regiments, as
that of Meagher was on my arrival here.

You may have some feeling about my asking that General Slocum
should have command of the two corps that properly belong to you,
viz., the Fourteenth and Twentieth, but you can recall that he was
but a corps commander, and could not legally make orders of
discharge, transfer, etc., which was imperatively necessary.  I
therefore asked that General Slocum should be assigned to command
"an army in the field," called the Army of Georgia, composed of the
Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps.  The order is not yet made by the
President, though I have recognized it because both, General Grant
and the President have sanctioned it, and promised to have the
order made.

My army is now here, pretty well clad and provided, divided into
three parts, of two corps each--much as our old Atlanta army was.

I expect to move on in a few days, and propose (if Lee remains in
Richmond) to pass the Roanoke, and open communication with the
Chowan and Norfolk.  This will bring me in direct communication
with General Grant.

This is an admirable point--country open, and the two railroads in
good order back to Wilmington and Beaufort.  We have already
brought up stores enough to fill our wagons, and only await some
few articles, and the arrival of some men who are marching up from
the coast, to be off.

General Grant explained to me his orders to you, which, of course,
are all right.  You can make reports direct to Washington or to
General Grant, but keep me advised occasionally of the general
state of affairs, that I may know what is happening.  I must give
my undivided attention to matters here.  You will hear from a
thousand sources pretty fair accounts of our next march.  Yours
truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



[LETTER FROM ADMIRAL DAHLGREN]

SOUTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON
FLAG-SHIP PHILADELPHIA, CHARLESTON, April 20, 1865


Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Armies of the Tennessee,
Georgia, and Mississippi.

Mr DEAR GENERAL: I was much gratified by a sight of your
handwriting, which has just reached me from Goldsboro'; it was very
suggestive of a past to me, when these regions were the scene of
your operations.

As you progressed through South Carolina, there was no
manifestation of weakness or of an intention to abandon Charleston,
until within a few hours of the fact.  On the 11th of February I
was at Stono, and a spirited demonstration was made by General
Schimmel-pfennig and the vessels.  He drove the rebels from their
rifle-pits in front of the lines, extending from Fort Pringle, and
pushed them vigorously.  The next day I was at Bull's Bay, with a
dozen steamers, among them the finest of the squadron.  General
Potter had twelve to fifteen hundred men, the object being to carry
out your views.  We made as much fuss as possible, and with better
success than I anticipated, for it seems that the rebs conceived
Stono to be a feint, and the real object at Bull's Bay, supposing,
from the number of steamers and boats, that we had several thousand
men.  Now came an aide from General Gillmore, at Port Royal, with
your cipher-dispatch from Midway, so I steamed down to Port Royal
to see him.  Next day was spent in vain efforts to decipher-finally
it was accomplished.  You thought that the state of the roads might
force you to turn upon Charleston; so I went there on the 15th, but
there was no sign yet of flinching.  Then I went to Bull's Bay next
day (16th), and found that the troops were not yet ashore, owing to
the difficulties of shoal water.  One of the gunboats had contrived
to get up to within shelling range, and both soldiers and sailors
were working hard.  On the evening of the 18th I steamed down to
Stono to see how matters were going there.  Passing Charleston, I
noticed two large fires, well inside--probably preparing to leave.
On the 17th, in Stono, rumors were flying about loose of
evacuation.  In course of the morning, General Schimmelpfennig
telegraphed me, from Morris Island, that there were symptoms of
leaving; that he would again make a push at Stono, and asked for
monitors.  General Schimmelpfennig came down in the afternoon, and
we met in the Folly Branch, near Secessionville.  He was sore that
the rebs would be off that night, so he was to assault them in
front, while a monitor and gunboats stung their flanks both sides.
I also sent an aide to order my battery of five eleven-inch guns,
at Cumming's Point, to fire steadily all night on Sullivan's
Island, and two monitors to close up to the island for the same
object.  Next morning (18th) the rascals were found to be off, and
we broke in from all directions, by land and water.  The main
bodies had left at eight or nine in the evening, leaving
detachments to keep up a fire from the batteries.  I steamed round
quickly, and soon got into the city, threading the streets with a
large group of naval captains who had joined me.  All was silent as
the grave.  No one to be seen but a few firemen.

No one can question the excellence of your judgment in taking the
track you did, and I never had any misgivings, but it was natural
to desire to go into the place with a strong hand, for, if any one
spot in the land was foremost in the trouble, it was Charleston.

Your campaign was the final blow, grand in conception, complete in
execution; and now it is yours to secure the last army which
rebeldom possesses.  I hear of your being in motion by the 9th, and
hope that the result may be all that you wish.

Tidings of the murder of the President have just come, and shocked
every mind.  Can it be that such a resort finds root in any stratum
of American opinion?  Evidently it has not been the act of one man,
nor of a madman.  Who have prompted him?

I am grateful for your remembrance of my boy; the thought of him is
ever nearest to my heart.  Generous, brave, and noble, as I ever
knew him to be, that he should close his young life so early, even
under the accepted conditions of a soldier's life, as a son of the
Union, would have been grief sufficient for me to bear; but that
his precious remains should have been so treated by the brutes into
whose hands they fell, adds even to the bitterness of death.  I am
now awaiting the hour when I can pay my last duties to his memory.

With my best and sincere wishes, my dear general, for your success
and happiness, I am, most truly, your friend,

J.  A.  DAHLGREN.




[General Order No.  50.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON, March 27, 1865

Ordered--1.  That at the hour of noon, on the 14th day of April,
1885, Brevet Major-General Anderson will raise and plant upon the
ruins of Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, the same United States
flag which floated over the battlements of that fort during the
rebel assault, and which was lowered and saluted by him and the
small force of his command when the works were evacuated on the
14th day of April, 1861.

2.  That the flag, when raised, be saluted by one hundred guns from
Fort Sumter, and by a national salute from every fort and rebel
battery that fired upon Fort Sumter.

3.  That suitable ceremonies be had upon the occasion, under the
direction of Major-General William T. Sherman, whose military
operations compelled the rebels to evacuate Charleston, or, in his
absence, under the charge of Major-General Q. A. Gilmore,
commanding the department.  Among the ceremonies will be the
delivery of a public address by the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher.

4.  That the naval forces at Charleston, and their commander on
that station, be invited to participate in the ceremonies of the
occasion.

By order of the President of the United States,

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.




[General Order No. 41.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH
HILTON HEAD, SOUTH CAROLINA, April 10, 1865

Friday next, the 14th inst., will be the fourth anniversary of the
capture of Fort Sumter by the rebels.  A befitting celebration on
that day, in honor of its reoccupation by the national forces, has
been ordered by the President, in pursuance of which Brevet Major-
General Robert Anderson, United States Army, will restore to its
original place on the fort the identical flag which, after an
honorable and gallant defense, he was compelled to lower to the
insurgents in South Carolina, in April, 1861.

The ceremonies for the occasion will commence with prayer, at
thirty minutes past eleven o'clock a.m.

At noon precisely, the flag will be raised and saluted with one
hundred guns from Fort Sumter, and with a national salute from Fort
Moultrie and Battery Bee on Sullivan's Island, Fort Putnam on
Morris Island, and Fort Johnson on James's Island; it being
eminently appropriate that the places which were so conspicuous in
the inauguration of the rebellion should take a part not less
prominent in this national rejoicing over the restoration of the
national authority.

After the salutes, the Rev.  Henry Ward Beecher will deliver an
address.

The ceremonies will close with prayer and a benediction.

Colonel Stewart L.  Woodford, chief of staff, under such verbal
instructions as he may receive, is hereby charged with the details
of the celebration, comprising all the arrangements that it may be
necessary to make for the accommodation of the orator of the day,
and the comfort and safety of the invited guests from the army and
navy, and from civil life.

By command of Major-General Q. A. Gillmore,
W. L. M. BURGER, Assistant Adjutant-General.



Copy of Major ANDERSON's Dispatch, announcing the Surrender of Fort
Sumter, April 14, 1861.

STEAMSHIP BALTIC, OFF SANDY HOOK
April 10, 1861, 10.30 a.m.  via New York

Honorable S.  Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington

Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, until the
quarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed by fire,
the gorge-walls seriously injured, the magazine surrounded by
flames, and its door closed from the effect of heat, four barrels
and three cartridges of powder only being available, and no
provisions remaining but pork, I accepted terms of evacuation
offered by General Beauregard, being the same offered by him on the
11th inst., prior to the commencement of hostilities, and marched
out of the fort, Sunday afternoon, the 14th inst., with colors
flying and drums beating, bringing away company and private
property, and saluting my flag with fifty guns.

ROBERT ANDERSON, Major First Artillery, commanding.




CHAPTER XXIV.

END OF THE WAR--FROM GOLDSBORO' TO RALEIGH AND WASHINGTON.

APRIL AND MAY, 1865.

As before described, the armies commanded respectively by Generals
J. M. Schofield, A. H. Terry, and myself, effected a junction in
and about Goldsboro', North Carolina, during the 22d and 23d of
March, 1865, but it required a few days for all the troops and
trains of wagons to reach their respective camps.  In person I
reached Goldsboro' on the 23d, and met General Schofield, who
described fully his operations in North Carolina up to that date;
and I also found Lieutenant Dunn, aide-de-camp to General Grant,
with a letter from him of March 16th, giving a general description
of the state of facts about City Point.  The next day I received
another letter, more full, dated the 22d, which I give herewith.

Nevertheless, I deemed it of great importance that I should have a
personal interview with the general, and determined to go in person
to City Point as soon as the repairs of the railroad, then in
progress under the personal direction of Colonel W. W. Wright,
would permit:



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 22, 1865

Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: Although the Richmond papers do not communicate the fact,
yet I saw enough in them to satisfy me that you occupied Goldsboro'
on the 19th inst. I congratulate you and the army on what may be
regarded as the successful termination of the third campaign since
leaving the Tennessee River, less than one year ago.

Since Sheridan's very successful raid north of the James, the enemy
are left dependent on the Southside and Danville roads for all
their supplies.  These I hope to cut next week.  Sheridan is at
White House, "shoeing up" and resting his cavalry.  I expect him to
finish by Friday night and to start the following morning, raid
Long Bridge, Newmarket, Bermuda Hundred, and the extreme left of
the army around Petersburg.  He will make no halt with the armies
operating here, but will be joined by a division of cavalry, five
thousand five hundred strong, from the Army of the Potomac, and
will proceed directly to the Southside and Danville roads.  His
instructions will be to strike the Southside road as near
Petersburg as he can, and destroy it so that it cannot be repaired
for three or four days, and push on to the Danville road, as near
to the Appomattox as he can get.  Then I want him to destroy the
road toward Burkesville as far as he can; then push on to the
Southside road, west of Burkesville, and destroy it effectually.
From that point I shall probably leave it to his discretion either
to return to this army, crossing the Danville road south of
Burkesville, or go and join you, passing between Danville and
Greensboro'.  When this movement commences I shall move out by my
left, with all the force I can, holding present intrenched lines.
I shall start with no distinct view, further than holding Lee's
forces from following Sheridan.  But I shall be along myself, and
will take advantage of any thing that turns up.  If Lee detaches, I
will attack; or if he comes out of his lines I will endeavor to
repulse him, and follow it up to the best advantage.

It is most difficult to understand what the rebels intend to do; so
far but few troops have been detached from Lee's army.  Much
machinery has been removed, and material has been sent to
Lynchburg, showing a disposition to go there.  Points, too, have
been fortified on the Danville road.

Lee's army is much demoralized, and great numbers are deserting.
Probably, from returned prisoners, and such conscripts as can be
picked up, his numbers may be kept up.  I estimate his force now at
about sixty-five thousand men.

Wilson started on Monday, with twelve thousand cavalry, from
Eastport.  Stoneman started on the same day, from East Tennessee,
toward Lynchburg.  Thomas is moving the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap.
Canby is moving with a formidable force on Mobile and the interior
of Alabama.

I ordered Gilmore, as soon as the fall of Charleston was known, to
hold all important posts on the sea-coast, and to send to
Wilmington all surplus forces.  Thomas was also directed to forward
to Newbern all troops belonging to the corps with you.  I
understand this will give you about five thousand men, besides
those brought east by Meagher.

I have been telegraphing General Meigs to hasten up locomotives and
cars for you.  General McCallum, he informs me, is attending to it.
I fear they are not going forward as fast as I world like.

Let me know if you want more troops, or any thing else.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S.  GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


The railroad was repaired to Goldsboro' by the evening of March
25th, when, leaving General Schofield in chief command, with a
couple of staff-officers I started for City Point, Virginia, in a
locomotive, in company with Colonel Wright, the constructing
engineer.  We reached Newbern that evening, which was passed in the
company of General Palmer and his accomplished lady, and early the
next morning we continued on to Morehead City, where General Easton
had provided for us the small captured steamer Russia, Captain
Smith.  We put to sea at once and steamed up the coast, reaching
Fortress Monroe on the morning of the 27th, where I landed and
telegraphed to my brother, Senator Sherman, at Washington, inviting
him to come down and return with me to Goldsboro.  We proceeded on
up James River to City Point, which we reached the same afternoon.
I found General Grant, with his family and staff, occupying a
pretty group of huts on the bank of James River, overlooking the
harbor, which was full of vessels of all classes, both war and
merchant, with wharves and warehouses on an extensive scale.  The
general received me most heartily, and we talked over matters very
fully.  After I had been with him an hour or so, he remarked that
the President, Mr. Lincoln, was then on board the steamer River
Queen, lying at the wharf, and he proposed that we should call and
see him.  We walked down to the wharf, went on board, and found Mr.
Lincoln alone, in the after-cabin.  He remembered me perfectly, and
at once engaged in a most interesting conversation.  He was full of
curiosity about the many incidents of our great march, which had
reached him officially and through the newspapers, and seemed to
enjoy very much the more ludicrous parts-about the "bummers," and
their devices to collect food and forage when the outside world
supposed us to be starving; but at the same time he expressed a
good deal of anxiety lest some accident might happen to the army in
North Carolina during my absence.  I explained to him that that
army was snug and comfortable, in good camps, at Goldsboro'; that
it would require some days to collect forage and food for another
march; and that General Schofield was fully competent to command it
in my absence.  Having made a good, long, social visit, we took our
leave and returned to General Grant's quarters, where Mrs. Grant
had provided tea.  While at the table, Mrs. Grant inquired if we
had seen Mrs. Lincoln.  "No," said the general, "I did not ask for
her;" and I added that I did not even know that she was on board.
Mrs. Grant then exclaimed, "Well, you are a pretty pair!" and added
that our neglect was unpardonable; when the general said we would
call again the next day, and make amends for the unintended slight.

Early the next day, March 28th, all the principal officers of the
army and navy called to see me, Generals Meade, Ord, Ingalls, etc.,
and Admiral Porter.  At this time the River Queen was at anchor out
in the river, abreast of the wharf, and we again started to visit
Mr. and Mrs. Lincoln.  Admiral Porter accompanied us.  We took a
small, tug at the wharf, which conveyed us on board, where we were
again received most courteously by the President, who conducted us
to the after-cabin.  After the general compliments, General Grant
inquired after Mrs. Lincoln, when the President went to her state-
room, returned, and begged us to excuse her, as she was not well.
We then again entered upon a general conversation, during which
General Grant explained to the President that at that very instant
of time General Sheridan was crossing James River from the north,
by a pontoon-bridge below City Point; that he had a large,
well-appointed force of cavalry, with which he proposed to strike
the Southside and Danville Railroads, by which alone General Lee,
in Richmond, supplied his army; and that, in his judgment, matters
were drawing to a crisis, his only apprehension being that General
Lee would not wait long enough.  I also explained that my army at
Goldsboro' was strong enough to fight Lee's army and Johnston's
combined, provided that General Grant could come up within a day or
so; that if Lee would only remain in Richmond another fortnight, I
could march up to Burkesville, when Lee would have to starve inside
of his lines, or come out from his intrenchments and fight us on
equal terms.

Both General Grant and myself supposed that one or the other of us
would have to fight one more bloody battle, and that it would be
the last.  Mr. Lincoln exclaimed, more than once, that there had
been blood enough shed, and asked us if another battle could not be
avoided.  I remember well to have said that we could not control
that event; that this necessarily rested with our enemy; and I
inferred that both Jeff. Davis and General Lee would be forced to
fight one more desperate and bloody battle.  I rather supposed it
would fall on me, somewhere near Raleigh; and General Grant added
that, if Lee would only wait a few more days, he would have his
army so disposed that if the enemy should abandon Richmond, and
attempt to make junction with General Jos. Johnston in North
Carolina, he (General Grant) would be on his heels.  Mr. Lincoln
more than once expressed uneasiness that I was not with my army at
Goldsboro', when I again assured him that General Schofield was
fully competent to command in my absence; that I was going to start
back that very day, and that Admiral Porter had kindly provided for
me the steamer Bat, which he said was much swifter than my own
vessel, the Russia.  During this interview I inquired of the
President if he was all ready for the end of the war.  What was to
be done with the rebel armies when defeated?  And what should be
done with the political leaders, such as Jeff. Davis, etc.?  Should
we allow them to escape, etc.?  He said he was all ready; all he
wanted of us was to defeat the opposing armies, and to get the men
composing the Confederate armies back to their homes, at work on
their farms and in their shops.  As to Jeff. Davis, he was hardly
at liberty to speak his mind fully, but intimated that he ought to
clear out, "escape the country," only it would not do for him to
say so openly.  As usual, he illustrated his meaning by a story:

A man once had taken the total-abstinence pledge. When visiting a
friend, he was invited to take a drink, but declined, on the score
of his pledge; when his friend suggested lemonade, which was
accepted.  In preparing the lemonade, the friend pointed to the
brandy-bottle, and said the lemonade would be more palatable if he
were to pour in a little brandy; when his guest said, if he could
do so "unbeknown" to him, he would "not object."  From which
illustration I inferred that Mr. Lincoln wanted Davis to escape,
"unbeknown" to him.

I made no notes of this conversation at the time, but Admiral
Porter, who was present, did, and in 1866 he furnished me an
account thereof, which I insert below, but the admiral describes
the first visit, of the 27th, whereas my memory puts Admiral
Porter's presence on the following day.  Still he may be right, and
he may have been with us the day before, as I write this chiefly
from memory.  There were two distinct interviews; the first was
late in the afternoon of March 27th, and the other about noon of
the 28th, both in the after-cabin of the steamer River Queen; on
both occasions Mr. Lincoln was full and frank in his conversation,
assuring me that in his mind he was all ready for the civil
reorganization of affairs at the South as soon as the war was over;
and he distinctly authorized me to assure Governor Vance and the
people of North Carolina that, as soon as the rebel armies laid
down their arms, and resumed their civil pursuits, they would at
once be guaranteed all their rights as citizens of a common
country; and that to avoid anarchy the State governments then in
existence, with their civil functionaries, would be recognized by
him as the government de facto till Congress could provide others.

I know, when I left him, that I was more than ever impressed by his
kindly nature, his deep and earnest sympathy with the afflictions
of the whole people, resulting from the war, and by the march of
hostile armies through the South; and that his earnest desire
seemed to be to end the war speedily, without more bloodshed or
devastation, and to restore all the men of both sections to their
homes. In the language of his second inaugural address, he seemed
to have "charity for all, malice toward none," and, above all, an
absolute faith in the courage, manliness, and integrity of the
armies in the field.  When at rest or listening, his legs and arms
seemed to hang almost lifeless, and his face was care-worn and
haggard; but, the moment he began to talk, his face lightened up,
his tall form, as it were, unfolded, and he was the very
impersonation of good-humor and fellowship.  The last words I
recall as addressed to me were that he would feel better when I was
back at Goldsboro'.  We parted at the gangway of the River Queen,
about noon of March 28th, and I never saw him again.  Of all the
men I ever met, he seemed to possess more of the elements of
greatness, combined with goodness, than any other.



ADMIRAL PORTER'S ACCOUNT OF THE INTERVIEW WITH
Mr. LINCOLN.

The day of General Sherman's arrival at City Point (I think the
27th of March, 1866), I accompanied him and General Grant on board
the President's flagship, the Queen, where the President received
us in the upper saloon, no one but ourselves being present.

The President was in an exceedingly pleasant mood, and delighted to
meet General Sherman, whom he cordially greeted.

It seems that this was the first time he had met Sherman, to
remember him, since the beginning of the war, and did not remember
when he had seen him before, until the general reminded him of the
circumstances of their first meeting.

This was rather singular on the part of Mr. Lincoln, who was, I
think, remarkable for remembering people, having that kingly
quality in an eminent degree.  Indeed, such was the power of his
memory, that he seemed never to forget the most minute
circumstance.

The conversation soon turned on the events of Sherman's campaign
through the South, with every movement of which the President
seemed familiar.

He laughed over some of the stories Sherman told of his "bummers,"
and told others in return, which illustrated in a striking manner
the ideas he wanted to convey.  For example, he would often express
his wishes by telling an apt story, which was quite a habit with
him, and one that I think he adopted to prevent his committing
himself seriously.

The interview between the two generals and the President lasted
about an hour and a half, and, as it was a remarkable one, I jotted
down what I remembered of the conversation, as I have made a
practice of doing during the rebellion, when any thing interesting
occurred.

I don't regret having done so, as circumstances afterward occurred
(Stanton's ill conduct toward Sherman) which tended to cast odium
on General Sherman for allowing such liberal terms to Jos.
Johnston.

Could the conversation that occurred on board the Queen, between
the President and General Sherman, have been known, Sherman would
not, and could not, have been censored.  Mr. Lincoln, had he lived,
would have acquitted the general of any blame, for he was only
carrying out the President's wishes.

My opinion is, that Mr. Lincoln came down to City Point with the
most liberal views toward the rebels.  He felt confident that we
would be successful, and was willing that the enemy should
capitulate on the most favorable terms.

I don't know what the President would have done had he been left to
himself, and had our army been unsuccessful, but he was than
wrought up to a high state of excitement.  He wanted peace on
almost any terms, and there is no knowing what proposals he might
have been willing to listen to.  His heart was tenderness
throughout, and, as long as the rebels laid down their arms, he did
not care how it was done.  I do not know how far he was influenced
by General Grant, but I presume, from their long conferences, that
they must have understood each other perfectly, and that the terms
given to Lee after his surrender were authorized by Mr. Lincoln.  I
know that the latter was delighted when he heard that they had been
given, and exclaimed, a dozen times, "Good!"  "All right!"
"Exactly the thing!" and other similar expressions.  Indeed, the
President more than once told me what he supposed the terms would
be: if Lee and Johnston surrendered, he considered the war ended,
and that all the other rebel forces world lay down their arms at
once.

In this he proved to be right.  Grant and Sherman were both of the
same opinion, and so was everyone else who knew anything about the
matter.

What signified the terms to them, so long as we obtained the actual
surrender of people who only wanted a good opportunity to give up
gracefully?  The rebels had fought "to the last ditch," and all
that they had left them was the hope of being handed down in
history as having received honorable terms.

After hearing General Sherman's account of his own position, and
that of Johnston, at that time, the President expressed fears that
the rebel general would escape south again by the railroads, and
that General Sherman would have to chase him anew, over the same
ground; but the general pronounced this to be impracticable.  He
remarked: "I have him where he cannot move without breaking up his
army, which, once disbanded, can never again be got together; and I
have destroyed the Southern railroads, so that they cannot be used
again for a long time."  General Grant remarked, "What is to
prevent their laying the rails again?"  "Why," said General
Sherman, "my bummers  don't do things by halves.  Every rail, after
having been placed over a hot fire, has been twisted as crooked as
a ram's-horn, and they never can be used again."

This was the only remark made by General Grant during the
interview, as he sat smoking a short distance from the President,
intent, no doubt, on his own plans, which were being brought to a
successful termination.

The conversation between the President and General Sherman, about
the terms of surrender to be allowed Jos. Johnston, continued.
Sherman energetically insisted that he could command his own terms,
and that Johnston would have to yield to his demands; but the
President was very decided about the matter, and insisted that the
surrender of Johnston's army most be obtained on any terms.

General Grant was evidently of the same way of thinking, for,
although he did not join in the conversation to any extent, yet he
made no objections, and I presume had made up his mind to allow the
best terms himself.

He was also anxious that Johnston should not be driven into
Richmond, to reenforce the rebels there, who, from behind their
strong intrenchments, would have given us incalculable trouble.

Sherman, as a subordinate officer, yielded his views to those of
the President, and the terms of capitulation between himself and
Johnston were exactly in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's wishes.  He
could not have done any thing which would have pleased the
President better.

Mr. Lincoln did, in fact, arrange the (so considered) liberal terms
offered General Jos. Johnston, and, whatever may have been General
Sherman's private views, I feel sure that he yielded to the wishes
of the President in every respect.  It was Mr. Lincoln's policy
that was carried out, and, had he lived long enough, he would have
been but too glad to have acknowledged it.  Had Mr. Lincoln lived,
Secretary Stanton would have issued no false telegraphic
dispatches, in the hope of killing off another general in the
regular army, one who by his success had placed himself in the way
of his own succession.

The disbanding of Jos. Johnston's army was so complete, that the
pens and ink used in the discussion of the matter were all wasted.

It was asserted, by the rabid ones, that General Sherman had given
up all that we had been fighting for, had conceded every thing to
Jos. Johnston, and had, as the boys say, "knocked the fat into the
fire;" but sober reflection soon overruled these harsh expressions,
and, with those who knew General Sherman, and appreciated him, he
was still the great soldier, patriot, and gentleman.  In future
times this matter will be looked at more calmly and
dispassionately.  The bitter animosities that have been engendered
during the rebellion will have died out for want of food on which
to live, and the very course Grant, Sherman, and others pursued, in
granting liberal terms to the defeated rebels, will be applauded.
The fact is, they met an old beggar in the road, whose crutches had
broken from under him: they let him have only the broken crutches
to get home with!

I sent General Sherman back to Newbern, North Carolina, in the
steamer Bat.

While he was absent from his command he was losing no time, for he
was getting his army fully equipped with stores and clothing; and,
when he returned, he had a rested and regenerated army, ready to
swallow up Jos. Johnston and all his ragamuffins.

Johnston was cornered, could not move without leaving every thing
behind him, and could not go to Richmond without bringing on a
famine in that destitute city.

I was with Mr. Lincoln all the time he was at City Point, and until
he left for Washington.  He was more than delighted with the
surrender of Lee, and with the terms Grant gave the rebel general;
and would have given Jos. Johnston twice as much, had the latter
asked for it, and could he have been certain that the rebel world
have surrendered without a fight.  I again repeat that, had Mr.
Lincoln lived, he would have shouldered all the responsibility.

One thing is certain: had Jos. Johnston escaped and got into
Richmond, and caused a larger list of killed and wounded than we
had, General Sherman would have been blamed.  Then why not give him
the full credit of capturing on the best terms the enemy's last
important army and its best general, and putting an end to the
rebellion.

It was a finale worthy of Sherman's great march through the swamps
and deserts of the South, a march not excelled by any thing we read
of in modern military history.

D. D. PORTER, Vice-Admiral.

(Written by the admiral in 1866, at the United States Naval Academy
at Annapolis, Md., and mailed to General Sherman at St. Louis, Mo.)


As soon as possible, I arranged with General Grant for certain
changes in the organization of my army; and the general also
undertook to send to North Carolina some tug-boat and barges to
carry stores from Newbern up as far as Kinston, whence they could
be hauled in wagons to our camps, thus relieving our railroads to
that extent.  I undertook to be ready to march north by April 10th,
and then embarked on the steamer Bat, Captain Barnes, for North
Carolina.  We steamed down James River, and at Old Point Comfort
took on board my brother, Senator Sherman, and Mr. Edwin Stanton,
son of the Secretary of War, and proceeded at once to our
destination.  On our way down the river, Captain Barnes expressed
himself extremely obliged to me for taking his vessel, as it had
relieved him of a most painful dilemma.  He explained that he had
been detailed by Admiral Porter to escort the President's unarmed
boat, the River Queen, in which capacity it became his special duty
to look after Mrs. Lincoln.  The day before my arrival at City
Point, there had been a grand review of a part of the Army of the
James, then commanded by General Ord.  The President rode out from
City Point with General Grant on horseback, accompanied by a
numerous staff, including Captain Barnes and Mrs. Ord; but Mrs.
Lincoln and Mrs. Grant had followed in a carriage.

The cavalcade reached the review-ground some five or six miles out
from City Point, found the troops all ready, drawn up in line, and
after the usual presentation of arms, the President and party,
followed by Mrs. Ord and Captain Barnes on horseback, rode the
lines, and returned to the reviewing stand, which meantime had been
reached by Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Grant in their carriage, which had
been delayed by the driver taking a wrong road.  Mrs. Lincoln,
seeing Mrs. Ord and Captain Barnes riding with the retinue, and
supposing that Mrs. Ord had personated her, turned on Captain
Barnes and gave him a fearful scolding; and even indulged in some
pretty sharp upbraidings to Mrs. Ord.

This made Barne's position very unpleasant, so that he felt much
relieved when he was sent with me to North Carolina.  The Bat was
very fast, and on the morning of the 29th we were near Cape
Hatteras; Captain Barnes, noticing a propeller coming out of
Hatteras Inlet, made her turn back and pilot us in.  We entered
safely, steamed up Pamlico Sound into Neuse River, and the next
morning,--by reason of some derangement of machinery, we anchored
about seven miles below Newbern, whence we went up in Captain
Barnes's barge.  As soon as we arrived at Newbern, I telegraphed up
to General Schofield at Goldsboro' the fact of my return, and that
I had arranged with General Grant for the changes made necessary in
the reorganization of the army, and for the boats necessary to
carry up the provisions and stores we needed, prior to the renewal
of our march northward.

These changes amounted to constituting the left wing a distinct
army, under the title of "the Army of Georgia," under command of
General Slocum, with his two corps commanded by General Jeff. C.
Davis and General Joseph A. Mower; the Tenth and Twenty-third Corps
already constituted another army, "of the Ohio," under the command
of Major-General Schofield, and his two corps were commanded by
Generals J. D. Cox and A. H. Terry.  These changes were necessary,
because army commanders only could order courts-martial, grant
discharges, and perform many other matters of discipline and
administration which were indispensable; but my chief purpose was
to prepare the whole army for what seemed among the probabilities
of the time--to fight both Lee's and Johnston's armies combined, in
case their junction could be formed before General Grant could
possibly follow Lee to North Carolina.

General George H. Thomas, who still remained at Nashville, was not
pleased with these changes, for the two corps with General Slocum,
viz., the Fourteenth and Twentieth, up to that time, had remained
technically a part of his "Army of the Cumberland;" but he was so
far away, that I had to act to the best advantage with the troops
and general officers actually present.  I had specially asked for
General Mower to command the Twentieth Corps, because I regarded
him as one of the boldest and best fighting generals in the whole
army.  His predecessor, General A. S. Williams, the senior division
commander present, had commanded the corps well from Atlanta to
Goldsboro', and it may have seemed unjust to replace him at that
precise moment; but I was resolved to be prepared for a most
desperate and, as then expected, a final battle, should it fall on
me.

I returned to Goldsboro' from Newbern by rail the evening of March
30th, and at once addressed myself to the task of reorganization
and replenishment of stores, so as to be ready to march by April
10th, the day agreed on with General Grant.

The army was divided into the usual three parts, right and left
wings, and centre.  The tabular statements herewith will give the
exact composition of these separate armies, which by the 10th of
April gave the following effective strength:


        Infantry ................... 80,968
        Artillery ..................  2,448
        Cavalry ....................  5,587

              Aggregate ............ 88,948
        Total number of guns, 91


The railroads to our rear had also been repaired, so that stores
were arriving very fast, both from Morehead City and Wilmington.
The country was so level that a single locomotive could haul
twenty-five and thirty cars to a train, instead of only ten, as was
the case in Tennessee and Upper Georgia.

By the 5th of April such progress had been made, that I issued the
following Special Field Orders, No. 48, prescribing the time and
manner of the next march


[Special Field Orders, No. 48.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, April 5, 1865.

Confidential to Army Commanders, Corps Commanders, and Chiefs of
Staff Departments:

The next grand objective is to place this army (with its full
equipment) north of Roanoke River, facing west, with a base for
supplies at Norfolk, and at Winton or Murfreesboro' on the Chowan,
and in full communication with the Army of the Potomac, about
Petersburg; and also to do the enemy as much harm as possible en
route:

1.  To accomplish this result the following general plan will be
followed, or modified only by written orders from these
headquarters, should events require a change:

(1.) On Monday, the 10th of April, all preparations are presumed to
be complete, and the outlying detachments will be called in, or
given directions to meet on the next march.  All preparations will
also be complete to place the railroad-stock back of Kinston on the
one road, and below the Northeast Branch on the other.

(2.) On Tuesday, the 11th, the columns will draw out on their lines
of march, say, about seven miles, and close up.

(3.) On Wednesday the march will begin in earnest, and will be kept
up at the rate, say, of about twelve miles a day, or according to
the amount of resistance.  All the columns will dress to the left
(which is the exposed flank), and commanders will study always to
find roads by which they can, if necessary, perform a general left
wheel, the wagons to be escorted to some place of security on the
direct route of march.  Foraging and other details may continue as
heretofore, only more caution and prudence should be observed; and
foragers should not go in advance of the advance-guard, but look
more to our right rear for corn, bacon, and meal.

2.  The left wing (Major-General Slocum commanding) will aim
straight for the railroad-bridge near Smithfield; thence along up
the Neuse River to the railroad-bridge over Neuse River, northeast
of Raleigh (Powell's); thence to Warrenton, the general point of
concentration.

The centre (Major-General Schofield commanding) will move to
Whitley's Mill, ready to support the left until it is past
Smithfield, when it will follow up (substantially) Little River to
about Rolesville, ready at all times to move to the support of the
left; after passing Tar River, to move to Warrenton.

The right wing (Major-General Howard commanding), preceded by the
cavalry, will move rapidly on Pikeville and Nahunta, then swing
across to Bulah to Folk's Bridge, ready to make junction with the
other armies in case the enemy offers battle this side of Neuse
River, about Smithfield; thence, in case of no serious opposition
on the left, will work up toward Earpsboro', Andrews, B----, and
Warrenton.

The cavalry (General Kilpatrick commanding), leaving its
encumbrances with the right wing, will push as though straight for
Weldon, until the enemy is across Tar River, and that bridge
burned; then it will deflect toward Nashville and Warrenton,
keeping up communication with general headquarters.

3.  As soon as the army starts, the chief-quartermaster and
commissary will prepare a resupply of stores at some point on
Pamlico or Albemarle Sounds, ready to be conveyed to Kinston or
Winton and Murfreesboro', according to developments.  As soon as
they have satisfactory information that the army is north of the
Roanoke, they will forthwith establish a depot at Winton, with a
sub-depot at Murfreesboro'.  Major-General Schofield will hold, as
heretofore, Wilmington (with the bridge across Northern Branch as
an outpost), Newborn (and Kinston as its outpost), and will be
prepared to hold Winton and Murfreesboro' as soon as the time
arrives for that move.  The navy has instructions from Admiral
Porter to cooperate, and any commanding officer is authorized to
call on the navy for assistance and cooperation, always in writing,
setting forth the reasons, of which necessarily the naval
commander must be the judge.

4.  The general-in-chief will be with the centre habitually, but
may in person shift to either flank where his presence may be
needed, leaving a staff-officer to receive reports.  He requires,
absolutely, a report of each army or grand detachment each night,
whether any thing material has occurred or not, for often the
absence of an enemy is a very important fact in military
prognostication.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.


But the whole problem became suddenly changed by the news of the
fall of Richmond and Petersburg, which reached as at Goldsboro', on
the 6th of April.  The Confederate Government, with Lee's army, had
hastily abandoned Richmond, fled in great disorder toward Danville,
and General Grant's whole army was in close pursuit.  Of course, I
inferred that General Lee would succeed in making junction with
General Johnston, with at least a fraction of his army, somewhere
to my front.  I at once altered the foregoing orders, and prepared
on the day appointed, viz., April 10th, to move straight on
Raleigh, against the army of General Johnston, known to be at
Smithfield, and supposed to have about thirty-five thousand men.
Wade Hampton's cavalry was on his left front and Wheeler's on his
right front, simply watching us and awaiting our initiative.
Meantime the details of the great victories in Virginia came thick
and fast, and on the 8th I received from General Grant this
communication, in the form of a cipher-dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865


Major-General SHERMAN, Goldsboro', North Carolina:

All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville
with the remnant of his force.  Sheridan, who was up with him last
night, reports all that is left with him--horse, foot, and
dragoons--at twenty thousand, much demoralized.  We hope to reduce
this number one-half.  I will push on to Burkesville, and, if a
stand is made at Danville, will, in a very few days, go there.  If
you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see
if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies.
Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro' or
nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you
receive this.  Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to
strike at.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


I answered immediately that we would move on the 10th, prepared to
follow Johnston wherever he might go.  Promptly on Monday morning,
April 10th, the army moved straight on Smithfield; the right wing
making a circuit by the right, and the left wing, supported by the
centre, moving on the two direct roads toward Raleigh, distant
fifty miles.  General Terry's and General Kilpatrick's troops moved
from their positions on the south or west bank of the Neuse River
in the same general direction, by Cox's Bridge.  On the 11th we
reached Smithfield, and found it abandoned by Johnston's army,
which had retreated hastily on Raleigh, burning the bridges.  To
restore these consumed the remainder of the day, and during that
night I received a message from General Grant, at Appomattox, that
General Lee had surrendered to him his whole army, which I at once
announced to the troops in orders:


[Special Field Orders, No.  54]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, SMITHFIELD, NORTH CAROLINA, April 12, 1865.

The general commanding announces to the army that he has official
notice from General Grant that General Lee surrendered to him his
entire army, on the 9th inst., at Appomattox Court-House, Virginia.

Glory to God and our country, and all honor to our comrades in
arms, toward whom we are marching!

A little more labor, a little more toil on our part, the great race
is won, and our Government stands regenerated, after four long
years of war.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


Of course, this created a perfect furore, of rejoicing, and we all
regarded the war as over, for I knew well that General Johnston had
no army with which to oppose mine.  So that the only questions that
remained were, would he surrender at Raleigh?  or would he allow
his army to disperse into guerrilla bands, to "die in the last
ditch," and entail on his country an indefinite and prolonged
military occupation, and of consequent desolation?  I knew well
that Johnston's army could not be caught; the country was too open;
and, without wagons, the men could escape us, disperse, and
assemble again at some place agreed on, and thus the war might be
prolonged indefinitely.

I then remembered Mr. Lincoln's repeated expression that he wanted
the rebel soldiers not only defeated, but "back at their homes,
engaged in their civil pursuits."  On the evening of the 12th I was
with the head of Slocum's column, at Gulley's, and General
Kilpatrick's cavalry was still ahead, fighting Wade Hampton's
rear-guard, with orders to push it through Raleigh, while I would
give a more southerly course to the infantry columns, so as, if
possible, to prevent a retreat southward.  On the 13th, early, I
entered Raleigh, and ordered the several heads of column toward
Ashville in the direction of Salisbury or Charlotte.  Before
reaching Raleigh, a locomotive came down the road to meet me,
passing through both Wade Hampton's and Kilpatrick's cavalry,
bringing four gentlemen, with a letter from Governor Vance to me,
asking protection for the citizens of Raleigh.  These gentlemen
were, of course, dreadfully excited at the dangers through which
they had passed.  Among them were ex-Senator Graham, Mr. Swain,
president of Chapel Hill University, and a Surgeon Warren, of the
Confederate army.  They had come with a flag of truce, to which
they were not entitled; still, in the interest of peace, I
respected it, and permitted them to return to Raleigh with their
locomotive, to assure the Governor and the people that the war was
substantially over, and that I wanted the civil authorities to
remain in the execution of their office till the pleasure of the
President could be ascertained.  On reaching Raleigh I found these
same gentlemen, with Messrs. Badger, Bragg, Holden, and others, but
Governor Vance had fled, and could not be prevailed on to return,
because he feared an arrest and imprisonment.  From the Raleigh
newspapers of the 10th I learned that General Stoneman, with his
division of cavalry, had come across the mountains from East
Tennessee, had destroyed the railroad at Salisbury, and was then
supposed to be approaching Greensboro'.  I also learned that
General Wilson's cavalry corps was "smashing things" down about
Selma and Montgomery, Alabama, and was pushing for Columbus and
Macon, Georgia; and I also had reason to expect that General
Sheridan would come down from Appomattox to join us at Raleigh with
his superb cavalry corps.  I needed more cavalry to check
Johnston's retreat, so that I could come up to him with my
infantry, and therefore had good reason to delay.  I ordered the
railroad to be finished up to Raleigh, so that I could operate from
it as a base, and then made:


[Special Field Orders, No. 55]


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD,
RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 14, 1865.

The next movement will be on Ashboro', to turn the position of the
enemy at the "Company's Shops" in rear of Haw River Bridge, and at
Greensboro', and to cut off his only available line of retreat by
Salisbury and Charlotte:

1.  General Kilpatrick will keep up a show of pursuit in the
direction of Hillsboro' and Graham, but be ready to cross Haw River
on General Howard's bridge, near Pittsboro', and thence will
operate toward Greensboro', on the right front of the right wing.

2.  The right wing, Major-General Howard commanding, will move out
on the Chapel Hill road, and send a light division up in the
direction of Chapel Hill University to act in connection with the
cavalry; but the main columns and trains will move via Hackney's
Cross-Roads, and Trader's Hill, Pittsboro', St. Lawrence, etc., to
be followed by the cavalry and light division, as soon as the
bridge is laid over Haw River.

8.  The centre, Major-General Schofield commanding, will move via
Holly Springs, New Hill, Haywood, and Moffitt's Mills.

4.  The left wing, Major-General Slocum commanding, will move
rapidly by the Aven's Ferry road, Carthage, Caledonia, and Cox's
Mills.

5.  All the troops will draw well out on the roads designated
during today and to-morrow, and on the following day will move with
all possible rapidity for Ashboro'.  No further destruction of
railroads, mills, cotton, and produce, will be made without the
specific orders of an army commander, and the inhabitants will be
dealt with kindly, looking to an early reconciliation.  The troops
will be permitted, however, to gather forage and provisions as
heretofore; only more care should be taken not to strip the poorer
classes too closely.

By order of General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.


Thus matters stood, when on the morning of the 14th General
Kilpatrick reported from Durham's Station, twenty-six miles up the
railroad toward Hillsboro', that a flag of truce had come in from
the enemy with a package from General Johnston addressed to me.
Taking it for granted that this was preliminary to a surrender, I
ordered the message to be sent me at Raleigh, and on the 14th
received from General Johnston a letter dated April 13, 1865, in
these words:


The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the
relative military condition of the belligerents.  I am, therefore,
induced to address you in this form the inquiry whether, to stop
the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are
willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to
communicate to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding the armies of
the United States, the request that he will take like action in
regard to other armies, the object being to permit the civil
authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the
existing war.


To which I replied as follows:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 14, 1865.

General J. E. JOHNSTON, commanding Confederate Army.

GENERAL: I have this moment received your communication of this
date.  I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the
suspension of farther hostilities between the armies commanded by
you and those commanded by myself, and will be willing to confer
with you to that end.  I will limit the advance of my main column,
to-morrow, to Morrisville, and the cavalry to the university, and
expect that you will also maintain the present position of your
forces until each has notice of a failure to agree.

That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same
terms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee at
Appomattox Court-House, on the 9th instant, relative to our two
armies; and, furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to
suspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia.
General Stoneman is under my command, and my order will suspend any
devastation or destruction contemplated by him.  I will add that I
really desire to save the people of North Carolina the damage they
would sustain by the march of this army through the central or
western parts of the State.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


I sent my aide-de-camp, Colonel McCoy, up to Durham's Station with
this letter, with instructions to receive the answer, to telegraph
its contents back to me at Raleigh, and to arrange for an
interview.  On the 16th I received a reply from General Johnston,
agreeing to meet me the next day at a point midway between our
advance at Durham and his rear at Hillsboro'.  I ordered a car and
locomotive to be prepared to convey me up to Durham's at eight
o'clock of the morning of April 17th.  Just as we were entering the
car, the telegraph-operator, whose office was up-stairs in the
depot-building, ran down to me and said that he was at that instant
of time receiving a most important dispatch in cipher from Morehead
City, which I ought to see.  I held the train for nearly half an
hour, when he returned with the message translated and written out.
It was from Mr. Stanton, announcing the assassination of Mr.
Lincoln, the attempt on the life of  Mr. Seward and son, and a
suspicion that a like fate was designed for General Grant and all
the principal officers of the Government.  Dreading the effect of
such a message at that critical instant of time, I asked the
operator if any one besides himself had seen it; he answered No!
I then bade him not to reveal the contents by word or look till I
came back, which I proposed to do the same afternoon.  The train
then started, and, as we passed Morris's Station, General Logan,
commanding the Fifteenth Corps, came into my car, and I told him I
wanted to see him on my return, as I had something very important
to communicate.  He knew I was going to meet General Johnston, and
volunteered to say that he hoped I would succeed in obtaining his
surrender, as the whole army dreaded the long march to Charlotte
(one hundred and seventy-five miles), already begun, but which had
been interrupted by the receipt of General Johnston's letter of the
13th.  We reached Durham's, twenty-six miles, about 10 a.m., where
General Kilpatrick had a squadron of cavalry drawn up to receive
me.  We passed into the house in which he had his headquarters, and
soon after mounted some led horses, which he had prepared for
myself and staff.  General Kilpatrick sent a man ahead with a white
flag, followed by a small platoon, behind which we rode, and were
followed by the rest of the escort.  We rode up the Hillsboro' road
for about five miles, when our flag bearer discovered another
coming to meet him: They met, and word was passed back to us that
General Johnston was near at hand, when we rode forward and met
General Johnston on horseback, riding side by side with General
Wade Hampton.  We shook hands, and introduced our respective
attendants.  I asked if there was a place convenient where we could
be private, and General Johnston said he had passed a small
farmhouse a short distance back, when we rode back to it together
side by side, our staff-officers and escorts following.  We had
never met before, though we had been in the regular army together
for thirteen years; but it so happened that we had never before
come
together.  He was some twelve or more years my senior; but we knew
enough of each other to be well acquainted at once.  We soon
reached the house of a Mr. Bennett, dismounted, and left our horses
with orderlies in the road.  Our officers, on foot, passed into the
yard, and General Johnston and I entered the small frame-house.  We
asked the farmer if we could have the use of his house for a few
minutes, and he and his wife withdrew into a smaller log-house,
which stood close by.

As soon as we were alone together I showed him the dispatch
announcing Mr. Lincoln's assassination, and watched him closely.
The perspiration came out in large drops on his forehead, and he
did not attempt to conceal his distress.  He denounced the act as a
disgrace to the age, and hoped I did not charge it to the
Confederate Government.  I told him I could not believe that he or
General Lee, or the officers of the Confederate army, could
possibly be privy to acts of assassination; but I would not say as
much for Jeff. Davis, George Sanders, and men of that stripe.  We
talked about the effect of this act on the country at large and on
the armies, and he realized that it made my situation extremely
delicate.  I explained to him that I had not yet revealed the news
to my own personal staff or to the army, and that I dreaded the
effect when made known in Raleigh.  Mr. Lincoln was peculiarly
endeared to the soldiers, and I feared that some foolish woman or
man in Raleigh might say something or do something that would
madden our men, and that a fate worse than that of Columbia would
befall the place.

I then told Johnston that he must be convinced that he could not
oppose my army, and that, since Lee had surrendered, he could do
the same with honor and propriety.  He plainly and repeatedly
admitted this, and added that any further fighting would be
"murder;" but he thought that, instead of surrendering piecemeal,
we might arrange terms that would embrace all the Confederate
armies.  I asked him if he could control other armies than his own;
he said, not then, but intimated that he could procure authority
from Mr. Davis.  I then told him that I had recently had an
interview with General Grant and President Lincoln, and that I was
possessed of their views; that with them and the people North there
seemed to be no vindictive feeling against the Confederate armies,
but there was against Davis and his political adherents; and that
the terms that General Grant had given to General Lee's army were
certainly most generous and liberal.  All this he admitted, but
always recurred to the idea of a universal surrender, embracing his
own army, that of Dick Taylor in Louisiana and Texas, and of Maury,
Forrest, and others, in Alabama and Georgia.  General Johnston's
account of our interview in his "Narrative" (page 402, et seq.) is
quite accurate and correct, only I do not recall his naming the
capitulation of Loeben, to which he refers.  Our conversation was
very general and extremely cordial, satisfying me that it could
have but one result, and that which we all desired, viz., to end
the war as quickly as possible; and, being anxious to return to
Raleigh before the news of Mr. Lincoln's assassination could be
divulged, on General Johnston's saying that he thought that, during
the night, he could procure authority to act in the name of all the
Confederate armies in existence we agreed to meet again the next
day at noon at the same place, and parted, he for Hillsboro' and I
for Raleigh.

We rode back to Durham's Station in the order we had come, and then
I showed the dispatch announcing Mr. Lincoln's death.  I cautioned
the officers to watch the soldiers closely, to prevent any violent
retaliation by them, leaving that to the Government at Washington;
and on our way back to Raleigh in the cars I showed the same
dispatch to General Logan and to several of the officers of the
Fifteenth Corps that were posted at Morrisville and Jones's
Station, all of whom were deeply impressed by it; but all gave
their opinion that this sad news should not change our general
course of action.

As soon as I reached Raleigh I published the following orders to
the army, announcing the assassination of the President, and I
doubt if, in the whole land, there were more sincere mourners over
his sad fate than were then in and about Raleigh.  I watched the
effect closely, and was gratified that there was no single act of
retaliation; though I saw and felt that one single word by me would
have laid the city in ashes, and turned its whole population
houseless upon the country, if not worse:

[Special Field Orders, No.  56.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 17, 1865.

The general commanding announces, with pain and sorrow, that on the
evening of the 14th instant, at the theatre in Washington city, his
Excellency the President of the United States, Mr. Lincoln, was
assassinated by one who uttered the State motto of Virginia.  At
the same time, the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, while suffering
from a broken arm, was also stabbed by another murderer in his own
house, but still survives, and his son was wounded, supposed
fatally.  It is believed, by persons capable of judging, that other
high officers were designed to share the same fate.  Thus it seems
that our enemy, despairing of meeting us in open, manly warfare,
begins to resort to the assassin's tools.

Your general does not wish you to infer that this is universal, for
he knows that the great mass of the Confederate army world scorn to
sanction each acts, but he believes it the legitimate consequence
of rebellion against rightful authority.

We have met every phase which this war has assumed, and must now be
prepared for it in its last and worst shape, that of assassins and
guerrillas; but woe onto the people who seek to expend their wild
passions in such a manner, for there is but one dread result!

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L.  M.  DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.


During the evening of the 17th and morning of the 18th I saw nearly
all the general officers of the army (Schofield, Slocum, Howard,
Logan, Blair), and we talked over the matter of the conference at
Bennett's house of the day before, and, without exception, all
advised me to agree to some terms, for they all dreaded the long
and harassing march in pursuit of a dissolving and fleeing army--
a march that might carry us back again over the thousand miles that
we had just accomplished.  We all knew that if we could bring
Johnston's army to bay, we could destroy it in an hour, but that
was simply impossible in the country in which we found ourselves.
We discussed all the probabilities, among which was, whether, if
Johnston made a point of it, I should assent to the escape from the
country of Jeff. Davis and his fugitive cabinet; and some one of my
general officers, either Logan or Blair, insisted that, if asked
for, we should even provide a vessel to carry them to Nassau from
Charleston.

The next morning I again started in the cars to Durham's Station,
accompanied by most of my personal staff, and by Generals Blair,
Barry, Howard, etc., and, reaching General Kilpatrick's
headquarters at Durham's, we again mounted, and rode, with the same
escort of the day, before, to Bennett's house, reaching there
punctually at noon.  General Johnston had not yet arrived, but a
courier shortly came, and reported him as on the way.  It must have
been nearly 2 p.m.  when he arrived, as before, with General Wade
Hampton.  He had halted his escort out of sight, and we again
entered Bennett's house, and I closed the door.  General Johnston
then assured me that he had authority over all the Confederate
armies, so that they would obey his orders to surrender on the same
terms with his own, but he argued that, to obtain so cheaply this
desirable result, I ought to give his men and officers some
assurance of their political rights after their surrender.  I
explained to him that Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of amnesty, of
December 8, 1863, still in force; enabled every Confederate soldier
and officer, below the rank of colonel, to obtain an absolute
pardon, by simply laying down his arms, and taking the common oath
of allegiance, and that General Grant, in accepting the surrender
of General Lee's army, had extended the same principle to all the
officers, General Lee included; such a pardon, I understood, would
restore to them all their rights of citizenship.  But he insisted
that the officers and men of the Confederate army were
unnecessarily alarmed about this matter, as a sort of bugbear.  He
then said that Mr. Breckenridge was near at hand, and he thought
that it would be well for him to be present.  I objected, on the
score that he was then in Davis's cabinet, and our negotiations
should be confined strictly to belligerents.  He then said
Breckenridge was a major-general in the Confederate army, and might
sink his character of Secretary of War.  I consented, and he sent
one of his staff-officers back, who soon returned with
Breckenridge, and he entered the room.  General Johnston and I then
again went over the whole ground, and Breckenridge confirmed what
he had said as to the uneasiness of the Southern officers and
soldiers about their political rights in case of surrender.  While
we were in consultation, a messenger came with a parcel of papers,
which General Johnston said were from Mr. Reagan,
Postmaster-General.  He and Breckenridge looked over them, and,
after some side conversation, he handed one of the papers to me.
It was in Reagan's handwriting, and began with a long preamble and
terms, so general and verbose, that I said they were inadmissible.
Then recalling the conversation of Mr. Lincoln, at City Point, I
sat down at the table, and wrote off the terms, which I thought
concisely expressed his views and wishes, and explained that I was
willing to submit these terms to the new President, Mr. Johnson,
provided that both armies should remain in statu quo until the
truce therein declared should expire.  I had full faith that
General Johnston would religiously respect the truce, which he did;
and that I would be the gainer, for in the few days it would take
to send the papers to Washington, and receive an answer, I could
finish the railroad up to Raleigh, and be the better prepared for a
long chase.

Neither Mr. Breckenridge nor General Johnston wrote one word of
that paper.  I wrote it myself, and announced it as the best I
could do, and they readily assented.

While copies of this paper were being made for signature, the
officers of our staffs commingled in the yard at Bennett's house,
and were all presented to Generals Johnston and Breckenridge.  All
without exception were rejoiced that the war was over, and that in
a very few days we could turn our faces toward home.  I remember
telling Breckenridge that he had better get away, as the feeling of
our people was utterly hostile to the political element of the
South, and to him especially, because he was the Vice-President of
the United States, who had as such announced Mr. Lincoln, of
Illinois, duly and properly elected the President of the United
States, and yet that he had afterward openly rebelled and taken up
arms against the Government.  He answered me that he surely would
give us no more trouble, and intimated that he would speedily leave
the country forever.  I may have also advised him that Mr. Davis
too should get abroad as soon as possible.

The papers were duly signed; we parted about dark, and my party
returned to Raleigh.  Early the next morning, April 19th, I
dispatched by telegraph to Morehead City to prepare a fleet-steamer
to carry a messenger to Washington, and sent Major Henry Hitchcock
down by rail, bearing the following letters, and agreement with
General Johnston, with instructions to be very careful to let
nothing escape him to the greedy newspaper correspondents, but to
submit his papers to General Halleck, General Grant, or the
Secretary of War, and to bring me back with all expedition their
orders and instructions.

On their face they recited that I had no authority to make final
terms involving civil or political questions, but that I submitted
them to the proper quarter in Washington for their action; and the
letters fully explained that the military situation was such that
the delay was an advantage to us.  I cared little whether they were
approved, modified, or disapproved in toto; only I wanted
instructions.  Many of my general officers, among whom, I am almost
positive, were Generals Logan and Blair, urged me to accept the
"terms," without reference at all to Washington, but I preferred
the latter course:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD,
RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 18, 1886.

General H.  W.  HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I received your dispatch describing the man Clark,
detailed to assassinate me.  He had better be in a hurry, or he
will be too late.

The news of Mr. Lincoln's death produced a most intense effect on
our troops.  At first I feared it would lead to excesses; but now
it has softened down, and can easily be guided.  None evinced more
feeling than General Johnston, who admitted that the act was
calculated to stain his cause with a dark hue; and he contended
that the loss was most serious to the South, who had begun to
realize that Mr. Lincoln was the best friend they had.

I cannot believe that even Mr. Davis was privy to the diabolical
plot, but think it the emanation of a set of young men of the
South, who are very devils.  I want to throw upon the South the
care of this class of men, who will soon be as obnoxious to their
industrial classes as to us.

Had I pushed Johnston's army to an extremity, it would have
dispersed, and done infinite mischief.  Johnston informed me that
General Stoneman had been at Salisbury, and was now at Statesville.
I have sent him orders to come to me.

General Johnston also informed me that General Wilson was at
Columbia, Georgia, and he wanted me to arrest his progress.  I leave
that to you.

Indeed, if the President sanctions my agreement with Johnston, our
interest is to cease all destruction.

Please give all orders necessary according to the views the
Executive may take, and influence him, if possible, not to vary the
terms at all, for I have considered every thing, and believe that,
the Confederate armies once dispersed, we can adjust all else
fairly and well.  I am, yours, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 18, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, or Major-General HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this day
between General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approved
by the President of the United States, will produce peace from the
Potomac to the Rio Grande.  Mr. Breckenridge was present at our
conference, in the capacity of major-general, and satisfied me of
the ability of General Johnston to carry out to their full extent
the terms of this agreement; and if you will get the President to
simply indorse the copy, and commission me to carry out the terms,
I will follow them to the conclusion.

You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy to
the lawful authority of the United States, and disperses his armies
absolutely; and the point to which I attach most importance is,
that the dispersion and disbandment of these armies is done in such
a manner as to prevent their breaking up into guerrilla bands.  On
the other hand, we can retain just as much of an army as we please.
I agreed to the mode and manner of the surrender of arms set forth,
as it gives the States the means of repressing guerrillas, which we
could not expect them to do if we stripped them of all arms.

Both Generals Johnston and Breckenridge admitted that slavery was
dead, and I could not insist on embracing it in such a paper,
because it can be made with the States in detail.  I know that all
the men of substance South sincerely want peace, and I do not
believe they will resort to war again during this century.  I have
no doubt that they will in the future be perfectly subordinate to
the laws of the United States.  The moment my action in this matter
is approved, I can spare five corps, and will ask for orders to
leave General Schofield here with the Tenth Corps, and to march
myself with the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and
Twenty-third Corps via Burkesville and Gordonsville to Frederick or
Hagerstown, Maryland, there to be paid and mustered out.

The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier and
officer not needed should be got home at work.  I would like to be
able to begin the march north by May 1st.

I urge, on the part of the President, speedy action, as it is
important to get the Confederate armies to their homes as well as
our own.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


Memorandum, or Basis of agreement, made this 18th day of April, A.
D.  1865, near Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolina, by
and between General Joseph E. JOHNSTON, commanding the Confederate
Army, and Major-General William T. SHERMAN, commanding the army of
the United States in North Carolina, both present:

1.  The contending armies now in the field to maintain the statu
quo until notice is given by the commanding general of any one to
its opponent, and reasonable time--say, forty-eight hours--allowed.

2.  The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and
conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their
arms and public property in the State Arsenal; and each officer and
man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and
to abide the action of the State and Federal authority.  The number
of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the Chief of
Ordnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of the
Congress of the United States, and, in the mean time, to be needed
solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States
respectively.

3.  The recognition, by the Executive of the United States, of the
several State governments, on their officers and Legislatures
taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United
States, and, where conflicting State governments have resulted from
the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme
Court of the United States.

4.  The reestablishment of all the Federal Courts in the several
States, with powers as defined by the Constitution of the United
States and of the States respectively.

5.  The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed,
so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises,
as well as their rights of person sad property, as defined by the
Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

6.  The Executive authority of the Government of the United States
not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long
as they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armed
hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their
residence.

7.  In general terms--the war to cease; a general amnesty, so far
as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of
the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of the
arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and
men hitherto composing said armies.

Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill
these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to
promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above
programme.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General,
Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General,
Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina.


Major Hitchcock got off on the morning of the 20th, and I reckoned
that it would take him four or five days to go to Washington and
back.  During that time the repairs on all the railroads and
telegraph-lines were pushed with energy, and we also got possession
of the railroad and telegraph from Raleigh to Weldon, in the
direction of Norfolk.  Meantime the troops remained statu quo, our
cavalry occupying Durham's Station and Chapel Hill.  General
Slocum's head of column was at Aven's Ferry on Cape Fear River, and
General Howard's was strung along the railroad toward Hillsboro';
the rest of the army was in and about Raleigh.

On the 20th I reviewed the Tenth Corps, and was much pleased at the
appearance of General Paines's division of black troops, the first
I had ever seen as a part of an organized army; and on the 21st I
reviewed the Twenty-third Corps, which had been with me to Atlanta,
but had returned to Nashville had formed an essential part of the
army which fought at Franklin, and with which General Thomas had
defeated General Hood in Tennessee.  It had then been transferred
rapidly by rail to Baltimore and Washington by General Grant's
orders, and thence by sea to North Carolina.  Nothing of interest
happened at Raleigh till the evening of April 23d, when Major
Hitchcock reported by telegraph his return to Morehead City, and
that he would come up by rail during the night.  He arrived at 6
a.m., April 24th, accompanied by General Grant and one or two
officers of his staff, who had not telegraphed the fact of their
being on the train, for prudential reasons.  Of course, I was both
surprised and pleased to see the general, soon learned that my
terms with Johnston had been disapproved, was instructed by him to
give the forty-eight hours' notice required by the terms of the
truce, and afterward to proceed to attack or follow him.  I
immediately telegraphed to General Kilpatrick, at Durham's, to have
a mounted courier ready to carry the following message, then on its
way up by rail, to the rebel lines:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 24, 1865 6 A.M.

General JOHNSTON, commanding Confederate Army, Greensboro':

You will take notice that the truce or suspension of hostilities
agreed to between us will cease in forty-eight hours after this is
received at your lines, under the first of the articles of
agreement.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


At the same time I wrote another short note to General Johnston, of
the same date:

I have replies from Washington to my communications of April 18th.
I am instructed to limit my operations to your immediate command,
and not to attempt civil negotiations.  I therefore demand the
surrender of your army on the same terms as were given to General
Lee at Appomattox, April 9th instant, purely and simply.

Of course, both these papers were shown to General Grant at the
time, before they were sent, and he approved of them.

At the same time orders were sent to all parts of the army to be
ready to resume the pursuit of the enemy on the expiration of the
forty-eight hours' truce, and messages were sent to General
Gillmore (at Hilton Head) to the same effect, with instructions to
get a similar message through to General Wilson, at Macon, by some
means.

General Grant had brought with him, from Washington, written
answers from the Secretary of War, and of himself, to my
communications of the 18th, which I still possess, and here give
the originals.  They embrace the copy of a dispatch made by Mr.
Stanton to General Grant, when he was pressing Lee at Appomattox,
which dispatch, if sent me at the same time (as should have been
done), would have saved a world of trouble.  I did not understand
that General Grant had come down to supersede me in command, nor
did he intimate it, nor did I receive these communications as a
serious reproof, but promptly acted on them, as is already shown;
and in this connection I give my answer made to General Grant, at
Raleigh, before I had received any answer from General Johnston to
the demand for the surrender of his own army, as well as my answer
to Mr. Stanton's letter, of the same date, both written on the
supposition that I might have to start suddenly in pursuit of
Johnston, and have no other chance to explain.


WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, April 21, 1865.

Lieutenant-General GRANT.

GENERAL: The memorandum or basis agreed upon between General
Sherman and General Johnston having been submitted to the
President, they are disapproved.  You will give notice of the
disapproval to General Sherman, and direct him to resume
hostilities at the earliest moment.

The instructions given to you by the late President, Abraham
Lincoln, on the 3d of March, by my telegraph of that date,
addressed to you, express substantially the views of President
Andrew Johnson, and will be observed by General Sherman.  A copy is
herewith appended.

The President desires that you proceed immediately to the
headquarters of Major-General Sherman, and direct operations
against the enemy.

Yours truly,

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.


The following telegram was received 2 p.m., City Point, March 4,
1865 (from Washington, 12 M., March 3,1865)

[CIPHER]

OFFICE UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have
no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation
of Lee's army or on solely minor and purely military matters.

He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or
confer upon any political question; such questions the President
holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military
conferences or conventions.

Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C.  April 21, 1865.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: The basis of agreement entered into between yourself and
General J. E. Johnston, for the disbandment of the Southern army,
and the extension of the authority of the General Government over
all the territory belonging to it, sent for the approval of the
President, is received.

I read it carefully myself before submitting it to the President
and Secretary of War, and felt satisfied that it could not possibly
be approved.  My reason for these views I will give you at another
time, in a more extended letter.

Your agreement touches upon questions of such vital importance
that, as soon as read, I addressed a note to the Secretary of War,
notifying him of their receipt, and the importance of immediate
action by the President; and suggested, in view of their
importance, that the entire Cabinet be called together, that all
might give an expression of their opinions upon the matter.  The
result was a disapproval by the President of the basis laid down; a
disapproval of the negotiations altogether except for the surrender
of the army commanded by General Johnston, and directions to me to
notify you of this decision.  I cannot do no better than by sending
you the inclosed copy of a dispatch (penned by the late President,
though signed by the Secretary of War) in answer to me, on sending
a letter received from General Lee, proposing to meet me for the
purpose of submitting the question of peace to a convention of
officers.

Please notify General Johnston, immediately on receipt of this, of
the termination of the truce, and resume hostilities against his
army at the earliest moment you can, acting in good faith.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 25, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, present.

GENERAL: I had the honor to receive your letter of April 21st, with
inclosures, yesterday, and was well pleased that you came along, as
you must have observed that I held the military control so as to
adapt it to any phase the case might assume.

It is but just I should record the fact that I made my terms with
General Johnston under the influence of the liberal terms you
extended to the army of General Lee at Appomattox Court-House on
the 9th, and the seeming policy of our Government, as evinced by
the call of the Virginia Legislature and Governor back to Richmond,
under yours and President Lincoln's very eyes.

It now appears this last act was done without any consultation with
you or any knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, but rather in opposition to a
previous policy well considered.

I have not the least desire to interfere in the civil policy of our
Government, but would shun it as something not to my liking; but
occasions do arise when a prompt seizure of results is forced on
military commanders not in immediate communication with the proper
authority.  It is probable that the terms signed by General
Johnston and myself were not clear enough on the point, well
understood between us, that our negotiations did not apply to any
parties outside the officers and men of the Confederate armies,
which could easily have been remedied.

No surrender of any army not actually at the mercy of an antagonist
was ever made without "terms," and these always define the military
status of the surrendered.  Thus you stipulated that the officers
and men of Lee's army should not be molested at their homes so long
as they obeyed the laws at the place of their residence.

I do not wish to discuss these points involved in our recognition
of the State governments in actual existence, but will merely state
my conclusions, to await the solution of the future.

Such action on our part in no manner recognizes for a moment the
so-called Confederate Government, or makes us liable for its debts
or acts.

The laws and acts done by the several States during the period of
rebellion are void, because done without the oath prescribed by our
Constitution of the United States, which is a "condition
precedent."

We have a right to, use any sort of machinery to produce military
results; and it is the commonest thing for military commanders to
use the civil governments in actual existence as a means to an end.
I do believe we could and can use the present State governments
lawfully, constitutionally, and as the very best possible means to
produce the object desired, viz., entire and complete submission to
the lawful authority of the United States.

As to punishment for past crimes, that is for the judiciary, and
can in no manner of way be disturbed by our acts; and, so far as I
can, I will use my influence that rebels shall suffer all the
personal punishment prescribed by law, as also the civil
liabilities arising from their past acts.

What we now want is the new form of law by which common men may
regain the positions of industry, so long disturbed by the war.

I now apprehend that the rebel armies will disperse; and, instead
of dealing with six or seven States, we will have to deal with
numberless bands of desperadoes, headed by such men as Mosby,
Forrest, Red Jackson, and others, who know not and care not for
danger and its consequences.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 25, 1865.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington.

DEAR SIR: I have been furnished a copy of your letter of April 21st
to General Grant, signifying your disapproval of the terms on which
General Johnston proposed to disarm and disperse the insurgents, on
condition of amnesty, etc.  I admit my folly in embracing in a
military convention any civil matters; but, unfortunately, such is
the nature of our situation that they seem inextricably united, and
I understood from you at Savannah that the financial state of the
country demanded military success, and would warrant a little
bending to policy.

When I had my conference with General Johnston I had the public
examples before me of General Grant's terms to Lee's army, and
General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature to
assemble at Richmond.

I still believe the General Government of the United States has
made a mistake; but that is none of my business--mine is a
different task; and I had flattered myself that, by four years of
patient, unremitting, and successful labor, I deserved no reminder
such as is contained in the last paragraph of your letter to
General Grant.  You may assure the President that I heed his
suggestion.  I am truly, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

On the same day, but later, I received an answer from General
Johnston, agreeing to meet me again at Bennett's house the next
day, April 26th, at noon.  He did not even know that General Grant
was in Raleigh.

General Grant advised me to meet him, and to accept his surrender
on the same terms as his with General Lee; and on the 26th I again
went up to Durham's Station by rail, and rode out to Bennett's
house, where we again met, and General Johnston, without
hesitation, agreed to, and we executed, the following final terms:


Terms of a Military Convention, entered into this 26th day of
April, 1865, at Bennett's House, near Durham's Station., North
Carolina, between General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, commanding the
Confederate Army, and Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding the
United States Army in North Carolina:

1.  All acts of war on the part of the troops under General
Johnston's command to cease from this date.

2.  All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro',
and delivered to an ordnance-officer of the United States Army.

3.  Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one
copy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other
to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman.
Each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writing
not to take up arms against the Government of the United States,
until properly released from this obligation.

4.  The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and
baggage, to be retained by them.

5.  This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to
return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States
authorities, so long as they observe their obligation and the laws
in force where they may reside.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General,
Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General,
Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina.

Approved:

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


I returned to Raleigh the same evening, and, at my request, General
Grant wrote on these terms his approval, and then I thought the
matter was surely at an end.  He took the original copy, on the
27th returned to Newbern, and thence went back to Washington.

I immediately made all the orders necessary to carry into effect
the terms of this convention, devolving on General Schofield the
details of granting the parole and making the muster-rolls of
prisoners, inventories of property, etc., of General Johnston's
army at and about Greensboro', North Carolina, and on General
Wilson the same duties in Georgia; but, thus far, I had been
compelled to communicate with the latter through rebel sources, and
General Wilson was necessarily confused by the conflict of orders
and information.  I deemed it of the utmost importance to establish
for him a more reliable base of information and supply, and
accordingly resolved to go in person to Savannah for that purpose.
But, before starting, I received a New York Times, of April 24th,
containing the following extraordinary communications:


[First Bulletin]

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, April 22, 1885.

Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived from General
Sherman.  An agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a
memorandum of what is called a basis for peace, had been entered
into on the 18th inst.   by General Sherman, with the rebel General
Johnston.  Brigadier-General Breckenridge was present at the
conference.

A cabinet meeting was held at eight o'clock in the evening, at
which the action of General Sherman was disapproved by the
President, by the Secretary of War, by General Grant, and by every
member of the cabinet.  General Sherman was ordered to resume
hostilities immediately, and was directed that the instructions
given by the late President, in the following telegram, which was
penned by Mr. Lincoln himself, at the Capitol, on the night of the
3d of March, were approved by President Andrew Johnson, and were
reiterated to govern the action of military commanders.

On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln and his
cabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General Grant was
brought to the Secretary of War, informing him that General Lee had
requested an interview or conference, to make an arrangement for
terms of peace.  The letter of General Lee was published in a
letter to Davis and to the rebel Congress.  General Grant's
telegram was submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who, after pondering a few
minutes, took up his pen and wrote with his own hand the following
reply, which he submitted to the Secretary of State and Secretary
of War.  It was then dated, addressed, and signed, by the Secretary
of War, and telegraphed to General Grant:


WASHINGTON, March 3, 1865-12 P.M.

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have
no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation
of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter.
He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or
confer upon any political questions.  Such questions the President
holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military
conferences or conventions.

Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.


The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman to withdraw from
Salisbury and join him will probably open the way for Davis to
escape to Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported to
be very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond
banks, but previous accumulations.

A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says: "It is
stated here, by respectable parties, that the amount of specie
taken south by Jeff.  Davis and his partisans is very large,
including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous
accumulations.  They hope, it is said, to make terms with General
Sherman, or some other commander, by which they will be permitted,
with their effects, including this gold plunder, to go to Mexico or
Europe.  Johnston's negotiations look to this end."

After the cabinet meeting last night, General Grant started for
North Carolina, to direct operations against Johnston's army.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.


Here followed the terms, and Mr. Stanton's ten reasons for
rejecting them.

The publication of this bulletin by authority was an outrage on me,
for Mr. Stanton had failed to communicate to me in advance, as was
his duty, the purpose of the Administration to limit our
negotiations to purely military matters; but, on the contrary, at
Savannah he had authorized me to control all matters, civil and
military.

By this bulletin, he implied that I had previously been furnished
with a copy of his dispatch of March 3d to General Grant, which was
not so; and he gave warrant to the impression, which was sown
broadcast, that I might be bribed by banker's gold to permit Davis
to escape.  Under the influence of this, I wrote General Grant the
following letter of April 28th, which has been published in the
Proceedings of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

I regarded this bulletin of Mr. Stanton as a personal and official
insult, which I afterward publicly resented.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 28,1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: Since you left me yesterday, I have seen the New York
Times of the 24th, containing a budget of military news,
authenticated by the signature of the Secretary of War, Hon. E. M.
Stanton, which is grouped in such a way as to give the public very
erroneous impressions.  It embraces a copy of the basis of
agreement between myself and General Johnston, of April 18th, with
comments, which it will be time enough to discuss two or three
years hence, after the Government has experimented a little more in
the machinery by which power reaches the scattered people of the
vast country known as the "South."

In the mean time, however, I did think that my rank (if not past
services) entitled me at least to trust that the Secretary of War
would keep secret what was communicated for the use of none but the
cabinet, until further inquiry could be made, instead of giving
publicity to it along with documents which I never saw, and drawing
therefrom inferences wide of the truth.  I never saw or had
furnished me a copy of President Lincoln's dispatch to you of the
3d of March, nor did Mr. Stanton or any human being ever convey to
me its substance, or any thing like it.  On the contrary, I had
seen General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature, made
in Mr. Lincoln's very presence, and failed to discover any other
official hint of a plan of reconstruction, or any ideas calculated
to allay the fears of the people of the South, after the
destruction of their armies and civil authorities would leave them
without any government whatever.

We should not drive a people into anarchy, and it is simply
impossible for our military power to reach all the masses of their
unhappy country.

I confess I did not desire to drive General Johnston's army into
bands of armed men, going about without purpose, and capable only
of infinite mischief.  But you saw, on your arrival here, that I
had my army so disposed that his escape was only possible in a
disorganized shape; and as you did not choose to "direct military
operations in this quarter," I inferred that you were satisfied
with the military situation; at all events, the instant I learned
what was proper enough, the disapproval of the President, I acted
in such a manner as to compel the surrender of General Johnston's
whole army on the same terms which you had prescribed to General
Lee's army, when you had it surrounded and in your absolute power.

Mr. Stanton, in stating that my orders to General Stoneman were
likely to result in the escape of "Mr. Davis to Mexico or Europe,"
is in deep error.  General Stoneman was not at "Salisbury," but had
gone back to "Statesville."  Davis was between us, and therefore
Stoneman was beyond him.  By turning toward me he was approaching
Davis, and, had he joined me as ordered, I would have had a mounted
force greatly needed for Davis's capture, and for other purposes.
Even now I don't know that Mr. Stanton wants Davis caught, and as
my official papers, deemed sacred, are hastily published to the
world, it will be imprudent for me to state what has been done in
that regard.

As the editor of the Times has (it may be) logically and fairly
drawn from this singular document the conclusion that I am
insubordinate, I can only deny the intention.

I have never in my life questioned or disobeyed an order, though
many and many a time have I risked my life, health, and reputation,
in obeying orders, or even hints to execute plans and purposes, not
to my liking.  It is not fair to withhold from me the plans and
policy of Government (if any there be), and expect me to guess at
them; for facts and events appear quite different from different
stand-points.  For four years I have been in camp dealing with
soldiers, and I can assure you that the conclusion at which the
cabinet arrived with such singular unanimity differs from mine.
I conferred freely with the best officers in this army as to the
points involved in this controversy, and, strange to say, they were
singularly unanimous in the other conclusion.  They will learn with
pain and amazement that I am deemed insubordinate, and wanting in
commonsense; that I, who for four years have labored day and night,
winter and summer, who have brought an army of seventy thousand men
in magnificent condition across a country hitherto deemed
impassable, and placed it just where it was wanted, on the day
appointed, have brought discredit on our Government!  I do not wish
to boast of this, but I do say that it entitled me to the courtesy
of being consulted, before publishing to the world a proposition
rightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudication, and then
accompanied by statements which invited the dogs of the press to be
let loose upon me.  It is true that non-combatants, men who sleep
in comfort and security while we watch on the distant lines, are
better able to judge than we poor soldiers, who rarely see a
newspaper, hardly hear from our families, or stop long enough to
draw our pay.  I envy not the task of "reconstruction," and am
delighted that the Secretary of War has relieved me of it.

As you did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs of
this army, I infer that, on personal inspection, your mind arrived
at a different conclusion from that of the Secretary of War.  I
will therefore go on to execute your orders to the conclusion, and,
when done, will with intense satisfaction leave to the civil
authorities the execution of the task of which they seem so
jealous.  But, as an honest man and soldier, I invite them to go
back to Nashville and follow my path, for they will see some things
and hear some things that may disturb their philosophy.

With sincere respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

P. S.--As Mr. Stanton's most singular paper has been published, I
demand that this also be made public, though I am in no manner
responsible to the press, but to the law, and my proper superiors.
W. T. S., Major-General.


On the 28th I summoned all the army and corps commanders together
at my quarters in the Governor's mansion at Raleigh, where every
thing was explained to them, and all orders for the future were
completed.  Generals Schofield, Terry, and Kilpatrick, were to
remain on duty in the Department of North Carolina, already
commanded by General Schofield, and the right and left wings were
ordered to march under their respective commanding generals North
by easy stages to Richmond, Virginia, there to await my return
from the South.

On the 29th of April, with a part of my personal staff, I proceeded
by rail to Wilmington, North Carolina, where I found Generals
Hawley and Potter, and the little steamer Russia, Captain Smith,
awaiting me.  After a short pause in Wilmington, we embarked, and
proceeded down the coast to Port Royal and the Savannah River,
which we reached on the 1st of May.  There Captain Hoses, who had
just come from General Wilson at Macon, met us, bearing letters for
me and General Grant, in which General Wilson gave a brief summary
of his operations up to date.  He had marched from Eastport,
Mississippi, five hundred miles in thirty days, took six thousand
three hundred prisoners, twenty-three colors, and one hundred and
fifty-six guns, defeating Forrest, scattering the militia, and
destroying every railroad, iron establishment, and factory, in
North Alabama and Georgia.

He spoke in the highest terms of his cavalry, as "cavalry,"
claiming that it could not be excelled, and he regarded his corps
as a model for modern cavalry in organization, armament, and
discipline.  Its strength was given at thirteen thousand five
hundred men and horses on reaching Macon.  Of course I was
extremely gratified at his just confidence, and saw that all he
wanted for efficient action was a sure base of supply, so that he
need no longer depend for clothing, ammunition, food, and forage,
on the country, which, now that war had ceased, it was our solemn
duty to protect, instead of plunder.  I accordingly ordered the
captured steamer Jeff. Davis to be loaded with stores, to proceed
at once up the Savannah River to Augusta, with a small detachment
of troops to occupy the arsenal, and to open communication with
General Wilson at Macon; and on the next day, May 2d, this steamer
was followed by another with a fall cargo of clothing, sugar,
coffee, and bread, sent from Hilton Head by the department
commander, General Gillmore, with a stronger guard commanded by
General Molineux.  Leaving to General Gillmore, who was present,
and in whose department General Wilson was, to keep up the supplies
at Augusta, and to facilitate as far as possible General Wilson's
operations inland, I began my return on the 2d of May.  We went
into Charleston Harbor, passing the ruins of old Forts Moultrie and
Sumter without landing.  We reached the city of Charleston, which
was held by part of the division of General John P.  Hatch, the
same that we had left at Pocotaligo.  We walked the old familiar
streets--Broad, King, Meeting, etc.--but desolation and ruin were
everywhere.  The heart of the city had been burned during the
bombardment, and the rebel garrison at the time of its final
evacuation had fired the railroad-depots, which fire had spread,
and was only subdued by our troops after they had reached the city.

I inquired for many of my old friends, but they were dead or gone,
and of them all I only saw a part of the family of Mrs. Pettigru.
I doubt whether any city was ever more terribly punished than
Charleston, but, as her people had for years been agitating for war
and discord, and had finally inaugurated the civil war by an attack
on the small and devoted garrison of Major Anderson, sent there by
the General Government to defend them, the judgment of the world
will be, that Charleston deserved the fate that befell her.
Resuming our voyage, we passed into Cape Fear River by its mouth at
Fort Caswell and Smithville, and out by the new channel at Fort
Fisher, and reached Morehead City on the 4th of May.  We found
there the revenue-cutter Wayanda, on board of which were the Chief-
Justice, Mr. Chase, and his daughter Nettie, now Mrs. Hoyt.  The
Chief-Justice at that moment was absent on a visit to Newbern, but
came back the next day.  Meantime, by means of the telegraph, I was
again in correspondence with General Schofield at Raleigh.  He had
made great progress in paroling the officers and men of Johnston's
army at Greensboro', but was embarrassed by the utter confusion and
anarchy that had resulted from a want of understanding on many
minor points, and on the political questions that had to be met at
the instant.  In order to facilitate the return to their homes of
the Confederate officers and men, he had been forced to make with
General Johnston the following supplemental terms, which were of
course ratified and approved:


MILITARY CONVENTION OF APRIL 26, 1865.
SUPPLEMENTAL TERMS.

1.  The field transportation to be loaned to the troops for their
march to their homes, and for subsequent use in their industrial
pursuits.  Artillery-horses may be used in field-transportation, if
necessary.

2.  Each brigade or separate body to retain a number of arms equal
to one-seventh of its effective strength, which, when the troops
reach the capitals of their states, will be disposed of as the
general commanding the department may direct.

3.  Private horses, and other private property of both officers and
men, to be retained by them.

4.  The commanding general of the Military Division of West
Mississippi, Major-General Canby, will be requested to give
transportation by water, from Mobile or New Orleans, to the troops
from Arkansas and Texas.

5.  The obligations of officers and soldiers to be signed by their
immediate commanders.

6.  Naval forces within the limits of General Johnston's command to
be included in the terms of this convention.



J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General,
Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina.


J. E. JOHNSTON, General,
Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina.


The total number of prisoners of war parolled by
General Schofield, at Greensboro', North Carolina,
as afterward officially reported, amounted to ........ 38,817

And the total number who surrendered in Georgia
and Florida, as reported by General J.  H.  Wilson,
was .................................................. 52,458

Aggregate surrendered under the capitulation of
General J. E. Johnston ............................... 89,270


On the morning of the 5th I also received from General Schofield
this dispatch:


RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, May 5, 1866.

To Major-General W: T. SHERMAN, Morehead City:

When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he said
the lines (for trade and intercourse) had been extended to embrace
this and other States south.  The order, it seems, has been
modified so as to include only Virginia and Tennessee.  I think it
would be an act of wisdom to open this State to trade at once.

I hope the Government will make known its policy as to the organs
of State government without delay.  Affairs must necessarily be in
a very unsettled state until that is done.  The people are now in a
mood to accept almost anything which promises a definite
settlement.  "What is to be done with the freedmen?" is the
question of all, and it is the all important question.  It requires
prompt and wise notion to prevent the negroes from becoming a huge
elephant on our hands.  If I am to govern this State, it is
important for me to know it at once.  If another is to be sent
here, it cannot be done too soon, for he probably will undo the
most that I shall have done.  I shall be glad to hear from you
fully, when you have time to write.  I will send your message to
General Wilson at once.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General.


I was utterly without instructions from any source on the points of
General Schofield's inquiry, and under the existing state of facts
could not even advise him, for by this time I was in possession of
the second bulletin of Mr. Stanton, published in all the Northern
papers, with comments that assumed that I was a common traitor and
a public enemy; and high officials had even instructed my own
subordinates to disobey my lawful orders.  General Halleck, who had
so long been in Washington as the chief of staff, had been sent on
the 21st of April to Richmond, to command the armies of the Potomac
and James, in place of General Grant, who had transferred his
headquarters to the national capital, and he (General Halleck) was
therefore in supreme command in Virginia, while my command over
North Carolina had never been revoked or modified.


[Second Bulletin.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 27 9.30 a.m.

To Major-General DIX:

The department has received the following dispatch from Major-
General Halleck, commanding the Military Division of the James.
Generals Canby and Thomas were instructed some days ago that
Sherman's arrangements with Johnston were disapproved by the
President, and they were ordered to disregard it and push the enemy
in every direction.

E.  M.  STANTON, Secretary of War.


RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, April 26-9.30 p.m.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright, are acting under orders to
pay no regard to any truce or orders of General Sherman respecting
hostilities, on the ground that Sherman's agreement could bind his
command only, and no other.

They are directed to push forward, regardless of orders from any
one except from General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat.

Beauregard has telegraphed to  Danville that a new arrangement has
been made with Sherman, and that the advance of the Sixth Corps was
to be suspended until further orders.

I have telegraphed back to obey no orders of Sherman, but to push
forward as rapidly as possible.

The bankers here have information to-day that Jeff. Davis's specie
is moving south from Goldsboro', in wagons, as fast as possible.

I suggest that orders be telegraphed, through General Thomas, that
Wilson obey no orders from Sherman, and notifying him and Canby,
and all commanders on the Mississippi, to take measures to
intercept the rebel chiefs and their plunder.

The specie taken with them is estimated here at from six to
thirteen million dollars.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General commanding.


Subsequently, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in
Washington, on the 22d of May, I testified fully on this whole
matter, and will abide the judgment of the country on the
patriotism and wisdom of my public conduct in this connection.
General Halleck's measures to capture General Johnston's army,
actually surrendered to me at the time, at Greensboro', on the 26th
of April, simply excited my contempt for a judgment such as he was
supposed to possess.  The assertion that Jeff. Davis's specie-
train, of six to thirteen million dollars, was reported to be
moving south from Goldsboro' in wagons as fast as possible, found
plenty of willing ears, though my army of eighty thousand men had
been at Goldsboro' from March 22d to the date of his dispatch,
April 26th; and such a train would have been composed of from
fifteen to thirty-two six-mule teams to have hauled this specie,
even if it all were in gold.  I suppose the exact amount of
treasure which Davis had with him is now known to a cent; some of
it was paid to his escort, when it disbanded at and near
Washington, Georgia, and at the time of his capture he had a small
parcel of gold and silver coin, not to exceed ten thousand dollars,
which is now retained in the United States Treasury-vault at
Washington, and shown to the curious.

The thirteen millions of treasure, with which Jeff. Davis was to
corrupt our armies and buy his escape, dwindled down to the
contents of a hand-valise!

To say that I was merely angry at the tone and substance of these
published bulletins of the War Department, would hardly express the
state of my feelings.  I was outraged beyond measure, and was
resolved to resent the insult, cost what it might.  I went to the
Wayanda and showed them to Mr. Chase, with whom I had a long and
frank conversation, during which he explained to me the confusion
caused in Washington by the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, the
sudden accession to power of Mr. Johnson, who was then supposed to
be bitter and vindictive in his feelings toward the South, and the
wild pressure of every class of politicians to enforce on the new
President their pet schemes.  He showed me a letter of his own,
which was in print, dated Baltimore, April 11th, and another of
April 12th, addressed to the President, urging him to recognize the
freedmen as equal in all respects to the whites.  He was the first
man, of any authority or station, who ever informed me that the
Government of the United States would insist on extending to the
former slaves of the South the elective franchise, and he gave as a
reason the fact that the slaves, grateful for their freedom, for
which they were indebted to the armies and Government of the North,
would, by their votes, offset the disaffected and rebel element of
the white population of the South.  At that time quite a storm was
prevailing at sea, outside, and our two vessels lay snug at the
wharf at Morehead City.  I saw a good deal of Mr. Chase, and
several notes passed between us, of which I have the originals yet.
Always claiming that the South had herself freed all her slaves by
rebellion, and that Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of freedom (of
September 22, 1862) was binding on all officers of the General
Government, I doubted the wisdom of at once clothing them with the
elective franchise, without some previous preparation and
qualification; and then realized the national loss in the death at
that critical moment of Mr. Lincoln, who had long pondered over the
difficult questions involved, who, at all events, would have been
honest and frank, and would not have withheld from his army
commanders at least a hint that would have been to them a guide.
It was plain to me, therefore, that the manner of his assassination
had stampeded the civil authorities in Washington, had unnerved
them, and that they were then undecided as to the measures
indispensably necessary to prevent anarchy at the South.

On the 7th of May the storm subsided, and we put to sea, Mr. Chase
to the south, on his proposed tour as far as New Orleans, and I for
James River.  I reached Fortress Monroe on the 8th, and thence
telegraphed my arrival to General Grant, asking for orders.  I
found at Fortress Monroe a dispatch from General Halleck,
professing great friendship, and inviting me to accept his
hospitality at Richmond.  I answered by a cipher-dispatch that I
had seen his dispatch to Mr. Stanton, of April 26th, embraced in
the second bulletin, which I regarded as insulting, declined his
hospitality, and added that I preferred we should not meet as I
passed through Richmond.  I thence proceeded to City Point in the
Russia, and on to Manchester, opposite Richmond, via Petersburg, by
rail.  I found that both wings of the army had arrived from
Raleigh, and were in camp in and around Manchester, whence I again
telegraphed General Grant, an the 9th of May, for orders, and also
reported my arrival to General Halleck by letter.  I found that
General Halleck had ordered General Davis's corps (the Fourteenth)
for review by himself.  This I forbade.  All the army knew of the
insult that had been made me by the Secretary of War and General
Halleck, and watched me closely to see if I would tamely submit.
During the 9th I made a full and complete report of all these
events, from the last report made at Goldsboro' up to date, and the
next day received orders to continue the march to Alexandria, near
Washington.


On the morning of the 11th we crossed the pontoon-bridge at
Richmond, marched through that city, and out on the Hanover
Court House road, General Slocum's left wing leading. The right wing
(General Logan) followed the next day, viz., the 12th.  Meantime,
General O. O. Howard had been summoned to Washington to take charge
of the new Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, and,
from that time till the army was finally disbanded, General John A.
Logan was in command of the right wing, and of the Army of the
Tennessee.  The left wing marched through Hanover Court House, and
thence took roads well to the left by Chilesburg; the Fourteenth
Corps by New Market and Culpepper, Manassas, etc.; the Twentieth
Corps by Spotsylvania Court-House and Chancellorsville.  The right
wing followed the more direct road by Fredericksburg.  On my way
north I endeavored to see as much of the battle-fields of the Army
of the Potomac as I could, and therefore shifted from one column to
the other, visiting en route Hanover Court-House, Spotsylvania,
Fredericksburg, Dumfries, etc., reaching Alexandria during the
afternoon of May 19th, and pitched my camp by the road side, about
half-way between Alexandria and the Long Bridge.  During the same
and next day the whole army reached Alexandria, and camped round
about it; General Meade's Army of the Potomac had possession of the
camps above, opposite Washington and Georgetown.  The next day (by
invitation) I went over to Washington and met many friends--among
them General Grant and President Johnson.  The latter occupied
rooms in the house on the corner of Fifteenth and H Streets,
belonging to Mr. Hooper.  He was extremely cordial to me, and
knowing that I was chafing under the censures of the War
Department, especially of the two war bulletins of Mr. Stanton, he
volunteered to say that he knew of neither of them till seen in the
newspapers, and that Mr. Stanton had shown neither to him nor to
any of his associates in the cabinet till they were published.
Nearly all the members of the cabinet made similar assurances to me
afterward, and, as Mr. Stanton made no friendly advances, and
offered no word of explanation or apology, I declined General
Grant's friendly offices for a reconciliation, but, on the
contrary, resolved to resent what I considered an insult, as
publicly as it was made.  My brother, Senator Sherman, who was Mr.
Stanton's neighbor, always insisted that Mr. Stanton had been
frightened by the intended assassination of himself, and had become
embittered thereby.  At all events, I found strong military guards
around his house, as well as all the houses occupied by the cabinet
and by the principal officers of Government; and a sense of
insecurity pervaded Washington, for which no reason existed.

On the 19th I received a copy of War Department Special Order No.
239, Adjutant-General's office, of May 18th, ordering a grand
review, by the President and cabinet, of all the armies then near
Washington; General Meade's to occur on Tuesday, May 23d, mine on
Wednesday, the 24th; and on the 20th I made the necessary orders
for my part.  Meantime I had also arranged (with General Grant's
approval) to remove after the review, my armies from the south side
of the Potomac to the north; both for convenience and because our
men had found that the grounds assigned them had been used so long
for camps that they were foul and unfit.

By invitation I was on the reviewing-stand, and witnessed the
review of the Army of the Potomac (on the 23d), commanded by
General Meade in person.  The day was beautiful, and the pageant
was superb.  Washington was full of strangers, who filled the
streets in holiday-dress, and every house was decorated with flags.
The army marched by divisions in close column around the Capitol,
down Pennsylvania Avenue, past the President and cabinet, who
occupied a large stand prepared for the occasion, directly in front
of the White House.

I had telegraphed to Lancaster for Mrs. Sherman, who arrived that
day, accompanied by her father, the Hon. Thomas Ewing, and my son
Tom, then eight years old.

During the afternoon and night of the 23d, the Fifteenth, Seventeenth,
and Twentieth Corps, crossed Long Bridge, bivouacked in the
streets about the Capitol, and the Fourteenth Corps closed up to
the bridge.  The morning of the 24th was extremely beautiful, and
the ground was in splendid order for our review.  The streets were
filled with people to see the pageant, armed with bouquets of
flowers for their favorite regiments or heroes, and every thing was
propitious.  Punctually at 9 A.M. the signal-gun was fired, when in
person, attended by General Howard and all my staff, I rode slowly
down Pennsylvania Avenue, the crowds of men, women, and children,
densely lining the sidewalks, and almost obstructing the way.  We
were followed close by General Logan and the head of the Fifteenth
Corps.  When I reached the Treasury-building, and looked back, the
sight was simply magnificent.  The column was compact, and the
glittering muskets looked like a solid mass of steel, moving with
the regularity of a pendulum.  We passed the Treasury building, in
front of which and of the White House was an immense throng of
people, for whom extensive stands had been prepared on both sides
of the avenue.  As I neared the brick-house opposite the lower
corner of Lafayette Square, some one asked me to notice Mr. Seward,
who, still feeble and bandaged for his wounds, had been removed
there that he might behold the troops.  I moved in that direction
and took off my hat to Mr. Seward, who sat at an upper window.  He
recognized the salute, returned it, and then we rode on steadily
past the President, saluting with our swords.  All on his stand
arose and acknowledged the salute.  Then, turning into the gate of
the presidential grounds, we left our horses with orderlies, and
went upon the stand, where I found Mrs. Sherman, with her father
and son.  Passing them, I shook hands with the President, General
Grant, and each member of the cabinet.  As I approached Mr.
Stanton, he offered me his hand, but I declined it publicly, and
the fact was universally noticed. I then took my post on the left
of the President, and for six hours and a half stood, while the
army passed in the order of the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth,
and Fourteenth Corps. It was, in my judgment, the most magnificent
army in existence--sixty-five thousand men, in splendid physique,
who had just completed a march of nearly two thousand miles in a
hostile country, in good drill, and who realized that they were
being closely scrutinized by thousands of their fellow-countrymen
and by foreigners.  Division after division passed, each commander
of an army corps or division coming on the stand during the passage
of his command, to be presented to the President, cabinet, and
spectators.  The steadiness and firmness of the tread, the careful
dress on the guides, the uniform intervals between the companies,
all eyes directly to the front, and the tattered and bullet-ridden
flags, festooned with flowers, all attracted universal notice.
Many good people, up to that time, had looked upon our Western army
as a sort of mob; but the world then saw, and recognized the fact,
that it was an army in the proper sense, well organized, well
commanded and disciplined; and there was no wonder that it had
swept through the South like a tornado.  For six hours and a half
that strong tread of the Army of the West resounded along
Pennsylvania Avenue; not a soul of that vast crowd of spectators
left his place; and, when the rear of the column had passed by,
thousands of the spectators still lingered to express their sense
of confidence in the strength of a Government which could claim
such an army.

Some little scenes enlivened the day, and called for the laughter
and cheers of the crowd.  Each division was followed by six
ambulances, as a representative of its baggage-train.  Some of the
division commanders had added, by way of variety, goats, milch-
cows, and pack-mules, whose loads consisted of game-cocks, poultry,
hams, etc., and some of them had the families of freed slaves
along, with the women leading their children.  Each division was
preceded by its corps of black pioneers, armed with picks and
spades.  These marched abreast in double ranks, keeping perfect
dress and step, and added much to the interest of the occasion.  On
the whole, the grand review was a splendid success, and was a
fitting conclusion to the campaign and the war.

I will now conclude by a copy of my general orders taking leave of
the army, which ended my connection with the war, though I
afterward visited and took a more formal leave of the officers and
men on July 4, 1865, at Louisville, Kentucky:




[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS NO. 76]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, WASHINGTON, D.C. May 30, 1865

The general commanding announces to the Armies of the Tennessee and
Georgia that the time has come for us to part.  Our work is done,
and armed enemies no longer defy us.  Some of you will go to your
homes, and others will be retained in military service till further
orders.

And now that we are all about to separate, to mingle with the civil
world, it becomes a pleasing duty to recall to mind the situation
of national affairs when, but little more than a year ago, we were
gathered about the cliffs of Lookout Mountain, and all the future
was wrapped in doubt and uncertainty.

Three armies had come together from distant fields, with separate
histories, yet bound by one common cause--the union of our country,
and the perpetuation of the Government of our inheritance.  There
is no need to recall to your memories Tunnel Hill, with Rocky-Face
Mountain and Buzzard-Roost Gap, and the ugly forts of Dalton
behind.

We were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, but
dashed through Snake-Creek Gap and fell on Resaca; then on to the
Etowah, to Dallas, Kenesaw; and the heats of summer found us on the
banks of the Chattahoochee, far from home, and dependent on a
single road for supplies.  Again we were not to be held back by any
obstacle, and crossed over and fought four hard battles for the
possession of the citadel of Atlanta.  That was the crisis of our
history.  A doubt still clouded our future, but we solved the
problem, destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State of
Georgia, severed all the main arteries of life to our enemy, and
Christmas found us at Savannah.

Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we again began a
march which, for peril, labor, and results, will compare with any
ever made by an organized army.  The floods of the Savannah, the
swamps of the Combahee and Edisto, the "high hills" and rocks of
the Santee, the flat quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear Rivers,
were all passed in midwinter, with its floods and rains, in the
face of an accumulating enemy; and, after the battles of
Averysboro' and Bentonsville, we once more came out of the
wilderness, to meet our friends at Goldsboro'.  Even then we paused
only long enough to get new clothing, to reload our wagons, again
pushed on to Raleigh and beyond, until we met our enemy suing for
peace, instead of war, and offering to submit to the injured laws
of his and our country.  As long as that enemy was defiant, nor
mountains nor rivers, nor swamps, nor hunger, nor cold, had checked
us; but when he, who had fought us hard and persistently, offered
submission, your general thought it wrong to pursue him farther,
and negotiations followed, which resulted, as you all know, in his
surrender.

How far the operations of this army contributed to the final
overthrow of the Confederacy and the peace which now dawns upon us,
must be judged by others, not by us; but that you have done all
that men could do has been admitted by those in authority, and we
have a right to join in the universal joy that fills our land
because the war is over, and our Government stands vindicated
before the world by the joint action of the volunteer armies and
navy of the United States.

To such as remain in the service, your general need only remind you
that success in the past was due to hard work and discipline, and
that the same work and discipline are equally important in the
future.  To such as go home, he will only say that our favored
country is so grand, so extensive, so diversified in climate, soil,
and productions, that every man may find a home and occupation
suited to his taste; none should yield to the natural impatience
sure to result from our past life of excitement and adventure.  You
will be invited to seek new adventures abroad; do not yield to the
temptation, for it will lead only to death and disappointment.

Your general now bids you farewell, with the full belief that, as
in war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you will make good
citizens; and if, unfortunately, new war should arise in our
country, "Sherman's army" will be the first to buckle on its old
armor, and come forth to defend and maintain the Government of our
inheritance.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L.  M.  DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.



List of the Average Number of Miles marched by the Different Army
Corps of the United States Forces under Command of Major-General W.
T. SHERMAN, United States Army, during his Campaigns: 1863-'64-'65.

         4th       14th      15th      16th      17th       20th
        Corps.   Corps.    Corps.   Corps    Corps.    Corps.

Miles:   110     1,586     2,289     508     2,076     1,525




CHAPTER XXV.

CONCLUSION--MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR.

Having thus recorded a summary of events, mostly under my own
personal supervision, during the years from 1846 to 1865, it seems
proper that I should add an opinion of some of the useful military
lessons to be derived therefrom.

That civil war, by reason of the existence of slavery, was
apprehended by most of the leading statesmen of the half-century
preceding its outbreak, is a matter of notoriety.  General Scott
told me on my arrival at New York, as early as 1850, that the
country was on the eve of civil war; and the Southern politicians
openly asserted that it was their purpose to accept as a casus
belli the election of General Fremont in 1856; but, fortunately or
unfortunately, he was beaten by Mr. Buchanan, which simply
postponed its occurrence for four years.  Mr. Seward had also
publicly declared that no government could possibly exist half
slave and half free; yet the Government made no military
preparation, and the Northern people generally paid no attention,
took no warning of its coming, and would not realize its existence
till Fort Sumter was fired on by batteries of artillery, handled by
declared enemies, from the surrounding islands and from the city of
Charleston.

General Bragg, who certainly was a man of intelligence, and who, in
early life, ridiculed a thousand times, in my hearing, the threats
of the people of South Carolina to secede from the Federal Union,
said to me in New Orleans, in February, 1861, that he was convinced
that the feeling between the slave and free States had become so
embittered that it was better to part in peace; better to part
anyhow; and, as a separation was inevitable, that the South should
begin at once, because the possibility of a successful effort was
yearly lessened by the rapid and increasing inequality between the
two sections, from the fact that all the European immigrants were
coming to the Northern States and Territories, and none to the
Southern.

The slave population m 1860 was near four millions, and the money
value thereof not far from twenty-five hundred million dollars.
Now, ignoring the moral side of the question, a cause that
endangered so vast a moneyed interest was an adequate cause of
anxiety and preparation, and the Northern leaders surely ought to
have foreseen the danger and prepared for it.  After the election
of Mr. Lincoln in 1860, there was no concealment of the declaration
and preparation for war in the South.  In Louisiana, as I have
related, men were openly enlisted, officers were appointed, and war
was actually begun, in January, 1861.  The forts at the mouth of
the Mississippi were seized, and occupied by garrisons that hauled
down the United States flag and hoisted that of the State.  The
United States Arsenal at Baton Rouge was captured by New Orleans
militia, its garrison ignominiously sent off, and the contents of
the arsenal distributed.  These were as much acts of war as was the
subsequent firing on Fort Sumter, yet no public notice was taken
thereof; and when, months afterward, I came North, I found not one
single sign of preparation.  It was for this reason, somewhat, that
the people of the South became convinced that those of the North
were pusillanimous and cowardly, and the Southern leaders were
thereby enabled to commit their people to the war, nominally in
defense of their slave property.  Up to the hour of the firing on
Fort Sumter, in April, 1861, it does seem to me that our public
men, our politicians, were blamable for not sounding the note of
alarm.

Then, when war was actually begun, it was by a call for seventy-
five thousand "ninety-day" men, I suppose to fulfill Mr. Seward's
prophecy that the war would last but ninety days.

The earlier steps by our political Government were extremely
wavering and weak, for which an excuse can be found in the fact
that many of the Southern representatives remained in Congress,
sharing in the public councils, and influencing legislation.  But
as soon as Mr. Lincoln was installed, there was no longer any
reason why Congress and the cabinet should have hesitated.  They
should have measured the cause, provided the means, and left the
Executive to apply the remedy.

At the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, viz., March 4, 1861, the
Regular Army, by law, consisted of two regiments of dragoons, two
regiments of cavalry, one regiment of mounted rifles, four
regiments of artillery, and ten regiments of infantry, admitting of
an aggregate strength of thirteen thousand and twenty-four officers
and men.  On the subsequent 4th of May the President, by his own
orders (afterward sanctioned by Congress), added a regiment of
cavalry, a regiment of artillery, and eight regiments of infantry,
which, with the former army, admitted of a strength of thirty-nine
thousand nine hundred and seventy-three; but at no time during the
war did the Regular Army attain a strength of twenty-five thousand
men.

To the new regiments of infantry was given an organization
differing from any that had heretofore prevailed in this country--
of three battalions of eight companies each; but at no time did
more than one of these regiments attain its full standard; nor in
the vast army of volunteers that was raised during the war were any
of the regiments of infantry formed on the three-battalion system,
but these were universally single battalions of ten companies; so
that, on the reorganization of the Regular Army at the close of the
war, Congress adopted the form of twelve companies for the
regiments of cavalry and artillery, and that of ten companies for
the infantry, which is the present standard.

Inasmuch as the Regular Army will naturally form the standard of
organization for any increase or for new regiments of volunteers,
it becomes important to study this subject in the light of past
experience, and to select that form which is best for peace as well
as war.

A cavalry regiment is now composed of twelve companies, usually
divided into six squadrons, of two companies each, or better
subdivided into three battalions of four companies each.  This is
an excellent form, easily admitting of subdivision as well as union
into larger masses.

A single battalion of four companies, with a field-officer, will
compose a good body for a garrison, for a separate expedition, or
for a detachment; and, in war, three regiments would compose a good
brigade, three brigades a division, and three divisions a strong
cavalry corps, such as was formed and fought by Generals Sheridan
and Wilson during the war.

In the artillery arm, the officers differ widely in their opinion
of the true organization.  A single company forms a battery, and
habitually each battery acts separately, though sometimes several
are united or "massed;" but these always act in concert with
cavalry or infantry.

Nevertheless, the regimental organization for artillery has always
been maintained in this country for classification and promotion.
Twelve companies compose a regiment, and, though probably no
colonel ever commanded his full regiment in the form of twelve
batteries, yet in peace they occupy our heavy sea-coast forts or
act as infantry; then the regimental organization is both necessary
and convenient.

But the infantry composes the great mass of all armies, and the
true form of the regiment or unit has been the subject of infinite
discussion; and, as I have stated, during the civil war the
regiment was a single battalion of ten companies.  In olden times
the regiment was composed of eight battalion companies and two
flank companies.  The first and tenth companies were armed with
rifles, and were styled and used as "skirmishers;" but during 'the
war they were never used exclusively for that special purpose, and
in fact no distinction existed between them and the other eight
companies.

The ten-company organization is awkward in practice, and I am
satisfied that the infantry regiment should have the same identical
organization as exists for the cavalry and artillery, viz., twelve
companies, so as to be susceptible of division into three
battalions of four companies each.

These companies should habitually be about a hundred one men
strong, giving twelve hundred to a regiment, which in practice
would settle down to about one thousand men.

Three such regiments would compose a brigade, three brigades a
division, and three divisions a corps.  Then, by allowing to an
infantry corps a brigade of cavalry and six batteries of
field-artillery, we would have an efficient  corps d'armee of
thirty thousand men, whose organization would be simple and most
efficient, and whose strength should never be allowed to fall below
twenty-five thousand men.

The corps is the true unit for grand campaigns and battle, should
have a full and perfect staff, and every thing requisite for
separate action, ready at all times to be detached and sent off for
any nature of service.  The general in command should have the rank
of lieutenant-general, and should be, by experience and education,
equal to any thing in war.  Habitually with us he was a major-
general, specially selected and assigned to the command by an order
of the President, constituting, in fact, a separate grade.


The division is the unit of administration, and is the legitimate
command of a major general.

The brigade is the next subdivision, and is commanded by a
brigadier-general.

The regiment is the family.  The colonel, as the father, should
have a personal acquaintance with every officer and man, and should
instill a feeling of pride and affection for himself, so that his
officers and men would naturally look to him for personal advice
and instruction.  In war the regiment should never be subdivided,
but should always be maintained entire.  In peace this is
impossible.

The company is the true unit of discipline, and the captain is the
company.  A good captain makes a good company, and he should have
the power to reward as well as punish.  The fact that soldiers
world naturally like to have a good fellow for their captain is the
best reason why he should be appointed by the colonel, or by some
superior authority, instead of being elected by the men.

In the United States the people are the "sovereign," all power
originally proceeds from them, and therefore the election of
officers by the men is the common rule.  This is wrong, because an
army is not a popular organization, but an animated machine, an
instrument in the hands of the Executive for enforcing the law, and
maintaining the honor and dignity of the nation; and the President,
as the constitutional commander-in-chief of the army and navy,
should exercise the power of appointment (subject to the
confirmation of the Senate) of the officers of "volunteers," as
well as of "regulars."

No army can be efficient unless it be a unit for action; and the
power must come from above, not from below: the President usually
delegates his power to the commander-in-chief, and he to the next,
and so on down to the lowest actual commander of troops, however
small the detachment.  No matter how troops come together, when
once united, the highest officer in rank is held responsible, and
should be consequently armed with the fullest power of the
Executive, subject only to law and existing orders.  The more
simple the principle, the greater the likelihood of determined
action; and the less a commanding officer is circumscribed by
bounds or by precedent, the greater is the probability that he will
make the best use of his command and achieve the best results.

The Regular Army and the Military Academy at West Point have in the
past provided, and doubtless will in the future provide an ample
supply of good officers for future wars; but, should their numbers
be insufficient, we can always safely rely on the great number of
young men of education and force of character throughout the
country, to supplement them.  At the close of our civil war,
lasting four years, some of our best corps and division generals,
as well as staff-officers, were from civil life; but I cannot
recall any of the most successful who did not express a regret that
he had not received in early life instruction in the elementary
principles of the art of war, instead of being forced to acquire
this knowledge in the dangerous and expensive school of actual war.

But the vital difficulty was, and will be again, to obtain an
adequate number of good soldiers.  We tried almost every system
known to modern nations, all with more or less success--voluntary
enlistments, the draft, and bought substitutes--and I think that all
officers of experience will confirm my assertion that the men who
voluntarily enlisted at the outbreak of the war were the best,
better than the conscript, and far better than the bought
substitute.  When a regiment is once organized in a State, and
mustered into the service of the United States, the officers and
men become subject to the same laws of discipline and government as
the regular troops.  They are in no sense "militia," but compose
a part of the Army of the United States, only retain their State
title for convenience, and yet may be principally recruited from
the neighborhood of their original organization: Once organized,
the regiment should be kept full by recruits, and when it becomes
difficult to obtain more recruits the pay should be raised by
Congress, instead of tempting new men by exaggerated bounties.  I
believe it would have been more economical to have raised the pay
of the soldier to thirty or even fifty dollars a month than to have
held out the promise of three hundred and even six hundred dollars
in the form of bounty.  Toward the close of the war, I have often
heard the soldiers complain that the "stay at-home" men got better
pay, bounties, and food, than they who were exposed to all the
dangers and vicissitudes of the battles and marches at the front.
The feeling of the soldier should be that, in every event, the
sympathy and preference of his government is for him who fights,
rather than for him who is on provost or guard duty to the rear,
and, like most men, he measures this by the amount of pay.  Of
course, the soldier must be trained to obedience, and should be
"content with his wages;" but whoever has commanded an army in the
field knows the difference between a willing, contented mass of
men, and one that feels a cause of grievance.  There is a soul to
an army as well as to the individual man, and no general can
accomplish the full work of his army unless he commands the soul of
his men, as well as their bodies and legs.

The greatest mistake made in our civil war was in the mode of
recruitment and promotion.  When a regiment became reduced by the
necessary wear and tear of service, instead of being filled up at
the bottom, and the vacancies among the officers filled from the
best noncommissioned officers and men, the habit was to raise new
regiments, with new colonels, captains, and men, leaving the old
and experienced battalions to dwindle away into mere skeleton
organizations.  I believe with the volunteers this matter was left
to the States exclusively, and I remember that Wisconsin kept her
regiments filled with recruits, whereas other States generally
filled their quotas by new regiments, and the result was that we
estimated a Wisconsin regiment equal to an ordinary brigade.  I
believe that five hundred new men added to an old and experienced
regiment were more valuable than a thousand men in the form of a
new regiment, for the former by association with good, experienced
captains, lieutenants, and non-commissioned officers, soon became
veterans, whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year.
The German method of recruitment is simply perfect, and there is no
good reason why we should not follow it substantially.

On a road, marching by the flank, it would be considered "good
order" to have five thousand men to a mile, so that a full corps of
thirty thousand men would extend six miles, but with the average
trains and batteries of artillery the probabilities are that it
would draw out to ten miles.  On a long and regular march the
divisions and brigades should alternate in the lead, the leading
division should be on the road by the earliest dawn, and march at
the rate of about two miles, or, at most, two and a half miles an
hour, so as to reach camp by noon.  Even then the rear divisions
and trains will hardly reach camp much before night. Theoretically,
a marching column should preserve such order that by simply halting
and facing to the right or left, it would be in line of battle; but
this is rarely the case, and generally deployments are made
"forward," by conducting each brigade by the flank obliquely to the
right or left to its approximate position in line of battle, and
there deployed.  In such a line of battle, a brigade of three
thousand infantry would occupy a mile of "front;" but for a strong
line of battle five-thousand men with two batteries should be
allowed to each mile, or a division would habitually constitute a
double line with skirmishers and a reserve on a mile of "front."

The "feeding" of an army is a matter of the most vital importance,
and demands the earliest attention of the general intrusted with a
campaign.  To be strong, healthy, and capable of the largest
measure of physical effort, the soldier needs about three pounds
gross of food per day, and the horse or mule about twenty pounds.
When a general first estimates the quantity of food and forage
needed for an army of fifty or one hundred thousand men, he is apt
to be dismayed, and here a good staff is indispensable, though the
general cannot throw off on them the responsibility.  He must give
the subject his personal attention, for the army reposes in him
alone, and should never doubt the fact that their existence
overrides in importance all other considerations.  Once satisfied
of this, and that all has been done that can be, the soldiers are
always willing to bear the largest measure of privation.  Probably
no army ever had a more varied experience in this regard than the
one I commanded in 1864'65.

Our base of supply was at Nashville, supplied by railways and the
Cumberland River, thence by rail to Chattanooga, a "secondary
base," and thence forward a single-track railroad.  The stores came
forward daily, but I endeavored to have on hand a full supply for
twenty days in advance.  These stores were habitually in the
wagon-trains, distributed to corps, divisions, and regiments, in
charge of experienced quartermasters and commissaries, and became
subject to the orders of the generals commanding these bodies.
They were generally issued on provision returns, but these had to
be closely scrutinized, for too often the colonels would make
requisitions for provisions for more men than they reported for
battle.  Of course, there are always a good many non-combatants
with an army, but, after careful study, I limited their amount to
twenty-five per cent. of the "effective strength," and that was
found to be liberal.  An ordinary army-wagon drawn by six mules may
be counted on to carry three thousand pounds net, equal to the food
of a full regiment for one day, but, by driving along beef-cattle,
a commissary may safely count the contents of one wagon as
sufficient for two days' food for a regiment of a thousand men; and
as a corps should have food on hand for twenty days ready for
detachment, it should have three hundred such wagons, as a
provision-train; and for forage, ammunition, clothing, and other
necessary stores, it was found necessary to have three hundred more
wagons, or six hundred wagons in all, for a corps d'armee.

These should be absolutely under the immediate control of the corps
commander, who will, however, find it economical to distribute them
in due proportion to his divisions, brigades, and even regiments.
Each regiment ought usually to have at least one wagon for
convenience to distribute stores, and each company two pack-mules,
so that the regiment may always be certain of a meal on reaching
camp without waiting for the larger trains.

On long marches the artillery and wagon-trains should always have
the right of way, and the troops should improvise roads to one
side, unless forced to use a bridge in common, and all trains
should have escorts to protect them, and to assist them in bad
places.  To this end there is nothing like actual experience, only,
unless the officers in command give the subject their personal
attention, they will find their wagon-trains loaded down with
tents, personal baggage, and even the arms and knapsacks of the
escort.  Each soldier should, if not actually "sick or wounded,"
carry his musket and equipments containing from forty to sixty
rounds of ammunition, his shelter-tent, a blanket or overcoat, and
an extra pair of pants, socks, and drawers, in the form of a scarf,
worn from the left shoulder to the right side in lieu of knapsack,
and in his haversack he should carry some bread, cooked meat, salt,
and coffee.  I do not believe a soldier should be loaded down too
much, but, including his clothing, arms, and equipment, he can
carry about fifty pounds without impairing his health or activity.
A simple calculation will show that by such a distribution a corps
will-thus carry the equivalent of five hundred wagon-loads--an
immense relief to the trains.

Where an army is near one of our many large navigable rivers, or
has the safe use of a railway, it can usually be supplied with the
full army ration, which is by far the best furnished to any army in
America or Europe; but when it is compelled to operate away from
such a base, and is dependent on its own train of wagons, the
commanding officer must exercise a wise discretion in the selection
of his stores.  In my opinion, there is no better food for man than
beef-cattle driven on the hoof, issued liberally, with salt, bacon,
and bread.  Coffee has also become almost indispensable, though
many substitutes were found for it, such as Indian-corn, roasted,
ground, and boiled as coffee; the sweet-potato, and the seed of the
okra plant prepared in the same way.  All these were used by the
people of the South, who for years could procure no coffee, but I
noticed that the women always begged of us some real coffee, which
seems to satisfy a natural yearning or craving more powerful than
can be accounted for on the theory of habit.  Therefore I would
always advise that the coffee and sugar ration be carried along,
even at the expense of bread, for which there are many substitutes.
Of these, Indian-corn is the best and most abundant.  Parched in a
frying-pan, it is excellent food, or if ground, or pounded and
boiled with meat of any sort, it makes a most nutritious meal.  The
potato, both Irish and sweet, forms an excellent substitute for
bread, and at Savannah we found that rice (was) also suitable, both for
men and animals.  For the former it should be cleaned of its husk
in a hominy block, easily prepared out of a log, and sifted with a
coarse corn bag; but for horses it should be fed in the straw.
During the Atlanta campaign we were supplied by our regular
commissaries with all sorts of patent compounds, such as desiccated
vegetables, and concentrated milk, meat-biscuit, and sausages, but
somehow the men preferred the simpler and more familiar forms of
food, and usually styled these "desecrated vegetables and
consecrated milk."  We were also supplied liberally with
lime-juice, sauerkraut, and pickles, as an antidote to scurvy, and
I now recall the extreme anxiety of my medical director, Dr. Kittoe,
about the scurvy, which he reported at one time as spreading and
imperiling the army.  This occurred at a crisis about Kenesaw, when
the railroad was taxed to its utmost capacity to provide the
necessary ammunition, food, and forage, and could not possibly
bring us an adequate supply of potatoes and cabbage, the usual
anti-scorbutics, when providentially the black berries ripened and
proved an admirable antidote, and I have known the skirmish-line,
without orders, to fight a respectable battle for the possession of
some old fields that were full of blackberries.  Soon, thereafter,
the green corn or roasting-ear came into season, and I heard no
more of the scurvy.  Our country abounds with plants which can be
utilized for a prevention to the scurvy; besides the above are the
persimmon, the sassafras root and bud, the wild-mustard, the
"agave," turnip tops, the dandelion cooked as greens, and a
decoction of the ordinary pine-leaf.

For the more delicate and costly articles of food for the sick we
relied mostly on the agents of the Sanitary Commission.  I do not
wish to doubt the value of these organizations, which gained so
much applause during our civil war, for no one can question the
motives of these charitable and generous people; but to be honest I
must record an opinion that the Sanitary Commission should limit
its operations to the hospitals at the rear, and should never
appear at the front.  They were generally local in feeling, aimed
to furnish their personal friends and neighbors with a better class
of food than the Government supplied, and the consequence was, that
one regiment of a brigade would receive potatoes and fruit which
would be denied another regiment close by: Jealousy would be the
inevitable result, and in an army all parts should be equal; there
should be no "partiality, favor, or affection."  The Government
should supply all essential wants, and in the hospitals to the rear
will be found abundant opportunities for the exercise of all
possible charity and generosity.  During the war I several times
gained the ill-will of the agents of the Sanitary Commission
because I forbade their coming to the front unless they would
consent to distribute their stores equally among all, regardless of
the parties who had contributed them.

The sick, wounded, and dead of an army are the subjects of the
greatest possible anxiety, and add an immense amount of labor to
the well men.  Each regiment in an active campaign should have a
surgeon and two assistants always close at hand, and each brigade
and division should have an experienced surgeon as a medical
director.  The great majority of wounds and of sickness should be
treated by the regimental surgeon, on the ground, under the eye of
the colonel.  As few should be sent to the brigade or division
hospital as possible, for the men always receive better care with
their own regiment than with strangers, and as a rule the cure is
more certain; but when men receive disabling wounds, or have
sickness likely to become permanent, the sooner they go far to the
rear the better for all.  The tent or the shelter of a tree is a
better hospital than a house, whose walls absorb fetid and
poisonous emanations, and then give them back to the atmosphere.
To men accustomed to the open air, who live on the plainest food,
wounds seem to give less pain, and are attended with less danger to
life than to ordinary soldiers in barracks.


Wounds which, in 1861, would have sent a man to the hospital for
months, in 1865 were regarded as mere scratches, rather the subject
of a joke than of sorrow.  To new soldiers the sight of blood and
death always has a sickening effect, but soon men become accustomed
to it, and I have heard them exclaim on seeing a dead comrade borne
to the rear, "Well, Bill has turned up his toes to the daisies."
Of course, during a skirmish or battle, armed men should never
leave their ranks to attend a dead or wounded comrade--this should
be seen to in advance by the colonel, who should designate his
musicians or company cooks as hospital attendants, with a white rag
on their arm to indicate their office.  A wounded man should go
himself (if able) to the surgeon near at hand, or, if he need help,
he should receive it from one of the attendants and not a comrade.
It is wonderful how soon the men accustom themselves to these
simple rules.  In great battles these matters call for a more
enlarged attention, and then it becomes the duty of the division
general to see that proper stretchers and field hospitals are ready
for the wounded, and trenches are dug for the dead.  There should
be no real neglect of the dead, because it has a bad effect on the
living; for each soldier values himself and comrade as highly as
though he were living in a good house at home.

The regimental chaplain, if any, usually attends the burials from
the hospital, should make notes and communicate details to the
captain of the company, and to the family at home.  Of course it is
usually impossible to mark the grave with names, dates, etc., and
consequently the names of the "unknown" in our national cemeteries
equal about one-half of all the dead.

Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as
described in European text-books, viz., in great masses, in perfect
order, manoeuvring by corps, divisions, and brigades.  We were
generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed
according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong
skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and of
every cover.  We were generally the assailants, and in wooded and
broken countries the "defensive" had a positive advantage over us,
for they were always ready, had cover, and always knew the ground
to their immediate front; whereas we, their assailants, had to
grope our way over unknown ground, and generally found a cleared
field or prepared entanglements that held us for a time under a
close and withering fire.  Rarely did the opposing lines in compact
order come into actual contact, but when, as at Peach-Tree Creek
and Atlanta, the lines did become commingled, the men fought
individually in every possible style, more frequently with the
musket clubbed than with the bayonet, and in some instances the men
clinched like wrestlers, and went to the ground together.
Europeans frequently criticised our war, because we did not always
take full advantage of a victory; the true reason was, that
habitually the woods served as a screen, and we often did not
realize the fact that our enemy had retreated till he was already
miles away and was again intrenched, having left a mere
skirmish-line to cover the movement, in turn to fall back to the
new position.

Our war was fought with the muzzle-loading rifle.  Toward the close
I had one brigade (Walcutt's) armed with breech-loading "Spencer's;"
the cavalry generally had breach-loading carbines, "Spencer's" and
"Sharp's," both of which were good arms.

The only change that breech-loading arms will probably make in the
art and practice of war will be to increase the amount of
ammunition to be expended, and necessarily to be carried along; to
still further "thin out" the lines of attack, and to reduce battles
to short, quick, decisive conflicts.  It does not in the least
affect the grand strategy, or the necessity for perfect
organization, drill, and discipline.  The companies and battalions
will be more dispersed, and the men will be less under the
immediate eye of their officers, and therefore a higher order of
intelligence and courage on the part of the individual soldier will
be an element of strength.

When a regiment is deployed as skirmishers, and crosses an open
field or woods, under heavy fire, if each man runs forward from
tree to tree, or stump to stump, and yet preserves a good general
alignment, it gives great confidence to the men themselves, for
they always keep their eyes well to the right and left, and watch
their comrades; but when some few hold back, stick too close or too
long to a comfortable log, it often stops the line and defeats the
whole object.  Therefore, the more we improve the fire-arm the more
will be the necessity for good organization, good discipline and
intelligence on the part of the individual soldier and officer.
There is, of course, such a thing as individual courage, which has
a value in war, but familiarity with danger, experience in war and
its common attendants, and personal habit, are equally valuable
traits, and these are the qualities with which we usually have to
deal in war.  All men naturally shrink from pain and danger, and
only incur their risk from some higher motive, or from habit; so
that I would define true courage to be a perfect sensibility of the
measure of danger, and a mental willingness to incur it, rather
than that insensibility to danger of which I have heard far more
than I have seen.  The most courageous men are generally
unconscious of possessing the quality; therefore, when one
professes it too openly, by words or bearing, there is reason to
mistrust it.  I would further illustrate my meaning by describing a
man of true courage to be one who possesses all his faculties and
senses perfectly when serious danger is actually present.

Modern wars have not materially changed the relative values or
proportions of the several arms of service: infantry, artillery,
cavalry, and engineers.  If any thing, the infantry has been
increased in value.  The danger of cavalry attempting to charge
infantry armed with breech-loading rifles was fully illustrated at
Sedan, and with us very frequently.  So improbable has such a thing
become that we have omitted the infantry-square from our recent
tactics.  Still, cavalry against cavalry, and as auxiliary to
infantry, will always be valuable, while all great wars will, as
heretofore, depend chiefly on the infantry.  Artillery is more
valuable with new and inexperienced troops than with veterans.  In
the early stages of the war the field-guns often bore the
proportion of six to a thousand men; but toward the close of the
war one gun; or at most two, to a thousand men, was deemed enough.
Sieges; such as characterized the wars of the last century, are too
slow for this period of the world, and the Prussians recently
almost ignored them altogether, penetrated France between the
forts, and left a superior force "in observation," to watch the
garrison and accept its surrender when the greater events of the
war ahead made further resistance useless; but earth-forts, and
especially field-works, will hereafter play an important part in
war, because they enable a minor force to hold a superior one in
check for a time, and time is a most valuable element in all wars.
It was one of Prof. Mahan's maxims that the spade was as useful in
war as the musket, and to this I will add the axe.  The habit of
intrenching certainly does have the effect of making new troops
timid.  When a line of battle is once covered by a good parapet,
made by the engineers or by the labor of the men themselves, it
does require an effort to make them leave it in the face of danger;
but when the enemy is intrenched, it becomes absolutely necessary
to permit each brigade and division of the troops immediately
opposed to throw up a corresponding trench for their own protection
in case of a sudden sally.  We invariably did this in all our
recent campaigns, and it had no ill effect, though sometimes our
troops were a little too slow in leaving their well-covered lines
to assail the enemy in position or on retreat.  Even our
skirmishers were in the habit of rolling logs together, or of
making a lunette of rails, with dirt in front, to cover their
bodies; and, though it revealed their position, I cannot say that
it worked a bad effect; so that, as a rule, it may safely be left
to the men themselves: On the "defensive," there is no doubt of the
propriety of fortifying; but in the assailing army the general must
watch closely to see that his men do not neglect an opportunity to
drop his precautionary defenses, and act promptly on the
"offensive" at every chance.

I have many a time crept forward to the skirmish-line to avail
myself of the cover of the pickets "little fort," to observe more
closely some expected result; and always talked familiarly with the
men, and was astonished to see how well they comprehended the
general object, and how accurately they were informed of the sate
of facts existing miles away from their particular corps.  Soldiers
are very quick to catch the general drift and purpose of a
campaign, and are always sensible when they are well commanded or
well cared for.  Once impressed with this fact, and that they are
making progress, they bear cheerfully any amount of labor and
privation.

In camp, and especially in the presence of an active enemy, it is
much easier to maintain discipline than in barracks in time of
peace.  Crime and breaches of discipline are much less frequent,
and the necessity for courts-martial far less.  The captain can
usually inflict all the punishment necessary, and the colonel
should always.  The field-officers' court is the best form for war,
viz., one of the field-officers-the lieutenant-colonel or major
--can examine the case and report his verdict, and the colonel
should execute it.  Of course, there are statutory offenses which
demand a general court-martial, and these must be ordered by the
division or corps commander; but, the presence of one of our
regular civilian judge-advocates in an army in the field would be a
first-class nuisance, for technical courts always work mischief.
Too many courts-martial in any command are evidence of poor
discipline and inefficient officers.

For the rapid transmission of orders in an army covering a large
space of ground, the magnetic telegraph is by far the best, though
habitually the paper and pencil, with good mounted orderlies,
answer every purpose.  I have little faith in the signal-service by
flags and torches, though we always used them; because, almost
invariably when they were most needed, the view was cut off by
intervening trees, or by mists and fogs.  There was one notable
instance in my experience, when the signal-flags carried a message.
of vital importance over the heads of Hood's army, which had
interposed between me and Allatoona, and had broken the
telegraph-wires--as recorded in Chapter XIX.; but the value of the
magnetic telegraph in war cannot be exaggerated, as was illustrated
by the perfect concert of action between the armies in Virginia and
Georgia during 1864.  Hardly a day intervened when General Grant
did not know the exact state of facts with me, more than fifteen
hundred miles away as the wires ran.  So on the field a thin
insulated wire may be run on improvised stakes or from tree to tree
for six or more miles in a couple of hours, and I have seen
operators so skillful, that by cutting the wire they would receive
a message with their tongues from a distant station.  As a matter
of course, the ordinary commercial wires along the railways form
the usual telegraph-lines for an army, and these are easily
repaired and extended as the army advances, but each army and wing
should have a small party of skilled men to put up the field-wire,
and take it down when done.  This is far better than the
signal-flags and torches.  Our commercial telegraph-lines will
always supply for war enough skillful operators.

The value of railways is also fully recognized in war quite as much
as, if not more so than, in peace.  The Atlanta campaign would
simply have been impossible without the use of the railroads from
Louisville to Nashville--one hundred and eighty-five miles--from
Nashville to Chattanooga--one hundred and fifty-one miles--and from
Chattanooga to Atlanta--one hundred and thirty-seven miles.  Every
mile of this "single track" was so delicate, that one man could in
a minute have broken or moved a rail, but our trains usually
carried along the tools and means to repair such a break.  We had,
however, to maintain strong guards and garrisons at each important
bridge or trestle--the destruction of which would have necessitated
time for rebuilding.  For the protection of a bridge, one or two
log block houses, two stories high, with a piece of ordnance and a
small infantry guard, usually sufficed.  The block-house had a
small parapet and ditch about it, and the roof was made shot proof
by earth piled on.  These points could usually be reached only by a
dash of the enemy's cavalry, and many of these block houses
successfully resisted serious attacks by both cavalry and
artillery. The only block-house that was actually captured on the
main was the one described near Allatoona.  Our trains from
Nashville forward were operated under military rules, and ran about
ten miles an hour in gangs of four trains of ten cars each.  Four
such groups of trains daily made one hundred and sixty cars, of ten
tons each, carrying sixteen hundred tons, which exceeded the
absolute necessity of the army, and allowed for the accidents that
were common and inevitable.  But, as I have recorded, that single
stem of railroad, four hundred and seventy-three miles long,
supplied an army of one hundred thousand men and thirty-five
thousand animals for the period of one hundred and ninety-six days,
viz., from May 1 to November 12, 1864.  To have delivered regularly
that amount of food and forage by ordinary wagons would have
required thirty-six thousand eight hundred wagons of six mules
each, allowing each wagon to have hauled two tons twenty miles each
day, a simple impossibility in roads such as then existed in that
region of country.  Therefore, I reiterate that the Atlanta
campaign was an impossibility without these railroads; and only
then, because we had the men and means to maintain and defend them,
in addition to what were necessary to overcome the enemy.
Habitually, a passenger-car will carry fifty men with their
necessary baggage.  Box-cars, and even platform-cars, answer the
purpose well enough, but they, should always have rough
board-seats.  For sick and wounded men, box-cars filled with straw
or bushes were usually employed.  Personally, I saw but little of
the practical working of the railroads, for I only turned back once
as far as Resaca; but I had daily reports from the engineer in
charge, and officers who came from the rear often explained to me
the whole thing, with a description of the wrecked trains all the
way from Nashville to Atlanta.  I am convinced that the risk to
life to the engineers and men on that railroad fully equaled that
on the skirmish-line, called for as high an order of courage, and
fully equaled it in importance.  Still, I doubt if there be any
necessity in time of peace to organize a corps specially to work
the military railroads in time of war, because in peace these same
men gain all the necessary experience, possess all the daring and
courage of soldiers, and only need the occasional protection and
assistance of the necessary train-guard, which may be composed of
the furloughed men coming and going, or of details made from the
local garrisons to the rear.

For the transfer of large armies by rail, from one theatre of
action to another by the rear--the cases of the transfer of the
Eleventh and Twelfth Corps--General Hooker, twenty-three thousand
men--from the East to Chattanooga, eleven hundred and ninety-two
miles in seven days, in the fall of 1863; and that of the Army of
the Ohio--General Schofield, fifteen thousand men--from the valley
of the Tennessee to Washington, fourteen hundred miles in eleven
days, en route to North Carolina in January, 1865, are the best
examples of which I have any knowledge, and reference to these is
made in the report of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, dated
November 22, 1865.

Engineer troops attached to an army are habitually employed in
supervising the construction of forts or field works of a nature
more permanent than the lines need by the troops in motion, and in
repairing roads and making bridges.  I had several regiments of
this kind that were most useful, but as a rule we used the
infantry, or employed parties of freedmen, who worked on the
trenches at night while the soldiers slept, and these in turn
rested by day.  Habitually the repair of the railroad and its
bridges was committed to hired laborers, like the English navies,
under the supervision of Colonel W. W. Wright, a railroad-engineer,
who was in the military service at the time, and his successful
labors were frequently referred to in the official reports of the
campaign.

For the passage of rivers, each army corps had a pontoon-train with
a detachment of engineers, and, on reaching a river, the leading
infantry division was charged with the labor of putting it down.
Generally the single pontoon-train could provide for nine hundred
feet of bridge, which sufficed; but when the rivers were very wide
two such trains would be brought together, or the single train was
supplemented by a trestle-bridge, or bridges made on crib-work, out
of timber found near the place.  The pontoons in general use were
skeleton frames, made with a hinge, so as to fold back and
constitute a wagon-body.  In this same wagon were carried the
cotton canvas cover, the anchor and chains, and a due proportion of
the balks, cheeses, and lashings.  All the troops became very
familiar with their mechanism and use, and we were rarely delayed
by reason of a river, however broad.  I saw, recently, in
Aldershot, England, a very complete pontoon-train; the boats were
sheathed with wood and felt, made very light; but I think these
were more liable to chafing and damage in rough handling than were
our less expensive and rougher boats.  On the whole, I would prefer
the skeleton frame and canvas cover to any style of pontoon that I
have ever seen.

In relation to guards, pickets, and vedettes, I doubt if any
discoveries or improvements were made during our war, or in any of
the modern wars in Europe.  These precautions vary with the nature
of the country and the situation of each army.  When advancing or
retreating in line of battle, the usual skirmish-line constitutes
the picket-line, and may have "reserves," but usually the main line
of battle constitutes the reserve; and in this connection I will
state that the recent innovation introduced into the new infantry
tactics by General Upton is admirable, for by it each regiment,
brigade, and division deployed, sends forward as "skirmishers" the
one man of each set of fours, to cover its own front, and these can
be recalled or reenforced at pleasure by the bugle-signal.

For flank-guards and rear-guards, one or more companies should be
detached under their own officers, instead of making up the guard
by detailing men from the several companies.

For regimental or camp guards, the details should be made according
to existing army regulations; and all the guards should be posted
early in the evening, so as to afford each sentinel or vedette a
chance to study his ground before it becomes too dark.

In like manner as to the staff.  The more intimately it comes into
contact with the troops, the more useful and valuable it becomes.
The almost entire separation of the staff from the line, as now
practised by us, and hitherto by the French, has proved
mischievous, and the great retinues of staff-officers with which
some of our earlier generals began the war were simply ridiculous.
I don't believe in a chief of staff at all, and any general
commanding an army, corps, or division, that has a staff-officer
who professes to know more than his chief, is to be pitied.  Each
regiment should have a competent adjutant, quartermaster, and
commissary, with two or three medical officers.  Each brigade
commander should have the same staff, with the addition of a couple
of young aides-de-camp, habitually selected from the subalterns of
the brigade, who should be good riders, and intelligent enough to
give and explain the orders of their general.

The same staff will answer for a division.  The general in command
of a separate army, and of a corps d'armee, should have the same
professional assistance, with two or more good engineers, and his
adjutant-general should exercise all the functions usually ascribed
to a chief of staff, viz., he should possess the ability to
comprehend the scope of operations, and to make verbally and in
writing all the orders and details necessary to carry into effect
the views of his general, as well as to keep the returns and
records of events for the information of the next higher authority,
and for history.  A bulky staff implies a division of
responsibility, slowness of action, and indecision, whereas a small
staff implies activity and concentration of purpose.  The smallness
of General Grant's staff throughout the civil war forms the best
model for future imitation.  So of tents, officers furniture, etc.,
etc.  In real war these should all be discarded, and an army is
efficient for action and motion exactly in the inverse ratio of its
impedimenta.  Tents should be omitted altogether, save one to a
regiment for an office, and a few for the division hospital.
Officers should be content with a tent fly, improvising poles and
shelter out of bushes.  The tents d'abri, or shelter-tent, carried
by the soldier himself, is all-sufficient.  Officers should never
seek for houses, but share the condition of their men.

A recent message (July 18, 1874) made to the French Assembly by
Marshal MacMahon, President of the French Republic, submits a
projet de loi, with a report prepared by a board of French generals
on "army administration," which is full of information, and is as
applicable to us as to the French.  I quote from its very
beginning: "The misfortunes of the campaign of 1870 have
demonstrated the inferiority of our system....  Two separate
organizations existed with parallel functions--the 'general' more
occupied in giving direction to his troops than in providing for
their material wants, which he regarded as the special province of
the staff, and the 'intendant' (staff) often working at random,
taking on his shoulders a crushing burden of functions and duties,
exhausting himself with useless efforts, and aiming to accomplish
an insufficient service, to the disappointment of everybody.  This
separation of the administration and command, this coexistence of
two wills, each independent of the other, which paralyzed both and
annulled the dualism, was condemned.  It was decided by the board
that this error should be "proscribed" in the new military system.
The report then goes on at great length discussing the provisions.
of the "new law," which is described to be a radical change from
the old one on the same subject.  While conceding to the Minister
of War in Paris the general control and supervision of the entire
military establishment primarily, especially of the annual
estimates or budget, and the great depots of supply, it distributes
to the commanders of the corps d'armee in time of peace, and to all
army commanders generally in time of war, the absolute command of
the money, provisions, and stores, with the necessary staff-
officers to receive, issue, and account for them.  I quote further:
"The object of this law is to confer on the commander of troops
whatever liberty of action the case demands.  He has the power even
to go beyond the regulations, in circumstances of urgency and
pressing necessity.  The extraordinary measures he may take on
these occasions may require their execution without delay.  The
staff-officer has but one duty before obeying, and that is to
submit his observations to the general, and to ask his orders in
writing.

With this formality his responsibility ceases, and the
responsibility for the extraordinary act falls solely on the
general who gives the order.  The officers and agents charged with
supplies are placed under the orders of the general in command of
the troops, that is, they are obliged both in war and peace to
obey, with the single qualification above named, of first making
their observations and securing the written order of the general.

With us, to-day, the law and regulations are that, no matter what
may be the emergency, the commanding general in Texas, New Mexico,
and the remote frontiers, cannot draw from the arsenals a pistol-
cartridge, or any sort of ordnance-stores, without first procuring
an order of the Secretary of War in Washington.  The commanding
general--though intrusted with the lives of his soldiers and with
the safety of a frontier in a condition of chronic war--cannot
touch or be trusted with ordnance-stores or property, and that is
declared to be the law!  Every officer of the old army remembers
how, in 1861, we were hampered with the old blue army regulations,
which  tied our hands, and that to do any thing positive and
necessary we had to tear it all to pieces--cut the red-tape, as it
was called, a dangerous thing for an army to do, for it was
calculated to bring the law and authority into contempt; but war
was upon us, and overwhelming necessity overrides all law.

This French report is well worth the study of our army-officers, of
all grades and classes, and I will only refer again, casually, to
another part, wherein it discusses the subject of military
correspondence: whether the staff-officer should correspond
directly with his chief in Paris, submitting to his general copies,
or whether he should be required to carry on his correspondence
through his general, so that the latter could promptly forward the
communication, indorsed with his own remarks and opinions.  The
latter is declared by the board to be the only safe role, because
"the general should never be ignorant of any thing that is
transpiring that concerns his command."

In this country, as in France, Congress controls the great
questions of war and peace, makes all laws for the creation and
government of armies, and votes the necessary supplies, leaving to
the President to execute and apply these laws, especially the
harder task of limiting the expenditure of public money to the
amount of the annual appropriations.  The executive power is
further subdivided into the seven great departments, and to the
Secretary of War is confided the general care of the military
establishment, and his powers are further subdivided into ten
distinct and separate bureaus.

The chiefs of these bureaus are under the immediate orders of the
Secretary of War, who, through them, in fact commands the army from
"his office," but cannot do so "in the field"--an absurdity in
military if not civil law.

The subordinates of these staff-corps and departments are selected
and chosen from the army itself, or fresh from West Point, and too
commonly construe themselves into the elite, as made of better clay
than the common soldier.  Thus they separate themselves more and
more from their comrades of the line, and in process of time
realize the condition of that old officer of artillery who thought
the army would be a delightful place for a gentleman if it were not
for the d-d soldier; or, better still, the conclusion of the young
lord in "Henry IV.," who told Harry Percy (Hotspur) that "but for
these vile guns he would himself have been a soldier."  This is all
wrong; utterly at variance with our democratic form of government
and of universal experience; and now that the French, from whom we
had copied the system, have utterly "proscribed" it, I hope that
our Congress will follow suit.  I admit, in its fullest force, the
strength of the maxim that the civil law should be superior to the
military in time of peace; that the army should be at all times
subject to the direct control of Congress; and I assert that, from
the formation of our Government to the present day, the Regular
Army has set the highest example of obedience to law and authority;
but, for the very reason that our army is comparatively so very
small, I hold that it should be the best possible, organized and
governed on true military principles, and that in time of peace we
should preserve the "habits and usages of war," so that, when war
does come, we may not again be compelled to suffer the disgrace,
confusion, and disorder of 1861.

The commanding officers of divisions, departments, and posts,
should have the amplest powers, not only to command their troops,
but all the stores designed for their use, and the officers of the
staff necessary to administer them, within the area of their
command; and then with fairness they could be held to the most
perfect responsibility.  The President and Secretary of War can
command the army quite as well through these generals as through
the subordinate staff-officers.  Of course, the Secretary would, as
now, distribute the funds according to the appropriation bills, and
reserve to himself the absolute control and supervision of the
larger arsenals and depots of supply.  The error lies in the law,
or in the judicial interpretation thereof, and no code of army
regulations can be made that meets the case, until Congress, like
the French Corps Legislatif, utterly annihilates and "proscribes"
the old law and the system which has grown up under it.

It is related of Napoleon that his last words were, "Tete d'armee!"
Doubtless, as the shadow of death obscured his memory, the last
thought that remained for speech was of some event when he was
directing an important "head of column."  I believe that every
general who has handled armies in battle most recall from his own
experience the intensity of thought on some similar occasion, when
by a single command he had given the finishing stroke to some
complicated action; but to me recurs another thought that is worthy
of record, and may encourage others who are to follow us in our
profession.  I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle but
I feared that some calamity had happened at the front the apparent
confusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead and
maimed, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and a
general apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue; all
these signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, and there the
contrast was complete--perfect order, men and horses--full of
confidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity, laughing,
and cheering.  Although cannon might be firing, the musketry
clattering, and the enemy's shot hitting close, there reigned a
general feeling of strength and security that bore a marked
contrast to the bloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear;
therefore, for comfort and safety, I surely would rather be at the
front than the rear line of battle.  So also on the march, the head
of a column moves on steadily, while the rear is alternately
halting and then rushing forward to close up the gap; and all sorts
of rumors, especially the worst, float back to the rear.  Old
troops invariably deem it a special privilege to be in the front
--to be at the "head of column"--because experience has taught them
that it is the easiest and most comfortable place, and danger only
adds zest and stimulus to this fact.

The hardest task in war is to lie in support of some position or
battery, under fire without the privilege of returning it; or to
guard some train left in the rear, within hearing but out of
danger; or to provide for the wounded and dead of some corps which
is too busy ahead to care for its own.

To be at the head of a strong column of troops, in the execution of
some task that requires brain, is the highest pleasure of war--a
grim one and terrible, but which leaves on the mind and memory the
strongest mark; to detect the weak point of an enemy's line; to
break through with vehemence and thus lead to victory; or to
discover some key-point and hold it with tenacity; or to do some
other distinct act which is afterward recognized as the real cause
of success.  These all become matters that are never forgotten.
Other great difficulties, experienced by every general, are to
measure truly the thousand-and-one reports that come to him in the
midst of conflict; to preserve a clear and well-defined purpose at
every instant of time, and to cause all efforts to converge to that
end.

To do these things he must know perfectly the strength and quality
of each part of his own army, as well as that of his opponent, and
must be where he can personally see and observe with his own eyes,
and judge with his own mind.  No man can properly command an army
from the rear, he must be "at its front;" and when a detachment is
made, the commander thereof should be informed of the object to be
accomplished, and left as free as possible to execute it in his own
way; and when an army is divided up into several parts, the
superior should always attend that one which he regards as most
important.  Some men think that modern armies may be so regulated
that a general can sit in an office and play on his several columns
as on the keys of a piano; this is a fearful mistake.  The
directing mind must be at the very head of the army--must be seen
there, and the effect of his mind and personal energy must be felt
by every officer and man present with it, to secure the best
results.  Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in
humiliation and disaster.

Lastly, mail facilities should be kept up with an army if possible,
that officers and men may receive and send letters to their
friends, thus maintaining the home influence of infinite assistance
to discipline.  Newspaper correspondents with an army, as a rule,
are mischievous.  They are the world's gossips, pick up and retail
the camp scandal, and gradually drift to the headquarters of some
general, who finds it easier to make reputation at home than with
his own corps or division.  They are also tempted to prophesy
events and state facts which, to an enemy, reveal a purpose in time
to guard against it.  Moreover, they are always bound to see facts
colored by the partisan or political character of their own
patrons, and thus bring army officers into the political
controversies of the day, which are always mischievous and wrong.
Yet, so greedy are the people at large for war news, that it is
doubtful whether any army commander can exclude all reporters,
without bringing down on himself a clamor that may imperil his own
safety.  Time and moderation must bring a just solution to this
modern difficulty.





CHAPTER XXVI.

AFTER THE WAR

In the foregoing pages I have endeavored to describe the public
events in which I was an actor or spectator before and during the
civil war of 1861-'65, and it now only remains for me to treat of
similar matters of general interest subsequent to the civil war.
Within a few days of the grand review of May 24, 1865, I took leave
of the army at Washington, and with my family went to Chicago to
attend a fair held in the interest of the families of soldiers
impoverished by the war.  I remained there about two weeks; on the
22d of June was at South Bend, Indiana, where two of my children
were at school, and reached my native place, Lancaster, Ohio, on
the 24th.  On the 4th of July I visited at Louisville, Kentucky,
the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Army Corps,
which had come from Washington, under the command of General John
A. Logan, for "muster out," or "further orders."  I then made a
short visit to General George H. Thomas at Nashville, and returned
to Lancaster, where I remained with the family till the receipt of
General Orders No. 118 of June 27, 1865, which divided the whole
territory of the United States into nineteen departments and five
military divisions, the second of which was the military division
of the "Mississippi," afterward changed to "Missouri," Major-
General W. T. Sherman to command, with, headquarters at St. Louis,
to embrace the Departments of the Ohio, Missouri, and Arkansas.

This territorial command included the States north of the Ohio
River, and the States and Territories north of Texas, as far west
as the Rocky Mountains, including Montana, Utah, and New Mexico,
but the part east of the Mississippi was soon transferred to
another division.  The department commanders were General E. O. C.
Ord, at Detroit; General John Pope, at Fort Leavenworth; and
General J. J. Reynolds, at Little Rock, but these also were soon
changed.  I at once assumed command, and ordered my staff and
headquarters from Washington to St. Louis, Missouri, going there in
person on the 16th of July.

My thoughts and feelings at once reverted to the construction of
the great Pacific Railway, which had been chartered by Congress in
the midst of war, and was then in progress.  I put myself in
communication with the parties engaged in the work, visiting them
in person, and assured them that I would afford them all possible
assistance and encouragement.  Dr. Durant, the leading man of the
Union Pacific, seemed to me a person of ardent nature, of great
ability and energy, enthusiastic in his undertaking, and determined
to build the road from Omaha to San Francisco.  He had an able
corps of assistants, collecting materials, letting out contracts
for ties, grading, etc., and I attended the celebration of the
first completed division of sixteen and a half miles, from Omaha to
Papillon.  When the orators spoke so confidently of the
determination to build two thousand miles of railway across the
plains, mountains, and desert, devoid of timber, with no
population, but on the contrary raided by the bold and bloody Sioux
and Cheyennes, who had almost successfully defied our power for
half a century, I was disposed to treat it jocularly, because I
could not help recall our California experience of 1855-'56, when
we celebrated the completion of twenty-two and a half miles of the
same road eastward of Sacramento; on which occasion Edward Baker
had electrified us by his unequalled oratory, painting the glorious
things which would result from uniting the Western coast with the
East by bands of iron.  Baker then, with a poet's imagination, saw
the vision of the mighty future, but not the gulf which meantime
was destined to swallow up half a million of the brightest and best
youth of our land, and that he himself would be one of the first
victims far away on the banks of the Potomac (he was killed in
battle at Balls Bluff, October 21, 1861).

The Kansas Pacific was designed to unite with the main branch about
the 100 deg. meridian, near Fort Kearney.  Mr. Shoemaker was its
general superintendent and building contractor, and this branch in
1865 was finished about forty miles to a point near Lawrence,
Kansas.  I may not be able to refer to these roads again except
incidentally, and will, therefore, record here that the location of
this branch afterward was changed from the Republican to the Smoky
Hill Fork of the Kansas River, and is now the main line to Denver.
The Union and Central Railroads from the beginning were pushed with
a skill, vigor, and courage which always commanded my admiration,
the two meeting at Promontory Point, Utah, July 15, 1869, and in my
judgment constitute one of the greatest and most beneficent
achievements of man on earth.

The construction of the Union Pacific Railroad was deemed so
important that the President, at my suggestion, constituted on the
5th of March, 1866, the new Department of the Platte, General P.
St. George Cooke commanding, succeeded by General C. C. Augur,
headquarters at Omaha, with orders to give ample protection to the
working-parties, and to afford every possible assistance in the
construction of the road; and subsequently in like manner the
Department of Dakota was constituted, General A. H. Terry
commanding, with headquarters at St. Paul, to give similar
protection and encouragement to the Northern Pacific Railroad.
These departments, with changed commanders, have continued up to
the present day, and have fulfilled perfectly the uses for which
they were designed.

During the years 1865 and 1866 the great plains remained almost in
a state of nature, being the pasture-fields of about ten million
buffalo, deer, elk, and antelope, and were in full possession of
the Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Kiowas, a race of bold
Indians, who saw plainly that the construction of two parallel
railroads right through their country would prove destructive to
the game on which they subsisted, and consequently fatal to
themselves.

The troops were posted to the best advantage to protect the parties
engaged in building these roads, and in person I reconnoitred well
to the front, traversing the buffalo regions from south to north,
and from east to west, often with a very small escort, mingling
with the Indians whenever safe, and thereby gained personal
knowledge of matters which enabled me to use the troops to the best
advantage.  I am sure that without the courage and activity of the
department commanders with the small bodies of regular troops on
the plains during the years 1866-'69, the Pacific Railroads could
not have been built; but once built and in full operation the fate
of the buffalo and Indian was settled for all time to come.

At the close of the civil war there were one million five hundred
and sixteen names on the muster-rolls, of which seven hundred and
ninety-seven thousand eight hundred and seven were present, and two
hundred and two thousand seven hundred and nine absent, of which
twenty-two thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine were regulars, the
others were volunteers, colored troops, and veteran reserves.  The
regulars consisted of six regiments of cavalry, five of artillery,
and nineteen of infantry.  By the act of July 28, 1866, the peace
establishment was fixed at one general (Grant), one lieutenant-
general (Sherman), five major-generals (Halleck, Meade, Sheridan,
Thomas, and Hancock), ten brigadiers (McDowell, Cooke, Pope,
Hooker, Schofield, Howard, Terry, Ord, Canby, and Rousseau), ten
regiments of cavalry, five of artillery, and forty-five of
infantry, admitting of an aggregate force of fifty-four thousand
six hundred and forty-one men.

All others were mustered out, and thus were remanded to their homes
nearly a million of strong, vigorous men who had imbibed the
somewhat erratic habits of the soldier; these were of every
profession and trade in life, who, on regaining their homes, found
their places occupied by others, that their friends and neighbors
were different, and that they themselves had changed.  They
naturally looked for new homes to the great West, to the new
Territories and States as far as the Pacific coast, and we realize
to-day that the vigorous men who control Kansas, Nebraska, Dakota,
Montana, Colorado, etc., etc., were soldiers of the civil war.
These men flocked to the plains, and were rather stimulated than
retarded by the danger of an Indian war.  This was another potent
agency in producing the result we enjoy to-day, in having in so
short a time replaced the wild buffaloes by more numerous herds of
tame cattle, and by substituting for the useless Indians the
intelligent owners of productive farms and cattle-ranches.

While these great changes were being wrought at the West, in the
East politics had resumed full sway, and all the methods of
anti-war times had been renewed.  President Johnson had differed
with his party as to the best method of reconstructing the State
governments of the South, which had been destroyed and impoverished
by the war, and the press began to agitate the question of the next
President.  Of course, all Union men naturally turned to General
Grant, and the result was jealousy of him by the personal friends
of President Johnson and some of his cabinet.  Mr. Johnson always
seemed very patriotic and friendly, and I believed him honest and
sincere in his declared purpose to follow strictly the Constitution
of the United States in restoring the Southern States to their
normal place in the Union; but the same cordial friendship
subsisted between General Grant and myself, which was the outgrowth
of personal relations dating back to 1839.  So I resolved to keep
out of this conflict.  In September, 1866, I was in the mountains
of New Mexico, when a message reached me that I was wanted at
Washington.  I had with me a couple of officers and half a dozen
soldiers as escort, and traveled down the Arkansas, through the
Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, all more or less
disaffected, but reached St. Louis in safety, and proceeded to
Washington, where I reported to General Grant.

He explained to me that President Johnson wanted to see me.  He did
not know the why or wherefore, but supposed it had some connection
with an order he (General Grant) had received to escort the newly
appointed Minister, Hon. Lew Campbell, of Ohio, to the court of
Juarez, the President-elect of Mexico, which country was still in
possession of the Emperor Maximilian, supported by a corps of
French troops commanded by General Bazaine.  General Grant denied
the right of the President to order him on a diplomatic mission
unattended by troops; said that he had thought the matter over,
world disobey the order, and stand the consequences.  He manifested
much feeling; and said it was a plot to get rid of him.  I then
went to President Johnson, who treated me with great cordiality,
and said that he was very glad I had come; that General Grant was
about to go to Mexico on business of importance, and he wanted me
at Washington to command the army in General Grant's absence.  I
then informed him that General Grant would not go, and he seemed
amazed; said that it was generally understood that General Grant
construed the occupation of the territories of our neighbor,
Mexico, by French troops, and the establishment of an empire
therein, with an Austrian prince at its head, as hostile to
republican America, and that the Administration had arranged with
the French Government for the withdrawal of Bazaine's troops, which
would leave the country free for the President-elect Juarez to
reoccupy the city of Mexico, etc., etc.; that Mr. Campbell had been
accredited to Juarez, and the fact that he was accompanied by so
distinguished a soldier as General Grant would emphasize the act of
the United States.  I simply reiterated that General Grant would
not go, and that he, Mr. Johnson, could not afford to quarrel with
him at that time.  I further argued that General Grant was at the
moment engaged on the most delicate and difficult task of
reorganizing the army under the act of July 28, 1866; that if the
real object was to put Mr. Campbell in official communication with
President Juarez, supposed to be at El Paso or Monterey, either
General Hancock, whose command embraced New Mexico, or General
Sheridan, whose command included Texas, could fulfill the object
perfectly; or, in the event of neither of these alternates proving
satisfactory to the Secretary of State, that I could be easier
spared than General Grant.  "Certainly," answered the President,
"if you will go, that will answer perfectly."

The instructions of the Secretary of State, W. H. Seward, to Hon.
Lewis D.  Campbell, Minister to Mexico, dated October 25, 1866; a
letter from President Johnson to Secretary of War Stanton, dated
October 26, 1866; and the letter of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of
War, to General Grant, dated October 27th, had been already
prepared and printed, and the originals or copies were furnished
me; but on the 30th of October, 1866, the following letter passed


EXECUTIVE MANSION

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 30,1866.

SIR: General Ulysses S. Grant having found it inconvenient to
assume the duties specified in my letter to you of the 26th inst.,
you will please relieve him, and assign them in all respects to
William T. Sherman, Lieutenant-General of the Army of the United
States.  By way of guiding General Sherman in the performance of
his duties, you will furnish him with a copy of your special orders
to General Grant made in compliance with my letter of the 26th
inst., together with a copy of the instructions of the Secretary of
State to Lewis D. Campbell, Esq., therein mentioned.

The lieutenant-general will proceed to the execution of his duties
without delay.

Very respectfully yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON
To the Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

At the Navy Department I learned that the United States ship
Susquehanna, Captain Alden, was fitting out in New York for the use
of this mission, and that there would be time for me to return to
St. Louis to make arrangements for a prolonged absence, as also to
communicate with Mr. Campbell, who was still at his home in
Hamilton, Ohio.  By correspondence we agreed to meet in New York,
November 8th, he accompanied by Mr. Plumb, secretary of legation,
and I by my aide, Colonel Audenried.

We embarked November 10th, and went to sea next day, making for
Havana and Vera Cruz, and, as soon as we were outside of Sandy
Hook, I explained to Captain Alden that my mission was ended,
because I believed by substituting myself for General Grant I had
prevented a serious quarrel between him and the Administration,
which was unnecessary.  We reached Havana on the 18th, with nothing
to vary the monotony of an ordinary sea-voyage, except off Hatteras
we picked up one woman and twenty men from open boats, who had just
abandoned a propeller bound from Baltimore to Charleston which
foundered.  The sea was very rough, but by the personal skill and
supervision of Captain Alden every soul reached our deck safely,
and was carried to our consul at Havana.  At Havana we were very
handsomely entertained, especially by Senor Aldama, who took us by
rail to his sugar-estates at Santa Ross, and back by Matanzas.

We took our departure thence on the 25th, and anchored under Isla
Verde, off Vera Cruz, on the 29th.

Everything about Vera Cruz indicated the purpose of the French to
withdraw, and also that the Emperor Maximilian would precede them,
for the Austrian frigate Dandolo was in port, and an Austrian bark,
on which were received, according to the report of our consul, Mr.
Lane, as many as eleven hundred packages of private furniture to be
transferred to Miramar, Maximilian's home; and Lieutenant Clarin,
of the French navy, who visited the Susquehanna from the French
commodore, Clouet, told me, without reserve, that, if we had
delayed eight days more, we would have found Maximilian gone.
General Bazaine was reported to be in the city of Mexico with about
twenty-eight thousand French troops; but instead of leaving Mexico
in three detachments, viz., November, 1866, March, 1867, and
November, 1867, as described in Mr. Seward's letter to Mr.
Campbell, of October 25, 1866, it looked to me that, as a soldier,
he would evacuate at some time before November, 1867, all at once,
and not by detachments.  Lieutenant Clarin telegraphed Bazaine at
the city of Mexico the fact of our arrival, and he sent me a most
courteous and pressing invitation to come up to the city; but, as
we were accredited to the government of Juarez, it was considered
undiplomatic to establish friendly relations with the existing
authorities.  Meantime we could not hear a word of Juarez, and
concluded to search for him along the coast northward.  When I was
in Versailles, France, July, 1872, learning that General Bazaine
was in arrest for the surrender of his army and post at Metz, in
1870, I wanted to call on him to thank him for his courteous
invitation to me at Vera Cruz in 1866.  I inquired of President
Thiera if I could with propriety call on the marshal.  He answered
that it would be very acceptable, no doubt, but suggested for
form's sake that I should consult the Minister of War, General de
Cissey, which I did, and he promptly assented.  Accordingly, I
called with my aide, Colonel Audenried, on Marshal Bazaine, who
occupied a small, two-story stone house at Versailles, in an
inclosure with a high garden wall, at the front gate or door of
which was a lodge, in which was a military guard.  We were shown to
a good room on the second floor, where was seated the marshal in
military half-dress, with large head, full face, short neck, and
evidently a man of strong physique.  He did not speak English, but
spoke Spanish perfectly.  We managed to carry on a conversation in
which I endeavored to convey my sense of his politeness in inviting
me so cordially up to the city of Mexico, and my regret that the
peculiar duty on which I was engaged did not admit of a compliance,
or even of an intelligent explanation, at the time.  He spoke of
the whole Mexican business as a "sad affair," that the empire
necessarily fell with the result of our civil war, and that poor
Maximilian was sacrificed to his own high sense of honor.

While on board the Susquehanna, on the 1st day of December, 1866,
we received the proclamation made by the Emperor Maximilian at
Orizaba, in which, notwithstanding the near withdrawal of the
French troops, he declared his purpose to remain and "shed the last
drop of his blood in defense of his dear country."  Undoubtedly
many of the most substantial people of Mexico, having lost all
faith in the stability of the native government, had committed
themselves to what they considered the more stable government of
Maximilian, and Maximilian, a man of honor, concluded at the last
moment he could not abandon them; the consequence was his death.

Failing to hear of Juarez, we steamed up the coast to the Island of
Lobos, and on to Tampico, off which we found the United States
steamer Paul Jones, which, drawing less water than the Susquehanna,
carried us over the bar to the city, then in possession of the
Liberal party, which recognized Juarez as their constitutional
President, but of Juarez and his whereabout we could hear not a
word; so we continued up the coast and anchored off Brazos
Santiago, December 7th.  Going ashore in small boats, we found a
railroad, under the management of General J. R. West, now one of
the commissioners of the city of Washington, who sent us up to
Brownsville, Texas.  We met on the way General Sheridan, returning
from a tour of inspection of the Rio Grande frontier.  On Sunday,
December 9th, we were all at Matamoras, Mexico, where we met
General Escobedo, one of Juarez's trusty lieutenants, who developed
to us the general plan agreed on for the overthrow of the empire,
and the reestablishment of the republican government of Mexico.  He
asked of us no assistance, except the loan of some arms,
ammunition, clothing, and camp-equipage.  It was agreed that Mr.
Campbell should, as soon as he could get his baggage off the
Susquehanna, return to Matamoras, and thence proceed to Monterey,
to be received by Juarez in person as, the accredited Minister of
the United States to the Republic of Mexico.  Meantime the weather
off the coast was stormy, and the Susquehanna parted a cable, so
that we were delayed some days at Brazos; but in due time Mr.
Campbell got his baggage, and we regained the deck of the
Susquehanna, which got up steam and started for New Orleans.  We
reached New Orleans December 20th, whence I reported fully
everything to General Grant, and on the 21st received the following
dispatch:

WASHINGTON, December 21,1866.
Lieutenant-General SHERMAN, New Orleans.

Your telegram of yesterday has been submitted to the President.
You are authorized to proceed to St. Louis at your convenience.
Your proceedings in the special and delicate duties assigned you
are cordially approved by the President and Cabinet and this
department.
EDWIN M. STANTON.

And on the same day I received this dispatch

GALVESTON, December 21, 1866.
To General SHERMAN, or General SHERIDAN.

Will be in New Orleans to-morrow.  Wish to see you both on arrival,
on matters of importance.
LEWIS D. CAMPBELL, Minister to Mexico.


Mr. Campbell arrived on the 22d, but had nothing to tell of the
least importance, save that he was generally disgusted with the
whole thing, and had not found Juarez at all.  I am sure this whole
movement was got up for the purpose of getting General Grant away
from Washington, on the pretext of his known antagonism to the
French occupation of Mexico, because he was looming up as a
candidate for President, and nobody understood the animus and
purpose better than did Mr. Stanton.  He himself was not then on
good terms with President Johnson, and with several of his
associates in the Cabinet.  By Christmas I was back in St. Louis.

By this time the conflict between President Johnson and Congress
had become open and unconcealed.  Congress passed the bill known as
the "Tenure of Civil Office" on the 2d of March, 1867 (over the
President's veto), the first clause of which, now section 1767 of
the Revised Statutes, reads thus: "Every person who holds any civil
office to which he has been or hereafter may be appointed, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall have
become duly qualified to act therein, shall be entitled to hold
such office during the term for which he was appointed, unless
sooner removed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or
by the appointment with the like advice and consent of a successor
in his place, except as herein otherwise provided."

General E. D. Townsend, in his "Anecdotes of the Civil War," states
tersely and correctly the preliminary circumstances of which I must
treat.  He says: "On Monday morning, August 5, 1867, President
Johnson invited Mr. Stanton to resign as Secretary of War.  Under
the tenure-of-civil-office law, Mr. Stanton declined.  The President
a week after suspended him, and appointed General Grant, General-
in-Chief of the Army, to exercise the functions.  This continued
until January 13, 1868, when according to the law the Senate passed
a resolution not sustaining the President's action.  The next
morning General Grant came to my office and handed me the key of
the Secretary's room, saying: 'I am to be found over at my office
at army headquarters.  I was served with a copy of the Senate
resolution last evening.'  I then went up-stairs and delivered the
key of his room to Mr. Stanton."

The mode and manner of Mr. Stanton's regaining his office, and of
General Grant's surrendering it, were at the time subjects of
bitter controversy.  Unhappily I was involved, and must bear
testimony.  In all January, 1868, I was a member of a board ordered
to compile a code of articles of war and army regulations, of which
Major-General Sheridan and Brigadier-General C. C. Augur were
associate members.  Our place of meeting was in the room of the old
War Department, second floor, next to the corner room occupied by
the Secretary of War, with a door of communication.  While we were
at work it was common for General Grant and, afterward, for Mr.
Stanton to drop in and chat with us on the social gossip of the
time.

On Saturday, January 11th, General Grant said that he had more
carefully read the law (tenure of civil office), and it was
different from what he had supposed; that in case the Senate did
not consent to the removal of Secretary of War Stanton, and he
(Grant) should hold on, he should incur a liability of ten thousand
dollars and five years' imprisonment.  We all expected the
resolution of Senator Howard, of Michigan, virtually restoring Mr.
Stanton to his office, would pass the Senate, and knowing that the
President expected General Grant to hold on, I inquired if he had
given notice of his change of purpose; he answered that there was
no hurry, because he supposed Mr. Stanton would pursue toward him
(Grant) the same course which he (Stanton) had required of him the
preceding August, viz., would address him a letter claiming the
office, and allow him a couple of days for the change.  Still, he
said he would go to the White House the same day and notify the
President of his intended action.

That afternoon I went over to the White House to present General
Pope, who was on a visit to Washington, and we found the President
and General Grant together.  We made our visit and withdrew,
leaving them still together, and I always supposed the subject of
this conference was the expected decision of the Senate, which
would in effect restore Mr. Stanton to his civil office of
Secretary of War.  That evening I dined with the Hon. Reverdy
Johnson, Senator from Maryland, and suggested to him that the best
way to escape a conflict was for the President to nominate some
good man as Secretary of War whose confirmation by the Senate would
fall within the provisions of the law, and named General J. D. Cox,
then Governor of Ohio, whose term of office was drawing to a close,
who would, I knew, be acceptable to General Grant and the army
generally.  Mr. Johnson was most favorably impressed with this
suggestion, and promised to call on the President the next day
(Sunday), which he did, but President Johnson had made up his mind
to meet the conflict boldly.  I saw General Grant that afternoon at
his house on I Street, and told him what I had done, and so anxious
was he about it that he came to our room at the War Department the
next morning (Monday), the 13th, and asked me to go in person to
the White House to urge the President to send in the name of
General Cox.  I did so, saw the President, and inquired if he had
seen Mr. Reverdy Johnson the day before about General Cox.  He
answered that he had, and thought well of General Cox, but would
say no further.

Tuesday, January 14, 1868, came, and with it Mr. Stanton.  He
resumed possession of his former office; came into that where
General Sheridan, General Augur, and I were at work, and greeted us
very cordially.  He said he wanted to see me when at leisure, and
at half-past 10 A.M.  I went into his office and found him and
General Grant together.  Supposing they had some special matters of
business, I withdrew, with the remark that I was close at hand, and
could come in at any moment.  In the afternoon I went again into
Mr. Stanton's office, and we had a long and most friendly
conversation; but not one word was spoken about the
"tenure-of-office" matter.  I then crossed over Seventeenth Street
to the headquarters of the army, where I found General Grant, who
expressed himself as by no means pleased with the manner in which
Mr. Stanton had regained his office, saying that he had sent a
messenger for him that morning as of old, with word that "he wanted
to see him."  We then arranged to meet at his office the next
morning at half-past nine, and go together to see the President.

That morning the National Intelligencer published an article
accusing General Grant of acting in bad faith to the President, and
of having prevaricated in making his personal explanation to the
Cabinet, so that General Grant at first felt unwilling to go, but
we went.  The President received us promptly and kindly.  Being
seated, General Grant said, "Mr. President, whoever gave the facts
for the article of the Intelligencer of this morning has made some
serious mistakes."  The President: "General Grant, let me interrupt
you just there.  I have not seen the Intelligencer of this morning,
and have no knowledge of the contents of any article therein"
General Grant then went on: "Well, the idea is given there that I
have not kept faith with you.  Now, Mr. President, I remember, when
you spoke to me on this subject last summer, I did say that, like
the case of the Baltimore police commissioners, I did suppose Mr.
Stanton could not regain his office except by a process through the
courts."  To this the President assented, saying he "remembered the
reference to the case of the Baltimore commissioners," when General
Grant resumed: "I said if I changed my opinion I would give you
notice, and put things as they were before my appointment as
Secretary of War ad interim."

We then entered into a general friendly conversation, both parties
professing to be satisfied, the President claiming that he had
always been most friendly to General Grant, and the latter
insisting that he had taken the office, not for honor or profit,
but in the general interests of the army.

As we withdrew, at the very door, General Grant said, "Mr.
President, you should make some order that we of the army are not
bound to obey the orders of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War," which
the President intimated he would do.

No such "orders" were ever made; many conferences were held, and
the following letters are selected out of a great mass to show the
general feeling at the time:


1321 K STREET, WASHINGTON,
January 28,1868, Saturday.

To the President:

I neglected this morning to say that I had agreed to go down to
Annapolis to spend Sunday with Admiral Porter.  General Grant also
has to leave for Richmond on Monday morning at 6 A.M.

At a conversation with the General after our interview, wherein I
offered to go with him on Monday morning to Mr. Stanton, and to say
that it was our joint opinion be should resign, it was found
impossible by reason of his (General Grant) going to Richmond and
my going to Annapolis.  The General proposed this course: He will
call on you to-morrow, and offer to go to Mr. Stanton to say, for
the good of the Army and of the country, he ought to resign.  This
on Sunday.  On Monday I will again call on you, and, if you think
it necessary, I will do the same, viz., go to Mr. Stanton and tell
him he should resign.

If he will not, then it will be time to contrive ulterior measures.
In the mean time it so happens that no necessity exists for
precipitating matters.
Yours truly,
W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.


DEAR GENERAL: On the point of starting, I have written the above,
and will send a fair copy of it to the President.  Please retain
this, that in case of necessity I may have a copy.  The President
clearly stated to me that he relied on us in this category.

Think of the propriety of your putting in writing what you have to
say tomorrow, even if you have to put it in the form of a letter to
hand him in person, retaining a copy.  I'm afraid that acting as a
go-between for three persons, I may share the usual fate of
meddlers, at last get kinks from all.  We ought not to be involved
in politics, but for the sake of the Army we are justified in
trying at least to cut this Gordian knot, which they do not appear
to have any practicable plan to do.  In haste as usual,

W. T. SHERMAN.


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
January 29, 1888.

DEAR SHERMAN: I called on the President and Mr. Stanton to-day, but
without any effect.

I soon found that to recommend resignation to Mr. Stanton would
have no effect, unless it was to incur further his displeasure;
and, therefore, did not directly suggest it to him.  I explained to
him, however, the course I supposed he would pursue, and what I
expected to do in that case, namely, to notify the President of his
intentions, and thus leave him to violate the "Tenure-of-Office
Bill" if he chose, instead of having me do it.

I would advise that you say nothing to Mr. Stanton on the subject
unless he asks your advice.  It will do no good, and may embarrass
you.  I did not mention your name to him, at least not in
connection with his position, or what you thought upon it.

All that Mr. Johnson said was pacific and compromising.  While I
think he wanted the constitutionality of the "Tenure Bill" tested,
I think now he would be glad either to get the vacancy of Secretary
of War, or have the office just where it was during suspension.
Yours truly,

U. S.  GRANT.



WASHINGTON D. C., January 27, 1868.

To the President.

DEAR SIR: As I promised, I saw Mr. Ewing yesterday, and after a
long conversation asked him to put down his opinion in writing,
which he has done and which I now inclose.

I am now at work on these Army Regulations, and in the course of
preparation have laid down the Constitution and laws now in force,
clearer than I find them elsewhere; and beg leave herewith to
inclose you three pages of printed matter for your perusal.  My
opinion is, if you will adopt these rules and make them an
executive order to General Grant, they will so clearly define the
duties of all concerned that no conflict can arise.  I hope to get
through this task in the course of this week, and want very much to
go to St. Louis.  For eleven years I have been tossed about so much
that I really do want to rest, study, and make the acquaintance of
my family.  I do not think, since 1857, I have averaged thirty days
out of three hundred and sixty-five at home.

Next summer also, in fulfillment of our promise to the Sioux, I
must go to Fort Phil Kearney early in the spring, so that, unless I
can spend the next two months at home, I might as well break up my
house at St. Louis, and give up all prospect of taking care of my
family.

For these reasons especially I shall soon ask leave to go to St.
Louis, to resume my proper and legitimate command.  With great
respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.


[Inclosure]

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 25, 1868.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I am quite clear in the opinion that it is not
expedient for the President to take any action now in the case of
Stanton.  So far as he and his interests are concerned, things are
in the best possible condition.  Stanton is in the Department, got
his secretary, but the secretary of the Senate, who have taken upon
themselves his sins, and who place him there under a large salary
to annoy and obstruct the operations of the Executive.  This the
people well enough understand, and he is a stench in the nostrils
of their own party.

I thought the nomination of Cox at the proper juncture would have
been wise as a peace-offering, but perhaps it would have let off
the Senate too easily from the effect of their arbitrary act.  Now
the dislodging of Stanton and filling the office even temporarily
without the consent of the Senate would raise a question as to the
legality of the President's acts, and he would belong to the
attacked instead of the attacking party.  If the war between
Congress and the President is to go on, as I suppose it is, Stanton
should be ignored by the President, left to perform his clerical
duties which the law requires him to perform, and let the party
bear the odium which is already upon them for placing him where he
is.  So much for the President.


As to yourself, I wish you as far as possible to keep clear of
political complications.  I do not think the President will require
you to do an act of doubtful legality.  Certainly he will not
without sanction of the opinion of his Attorney-General; and you
should have time, in a questionable case, to consult with me before
called upon to act.  The office of Secretary of War is a civil
office, as completely so as that of Secretary of State; and you as
a military officer cannot, I think, be required to assume or
exercise it. This may, if necessary, be a subject for further
consideration.  Such, however, will not, I think, be the case.
The appeal is to the people, and it is better for the President to
persist in the course he has for some time pursued--let the
aggressions all come from the other side; and I think there is no
doubt he will do so.  Affectionately,   T. EWING.

To--Lieutenant-General SHERMAN.



LIBRARY ROOM, WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., January 31, 1868.

To the President:

Since our interview of yesterday I have given the subject of our
conversation all my thoughts, and I beg you will pardon my reducing
the same to writing.

My personal preferences, as expressed, were to be allowed to return
to St. Louis to resume my present command, because my command was
important, large, suited to my rank and inclination, and because my
family was well provided for there in house, facilities, schools,
living, and agreeable society; while, on the other hand, Washington
was for many (to me) good reasons highly objectionable, especially
because it is the political capital of the country; and focus of
intrigue, gossip, and slander.  Your personal preferences were, as
expressed, to make a new department East, adequate to my rank, with
headquarters at Washington, and assign me to its command, to remove
my family here, and to avail myself of its schools, etc.; to remove
Mr. Stanton from his office as Secretary of War, and have me to
discharge the duties.

To effect this removal two modes were indicated: to simply cause
him to quit the War-Office Building, and notify the Treasury
Department and the Army Staff Departments no longer to respect him
as Secretary of War; or to remove him and submit my name to the
Senate for confirmation.

Permit me to discuss these points a little, and I will premise by
saying that I have spoken to no one on the subject, and have not
even seen Mr. Ewing, Mr. Stanbery, or General Grant, since I was
with you.

It has been the rule and custom of our army, since the organization
of the government, that the second officer of the army should be at
the second (in importance) command, and remote from general
headquarters.  To bring me to Washington world put three heads to
an army, yourself, General Grant, and myself, and we would be more
than human if we were not to differ.  In my judgment it world ruin
the army, and would be fatal to one or two of us.

Generals Scott and Taylor proved themselves soldiers and patriots
in the field, but Washington was fatal to both.  This city, and the
influences that centre here, defeated every army that had its
headquarters here from 1861 to 1864, and would have overwhelmed
General Grant at Spottsylvania and Petersburg, had he not been
fortified by a strong reputation, already hard-earned, and because
no one then living coveted the place; whereas, in the West, we made
progress from the start, because there was no political capital
near enough to poison our minds, and kindle into life that craving,
itching for fame which has killed more good men than bullets.  I
have been with General Grant in the midst of death and slaughter
when the howls of people reached him after Shiloh; when messengers
were speeding to and from his army to Washington, bearing slanders,
to induce his removal before he took Vicksburg; in Chattanooga,
when the soldiers were stealing the corn of the starving mules to
satisfy their own hunger; at Nashville, when he was ordered to the
"forlorn hope" to command the Army of the Potomac, so often
defeated--and yet I never saw him more troubled than since he has
been in Washington, and been compelled to read himself a "sneak and
deceiver," based on reports of four of the Cabinet, and apparently
with your knowledge.  If this political atmosphere can disturb the
equanimity of one so guarded and so prudent as he is, what will be
the result with me, so careless, so outspoken as I am?  Therefore,
with my consent, Washington never.

As to the Secretary of War, his office is twofold.  As a Cabinet
officer he should not be there without your hearty, cheerful
assent, and I believe that is the judgment and opinion of every
fair-minded man.  As the holder of a civil office, having the
supervision of moneys appropriated by Congress and of contracts for
army supplies, I do think Congress, or the Senate by delegation
from Congress, has a lawful right to be consulted.  At all events,
I would not risk a suit or contest on that phase of the question.
The law of Congress, of March 2, 1867, prescribing the manner in
which orders and instructions relating to "military movements"
shall reach the army, gives you as constitutional Commander-in-
Chief the very power you want to exercise, and enables you to
prevent the Secretary from making any such orders and instructions;
and consequently he cannot control the army, but is limited and
restricted to a duty that an Auditor of the Treasury could perform.
You certainly can afford to await the result.  The Executive power
is not weakened, but rather strengthened.  Surely he is not such an
obstruction as would warrant violence, or even s show of force,
which would produce the very reaction and clamor that he hopes for
to save him from the absurdity of holding an empty office "for the
safety of the country."

This is so much as I ought to say, and more too, but if it produces
the result I will be more than satisfied, viz., that I be simply
allowed to resume my proper post and duties in St. Louis.  With
great respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



On the 1st of February, the board of which I was the president
submitted to the adjutant-general our draft of the "Articles of War
and Army Regulations," condensed to a small compass, the result of
our war experience.  But they did not suit the powers that were,
and have ever since slept the sleep that knows no waking, to make
room for the ponderous document now in vogue, which will not stand
the strain of a week's campaign in real war.

I hurried back to St. Louis to escape the political storm I saw
brewing.  The President repeatedly said to me that he wanted me in
Washington, and I as often answered that nothing could tempt me to
live in that center of intrigue and excitement; but soon came the
following:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, February 10, 1868.

DEAR GENERAL: I have received at last the President's reply to my
last, letter.  He attempts to substantiate his statements by his
Cabinet.  In this view it is important that I should have a letter
from you, if you are willing to give it, of what I said to you
about the effect of the "Tenure-of-Office Bill," and my object in
going to see the President on Saturday before the installment of
Mr. Stanton.  What occurred after the meeting of the Cabinet on the
Tuesday following is not a subject under controversy now;
therefore, if you choose to write down your recollection (and I
would like to have it) on Wednesday, when you and I called on the
President, and your conversation with him the last time you saw
him, make that a separate communication.

Your order to come East was received several days ago, but the
President withdrew it, I supposed to make some alteration, but it
has not been returned.
Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT.



[TELEGRAM.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 18, 1868.

Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis.

The order is issued ordering you to Atlantic Division.

U. S. GRANT, General.



[TELEGRAM]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, February 14, 1868.

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C.

Your dispatch is received informing me that the order for the
Atlantic Division has been issued, and that I am assigned to its
command.  I was in hopes I had escaped the danger, and now were I
prepared I should resign on the spot, as it requires no foresight
to predict such must be the inevitable result in the end.  I will
make one more desperate effort by mail, which please await.

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



[TELEGRAM.]

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1868.
Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis.

I think it due to you that your letter of January 31st to the
President of the United States should be published, to correct
misapprehension in the public mind about your willingness to come
to Washington.  It will not be published against your will.

(Sent in cipher.)



[TELEGRAM.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868.

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C.

Dispatch of to-day received.  Please await a letter I address this
day through you to the President, which will in due time reach the
public, covering the very point you make.

I don't want to come to Washington at all.

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



[TELEGRAM.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Loins, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868.

Hon. John SHERMAN, United States Senate, Washington, D.  C.

Oppose confirmation of myself as brevet general, on ground that it
is unprecedented, and that it is better not to extend the system of
brevets above major-general.  If I can't avoid coming to
Washington, I may have to resign.

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., February 12, 1868.

The following orders are published for the information and guidance
of all concerned:

U. S. GRANT, General.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C., February 12, 1868.

GENERAL: You will please issue an order creating a military
division to be styled the Military Division of the Atlantic, to be
composed of the Department of the Lakes, the Department of the
East, and the Department of Washington, to be commanded by
Lieutenant-General W. T. Sherman, with his headquarters at
Washington.  Until further orders from the President, you will
assign no officer to the permanent command of the Military Division
of the Missouri.

Respectfully yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.


GENERAL U. S. GRANT,
Commanding Armies of The United States, Washington, D. C.

Major-General P. H. Sheridan, the senior officer in the Military
Division of the Missouri, will temporarily perform the duties of
commander of the Military Division of the Missouri in addition to
his duties of department commander.  By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.



This order, if carried into effect, would have grouped in
Washington:

1.  The President, constitutional Commander-in-Chief.

2.  The Secretary of War, congressional Commander-in-Chief.

3.  The General of the Armies of the United States.

4.  The Lieutenant-General of the Army.

5.  The Commanding General of the Department of Washington.

6.  The commander of the post-of Washington.

At that date the garrison of Washington was a brigade of infantry
and a battery of artillery.  I never doubted Mr. Johnson's
sincerity in wishing to befriend me, but this was the broadest kind
of a farce, or meant mischief.  I therefore appealed to him by
letter to allow me to remain where I was, and where I could do
service, real service, and received his most satisfactory answer.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868.

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL: Last evening, just before leaving my office, I
received your note of the 10th, and had intended answering it
according to your request; but, after I got home, I got your
dispatch of yesterday, announcing that the order I dreaded so much
was issued.  I never felt so troubled in my life.  Were it an order
to go to Sitka, to the devil, to battle with rebels or Indians, I
think you would not hear a whimper from me, but it comes in such a
questionable form that, like Hamlet's ghost, it curdles my blood
and mars my judgment.  My first thoughts were of resignation, and I
had almost made up my mind to ask Dodge for some place on the
Pacific road, or on one of the Iowa roads, and then again various
colleges ran through my memory, but hard times and an expensive
family have brought me back to staring the proposition square in
the face, and I have just written a letter to the President, which
I herewith transmit through you, on which I will hang a hope of
respite till you telegraph me its effect.  The uncertainties ahead
are too great to warrant my incurring the expense of breaking up my
house and family here, and therefore in no event will I do this
till I can be assured of some permanence elsewhere.  If it were at
all certain that you would accept the nomination of President in
May, I would try and kill the intervening time, and then judge of
the chances, but I do not want you to reveal your plans to me till
you choose to do so.

I have telegraphed to John Sherman to oppose the nomination which
the papers announce has been made of me for brevet general.

I have this minute received your cipher dispatch of to-day, which I
have just answered and sent down to the telegraph-office, and the
clerk is just engaged in copying my letter to the President to go
with this.  If the President or his friends pretend that I seek to
go to Washington, it will be fully rebutted by letters I have
written to the President, to you, to John Sherman, to Mr. Ewing,
and to Mr. Stanbery.  You remember that in our last talk you
suggested I should write again to the President.  I thought of it,
and concluded my letter of January 31st, already delivered, was
full and emphatic.  Still, I did write again to Mr. Stanbery,
asking him as a friend to interpose in my behalf.  There are plenty
of people who know my wishes, and I would avoid, if possible, the
publication of a letter so confidential as that of January 31st, in
which I notice I allude to the President's purpose of removing Mr.
Stanton by force, a fact that ought not to be drawn out through me
if it be possible to avoid it.  In the letter herewith I confine
myself to purely private matters, and will not object if it reaches
the public in any proper way.  My opinion is, the President thinks
Mrs. Sherman would like to come to Washington by reason of her
father and brothers being there.  This is true, for Mrs. Sherman
has an idea that St. Louis is unhealthy for our children, and
because most of the Catholics here are tainted with the old secesh
feeling.  But I know better what is to our common interest, and
prefer to judge of the proprieties myself.  What I do object to is
the false position I would occupy as between you and the President.
Were there an actual army at or near Washington, I could be
withdrawn from the most unpleasant attitude of a "go-between," but
there is no army there, nor any military duties which you with a
host of subordinates can not perform.  Therefore I would be there
with naked, informal, and sinecure duties, and utterly out of
place.  This you understand well enough, and the army too, but the
President and the politicians, who flatter themselves they are
saving the country, cannot and will not understand.  My opinion is,
the country is doctored to death, and if President and Congress
would go to sleep like Rip Van Winkle, the country would go on
under natural influences, and recover far faster than under their
joint and several treatment.  This doctrine would be accounted by
Congress, and by the President too, as high treason, and therefore
I don't care about saying so to either of them, but I know you can
hear anything, and give it just what thought or action it merits.

Excuse this long letter, and telegraph me the result of my letter
to the President as early as you can.  If he holds my letter so
long as to make it improper for me to await his answer, also
telegraph me.

The order, when received, will, I suppose, direct me as to whom and
how I am to turn over this command, which should, in my judgment,
not be broken up, as the three departments composing the division
should be under one head.

I expect my staff-officers to be making for me within the hour to
learn their fate, so advise me all you can as quick as possible.

With great respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



To the President.

DEAR SIR: It is hard for me to conceive you would purposely do me
an unkindness unless under the pressure of a sense of public duty,
or because you do not believe me sincere.  I was in hopes, since my
letter to you of the 31st of January, that you had concluded to
pass over that purpose of yours expressed more than once in
conversation--to organize a new command for me in the East, with
headquarters in Washington; but a telegram from General Grant of
yesterday says that "the order was issued ordering you" (me) "to
Atlantic Division"; and the newspapers of this morning contain the
same information, with the addition that I have been nominated as
brevet general.  I have telegraphed my own brother in the Senate to
oppose my confirmation, on the ground that the two higher grades in
the army ought not to be complicated with brevets, and I trust you
will conceive my motives aright.  If I could see my way clear to
maintain my family, I should not hesitate a moment to resign my
present commission, and seek some business wherein I would be free
from these unhappy complications that seem to be closing about me,
spite of my earnest efforts to avoid them; but necessity ties my
hands, and I must submit with the best grace I can till I make
other arrangements.

In Washington are already the headquarters of a department, and of
the army itself, and it is hard for me to see wherein I can render
military service there.  Any staff-officer with the rank of major
could surely fill any gap left between these two military officers;
and, by being placed in Washington, I will be universally construed
as a rival to the General-in-Chief, a position damaging to me in
the highest degree.  Our relations have always been most
confidential and friendly, and if, unhappily, any cloud of
differences should arise between us, my sense of personal dignity
and duty would leave me no alternative but resignation.  For this I
am not yet prepared, but I shall proceed to arrange for it as
rapidly as possible, so that when the time does come (as it surely
will if this plan is carried into effect) I may act promptly.

Inasmuch as the order is now issued, I cannot expect a full
revocation of it, but I beg the privilege of taking post at New
York, or any point you may name within the new military division
other than Washington.  This privilege is generally granted to all
military commanders, and I see no good reason why I too may not ask
for it, and this simple concession, involving no public interest,
will much soften the blow, which, right or wrong, I construe as one
of the hardest I have sustained in a life somewhat checkered with
adversity.  With great respects yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



WASHINGTON, D. C., 2 p.m., February 19, 1888.
Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri:

I have just received, with General Grant's indorsement of
reference, your letter to me of the fourteenth (14th) inst.

The order to which you refer was made in good faith, and with a
view to the best interests of the country and the service; as,
however, your assignment to a new military division seems so
objectionable, you will retain your present command.

ANDREW JOHNSON.


On that same 19th of February he appointed Adjutant, General
Lorenzo Thomas to be Secretary of War ad interim, which finally
resulted in the articles of impeachment and trial of President
Johnson before the Senate.  I was a witness on that trial, but of
course the lawyers would not allow me to express any opinion of the
President's motives or intentions, and restricted me to the facts
set forth in the articles of impeachment, of which I was glad to
know nothing.  The final test vote revealed less than two thirds,
and the President was consequently acquitted.  Mr. Stanton
resigned.  General Schofield, previously nominated, was confirmed
as Secretary of War, thus putting an end to what ought never to
have happened at all.



INDIAN PEACE COMMISSION.

On the 20th of July, 1867, President Johnson approved an act to
establish peace with certain hostile Indian tribes, the first
section of which reads as follows: "Be it enacted, etc., that the
President of the United States be and is hereby authorized to
appoint a commission to consist of three (3) officers of the army
not below the rank of brigadier-general, who, together with N. G.
Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John B.  Henderson,
chairman of the Committee of Indian Affairs of the Senate, S. F.
Tappan, and John B.  Sanborn, shall have power and authority to
call together the chiefs and head men of such bands or tribes of
Indians as are now waging war against the United States, or
committing depredations on the people thereof, to ascertain the
alleged reasons for their acts of hostility, and in their
discretion, under the direction of the President, to make and
conclude with said bands or tribes such treaty stipulations,
subject to the action of the Senate, as may remove all just causes
of complaint on their part, and at the same time establish security
for person and property along the lines of railroad now being
constructed to the Pacific and other thoroughfares of travel to the
Western Territories, and such as will most likely insure
civilization for the Indians, and peace and safety for the whites."

The President named as the military members Lieutenant-General
Sherman, Brigadier-Generals A. H. Terry and W. S. Harney.
Subsequently, to insure a full attendance, Brigadier-General C. C.
Augur was added to the commission, and his name will be found on
most of the treaties.  The commissioners met at St. Louis and
elected N. G. Taylor, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
president; J. B. Sanborn, treasurer; and A. S. H. White, Esq., of
Washington, D. C., secretary.  The year 1867 was too far advanced
to complete the task assigned during that season, and it was agreed
that a steamboat (St. John's) should be chartered to convey the
commission up the Missouri River, and we adjourned to meet at
Omaha.  In the St. John's the commission proceeded up the Missouri
River, holding informal "talks" with the Santees at their agency
near the Niobrara, the Yanktonnais at Fort Thompson, and the
Ogallallas, Minneconjous, Sans Arcs, etc., at Fort Sully.  From
this point runners were sent out to the Sioux occupying the country
west of the Missouri River, to meet us in council at the Forks of
the Platte that fall, and to Sitting Bull's band of outlaw Sioux,
and the Crows on the upper Yellowstone, to meet us in May, 1868, at
Fort Laramie.  We proceeded up the river to the mouth of the
Cheyenne and turned back to Omaha, having ample time on this
steamboat to discuss and deliberate on the problems submitted to
our charge.

We all agreed that the nomad Indians should be removed from the
vicinity of the two great railroads then in rapid construction, and
be localized on one or other of the two great reservations south of
Kansas and north of Nebraska; that agreements not treaties, should
be made for their liberal maintenance as to food, clothing,
schools, and farming implements for ten years, during which time we
believed that these Indians should become self-supporting.  To the
north we proposed to remove the various bands of Sioux, with such
others as could be induced to locate near them; and to the south,
on the Indian Territory already established, we proposed to remove
the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches, and such others as we
could prevail on to move thither.

At that date the Union Pacific construction had reached the Rocky
Mountains at Cheyenne, and the Kansas Pacific to about Fort
Wallace.  We held council with the Ogallallas at the Forks of the
Platte, and arranged to meet them all the next spring, 1868.  In
the spring of 1868 we met the Crows in council at Fort Laramie, the
Sioux at the North Platte, the Shoshones or Snakes at Fort Hall,
the Navajos at Fort Sumner, on the Pecos, and the Cheyennes and
Arapahoes at Medicine Lodge.  To accomplish these results the
commission divided up into committees, General Augur going to the
Shoshones, Mr. Tappan and I to the Navajos, and the remainder to
Medicine Lodge.  In that year we made treaties or arrangements with
all the tribes which before had followed the buffalo in their
annual migrations, and which brought them into constant conflict
with the whites.

Mr. Tappan and I found it impossible to prevail on the Navajos to
remove to the Indian Territory, and had to consent to their return
to their former home, restricted to a limited reservation west of
Santa Fe, about old Fort Defiance, and there they continue unto
this day, rich in the possession of herds of sheep and goats, with
some cattle and horses; and they have remained at peace ever since.

A part of our general plan was to organize the two great
reservations into regular Territorial governments, with Governor,
Council, courts, and civil officers.  General Harney was
temporarily assigned to that of the Sioux at the north, and General
Hazen to that of the Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, etc.,
etc., at the south, but the patronage of the Indian Bureau was too
strong for us, and that part of our labor failed.  Still, the
Indian Peace Commission of 1867-'68 did prepare the way for the
great Pacific Railroads, which, for better or worse, have settled
the fate of the buffalo and Indian forever.  There have been wars
and conflicts since with these Indians up to a recent period too
numerous and complicated in their detail for me to unravel and
record, but they have been the dying struggles of a singular race
of brave men fighting against destiny, each less and less violent,
till now the wild game is gone, the whites too numerous and
powerful; so that the Indian question has become one of sentiment
and charity, but not of war.

The peace, or "Quaker" policy, of which so much has been said,
originated about thus: By the act of Congress, approved March
3,1869, the forty-five regiments of infantry were reduced to
twenty-five, and provision was made for the "muster out" of many of
the surplus officers, and for retaining others to be absorbed by
the usual promotions and casualties.  On the 7th of May of that
year, by authority of an act of Congress approved June 30, 1834,
nine field-officers and fifty-nine captains and subalterns were
detached and ordered to report to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, to serve as Indian superintendents and agents.  Thus by an
old law surplus army officers were made to displace the usual civil
appointees, undoubtedly a change for the better, but most
distasteful to members of Congress, who looked to these
appointments as part of their proper patronage.  The consequence
was the law of July 15, 1870, which vacated the military commission
of any officer who accepted or exercised the functions of a civil
officer.  I was then told that certain politicians called on
President Grant, informing him that this law was chiefly designed
to prevent his using army officers for Indian agents, "civil
offices," which he believed to be both judicious and wise; army
officers, as a rule, being better qualified to deal with Indians
than the average political appointees.  The President then quietly
replied: "Gentlemen, you have defeated my plan of Indian
management; but you shall not succeed in your purpose, for I will
divide these appointments up among the religious churches, with
which you dare not contend."  The army officers were consequently
relieved of their "civil offices," and the Indian agencies were
apportioned to the several religious churches in about the
proportion of their--supposed strength--some to the Quakers, some
to the Methodists, to the Catholics, Episcopalians, Presbyterians,
etc., etc.--and thus it remains to the present time, these
religious communities selecting the agents to be appointed by the
Secretary of the Interior.  The Quakers, being first named, gave
name to the policy, and it is called the "Quaker" policy to-day.
Meantime railroads and settlements by hardy, bold pioneers have
made the character of Indian agents of small concern, and it
matters little who are the beneficiaries.

As was clearly foreseen, General U. S. Grant was duly nominated,
and on the 7th of November, 1868, was elected President of the
United States for the four years beginning with March 4, 1869.

On the 15th and 16th of December, 1868, the four societies of the
Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, Ohio, and Georgia, held a
joint reunion at Chicago, at which were present over two thousand
of the surviving officers and soldiers of the war.  The ceremonies
consisted of the joint meeting in Crosby's magnificent opera-house,
at which General George H. Thomas presided.  General W. W. Belknap
was the orator for the Army of the Tennessee, General Charles Cruft
for the Army of the Cumberland, General J. D. Cox for the Army of
the Ohio, and General William Cogswell for the Army of Georgia.
The banquet was held in the vast Chamber of Commerce, at which I
presided.  General Grant, President-elect, General J. M. Schofield,
Secretary of War, General H. W. Slocum, and nearly every general
officer of note was present except General Sheridan, who at the
moment was fighting the Cheyennes in Southern Kansas and the Indian
country.

At that time we discussed the army changes which would necessarily
occur in the following March, and it was generally understood that
I was to succeed General Grant as general-in-chief, but as to my
successor, Meade, Thomas, and Sheridan were candidates.  And here I
will remark that General Grant, afterward famous as the "silent
man," used to be very gossipy, and no one was ever more fond than
he of telling anecdotes of our West Point and early army life.  At
the Chicago reunion he told me that I would have to come to
Washington, that he wanted me to effect a change as to the general
staff, which he had long contemplated, and which was outlined in
his letter to Mr. Stanton of January 29,1866, given hereafter,
which had been repeatedly published, and was well known to the
military world; that on being inaugurated President on the 4th of
March he would retain General Schofield as his Secretary of War
until the change had become habitual; that the modern custom of the
Secretary of War giving military orders to the adjutant-general and
other staff officers was positively wrong and should be stopped.
Speaking of General Grant's personal characteristics at that period
of his life, I recall a conversation in his carriage, when, riding
down Pennsylvania Avenue, he, inquired of me in a humorous way,
"Sherman, what special hobby do you intend to adopt?"  I inquired
what he meant, and he explained that all men had their special
weakness or vanity, and that it was wiser to choose one's own than
to leave the newspapers to affix one less acceptable, and that for
his part he had chosen the "horse," so that when anyone tried to
pump him he would turn the conversation to his "horse."  I answered
that I would stick to the "theatre and balls," for I was always
fond of seeing young people happy, and did actually acquire a
reputation for "dancing," though I had not attempted the waltz, or
anything more than the ordinary cotillon, since the war.

On the 24th of February, 1869, I was summoned to Washington,
arriving on the 26th, taking along my aides, Lieutenant-Colonels
Dayton and Audenried.

On the 4th of March General Grant was duly inaugurated President of
the United States, and I was nominated and confirmed as General of
the Army.

Major-General P. H. Sheridan was at the same time nominated and
confirmed as lieutenant-general, with orders to command the
Military Division of the Missouri, which he did, moving the
headquarters from St. Louis to Chicago; and General Meade was
assigned to command the Military Division of the Atlantic, with
headquarters at Philadelphia.

At that moment General Meade was in Atlanta, Georgia, commanding
the Third Military District under the "Reconstruction Act;" and
General Thomas, whose post was in Nashville, was in Washington on a
court of inquiry investigating certain allegations against General
A. B. Dyer, Chief of Ordnance.  He occupied the room of the second
floor in the building on the corner of H and Fifteenth Streets,
since become Wormley's Hotel.  I at the time was staying with my
brother, Senator Sherman, at his residence, 1321 K Street, and it
was my habit each morning to stop at Thomas's room on my way to the
office in the War Department to tell him the military news, and to
talk over matters of common interest.  We had been intimately
associated as "man and boy" for thirty-odd years, and I profess to
have had better opportunities to know him than any man then living.
His fame as the "Rock of Chickamauga" was perfect, and by the world
at large he was considered as the embodiment of strength, calmness,
and imperturbability.  Yet of all my acquaintances Thomas worried
and fretted over what he construed neglects or acts of favoritism
more than any other.

At that time he was much worried by what he supposed was injustice
in the promotion of General Sheridan, and still more that General
Meade should have an Eastern station, which compelled him to remain
at Nashville or go to the Pacific.  General Thomas claimed that all
his life he had been stationed in the South or remote West, and had
not had a fair share of Eastern posts, whereas that General Meade
had always been there.  I tried to get him to go with me to see
President Grant and talk the matter over frankly, but he would not,
and I had to act as a friendly mediator.  General Grant assured me
at the time that he not only admired and respected General Thomas,
but actually loved him as a man, and he authorized me in making up
commands for the general officers to do anything and everything to
favor him, only he could not recede from his former action in
respect to Generals Sheridan and Meade.

Prior to General Grant's inauguration the army register showed as
major-generals Halleck, Meade, Sheridan, Thomas, and Hancock.
Therefore, the promotion of General Sheridan to be lieutenant-
general did not "overslaugh" Thomas, but it did Meade and Halleck.
The latter did not expect promotion; General Meade did, but was
partially, not wholly, reconciled by being stationed at
Philadelphia, the home of his family; and President Grant assured
me that he knew of his own knowledge that General Sheridan had been
nominated major-general before General Meade, but had waived dates
out of respect for his age and longer service, and that he had
nominated him as lieutenant-general by reason of his special
fitness to command the Military Division of the Missouri, embracing
all the wild Indians, at that very moment in a state of hostility.
I gave General Thomas the choice of every other command in the
army, and of his own choice he went to San Francisco, California,
where he died, March 28, 1870.  The truth is, Congress should have
provided by law for three lieutenant-generals for these three
pre-eminent soldiers, and should have dated their commissions with
"Gettysburg," "Winchester," and "Nashville."  It would have been a
graceful act, and might have prolonged the lives of two most
popular officers, who died soon after, feeling that they had
experienced ingratitude and neglect.

Soon after General Grant's inauguration as President, and, as I
supposed, in fulfilment of his plan divulged in Chicago the
previous December, were made the following:


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, March 8, 1869.

General Orders No. 11:

The following orders of the President of the United States are
published for the information and government of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON CITY, March 5, 1869.

By direction of the President, General William T. Sherman will
assume command of the Army of the United States.

The chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus will report to
and act under the immediate orders of the general commanding the
army.

Any official business which by law or regulation requires the
action of the President or Secretary of War will be submitted by
the General of the Army to the Secretary of War, and in general all
orders from the President or Secretary of War to any portion of the
army, line or staff, will be transmitted through the General of the
Army.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Secretary of War.

By command of the General of the Army.

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.


On the same day I issued my General Orders No. 12, assuming command
and naming all the heads of staff departments and bureaus as
members of my staff, adding to my then three aides, Colonels McCoy,
Dayton, and Audenried, the names of Colonels Comstock, Horace
Porter, and Dent, agreeing with President Grant that the two latter
could remain with him till I should need their personal services or
ask their resignations.

I was soon made aware that the heads of several of the staff corps
were restive under this new order of things, for by long usage they
had grown to believe themselves not officers of the army in a
technical sense, but a part of the War Department, the civil branch
of the Government which connects the army with the President and
Congress.

In a short time General John A. Rawlins, General Grant's former
chief of staff, was nominated and confirmed as Secretary of War;
and soon appeared this order:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, March 27, 1869.

General Orders No.  28:

The following orders received for the War Department are published
for the government of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON CITY, March 26, 1869.

By direction of the President, the order of the Secretary of War,
dated War Department, March 5, 1869, and published in General
Orders No. 11, headquarters of the army, Adjutant-General's Office,
dated March 8, 1869, except so much as directs General W. T.
Sherman to assume command of the Army of the United States, is
hereby rescinded.

All official business which by law or regulations requires the
action of the President or Secretary of War will be submitted by
the chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus to the
Secretary of War.

All orders and instructions relating to military operations issued
by the President or Secretary of War will be issued through the
General of the Army.

JOHN A.  RAWLINS, Secretary of War.

By command of General SHERMAN:

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.


Thus we were thrown back on the old method in having a double--if
not a treble-headed machine.  Each head of a bureau in daily
consultation with the Secretary of War, and the general to command
without an adjutant, quartermaster, commissary, or any staff except
his own aides, often reading in the newspapers of military events
and orders before he could be consulted or informed.  This was the
very reverse of what General Grant, after four years' experience in
Washington as general-in-chief, seemed to want, different from what
he had explained to me in Chicago, and totally different from the
demand he had made on Secretary of War Stanton in his complete
letter of January 29, 1866.  I went to him to know the cause: He
said he had been informed by members of Congress that his action,
as defined by his order of March 5th, was regarded as a violation
of laws making provision for the bureaus of the War Department;
that he had repealed his own orders, but not mine, and that he had
no doubt that General Rawlins and I could draw the line of
separation satisfactorily to us both.  General Rawlins was very
conscientious, but a very sick man when appointed Secretary of War.
Several times he made orders through the adjutant-general to
individuals of the army without notifying me, but always when his
attention was called to it he apologized, and repeatedly said to me
that he understood from his experience on General Grant's staff how
almost insulting it was for orders to go to individuals of a
regiment, brigade, division, or an army of any kind without the
commanding officer being consulted or even advised.  This habit is
more common at Washington than any place on earth, unless it be in
London, where nearly the same condition of facts exists.  Members
of Congress daily appeal to the Secretary of War for the discharge
of some soldier on the application of a mother, or some young
officer has to be dry-nursed, withdrawn from his company on the
plains to be stationed near home.  The Secretary of War, sometimes
moved by private reasons, or more likely to oblige the member of
Congress, grants the order, of which the commanding general knows
nothing till he reads it in the newspapers.  Also, an Indian tribe,
goaded by the pressure of white neighbors, breaks out in revolt.
The general-in-chief must reenforce the local garrisons not only
with men, but horses, wagons, ammunition, and food.  All the
necessary information is in the staff bureaus in Washington, but
the general has no right to call for it, and generally finds it
more practicable to ask by telegraph of the distant division or
department commanders for the information before making the formal
orders.  The general in actual command of the army should have a
full staff, subject to his own command.  If not, he cannot be held
responsible for results.

General Rawlins sank away visibly, rapidly, and died in Washington,
September 6,1869, and I was appointed to perform the duties of his
office till a successor could be selected.  I realized how much
easier and better it was to have both offices conjoined.

The army then had one constitutional commander-in-chief of both
army and navy, and one actual commanding general, bringing all
parts into real harmony.  An army to be useful must be a unit, and
out of this has grown the saying, attributed to Napoleon, but
doubtless spoken before the days of Alexander, that an army with an
inefficient commander was better than one with two able heads.  Our
political system and methods, however, demanded a separate
Secretary of War, and in October President Grant asked me to scan
the list of the volunteer generals of good record who had served in
the civil war, preferably from the "West."  I did so, and submitted
to him in writing the names of W. W. Belknap, of Iowa; G.  M.
Dodge, the Chief Engineer of the Union Pacific Railroad; and Lucius
Fairchild, of Madison, Wisconsin.  I also named General John W.
Sprague, then employed by the Northern Pacific Railroad in
Washington Territory.  General Grant knew them all personally, and
said if General Dodge were not connected with the Union Pacific
Railroad, with which the Secretary of War must necessarily have
large transactions, he would choose him, but as the case stood, and
remembering the very excellent speech made by General Belknap at
the Chicago reunion of December, 1868, he authorized me to
communicate with him to ascertain if he were willing to come to
Washington as Secretary of War.  General Belknap was then the
collector of internal revenue at Keokuk, Iowa.  I telegraphed him
and received a prompt and favorable answer.  His name was sent to
the Senate, promptly confirmed, and he entered on his duties
October 25,1869.  General Belknap surely had at that date as fair a
fame as any officer of volunteers of my personal acquaintance.  He
took up the business where it was left off, and gradually fell into
the current which led to the command of the army itself as of the
legal and financial matters which properly pertain to the War
Department.  Orders granting leaves of absence to officers,
transfers, discharges of soldiers for favor, and all the old
abuses, which had embittered the life of General Scott in the days
of Secretaries of War Marcy and Davis, were renewed.  I called his
attention to these facts, but without sensible effect.  My office
was under his in the old War Department, and one day I sent my
aide-de-camp, Colonel Audenried, up to him with some message, and
when he returned red as a beet, very much agitated, he asked me as
a personal favor never again to send him to General Belknap.  I
inquired his reason, and he explained that he had been treated with
a rudeness and discourtesy he had never seen displayed by any
officer to a soldier.  Colonel Audenried was one of the most
polished gentlemen in the army, noted for his personal bearing and
deportment, and I had some trouble to impress on him the patience
necessary for the occasion, but I promised on future occasions to
send some other or go myself.  Things went on from bad to worse,
till in 1870 I received from Mr. Hugh Campbell, of St. Louis, a
personal friend and an honorable gentleman, a telegraphic message
complaining that I had removed from his position Mr. Ward, post
trader at Fort Laramie, with only a month in which to dispose of
his large stock of goods, to make room for his successor.

It so happened that we of the Indian Peace Commission had been much
indebted to this same trader, Ward, for advances of flour, sugar,
and coffee, to provide for the Crow Indians, who had come down from
their reservation on the Yellowstone to meet us in 1868, before our
own supplies had been received.  For a time I could not-comprehend
the nature of Mr. Campbell's complaint, so I telegraphed to the
department commander, General C. C. Augur, at Omaha, to know if any
such occurrence had happened, and the reasons therefor.  I received
a prompt answer that it was substantially true, and had been
ordered by The Secretary of War.  It so happened that during
General Grant's command of the army Congress had given to the
general of the army the appointment of "post-traders."  He had
naturally devolved it on the subordinate division and department
commanders, but the legal power remained with the general of the
army.  I went up to the Secretary of War, showed him the
telegraphic correspondence, and pointed out the existing law in the
Revised Statutes.  General Belknap was visibly taken aback, and
explained that he had supposed the right of appointment rested with
him, that Ward was an old rebel Democrat, etc.; whereas Ward had
been in fact the sutler of Fort Laramie, a United States military
post, throughout the civil war.  I told him that I should revoke
his orders, and leave the matter where it belonged, to the local
council of administration and commanding officers.  Ward was
unanimously reelected and reinstated.  He remained the trader of
the post until Congress repealed the law, and gave back the power
of appointment to the Secretary of War, when of course he had to
go.  But meantime he was able to make the necessary business
arrangements which saved him and his partners the sacrifice which
would have been necessary in the first instance.  I never had any
knowledge whatever of General Belknap's transactions with the
traders at Fort Sill and Fort Lincoln which resulted in his
downfall.  I have never sought to ascertain his motives for
breaking with me, because he knew I had always befriended him while
under my military command, and in securing him his office of
Secretary of War.  I spoke frequently to President Grant of the
growing tendency of his Secretary of War to usurp all the powers of
the commanding general, which would surely result in driving me
away.  He as frequently promised to bring us together to agree upon
a just line of separation of our respective offices, but never did.

Determined to bring the matter to an issue, I wrote the following
letter:


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE  UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 17, 1870.

General W. W. BELKNAP, Secretary of War.

GENERAL: I must urgently and respectfully invite your attention
when at leisure to a matter of deep interest to future commanding
generals of the army more than to myself, of the imperative
necessity of fixing and clearly defining the limits of the powers
and duties of the general of the army or of whomsoever may succeed
to the place of commander-in-chief.

The case is well stated by General Grant in his letter of January
29, 1866, to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, hereto appended,
and though I find no official answer recorded, I remember that
General Grant told me that the Secretary of War had promptly
assured him in conversation that he fully approved of his views as
expressed in this letter.

At that time the subject was much discussed, and soon after
Congress enacted the bill reviving the grade of general, which bill
was approved July 25, 1866, and provided that the general, when
commissioned, may be authorized under the direction and during the
pleasure of the President to command the armies of the United
States; and a few days after, viz., July 28, 1866, was enacted the
law which defined the military peace establishment.  The enacting
clause reads: "That the military peace establishment of the United
States shall hereafter consist of five regiments of artillery, ten
regiments of cavalry, forty-five regiments of infantry, the
professors and Corps of Cadets of the United States Military
Academy, and such other forces as shall be provided for by this
act, to be known as the army of the United States."

The act then recites in great detail all the parts of the army,
making no distinction between the line and staff, but clearly makes
each and every part an element of the whole.

Section 37 provides for a board to revise the army regulations and
report; and declares that the regulations then in force, viz.,
those of 1863, should remain until Congress "shall act on said
report;" and section 38 and last enacts that all laws and parts of
laws inconsistent with the provisions of this act be and the same
are hereby repealed.

Under the provisions of this law my predecessor, General Grant, did
not hesitate to command and make orders to all parts of the army,
the Military Academy, and staff, and it was under his advice that
the new regulations were compiled in 1868 that drew the line more
clearly between the high and responsible duties of the Secretary of
War and the general of the army.  He assured me many a time before
I was called here to succeed him that he wanted me to perfect the
distinction, and it was by his express orders that on assuming the
command of the army I specifically placed the heads of the staff
corps here in Washington in the exact relation to the army which
they would bear to an army in the field.

I am aware that subsequently, in his orders of March 26th, he
modified his former orders of March 5th, but only as to the heads
of bureaus in Washington, who have, he told me, certain functions
of office imposed on them by special laws of Congress, which laws,
of course, override all orders and regulations, but I did not
either understand from him in person, or from General Rawlins, at
whose instance this order was made, that it was designed in any way
to modify, alter, or change his purposes that division and
department commanders, as well as the general of the army, should
exercise the same command of the staff as they did of the line of
the army.

I need not remind the Secretary that orders and reports are made to
and from the Military Academy which the general does not even see,
though the Military Academy is specifically named as a part of that
army which he is required to command.  Leaves of absence are
granted, the stations of officers are changed, and other orders are
now made directly to the army, not through the general, but direct
through other officials and the adjutant-general.

So long as this is the case I surely do not command the army of the
United States, and am not responsible for it.

I am aware that the confusion results from the fact that the
thirty-seventh section of the act of July 28, 1866, clothes the
army regulations of 1863 with the sanction of law, but the next
section repeals all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with the
provisions of this act.  The regulations of 1863 are but a
compilation of orders made prior to the war, when such men as Davis
and Floyd took pleasure in stripping General Scott of even the
semblance of power, and purposely reduced him to a cipher in the
command of the army.

Not one word can be found in those regulations speaking of the
duties of the lieutenant-general commanding the army, or defining a
single act of authority rightfully devolving on him.  Not a single
mention is made of the rights and duties of a commander-in-chief of
the army.  He is ignored, and purposely, too, as a part of the
programme resulting in the rebellion, that the army without a
legitimate head should pass into the anarchy which these men were
shaping for the whole country.

I invite your attention to the army regulations of 1847, when our
best soldiers lived, among whom was your own father, and see
paragraphs 48 and 49, page 8, and they are so important that I
quote them entire:

"48.  The military establishment is placed under the orders of the
major-general commanding in chief in all that regards its
discipline and military control.  Its fiscal arrangements properly
belong to the administrative departments of the staff and to the
Treasury Department under the direction of the Secretary of War.

"49.  The general of the army will watch over the economy of the
service in all that relates to the expenditure of money, supply of
arms, ordnance and ordnance stores, clothing, equipments,
camp-equipage, medical and hospital stores, barracks, quarters,
transportation, Military Academy, pay, and subsistence: in short,
everything which enters into the expenses of the military
establishment, whether personal or material.  He will also see that
the estimates for the military service are based on proper data,
and made for the objects contemplated by law, and necessary to the
due support and useful employment of the army.  In carrying into
effect these important duties, he will call to his counsel and
assistance the staff, and those officers proper, in his opinion, to
be employed in verifying and inspecting all the objects which may
require attention.  The rules and regulations established for the
government of the army, and the laws relating to the military
establishment, are the guides to the commanding general in the
performance of his duties."

Why was this, or why was all mention of any field of duty for the
head of the army left out of the army regulations?  Simply because
Jefferson Davis had a purpose, and absorbed to himself, as
Secretary of War, as General Grant well says, all the powers of
commander-in-chief.  Floyd succeeded him, and the last regulations
of 1863 were but a new compilation of their orders, hastily
collected and published to supply a vast army with a new edition.

I contend that all parts of these regulations inconsistent with the
law of July 28, 1866, are repealed.

I surely do not ask for any power myself, but I hope and trust, now
when we have a military President and a military Secretary of War,
that in the new regulations to be laid before Congress next session
the functions and duties of the commander-in-chief will be so
clearly marked out and defined that they may be understood by
himself and the army at large.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, General.

[Inclosure.]

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1866.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

From the period of the difficulties between Major-General (now
Lieutenant-General) Scott with Secretary Marcy, during the
administration of President Polk, the command of the army virtually
passed into the hands of the Secretary of War.

From that day to the breaking out of the rebellion the general-
in-chief never kept his headquarters in Washington, and could not,
consequently, with propriety resume his proper functions.  To
administer the affairs of the army properly, headquarters and the
adjutant-general's office must be in the same place.

During the war, while in the field, my functions as commander of
all the armies was never impaired, but were facilitated in all
essential matters by the Administration and by the War Department.
Now, however, that the war is over, and I have brought my head-
quarters to the city, I find my present position embarrassing and,
I think, out of place.  I have been intending, or did intend, to
make the beginning of the New Year the time to bring this matter
before you, with the view of asking to have the old condition of
affairs restored, but from diffidence about mentioning the matter
have delayed.  In a few words I will state what I conceive to be my
duties and my place, and ask respectfully to be restored to them
and it.

The entire adjutant-general's office should be under the entire
control of the general-in-chief of the army.  No orders should go
to the army, or the adjutant-general, except through the general-
in-chief.  Such as require the action of the President would be
laid before the Secretary of War, whose actions would be regarded
as those of the President.  In short, in my opinion, the general-
in-chief stands between the President and the army in all official
matters, and the Secretary of War is between the army (through the
general-in-chief) and the President.

I can very well conceive that a rule so long disregarded could not,
or would not, be restored without the subject being presented, and
I now do so respectfully for your consideration.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


General Belknap never answered that letter.

In August, 1870, was held at Des Moines, Iowa, an encampment of old
soldiers which I attended, en route to the Pacific, and at Omaha
received this letter:


LONG BRANCH, New Jersey, August 18,1870.

General W. T. SHERMAN.

DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 7th inst. did not reach Long
Branch until after I had left for St. Louis, and consequently is
just before me for the first time.  I do not know what changes
recent laws, particularly the last army bill passed, make in the
relations between the general of the army and the Secretary of War.

Not having this law or other statutes here, I cannot examine the
subject now, nor would I want to without consultation with the
Secretary of War.  On our return to Washington I have no doubt but
that the relations between the Secretary and yourself can be made
pleasant, and the duties of each be so clearly defined as to leave
no doubt where the authority of one leaves off and the other
commences.

My own views, when commanding the army, were that orders to the
army should go through the general.  No changes should be made,
however, either of the location of troops or officers, without the
knowledge of the Secretary of War.

In peace, the general commanded them without reporting to the
Secretary farther than he chose the specific orders he gave from
time to time, but subjected himself to orders from the Secretary,
the latter deriving his authority to give orders from the
President.  As Congress has the right, however, to make rules and
regulations for the government of the army, rules made by them
whether they are as they should be or not, will have to govern.  As
before stated, I have not examined the recent law.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT.


To which I replied:

OMAHA, NEBRASKA, September 2,1870.

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL: I have received your most acceptable letter of August
18th, and assure you that I am perfectly willing to abide by any
decision you may make.  We had a most enthusiastic meeting at Des
Moines, and General Bellknap gave us a fine, finished address.  I
have concluded to go over to San Francisco to attend the annual
celebration of the Pioneers, to be held on the 9th instant; from
there I will make a short tour, aiming to get back to St. Louis by
the 1st of October, and so on to Washington without unnecessary
delay.

Conscious of the heavy burdens already on you, I should refrain
from adding one ounce to your load of care, but it seems to me now
is the time to fix clearly and plainly the field of duty for the
Secretary of War and the commanding general of the army, so that we
may escape the unpleasant controversy that gave so much scandal in
General Scott's time, and leave to our successors a clear field.

No matter what the result, I promise to submit to whatever decision
you may make.  I also feel certain that General Belknap thinks he
is simply executing the law as it now stands, but I am equally
certain that he does not interpret the law reviving the grade of
general, and that fixing the "peace establishment" of 1868, as I
construe them.

For instance, I am supposed to control the discipline of the
Military Academy as a part of the army, whereas General Belknap
ordered a court of inquiry in the case of the colored cadet, made
the detail, reviewed the proceedings, and made his order, without
my knowing a word of it, except through the newspapers; and more
recently, when I went to Chicago to attend to some division
business, I found the inspector-general (Hardie) under orders from
the Secretary of War to go to Montana on some claim business.

All I ask is that such orders should go through me.  If all the
staff-officers are subject to receive orders direct from the
Secretary of War it will surely clash with the orders they may be
in the act of executing from me, or from their immediate
commanders.

I ask that General Belknap draw up some clear, well-defined rules
for my action, that he show them to me before publication, that I
make on them my remarks, and then that you make a final decision.
I promise faithfully to abide by it, or give up my commission.

Please show this to General Belknap, and I will be back early in
October.  With great respect, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN

I did return about October 15th, saw President Grant, who said
nothing had been done in the premises, but that he would bring
General Belknap and me together and settle this matter.  Matters
went along pretty much as usual till the month of August, 1871,
when I dined at the Arlington with Admiral Alder and General
Belknap.  The former said he had been promoted to rear-admiral and
appointed to command the European squadron, then at Villa Franca,
near Nice, and that he was going out in the frigate Wabash,
inviting me to go along.  I had never been to Europe, and the
opportunity was too tempting to refuse.  After some preliminaries I
agreed to go along, taking with me as aides-de-camp Colonel
Audenried and Lieutenant Fred Grant.  The Wabash was being
overhauled at the Navy-Yard at Boston, and was not ready to sail
till November, when she came to New-York, where we all embarked
Saturday, November 11th.

I have very full notes of the whole trip, and here need only state
that we went out to the Island of Madeira, and thence to Cadiz and
Gibraltar.  Here my party landed, and the Wabash went on to Villa
Franca.  From Gibraltar we made the general tour of Spain to
Bordeaux, through the south of France to Marseilles, Toulon, etc.,
to Nice, from which place we rejoined the Wabash and brought ashore
our baggage.

From Nice we went to Genoa, Turin, the Mont Cenis Tunnel, Milan,
Venice, etc., to Rome.  Thence to Naples, Messina, and Syracuse,
where we took a steamer to Malta.  From Malta to Egypt and
Constantinople, to Sebastopol, Poti, and Tiflis.  At Constantinople
and Sebastopol my party was increased by Governor Curtin, his son,
and Mr. McGahan.

It was my purpose to have reached the Caspian, and taken boats to
the Volga, and up that river as far as navigation would permit, but
we were dissuaded by the Grand-Duke Michael, Governor-General of
the Caucasas, and took carriages six hundred miles to Taganrog, on
the Sea of Azof, to which point the railroad system of Russia was
completed.  From Taganrog we took cars to Moscow and St.
Petersburg.  Here Mr. Curtin and party remained, he being our
Minister at that court; also Fred Grant left us to visit his aunt
at Copenhagen.  Colonel Audenried and I then completed the tour of
interior Europe, taking in Warsaw, Berlin, Vienna, Switzerland,
France, England, Scotland, and Ireland, embarking for home in the
good steamer Baltic, Saturday, September 7, 1872, reaching
Washington, D. C., September 22d.  I refrain from dwelling on this
trip, because it would swell this chapter beyond my purpose.

When I regained my office I found matters unchanged since my
departure, the Secretary of War exercising all the functions of
commander-in-chief, and I determined to allow things to run to their
necessary conclusion.  In 1873 my daughter Minnie also made a trip
to Europe, and I resolved as soon as she returned that I would
simply move back to St. Louis to execute my office there as best I
could.  But I was embarrassed by being the possessor of a large
piece of property in Washington on I Street, near the corner of
Third, which I could at the time neither sell nor give away.  It
came into my possession as a gift from friends in New York and
Boston, who had purchased it of General Grant and transferred to me
at the price of $65,000.

The house was very large, costly to light, heat, and maintain, and
Congress had reduced my pay four or five thousand dollars a year,
so that I was gradually being impoverished.  Taxes, too, grew
annually, from about four hundred dollars a year to fifteen
hundred, besides all sorts of special taxes.

Finding myself caught in a dilemma, I added a new hall, and made
out of it two houses, one of which I occupied, and the other I
rented, and thus matters stood in 1873-'74.  By the agency of Mr.
Hall, a neighbor and broker, I effected a sale of the property to
the present owner, Mr. Emory, at a fair price, accepting about half
payment in notes, and the other half in a piece of property on E
Street, which I afterward exchanged for a place in Cite Brilliante,
a suburb of St. Louis, which I still own.  Being thus foot-loose,
and having repeatedly notified President Grant of my purpose, I
wrote the Secretary of War on the 8th day of May, 1874, asking the
authority of the President and the War Department to remove my
headquarters to St. Louis.

On the 11th day of May General Belknap replied that I had the
assent of the President and himself, inclosing the rough draft of
an order to accomplish this result, which I answered on the 15th,
expressing my entire satisfaction, only requesting delay in the
publication of the orders till August or September, as I preferred
to make the changes in the month of October.

On the 3d of September these orders were made:


WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, September 8,
1874.

General Orders No. 108.

With the assent of the President, and at the request of the
General, the headquarters of the armies of the United States will
be established at St. Louis, Missouri, in the month of October
next.

The regulations and orders now governing the functions of the
General of the Army, and those in relation to transactions of
business with the War Department and its bureaus, will continue in
force.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, Adjutant-General.



Our daughter Minnie was married October 1, 1874, to Thomas W.
Fitch, United States Navy, and we all forthwith packed up and
regained our own house at St. Louis, taking an office on the corner
of Tenth and Locust Streets.  The only staff I brought with me were
the aides allowed by law, and, though we went through the forms of
"command," I realized that it was a farce, and it did not need a
prophet to foretell it would end in a tragedy.  We made ourselves
very comfortable, made many pleasant excursions into the interior,
had a large correspondence, and escaped the mortification of being
slighted by men in Washington who were using their temporary power
for selfish ends.

Early in March, 1676, appeared in all the newspapers of the day the
sensational report from Washington that Secretary of War Belknap
had been detected in selling sutlerships in the army; that he had
confessed it to Representative Blackburn, of Kentucky; that he had
tendered his resignation, which had been accepted by the President;
and that he was still subject to impeachment,--would be impeached
and tried by the Senate.  I was surprised to learn that General
Belknap was dishonest in money matters, for I believed him a brave
soldier, and I sorely thought him honest; but the truth was soon
revealed from Washington, and very soon after I received from Judge
Alphonso Taft, of Cincinnati, a letter informing me that he had
been appointed Secretary of War, and should insist on my immediate
return to Washington.  I answered that I was ready to go to
Washington, or anywhere, if assured of decent treatment.

I proceeded to Washington, when, on the 6th of April, were
published these orders:

General Orders No. 28.

The following orders of the President of the United States are
hereby promulgated for the information and guidance of all
concerned:

The headquarters of the army are hereby reestablished at Washington
City, and all orders and instructions relative to military
operations or affecting the military control and discipline of the
army issued by the President through the Secretary of War, shall be
promulgated through the General of the Army, and the departments of
the Adjutant-General and the Inspector-General shall report to him,
and be under his control in all matters relating thereto.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, Adjutant-General.


This was all I had ever asked; accordingly my personal staff were
brought back to Washington, where we resumed our old places; only I
did not, for some time, bring back the family, and then only to a
rented house on Fifteenth Street, which we occupied till we left
Washington for good.  During the period from 1876 to 1884 we had as
Secretaries of War in succession, the Hon's. Alphonso Taft, J. D.
Cameron, George W. McCrary, Alexander Ramsey, and R. T. Lincoln,
with each and all of whom I was on terms of the most intimate and
friendly relations.

And here I will record of Washington that I saw it, under the magic
hand of Alexander R. Shepherd, grow from a straggling, ill-paved
city, to one of the cleanest, most beautiful, and attractive cities
of the whole world.  Its climate is salubrious, with as much
sunshine as any city of America.  The country immediately about it
is naturally beautiful and romantic, especially up the Potomac, in
the region of the Great Falls; and, though the soil be poor as
compared with that of my present home, it is susceptible of easy
improvement and embellishment.  The social advantages cannot be
surpassed even in London, Paris, or Vienna; and among the resident
population, the members of the Supreme Court, Senate, House of
Representatives, army, navy, and the several executive departments,
may be found an intellectual class one cannot encounter in our
commercial and manufacturing cities.  The student may, without tax
and without price, have access, in the libraries of Congress and of
the several departments, to books of every nature and kind; and the
museums of natural history are rapidly approaching a standard of
comparison with the best of the world.  Yet it is the usual and
proper center of political intrigue, from which the army especially
should keep aloof, because the army must be true and faithful to
the powers that be, and not be subjected to a temptation to favor
one or other of the great parties into which our people have
divided, and will continue to divide, it may be, with advantage to
the whole.

It would be a labor of love for me, in this connection, to pay a
tribute of respect, by name, to the many able and most patriotic
officers with whom I was so long associated as the commanding
generals of military divisions and departments, as well as
staff-officers; but I must forego the temptation, because of the
magnitude of the subject, certain that each and all of them will
find biographers better posted and more capable than myself; and I
would also like to make recognition of the hundreds of acts of most
graceful hospitality on the part of the officers and families at
our remote military posts in the days, of the "adobe," the "jacal,"
and "dug-out," when a board floor and a shingle roof were luxuries
expected by none except the commanding officer.  I can see, in
memory, a beautiful young city-bred lady, who had married a poor
second-lieutenant, and followed him to his post on the plains,
whose quarters were in a "dug-out" ten feet by about fifteen, seven
feet high, with a dirt roof; four feet of the walls were the
natural earth, the other three of sod, with holes for windows and
corn-sacks for curtains.  This little lady had her Saratoga trunk,
which was the chief article of furniture; yet, by means of a rug on
the ground-floor, a few candle-boxes covered with red cotton calico
for seats, a table improvised out of a barrel-head, and a fireplace
and chimney excavated in the back wall or bank, she had transformed
her "hole in the ground" into a most attractive home for her young
warrior husband; and she entertained me with a supper consisting of
the best of coffee, fried ham, cakes, and jellies from the
commissary, which made on my mind an impression more lasting than
have any one of the hundreds of magnificent banquets I have since
attended in the palaces and mansions of our own and foreign lands.

Still more would I like to go over again the many magnificent trips
made across the interior plains, mountains, and deserts before the
days of the completed Pacific Railroad, with regular "Doughertys"
drawn by four smart mules, one soldier with carbine or loaded
musket in hand seated alongside the driver; two in the back seat
with loaded rifles swung in the loops made for them; the lightest
kind of baggage, and generally a bag of oats to supplement the
grass, and to attach the mules to their camp.  With an outfit of
two, three, or four of such, I have made journeys of as much as
eighteen hundred miles in a single season, usually from post to
post, averaging in distance about two hundred miles a week, with as
much regularity as is done today by the steam-car its five hundred
miles a day; but those days are gone, and, though I recognize the
great national advantages of the more rapid locomotion, I cannot
help occasionally regretting the change.  One instance in 1866
rises in my memory, which I must record: Returning eastward from
Fort Garland, we ascended the Rocky Mountains to the Sangre-de-
Cristo Pass.  The road descending the mountain was very rough and
sidling.  I got out with my rifle, and walked ahead about four
miles, where I awaited my "Dougherty."  After an hour or so I saw,
coming down the road, a wagon; and did not recognize it as my own
till quite near.  It had been upset, the top all mashed in, and no
means at hand for repairs.  I consequently turned aside from the
main road to a camp of cavalry near the Spanish Peaks, where we
were most hospitably received by Major A---- and his accomplished
wife.  They occupied a large hospital-tent, which about a dozen
beautiful greyhounds were free to enter at will.  The ambulance was
repaired, and the next morning we renewed our journey, escorted by
the major and his wife on their fine saddle-horses.

They accompanied us about ten miles of the way; and, though age has
since begun to tell on them, I shall ever remember them in their
pride and strength as they galloped alongside our wagons down the
long slopes of the Spanish Peaks in a driving snow-storm.

And yet again would it be a pleasant task to recall the many
banquets and feasts of the various associations of officers and
soldiers, who had fought the good battles of the civil war, in
which I shared as a guest or host, when we could indulge in a
reasonable amount of glorification at deeds done and recorded, with
wit, humor, and song; these when memory was fresh, and when the old
soldiers were made welcome to the best of cheer and applause in
every city and town of the land.  But no! I must hurry to my
conclusion, for this journey has already been sufficiently
prolonged.

I had always intended to divide time with my natural successor,
General P. H. Sheridan, and early, notified him that I should about
the year 1884 retire from the command of the army, leaving him
about an equal period of time for the highest office in the army.
It so happened that Congress had meantime by successive "enactments"
cut down the army to twenty-five thousand men, the usual strength
of a corps d'armee, the legitimate command of a lieutenant-general.
Up to 1882 officers not disabled by wounds or sickness could only
avail themselves of the privileges of retirement on application,
after thirty years of service, at sixty-two years of age; but on
the 30th of June, 1882, a bill was passed which, by operation of
the law itself, compulsorily retired all army officers, regardless
of rank, at the age of sixty-four years.  At the time this law was
debated in Congress, I was consulted by Senators and others in the
most friendly manner, representing that, if I wanted it, an
exception could justly and easily be made in favor of the general
and lieutenant-general, whose commissions expired with their lives;
but I invariably replied that I did not ask or expect an exception
in my case, because no one could know or realize when his own
mental and physical powers began to decline.  I remembered well the
experience of Gil Blas with the Bishop of Granada, and favored the
passage of the law fixing a positive period for retirement, to
obviate in the future special cases of injustice such as I had seen
in the recent past. The law was passed, and every officer then knew
the very day on which he must retire, and could make his
preparations accordingly.  In my own case the law was liberal in
the extreme, being "without reduction in his current pay and
allowances."

I would be sixty-four years old on the 8th of February, 1884, a
date inconvenient to move, and not suited to other incidents; so I
resolved to retire on the 1st day of November, 1883, to resume my
former home at St. Louis, and give my successor ample time to meet
the incoming Congress, But, preliminary thereto, I concluded to
make one more tour of the continent, going out to the Pacific by
the Northern route, and returning by that of the thirty-fifth
parallel.  This we accomplished, beginning at Buffalo, June 21st,
and ending at St. Louis, Missouri, September 30, 1883, a full and
most excellent account of which can be found in Colonel Tidball's
"Diary," which forms part of the report of the General of the Army
for the year 1883.

Before retiring also, as was my duty, I desired that my aides-
de-camp who had been so faithful and true to me should not suffer
by my act.  All were to retain the rank of colonels of cavalry till
the last day, February 8, 1884; but meantime each secured places,
as follows:

Colonel O. M. Poe was lieutenant-colonel of the Engineer Corps
United States Army, and was by his own choice assigned to Detroit
in charge of the engineering works on the Upper Lakes, which duty
was most congenial to him.

Colonel J. C. Tidball was assigned to command the Artillery School
at Fort Monroe, by  virtue of his commission as lieutenant-colonel,
Third Artillery, a station for which he was specially qualified.

Colonel John E.  Tourtelotte was then entitled to promotion to
major of the Seventh Cavalry, a rank in which he could be certain
of an honorable command.

The only remaining aide-de-camp was Colonel John M. Bacon, who
utterly ignored self in his personal attachment to me.  He was then
a captain of the Ninth Cavalry, but with almost a certainty of
promotion to be major of the Seventh before the date of my official
retirement, which actually resulted.  The last two accompanied me
to St. Louis, and remained with me to the end.  Having previously
accomplished the removal of my family to St. Louis, and having
completed my last journey to the Pacific, I wrote the following
letter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, D. C., October 8, 1883.

Hon. R. T. LINCOLN, Secretary of War.

SIR: By the act of Congress, approved June 30, 1882, all
army-officers are retired on reaching the age of sixty-four years.
If living, I will attain that age on the 8th day of February, 1884;
but as that period of the year is not suited for the changes
necessary on my retirement, I have contemplated anticipating the
event by several months, to enable the President to meet these
changes at a more convenient season of the year, and also to enable
my successor to be in office before the assembling of the next
Congress.

I therefore request authority to turn over the command of the army
to Lieutenant-General Sheridan on the 1st day of November, 1883,
and that I be ordered to my home at St. Louis, Missouri, there to
await the date of my legal retirement; and inasmuch as for a long
time I must have much correspondence about war and official
matters, I also ask the favor to have with me for a time my two
present aides-de-camp, Colonels J. E. Tourtelotte and J. M. Bacon.

The others of my personal staff, viz., Colonels O. M. Poe and J.
C. Tidball, have already been assigned to appropriate duties in
their own branches of the military service, the engineers and
artillery.  All should retain the rank and pay as aides-de-camp
until February 8,1884.  By or before the 1st day of November I can
complete all official reports, and believe I can surrender the army
to my successor in good shape and condition, well provided in all
respects, and distributed for the best interests of the country.

I am grateful that my physical and mental-strength remain
unimpaired by years, and am thankful for the liberal provision made
by Congress for my remaining years, which will enable me to respond
promptly to any call the President may make for my military service
or judgment as long as I live.  I have the honor to be your
obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, General.


The answer was:




WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON CITY, October 10, 1888.

General W. T. SHERMAN, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I have submitted to the President your letter of the 8th
instant, requesting that you be relieved of the command of the army
on the 1st of November next, as a more convenient time for making
the changes in military commands which must follow your retirement
from active service, than would be the date of your retirement
under the law.

In signifying his approval of your request, the President directs
me to express to you his earnest hope that there may be given you
many years of health and happiness in which to enjoy the gratitude
of your fellow-citizens, well earned by your most distinguished
public services.

It will give me pleasure to comply with your wishes respecting your
aides-de-camp, and the necessary orders will be duly issued.

I have the honor to be, General, your obedient servant,

ROBERT T.  LINCOLN, Secretary of War.


On the 27th day of October I submitted to the Secretary of
War, the Hon. R. T. Lincoln, my last annual report, embracing among
other valuable matters the most interesting and condensed report of
Colonel O. M. Poe, A. D. C., of the "original conception, progress,
and completion" of the four great transcontinental railways, which
have in my judgment done more for the subjugation and civilization
of the Indians than all other causes combined, and have made
possible the utilization of the vast area of pasture lands and
mineral regions which before were almost inaccessible, for my
agency in which I feel as much pride as for my share in any of the
battles in which I took part.

Promptly on the 1st of November were made the following general
orders, and the command of the Army of the United States passed
from me to Lieutenant-General P. H. Sheridan, with as little
ceremony as would attend the succession of the lieutenant-colonel
of a regiment to his colonel about to take a leave of absence:


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, November 1, 1885.

General Orders No. 77:

By and with the consent of the President, as contained in General
Orders No. 71, of October 13, 1883, the undersigned relinquishes
command of the Army of the United States.

In thus severing relations which have hitherto existed between us,
he thanks all officers and men for their fidelity to the high trust
imposed on them during his official life, and will, in his
retirement, watch with parental solicitude their progress upward in
the noble profession to which they have devoted their lives.

W. T. SHERMAN, General.

Official: R. C. DRUM, Adjutant-General.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, November 1, 1885.

General Orders No. 78:

In obedience to orders of the President, promulgated in General
Orders No. 71, October 13, 1883, from these headquarters, the
undersigned hereby assumes command of the Army of the United
States....

P. H. SHERIDAN, Lieutenant-General.

Official: R.  C.  DRUM, adjutant-General.


After a few days in which to complete my social visits, and after a
short visit to my daughter, Mrs. A. M. Thackara, at Philadelphia, I
quietly departed for St. Louis; and, as I hope, for "good and all,"
the family was again reunited in the same place from which we were
driven by a cruel, unnecessary civil war initiated in Charleston
Harbor in April, 1861.

On the 8th day of February, 1884; I was sixty-four years of age,
and therefore retired by the operation of the act of Congress,
approved June 30, 1882; but the fact was gracefully noticed by
President Arthur in the following general orders:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, February 8, 1984.

The following order of the President is published to the army:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 8, 1884.

General William T. Sherman, General of the Army, having this day
reached the age of sixty-four years, is, in accordance with the
law, placed upon the retired list of the army, without reduction in
his current pay and allowances.

The announcement of the severance from the command of the army of
one who has been for so many years its distinguished chief, can but
awaken in the minds, not only of the army, but of the people of the
United States, mingled emotions of regret and gratitude--regret at
the withdrawal from active military service of an officer whose
lofty sense of duty has been a model for all soldiers since he
first entered the army in July, 1840; and gratitude, freshly
awakened, for the services of incalculable value rendered by him in
the war for the Union, which his great military genius and daring
did so much to end.

The President deems this a fitting occasion to give expression, in
this manner, to the gratitude felt toward General Sherman by his
fellow-citizens, and to the hope that Providence may grant him many
years of health and happiness in the relief from the active duties
of his profession.

By order of the Secretary of War:

CHESTER A. ARTHUR.

R. C. DRUM, Adjutant-General.



To which I replied:

St. Louis, February 9, 1884.

His Excellency CHESTER A. ARTHUR,
President of the United States.

DEAR SIR: Permit me with a soldier's frankness to thank you
personally for the handsome compliment bestowed in general orders
of yesterday, which are reported in the journals of the day.  To me
it was a surprise and a most agreeable one.  I had supposed the
actual date of my retirement would form a short paragraph in the
common series of special orders of the War Department; but as the
honored Executive of our country has made it the occasion for his
own hand to pen a tribute of respect and affection to an officer
passing from the active stage of life to one of ease and rest, I
can only say I feel highly honored, and congratulate myself in thus
rounding out my record of service in a manner most gratifying to my
family and friends.  Not only this, but I feel sure, when the
orders of yesterday are read on parade to the regiments and
garrisons of the United States, many a young hero will tighten his
belt, and resolve anew to be brave and true to the starry flag,
which we of our day have carried safely through one epoch of
danger, but which may yet be subjected to other trials, which may
demand similar sacrifices, equal fidelity and courage, and a larger
measure of intelligence.  Again thanking you for so marked a
compliment, and reciprocating the kind wishes for the future,

I am, with profound respect, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, General.

This I construe as the end of my military career.  In looking back
upon the past I can only say, with millions of others, that I have
done many things I should not have done, and have left undone still
more which ought to have been done; that I can see where hundreds
of opportunities have been neglected, but on the whole am content;
and feel sure that I can travel this broad country of ours, and be
each night the welcome guest in palace or cabin; and, as

               "all the world's stage,
                And all the men and women merely players,"

I claim the privilege to ring down the curtain.

W. T. SHERMAN, General.



..............................................................




PERSONAL MEMOIRES OF P. H. SHERIDAN, VOLUME 1.

By Philip Henry Sheridan



PREFACE

When, yielding to the solicitations of my friends, I finally decided
to write these Memoirs, the greatest difficulty which confronted me
was that of recounting my share in the many notable events of the
last three decades, in which I played a part, without entering too
fully into the history of these years, and at the same time without
giving to my own acts an unmerited prominence.  To what extent I have
overcome this difficulty I must leave the reader to judge.

In offering this record, penned by my own hand, of the events of my
life, and of my participation in our great struggle for national
existence, human liberty, and political equality, I make no
pretension to literary merit; the importance of the subject-matter of
my narrative is my only claim on the reader's attention.

Respectfully dedicating this work to my comrades in arms during the
War of the Rebellion, I leave it as a heritage to my children, and as
a source of information for the future historian.

P. H. SHERIDAN.

Nonguitt, Mass., August 2, 1888




PERSONAL MEMOIRS

P. H. SHERIDAN.






VOLUME I.

CHAPTER I.

ANCESTRY--BIRTH--EARLY EDUCATION--A CLERK IN A GROCERY
STORE--APPOINTMENT--MONROE SHOES--JOURNEY TO WEST POINT--HAZING
--A FISTICUFF BATTLE--SUSPENDED--RETURNS TO CLERKSHIP--GRADUATION.

My parents, John and Mary Sheridan, came to America in 1830, having
been induced by the representations of my father's uncle, Thomas
Gainor, then living in Albany, N. Y., to try their fortunes in the
New World: They were born and reared in the County Cavan, Ireland,
where from early manhood my father had tilled a leasehold on the
estate of Cherrymoult; and the sale of this leasehold provided him
with means to seek a new home across the sea.  My parents were
blood relations--cousins in the second degree--my mother, whose
maiden name was Minor, having descended from a collateral branch of
my father's family.  Before leaving Ireland they had two children,
and on the 6th of March, 1831, the year after their arrival in this
country, I was born, in Albany, N. Y., the third child in a family
which eventually increased to six--four boys and two girls.

The prospects for gaining a livelihood in Albany did not meet the
expectations which my parents had been led to entertain, so in 1832
they removed to the West, to establish themselves in the village of
Somerset, in Perry County, Ohio, which section, in the earliest days
of the State; had been colonized from Pennsylvania and Maryland.  At
this period the great public works of the Northwest--the canals and
macadamized roads, a result of clamor for internal improvements--were
in course of construction, and my father turned his attention to
them, believing that they offered opportunities for a successful
occupation.  Encouraged by a civil engineer named Bassett, who had
taken a fancy to him, he put in bids for a small contract on the
Cumberland Road, known as the "National Road," which was then being
extended west from the Ohio River.  A little success in this first
enterprise led him to take up contracting as a business, which he
followed on various canals and macadamized roads then building in
different parts of the State of Ohio, with some good fortune for
awhile, but in 1853 what little means he had saved were swallowed up
--in bankruptcy, caused by the failure of the Sciota and Hocking
Valley Railroad Company, for which he was fulfilling a contract at
the time, and this disaster left him finally only a small farm, just
outside the village of Somerset, where he dwelt until his death in
1875.

My father's occupation kept him away from home much of the time
during my boyhood, and as a consequence I grew up under the sole
guidance and training of my mother, whose excellent common sense and
clear discernment in every way fitted her for such maternal duties.
When old enough I was sent to the village school, which was taught by
an old-time Irish "master"--one of those itinerant dominies of the
early frontier--who, holding that to spare the rod was to spoil the
child, if unable to detect the real culprit when any offense had been
committed, would consistently apply the switch to the whole school
without discrimination.  It must be conceded that by this means he
never failed to catch the guilty mischief-maker.  The school-year was
divided into terms of three months, the teacher being paid in each
term a certain sum--three dollars, I think, for each pupil-and having
an additional perquisite in the privilege of boarding around at his
option in the different families to which his scholars belonged.
This feature was more than acceptable to the parents at times, for
how else could they so thoroughly learn all the neighborhood gossip?
But the pupils were in almost unanimous opposition, because Mr.
McNanly's unheralded advent at any one's house resulted frequently in
the discovery that some favorite child had been playing "hookey,"
which means (I will say to the uninitiated, if any such there be)
absenting one's self from school without permission, to go on a
fishing or a swimming frolic.  Such at least was my experience more
than once, for Mr. McNanly particularly favored my mother's house,
because of a former acquaintanceship in Ireland, and many a time a
comparison of notes proved that I had been in the woods with two
playfellows, named Binckly and Greiner, when the master thought I was
home, ill, and my mother, that I was at school, deeply immersed in
study.  However, with these and other delinquencies not uncommon
among boys, I learned at McNanly's school, and a little later, under
a pedagogue named Thorn, a smattering of geography and history, and
explored the mysteries of Pike's Arithmetic and Bullions' English
Grammar, about as far as I could be carried up to the age of
fourteen.  This was all the education then bestowed upon me, and
this--with the exception of progressing in some of these branches by
voluntary study, and by practical application in others, supplemented
by a few months of preparation after receiving my appointment as a
cadet--was the extent of my learning on entering the Military
Academy.

When about fourteen years old I began to do something for myself; Mr.
John Talbot, who kept a country store in the village, employing me to
deal out sugar, coffee, and calico to his customers at the munificent
salary of twenty-four dollars a year.  After I had gained a
twelve-months' experience with Mr. Talbot my services began to be
sought by, others, and a Mr. David Whitehead secured them by the offer
of sixty dollars a year--Talbot refusing to increase my pay, but not
objecting to my advancement.  A few months later, before my year was
up, another chance to increase my salary came about; Mr. Henry Dittoe,
the enterprising man of the village, offering me one hundred and
twenty dollars a year to take a position in the dry-goods store of
Fink & Dittoe.  I laid the matter before Mr. Whitehead, and he frankly
advised me to accept, though he cautioned me that I might regret it,
adding that he was afraid Henry (referring to Mr. Dittoe) "had too
many irons in the fire." His warning in regard to the enterprising
merchant proved a prophecy, for "too many irons in the fire" brought
about Mr. Dittoe's bankruptcy, although this misfortune did not befall
him till long after I had left his service.  I am glad to say,
however, that his failure was an exceptionally honest one, and due
more to the fact that he was in advance of his surroundings than to
any other cause.

I remained with Fink & Dittoe until I entered the Military Academy,
principally in charge of the book-keeping, which was no small work
for one of my years, considering that in those days the entire
business of country stores in the West was conducted on the credit
system; the customers, being mostly farmers, never expecting to pay
till the product of their farms could be brought to market; and even
then usually squared the book-accounts by notes of hand, that were
often slow of collection.

From the time I ceased to attend school my employment had
necessitated, to a certain degree, the application of what I had
learned there, and this practical instruction I reinforced somewhat
by doing considerable reading in a general way, until ultimately I
became quite a local authority in history, being frequently chosen as
arbiter in discussions and disputes that arose in the store.  The
Mexican War, then going on, furnished, of course, a never-ending
theme for controversy, and although I was too young to enter the
military service when volunteers were mustering in our section, yet
the stirring events of the times so much impressed and absorbed me
that my sole wish was to become a soldier, and my highest aspiration
to go to West Point as a Cadet from my Congressional district.  My
chances for this seemed very remote, however, till one day an
opportunity was thrown in my way by the boy who then held the place
failing to pass his examination.  When I learned that by this
occurrence a vacancy existed, I wrote to our representative in
Congress, the Hon. Thomas Ritchey, and asked him for the appointment,
reminding him that we had often met in Fink & Dittoe's store, and
that therefore he must know something of my qualifications.  He
responded promptly by enclosing my warrant for the class of 1848; so,
notwithstanding the many romances that have been published about the
matter, to Mr. Ritchey, and to him alone, is due all the credit--if
my career justifies that term--of putting me in the United States
Army.

At once I set about preparing for the examination which precedes
admission to the Military Academy, studying zealously under the
direction of Mr. William Clark; my old teachers, McNanly and Thorn,
having disappeared from Somerset and sought new fields of usefulness.
The intervening months passed rapidly away, and I fear that I did not
make much progress, yet I thought I should be able to pass the
preliminary examination.  That which was to follow worried me more
and gave me many sleepless nights; but these would have been less in
number, I fully believe, had it not been for one specification of my,
outfit which the circular that accompanied my appointment demanded.
This requirement was a pair of "Monroe shoes."  Now, out in Ohio,
what "Monroe shoes" were was a mystery--not a shoemaker in my section
having so much as an inkling of the construction of the perplexing
things, until finally my eldest brother brought an idea of them from
Baltimore, when it was found that they were a familiar pattern under
another name.

At length the time for my departure came, and I set out for West
Point, going by way of Cleveland and across Lake Erie to Buffalo.  On
the steamer I fell in with another appointee en route to the academy,
David S. Stanley, also from Ohio; and when our acquaintanceship had
ripened somewhat, and we had begun to repose confidence in each
other, I found out that he had no "Monroe shoes," so I deemed myself
just that much ahead of my companion, although my shoes might not
conform exactly to the regulations in Eastern style and finish.  At
Buffalo, Stanley and I separated, he going by the Erie Canal and I by
the railroad, since I wanted to gain time on account of commands to
stop in Albany to see my father's uncle.  Here I spent a few days,
till Stanley reached Albany, when we journeyed together down the
river to West Point.  The examination began a few days after our
arrival, and I soon found myself admitted to the Corps of Cadets, to
date from July 1, 1848, in a class composed of sixty-three members,
many of whom--for example, Stanley, Slocum, Woods, Kautz, and Crook
--became prominent generals in later years, and commanded divisions,
corps, and armies in the war of the rebellion.

Quickly following my admission I was broken in by a course of hazing,
with many of the approved methods that the Cadets had handed down
from year to year since the Academy was founded; still, I escaped
excessive persecution, although there were in my day many occurrences
so extreme as to call forth condemnation and an endeavor to suppress
the senseless custom, which an improved civilization has now about
eradicated, not only at West Point, but at other colleges.

Although I had met the Academic board and come off with fair success,
yet I knew so little of Algebra or any of the higher branches of
mathematics that during my first six months at the Academy I was
discouraged by many misgivings as to the future, for I speedily
learned that at the January examination the class would have to stand
a test much severer than that which had been applied to it on
entering.  I resolved to try hard, however, and, besides, good
fortune gave me for a room-mate a Cadet whose education was more
advanced than mine, and whose studious habits and willingness to aid
others benefited me immensely.  This room-mate was Henry W. Slocum,
since so signally distinguished in both military and civil capacities
as to win for his name a proud place in the annals of his country.
After taps--that is, when by the regulations of the Academy all the
lights were supposed to be extinguished, and everybody in bed--Slocum
and I would hang a blanket over the one window of our room and
continue our studies--he guiding me around scores of stumbling-blocks
in Algebra and elucidating many knotty points in other branches of
the course with which I was unfamiliar.  On account of this
association I went up before the Board in January with less
uneasiness than otherwise would have been the case, and passed the
examination fairly well.  When it was over, a self-confidence in my
capacity was established that had not existed hitherto, and at each
succeeding examination I gained a little in order of merit till my
furlough summer came round--that is, when I was half through the
four-year course.

My furlough in July and August, 1850, was spent at my home in Ohio,
with the exception of a visit or two to other Cadets on furlough in
the State, and at the close of my leave I returned to the Academy in
the full expectation of graduating with my class in 1852.

A quarrel of a belligerent character in September, ,1851, with Cadet
William R. Terrill, put an end to this anticipation, however, and
threw me back into the class which graduated in 1853.  Terrill was a
Cadet Sergeant, and, while my company was forming for parade, having,
given me an order, in what I considered an improper tone, to "dress"
in a certain direction, when I believed I was accurately dressed, I
fancied I had a grievance, and made toward him with a lowered
bayonet, but my better judgment recalled me before actual contact
could take place.  Of course Terrill reported me for this, and my ire
was so inflamed by his action that when we next met I attacked him,
and a fisticuff engagement in front of barracks followed, which was
stopped by an officer appearing on the scene.  Each of us handed in
an explanation, but mine was unsatisfactory to the authorities, for I
had to admit that I was the assaulting party, and the result was that
I was suspended by the Secretary of War, Mr. Conrad, till August 28,
1852--the Superintendent of the Academy, Captain Brewerton, being
induced to recommend this milder course, he said, by my previous good
conduct.  At the time I thought, of course, my suspension a very
unfair punishment, that my conduct was justifiable and the
authorities of the Academy all wrong, but riper experience has led me
to a different conclusion, and as I look back, though the
mortification I then endured was deep and trying, I am convinced that
it was hardly as much as I deserved for such an outrageous breach of
discipline.

There was no question as to Terrill's irritating tone, but in giving
me the order he was prompted by the duty of his position as a file
closer, and I was not the one to remedy the wrong which I conceived
had been done me, and clearly not justifiable in assuming to correct
him with my own hands.  In 1862, when General Buell's army was
assembling at Louisville, Terrill was with it as a brigadier-general
(for, although a Virginian, he had remained loyal), and I then took
the initiative toward a renewal of our acquaintance.  Our renewed
friendship was not destined to be of long duration, I am sorry to
say, for a few days later, in the battle of Perryville, while
gallantly fighting for his country, poor Terrill was killed.

My suspension necessitated my leaving the Academy, and I returned
home in the fall of 1851, much crestfallen.  Fortunately, my good
friend Henry Dittoe again gave me employment in keeping the books of
his establishment, and this occupation of my time made the nine
months which were to elapse before I could go back to West Point pass
much more agreeably than they would have done had I been idle.  In
August, 1852, I joined the first class at the Academy in accordance
with the order of the War Department, taking my place at the foot of
the class and graduating with it the succeeding June, number
thirty-four in a membership of fifty-two.  At the head of this class
graduated James B. McPherson, who was killed in the Atlanta campaign
while commanding the Army of the Tennessee.  It also contained such
men as John M. Schofield, who commanded the Army of the Ohio; Joshua
W. Sill, killed as a brigadier in the battle of Stone River; and many
others who, in the war of the rebellion, on one side or the other,
rose to prominence, General John B. Hood being the most distinguished
member of the class among the Confederates.

At the close of the final examination I made no formal application
for assignment to any particular arm of the service, for I knew that
my standing would not entitle me to one of the existing vacancies,
and that I should be obliged to take a place among the brevet second
lieutenants.  When the appointments were made I therefore found
myself attached to the First Infantry, well pleased that I had
surmounted all the difficulties that confront the student at our
national school, and looking forward with pleasant anticipation to
the life before me.




CHAPTER II.

ORDERED TO FORT DUNCAN, TEXAS--"NORTHERS"--SCOUTING
DUTY--HUNTING--NEARLY CAUGHT BY THE INDIANS--A PRIMITIVE HABITATION
--A BRAVE DRUMMERBOY'S DEATH--A MEXICAN BALL.

On the 1st day of July, 1853, I was commissioned a brevet second
lieutenant in the First Regiment of United States Infantry, then
stationed in Texas.  The company to which I was attached was
quartered at Fort Duncan, a military post on the Rio Grande opposite
the little town of Piedras Negras, on the boundary line between the
United States and the Republic of Mexico.

After the usual leave of three months following graduation from the
Military Academy I was assigned to temporary duty at Newport
Barracks, a recruiting station and rendezvous for the assignment of
young officers preparatory to joining their regiments.  Here I
remained from September, 1853, to March, 1854, when I was ordered to
join my company at Fort Duncan.  To comply with this order I
proceeded by steamboat down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to New
Orleans, thence by steamer across the Gulf of Mexico to Indianola,
Tex., and after landing at that place, continued in a small schooner
through what is called the inside channel on the Gulf coast to Corpus
Christi, the headquarters of Brigadier-General Persifer F. Smith, who
was commanding the Department of Texas.  Here I met some of my old
friends from the Military Academy, among them Lieutenant Alfred
Gibbs, who in the last year of the rebellion commanded under me a
brigade of cavalry, and Lieutenant Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte, of the
Mounted Rifles, who resigned in 1854 to accept service in the French
Imperial army, but to most of those about headquarters I was an
entire stranger.  Among the latter was Captain Stewart Van Vliet, of
the Quartermaster's Department, now on the retired list.  With him I
soon came in frequent contact, and, by reason of his connection with
the Quartermaster's Department, the kindly interest he took in
forwarding my business inaugurated between us--a lasting friendship.

A day or two after my arrival at Corpus Christi a train of Government
wagons, loaded with subsistence stores and quartermaster's supplies,
started for Laredo, a small town on the Rio Grande below Fort Duncan.
There being no other means of reaching my station I put my small
personal possessions, consisting of a trunk, mattress, two blankets,
and a pillow into one of the heavily loaded wagons and proceeded to
join it, sitting on the boxes or bags of coffee and sugar, as I might
choose.  The movement of the train was very slow, as the soil was
soft on the newly made and sandy roads.  We progressed but a few
miles on our first day's journey, and in the evening parked our train
at a point where there was no wood, a scant supply of water--and that
of bad quality--but an abundance of grass.  There being no
comfortable place to sleep in any of the wagons, filled as they were
to the bows with army supplies, I spread my blankets on the ground
between the wheels of one of them, and awoke in the morning feeling
as fresh and bright as would have been possible if all the comforts
of civilization had been at my command.

It took our lumbering train many days to reach Laredo, a distance of
about one hundred and sixty miles from Corpus Christi.  Each march
was but a repetition of the first day's journey, its monotony
occasionally relieved, though, by the passage of immense flocks of
ducks and geese, and the appearance at intervals of herds of deer,
and sometimes droves of wild cattle, wild horses and mules.  The
bands of wild horses I noticed were sometimes led by mules, but
generally by stallions with long wavy manes, and flowing tails which
almost touched the ground.

We arrived at Laredo during one of those severe storms incident to
that section, which are termed "Northers" from the fact that the
north winds culminate occasionally in cold windstorms, frequently
preceded by heavy rains.  Generally the blow lasts for three days,
and the cold becomes intense and piercing.  While the sudden
depression of the temperature is most disagreeable, and often causes
great suffering, it is claimed that these "Northers" make the climate
more healthy and endurable.  They occur from October to May, and in
addition to the destruction which, through the sudden depression of
the temperature, they bring on the herds in the interior, they are
often of sufficient violence to greatly injure the harbors on the
coast.

The post near Laredo was called Fort McIntosh, and at this period the
troops stationed there consisted of eight companies of the Fifth
Infantry and two of the First, one of the First Artillery, and three
of the Mounted Rifles.  Just before the "Norther" began these troops
had completed a redoubt for the defense of the post, with the
exception of the ditches, but as the parapet was built of sand--the
only material about Laredo which could be obtained for its
construction--the severity of the winds was too much for such a
shifting substance, and the work was entirely blown away early in the
storm.

I was pleasantly and hospitably welcomed by the officers at the post,
all of whom were living in tents, with no furniture except a cot and
trunk, and an improvised bed for a stranger, when one happened to
come along.  After I had been kindly taken in by one of the younger
officers, I reported to the commanding officer, and was informed by
him that he would direct the quartermaster to furnish me, as soon as
convenient, with transportation to Fort Duncan, the station of my
company.

In the course of a day or two, the quartermaster notified me that a
Government six-mule wagon would be placed at my disposal to proceed
to my destination.  No better means offering, I concluded to set out
in this conveyance, and, since it was also to carry a quantity of
quartermaster's property for Fort Duncan, I managed to obtain room
enough for my bed in the limited space between the bows and load,
where I could rest tolerably well, and under cover at night, instead
of sleeping on the ground under the wagon, as I had done on the road
from Corpus Christi to Laredo.

I reached Fort Duncan in March, 1854., and was kindly received by the
commanding officer of the, regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson
Morris, and by the captain of my company ("D"), Eugene E. McLean, and
his charming wife the only daughter of General E. V. Sumner, who was
already distinguished in our service, but much better known in after
years in the operations of the Army of the Potomac, during its early
campaigns in Virginia.  Shortly after joining company "D" I was sent
out on scouting duty with another company of the regiment to Camp La
Pena, about sixty or seventy miles east of Fort Duncan, in a section
of country that had for some time past been subjected to raids by the
Lipan and Comanche Indians.  Our outpost at La Pena was intended as a
protection against the predatory incursions of these savages, so
almost constant scouting became a daily occupation.  This enabled me
soon to become familiar with and make maps of the surrounding
country, and, through constant association with our Mexican guide, to
pick up in a short time quite a smattering of the Spanish language,
which was very useful to one serving on that frontier.

At that early day western Texas was literally filled with game, and
the region in the immediate vicinity of La Pena contained its full
proportion of deer, antelope, and wild turkeys.  The temptation to
hunt was therefore constantly before me, and a desire to indulge in
this pastime, whenever free from the legitimate duty of the camp,
soon took complete possession of me, so expeditions in pursuit of
game were of frequent occurrence.  In these expeditions I was always
accompanied by a soldier named Frankman, belonging to "D" company,
who was a fine sportsman, and a butcher by trade.  In a short period
I learned from Frankman how to approach and secure the different
species of game, and also how to dress and care for it when killed.
Almost every expedition we made was rewarded with a good supply of
deer, antelope, and wild turkeys, and we furnished the command in
camp with such abundance that it was relieved from the necessity of
drawing its beef ration, much to the discomfiture of the disgruntled
beef contractor.

The camp at La Pena was on sandy ground, unpleasant for men and
animals, and by my advice it was moved to La Pendencia, not far from
Lake Espantosa.  Before removal from our old location, however, early
one bright morning Frankman and I started on one of our customary
expeditions, going down La Pena Creek to a small creek, at the head
of which we had established a hunting rendezvous.  After proceeding
along the stream for three or four miles we saw a column of smoke on
the prairie, and supposing it arose from a camp of Mexican rancheros
catching wild horses or wild cattle, and even wild mules, which were
very numerous in that section of country along the Nueces River, we
thought we would join the party and see how much success they were
having, and observe the methods employed in this laborious and
sometimes dangerous vocation.  With this object in view, we continued
on until we found it necessary to cross to the other side of the
creek to reach the point indicated by the smoke.  Just before
reaching the crossing I discovered moccasin tracks near the water's
edge, and realizing in an instant that the camp we were approaching
might possibly be one of hostile Indians--all Indians in that country
at that time were hostile--Frankman and I backed out silently, and
made eager strides for La Pena, where we had scarcely arrived when
Captain M. E. Van Buren, of the Mounted Rifle regiment, came in with
a small command, and reported that he was out in pursuit of a band of
Comanche Indians, which had been committing depredations up about
Fort Clark, but that he had lost the trail.  I immediately informed
him of what had occurred to me during the morning, and that I could
put him on the trail of the Indians he was desirous of punishing.

We hurriedly supplied with rations his small command of thirteen,
men, and I then conducted him to the point where I had seen the
smoke, and there we found signs indicating it to be the recently
abandoned camp of the Indians he was pursuing, and we also noticed
that prairie rats had formed the principal article of diet at the
meal they had just completed.  As they had gone, I could do no more
than put him on the trail made in their departure, which was well
marked; for Indians, when in small parties, and unless pressed,
usually follow each other in single file.  Captain Van Buren followed
the trail by Fort Ewell, and well down toward Corpus Christi, day and
night, until the Indians, exhausted and used up, halted, on an open
plain, unsaddled their horses, mounted bareback, and offered battle.
Their number was double that of Van Buren's detachment, but he
attacked them fearlessly, and in the fight was mortally wounded by an
arrow which entered his body in front, just above the sword belt, and
came through the belt behind.  The principal chief of the Indians was
killed, and the rest fled.  Captain Van Buren's men carried him to
Corpus Christi, where in a few days he died.

After our removal to La Pendencia a similar pursuit of savages
occurred, but with more fortunate results.  Colonel John H. King, now
on the retired list, then a captain in the First Infantry, came to
our camp in pursuit of a marauding band of hostile Indians, and I was
enabled to put him also on the trail.  He soon overtook them, and
killing two without loss to himself, the band dispersed like a flock
of quail and left him nothing to follow.  He returned to our camp
shortly after, and the few friendly Indian scouts he had with him
held a grand pow-wow and dance over the scalps of the fallen braves.

Around La Pendencia, as at La Pena, the country abounded in deer,
antelope, wild turkeys, and quail, and we killed enough to supply
abundantly the whole command with the meat portion of the ration.
Some mornings Frankman and I would bring in as many as seven deer,
and our hunting expeditions made me so familiar with the region
between our camp and Fort Duncan, the headquarters of the regiment,
that I was soon enabled to suggest a more direct route of
communication than the circuitous one then traversed, and in
a short time it was established.

Up to this time I had been on detached duty, but soon my own company
was ordered into the field to occupy a position on Turkey Creek,
about ten or twelve miles west of the Nueces River, on the road from
San Antonio to Fort Duncan, and I was required to join the company.
Here constant work and scouting were necessary, as our camp was
specially located with reference to protecting from Indian raids the
road running from San Antonio to Fort Duncan, and on to the interior
of Mexico.  In those days this road was the great line of travel, and
Mexican caravans were frequently passing over it, to and fro, in such
a disorganized condition as often to invite attack from marauding
Comanches and Lipans.  Our time, therefore, was incessantly occupied
in scouting, but our labors were much lightened because they were
directed with intelligence and justice by Captain McLean, whose
agreeable manners and upright methods are still so impressed on my
memory that to this day I look back upon my service with "D" Company
of the First Infantry as among those events which I remember with
most pleasure.

In this manner my first summer of active field duty passed rapidly
away, and in the fall my company returned to Fort Duncan to go into
winter quarters.  These quarters, when constructed, consisted of "A"
tents pitched under a shed improvised by the company.  With only
these accommodations I at first lived around as best I could until
the command was quartered, and then, requesting a detail of wagons
from the quartermaster, I went out some thirty miles to get poles to
build a more comfortable habitation for myself.  In a few days enough
poles for the construction of a modest residence were secured and
brought in, and then the building of my house began.  First, the
poles were cut the proper length, planted in a trench around four
sides of a square of very small proportions, and secured at the top
by string-pieces stretched from one angle to another, in which
half-notches hack been made at proper intervals to receive the
uprights.  The poles were then made rigid by strips nailed on
half-way to the ground, giving the sides of the structure firmness,
but the interstices were large and frequent; still, with the aid of
some old condemned paulins obtained from the quartermaster, the walls
were covered and the necessity for chinking obviated.  This method of
covering the holes in the side walls also possessed the advantage of
permitting some little light to penetrate to the interior of the
house, and avoided the necessity of constructing a window, for which,
by the way, no glass could have been obtained.  Next a good large
fire-place and chimney were built in one corner by means of stones
and mud, and then the roof was put on--a thatched one of prairie
grass.  The floor was dirt compactly tamped.

My furniture was very primitive: a chair or two, with about the same
number of camp stools, a cot, and a rickety old bureau that I
obtained in some way not now remembered.  My washstand consisted of a
board about three feet long, resting on legs formed by driving sticks
into the ground until they held it at about the proper height from
the floor.  This washstand was the most expensive piece of furniture
I owned, the board having cost me three dollars, and even then I
obtained it as a favor, for lumber on the Rio Grande was so scarce in
those days that to possess even the smallest quantity was to indulge
in great luxury.  Indeed, about all that reached the post was what
came in the shape of bacon boxes, and the boards from these were
reserved for coffins in which to bury our dead.

In this rude habitation I spent a happy winter, and was more
comfortably off than many of the officers, who had built none, but
lived in tents and took the chances of "Northers." During this period
our food was principally the soldier's ration: flour, pickled pork,
nasty bacon--cured in the dust of ground charcoal--and fresh beef, of
which we had a plentiful supply, supplemented with game of various
kinds.  The sugar, coffee, and smaller parts of the ration were good,
but we had no vegetables, and the few jars of preserves and some few
vegetables kept by the sutler were too expensive to be indulged in.
So during all the period I lived at Fort Duncan and its sub-camps,
nearly sixteen months, fresh vegetables were practically
unobtainable.  To prevent scurvy we used the juice of the maguey
plant, called pulque, and to obtain a supply of this anti-scorbutic I
was often detailed to march the company out about forty miles, cut
the plant, load up two or three wagons with the stalks, and carry
them to camp.  Here the juice was extracted by a rude press, and put
in bottles until it fermented and became worse in odor than
sulphureted hydrogen.  At reveille roll-call every morning this
fermented liquor was dealt out to the company, and as it was my duty,
in my capacity of subaltern, to attend these roll-calls and see that
the men took their ration of pulque, I always began the duty by
drinking a cup of the repulsive stuff myself.  Though hard to
swallow, its well-known specific qualities in the prevention and cure
of scurvy were familiar to all, so every man in the command gulped
down his share notwithstanding its vile taste and odor.

Considering our isolation, the winter passed very pleasantly to us
all.  The post was a large one, its officers congenial, and we had
many enjoyable occasions.  Dances, races, and horseback riding filled
in much of the time, and occasional raids from Indians furnished more
serious occupation in the way of a scout now and then.  The proximity
of the Indians at times rendered the surrounding country somewhat
dangerous for individuals or small parties at a distance from the
fort; but few thought the savages would come near, so many risks were
doubtless run by various officers, who carried the familiar
six-shooter as their only weapon while out horseback riding, until
suddenly we were awakened to the dangers we had been incurring.

About mid-winter a party of hostile Lipans made a swoop around and
skirting the garrison, killing a herder--a discharged drummer-boy--in
sight of the flag-staff.  Of course great excitement followed.
Captain J. G. Walker, of the Mounted Rifles, immediately started with
his company in pursuit of the Indians, and I was directed to
accompany the command.  Not far away we found the body of the boy
filled with arrows, and near him the body of a fine looking young
Indian, whom the lad had undoubtedly killed before he was himself
overpowered.  We were not a great distance behind the Indians when
the boy's body was discovered, and having good trailers we gained on
them rapidly, with the prospect of overhauling them, but as soon as
they found we were getting near they headed for the Rio Grande, made
the crossing to the opposite bank, and were in Mexico before we could
overtake them.  When on the other side of the boundary they grew very
brave, daring us to come over to fight them, well aware all the time
that the international line prevented us from continuing the pursuit.
So we had to return to the post without reward for our exertion
except the consciousness of having made the best effort we could to
catch the murderers.  That night, in company with Lieutenant Thomas
G. Williams, I crossed over the river to the Mexican village of
Piedras Negras, and on going to a house where a large baille, or
dance, was going on we found among those present two of the Indians
we had been chasing.  As soon as they saw us they strung their bows
for a fight, and we drew our six-shooters, but the Mexicans quickly
closed in around the Indians and forced them out of the house--or
rude jackal--where the "ball" was being held, and they escaped.  We
learned later something about the nature of the fight the drummer had
made, and that his death had cost them dear, for, in addition to the
Indian killed and lying by his side, he had mortally wounded another
and seriously wounded a third, with the three shots that he had
fired.

At this period I took up the notion of making a study of ornithology,
incited to it possibly by the great number of bright-colored birds
that made their winter homes along the Rio Grande, and I spent many a
leisure hour in catching specimens by means of stick traps, with
which I found little difficulty in securing almost every variety of
the feathered tribes.  I made my traps by placing four sticks of a
length suited to the size desired so as to form a square, and
building up on them in log-cabin fashion until the structure came
almost to a point by contraction of the corners.  Then the sticks
were made secure, the trap placed at some secluded spot, and from the
centre to the outside a trench was dug in the ground, and thinly
covered when a depth had been obtained that would leave an aperture
sufficiently large to admit the class of birds desired.  Along this
trench seeds and other food were scattered, which the birds soon
discovered, and of course began to eat, unsuspectingly following the
tempting bait through the gallery till they emerged from its farther
end in the centre of the trap, where they contentedly fed till the
food was all gone.  Then the fact of imprisonment first presented
itself, and they vainly endeavored to escape through the interstices
of the cage, never once guided by their instinct to return to liberty
through the route by which they had entered.

Among the different kinds of birds captured in this way,
mocking-birds, blue-birds, robins, meadow larks, quail, and plover
were the most numerous.  They seemed to have more voracious appetites
than other varieties, or else they were more unwary, and consequently
more easily caught.  A change of station, however, put an end to my
ornithological plans, and activities of other kinds prevented me from
resuming them in after life.

There were quite a number of young officers at the post during the
winter, and as our relations with the Mexican commandant at Piedras
Negras were most amicable, we were often invited to dances at his
house.  He and his hospitable wife and daughter drummed up the female
portion of the elite of Piedras Negras and provided the house, which
was the official as well as the personal residence of the commandant,
while we--the young officers--furnished the music and such
sweetmeats, candies, &c., for the baille as the country would afford.

We generally danced in a long hall on a hard dirt floor.  The girls
sat on one side of the hall, chaperoned by their mothers or some old
duennas, and the men on the other.  When the music struck up each man
asked the lady whom his eyes had already selected to dance with him,
and it was not etiquette for her to refuse--no engagements being
allowed before the music began.  When the dance, which was generally
a long waltz, was over, he seated his partner, and then went to a
little counter at the end of the room and bought his dulcinea a plate
of the candies and sweetmeats provided.  Sometimes she accepted them,
but most generally pointed to her duenna or chaperon behind, who held
up her apron and caught the refreshments as they were slid into it
from the plate.  The greatest decorum was maintained at these dances,
primitively as they were conducted; and in a region so completely cut
off from the world, their influence was undoubtedly beneficial to a
considerable degree in softening the rough edges in a half-breed
population.

The inhabitants of this frontier of Mexico were strongly marked with
Indian characteristics, particularly with those of the Comanche type,
and as the wild Indian blood predominated, few of the physical traits
of the Spaniard remained among them, and outlawry was common.  The
Spanish conquerors had left on the northern border only their
graceful manners and their humility before the cross.  The sign of
Christianity was prominently placed at all important points on roads
or trails, and especially where any one had been killed; and as the
Comanche Indians, strong and warlike, had devastated northeastern
Mexico in past years, all along the border, on both sides of the Rio
Grande, the murderous effects of their raids were evidenced by
numberless crosses.  For more than a century forays had been made on
the settlements and towns by these bloodthirsty savages, and, the
Mexican Government being too weak to afford protection, property was
destroyed, the women and children carried off or ravished, and the
men compelled to look on in an agony of helplessness till relieved by
death.  During all this time, however, the forms and ceremonials of
religion, and the polite manners received from the Spaniards, were
retained, and reverence for the emblems of Christianity was always
uppermost in the mind of even the most ignorant.




CHAPTER III.

ORDERED TO FORT READING, CAL.--A DANGEROUS UNDERTAKING--A RESCUED
SOLDIER--DISCOVERING INDIANS--PRIMITIVE FISHING--A DESERTED
VILLAGE--CAMPING OPPOSITE FORT VANCOUVER.

In November, 1854, I received my promotion to a second lieutenancy in
the Fourth Infantry, which was stationed in California and Oregon. In
order to join my company at Fort Reading, California, I had to go to
New York as a starting point, and on arrival there, was placed on
duty, in May, 1855, in command of a detachment of recruits at
Bedloe's Island, intended for assignment to the regiments on the
Pacific coast.  I think there were on the island (now occupied by the
statue of Liberty Enlightening the World) about three hundred
recruits.  For a time I was the only officer with them, but shortly
before we started for California, Lieutenant Francis H. Bates, of the
Fourth Infantry, was placed in command. We embarked for the Pacific
coast in July, 1855, and made the journey without incident via the
Isthmus of Panama, in due time landing our men at Benecia Barracks,
above San Francisco.

From this point I proceeded to join my company at Fort Reading, and
on reaching that post, found orders directing me to relieve
Lieutenant John B. Hood--afterward well known as a distinguished
general in the Confederate service.  Lieutenant Hood was in command
of the personal mounted escort of Lieutenant R. S. Williamson, who
was charged with the duty of making such explorations and surveys as
would determine the practicability of connecting, by railroad, the
Sacramento Valley in California with the Columbia River in Oregon
Territory, either through the Willamette Valley, or (if this route
should prove to be impracticable) by the valley of the Des Chutes
River near the foot-slopes of the Cascade chain.  The survey was
being made in accordance with an act of Congress, which provided both
for ascertaining the must practicable and economical route for a
railroad between the Mississippi River and the Pacific Ocean, and for
military and geographical surveys west of the Mississippi River.

Fort Reading was the starting-point for this exploring expedition,
and there I arrived some four or five days after the party under
Lieutenant Williamson had begun its march.  His personal escort
numbered about sixty mounted men, made up of detachments from
companies of the First Dragoons, under command of Lieutenant Hood,
together with about one hundred men belonging to the Fourth Infantry
and Third Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Horatio Gates Gibson,
the present colonel of the Third United States Artillery.  Lieutenant
George Crook--now major-general--was the quartermaster and commissary
of subsistence of the expedition.

The commanding officer at Fort Reading seemed reluctant to let me go
on to relieve Lieutenant Hood, as the country to be passed over was
infested by the Pit River Indians, known to be hostile to white
people and especially to small parties.  I was very anxious to
proceed, however, and willing to take the chances; so, consent being
finally obtained, I started with a corporal and two mounted men,
through a wild and uninhabited region, to overtake if possible
Lieutenant Williamson.  Being on horseback, and unencumbered by
luggage of any kind except blankets and a little hard bread, coffee
and smoking-tobacco, which were all carried on our riding animals, we
were sanguine of succeeding, for we traversed in one day fully the
distance made in three by Lieutenant Williamson's party on foot.

The first day we reached the base of Lassan's Butte, where I
determined to spend the night near an isolated cabin, or dugout, that
had been recently constructed by a hardy pioneer.  The wind was
blowing a disagreeable gale, which had begun early in the day.  This
made it desirable to locate our camp under the best cover we could
find, and I spent some little time in looking about for a
satisfactory place, but nothing better offered than a large fallen
tree, which lay in such a direction that by encamping on its lee side
we would be protected from the fury of the storm.  This spot was
therefore fixed upon, and preparation made for spending the night as
comfortably as the circumstances would permit.

After we had unsaddled I visited the cabin to inquire in regard to
the country ahead, and there found at first only a soldier of
Williamson's party; later the proprietor of the ranch appeared.  The
soldier had been left behind by the surveying party on account of
illness, with instructions to make his way back to Fort Reading as
best he could when he recovered.  His condition having greatly
improved, however, since he had been left, he now begged me in
beseeching terms to take him along with my party, which I finally
consented to do, provided that if he became unable to keep up with
me, and I should be obliged to abandon him, the responsibility would
be his, not mine.  This increased my number to five, and was quite a
reinforcement should we run across any hostile Indians; but it was
also certain to prove an embarrassment should the man again fall ill.

During the night, notwithstanding the continuance of the storm, I had
a very sound and refreshing sleep behind the protecting log where we
made our camp, and at daylight next morning we resumed our journey,
fortified by a breakfast of coffee and hard bread.  I skirted around
the base of Lassan's Butte, thence down Hat Creek, all the time
following the trail made by Lieutenant Williamson's party.  About
noon the soldier I had picked up at my first camp gave out, and could
go no farther.  As stipulated when I consented to take him along, I
had the right to abandon him, but when it came to the test I could
not make up my mind to do it.  Finding a good place not far off the
trail, one of my men volunteered to remain with him until he died;
and we left them there, with a liberal supply of hard bread and
coffee, believing that we would never again see the invalid.  My
reinforcement was already gone, and another man with it.

With my diminished party I resumed the trail and followed it until
about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when we heard the sound of voices,
and the corporal, thinking we were approaching Lieutenant
Williamson's party, was so overjoyed in anticipation of the junction,
that he wanted to fire his musket as an expression of his delight.
This I prevented his doing, however, and we continued cautiously and
slowly on to develop the source of the sounds in front.  We had not
gone far before I discovered that the noise came from a band of Pit
River Indians, who had struck the trail of the surveying expedition,
and were following it up, doubtless with evil intent.  Dismounting
from my horse I counted the moccasin tracks to ascertain the number
of Indians, discovered it to be about thirty, and then followed on
behind them cautiously, but with little difficulty, as appearances of
speed on their part indicated that they wished to overtake Lieutenant
Williamson's party, which made them less on the lookout than usual
for any possible pursuers.  After following the trail until nearly
sundown, I considered it prudent to stop for the night, and drew off
some little distance, where, concealed in a dense growth of timber,
we made our camp.

As I had with me now only two men, I felt somewhat nervous, so I
allowed no fires to be built, and in consequence our supper consisted
of hard bread only.  I passed an anxious night, but beyond our own
solicitude there was nothing to disturb us, the Indians being too
much interested in overtaking the party in front to seek for victims
in the rear, After a hard-bread breakfast we started again on the
trail, and had proceeded but a short distance when, hearing the
voices of the Indians, we at once slackened our speed so as not to
overtake them.

Most of the trail on which we traveled during the morning ran over an
exceedingly rough lava formation--a spur of the lava beds often
described during the Modoc war of 1873 so hard and flinty that
Williamson's large command made little impression on its surface,
leaving in fact, only indistinct traces of its line of march.  By
care and frequent examinations we managed to follow his route through
without much delay, or discovery by the Indians, and about noon,
owing to the termination of the lava formation, we descended into the
valley of Hat Greek, a little below where it emerges from the second
canon and above its confluence with Pit River.  As soon as we reached
the fertile soil of the valley, we found Williamson's trail well
defined, deeply impressed in the soft loam, and coursing through
wild-flowers and luxuriant grass which carpeted the ground on every
hand.

When we struck this delightful locality we traveled with considerable
speed, and after passing over hill and vale for some distance, the
trail becoming more and more distinct all the time, I suddenly saw in
front of me the Pit River Indians.

This caused a halt, and having hurriedly re-capped our guns and
six-shooters, thus preparing for the worst, I took a look at the band
through my field-glass.  They were a half-mile or more in our front
and numbered about thirty individuals, armed with bows and arrows
only.  Observing us they made friendly demonstrations, but I had not
implicit faith in a Pit River Indian at that period of the settlement
of our country, and especially in that wild locality, so after a
"council of war" with the corporal and man, I concluded to advance to
a point about two hundred yards distant from the party, when, relying
on the speed of our horses rather than on the peaceable intentions of
the savages, I hoped to succeed in cutting around them and take the
trail beyond.  Being on foot they could not readily catch us, and
inasmuch as their arrows were good for a range of only about sixty
yards, I had no fear of any material damage on that score.

On reaching the place selected for our flank movement we made a dash
to the left of the trail, through the widest part of the valley, and
ran our horses swiftly by, but I noticed that the Indians did not
seem to be disturbed by the manoeuvre and soon realized that this
indifference was occasioned by the knowledge that we could not cross
Hat Creek, a deep stream with vertical banks, too broad to be leaped
by our horses.  We were obliged, therefore, to halt, and the Indians
again made demonstrations of friendship, some of them even getting
into the stream to show that they were at the ford.  Thus reassured,
we regained our confidence and boldly crossed the river in the midst
of them.  After we had gained the bluff on the other side of the
creek, I looked down into the valley of Pit River, and could plainly
see the camp of the surveying party.  Its proximity was the influence
which had doubtless caused the peaceable conduct of the Indians.
Probably the only thing that saved us was their ignorance of our
being in their rear, until we stumbled on them almost within sight of
the large party under Williamson.

The Pit River Indians were very hostile at that time, and for many
succeeding years their treachery and cruelty brought misfortune and
misery to the white settlers who ventured their lives in search of
home and fortune in the wild and isolated section over which these
savages roamed.  Not long after Williamson's party passed through
their country, the Government was compelled to send into it a
considerable force for the purpose of keeping them under control.
The outcome of this was a severe fight--resulting in the loss of a
good many lives--between the hostiles and a party of our troops under
Lieutenant George Crook.  It finally ended in the establishment of a
military post in the vicinity of the battle-ground, for the permanent
occupation of the country.

A great load was lifted from my heart when I found myself so near
Williamson's camp, which I joined August 4, 1855, receiving a warm
welcome from the officers.  During the afternoon I relieved
Lieutenant Hood of the command of the personal escort, and he was
ordered to return, with twelve of the mounted men, over the trail I
had followed.  I pointed out to him on the map the spot where he
would find the two men left on the roadside, and he was directed to
take them into Fort Reading.  They were found without difficulty, and
carried in to the post.  The sick man--Duryea--whom I had expected
never to see again, afterward became the hospital steward at Fort
Yamhill, Oregon, when I was stationed there.

The Indians that I had passed at the ford came to the bluff above the
camp, and arranging themselves in a squatting posture, looked down
upon Williamson's party with longing eyes, in expectation of a feast.
They were a pitiable lot, almost naked, hungry and cadaverous.
Indians are always hungry, but these poor creatures were particularly
so, as their usual supply of food had grown very scarce from one
cause and another.

In prosperity they mainly subsisted on fish, or game killed with the
bow and arrow.  When these sources failed they lived on grasshoppers,
and at this season the grasshopper was their principal food.  In
former years salmon were very abundant in the streams of the
Sacramento Valley, and every fall they took great quantities of these
fish and dried them for winter use, but alluvial mining had of late
years defiled the water of the different streams and driven the fish
out.  On this account the usual supply of salmon was very limited.
They got some trout high up on the rivers, above the sluices and
rockers of the miners, but this was a precarious source from which to
derive food, as their means of taking the trout were very primitive.
They had neither hooks nor lines, but depended entirely on a
contrivance made from long, slender branches of willow, which grew on
the banks of most of the streams.  One of these branches would be
cut, and after sharpening the butt-end to a point, split a certain
distance, and by a wedge the prongs divided sufficiently to admit a
fish between.  The Indian fisherman would then slyly put the forked
end in the water over his intended victim, and with a quick dart
firmly wedge him between the prongs.  When secured there, the work of
landing him took but a moment.  When trout were plentiful this
primitive mode of taking them was quite successful, and I have often
known hundreds of pounds to be caught in this way, but when they were
scarce and suspicious the rude method was not rewarded with good
results.

The band looking down on us evidently had not had much fish or game
to eat for some time, so when they had made Williamson understand
that they were suffering for food he permitted them to come into
camp, and furnished them with a supply, which they greedily swallowed
as fast as it was placed at their service, regardless of possible
indigestion.  When they had eaten all they could hold, their
enjoyment was made complete by the soldiers, who gave them a quantity
of strong plug tobacco.  This they smoked incessantly, inhaling all
the smoke, so that none of the effect should be lost.  When we
abandoned this camp the next day, the miserable wretches remained in
it and collected the offal about the cooks' fires to feast still
more, piecing out the meal, no doubt, with their staple article of
food--grasshoppers.

On the morning of August 5 Lieutenant Hood started back to Fort
Reading, and Lieutenant Williamson resumed his march for the Columbia
River.  Our course was up Pit River, by the lower and upper canons,
then across to the Klamath Lakes, then east, along their edge to the
upper lake.  At the middle Klamath Lake, just after crossing Lost
River and the Natural Bridge, we met a small party of citizens from
Jacksonville, Oregon, looking for hostile Indians who had committed
some depredations in their neighborhood.  From them we learned that
the Rogue River Indians in southern Oregon were on the war-path, and
that as the "regular troops up there were of no account, the citizens
had taken matters in hand, and intended cleaning up the hostiles."
They swaggered about our camp, bragged a good deal, cursed the
Indians loudly, and soundly abused the Government for not giving them
better protection.  It struck me, however, that they had not worked
very hard to find the hostiles; indeed, it could plainly be seen that
their expedition was a town-meeting sort of affair, and that anxiety
to get safe home was uppermost in their thoughts.  The enthusiasm
with which they started had all oozed out, and that night they
marched back to Jacksonville.  The next day, at the head of the lake,
we came across an Indian village, and I have often wondered since
what would have been the course pursued by these valiant warriors
from Jacksonville had they gone far enough to get into its vicinity.

When we reached the village the tepees--made of grass--were all
standing, the fires burning and pots boiling--the pots filled with
camas and tula roots--but not an Indian was to be seen.  Williamson
directed that nothing in the village should be disturbed; so guards
were placed over it to carry out his instructions and we went into
camp just a little beyond.  We had scarcely established ourselves
when a very old Indian rose up from the high grass some distance off,
and with peaceable signs approached our camp, evidently for the
purpose of learning whether or not our intentions were hostile.
Williamson told him we were friendly; that we had passed through his
village without molesting it, that we had put a guard there to secure
the property his people had abandoned in their fright, and that they
might come back in safety.  The old man searchingly eyed everything
around for some little time, and gaining confidence from the
peaceable appearance of the men, who were engaged in putting up the
tents and preparing their evening meal, he concluded to accept our
professions of friendship, and bring his people in.  Going out about
half a mile from the village he gave a peculiar yell, at which
between three and four hundred Indians arose simultaneously from the
ground, and in answer to his signal came out of the tall grass like a
swarm of locusts and soon overran our camp in search of food, for
like all Indians they were hungry.  They too, proved to be Pit
Rivers, and were not less repulsive than those of their tribe we had
met before.  They were aware of the hostilities going on between the
Rogue Rivers and the whites, but claimed that they had not taken any
part in them.  I question if they had, but had our party been small,
I fear we should have been received at their village in a very
different manner.

From the upper Klamath Lake we marched over the divide and down the
valley of the Des Chutes River to a point opposite the mountains
called the Three Sisters.  Here, on September 23, the party divided,
Williamson and I crossing through the crater of the Three Sisters and
along the western slope of the Cascade Range, until we struck the
trail on McKenzie River, which led us into the Willamette Valley not
far from Eugene City.  We then marched down the Willamette Valley to
Portland, Oregon, where we arrived October 9, 1855

The infantry portion of the command, escorting Lieutenant Henry L.
Abbot, followed farther down the Des Chutes River, to a point
opposite Mount Hood, from which it came into the Willamette Valley
and then marched to Portland.  At Portland we all united, and moving
across the point between the Willamette and Columbia rivers, encamped
opposite Fort Vancouver, on the south bank of the latter stream, on
the farm of an old settler named Switzler, who had located there many
years before.




CHAPTER IV.

"OLD RED"--SKILLFUL SHOOTING--YAKIMA--WAR--A LUDICROUS
MISTAKE--"CUT-MOUTH JOHN'S" ENCOUNTER--FATHER PANDOZA'S
MISSION--A SNOW-STORM--FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION.

Our camp on the Columbia, near Fort Vancouver, was beautifully
situated on a grassy sward close to the great river; and--as little
duty was required of us after so long a journey, amusement of one
kind or another, and an interchange of visits with the officers at
the post, filled in the time acceptably.  We had in camp an old
mountaineer guide who had accompanied us on the recent march, and who
had received the sobriquet of "Old Red," on account of the shocky and
tangled mass of red hair and beard, which covered his head and face
so completely that only his eyes could be seen.  His eccentricities
constantly supplied us with a variety of amusements.  Among the
pastimes he indulged in was one which exhibited his skill with the
rifle, and at the same time protected the camp from the intrusions
and ravages of a drove of razor-backed hogs which belonged to Mr.
Switzler.  These hogs were frequent visitors, and very destructive to
our grassy sward, rooting it up in front of our tents and all about
us; in pursuit of bulbous roots and offal from the camp.  Old Red
conceived the idea that it would be well to disable the pigs by
shooting off the tips of their snouts, and he proceeded to put his
conception into execution, and continued it daily whenever the hogs
made their appearance.  Of course their owner made a row about it;
but when Old Red daily settled for his fun by paying liberally with
gold-dust from some small bottles of the precious metal in his
possession, Switzler readily became contented, and I think even
encouraged the exhibitions--of skill.

It was at this period (October, 1855) that the Yakima Indian war
broke out, and I was detached from duty with the exploring party and
required by Major Gabriel J. Rains, then commanding the district, to
join an expedition against the Yakimas.  They had some time before
killed their agent, and in consequence a force under Major Granville
O. Haller had been sent out from the Dalles of the Columbia to
chastise them; but the expedition had not been successful; in fact,
it had been driven back, losing a number of men and two mountain
howitzers.

The object of the second expedition was to retrieve this disaster.
The force was composed of a small body of regular troops, and a
regiment of Oregon mounted volunteers under command of Colonel James
W. Nesmith--subsequently for several years United States Senator from
Oregon.  The whole force was under the command of Major Rains, Fourth
Infantry, who, in order that he might rank Nesmith, by some
hocus-pocus had been made a brigadier-general, under an appointment
from the Governor of Washington Territory.

We started from the Dalles October 30, under conditions that were not
conducive to success.  The season was late for operations; and worse
still, the command was not in accord with the commanding officer,
because of general belief in his incompetency, and on account of the
fictitious rank he assumed.  On the second day out I struck a small
body of Indians with my detachment of dragoons, but was unable to do
them any particular injury beyond getting possession of a large
quantity of their winter food, which their hurried departure
compelled them to abandon.  This food consisted principally of dried
salmon-pulverized and packed in sacks made of grass-dried
huckleberries, and dried camas; the latter a bulbous root about the
size of a small onion, which, when roasted and ground, is made into
bread by the Indians and has a taste somewhat like cooked chestnuts.

Our objective point was Father Pandoza's Mission, in the Yakima
Valley, which could be reached by two different routes, and though
celerity of movement was essential, our commanding officer
"strategically" adopted the longer route, and thus the Indians had
ample opportunity to get away with their horses, cattle, women and
children, and camp property.

After the encounter which I just now referred to, the command, which
had halted to learn the results of my chase, resumed its march to and
through the Klikitat canon, and into the lower Yakima Valley, in the
direction of the Yakima River.  I had charge at the head of the
column as it passed through the canon, and on entering the valley
beyond, saw in the distance five or six Indian scouts, whom I pressed
very closely, until after a run of several miles they escaped across
the Yakima River.

The soil in the valley was light and dry, and the movement of animals
over it raised great clouds of dust, that rendered it very difficult
to distinguish friend from foe; and as I was now separated from the
main column a considerable distance, I deemed it prudent to call a
halt until we could discover the direction taken by the principal
body of the Indians.  We soon learned that they had gone up the
valley, and looking that way, we discovered a column of alkali dust
approaching us, about a mile distant, interposing between my little
detachment and the point where I knew General Rains intended to
encamp for the night.  After hastily consulting with Lieutenant
Edward H. Day, of the Third United States Artillery, who was with me,
we both concluded that the dust was caused by a body of the enemy
which had slipped in between us and our main force.  There seemed no
alternative left us but to get back to our friends by charging
through these Indians; and as their cloud of dust was much larger
than ours, this appeared a desperate chance.  Preparations to charge
were begun, however, but, much to our surprise, before they were
completed the approaching party halted for a moment and then
commenced to retreat.  This calmed the throbbing of our hearts, and
with a wild cheer we started in a hot pursuit, that continued for
about two miles, when to our great relief we discovered that we were
driving into Rains's camp a squadron of Nesmith's battalion of Oregon
volunteers that we had mistaken for Indians, and who in turn believed
us to be the enemy.  When camp was reached, we all indulged in a
hearty laugh over the affair, and at the fright each party had given
the other.  The explanations which ensued proved that the squadron of
volunteers had separated from the column at the same time that I had
when we debouched from the canon, and had pursued an intermediate
trail through the hills, which brought it into the valley of the
Yakima at a point higher up the river than where I had struck it.

Next day we resumed our march up the valley, parallel to the Yakima.
About 1 o'clock we saw a large body of Indians on the opposite side
of the river, and the general commanding made up his mind to cross
and attack them.  The stream was cold, deep, and swift, still I
succeeded in passing my dragoons over safely, but had hardly got them
well on the opposite bank when the Indians swooped down upon us.
Dismounting my men, we received the savages with a heavy fire, which
brought them to a halt with some damage and more or less confusion.

General Rains now became very much excited and alarmed about me, and
endeavored to ford the swift river with his infantry and artillery,
but soon had to abandon the attempt, as three or four of the poor
fellows were swept off their feet and drowned.  Meantime Nesmith came
up with his mounted force, crossed over, and joined me.

The Indians now fell back to a high ridge, on the crest of which they
marched and countermarched, threatening to charge down its face.
Most of them were naked, and as their persons were painted in gaudy
colors and decorated with strips of red flannel, red blankets and gay
war-bonnets, their appearance presented a scene of picturesque
barbarism, fascinating but repulsive.  As they numbered about six
hundred, the chances of whipping them did not seem overwhelmingly in
our favor, yet Nesmith and I concluded we would give them a little
fight, provided we could engage them without going beyond the ridge.
But all our efforts were in vain, for as we advanced they retreated,
and as we drew back they reappeared and renewed their parade and
noisy demonstrations, all the time beating their drums and yelling
lustily.  They could not be tempted into a fight where we desired it,
however, and as we felt unequal to any pursuit beyond the ridge
without the assistance of the infantry and artillery, we re-crossed
the river and encamped with Rains.  It soon became apparent that the
noisy demonstrations of the Indians were intended only as a blind to
cover the escape of their women and children to a place of safety in
the mountains.

Next morning we took up our march without crossing the river; and as
our route would lead us by the point on the opposite bank where the
Indians had made their picturesque display the day before, they at an
early hour came over to our side, and rapidly moved ahead of us to
some distant hills, leaving in our pathway some of the more
venturesome young braves, who attempted, to retard our advance by
opening fire at long range from favorable places where they lay
concealed.  This fire did us little harm, but it had the effect of
making our progress so slow that the patience of every one but
General Rains was well-nigh exhausted.

About 2 o'clock in the afternoon we arrived well up near the base of
the range of hills, and though it was growing late we still had time
to accomplish something, but our commanding officer decided that it
was best to go into camp, and make a systematic attack next morning.
I proposed that he let me charge with my dragoons through the narrow
canon where the river broke through the range, while the infantry
should charge up the hill and drive the enemy from the top down on
the other side.  In this way I thought we might possibly catch some
of the fugitives, but his extreme caution led him to refuse the
suggestion, so we pitched our tents out of range of their desultory
fire, but near enough to observe plainly their menacing and
tantalizing exhibitions of contempt.

In addition to firing occasionally, they called us all sorts of bad
names, made indecent gestures, and aggravated us, so that between 3
and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, by an inexplicable concert of action,
and with a serious breach of discipline, a large number of the men
and many of the officers broke en masse from the camp with loud yells
and charged the offending savages.  As soon as this mob got within
musket-shot they opened fire on the Indians, who ran down the other
face of the ridge without making the slightest resistance.  The hill
was readily taken by this unmilitary proceeding, and no one was hurt
on either side, but as Rains would not permit it to be held, a large
bonfire was lighted on the crest in celebration of the victory, and
then all hands marched back to camp, where they had no sooner arrived
and got settled down than the Indians returned to the summit of the
ridge, seemingly to enjoy the fire that had been so generously built
for their benefit, and with renewed taunts and gestures continued to
insult us.

Our camp that night was strongly picketed, and when we awoke in the
morning the Indians still occupied their position on the hill.  At
daylight we advanced against them, two or three companies of infantry
moving forward to drive them from the summit, while our main column
passed through the canon into the upper Yakima Valley led by my
dragoons, who were not allowed to charge into the gorge, as the
celerity of such a movement might cause the tactical combination to
fail.

As we passed slowly and cautiously through the canon the Indians ran
rapidly away, and when we reached the farther end they had entirely
disappeared from our front, except one old fellow, whose lame horse
prevented him keeping up with the main body.  This presented an
opportunity for gaining results which all thought should not be lost,
so our guide, an Indian named "Cut-mouth John," seized upon it, and
giving hot chase, soon, overtook the poor creature, whom he speedily
killed without much danger to himself, for the fugitive was armed
with only an old Hudson's Bay flint-lock horse-pistol which could not
be discharged.

"Cut-mouth John's" engagement began and ended all the fighting that
took place on this occasion, and much disappointment and discontent
followed, Nesmith's mounted force and my dragoons being particularly
disgusted because they had not been "given a chance."  During the
remainder of the day we cautiously followed the retreating foe, and
late in the evening went into camp a short distance from Father
Pandoza's Mission; where we were to await a small column of troops
under command of Captain Maurice Maloney, of the Fourth Infantry,
that was to join us from Steilicom by way of the Natchez Pass, and
from which no tidings had as yet been received.

Next morning the first thing I saw when I put my head out from my
blankets was "Cut-mouth John," already mounted and parading himself
through the camp.  The scalp of the Indian he had despatched the day
before was tied to the cross-bar of his bridle bit, the hair dangling
almost to the ground, and John was decked out in the sacred vestments
of Father Pandoza, having, long before any one was stirring in camp,
ransacked the log-cabin at the Mission in which the good man had
lived.  John was at all times a most repulsive looking individual, a
part of his mouth having been shot away in a fight with Indians near
Walla Walla some years before, in which a Methodist missionary had
been killed; but his revolting personal appearance was now worse than
ever, and the sacrilegious use of Father Pandoza's vestments, coupled
with the ghastly scalp that hung from his bridle, so turned opinion
against him that he was soon captured, dismounted, and his parade
brought to an abrupt close, and I doubt whether he ever after quite
reinstated himself in the good graces of the command.

In the course of the day nearly all the men visited the Mission, but
as it had been plundered by the Indians at the outbreak of
hostilities, when Father Pandoza was carried off, little of value was
left about it except a considerable herd of pigs, which the father
with great difficulty had succeeded in accumulating from a very small
beginning.  The pigs had not been disturbed by the Indians, but the
straggling troops soon disposed of them, and then turned their
attention to the cabbages and potatoes in the garden, with the
intention, no doubt, of dining that day on fresh pork and fresh
vegetables instead of on salt junk and hard bread, which formed their
regular diet on the march.  In digging up the potatoes some one
discovered half a keg of powder, which had been buried in the garden
by the good father to prevent the hostile Indians from getting it to
use against the whites.  As soon as this was unearthed wild
excitement ensued, and a cry arose that Father Pandoza was the person
who furnished powder to the Indians; that here was the proof; that at
last the mysterious means by which the Indians obtained ammunition
was explained--and a rush was made for the mission building. This was
a comfortable log-house of good size, built by the Indians for a
school and church, and attached to one end was the log-cabin
residence of the priest.  Its destruction was a matter of but a few
moments.  A large heap of dry wood was quickly collected and piled in
the building, matches applied, and the whole Mission, including the
priest's house, was soon enveloped in flames, and burned to the
ground before the officers in camp became aware of the disgraceful
plundering in which their men were engaged.

The commanding officer having received no news from Captain Maloney
during the day, Colonel Nesmith and I were ordered to go to his
rescue, as it was concluded that he had been surrounded by Indians in
the Natchez Pass.  We started early the next morning, the snow
falling slightly as we set out, and soon arrived at the eastern mouth
of the Natchez Pass.  On the way we noticed an abandoned Indian
village, which had evidently not been occupied for some time.  As we
proceeded the storm increased, and the snow-fall became deeper and
deeper, until finally our horses could not travel through it.  In
consequence we were compelled to give up further efforts to advance,
and obliged to turn back to the abandoned village, where we encamped
for the night.  Near night-fall the storm greatly increased, and our
bivouac became most uncomfortable; but spreading my blankets on the
snow and covering them with Indian matting, I turned in and slept
with that soundness and refreshment accorded by nature to one
exhausted by fatigue.  When I awoke in the morning I found myself
under about two feet of snow, from which I arose with difficulty, yet
grateful that it had kept me warm during the night.

After a cup of coffee and a little hard bread, it was decided we
should return to the main camp near the Mission, for we were now
confident that Maloney was delayed by the snow, and safe enough on
the other side of the mountains.  At all events he was beyond aid
from us, for the impassable snowdrifts could not be overcome with the
means in our possession.  It turned out that our suppositions as to
the cause of his delay were correct.  He had met with the same
difficulties that confronted us, and had been compelled to go into
camp.

Meanwhile valuable time had been lost, and the Indians, with their
families and stock, were well on their way to the Okenagan country, a
region into which we could not penetrate in the winter season.  No
other course was therefore left but to complete the dismal failure of
the expedition by returning home, and our commander readily gave the
order to march back to the Dalles by the "short" route over the
Yakima Mountains.

As the storm was still unabated, it was evident our march home would
be a most difficult one, and it was deemed advisable to start back at
once, lest we should be blocked up in the mountains by the snows for
a period beyond which our provisions would not last.  Relying on the
fact that the short route to the Dalles would lead us over the range
at its most depressed point, where it was hoped the depth of snow was
not yet so great as to make the route impassable, we started with
Colonel Nesmith's battalion in advance to break the road, followed by
my dragoons.  In the valley we made rapid progress, but when we
reached the mountain every step we took up its side showed the snow
to be growing deeper and deeper.  At last Nesmith reached the summit,
and there found a depth of about six feet of snow covering the
plateau in every direction, concealing all signs of the trail so
thoroughly that his guides became bewildered and took the wrong
divide.  The moment I arrived at the top my guide--Donald Mc Kay--who
knew perfectly the whole Yakima range, discovered Nesmith's mistake.
Word was sent to bring him back, but as he had already nearly crossed
the plateau, considerable delay occurred before he returned.  When he
arrived we began anew the work of breaking a road for the foot troops
behind us, my detachment now in advance.  The deep snow made our work
extremely laborious, exhausting men and horses almost to the point of
relinquishing the struggle, but our desperate situation required that
we should get down into the valley beyond, or run the chance of
perishing on the mountain in a storm which seemed unending.  About
midnight the column reached the valley, very tired and hungry, but
much elated over its escape.  We had spent a day of the most intense
anxiety, especially those who had had the responsibility of keeping
to the right trail, and been charged with the hard work of breaking
the road for the infantry and artillery through such a depth of snow.

Our main difficulties were now over, and in due time we reached the
Dalles, where almost everyone connected with the expedition voted it
a wretched failure; indeed, General Rains himself could not think
otherwise, but he scattered far and wide blame for the failure of his
combinations.  This, of course, led to criminations and
recriminations, which eventuated in charges of incompetency preferred
against him by Captain Edward O. C. Ord, of the Third Artillery.
Rains met the charges with counter-charges against Ord, whom he
accused of purloining Father Pandoza's shoes, when the soldiers in
their fury about the ammunition destroyed the Mission.  At the time
of its destruction a rumor of this nature was circulated through
camp, started by some wag, no doubt in jest; for Ord, who was
somewhat eccentric in his habits, and had started on the expedition
rather indifferently shod in carpet-slippers, here came out in a
brand-new pair of shoes.  Of course there was no real foundation for
such a report, but Rains was not above small things, as the bringing
of this petty accusation attests.  Neither party was ever tried, for
General John E. Wool the department commander, had not at command a
sufficient number of officers of appropriate rank to constitute a
court in the case of Rains, and the charges against Ord were very
properly ignored on account of their trifling character.

Shortly after the expedition returned to the Dalles, my detachment
was sent down to Fort Vancouver, and I remained at that post during
the winter of 1855-'56, till late in March.




CHAPTER V.

AN INDIAN CONFEDERATION--MASSACRE AT THE CASCADES OF THE
COLUMBIA--PLAN TO RELIEVE THE BLOCKHOUSE--A HAZARDOUS FLANK
MOVEMENT--A NEW METHOD OF ESTABLISHING GUILT--EXECUTION OF
THE INDIAN MURDERERS.

The failure of the Haller expedition from lack of a sufficient force,
and of the Rains expedition from the incompetency of its commander,
was a great mortification to the officers and men connected with
them, and, taken together, had a marked effect upon the Indian
situation in Oregon and Washington Territories at that particular
era.  Besides, it led to further complications and troubles, for it
had begun to dawn upon the Indians that the whites wanted to come in
and dispossess them of their lands and homes, and the failures of
Haller and Rains fostered the belief with the Indians that they could
successfully resist the pressure of civilization.

Acting under these influences, the Spokanes, Walla Wallas, Umatillas,
and Nez Perces cast their lot with the hostiles, and all the savage
inhabitants of the region east of the Cascade Range became involved
in a dispute as to whether the Indians or the Government should
possess certain sections of the country, which finally culminated in
the war of 1856.

Partly to meet the situation that was approaching, the Ninth Infantry
had been sent out from the Atlantic coast to Washington Territory,
and upon its arrival at Fort Vancouver encamped in front of the
officers' quarters, on the beautiful parade-ground of that post, and
set about preparing for the coming campaign.  The commander, Colonel
George Wright, who had been promoted to the colonelcy of the regiment
upon its organization the previous year, had seen much active duty
since his graduation over thirty years before, serving with credit in
the Florida and Mexican wars.  For the three years previous to his
assignment to the Ninth Infantry he had been stationed on the Pacific
coast, and the experience he had there acquired, added to his
excellent soldierly qualities, was of much benefit in the active
campaigns in which, during the following years, he was to
participate.  Subsequently his career was brought to an untimely
close when, nine years after this period, as he was returning to the
scene of his successes, he, in common with many others was drowned by
the wreck of the ill-fated steamer Brother Jonathan.  Colonel Wright
took command of the district in place of Rains, and had been at
Vancouver but a short time before he realized that it would be
necessary to fight the confederated tribes east of the Cascade Range
of mountains, in order to disabuse them of the idea that they were
sufficiently strong to cope with the power of the Government.  He
therefore at once set about the work of organizing and equipping his
troops for a start in the early spring against the hostile Indians,
intending to make the objective point of his expedition the heart of
the Spokane country on the Upper Columbia River, as the head and
front of the confederation was represented in the person of old
Cammiackan, chief of the Spokanes.

The regiment moved from Fort Vancouver by boat, March 25, 1856, and
landed at the small town called the Dalles, below the mouth of the
Des Chutes River at the eastern base of the Cascade Range, and just
above where the Columbia River enters those mountains.  This
rendezvous was to be the immediate point of departure, and all the
troops composing the expedition were concentrated there.

On the morning of March 26 the movement began, but the column had
only reached Five Mile Creek when the Yakimas, joined by many young
warriors-free lances from other tribes, made a sudden and unexpected
attack at the Cascades of the Columbia, midway between Vancouver and
the Dalles, killed several citizens, women and children, and took
possession of the Portage by besieging the settlers in their cabins
at the Upper Cascades, and those who sought shelter at the Middle
Cascades in the old military block-house, which had been built some
years before as a place of refuge under just such circumstances.
These points held out, and were not captured, but the landing at the
Lower Cascades fell completely into the hands of the savages.
Straggling settlers from the Lower Cascades made their way down to
Fort Vancouver, distant about thirty-six miles, which they reached
that night; and communicated the condition of affairs.  As the
necessity for early relief to the settlers and the re-establishment
of communication with the Dalles were apparent, all the force that
could be spared was ordered out, and in consequence I immediately
received directions to go with my detachment of dragoons, numbering
about forty effective men, to the relief of the middle blockhouse,
which really meant to retake the Cascades.  I got ready at once, and
believing that a piece of artillery would be of service to me, asked
for one, but as there proved to be no guns at the post, I should have
been obliged to proceed without one had it not been that the regular
steamer from San Francisco to Portland was lying at the Vancouver
dock unloading military supplies, and the commander, Captain Dall,
supplied me with the steamer's small iron cannon, mounted on a wooden
platform, which he used in firing salutes at different ports on the
arrival and departure of the vessel.  Finding at the arsenal a supply
of solid shot that would fit the gun, I had it put upon the steamboat
Belle, employed to carry my command to the scene of operations, and
started up the Columbia River at 2 A.M. on the morning of the 27th.
We reached the Lower Cascades early in the day, where, selecting a
favorable place for the purpose, I disembarked my men and gun on the
north bank of the river, so that I could send back the steamboat to
bring up any volunteer assistance that in the mean time might have
been collected at Vancouver.

The Columbia River was very high at the time, and the water had
backed up into the slough about the foot of the Lower Cascades to
such a degree that it left me only a narrow neck of firm ground to
advance over toward the point occupied by the Indians.  On this neck
of land the hostiles had taken position, as I soon learned by
frequent shots, loud shouting, and much blustering; they, by the most
exasperating yells and indecent exhibitions, daring me to the
contest.

After getting well in hand everything connected with my little
command, I advanced with five or six men to the edge of a growth of
underbrush to make a reconnoissance.  We stole along under cover of
this underbrush until we reached the open ground leading over the
causeway or narrow neck before mentioned, when the enemy opened fire
and killed a soldier near my side by a shot which, just grazing the
bridge of my nose, struck him in the neck, opening an artery and
breaking the spinal cord.  He died instantly.  The Indians at once
made a rush for the body, but my men in the rear, coming quickly to
the rescue, drove them back; and Captain Doll's gun being now brought
into play, many solid shot were thrown into the jungle where they lay
concealed, with the effect of considerably moderating their
impetuosity.  Further skirmishing at long range took place at
intervals during the day, with little gain or loss, however, to
either side, for both parties held positions which could not be
assailed in flank, and only the extreme of rashness in either could
prompt a front attack.  My left was protected by the back water
driven into the slough by the high stage of the river, and my right
rested secure on the main stream.  Between us was only the narrow
neck of land, to cross which would be certain death.  The position of
the Indians was almost the exact counterpart of ours.

In the evening I sent a report of the situation back to Vancouver by
the steamboat, retaining a large Hudson's Bay bateau which I had
brought up with me.  Examining this I found it would carry about
twenty men, and made up my mind that early next morning I would cross
the command to the opposite or south side of the Columbia River, and
make my way up along the mountain base until I arrived abreast the
middle blockhouse, which was still closely besieged, and then at some
favorable point recross to the north bank to its relief, endeavoring
in this manner to pass around and to the rear of the Indians, whose
position confronting me was too strong for a direct attack.  This
plan was hazardous, but I believed it could be successfully carried
out if the boat could be taken with me; but should I not be able to
do this I felt that the object contemplated in sending me out would
miserably fail, and the small band cooped up at the block-house would
soon starve or fall a prey to the Indians, so I concluded to risk all
the chances the plan involved.

On the morning of March 28 the savages were still in my front, and
after giving them some solid shot from Captain Dall's gun we slipped
down to the river-bank, and the detachment crossed by means of the
Hudson's Bay boat, making a landing on the opposite shore at a point
where the south channel of the river, after flowing around Bradford's
Island, joins the main stream.  It was then about 9 o'clock, and
everything had thus far proceeded favorably, but examination of the
channel showed that it would be impossible to get the boat up the
rapids along the mainland, and that success could only be assured by
crossing the south channel just below the rapids to the island, along
the shore of which there was every probability we could pull the boat
through the rocks and swift water until the head of the rapids was
reached, from which point to the block-house there was smooth water.
Telling the men of the embarrassment in which I found myself, and
that if I could get enough of them to man the boat and pull it up the
stream by a rope to the shore we would cross to the island and make
the attempt, all volunteered to go, but as ten men seemed sufficient
I selected that number to accompany me.  Before starting, however, I
deemed it prudent to find out if possible what was engaging the
attention of the Indians, who had not yet discovered that we had left
their front.  I therefore climbed up the side of the abrupt mountain
which skirted the water's edge until I could see across the island.
From this point I observed the Indians running horse-races and
otherwise enjoying themselves behind the line they had held against
me the day before.  The squaws decked out in gay colors, and the men
gaudily dressed in war bonnets, made the scene most attractive, but
as everything looked propitious for the dangerous enterprise in hand
I spent little time watching them.  Quickly returning to the boat, I
crossed to the island with my ten men, threw ashore the rope attached
to the bow, and commenced the difficult task of pulling her up the
rapids.  We got along slowly at first, but soon striking a camp of
old squaws who had been left on the island for safety, and had not
gone over to the mainland to see the races, we utilized them to our
advantage.  With unmistakable threats and signs we made them not only
keep quiet, but also give us much needed assistance in pulling
vigorously on the towrope of our boat.

I was laboring under a dreadful strain of mental anxiety during all
this time, for had the Indians discovered what we were about, they
could easily have come over to the island in their canoes, and, by
forcing us to take up our arms to repel their attack, doubtless would
have obliged the abandonment of the boat, and that essential adjunct
to the final success of my plan would have gone down the rapids.
Indeed, under such circumstances, it would have been impossible for
ten men to hold out against the two or three hundred Indians; but the
island forming an excellent screen to our movements, we were not
discovered, and when we reached the smooth water at the upper end of
the rapids we quickly crossed over and joined the rest of the men,
who in the meantime had worked their way along the south bank of the
river parallel with us.  I felt very grateful to the old squaws for
the assistance they rendered.  They worked well under compulsion, and
manifested no disposition to strike for higher wages.  Indeed, I was
so much relieved when we had crossed over from the island and joined
the rest of the party, that I mentally thanked the squaws one and
all.  I had much difficulty in keeping the men on the main shore from
cheering at our success, but hurriedly taking into the bateau all of
them it could carry, I sent the balance along the southern bank,
where the railroad is now built, until both detachments arrived at a
point opposite the block-house, when, crossing to the north bank, I
landed below the blockhouse some little distance, and returned the
boat for the balance of the men, who joined me in a few minutes.

When the Indians attacked the people at the Cascades on the 26th,
word was sent to Colonel Wright, who had already got out from the
Dalles a few miles on his expedition to the Spokane country.  He
immediately turned his column back, and soon after I had landed and
communicated with the beleaguered block-house the advance of his
command arrived under Lieutenant-Colonel Edward J. Steptoe.  I
reported to Steptoe, and related what had occurred during the past
thirty-six hours, gave him a description of the festivities that were
going on at the lower Cascades, and also communicated the
intelligence that the Yakimas had been joined by the Cascade Indians
when the place was first attacked.  I also told him it was my belief
that when he pushed down the main shore the latter tribe without
doubt would cross over to the island we had just left, while the
former would take to the mountains.  Steptoe coincided with me in
this opinion, and informing me that Lieutenant Alexander Piper would
join my detachment with a mountain' howitzer, directed me to convey
the command to the island and gobble up all who came over to it.

Lieutenant Piper and I landed on the island with the first boatload,
and after disembarking the howitzer we fired two or three shots to
let the Indians know we had artillery with us, then advanced down the
island with the whole of my command, which had arrived in the mean
time; all of the men were deployed as skirmishers except a small
detachment to operate the howitzer.  Near the lower end of the island
we met, as I had anticipated, the entire body of Cascade Indianmen,
women, and children--whose homes were in the vicinity of the
Cascades.  They were very much frightened and demoralized at the turn
events had taken, for the Yakimas at the approach of Steptoe had
abandoned them, as predicted, and fled to the mountians.  The chief
and head-men said they had had nothing to do with the capture of the
Cascades, with the murder of men at the upper landing, nor with the
massacre of men, women, and children near the block-house, and put
all the blame on the Yakimas and their allies.  I did not believe
this, however, and to test the truth of their statement formed them
all in line with their muskets in hand.  Going up to the first man on
the right I accused him of having engaged in the massacre, but was
met by a vigorous denial.  Putting my forefinger into the muzzle of
his gun, I found unmistakable signs of its having been recently
discharged.  My finger was black with the stains of burnt powder, and
holding it up to the Indian, he had nothing more to say in the face
of such positive evidence of his guilt.  A further examination proved
that all the guns were in the same condition.  Their arms were at
once taken possession of, and leaving a small, force to look after
the women and children and the very old men, so that there could be
no possibility of escape, I arrested thirteen of the principal
miscreants, crossed the river to the lower landing, and placed them
in charge of a strong guard.

Late in the evening the steamboat, which I had sent back to
Vancouver, returned, bringing to my assistance from Vancouver,
Captain Henry D. Wallen's company of the Fourth Infantry and a
company of volunteers hastily organized at Portland, but as the
Cascades had already been retaken, this reinforcement was too late to
participate in the affair.  The volunteers from Portland, however,
were spoiling for a fight, and in the absence of other opportunity
desired to shoot the prisoners I held (who, they alleged, had killed
a man named Seymour), and proceeded to make their arrangements to do
so, only desisting on being informed that the Indians were my
prisoners, subject to the orders of Colonel Wright, and would be
protected to the last by my detachment.  Not long afterward Seymour
turned up safe and sound, having fled at the beginning of the attack
on the Cascades, and hid somewhere in the thick underbrush until the
trouble was over, and then made his way back to the settlement.  The
next day I turned my prisoners over to Colonel Wright, who had them
marched to the upper landing of the Cascades, where, after a trial by
a military commission, nine of them were sentenced to death and duly
hanged.  I did not see them executed, but was afterward informed
that, in the absence of the usual mechanical apparatus used on such
occasions, a tree with a convenient limb under which two empty
barrels were placed, one on top of the other, furnished a rude but
certain substitute.  In executing the sentence each Indian in turn
was made to stand on the top barrel, and after the noose was adjusted
the lower barrel was knocked away, and the necessary drop thus
obtained.  In this way the whole nine were punished.  Just before
death they all acknowledged their guilt by confessing their
participation in the massacre at the block-house, and met their doom
with the usual stoicism of their race.




CHAPTER VI.

MISDIRECTED VENGEANCE--HONORABLE MENTION--CHANGE OF COMMAND--EDUCATED
OXEN--FEEDING THE INDIANS--PURCHASING A BURYING-GROUND--KNOWING RATS.

While still encamped at the lower landing, some three or four days
after the events last recounted, Mr. Joseph Meek, an old frontiersman
and guide for emigrant trains through the mountains, came down from
the Dalles, on his way to Vancouver, and stopped at my camp to
inquire if an Indian named Spencer and his family had passed down to
Vancouver since my arrival at the Cascades.  Spencer, the head of the
family, was a very influential, peaceable Chinook chief, whom Colonel
Wright had taken with him from Fort Vancouver as an interpreter and
mediator with the Spokanes and other hostile tribes, against which
his campaign was directed.  He was a good, reliable Indian, and on
leaving Vancouver to join Colonel Wright, took his family along, to
remain with relatives and friends at Fort Dalles until the return of
the expedition.  When Wright was compelled to retrace his steps on
account of the capture of the Cascades, this family for some reason
known only to Spencer, was started by him down the river to their
home at Vancouver.

Meek, on seeing the family leave the Dalles, had some misgivings as
to their safe arrival at their destination, because of the excited
condition of the people about the Cascades; but Spencer seemed to
think that his own peaceable and friendly reputation, which was
widespread, would protect them; so he parted from his wife and
children with little apprehension as to their safety.  In reply to
Meek's question, I stated that I had not seen Spencer's family, when
he remarked, "Well, I fear that they are gone up," a phrase used in
that country in early days to mean that they had been killed.  I
questioned him closely, to elicit further information, but no more
could be obtained; for Meek, either through ignorance or the usual
taciturnity of his class, did not explain more fully, and when the
steamer that had brought the reinforcement started down the river, he
took passage for Vancouver, to learn definitely if the Indian family
had reached that point.  I at once sent to the upper landing, distant
about six miles, to make inquiry in regard to the matter, and in a,
little time my messenger returned with the information that the
family had reached that place the day before, and finding that we had
driven the hostiles off, continued their journey on foot toward my
camp, from which point they expected to go by steamer down the river
to Vancouver.

Their non-arrival aroused in me suspicions of foul play, so with all
the men I could spare, and accompanied by Lieutenant William T.
Welcker, of the Ordnance Corps--a warm and intimate friend--I went in
search of the family, deploying the men as skirmishers across the
valley, and marching them through the heavy forest where the ground
was covered with fallen timber and dense underbrush, in order that no
point might escape our attention.  The search was continued between
the base of the mountain and the river without finding any sign of
Spencer's family, until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when we
discovered them between the upper and lower landing, in a small open
space about a mile from the road, all dead--strangled to death with
bits of rope.  The party consisted of the mother, two youths, three
girls, and a baby.  They had all been killed by white men, who had
probably met the innocent creatures somewhere near the blockhouse,
driven them from the road into the timber, where the cruel murders
were committed without provocation, and for no other purpose than the
gratification of the inordinate hatred of the Indian that has often
existed on the frontier, and which on more than one occasion has
failed to distinguish friend from foe.  The bodies lay in a
semicircle, and the bits of rope with which the poor wretches had
been strangled to death were still around their necks.  Each piece of
rope--the unwound strand of a heavier piece--was about two feet long,
and encircled the neck of its victim with a single knot, that must
have been drawn tight by the murderers pulling at the ends.  As there
had not been quite enough rope to answer for all, the babe was
strangled by means of a red silk handkerchief, taken, doubtless, from
the neck of its mother.  It was a distressing sight.  A most cruel
outrage had been committed upon unarmed people--our friends and
allies--in a spirit of aimless revenge.  The perpetrators were
citizens living near the middle block-house, whose wives and children
had been killed a few days before by the hostiles, but who well knew
that these unoffending creatures had had nothing to do with those
murders.

In my experience I have been obliged to look upon many cruel scenes
in connection with Indian warfare on the Plains since that day, but
the effect of this dastardly and revolting crime has never been
effaced from my memory.  Greater and more atrocious massacres have
been committed often by Indians; their savage nature modifies one's
ideas, however, as to the inhumanity of their acts, but when such
wholesale murder as this is done by whites, and the victims not only
innocent, but helpless, no defense can be made for those who
perpetrated the crime, if they claim to be civilized beings.  It is
true the people at the Cascades had suffered much, and that their
wives and children had been murdered before their eyes, but to wreak
vengeance on Spencer's unoffending family, who had walked into their
settlement under the protection of a friendly alliance, was an
unparalleled outrage which nothing can justify or extenuate.  With as
little delay as possible after the horrible discovery, I returned to
camp, had boxes made, and next day buried the bodies of these hapless
victims of misdirected vengeance.

The summary punishment inflicted on the nine Indians, in their trial
and execution, had a most salutary effect on the confederation, and
was the entering wedge to its disintegration; and though Colonel
Wright's campaign continued during the summer and into the early
winter, the subjugation of the allied bands became a comparatively
easy matter after the lesson taught the renegades who were captured
at the Cascades.  My detachment did not accompany Colonel Wright, but
remained for some time at the Cascades, and while still there General
Wool came up from San Francisco to take a look into the condition of
things.  From his conversation with me in reference to the affair at
the Cascades, I gathered that he was greatly pleased at the service I
had performed, and I afterward found that his report of my conduct
had so favorably impressed General Scott that that distinguished
officer complimented me from the headquarters of the army in general
orders.

General Wool, while personally supervising matters on the Columbia
River, directed a redistribution to some extent of the troops in the
district, and shortly before his return to San Francisco I was
ordered with my detachment of dragoons to take station on the Grande
Ronde Indian Reservation in Yamhill County, Oregon, about twenty-five
miles southwest of Dayton, and to relieve from duty at that point
Lieutenant William B. Hazen--late brigadier-general and chief signal
officer--who had established a camp there some time before.  I
started for my new station on April 21, and marching by way of
Portland and Oregon City, arrived at Hazen's camp April 25.  The camp
was located in the Coast range of mountains, on the northeast part of
the reservation, to which last had been added a section of country
that was afterward known as the Siletz reservation.  The whole body
of land set aside went under the general name of the "Coast
reservation," from its skirting the Pacific Ocean for some distance
north of Yaquina Bay, and the intention was to establish within its
bounds permanent homes for such Indians as might be removed to it.
In furtherance of this idea, and to relieve northern California and
southwestern Oregon from the roaming, restless bands that kept the
people of those sections in a state of constant turmoil, many of the
different tribes, still under control but liable to take part in
warfare, were removed to the reservation, so that they might be away
from the theatre of hostilities.

When I arrived I found that the Rogue River Indians had just been
placed upon the reservation, and subsequently the Coquille, Klamath,
Modocs, and remnants of the Chinooks were collected there also, the
home of the latter being in the Willamette Valley.  The number all
told amounted to some thousands, scattered over the entire Coast
reservation, but about fifteen hundred were located at the Grande
Ronde under charge of an agent, Mr. John F. Miller, a sensible,
practical man, who left the entire police control to the military,
and attended faithfully to the duty of settling the Indians in the
work of cultivating the soil.

As the place was to be occupied permanently, Lieutenant Hazen had
begun, before my arrival, the erection of buildings for the shelter
of his command, and I continued the work of constructing the post as
laid out by him.  In those days the Government did not provide very
liberally for sheltering its soldiers; and officers and men were
frequently forced to eke out parsimonious appropriations by toilsome
work or go without shelter in most inhospitable regions.  Of course
this post was no exception to the general rule, and as all hands were
occupied in its construction, and I the only officer present, I was
kept busily employed in supervising matters, both as commandant and
quartermaster, until July, when Captain D. A. Russell, of the Fourth
Infantry, was ordered to take command, and I was relieved from the
first part of my duties.

About this time my little detachment parted from me, being ordered to
join a company of the First Dragoons, commanded by Captain Robert
Williams, as it passed up the country from California by way of
Yamhill.  I regretted exceedingly to see them go, for their faithful
work and gallant service had endeared every man to me by the
strongest ties.  Since I relieved Lieutenant Hood on Pit River,
nearly a twelvemonth before, they had been my constant companions,
and the zeal with which they had responded to every call I made on
them had inspired in my heart a deep affection that years have not
removed.  When I relieved Hood--a dragoon officer of their own
regiment--they did not like the change, and I understood that they
somewhat contemptuously expressed this in more ways than one, in
order to try the temper of the new "Leftenant," but appreciative and
unremitting care, together with firm and just discipline, soon
quieted all symptoms of dissatisfaction and overcame all prejudice.
The detachment had been made up of details from the different
companies of the regiment in order to give Williamson a mounted
force, and as it was usual, under such circumstances, for every
company commander to shove into the detail he was called upon to
furnish the most troublesome and insubordinate individuals of his
company, I had some difficulty, when first taking command, in
controlling such a medley of recalcitrants; but by forethought for
them and their wants, and a strict watchfulness for their rights and
comfort, I was able in a short time to make them obedient and the
detachment cohesive.  In the past year they had made long and
tiresome marches, forded swift mountain streams, constructed rafts of
logs or bundles of dry reeds to ferry our baggage, swum deep rivers,
marched on foot to save their worn-out and exhausted animals, climbed
mountains, fought Indians, and in all and everything had done the
best they could for the service and their commander.  The disaffected
feeling they entertained when I first assumed command soon wore away,
and in its place came a confidence and respect which it gives me the
greatest pleasure to remember, for small though it was, this was my
first cavalry command.  They little thought, when we were in the
mountains of California and Oregon--nor did I myself then dream--that
but a few years were to elapse before it would be my lot again to
command dragoons, this time in numbers so vast as of themselves to
compose almost an army.

Shortly after the arrival of Captain Russell a portion of the Indians
at the Grande Ronde reservation were taken down the coast to the
Siletz reservation, and I was transferred temporarily to Fort
Haskins, on the latter reserve, and assigned to the duty of
completing it and building a blockhouse for the police control of the
Indians placed there.

While directing this work, I undertook to make a road across the
coast mountains from King's Valley to the Siletz, to shorten the haul
between the two points by a route I had explored.  I knew there were
many obstacles in the way, but the gain would be great if we could
overcome them, so I set to work with the enthusiasm of a young
path-finder.  The point at which the road was to cross the range was
rough and precipitous, but the principal difficulty in making it would
be from heavy timber on the mountains that had been burned over years
and years before, until nothing was left but limbless trunks of dead
trees--firs and pines--that had fallen from time to time until the
ground was matted with huge logs from five to eight feet in diameter.
These could not be chopped with axes nor sawed by any ordinary means,
therefore we had to burn them into suitable lengths, and drag the
sections to either side of the roadway with from four to six yoke of
oxen.

The work was both tedious and laborious, but in time perseverance
surmounted all obstacles and the road was finished, though its grades
were very steep.  As soon as it was completed, I wished to
demonstrate its value practically, so I started a Government wagon
over it loaded with about fifteen hundred pounds of freight drawn by
six yoke of oxen, and escorted by a small detachment of soldiers.
When it had gone about seven miles the sergeant in charge came back
to the post and reported his inability to get any further.  Going out
to the scene of difficulty I found the wagon at the base of a steep
hill, stalled.  Taking up a whip myself, I directed the men to lay on
their gads, for each man had supplied himself with a flexible hickory
withe in the early stages of the trip, to start the team, but this
course did not move the wagon nor have much effect on the demoralized
oxen; but following as a last resort an example I heard of on a
former occasion, that brought into use the rough language of the
country, I induced the oxen to move with alacrity, and the wagon and
contents were speedily carried to the summit.  The whole trouble was
at once revealed: the oxen had been broken and trained by a man who,
when they were in a pinch, had encouraged them by his frontier
vocabulary, and they could not realize what was expected of them
under extraordinary conditions until they heard familiar and possibly
profanely urgent phrases.  I took the wagon to its destination, but
as it was not brought back, even in all the time I was stationed in
that country, I think comment on the success of my road is
unnecessary.

I spent many happy months at Fort Haskins, remaining there until the
post was nearly completed and its garrison increased by the arrival
of Captain F. T. Dent--a brother-in-law of Captain Ulysses S. Grant
--with his company of the Fourth Infantry, in April, 1857.  In the
summer of 1856, and while I was still on duty there, the Coquille
Indians on the Siletz, and down near the Yaquina Bay, became, on
account of hunger and prospective starvation, very much excited and
exasperated, getting beyond the control of their agent, and even
threatening his life, so a detachment of troops was sent out to set
things to rights, and I took command of it.  I took with me most of
the company, and arrived at Yaquina Bay in time to succor the agent,
who for some days had been besieged in a log hut by the Indians and
had almost abandoned hope of rescue.

Having brought with me over the mountains a few head of beef cattle
for the hungry Indians, without thinking of running any great
personal risk I had six beeves killed some little distance from my
camp, guarding the meat with four Soldiers, whom I was obliged to
post as sentinels around the small area on which the carcasses lay.
The Indians soon formed a circle about the sentinels, and impelled by
starvation, attempted to take the beef before it could be equally
divided.  This was of course resisted, when they drew their knives
--their guns having been previously taken away from them--and some of
the inferior chiefs gave the signal to attack.  The principal chief,
Tetootney John, and two other Indians joined me in the centre of the
circle, and protesting that they would die rather than that the
frenzied onslaught should succeed, harangued the Indians until the
rest of the company hastened up from camp and put an end to the
disturbance.  I always felt grateful to Tetootney John for his
loyalty on this occasion, and many times afterward aided his family
with a little coffee and sugar, but necessarily surreptitiously, so
as not to heighten the prejudices that his friendly act had aroused
among his Indian comrades.

The situation at Yaquina Bay did not seem very safe, notwithstanding
the supply of beef we brought; and the possibility that the starving
Indians might break out was ever present, so to anticipate any
further revolt, I called for more troops.  The request was complied
with by sending to my assistance the greater part of my own company
("K")from Fort Yamhill.  The men, inspired by the urgency of our
situation, marched more than forty miles a day, accomplishing the
whole distance in so short a period, that I doubt if the record has
ever been beaten.  When this reinforcement arrived, the Indians saw
the futility of further demonstrations against their agent, who they
seemed to think was responsible for the insufficiency of food, and
managed to exist with the slender rations we could spare and such
indifferent food as they could pick up, until the Indian Department
succeeded in getting up its regular supplies.  In the past the poor
things had often been pinched by hunger and neglect, and at times
their only food was rock oysters, clams and crabs.  Great quantities
of these shell-fish could be gathered in the bay near at hand, but
the mountain Indians, who had heretofore lived on the flesh of
mammal, did not take kindly to mollusks, and, indeed, ate the
shell-fish only as a last resort.

Crab catching at night on the Yaquina Bay by the coast Indians was a
very picturesque scene.  It was mostly done by the squaws and
children, each equipped with a torch in one hand, and a sharp-pointed
stick in the other to take and lift the fish into baskets slung on
the back to receive them.  I have seen at times hundreds of squaws
and children wading about in Yaquina Bay taking crabs in this manner,
and the reflection by the water of the light from the many torches,
with the movements of the Indians while at work, formed a weird and
diverting picture of which we were never tired.

Not long after the arrival of the additional troops from Yamhill, it
became apparent that the number of men at Yaquina Bay would have to
be reduced, so in view of this necessity, it was deemed advisable to
build a block-house for the better protection of the agents and I
looked about for suitable ground on which to erect it.  Nearly all
around the bay the land rose up from the beach very abruptly, and the
only good site that could be found was some level ground used as the
burial-place of the Yaquina Bay Indians--a small band of fish-eating
people who had lived near this point on the coast for ages.  They
were a robust lot, of tall and well-shaped figures, and were called
in the Chinook tongue "salt chuck," which means fish-eaters, or
eaters of food from the salt water.  Many of the young men and women
were handsome in feature below the forehead, having fine eyes,
aquiline noses and good mouths, but, in conformity with a
long-standing custom, all had flat heads, which gave them a distorted
and hideous appearance, particularly some of the women, who went to
the extreme of fashion and flattened the head to the rear in a sharp
horizontal ridge by confining it between two boards, one running back
from the forehead at an angle of about forty degrees, and the other up
perpendicularly from the back of the neck.  When a head had been
shaped artistically the dusky maiden owner was marked as a belle, and
one could become reconciled to it after a time, but when carelessness
and neglect had governed in the adjustment of the boards, there
probably was nothing in the form of a human being on the face of the
earth that appeared so ugly.

It was the mortuary ground of these Indians that occupied the only
level spot we could get for the block-house.  Their dead were buried
in canoes, which rested in the crotches of forked sticks a few feet
above-ground.  The graveyard was not large, containing probably from
forty to fifty canoes in a fair state of preservation.  According to
the custom of all Indian tribes on the Pacific coast, when one of
their number died all his worldly effects were buried with him, so
that the canoes were filled with old clothes, blankets, pieces of
calico and the like, intended for the use of the departed in the
happy hunting grounds.

I made known to the Indians that we would have to take this piece of
ground for the blockhouse.  They demurred at first, for there is
nothing more painful to an Indian than disturbing his dead, but they
finally consented to hold a council next day on the beach, and thus
come to some definite conclusion.  Next morning they all assembled,
and we talked in the Chinook language all day long, until at last
they gave in, consenting, probably, as much because they could not
help themselves, as for any other reason.  It was agreed that on the
following day at 12 o'clock, when the tide was going out, I should
take my men and place the canoes in the bay, and let them float out
on the tide across the ocean to the happy hunting-grounds:

At that day there existed in Oregon in vast numbers a species of
wood-rat, and our inspection of the graveyard showed that the canoes
were thickly infested with them.  They were a light gray animal,
larger than the common gray squirrel, with beautiful bushy tails,
which made them strikingly resemble the squirrel, but in cunning and
deviltry they were much ahead of that quick-witted rodent.  I have
known them to empty in one night a keg of spikes in the storehouse in
Yamhill, distributing them along the stringers of the building, with
apparently no other purpose than amusement.  We anticipated great fun
watching the efforts of these rats to escape the next day when the
canoes should be launched on the ocean, and I therefore forbade any
of the command to visit the graveyard in the interim, lest the rats
should be alarmed.  I well knew that they would not be disturbed by
the Indians, who held the sacred spot in awe.  When the work of
taking down the canoes and carrying them to the water began,
expectation was on tiptoe, but, strange as it may seem, not a rat was
to be seen.  This unexpected development was mystifying.  They had
all disappeared; there was not one in any of the canoes, as
investigation proved, for disappointment instigated a most thorough
search.  The Indians said the rats understood Chinook, and that as
they had no wish to accompany the dead across the ocean to the happy
hunting-grounds, they took to the woods for safety.  However that may
be, I have no doubt that the preceding visits to the burial-ground,
and our long talk of the day before, with the unusual stir and
bustle, had so alarmed the rats that, impelled, by their suspicious
instincts, they fled a danger, the nature of which they could not
anticipate, but which they felt to be none the less real and
impending.




CHAPTER VII.

LEARNING THE CHINOOK LANGUAGE--STRANGE INDIAN
CUSTOMS--THEIR DOCTORS--SAM PATCH--THE MURDER OF A
WOMAN--IN A TIGHT PLACE--SURPRISING THE INDIANS--CONFLICTING
REPORTS OF THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN--SECESSION QUESTION IN
CALIFORNIA--APPOINTED A CAPTAIN--TRANSFERRED TO THE EAST.

The troubles at the Siletz and Yaquina Bay were settled without
further excitement by the arrival in due time of plenty of food, and
as the buildings, at Fort Haskins were so near completion that my
services as quartermaster were no longer needed, I was ordered to
join my own company at Fort Yamhill, where Captain Russell was still
in command.  I returned to that place in May, 1857, and at a period a
little later, in consequence of the close of hostilities in southern
Oregon, the Klamaths and Modocs were sent back to their own country,
to that section in which occurred, in 1873, the disastrous war with
the latter tribe.  This reduced considerably the number of Indians at
the Grande Ronde, but as those remaining were still somewhat unruly,
from the fact that many questions requiring adjustment were
constantly arising between the different bands, the agent and the
officers at the post were kept pretty well occupied.  Captain Russell
assigned to me the special work of keeping up the police control, and
as I had learned at an early day to speak Chinook (the "court
language" among the coast tribes) almost as well as the Indians
themselves, I was thereby enabled to steer my way successfully on
many critical occasions.

For some time the most disturbing and most troublesome element we had
was the Rogue River band.  For three or four years they had fought
our troops obstinately, and surrendered at the bitter end in the
belief that they were merely overpowered, not conquered.  They openly
boasted to the other Indians that they could whip the soldiers, and
that they did not wish to follow the white man's ways, continuing
consistently their wild habits, unmindful of all admonitions.
Indeed, they often destroyed their household utensils, tepees and
clothing, and killed their horses on the graves of the dead, in the
fulfillment of a superstitious custom, which demanded that they
should undergo, while mourning for their kindred, the deepest
privation in a property sense.  Everything the loss of which would
make them poor was sacrificed on the graves of their relatives or
distinguished warriors, and as melancholy because of removal from
their old homes caused frequent deaths, there was no lack of occasion
for the sacrifices.  The widows and orphans of the dead warriors were
of course the chief mourners, and exhibited their grief in many
peculiar ways.  I remember one in particular which was universally
practiced by the near kinsfolk.  They would crop their hair very
close, and then cover the head with a sort of hood or plaster of
black pitch, the composition being clay, pulverized charcoal, and the
resinous gum which exudes from the pine-tree.  The hood, nearly an
inch in thickness, was worn during a period of mourning that lasted
through the time it would take nature, by the growth of the hair,
actually to lift from the head the heavy covering of pitch after it
had become solidified and hard as stone.  It must be admitted that
they underwent considerable discomfort in memory of their relatives.
It took all the influence we could bring to bear to break up these
absurdly superstitious practices, and it looked as if no permanent
improvement could be effected, for as soon as we got them to discard
one, another would be invented.  When not allowed to burn down their
tepees or houses, those poor souls who were in a dying condition
would be carried out to the neighboring hillsides just before
dissolution, and there abandoned to their sufferings, with little or
no attention, unless the placing under their heads of a small stick
of wood--with possibly some laudable object, but doubtless great
discomfort to their victim--might be considered such.

To uproot these senseless and monstrous practices was indeed most
difficult.  The most pernicious of all was one which was likely to
bring about tragic results.  They believed firmly in a class of
doctors among their people who professed that they could procure the
illness of an individual at will, and that by certain incantations
they could kill or cure the sick person.  Their faith in this
superstition was so steadfast that there was no doubting its
sincerity, many indulging at times in the most trying privations,
that their relatives might be saved from death at the hands of the
doctors.  I often talked with them on the subject, and tried to
reason them out of the superstitious belief, defying the doctors to
kill me, or even make me ill; but my talks were unavailing, and they
always met my arguments with the remark that I was a white man, of a
race wholly different from the red man, and that that was the reason
the medicine of the doctors would not affect me.  These villainous
doctors might be either men or women, and any one of them finding an
Indian ill, at once averred that his influence was the cause,
offering at the same time to cure the invalid for a fee, which
generally amounted to about all the ponies his family possessed.  If
the proposition was accepted and the fee paid over, the family, in
case the man died, was to have indemnity through the death of the
doctor, who freely promised that they might take his life in such
event, relying on his chances of getting protection from the furious
relatives by fleeing to the military post till time had so assuaged
their grief that matters could be compromised or settled by a
restoration of a part of the property, when the rascally leeches
could again resume their practice.  Of course the services of a
doctor were always accepted when an Indian fell ill; otherwise the
invalid's death would surely ensue, brought about by the evil
influence that was unpropitiated.  Latterly it had become quite the
thing, when a patient died, for the doctor to flee to our camp--it
was so convenient and so much safer than elsewhere--and my cellar was
a favorite place of refuge from the infuriated friends of the
deceased.

Among the most notable of these doctors was an Indian named Sam
Patch, who several times sought asylum in any cellar, and being a
most profound diplomat, managed on each occasion and with little
delay to negotiate a peaceful settlement and go forth in safety to
resume the practice of his nefarious profession.  I often hoped he
would be caught before reaching the post, but he seemed to know
intuitively when the time had come to take leg-bail, for his advent
at the garrison generally preceded by but a few hours the death of
some poor dupe.

Finally these peculiar customs brought about the punishment of a
noted doctress of the Rogue River tribe, a woman who was constantly
working in this professional way, and who had found a victim of such
prominence among the Rogue Rivers that his unlooked for death brought
down on her the wrath of all.  She had made him so ill, they
believed, as to bring him to death's door notwithstanding the many
ponies that had been given her to cease the incantations, and it was
the conviction of all that she had finally caused the man's death
from some ulterior and indiscernible motive.  His relatives and
friends then immediately set about requiting her with the just
penalties of a perfidious breach of contract.  Their threats induced
her instant flight toward my house for the usual protection, but the
enraged friends of the dead man gave hot chase, and overtook the
witch just inside the limits of the garrison, where, on the
parade-ground, in sight of the officers' quarters, and before any one
could interfere, they killed her.  There were sixteen men in pursuit
of the doctress, and sixteen gun-shot wounds were found in her body
when examined by the surgeon of the post.  The killing of the woman
was a flagrant and defiant outrage committed in the teeth of the
military authority, yet done so quickly that we could not prevent it.
This necessitated severe measures, both to allay the prevailing
excitement and to preclude the recurrence of such acts.  The body was
cared for, and delivered to the relatives the next day for burial,
after which Captain Russell directed me to take such steps as would
put a stop to the fanatical usages that had brought about this
murderous occurrence, for it was now seen that if timely measures were
not taken to repress them, similar tragedies would surely follow.

Knowing all the men of the Rogue River tribe, and speaking fluently
the Chinook tongue, which they all understood, I went down to their
village the following day, after having sent word to the tribe that I
wished to have a council with them.  The Indians all met me in
council, as I had desired, and I then told them that the men who had
taken part in shooting the woman would have to be delivered up for
punishment.  They were very stiff with me at the interview, and with
all that talent for circumlocution and diplomacy with which the
Indian is lifted, endeavored to evade my demands and delay any
conclusion.  But I was very positive, would hear of no compromise
whatever, and demanded that my terms be at once complied with.  No
one was with me but a sergeant of my company, named Miller, who held
my horse, and as the chances of an agreement began to grow remote, I
became anxious for our safety.  The conversation waxing hot and the
Indians gathering close in around me, I unbuttoned the flap of my
pistol holster, to be ready for any emergency.  When the altercation
became most bitter I put my hand to my hip to draw my pistol, but
discovered it was gone--stolen by one of the rascals surrounding me.
Finding myself unarmed, I modified my tone and manner to correspond
with my helpless condition, thus myself assuming the diplomatic side
in the parley, in order to gain time.  As soon as an opportunity
offered, and I could, without too much loss of self-respect, and
without damaging my reputation among the Indians, I moved out to
where the sergeant held my horse, mounted, and crossing the Yamhill
River close by, called back in Chinook from the farther bank that
"the sixteen men who killed the woman must be delivered up, and my
six-shooter also." This was responded to by contemptuous laughter, so
I went back to the military post somewhat crestfallen, and made my
report of the turn affairs had taken, inwardly longing for another
chance to bring the rascally Rogue Rivers to terms.

When I had explained the situation to Captain Russell, he thought
that we could not, under any circumstances, overlook this defiant
conduct of the Indians, since, unless summarily punished, it would
lead to even more serious trouble in the future.  I heartily seconded
this proposition, and gladly embracing the opportunity it offered,
suggested that if he would give me another chance, and let me have
the effective force of the garrison, consisting of about fifty men, I
would chastise the Rogue Rivers without fail, and that the next day
was all the time I required to complete arrangements.  He gave me the
necessary authority, and I at once set to work to bring about a
better state of discipline on the reservation, and to put an end to
the practices of the medicine men (having also in view the recovery
of my six-shooter and self-respect), by marching to the village and
taking the rebellious Indians by force.

In the tribe there was an excellent woman called Tighee Mary (Tighee
in Chinook means chief), who by right of inheritance was a kind of
queen of the Rogue Rivers.  Fearing that the insubordinate conduct of
the Indians would precipitate further trouble, she came early the
following morning to see me and tell me of the situation Mary
informed me that she had done all in her power to bring the Indians
to reason, but without avail, and that they were determined to fight
rather than deliver up the sixteen men who had engaged in the
shooting.  She also apprised me of the fact that they had taken up a
position on the Yamhill River, on the direct road between the post
and village, where, painted and armed for war, they were awaiting
attack.

On this information I concluded it would be best to march to the
village by a circuitous route instead of directly, as at first
intended, so I had the ferry-boat belonging to the post floated about
a mile and a half down the Yamhill River and there anchored.  At 11
o'clock that night I marched my fifty men, out of the garrison, in a
direction opposite to that of the point held by the Indians, and soon
reached the river at the ferryboat.  Here I ferried the party over
with little delay, and marched them along the side of the mountain,
through underbrush and fallen timber, until, just before daylight, I
found that we were immediately in rear of the village, and thence in
rear, also, of the line occupied by the refractory Indians, who were
expecting to meet me on the direct road from the post.  Just at break
of day we made a sudden descent upon the village and took its
occupants completely by surprise, even capturing the chief of the
tribe, "Sam," who was dressed in all his war toggery, fully armed and
equipped, in anticipation of a fight on the road where his comrades
were in position.  I at once put Sam under guard, giving orders to
kill him instantly if the Indians fired a shot; then forming my line
on the road beyond the edge of the village, in rear of the force
lying in wait for a front attack, we moved forward.  When the hostile
party realized that they were completely cut off from the village,
they came out from their stronghold on the river and took up a line
in my front, distant about sixty yards with the apparent intention of
resisting to the last.

As is usual with Indians when expecting a fight, they were nearly
naked, fantastically painted with blue clay, and hideously arrayed in
war bonnets.  They seemed very belligerent, brandishing their muskets
in the air, dancing on one foot, calling us ugly names, and making
such other demonstrations of hostility, that it seemed at first that
nothing short of the total destruction of the party could bring about
the definite settlement that we were bent on.  Still, as it was my
desire to bring them under subjection without loss of life, if
possible, I determined to see what result would follow when they
learned that their chief was at our mercy.  So, sending Sam under
guard to the front, where he could be seen, informing them that he
would be immediately shot if they fired upon us, and aided by the
cries and lamentations of the women of the village, who deprecated
any hostile action by either party, I soon procured a parley.

The insubordinate Indians were under command of "Joe," Sam's brother,
who at last sent me word that he wanted to see me, and we met between
our, respective lines.  I talked kindly to him, but was firm in my
demand that the men who killed the woman must be given up and my
six-shooter returned.  His reply was he did not think it could be done,
but he would consult his people.  After the consultation, he returned
and notified me that fifteen would surrender and the six-shooter
would be restored, and further, that we could kill the sixteenth man,
since the tribe wished to get rid of him anyhow, adding that he was a
bad Indian, whose bullet no doubt had given the woman her death
wound.  He said that if I assented to this arrangement, he would
require all of his people except the objectionable man to run to the
right of his line at a preconcerted signal.  The bad Indian would be
ordered to stand fast on the extreme left, and we could open fire on
him as his comrades fell away to the right.  I agreed to the
proposition, and gave Joe fifteen minutes to execute his part of it.
We then returned to our respective forces, and a few minutes later
the fifteen ran to the right flank as agreed upon, and we opened fire
on the one Indian left standing alone, bringing him down in his
tracks severely wounded by a shot through the shoulder.

While all this was going on, the other bands of the reservation,
several thousand strong, had occupied the surrounding hills for the
purpose of witnessing the fight, for as the Rogue Rivers had been
bragging for some time that they could whip the soldiers, these other
Indians had come out to see it done.  The result, however,
disappointed the spectators, and the Rogue Rivers naturally lost
caste.  The fifteen men now came in and laid down their arms
(including my six-shooter) in front of us as agreed, but I compelled
them to take the surrendered guns up again and carry them to the
post, where they were deposited in the block-house for future
security.  The prisoners were ironed with ball and chain, and made to
work at the post until their rebellious spirit was broken; and the
wounded man was correspondingly punished after he had fully
recovered.  An investigation as to why this man had been selected as
the offering by which Joe and his companions expected to gain
immunity, showed that the fellow was really a most worthless
character, whose death even would have been a benefit to the tribe.
Thus it seemed that they had two purposes in view--the one to
propitiate me and get good terms, the other to rid themselves of a
vagabond member of the tribe.

The punishment of these sixteen Indians by ball and chain ended all
trouble with the Rogue River tribe.  The, disturbances arising from
the incantations of the doctors and doctresses, and the practice of
killing horses and burning all worldly property on the graves of
those who died, were completely suppressed, and we made with little
effort a great stride toward the civilization of these crude and
superstitious people, for they now began to recognize the power of
the Government.  In their management afterward a course of justice
and mild force was adopted, and unvaryingly applied.  They were
compelled to cultivate their land, to attend church, and to send
their children to school.  When I saw them, fifteen years later,
transformed into industrious and substantial farmers, with neat
houses, fine cattle, wagons and horses, carrying their grain, eggs,
and butter to market and bringing home flour, coffee, sugar, and
calico in return, I found abundant confirmation of my early opinion
that the most effectual measures for lifting them from a state of
barbarism would be a practical supervision at the outset, coupled
with a firm control and mild discipline.

In all that was done for these Indians Captain Russell's judgment and
sound, practical ideas were the inspiration.  His true manliness,
honest and just methods, together with the warm-hearted interest he
took in all that pertained to matters of duty to his Government,
could not have produced other than the best results, in what position
soever he might have been placed.  As all the lovable traits of his
character were constantly manifested, I became most deeply attached
to him, and until the day of his death in 1864, on the battle-field
of Opequan, in front of Winchester, while gallantly leading his
division under my command, my esteem and affection were sustained and
intensified by the same strong bonds that drew me to him in these
early days in Oregon.

After the events just narrated I continued on duty at the post of
Yamhill, experiencing the usual routine of garrison life without any
incidents of much interest, down to the breaking out of the war of
the rebellion in April, 1861.  The news of the firing on Fort Sumter
brought us an excitement which overshadowed all else, and though we
had no officers at the post who sympathized with the rebellion, there
were several in our regiment--the Fourth Infantry--who did, and we
were considerably exercised as to the course they might pursue, but
naturally far more so concerning the disposition that would be made
of the regiment during the conflict.

In due time orders came for the regiment to go East, and my company
went off, leaving me, however--a second lieutenant--in command of the
post until I should be relieved by Captain James J. Archer, of the
Ninth Infantry, whose company was to take the place of the old
garrison.  Captain Archer, with his company of the Ninth, arrived
shortly after, but I had been notified that he intended to go South,
and his conduct was such after reaching the post that I would not
turn over the command to him for fear he might commit some rebellious
act.  Thus a more prolonged detention occurred than I had at first
anticipated.  Finally the news came that he had tendered his
resignation and been granted a leave of absence for sixty days.  On
July 17 he took his departure, but I continued in command till
September 1, when Captain Philip A. Owen, of the Ninth Infantry,
arrived and, taking charge, gave me my release.

From the day we received the news of the firing on Sumter until I
started East, about the first of September, 1861, I was deeply
solicitous as to the course of events, and though I felt confident
that in the end the just cause of the Government must triumph, yet
the thoroughly crystallized organization which the Southern
Confederacy quickly exhibited disquieted me very much, for it alone
was evidence that the Southern leaders had long anticipated the
struggle and prepared for it.  It was very difficult to obtain direct
intelligence of the progress of the war.  Most of the time we were in
the depths of ignorance as to the true condition of affairs, and this
tended to increase our anxiety.  Then, too, the accounts of the
conflicts that had taken place were greatly exaggerated by the
Eastern papers, and lost nothing in transition.  The news came by the
pony express across the Plains to San Francisco, where it was still
further magnified in republishing, and gained somewhat in Southern
bias.  I remember well that when the first reports reached us of, the
battle of Bull Run--that sanguinary engagement--it was stated that
each side had lost forty thousand men in killed and wounded, and none
were reported missing nor as having run away.  Week by week these
losses grew less, until they finally shrunk into the hundreds, but
the vivid descriptions of the gory conflict were not toned down
during the whole summer.

We received our mail at Yamhill only once a week, and then had to
bring it from Portland, Oregon, by express.  On the day of the week
that our courier, or messenger, was expected back from Portland, I
would go out early in the morning to a commanding point above the
post, from which I could see a long distance down the road as it ran
through the valley of the Yamhill, and there I would watch with
anxiety for his coming, longing for good news; for, isolated as I had
been through years spent in the wilderness, my patriotism was
untainted by politics, nor had it been disturbed by any discussion of
the questions out of which the war grew, and I hoped for the success
of the Government above all other considerations.  I believe I was
also uninfluenced by any thoughts of the promotion that might result
to me from the conflict, but, out of a sincere desire to contribute
as much as I could to the preservation of the Union, I earnestly
wished to be at the seat of war, and feared it might end before I
could get East.  In no sense did I anticipate what was to happen to
me afterward, nor that I was to gain any distinction from it.  I was
ready to do my duty to the best of my ability wherever I might be
called, and I was young, healthy, insensible to fatigue, and desired
opportunity, but high rank was so distant in our service that not a
dream of its attainment had flitted through my brain.

During the period running from January to September, 1861, in
consequence of resignations and the addition of some new regiments to
the regular army, I had passed through the grade of first lieutenant
and reached that of captain in the Thirteenth United States Infantry,
of which General W. T. Sherman had recently been made the colonel.
When relieved from further duty at Yamhill by Captain Owen, I left
for the Atlantic coast to join my new regiment.  A two days' ride
brought me down to Portland, whence I sailed to San Franciso, and at
that city took passage by steamer for New York via the Isthmus of
Panama, in company with a number of officers who were coming East
under circumstances like my own.

At this time California was much agitated--on the question of
secession, and the secession element was so strong that considerable
apprehension was felt by the Union people lest the State might be
carried into the Confederacy.  As a consequence great distrust
existed in all quarters, and the loyal passengers on the steamer, not
knowing what might occur during our voyage, prepared to meet
emergencies by thoroughly organizing to frustrate any attempt that
might possibly be made to carry us into some Southern port after we
should leave Aspinwall.  However, our fears proved groundless; at all
events, no such attempt was made, and we reached New York in safety
in November, 1861.  A day or two in New York sufficed to replenish a
most meagre wardrobe, and I then started West to join my new
regiment, stopping a day and a night at the home of my parents in
Ohio, where I had not been since I journeyed from Texas for the
Pacific coast.  The headquarters of my regiment were at Jefferson
Barracks, Missouri, to which point I proceeded with no further delay
except a stay in the city of St. Louis long enough to pay my respects
to General H. W. Halleck.




CHAPTER VIII.

AUDITING ACCOUNTS--CHIEF QUARTERMASTER AND COMMISSARY OF THE ARMY OF
SOUTHWEST MISSOURI--PREPARING FOR THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN--A
DIFFERENCE WITH GENERAL CURTIS--ORDERED TO THE FRONT--APPOINTED A
COLONEL.

Some days after I had reached the headquarters of my regiment near
St. Louis, General Halleck sent for me, and when I reported he
informed me that there existed a great deal of confusion regarding
the accounts of some of the disbursing officers in his department,
whose management of its fiscal affairs under his predecessor, General
John C. Fremont, had been very loose; and as the chaotic condition of
things could be relieved only by auditing these accounts, he
therefore had determined to create a board of officers for the
purpose, and intended to make me president of it.  The various
transactions in question covered a wide field, for the department
embraced the States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Illinois, Arkansas,
and all of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River.

The duty was not distasteful, and I felt that I was qualified to
undertake it, for the accounts to be audited belonged exclusively to
the Quartermaster and Subsistence departments, and by recent
experience I had become familiar with the class of papers that
pertained to those branches of the army.  Indeed, it was my
familiarity with such transactions, returns, etc., that probably
caused my selection as president of the board.

I entered upon the work forthwith, and continued at it until the 26th
of December, 1861.  At that date I was relieved from the auditing
board and assigned to duty as Chief Commissary of the Army of
Southwest Missouri, commanded by General Samuel R. Curtis.  This army
was then organizing at Rolla, Missouri, for the Pea Ridge campaign,
its strength throughout the campaign being in the aggregate about
fifteen thousand men.

As soon as I received information of my selection for this position,
I went to General Halleck and requested him to assign me as Chief
Quartermaster also.  He was reluctant to do so, saying that I could
not perform both duties, but I soon convinced him that I could do
both better than the one, for I reminded him that as Chief
Quartermaster I should control the transportation, and thus obviate
all possible chances of discord between the two staff departments; a
condition which I deemed essential to success, especially as it was
intended that Curtis's army should mainly subsist on the country.
This argument impressed Halleck, and becoming convinced, he promptly
issued the order making me Chief Quartermaster and Chief Commissary
of Subsistence of the Army of Southwest Missouri, and I started for
Rolla to enter upon the work assigned me.

Having reported to General Curtis, I quickly learned that his system
of supply was very defective, and the transportation without proper
organization, some of the regiments having forty to fifty wagon each,
and others only three or four.  I labored day and night to remedy
these and other defects, and with the help of Captain Michael P.
Small, of the Subsistence Department, who was an invaluable
assistant, soon brought things into shape, putting the transportation
in good working order, giving each regiment its proper quota of
wagons, and turning the surplus into the general supply trains of the
army.  In accomplishing this I was several times on the verge of
personal conflict with irate regimental commanders, but Colonel G. M.
Dodge so greatly sustained me with General Curtis by strong moral
support, and by such efficient details from his regiment--the Fourth
Iowa Volunteer Infantry--that I still bear him and it great affection
and lasting gratitude.

On January 26, 1862, General Curtis's army began its march from Rolla
to Springfield, Missouri, by way of Lebanon.  The roads were deep
with mud, and so badly cut up that the supply trains in moving
labored under the most serious difficulties, and were greatly
embarrassed by swollen streams.  Under these circumstances many
delays occurred, and when we arrived at Lebanon nearly all the
supplies with which we had started had been consumed, and the work of
feeding the troops off the country had to begin at that point.  To
get flour, wheat had to be taken from the stacks, threshed, and sent
to the mills to be ground.  Wheat being scarce in this region, corn
as a substitute had to be converted into meal by the same laborious
process.  In addition, beef cattle had to be secured for the meat
ration.

By hard work we soon accumulated a sufficient quantity of flour and
corn meal to justify the resumption of our march on Springfield; at
or near which point the enemy was believed to be awaiting us, and the
order was given to move forward, the commanding general cautioning
me, in the event of disaster, to let no salt fall into General
Price's hands.  General Curtis made a hobby of this matter of salt,
believing the enemy was sadly in need of that article, and he
impressed me deeply with his conviction that our cause would be
seriously injured by a loss which would inure so greatly and
peculiarly to the enemy's benefit; but we afterward discovered, when
Price abandoned his position, that about all he left behind was salt.

When we were within about eight miles of Springfield, General Curtis
decided to put his troops in line of battle for the advance on the
town, and directed me to stretch out my supply trains in a long line
of battle, so that in falling back, in case the troops were repulsed,
he could rally the men on the wagons.  I did not like the tactics,
but of course obeyed the order.  The line moved on Springfield, and
took the town without resistance, the enemy having fled southward, in
the direction of Pea Ridge, the preceding day.  Of course our success
relieved my anxiety about the wagons; but fancy has often pictured
since, the stampede of six mule teams that, had we met with any
reverse, would have taken place over the prairies of southwest
Missouri.

The army set out in pursuit of Price, but I was left at Springfield
to gather supplies from the surrounding country, by the same means
that had been used at Lebanon, and send them forward.  To succeed in
this useful and necessary duty required much hard work.  To procure
the grain and to run the mills in the country, replacing the
machinery where parts had been carried away, or changing the
principle and running the mills on some different plan when
necessary, and finally forward the product to the army, made a task
that taxed the energy of all engaged in it.  Yet, having at command a
very skillful corps of millwrights, machinists, and millers, detailed
principally from the Fourth Iowa and Thirty-sixth Illinois volunteer
regiments, we soon got matters in shape, and were able to send such
large quantities of flour and meal to the front, that only the bacon
and small parts of the ration had to be brought forward from our
depot at Rolla.  When things were well systematized, I went forward
myself to expedite the delivery of supplies, and joined the army at
Cross Hollows, just south of Pea Ridge.

Finding everything working well at Cross Hollows, I returned to
Springfield in a few days to continue the labor of collecting
supplies.  On my way back I put the mills at Cassville in good order
to grind the grain in that vicinity, and perfected there a plan for
the general supply from the neighboring district of both the men and
animals of the army, so that there should, be no chance of a failure
of the campaign from bad roads or disaster to my trains.  Springfield
thus became the centre of the entire supply section.

Just after my return to Springfield the battle of Pea Ridge was
fought.  The success of the Union troops in this battle was
considerable, and while not of sufficient magnitude to affect the
general cause materially, it was decisive as to that particular
campaign, and resulted in driving all organized Confederate forces
out of the State of Missouri.  After Pea Ridge was won, certain
efforts were made to deprive Curtis of the credit due him for the
victory; but, no matter what merit belonged to individual commanders,
I was always convinced that Curtis was deserving of the highest
commendation, not only for the skill displayed on the field, but for
a zeal and daring in campaign which was not often exhibited at that
early period of the war.  Especially should this credit be awarded
him, when we consider the difficulties under which he labored, how he
was hampered in having to depend on a sparsely settled country for
the subsistence of his troops.  In the reports of the battle that
came to Springfield, much glory was claimed for some other general
officers, but as I had control of the telegraph line from Springfield
east, I detained all despatches until General Curtis had sent in his
official report.  He thus had the opportunity of communicating with
his superior in advance of some of his vain subordinates, who would
have laid claim to the credit of the battle had I not thwarted them
by this summary means.

Not long afterward came the culmination of a little difference that
had arisen between General Curtis and me, brought about, I have since
sometimes thought, by an assistant quartermaster from Iowa, whom I
had on duty with me at Springfield.  He coveted my place, and finally
succeeded in getting it.  He had been an unsuccessful banker in Iowa,
and early in the war obtained an appointment as assistant
quartermaster of volunteers with the rank of captain.  As chief
quartermaster of the army in Missouri, there would be opportunities
for the recuperation of his fortunes which would not offer to one in
a subordinate place; so to gain this position he doubtless intrigued
for it while under my eye, and Curtis was induced to give it to him
as soon as I was relieved.  His career as my successor, as well as in
other capacities in which he was permitted to act during the war, was
to say the least not savory.  The war over he turned up in Chicago as
president of a bank, which he wrecked; and he finally landed in the
penitentiary for stealing a large sum of money from the United States
Treasury at Washington while employed there as a clerk.  The chances
that this man's rascality would be discovered were much less when
chief of the departments of transportation and supply of an army than
they afterward proved to be in the Treasury.  I had in my possession
at all times large sums of money for the needs of the army, and among
other purposes for which these funds were to be disbursed was the
purchase of horses and mules.  Certain officers and men more devoted
to gain than to the performance of duty (a few such are always to be
found in armies) quickly learned this, and determined to profit by
it.  Consequently they began a regular system of stealing horses from
the people of the country and proffering them to me for purchase.  It
took but a little time to discover this roguery, and when I became
satisfied of their knavery I brought it to a sudden close by seizing
the horses as captured property, branding them U. S., and refusing to
pay for them.  General Curtis, misled by the misrepresentations that
had been made, and without fully knowing the circumstances, or
realizing to what a base and demoralizing state of things this course
was inevitably tending, practically ordered me to make the Payments,
and I refused.  The immediate result of this disobedience was a
court-martial to try me; and knowing that my usefulness in that army
was gone, no matter what the outcome of the trial might be, I asked
General Halleck to relieve me from duty with General Curtis and order
me to St. Louis.  This was promptly done, and as my connection with
the Army of Southwest Missouri was thus severed before the court
could be convened, my case never came to trial.  The man referred to
as being the cause of this condition of affairs was appointed by
General Curtis to succeed me.  I turned over to the former all the
funds and property for which I was responsible, also the branded
horses and mules stolen from the people of the country, requiring
receipts for everything.  I heard afterward that some of the blooded
stock of southwest Missouri made its way to Iowa in an unaccountable
manner, but whether the administration of my successor was
responsible for it or not I am unable to say.

On my arrival at St. Louis I felt somewhat forlorn and disheartened
at the turn affairs had taken.  I did not know where I should be
assigned, nor what I should be required to do, but these
uncertainties were dispelled in a few days by General Halleck, who,
being much pressed by the Governors of some of the Western States to
disburse money in their sections, sent me out into the Northwest with
a sort of roving commission to purchase horses for the use of the
army.  I went to Madison and Racine, Wis., at which places I bought
two hundred horses, which were shipped to St. Louis.  At Chicago I
bought two hundred more, and as the prices paid at the latter point
showed that Illinois was the cheapest market--it at that time
producing a surplus over home demands--I determined to make Chicago
the centre of my operations.

While occupied in this way at Chicago the battle of Shiloh took
place, and the desire for active service with troops became uppermost
in my thoughts, so I returned to St. Louis to see if I could not get
into the field.  General Halleck having gone down to the Shiloh
battle-field, I reported to his Assistant Adjutant-General, Colonel
John C. Kelton, and told him of my anxiety to take a hand in active
field-service, adding that I did not wish to join my regiment, which
was still organizing and recruiting at Jefferson Barracks, for I felt
confident I could be more useful elsewhere.  Kelton knew that the
purchasing duty was but temporary, and that on its completion,
probably at no distant date, I should have to join my company at the
barracks; so, realizing the inactivity to which that situation of
affairs would subject me, he decided to assume the responsibility of
sending me to report to General Halleck at Shiloh, and gave me an
order to that effect.

This I consider the turning-point in my military career, and shall
always feel grateful to Colonel Kelton for his kindly act which so
greatly influenced my future.  My desire to join the army at Shiloh
had now taken possession of me, and I was bent on getting there by
the first means available.  Learning that a hospital-boat under
charge of Dr. Hough was preparing to start for Pittsburg Landing, I
obtained the Doctor's consent to take passage on it, and on the
evening of April 15, I left St. Louis for the scene of military
operations in northeastern Mississippi.

At Pittsburg Landing I reported to General Halleck, who, after some
slight delay, assigned me to duty as an assistant to Colonel George
Thom, of the topographical engineers.  Colonel Thom put me at the
work of getting the trains up from the landing, which involved the
repair of roads for that purpose by corduroying the marshy places.
This was rough, hard work, without much chance of reward, but it, was
near the field of active operations, and I determined to do the best
I could at it till opportunity for something better might arise.

General Halleck did not know much about taking care of himself in the
field.  His camp arrangements were wholly inadequate, and in
consequence he and all the officers about him were subjected to much
unnecessary discomfort and annoyance.  Someone suggested to him to
appoint me quartermaster for his headquarters, with a view to
systematizing the establishment and remedying the defects complained
of, and I was consequently assigned to this duty.  Shortly after this
assignment I had the satisfaction of knowing that General Halleck was
delighted with the improvements made at headquarters, both in camp
outfit and transportation, and in administration generally.  My
popularity grew as the improvements increased, but one trifling
incident came near marring it.  There was some hitch about getting
fresh beef for General Halleck's mess, and as by this time everybody
had come to look to me for anything and everything in the way of
comfort, Colonel Joe McKibben brought an order from the General for
me to get fresh beef for the headquarters mess.  I was not caterer
for this mess, nor did I belong to it even, so I refused point-blank.
McKibben, disliking to report my disobedience, undertook persuasion,
and brought Colonel Thom to see me to aid in his negotiations, but I
would not give in, so McKibben in the kindness of his heart rode
several miles in order to procure the beef himself, and thus save me
from the dire results which he thought would follow should Halleck
get wind of such downright insubordination.  The next day I was made
Commissary of Subsistence for the headquarters in addition to my
other duties, and as this brought me into the line of fresh beef,
General Halleck had no cause thereafter to complain of a scarcity of
that article in his mess.

My stay at General Halleck's headquarters was exceedingly agreeable,
and my personal intercourse with officers on duty there was not only
pleasant and instructive, but offered opportunities for improvement
and advancement for which hardly any other post could have afforded
like chances.  My special duties did not occupy all my time, and
whenever possible I used to go over to General Sherman's division,
which held the extreme right of our line in the advance on Corinth,
to witness the little engagements occurring there continuously during
the slow progress which the army was then making, the enemy being
forced back but a short distance each day.  I knew General Sherman
very well.  We came from near the same section of country in Ohio,
and his wife and her family had known me from childhood.  I was
always kindly received by the General, and one day he asked me if I
would be willing to accept the colonelcy of a certain Ohio regiment
if he secured the appointment.  I gladly told him yes, if General
Halleck would let me go; but I was doomed to disappointment, for in
about a week or so afterward General Sherman informed me that the
Governor of Ohio would not consent, having already decided to appoint
some one else.

A little later Governor Blair, of Michigan, who was with the army
temporarily in the interest of the troops from his State, and who
just at this time was looking around for a colonel for the Second
Michigan Cavalry, and very anxious to get a regular officer, fixed
upon me as the man.  The regiment was then somewhat run down by
losses from sickness, and considerably split into factions growing
out of jealousies engendered by local differences previous to
organization, and the Governor desired to bridge over all these
troubles by giving the regiment a commander who knew nothing about
them.  I presume that some one said to the Governor about this time,
"Why don't you get Sheridan?"  This, however, is only conjecture.  I
really do not know how my name was proposed to him, but I have often
been told since that General Gordon Granger, whom I knew slightly
then, and who had been the former colonel of the regiment, first
suggested the appointment.  At all events, on the morning of May 27,
1862, Captain Russell A. Alger--recently Governor of Michigan
--accompanied by the quartermaster of the regiment, Lieutenant Frank
Walbridge, arrived at General Halleck's headquarters and delivered to
me this telegram:

(By Telegraph.)
"MILITARY DEPT OF MICHIGAN,
"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
"DETROIT, May 25, 1862.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 148.

"Captain Philip H. Sheridan, U. S. Army, is hereby appointed
Colonel of the Second Regiment Michigan Cavalry, to rank from
this date.

"Captain Sheridan will immediately assume command of the
regiment.

"By order of the Commander-in-Chief,
"JNO. ROBERTSON,
"Adjutant-General."


I took the order to General Halleck, and said that I would like to
accept, but he was not willing I should do so until the consent of
the War Department could be obtained.  I returned to my tent much
disappointed, for in those days, for some unaccountable reason, the
War Department did not favor the appointment of regular officers to
volunteer regiments, and I feared a disapproval at Washington.  After
a further consultation with Captain Alger and Lieutenant Walbridge, I
determined to go to the General again and further present the case.
Enlarging on my desire for active service with troops, and urging the
utter lack of such opportunity where I was, I pleaded my cause until
General Halleck finally resolved to take the responsibility of
letting me go without consulting the War Department.  When I had
thanked him for the kindness, he said that inasmuch as I was to leave
him, he would inform me that the regiment to which I had just been
appointed was ordered out as part of a column directed to make a raid
to the south of the enemy, then occupying Corinth, and that if I
could turn over my property, it would probably be well for me to join
my command immediately, so that I could go with the expedition.  I
returned to my tent, where Alger and Walbridge were still waiting,
and told them of the success of my interview, at the same time
notifying them that I would join the regiment in season to accompany
the expedition of which Halleck had spoken.

In the course of the afternoon I turned over all my property to my
successor, and about 8 o'clock that evening made my appearance at the
camp of the Second Michigan Cavalry, near Farmington, Mississippi.
The regiment was in a hubbub of excitement making preparations for
the raid, and I had barely time to meet the officers of my command,
and no opportunity at all to see the men, when the trumpet sounded to
horse.  Dressed in a coat and trousers of a captain of infantry, but
recast as a colonel of cavalry by a pair of well-worn eagles that
General Granger had kindly given me, I hurriedly placed on my saddle
a haversack, containing some coffee, sugar, bacon, and hard bread,
which had been prepared, and mounting my horse, I reported my
regiment to the brigade commander as ready for duty.




CHAPTER IX.

EXPEDITION TO BOONEVILLE--DESTROYING SUPPLIES--CONFEDERATE
STRAGGLERS--SUCCESS OF THE EXPEDITION--A RECONNOISSANCE--THE
IMPORTANCE OF BODILY SUSTENANCE--THE BATTLE OF BOONEVILLE
--RECOMMENDED FOR APPOINTMENT AS A BRIGADIER-GENERAL.

The expedition referred to by General Halleck in his parting
conversation was composed of the Second Michigan and Second Iowa
regiments of cavalry, formed into a brigade under command of Colonel
Washington L. Elliott, of the Second Iowa.  It was to start on the
night of the 27th of May at 12 o'clock, and proceed by a circuitous
route through Iuka, Miss., to Booneville, a station on the Mobile and
Ohio Railroad, about twenty-two miles below Corinth, and accomplish
all it could in the way of destroying the enemy's supplies and
cutting his railroad communications.

The weather in that climate was already warm, guides unobtainable,
and both men and horses suffered much discomfort from the heat, and
fatigue from the many delays growing out of the fact that we were in
almost total ignorance of the roads leading to the point that we
desired to reach.  In order that we might go light we carried only
sugar, coffee, and salt, depending on the country for meat and bread.
Both these articles were scarce, but I think we got all there was,
for our advent was so unexpected by the people of the region through
which we passed that, supposing us to be Confederate cavalry, they
often gave us all they had, the women and servants contributing most
freely from their, reserve stores.

Before reaching Booneville I had the advance, but just as we arrived
on the outskirts of the town the brigade was formed with the Second
Iowa on my right, and the whole force moved forward, right in front,
preceded by skirmishers.  Here we encountered the enemy, but forced
him back with little resistance.  When we had gained possession of
the station, Colonel Elliott directed me to take the left wing of my
regiment, pass to the south, and destroy a bridge or culvert supposed
to be at a little distance below the town on the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad.  The right wing, or other half of the regiment, was to be
held in reserve for my support if necessary.  I moved rapidly in the
designated direction till I reached the railroad, and then rode down
it for a mile and a half, but found neither bridge nor culvert.  I
then learned that there was no bridge of any importance except the
one at Baldwin, nine miles farther down, but as I was aware, from
information recently received, that it was defended by three
regiments and a battery, I concluded that I could best accomplish the
purpose for which I had been detached--crippling the road--by tearing
up the track, bending the rails, and burning the cross-ties.  This
was begun with alacrity at four different points, officers and men
vieing with one another in the laborious work of destruction.  We had
but few tools, and as the difficulties to overcome were serious, our
progress was slow, until some genius conceived the idea that the
track, rails and ties, might be lifted from its bed bodily, turned
over, and subjected to a high heat; a convenient supply of dry
fence-rails would furnish ample fuel to render the rails useless.
In this way a good deal of the track was effectively broken up, and
communication by rail from Corinth to the south entirely cut off.
While we were still busy in wrecking the road, a dash was made at my
right and rear by a squadron of Confederate cavalry.  This was
handsomely met by the reserve under Captain Archibald P. Campbell, of
the Second Michigan, who, dismounting a portion of his command,
received the enemy with such a volley from his Colt's repeating
rifles that the squadron broke and fled in all directions.  We were
not molested further, and resumed our work, intending to extend the
break toward Baldwin, but receiving orders from Elliott to return to
Booneville immediately, the men were recalled, and we started to
rejoin the main command.

In returning to Booneville, I found the railroad track above where I
had struck it blocked by trains that we had thus cut off, and the
woods and fields around the town covered with several thousand
Confederate soldiers.  These were mostly convalescents and
disheartened stragglers belonging to General Beauregard's army, and
from them we learned that Corinth was being evacuated.  I spent some
little time in an endeavor to get these demoralized men into an open
field, with a view to some future disposition of them; but in the
midst of the undertaking I received another order from Colonel
Elliott to join him at once.  The news of the evacuation had also
reached Elliott, and had disclosed a phase of the situation so
different from that under which he had viewed it when we arrived at
Booneville, that he had grown anxious to withdraw, lest we should be
suddenly pounced upon by an overwhelming force from some one of the
columns in retreat.  Under such circumstances my prisoners would
prove a decided embarrassment, so I abandoned further attempts to get
them together--not even paroling them, which I thought might have
been done with but little risk.

In the meantime the captured cars had been fired, and as their
complete destruction was assured by explosions from those containing
ammunition, they needed no further attention, so I withdrew my men
and hastened to join Elliott, taking along some Confederate officers
whom I had retained from among four or five hundred prisoners
captured when making the original dash below the town.

The losses in my regiment, and, in fact, those of the entire command,
were insignificant.  The results of the expedition were important;
the railroad being broken so thoroughly as to cut off all rolling
stock north of Booneville, and to place at the service of General
Halleck's army the cars and locomotives of which the retreating
Confederates were now so much in need.  In addition, we burned
twenty-six cars containing ten thousand stand of small arms, three
pieces of artillery, a great quantity of clothing, a heavy supply of
ammunition, and the personal baggage of General Leonidas Polk.  A
large number of prisoners, mostly sick and convalescent, also fell
into our hands; but as we could not carry them with us--such a hurried
departure was an immediate necessity, by reason of our critical
situation--the process of paroling them was not completed, and they
doubtless passed back to active service in the Confederacy, properly
enough unrecognized as prisoners of war by their superiors.

In returning, the column marched back by another indirect route to
its old camp near Farmington, where we learned that the whole army
had moved into and beyond Corinth, in pursuit of Beauregard, on the
13th of May, the very day we had captured Booneville.  Although we
had marched about one hundred and eighty miles in four days, we were
required to take part, of course, in the pursuit of the Confederate
army.  So, resting but one night in our old camp, we were early in
the saddle again on the morning of the 2d of June.  Marching south
through Corinth, we passed on the 4th of June the scene of our late
raid, viewing with much satisfaction, as we took the road toward
Blackland, the still smoldering embers of the burned trains.

On the 4th of June I was ordered to proceed with my regiment along
the Blackland road to determine the strength of the enemy in that
direction, as it was thought possible we might capture, by a
concerted movement which General John Pope had suggested to General
Halleck, a portion of Beauregard's rear guard.  Pushing the
Confederate scouts rapidly in with a running fire for a mile or more,
while we were approaching a little stream, I hoped to gobble the main
body of the enemy's pickets.  I therefore directed the sabre
battalion of the regiment, followed by that portion of it armed with
revolving rifles, to dash forward in column, cut off these videttes
before they could cross the stream, and then gather them in.  The
pickets fled hastily, however, and a pell-mell pursuit carried us
over the stream at their heels by a little bridge, with no thought of
halting till we gained a hill on the other side, and suddenly found
ourselves almost in the camp of a strong body of artillery and
infantry.  Captain Campbell being in advance, hurriedly dismounted
his battalion for a further forward movement on foot, but it was
readily seen that the enemy was present in such heavy force as almost
to ensure our destruction, and I gave orders for a hasty withdrawal.
We withdrew without loss under cover of thick woods, aided much,
however, by the consternation of the Confederates, who had hardly
recovered from their surprise at our sudden appearance in their camp
before we had again placed the stream between them and us by
recrossing the bridge.  The reconnoissance was a success in one way
--that is, in finding out that the enemy was at the point supposed by,
General Pope; but it also had a tendency to accelerate Beauregard's
retreat, for in a day or two his whole line fell back as far south as
Guntown, thus rendering abortive the plans for bagging a large
portion of his army.

General Beauregard's evacuation of Corinth and retreat southward were
accomplished in the face of a largely superior force of Union troops,
and he reached the point where he intended to halt for reorganization
without other loss than that sustained in the destruction of the cars
and supplies at Booneville, and the capture of some stragglers and
deserters that fell into our hands while we were pressing his rear
from General Pope's flank.  The number of these was quite large, and
indicated that the enemy was considerably demoralized.  Under such
circumstances, an energetic and skillfully directed pursuit might not
have made certain the enemy's destruction, but it would largely have
aided in disintegrating his forces, and I never could quite
understand why it was not ordered.  The desultory affairs between
rear and advance guards seemed as a general, thing to have no
particular purpose in view beyond finding out where the enemy was,
and when he was found, since no supporting colums were at hand and no
one in supreme control was present to give directions, our
skirmishing was of little avail and brought but small reward.

A short time subsequent to these occurrences, Colonel Elliott was
made a brigadier-general, and as General Pope appointed him his
Chief-of-Staff, I, on the 11th of June, 1862, fell in command of the
brigade by seniority.  For the rest of the month but little of moment
occurred, and we settled down into camp at Booneville on the 26th of
June, in a position which my brigade had been ordered to take up some
twenty miles, in advance of the main army for the purpose of covering
its front.  Although but a few days had elapsed from the date of my
appointment as colonel of the Second Michigan to that of my
succeeding to the command of the brigade, I believe I can say with
propriety that I had firmly established myself in the confidence of
the officers and men of the regiment, and won their regard by
thoughtful care.  I had striven unceasingly to have them well fed and
well clothed, had personally looked after the selection of their
camps, and had maintained such a discipline as to allay former
irritation.

Men who march, scout, and fight, and suffer all the hardships that
fall to the lot of soldiers in the field, in order to do vigorous
work must have the best bodily sustenance, and every comfort that can
be provided.  I knew from practical experience on the frontier that
my efforts in this direction would not only be appreciated, but
requited by personal affection and gratitude; and, further, that such
exertions would bring the best results to me.  Whenever my authority
would permit I saved my command from needless sacrifices and
unnecessary toil; therefore, when hard or daring work was to be done
I expected the heartiest response, and always got it.  Soldiers are
averse to seeing their comrades killed without compensating results,
and none realize more quickly than they the blundering that often
takes place on the field of battle.  They want some tangible
indemnity for the loss of life, and as victory is an offset the value
of which is manifest, it not only makes them content to shed their
blood, but also furnishes evidence of capacity in those who command
them.  My regiment had lost very few men since coming under my
command, but it seemed, in the eyes of all who belonged to it, that
casualties to the enemy and some slight successes for us had repaid
every sacrifice, and in consequence I had gained not only their
confidence as soldiers, but also their esteem and love as men, and to
a degree far beyond what I then realized.

As soon as the camp of my brigade was pitched at Booneville, I began
to scout in every direction, to obtain a knowledge of the enemy's
whereabouts and learn the ground about me.  My standing in drawing at
the Military Academy had never been so high as to warrant the belief
that I could ever prove myself an expert, but a few practical lessons
in that line were impressed on me there, and I had retained enough to
enable me to make rough maps that could be readily understood, and
which would be suitable to replace the erroneous skeleton outlines of
northern Mississippi, with which at this time we were scantily
furnished; so as soon as possible I compiled for the use of myself
and my regimental commanders an information map of the surrounding
country.  This map exhibited such details as country roads, streams,
farmhouses, fields, woods, and swamps, and such other topographical
features as would be useful.  I must confess that my crude sketch did
not evidence much artistic merit, but it was an improvement on what
we already possessed in the way of details to guide the command, and
this was what I most needed; for it was of the first importance that
in our exposed condition we should be equipped with a thorough
knowledge of the section in which we were operating, so as to be
prepared to encounter an enemy already indicating recovery from the
disorganizing effects of his recent retreat.

In the immediate vicinity of Booneville the country was covered with
heavy forests, with here and there clearings or intervening fields
that had been devoted to the cultivation of cotton and corn.  The
ground was of a low character, typical of northeastern Mississippi,
and abounded in small creeks that went almost totally dry even in
short periods of drought, but became flooded with muddy water under
the outpouring of rain peculiar to a semi-tropical climate.  In such
a region there were many chances of our being surprised, especially
by an enemy who knew the country well, and whose ranks were filled
with local guides; and great precautions as well as the fullest
information were necessary to prevent disaster.  I therefore
endeavored to familiarize all with our surroundings, but scarcely had
matters begun to shape themselves as I desired when our annihilation
was attempted by a large force of Confederate cavalry.

On the morning of July 1, 1862, a cavalry command of between five and
six thousand-men, under the Confederate General James R. Chalmers,
advanced on two roads converging near Booneville.  The head of the
enemy's column on the Blackland and Booneville road came in contact
with my pickets three miles and a half west of Booneville.  These
pickets, under Lieutenant Leonidas S. Scranton, of the Second
Michigan Cavalry, fell back slowly, taking advantage of every tree or
other cover to fire from till they arrived at the point where the
converging roads joined.  At this junction there was a strong
position in the protecting timber, and here Scranton made a firm
stand, being reinforced presently by the few men he had out as
pickets on the road to his left, a second company I had sent him from
camp, and subsequently by three companies more, all now commanded by
Captain Campbell.  This force was dismounted and formed in line, and
soon developed that the enemy was present in large numbers.  Up to
this time Chalmers had shown only the heads of his columns, and we
had doubts as to his purpose, but now that our resistance forced him
to deploy two regiments on the right and left of the road, it became
apparent that he meant business, and that there was no time to lose
in preparing to repel his attack.

Full information of the situation was immediately sent me, and I
directed Campbell to hold fast, if possible, till I could support
him, but if compelled to retire he was authorized to do so slowly,
taking advantage of every means that fell in his way to prolong the
fighting.  Before this I had stationed one battalion of the Second
Iowa in Booneville, but Colonel Edward Hatch, commanding that
regiment, was now directed to leave one company for the protection of
our camp a little to the north of the station, and take the balance
of the Second Iowa, with the battalion in Booneville except two sabre
companies, and form the whole in rear of Captain Campbell, to protect
his flanks and support him by a charge should the enemy break his
dismounted line.

While these preparations were being made, the Confederates attempted
to drive Campbell from his position by a direct attack through an
open field.  In this they failed, however, for our men, reserving
their fire until the enemy came within about thirty yards, then
opened on him with such a shower of bullets from our Colt's rifles
that it soon became too hot for him, and he was repulsed with
considerable loss.  Foiled in this move, Chalmers hesitated to attack
again in front, but began overlapping both flanks of Campbell's line
by force of numbers, compelling Campbell to retire toward a strong
position I had selected in his rear for a line on which to make our
main resistance.  As soon as the enemy saw this withdrawing he again
charged in front, but was again as gallantly repelled as in the first
assault, although the encounter was for a short time so desperate as
to have the character of a hand-to-hand conflict, several groups of
friend and foe using on each other the butts of their guns.  At this
juncture the timely arrival of Colonel Hatch with the Second Iowa
gave a breathing-spell to Campbell, and made the Confederates so
chary of further direct attacks that he was enabled to retire; and at
the same time I found opportunity to make disposition of the
reinforcement to the best advantage possible, placing the Second Iowa
on the left of the new line and strengthening Campbell on its right
with all the men available.

In view of his numbers, the enemy soon regained confidence in his
ability to overcome us, and in a little while again began his
flanking movements, his right passing around my left flank some
distance, and approaching our camp and transportation, which I had
forbidden to be moved out to the rear.  Fearing that he would envelop
us and capture the camp and transportation, I determined to take the
offensive.  Remembering a circuitous wood road that I had become
familiar with while making the map heretofore mentioned, I concluded
that the most effective plan would be to pass a small column around
the enemy's left, by way of this road, and strike his rear by a
mounted charge simultaneously with an advance of our main line on his
front.  I knew that the attack in rear would be a most hazardous
undertaking, but in the face of such odds as the enemy had the
condition of affairs was most critical, and could be relieved, only
by a bold and radical change in our tactics; so I at once selected
four sabre companies, two from the Second Michigan and two from the
Second Iowa, and placing Captain Alger, of the former regiment, in
command of them, I informed him that I expected of them the quick and
desperate work that is usually imposed on a forlorn hope.

To carry out the purpose now in view, I instructed Captain Alger to
follow the wood road as it led around the left of the enemy's
advancing forces, to a point where 'it joined the Blackland road,
about three miles from Booneville, and directed him, upon reaching
the Blackland road, to turn up it immediately, and charge the rear of
the enemy's line.  Under no circumstances was he to deploy the
battalion, but charge in column right through whatever he came upon,
and report to me in front of Booneville, if at all possible for him
to get there.  If he failed to break through the enemy's line, he was
to go ahead as far as he could, and then if any of his men were left,
and he was able to retreat, he was to do so by the same route he had
taken on his way out.  To conduct him on this perilous service I sent
along a thin, sallow, tawny-haired Mississippian named Beene, whom I
had employed as a guide and scout a few days before, on account of
his intimate knowledge of the roads, from the public thoroughfares
down to the insignificant by-paths of the neighboring swamps.  With
such guidance I felt sure that the column would get to the desired
point without delay, for there was no danger of its being lost or
misled by taking any of the many by-roads which traversed the dense
forests through which it would be obliged to pass.  I also informed
Alger that I should take the reserve and join the main line in front
of Booneville for the purpose of making an advance of my whole force,
and that as a signal he must have his men cheer loudly when he struck
the enemy's rear, in order that my attack might be simultaneous with
his.

I gave him one hour to go around and come back through the enemy, and
when he started I moved to the front with the balance of the reserve,
to put everything I had into the fight.  This meant an inestimable
advantage to the enemy in case of our defeat, but our own safety
demanded the hazard.  All along our attenuated line the fighting was
now sharp, and the enemy's firing indicated such numerical strength
that fear of disaster to Alger increased my anxiety terribly as the
time set for his cheering arrived and no sound of it was heard.

Relying, however, on the fact that Beene's knowledge of the roads
would prevent his being led astray, and confident of Alger's
determination to accomplish the purpose for which he set out, as soon
as the hour was up I ordered my whole line forward.  Fortunately,
just as this moment a locomotive and two cars loaded with grain for
my horses ran into Booneville from Corinth.  I say fortunately,
because it was well known throughout the command that in the morning,
when I first discovered the large numbers of the enemy, I had called
for assistance; and my troops, now thinking that reinforcements had
arrived by rail from Rienzi, where a division of infantry was
encamped, and inspirated by this belief, advanced with renewed
confidence and wild cheering.  Meantime I had the engineer of the
locomotive blow his whistle loudly, so that the enemy might also
learn that a train had come; and from the fact that in a few moments
he began to give way before our small force, I thought that this
strategem had some effect.  Soon his men broke, and ran in the utmost
disorder over the country in every direction.  I found later,
however, that his precipitous retreat was due to the pressure on his
left from the Second Iowa, in concert with the front attack of the
Second Michigan, and the demoralization wrought in his rear by Alger,
who had almost entirely accomplished the purpose of his expedition,
though he had failed to come through, or so near that I could hear
the signal agreed upon before leaving Booneville.

After Alger had reached and turned up the Blackland road, the first
thing he came across was the Confederate headquarters; the officers
and orderlies about which he captured and sent back some distance to
a farm-house.  Continuing on a gallop, he soon struck the rear of the
enemy's line, but was unable to get through; nor did he get near
enough for me to hear his cheering; but as he had made the distance
he was to travel in the time allotted, his attack and mine were
almost coincident, and the enemy, stampeded by the charges in front
and rear, fled toward Blackland, with little or no attempt to capture
Alger's command, which might readily have been done.  Alger's
troopers soon rejoined me at Booneville, minus many hats, having
returned by their original route.  They had sustained little loss
except a few men wounded and a few temporarily missing.  Among these
was Alger himself, who was dragged from his saddle by the limb of a
tree that, in the excitement of the charge, he was unable to flank.
The missing had been dismounted in one way or another, and run over
by the enemy in his flight; but they all turned up later, none the
worse except for a few scratches and bruises.

My effective strength in this fight was 827 all told, and Alger's
command comprised ninety officers and men.  Chalmers's force was
composed of six regiments and two battalions, and though I have been
unable to find any returns from which to verify his actual numbers,
yet, from the statements of prisoners and from information obtained
from citizens along his line of march, it is safe to say that he had
in the action not less than five-thousand men.  Our casualties were
not many--forty-one in all.  His loss in killed and wounded was
considerable, his most severely wounded--forty men--falling into our
hands, having been left at farm-houses in the vicinity of the
battlefield.

The victory in the face of such odds was most gratifying, and as it
justified my disinclination--in fact, refusal--to retire from
Booneville without fighting (for the purpose of saving my
transportation, as directed by superior authority when I applied in
the morning for reinforcements), it was to me particularly grateful.
It was also very valuable in, view of the fact that it increased the
confidence between the officers and men of my brigade and me, and
gave us for the balance of the month not only comparative rest, but
entire immunity from the dangers of a renewed effort to gobble my
isolated outpost.  In addition to all this, commendation from my
immediate superiors was promptly tendered through oral and written
congratulations; and their satisfaction at the result of the battle
took definite form a few days later, in the following application for
my promotion, when, by an expedition to Ripley, Miss., most valuable
information as to the enemy's location and plans was captured:



"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
"JULY 30, 1862.--3.05 P. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
"Washington, D. C.

"Brigadiers scarce; good ones scarce.  Asboth goes on the month's
leave you gave him ten months since; Granger has temporary command.
The undersigned respectfully beg that you will obtain the promotion
of Sheridan.  He is worth his weight in gold.  His Ripley expedition
has brought us captured letters of immense value, as well as
prisoners, showing the rebel plans and dispositions, as you will
learn from District Commander.

"W. S. ROSECRANS, Brigadier-General.
"C. C. SULLIVAN,      "       "
"G. GRANGER,          "       "
"W. L. ELLIOTT,       "       "
"A. ASBOTH,           "       "     "




CHAPTER X.

IN CAMP NEAR RIENZI--GENERAL GRANGER--A VALUABLE CAPTURE AT RIPLEY
--RAIDING A CORNFIELD--REPULSING AN ATTACK--PRESENTED WITH THE BLACK
HORSE "RIENZI"--MEETING GENERAL GRANT--APPOINTED A BRIGADIER-GENERAL.

After the battle of Booneville, it was decided by General Rosecrans,
on the advice of General Granger, that my position at Booneville was
too much exposed, despite the fact that late on the evening of the
fight my force had been increased by the addition of, a battery of
four guns and two companies of infantry, and by the Third Michigan
Cavalry, commanded by Colonel John K. Mizner; so I was directed to
withdraw from my post and go into camp near Rienzi, Mississippi,
where I could equally well cover the roads in front of the army, and
also be near General Asboth's division of infantry, which occupied a
line in rear of the town.  This section of country, being higher and
more rolling than that in the neighborhood of Booneville, had many
advantages in the way of better camping-grounds, better grazing and
the like, but I moved with reluctance, because I feared that my
proximity to Asboth would diminish to a certain extent my
independence of command.

General Asboth was a tall, spare, handsome man, with gray mustache
and a fierce look.  He was an educated soldier, of unquestioned
courage, but the responsibilities of outpost duty bore rather heavily
on him, and he kept all hands in a state of constant worry in
anticipation of imaginary attacks.  His ideas of discipline were not
very rigid either, and as by this time there had been introduced into
my brigade some better methods than those obtaining when it first
fell to my command, I feared the effect should he, have any control
over it, or meddle with its internal affairs.  However, there was
nothing to do but to move to the place designated, but General
Granger, who still commanded the cavalry division to which the
brigade belonged, so arranged matters with General Rosecrans, who had
succeeded to the command of the Army of the Mississippi, that my
independence was to be undisturbed, except in case of a general
attack by the enemy.

We went into camp near Rienzi, July 22, sending back to the general
field-hospital at Tuscumbia Springs all our sick--a considerable
number--stricken down by the malarial influences around Booneville.
In a few days the fine grazing and abundance of grain for our
exhausted horses brought about their recuperation; and the many large
open fields in the vicinity gave opportunity for drills and parades,
which were much needed.  I turned my attention to those disciplinary
measures which, on account of active work in the field, had been
necessarily neglected since the brigade had arrived at Pittsburg
Landing, in April; and besides, we had been busy in collecting
information by scouting parties and otherwise, in prosecution of the
purpose for which we were covering the main army.

I kept up an almost daily correspondence with General Granger,
concerning the information obtained by scouts and reconnoitring
parties, and he came often to Rienzi to see me in relation to this
and other matters.  Previously I had not had much personal
association with Granger.  While I was at Halleck's headquarters we
met on one or two occasions, and the day I joined the Second Michigan
at Farmington I saw him for a few moments, but, with such slight
exception, our intercourse had been almost exclusively official.  He
had suggested my name, I was told, to Governor Blair, when the
Governor was in search of an officer of the regular army to appoint
to the colonelcy of the Second Michigan Cavalry, but his
recommendation must have been mainly based on the favorable opinions
he had heard expressed by General Halleck and by some of the officers
of his staff, rather than from any personal knowledge of my capacity.
Of course I was very grateful for this, but some of his
characteristics did not impress me favorably, and I sometimes wished
the distance between our camps greater.  His most serious failing was
an uncontrollable propensity to interfere with and direct the minor
matters relating to the command, the details for which those under
him were alone responsible.  Ill-judged meddling in this respect
often led to differences between us, only temporary it is true, but
most harassing to the subordinate, since I was compelled by the
circumstances of the situation not only invariably to yield my own
judgment, but many a time had to play peacemaker--smoothing down
ruffled feelings, that I knew had been excited by Granger's freaky
and spasmodic efforts to correct personally some trifling fault that
ought to have been left to a regimental or company commander to
remedy.  Yet with all these small blemishes Granger had many good
qualities, and his big heart was so full of generous impulses and
good motives as to far outbalance his short-comings; and
not-withstanding the friction and occasional acerbity of our official
intercourse, we maintained friendly relations till his death.

In pursuance of the fatal mistake made by dispersing Halleck's forces
after the fall of Corinth, General Don Carlos Buell's Army of the
Ohio had been started some time before on its march eastward toward
Chattanooga; and as this movement would be followed of course by a
manoeuvre on the part of the enemy, now at Tupelo under General
Braxton Bragg, either to meet Buell or frustrate his designs by some
counter-operation, I was expected to furnish, by scouting and all
other means available, information as to what was going on within the
Confederate lines.  To do the work required, necessitated an increase
of my command, and the Seventh Kansas Cavalry was therefore added to
it, and my picket-line extended so as to cover from Jacinto
southwesterly to a point midway between Rienzi and Booneville, and
then northwesterly to the Hatchie River.  Skirmishes between outposts
on this line were of frequent occurrence, with small results to
either side, but they were somewhat annoying, particularly in the
direction of Ripley, where the enemy maintained a considerable
outpost.  Deciding to cripple if not capture this outpost, on the
evening of July 27, I sent out an expedition under Colonel Hatch,
which drove the enemy from the town of Ripley and took a few
prisoners, but the most valuable prize was in the shape of a package
of thirty-two private letters, the partial reading of which disclosed
to me the positive transfer from Mississippi of most of Bragg's army,
for the purpose of counteracting Buell's operations in northern
Alabama and East Tennessee.  This decisive evidence was of the utmost
importance, and without taking time to read all the letters, I
forwarded them to General Granger July 28, in a despatch which
stated: "I deem it necessary to send them at once; the enemy is
moving in large force on Chattanooga."  Other than this the results
of the expedition were few; and the enemy, having fled from Ripley
with but slight resistance, accompanied by almost all the
inhabitants, re-occupied the place next day after our people had
quitted it, and resumed in due time his annoying attacks on our
outposts, both sides trying to achieve something whenever occasion
offered.

The prevalence of a severe drought had resulted in drying up many of
the streams within the enemy's lines, and, in consequence, he was
obliged to shift his camps often, and send his beef-cattle and mules
near his outposts for water.  My scouts kept me well posted in regard
to the movements of both camps and herds; and a favorable opportunity
presenting itself, I sent an expedition on August 14 to gather in
some animals located on Twenty-Mile Creek, a stream always supplied
with water from a source of never-failing, springs.  Our side met
with complete success in this instance, and when the expedition
returned, we were all made happy by an abundance of fresh beef, and
by some two hundred captured mules, that we thus added to our trains
at a time when draft animals were much needed.

Rations for the men were now supplied in fair quantities, and the
only thing required to make us wholly contented was plenty of grain
for our animals.  Because of the large number of troops then in West
Tennessee and about Corinth, the indifferent railroad leading down
from Columbus, Ky., was taxed to its utmost capacity to transport
supplies.  The quantity of grain received at Corinth from the north
was therefore limited, and before reaching the different outposts, by
passing through intermediate depots of supply, it had dwindled to
insignificance.  I had hopes, however, that this condition of things
might be ameliorated before long by gathering a good supply of corn
that was ripening in the neighborhood, and would soon, I thought, be
sufficiently hard to feed to my animals.  Not far from my
headquarters there was a particularly fine field, which, with this
end in view, I had carefully protected through the milky stage, to
the evident disappointment of both Asboth's men and mine.  They bore
the prohibition well while it affected only themselves, but the trial
was too great when it came to denying their horses; and men whose
discipline kept faith with my guards during the roasting-ear period
now fell from grace.  Their horses were growing thin, and few could
withstand the mute appeals of their suffering pets; so at night the
corn, because of individual foraging, kept stealthily and steadily
vanishing, until the field was soon fringed with only earless stalks.
The disappearance was noticed, and the guard increased, but still the
quantity of corn continued to grow less, the more honest troopers
bemoaning the loss, and questioning the honor of those to whose
safekeeping it had been entrusted.  Finally, doubtless under the
apprehension that through their irregularities the corn would all
disappear and find its way to the horses in accordance with the
stealthy enterprise of their owners, a general raid was made on the
field in broad daylight, and though the guard drove off the
marauders, I must admit that its efforts to keep them back were so
unsuccessful that my hopes for an equal distribution of the crop were
quickly blasted.  One look at the field told that it had been swept
clean of its grain.  Of course a great row occurred as to who was to
blame, and many arrests and trials took place, but there had been
such an interchanging of cap numbers and other insignia that it was
next to impossible to identify the guilty, and so much crimination
and acrimony grew out of the affair that it was deemed best to drop
the whole matter.

On August 27 about half of the command was absent reconnoitring, I
having sent it south toward Tupelo, in the hope of obtaining some
definite information regarding a movement to Holly Springs of the
remainder of the Confederate army, under General Price, when about
mid-day I was suddenly aroused by excited cries and sounds of firing,
and I saw in a moment that the enemy was in my camp.  He had come in
on my right flank from the direction of the Hatchie River, pell-mell
with our picket-post stationed about three miles out on the Ripley
road.  The whole force of the enemy comprised about eight hundred,
but only his advance entered with my pickets, whom he had charged and
badly stampeded, without, on their part, the pretense of a fight in
behalf of those whom it was their duty to protect until proper
dispositions for defense could be made.  The day was excessively hot,
one of those sultry debilitating days that had caused the suspending
of all military exercises; and as most of the men were lounging or
sleeping in their tents, we were literally caught napping.  The alarm
spread instantly through the camp, and in a moment the command turned
out for action, somewhat in deshabille it is true, but none the less
effective, for every man had grabbed his rifle and cartridge-box at
the first alarm.  Aided by a few shots from Captain Henry Hescock's
battery, we soon drove the intruders from our camp in about the same
disorder in which they had broken in on us.  By this time Colonel
Hatch and Colonel Albert L. Lee had mounted two battalions each, and
I moved them out at a lively pace in pursuit, followed by a section
of the battery.  No halt was called till we came upon the enemy's
main body, under Colonel Faulkner, drawn up in line of battle near
Newland's store.  Opening on him with the two pieces of artillery, I
hurriedly formed line confronting him, and quickly and with but
little resistance drove him in confusion from the field.  The sudden
turning of the tables dismayed Faulkner's men, and panic seizing
them, they threw away every loose article of arms or clothing of
which they could dismember themselves, and ran in the wildest
disorder in a mad effort to escape.  As the chase went on the panic
increased, the clouds of dust from the road causing an intermingling
of friend and foe.  In a little while the affair grew most ludicrous,
Faulkner's hatless and coatless men taking to the woods in such
dispersed order and so demoralized that a good many prisoners were
secured, and those of the enemy who escaped were hunted until dark.
When the recall was sounded, our men came in loaded down with plunder
in the shape of hats, haversacks, blankets, pistols, and shotguns, in
a quantity which amply repaid for the surprise of the morning, but
did not excuse the delinquent commander of our picket-guard, who a
few days later was brought to a realizing sense of his duty by a
court-martial.

Shortly after this affair Captain Archibald P. Campbell, of the
Second Michigan Cavalry, presented me with the black horse called
Rienzi, since made historical from having been ridden by me in many
battles, conspicuously in the ride from Winchester to Cedar Creek,
which has been celebrated in the poem by T. Buchanan Read.  This
horse was of Morgan stock, and then about three years old.  He was
jet black, excepting three white feet, sixteen hands high, and
strongly built, with great powers of endurance.  He was so active
that he could cover with ease five miles an hour at his natural
walking gait.  The gelding had been ridden very seldom; in fact,
Campbell had been unaccustomed to riding till the war broke out, and,
I think, felt some disinclination to mount the fiery colt.  Campbell
had an affection for him, however, that never waned, and would often
come to my headquarters to see his favorite, the colt being cared for
there by the regimental farrier, an old man named John Ashley, who
had taken him in charge when leaving Michigan, and had been his groom
ever since.  Seeing that I liked the horse--I had ridden him on
several occasions--Campbell presented him to me on one of these
visits, and from that time till the close of the war I rode him
almost continuously, in every campaign and battle in which I took
part, without once finding him overcome by fatigue, though on many
occasions his strength was severely tested by long marches and short
rations.  I never observed in him any vicious habit; a nervousness
and restlessness and switch of the tail, when everything about him
was in repose, being the only indication that he might be
untrustworthy.  No one but a novice could be deceived by this,
however, for the intelligence evinced in every feature, and his
thoroughbred appearance, were so striking that any person accustomed
to horses could not misunderstand such a noble animal.  But Campbell
thought otherwise, at least when the horse was to a certain degree
yet untrained, and could not be pursuaded to ride him; indeed, for
more than a year after he was given to me, Campbell still retained
suspicions of his viciousness, though, along with this mistrust, an
undiminished affection.  Although he was several times wounded, this
horse escaped death in action; and living to a ripe old age, died in
1878, attended to the last with all the care and surrounded with
every comfort due the faithful service he had rendered.

In moving from Corinth east toward Chattanooga, General Buell's army
was much delayed by the requirement that he should repair the Memphis
and Charleston railroad as he progressed.  The work of repair obliged
him to march very slowly, and was of but little use when done, for
guerrillas and other bands of Confederates destroyed the road again
as soon as he had passed on.  But worst of all, the time thus
consumed gave General Bragg the opportunity to reorganize and
increase his army to such an extent that he was able to contest the
possession of Middle Tennessee and Kentucky.  Consequently, the
movement of this army through Tennessee and Kentucky toward the Ohio
River--its objective points being Louisville and Cincinnati--was now
well defined, and had already rendered abortive General Buell's
designs on Chattanooga and East Tennessee.  Therefore extraordinary
efforts on the part of the Government became necessary, and the
concentration of National troops at Louisville and Cincinnati to meet
the contingency of Bragg's reaching those points was an obvious
requirement.  These troops were drawn from all sections in the West
where it was thought they could be spared, and among others I was
ordered to conduct thither--to Louisville or Cincinnati, as
subsequent developments might demand--my regiment, Hescock's battery,
the Second and Fifteenth Missouri, and the Thirty-sixth and
Forty-fourth Illinois regiments of infantry, known as the "Pea Ridge
Brigade." With this column I marched back to Corinth on the 6th of
September, 1862, for the purpose of getting railroad transportation
to Columbus, Kentucky.

At Corinth I met General Grant, who by this time had been
reestablished in favor and command somewhat, General Halleck having
departed for Washington to assume command of the army as
General-in-Chief.  Before and during the activity which followed his
reinstatement, General Grant had become familiar with my services
through the transmission to Washington of information I had furnished
concerning the enemy's movements, and by reading reports of my fights
and skirmishes in front, and he was loth to let me go.  Indeed, he
expressed surprise at seeing me in Corinth, and said he had not
expected me to go; he also plainly showed that he was much hurt at
the inconsiderate way in which his command was being depleted.  Since
I was of the opinion that the chief field of usefulness and
opportunity was opening up in Kentucky, I did not wish him to retain
me, which he might have done, and I impressed him with my conviction,
somewhat emphatically, I fear.  Our conversation ended with my wish
gratified.  I afterward learned that General Granger, whom General
Grant did not fancy, had suggested that I should take to Cincinnati
the main portion of Granger's command--the Pea Ridge Brigade--as well
as the Second Michigan Cavalry, of which I was still colonel.
We started that night, going by rail over the Mobile and Ohio road to
Columbus, Ky., where we embarked on steamboats awaiting us.  These
boats were five in number, and making one of them my flag-ship,
expecting that we might come upon certain batteries reported to be
located upon the Kentucky shore of the Ohio, I directed the rest to
follow my lead.  Just before reaching Caseyville, the captain of a
tin-clad gunboat that was patrolling the river brought me the
information that the enemy was in strong force at Caseyville, and
expressed a fear that my fleet could not pass his batteries.
Accepting the information as correct, I concluded to capture the
place before trying to pass up the river.  Pushing in to the bank as
we neared the town, I got the troops ashore and moved on Caseyville,
in the expectation of a bloody fight, but was agreeably surprised
upon reaching the outskirts of the village by an outpouring of its
inhabitants--men, women, and children--carrying the Stars and
Stripes, and making the most loyal professions.  Similar
demonstrations of loyalty had been made to the panic-stricken captain
of the gunboat when he passed down the river, but he did not stay to
ascertain their character, neither by landing nor by inquiry, for he
assumed that on the Kentucky bank of the river there could be no
loyalty.  The result mortified the captain intensely; and deeming his
convoy of little further use, he steamed toward Cairo in quest of
other imaginary batteries, while I re-embarked at Caseyville, and
continued up the Ohio undisturbed.  About three miles below
Cincinnati I received instructions to halt, and next day I was
ordered by Major-General H. G. Wright to take my troops back to
Louisville, and there assume command of the Pea Ridge Brigade,
composed of the Second and Fifteenth Missouri, Thirty-sixth and
Forty-fourth Illinois infantry, and of such other regiments as might
be sent me in advance of the arrival of General Buell's army.
When I reached Louisville I reported to Major-General William Nelson,
who was sick, and who received me as he lay in bed.  He asked me why
I did not wear the shoulder-straps of my rank.  I answered that I was
the colonel of the Second Michigan cavalry, and had on my appropriate
shoulder-straps.  He replied that I was a brigadier-general for the
Booneville fight, July 1, and that I should wear the shoulder-straps
of that grade.  I returned to my command and put it in camp; and
as I had no reluctance to wearing the shoulder-straps of a
brigadier-general, I was not long in procuring a pair, particularly
as I was fortified next day by receiving from Washington official
information of my appointment as a brigadier-general, to date from
July 1, 1862, the day of the battle of Booneville.




CHAPTER XI.

GOOD ADVICE FROM GENERAL NELSON--HIS TRAGIC DEATH--PUTTING LOUISVILLE
IN A STATE OF DEFENSE--ASSIGNED TO THE COMMAND OF THE ELEVENTH
DIVISION--CAPTURE OF CHAPLIN HEIGHTS--BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE--REPORTED
AMONG THE KILLED--A THRILLING INCIDENT--GENERAL BUELL RELIEVED BY
GENERAL ROSECRANS.

I reported to Major-General Nelson at the Galt House in Louisville,
September 14, 1862, who greeted me in the bluff and hearty fashion of
a sailor--for he had been in the navy till the breaking out of the
war.  The new responsibilities that were now to fall upon me by
virtue of increased rank caused in my mind an uneasiness which, I
think, Nelson observed at the interview, and he allayed it by giving
me much good advice, and most valuable information in regard to
affairs in Kentucky, telling me also that he intended I should retain
in my command the Pea Ridge Brigade and Hescock's battery.  This
latter assurance relieved me greatly, for I feared the loss of these
troops in the general redistribution which I knew must soon take
place; and being familiar with their valuable service in Missouri,
and having brought them up from Mississippi, I hoped they would
continue with me.  He directed me to take position just below the
city with the Pea Ridge Brigade, Hescock's battery, and the Second
Michigan Cavalry, informing me, at the same time, that some of the
new regiments, then arriving under a recent call of the President for
volunteers, would also be assigned to my command.  Shortly after the
interview eight new regiments and an additional battery joined me,
thus making good his promise of more troops.

A few days later came Nelson's tragic end, shocking the whole
country.  Those of us in camp outside of the city were startled on
the morning of September 29 by the news that General Jefferson C.
Davis, of the Union Army, had shot General Nelson at the Galt House,
and the wildest rumors in regard to the occurrence came thick and
fast; one to the effect that Nelson was dead, another having it that
he was living and had killed Davis, and still others reflecting on
the loyalty of both, it being supposed by the general public at first
that the difficulty between the two men had grown out of some
political rather than official or personal differences.  When the
news came, I rode into the city to the Galt House to learn the
particulars, reaching there about 10 o'clock in the forenoon.  Here I
learned that Nelson had been shot by Davis about two hours before, at
the foot of the main stairway leading from the corridor just beyond
the office to the second floor, and that Nelson was already dead.  It
was almost as difficult to get reliable particulars of the matter at
the hotel as it had been in my camp, but I gathered that the two men
had met first at an early hour near the counter of the hotel office,
and that an altercation which had begun several days before in
relation to something official was renewed by Davis, who, attempting
to speak to Nelson in regard to the subject-matter of their previous
dispute, was met by an insulting refusal to listen.  It now appears
that when Nelson made this offensive remark, Davis threw a small
paper ball that he was nervously rolling between his fingers into
Nelson's face, and that this insult was returned by Nelson slapping
Davis (Killed by a Brother Soldier.--Gen. J. B. Fry.) in the face.
But at the time, exactly what had taken place just before the
shooting was shrouded in mystery by a hundred conflicting stories,
the principal and most credited of which was that Davis had demanded
from Nelson an apology for language used in the original altercation,
and that Nelson's refusal was accompanied by a slap in the face, at
the same moment denouncing Davis as a coward.  However this may be,
Nelson, after slapping Davis, moved toward the corridor, from which a
stairway led to the second floor, and just as he was about to ascend,
Davis fired with a pistol that he had obtained from some one near by
after the blow had been struck.  The ball entered Nelson's breast
just above the heart, but his great strength enabled him to ascend
the stairway notwithstanding the mortal character of the wound, and
he did not fall till he reached the corridor on the second floor.  He
died about half an hour later.  The tragedy cast a deep gloom over
all who knew the men, for they both had many warm personal friends;
and affairs at Louisville had hardly recovered as yet from the
confused and discouraging condition which preceded the arrival of
General Buell's army.  General Buell reported the killing of Nelson
to the authorities at Washington, and recommended the trial of Davis
by court-martial, but no proceedings were ever instituted against him
in either a civil or military court, so to this day it has not been
determined judicially who was the aggressor.  Some months later Davis
was assigned to the command of a division in Buell's army after that
officer had been relieved from its command.

Two Confederate armies, under General Kirby Smith and General Braxton
Bragg, had penetrated into Kentucky, the one under Smith by the way
of Cumberland Gap, the other and main army under Bragg by way of the
Sequatche Valley, Glasgow, and Mumfordsville.  Glasgow was captured
by the enemy on the 17th of September, and as the expectation was
that Buell would reach the place in time to save the town, its loss
created considerable alarm in the North, for fears were now
entertained that Bragg would strike Louisville and capture the city
before Buell could arrive on the ground.  It became necessary
therefore to put Louisville in a state of defense, and after the
cordon of principal works had been indicated, my troops threw up in
one night a heavy line of rifle-pits south of the city, from the
Bardstown pike to the river.  The apprehended attack by Bragg never
came, however, for in the race that was then going on between him and
Buell on parallel roads, the Army of the Ohio outmarched the
Confederates, its advance arriving at Louisville September 25.

General Buell immediately set about reorganizing the whole force, and
on September 29 issued an order designating the troops under my
command as the Eleventh Division, Army of the Ohio, and assigning
Brigadier-General J. T. Boyle to command the division, and me to
command one of its brigades.  To this I could not object, of course,
for I was a brigadier-general of very recent date, and could hardly
expect more than a brigade.  I had learned, however, that at least
one officer to whom a high command had been given--a corps--had not
yet been appointed a general officer by the President, and I
considered it somewhat unfair that I should be relegated to a
brigade, while men who held no commissions at all were being made
chiefs of corps and divisions; so I sought an interview with General
Buell's chief-of-staff, Colonel Fry, and, while not questioning
Buell's good intentions nor his pure motives, insisted that my rights
in the matter should be recognized.  That same evening I was assigned
to the command of the Eleventh Division, and began preparing it at
once for a forward movement, which I knew must soon take place in the
resumption of offensive operations by the Army of the Ohio.

During the interval from September 25 till October 1 there was among
the officers much criticism of General Buell's management of the
recent campaign, which had resulted in his retirement to Louisville;
and he was particularly censured by many for not offering battle to
General Bragg while the two armies were marching parallel to each
other, and so near that an engagement could have been brought on at
any one of several points--notably so at Glasgow, Kentucky, if there
had been a desire to join issue.  It was asserted, and by many
conceded, that General Buell had a sufficient force to risk a fight.
He was much blamed for the loss of Mumfordsville also.  The capture
of this point, with its garrison, gave Bragg an advantage in the race
toward the Ohio River, which odds would most likely have ensured the
fall of Louisville had they been used with the same energy and skill
that the Confederate commander displayed from Chattanooga to Glasgow;
but something always diverted General Bragg at the supreme moment,
and he failed to utilize the chances falling to him at this time,
for, deflecting his march to the north toward Bardstown, he left open
to Buell the direct road to Louisville by way of Elizabethtown.

At Bardstown Bragg's army was halted while he endeavored to establish
a Confederate government in Kentucky by arranging for the
installation of a provisional governor at Lexington.  Bragg had been
assured that the presence of a Confederate army in Kentucky would so
encourage the secession element that the whole State could be forced
into the rebellion and his army thereby largely increased; but he had
been considerably misled, for he now found that though much latent
sympathy existed for his cause, yet as far as giving active aid was
concerned, the enthusiasm exhibited by the secessionists of Kentucky
in the first year of the war was now replaced by apathy, or at best
by lukewarmness.  So the time thus spent in political machinations
was wholly lost to Bragg; and so little reinforcement was added to
his army that it may be said that the recruits gained were not enough
to supply the deficiencies resulting from the recent toilsome marches
of the campaign.

In the meanwhile Buell had arrived at Louisville, system had been
substituted for the chaos which had previously obtained there, and
orders were issued for an advance upon the enemy with the purpose of
attacking and the hope of destroying him within the limits of the
"blue grass" region, and, failing in that, to drive him from
Kentucky.  The army moved October 1, 1862, and my division, now a
part of the Third Corps, commanded by General C. C. Gilbert, marched
directly on Bardstown, where it was thought the enemy would make a
stand, but Bragg's troops retreated toward Perryville, only resisting
sufficiently to enable the forces of General Kirby Smith to be drawn
in closer--they having begun a concentration at Frankfort--so they
could be used in a combined attack on Louisville as soon as the
Confederate commander's political projects were perfected.

Much time was consumed by Buell's army in its march on Perryville,
but we finally neared it on the evening of October 7.  During the
day, Brigadier-General Robert B. Mitchell's division of Gilbert's
corps was in the advance on the Springfield pike, but as the enemy
developed that he was in strong force on the opposite side of a small
stream called Doctor's Creek, a tributary of Chaplin River, my
division was brought up and passed to the front.  It was very
difficult to obtain water in this section of Kentucky, as a drought
had prevailed for many weeks, and the troops were suffering so for
water that it became absolutely necessary that we should gain
possession of Doctor's Creek in order to relieve their distress.
Consequently General Gilbert, during the night, directed me to push
beyond Doctor's Creek early the next morning.  At daylight on the 8th
I moved out Colonel Dan McCook's brigade and Barnett's battery for
the purpose, but after we had crossed the creek with some slight
skirmishing, I found that we could not hold the ground unless we
carried and occupied a range of hills, called Chaplin Heights, in
front of Chaplin River.  As this would project my command in the
direction of Perryville considerably beyond the troops that were on
either flank, I brought up Laiboldt's brigade and Hescock's battery
to strengthen Colonel McCook.  Putting both brigades into line we
quickly carried the Heights, much to the surprise of the enemy, I
think, for he did not hold on to the valuable ground as strongly as
he should have done.  This success not only ensured us a good supply
of water, but also, later in the day, had an important bearing in the
battle of Perryville.  After taking the Heights, I brought up the
rest of my division and intrenched, without much difficulty, by
throwing up a strong line of rifle-pits, although the enemy's
sharpshooters annoyed us enough to make me order Laiboldt's brigade
to drive them in on the main body.  This was successfully done in a
few minutes, but in pushing them back to Chaplin River, we discovered
the Confederates forming a line of battle on the opposite bank, with
the apparent purpose of an attack in force, so I withdrew the brigade
to our intrenchments on the crest and there awaited the assault.

While this skirmishing was going on, General Gilbert--the corps
commander--whose headquarters were located on a hill about a mile
distant to the rear, kept sending me messages by signal not to bring
on an engagement.  I replied to each message that I was not bringing
on an engagement, but that the enemy evidently intended to do so, and
that I believed I should shortly be attacked.  Soon after returning
to the crest and getting snugly fixed in the rifle-pits, my attention
was called to our left, the high ground we occupied affording me in
that direction an unobstructed view.  I then saw General A. McD.
McCook's corps--the First-advancing toward Chaplin River by the
Mackville road, apparently unconscious that the Confederates were
present in force behind the stream.  I tried by the use of signal
flags to get information of the situation to these troops, but my
efforts failed, and the leading regiments seemed to approach the
river indifferently prepared to meet the sudden attack that speedily
followed, delivered as it was from the chosen position of the enemy.
The fury of the Confederate assault soon halted this advance force,
and in a short time threw it into confusion, pushed it back a
considerable distance, and ultimately inflicted upon it such loss of
men and guns as to seriously cripple McCook's corps, and prevent for
the whole day further offensive movement on his part, though he
stoutly resisted the enemy's assaults until 4 o'clock in the
afternoon.

Seeing McCook so fiercely attacked, in order to aid him I advanced
Hescock's battery, supported by six regiments, to a very good
position in front of a belt of timber on my extreme left, where an
enfilading fire could be opened on that portion of the enemy
attacking the right of the First Corps, and also on his batteries
across Chaplin River.  But at this juncture he placed two batteries
on my right and began to mass troops behind them, and General
Gilbert, fearing that my intrenched position on the heights might be
carried, directed me to withdraw Hescock and his supports and return
them to the pits.  My recall was opportune, for I had no sooner got
back to my original line than the Confederates attacked me furiously,
advancing almost to my intrenchments, notwithstanding that a large
part of the ground over which they had to move was swept by a heavy
fire of canister from both my batteries.  Before they had quite
reached us, however, our telling fire made them recoil, and as they
fell back, I directed an advance of my whole division, bringing up my
reserve regiments to occupy the crest of the hills; Colonel William
P. Carlin's brigade of Mitchell's division meanwhile moving forward
on my right to cover that flank.  This advance pressed the enemy to
Perryville, but he retired in such good order that we gained nothing
but some favorable ground that enabled me to establish my batteries
in positions where they could again turn their attention to the
Confederates in front of McCook, whose critical condition was shortly
after relieved, however, by a united pressure of Gilbert's corps
against the flank of McCook's assailants, compelling them to retire
behind Chaplin River.

The battle virtually ended about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, though
more or less desultory firing continued until dark.  Considering the
severity of the engagement on McCook's front, and the reverses that
had befallen him, I question if, from that part of the line, much
could have been done toward retrieving the blunders of the day, but
it did seem to me that, had the commander of the army been able to be
present on the field, he could have taken advantage of Bragg's final
repulse, and there would have remained in our hands more than the
barren field.  But no attempt was made to do anything more till next
morning, and then we secured little except the enemy's killed and
most severely wounded.

The operations of my division during the engagement pleased.  General
Gilbert very much, and he informed me that he would relax a rigidly
enforced order which General Buell had issued some days before,
sufficiently to permit my trains to come to the front and supply my
almost starving troops with rations.  The order in question was one
of those issued, doubtless with a good intent, to secure generally
the safety of our trains, but General Gilbert was not elastic, and on
the march he had construed the order so illiberally that it was next
to impossible to supply the men with food, and they were particularly
short in this respect on the eve of the battle.  I had then
endeavored to persuade him to modify his iron-clad interpretation of
the order, but without effect, and the only wagons we could bring up
from the general parks in rear were ambulances and those containing
ammunition.  So to gain access to our trains was a great boon, and at
that moment a more welcome result than would have been a complete
victory minus this concession.

When the battle ceased General Gilbert asked me to join him at
Buell's headquarters, which were a considerable distance to the rear,
so after making some dispositions for the evening I proceeded there
as requested.  I arrived just as Buell was about to sit down to his
supper, and noticing that he was lame, then learned that he had been
severely injured by a recent fall from his horse.  He kindly invited
me to join him at the table, an invitation which I accepted with
alacrity, enjoying the meal with a relish known only to a very-hungry
man, for I had eaten nothing since morning.  Of course the events of
the day were the chief topic of discussion--as they were during my
stay at headquarters--but the conversation indicated that what had
occurred was not fully realized, and I returned to my troops
impressed with the belief that General Buell and his staff-officers
were unconscious of the magnitude of the battle that had just been
fought.

It had been expected by Buell that he would fight the enemy on the
9th of October, but the Confederates disposed of that proposition by
attacking us on the 8th, thus disarranging a tactical conception
which, with our superior numbers, would doubtless have proved
successful had it not been anticipated by an enterprising foe.
During the battle on the 8th the Second Corps, under General Thomas
L. Crittenden, accompanied by General George H. Thomas, lay idle the
whole day for want of orders, although it was near enough to the
field to take an active part in the fight; and, moreover, a large
part of Gilbert's corps was unengaged during the pressure on McCook.
Had these troops been put in on the enemy's left at any time after he
assaulted McCook, success would have been beyond question; but there
was no one on the ground authorized to take advantage of the
situation, and the battle of Perryville remains in history an example
of lost opportunities.  This was due in some measure probably to
General Buell's accident, but is mainly attributable to the fact that
he did not clearly apprehend Bragg's aim, which was to gain time to
withdraw behind Dick's River all the troops he had in Kentucky, for
the Confederate general had no idea of risking the fate of his army
on one general battle at a place or on a day to be chosen by the
Union commander.

Considering the number of troops actually engaged, the losses to
Buell were severe, amounting to something over five thousand in
killed, wounded, and missing.  Among the killed were two brigade
commanders of much promise--General James S. Jackson and General
William R. Terrill.  McCook's corps lost twelve guns, some of which
were recovered next day.  The enemy's loss in killed and wounded we
never learned, but it must have equalled ours; and about four
thousand prisoners, consisting principally of sick and wounded, fell
into our hands.  In the first report of the battle sent North to the
newspapers I was reported among the killed; but I was pleased to
notice, when the papers reached us a few days later, that the error
had been corrected before my obituary could be written.

The enemy retired from our front the night of the 8th, falling back
on Harrodsburg to form a junction with Kirby Smith, and by taking
this line of retreat opened to us the road to Danville and the chance
for a direct march against his depot of supplies at Bryantsville.  We
did not take advantage of this opening, however, and late in the day
--on the 9th--my division marched in pursuit, in the direction of
Harrodsburg, which was the apex of a triangle having for its base a
line from Perryville to Danville.  The pursuit was slow, very slow,
consuming the evening of the 9th and all of the 10th and 11th.  By
cutting across the triangle spoken of above, just south of the apex,
I struck the Harrodsburg-Danville road, near Cave Springs, joining
there Gilbert's left division, which had preceded me and marched
through Harrodsburg.  Here we again rested until the intention of the
enemy could be divined, and we could learn on which side of Dick's
River he would give us battle.  A reconnoissance sent toward the
Dickville crossing developed to a certainty that we should not have
another engagement, however; for it disclosed the fact that Bragg's
army had disappeared toward Camp Dick Robinson, leaving only a small
rear-guard at Danville, which in turn quickly fled in the direction
of Lancaster, after exchanging a few shots with Hescock's battery.

While this parting salute of deadly projectiles was going on, a
little, daughter of Colonel William J. Landram, whose home was in
Danville, came running out from his house and planted a small
national flag on one of Hescock's guns.  The patriotic act was so
brave and touching that it thrilled all who witnessed the scene; and
until the close of the war, when peace separated the surviving
officers and men of the battery, that little flag was protected and
cherished as a memento of the Perryville campaign.

Pursuit of the enemy was not continued in force beyond Crab Orchard,
but some portions of the army kept at Bragg's heels until he crossed
the Cumberland River, a part of his troops retiring to Tennessee by
way of Cumberland Gap, but the major portion through Somerset.  As
the retreat of Bragg transferred the theatre of operations back to
Tennessee, orders were now issued for a concentration of Buell's army
at Bowling Green, with a view to marching it to Nashville, and my
division moved to that point without noteworthy incident.  I reached
Bowling Green with a force much reduced by the losses sustained in
the battle of Perryville and by sickness.  I had started from
Louisville on October 1 with twelve regiments of infantry--four old
and eight new ones--and two batteries, but many poor fellows,
overcome by fatigue, and diseases induced by the heat, dust, and
drought of the season, had to be left at roadside hospitals.  This
was particularly the case with the new regiments, the men of which,
much depressed by homesickness, and not yet inured to campaigning,
fell easy victims to the hardships of war.

At Bowling Green General Buell was relieved, General W. S. Rosecrans
succeeding him.  The army as a whole did not manifest much regret at
the change of commanders, for the campaign from Louisville on was
looked upon generally as a lamentable failure, yet there were many
who still had the utmost confidence in General Buell, and they
repelled with some asperity the reflections cast upon him by his
critics.  These admirers held him blameless throughout for the
blunders of the campaign, but the greater number laid every error at
his door, and even went to the absurdity of challenging his loyalty
in a mild way, but they particularly charged incompetency at
Perryville, where McCook's corps was so badly crippled while nearly
30,000 Union troops were idle on the field, or within striking
distance.  With these it was no use to argue that Buell's accident
stood in the way of his activity, nor that he did not know that the
action had assumed the proportions of a battle.  The physical
disability was denied or contested, but even granting this, his
detractors claimed that it did not excuse his ignorance of the true
condition of the fight, and finally worsted his champions by pointing
out that Bragg's retreat by way of Harrodsburg beyond Dick's River so
jeopardized the Confederate army, that had a skillful and energetic
advance of the Union troops been made, instead of wasting precious
time in slow and unnecessary tactical manoeuvres, the enemy could
have been destroyed before he could quit the State of Kentucky.




CHAPTER XII.

MOVING TO BOWLING GREEN--JAMES CARD, THE SCOUT AND GUIDE--GENERAL
SILL--COLONEL SCHAEFER--COLONEL G. W. ROBERTS--MOVEMENT ON
MURFREESBORO'--OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF STONE RIVER.

My division had moved from Crab Orchard to Bowling Green by easy
marches, reaching this place November 1. General Rosecrans assumed
command of the department October 30, at Louisville, and joined the
army November 2.  There had been much pressure brought to bear on
General Buell to induce him to take measures looking to the occupancy
of East Tennessee, and the clamor to this end from Washington still
continued; but now that Bragg was south of the Cumberland River, in a
position threatening Nashville, which was garrisoned by but a small
force, it was apparent to every one at all conversant with the
situation that a battle would have to be fought somewhere in Middle
Tennessee.  So, notwithstanding the pressure from Washington, the
army was soon put in motion for Nashville, and when we arrived there
my division went into camp north of the river, on a plateau just
outside the little town of Edgefield, until the movements of the
enemy should be further developed.

While in this camp, on the plantation of Mr. Hobson, there came to my
headquarters one morning an East Tennessean named James Card, who
offered to the Union cause his services in any capacity in which they
might be made useful.  This offer, and the relation of his personal
history, were given with such sincerity of speech and manner that in
a short time I became convinced of his honesty of purpose.  He was a
small, active, busy man, with a determined way about him, and his
countenance indicated great intelligence.  He gave minute information
that was of inestimable value to me regarding East and Middle
Tennessee and northern Georgia, for, with a view to the army's future
movements, I was then making a study of the topography of this
region, and posting myself as to Middle Tennessee, for all knew this
would be the scene of active operations whenever the campaign was
resumed.  This man, like most of the East Tennesseans whom I had met,
was intensely loyal and patriotic, and the interview led in a few
days to his employment as a scout and guide, and subsequently to the
engaging in the same capacity of two of his brothers, who were good
men; but not quite as active nor so intelligent as he was.  Card had
been a colporter, having pedled books, especially religious tracts,
over all Middle and East Tennessee and Georgia, assisted by his
brothers at times, and was therefore thoroughly familiar with these
regions, their roads and inhabitants.  He also preached to country
congregations occasionally, when ministers were scarce, and I have no
doubt often performed the functions of family physician in the
mountain district.  Thus his opportunities were great; and the loyal
people in every section of the country being well known to him and
his brothers, the three began, at this time, a system of scouting and
investigation which bore its first-fruits in specifically locating
the different divisions of Bragg's army, with statements of their
strength and condition, and all with so much accuracy that I
thereafter felt reasonably sure that I could at all times procure
such knowledge of the enemy's operations as would well equip me for
any contingency that might arise.

By the middle of November the enemy, having assembled his forces in
Middle Tennessee, showed considerable boldness, and it became
necessary to rearrange the Union lines; so my troops were moved to
the south side of the river, out on the Murfreesboro' pike, to Mill
Creek, distant from Nashville about seven miles.  While we were in
camp on Mill Creek the army was reorganized, and General Joshua W.
Sill, at his own request, was assigned to my division, and took
command of Colonel Nicholas Greusel's brigade.  My division became at
the same time the Third Division, Right Wing, Fourteenth Army Corps,
its three brigades of four regiments each being respectively
commanded by General Sill, Colonel Frederick Schaefer and Colonel Dan
McCook; but a few days later Colonel George W. Roberts's brigade,
from the garrison at Nashville, was substituted for McCook's.

General Sill was a classmate of mine at the Military Academy, having
graduated in 1853.  On graduating he was appointed to the Ordnance
Corps, and served in that department at various arsenals and ordnance
depots throughout the country till early in 1861, when he resigned to
accept a professorship of mathematics and civil engineering at the
Brooklyn Collegiate and Polytechnic Institute.  At the breaking out
of the war he immediately tendered his services to the Government,
and soon rose to the colonelcy of the Thirty-Third Ohio Volunteers,
and afterward to the rank of brigadier-general.  I knew him well, and
was glad that he came to my division, though I was very loth to
relieve Colonel Greusel, of the Thirty-Sixth Illinois, who had
already indicated much military skill and bravery, and at the battle
of Perryville had handled his men with the experience of a veteran.
Sill's modesty and courage were exceeded only by a capacity that had
already been demonstrated in many practical ways, and his untimely
death, almost within a month of his joining me, abruptly closed a
career which, had it been prolonged a little more, not only would
have shed additional lustre on his name, but would have been of
marked benefit to his country.

Colonel Schaefer, of the Second Missouri Infantry, had been absent on
sick-leave during the Kentucky campaign, but about this date he
returned to duty, and by seniority fell in command of the second
brigade.  He was of German birth, having come from Baden, where,
prior to 1848, he had been a non-commissioned officer in the service
of his State.  He took part as an insurgent in the so-called
revolution which occurred at Baden in that year, and, compelled to
emigrate on the suppression of the insurrection, made his way to this
country and settled in St. Louis.  Here the breaking out of the war
found him, and through the personal interest which General Sigel took
in him he was commissioned a colonel of volunteers.  He had had a
pretty fair education, a taste for the military profession, and was
of tall and slender build, all of which gave him a student-like
appearance.  He was extremely excitable and nervous when anticipating
a crisis, but always calmed down to cool deliberation when the
critical moment came.  With such a man I could not be less than well
satisfied, although the officer whom he replaced--Colonel Laiboldt
--had performed efficient service and shown much capacity in the
recent campaign.

Colonel G. W. Roberts, of the Forty-Second Illinois Infantry, also
came to me in the reorganization.  He was an ideal soldier both in
mind and body.  He was young, tall, handsome, brave, and dashing, and
possessed a balance-wheel of such good judgment that in his sphere of
action no occasion could arise from which he would not reap the best
results.  But he too was destined to lay, down his life within a few
days, and on the same fatal field.  His brigade had been performing
garrison duty in Nashville during the siege of that city while
Buell's army was in Kentucky, but disliking the prospect of
inactivity pending the operations opening before us, Roberts had
requested and obtained a transfer to the army in the field.  His
brigade relieved Colonel Dan McCook's, the latter reluctantly joining
the garrison at Nashville, every one in it disappointed and disgusted
that the circumstances existing at this time should necessitate their
relegation to the harassing and tantalizing duty of protecting our
depots and line of supply.

I was fortunate in having such brigade commanders, and no less
favored in the regimental and battery commanders.  They all were not
only patriots, but soldiers, and knowing that discipline must be one
of the most potent factors in bringing to a successful termination,
the mighty contest in which our nation was struggling for existence,
they studied and practiced its methods ceaselessly, inspiring with
the same spirit that pervaded themselves the loyal hearts of their
subordinate officers and men.  All worked unremittingly in the camp
at Mill Creek in preparing for the storm, which now plainly indicated
its speedy coming.  Drills, parades, scouts, foraging expeditions,
picket and guard duty, made up the course in this school of
instruction, supplemented by frequent changes in the locations of the
different brigades, so that the division could have opportunity to
learn to break camp quickly and to move out promptly on the march.
Foraging expeditions were particularly beneficial in this respect,
and when sent out, though absent sometimes for days, the men went
without tents or knapsacks, equipped with only one blanket and their
arms, ammunition, and rations, to teach them to shift for themselves
with slender means in the event of necessity.  The number of
regimental and headquarters wagons was cut down to the lowest
possible figure, and everything made compact by turning into the
supply and ammunition trains of the division all surplus
transportation, and restricting the personal baggage of officers to
the fewest effects possible.

My own staff also was somewhat reorganized and increased at Mill
Creek, and though it had been perfectly satisfactory before, yet, on
account of the changes of troops that had occurred in the command, I
found it necessary to replace valuable officers in some instances,
and secure additional ones in others.  The gathering of information
about the enemy was also industriously pursued, and Card and his
brothers were used constantly on expeditions within the Confederate
lines, frequently visiting Murfreesboro', Sparta, Tullahoma,
Shelbyville, and other points.  What they learned was reported to
army headquarters, often orally through me or personally communicated
by Card himself, but much was forwarded in official letters,
beginning with November 24, when I transmitted accurate information
of the concentration of Bragg's main force at Tullahoma.  Indeed,
Card kept me so well posted as to every movement of the enemy, not
only with reference to the troops in my immediate front, but also
throughout his whole army, that General Rosecrans placed the most
unreserved reliance on all his statements, and many times used them
to check and correct the reports brought in by his own scouts.

Slight skirmishes took place frequently during this period, and now
and then heavy demonstrations were made in the neighborhood of
Nolensville by reconnoitring parties from both armies, but none of
these ever grew into a battle.  These affairs sprung from the desire
of each side to feel his antagonist, and had little result beyond
emphasizing the fact that behind each line of pickets lay a massed
and powerful army busily preparing for the inevitable conflict and
eager for its opening.  So it wore on till the evening of December
25, 1862; then came the order to move forward.

General Rosecrans, in the reorganization of the army, had assigned
Major-General A. McD. McCook to command the right wing, Major-General
George H. Thomas the centre, and Major-General T. L. Crittenden the
left wing.  McCook's wing was made up of three divisions,
commanded in order of rank by Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis;
Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson, and Brigadier-General P. H. Sheridan.
Although the corps nomenclature established by General Buell was
dropped, the grand divisions into which he had organized the army at
Louisville were maintained, and, in fact, the conditions established
then remained practically unaltered, with the exception of the
interchange of some brigades, the transfer of a few general officers
from one wing or division to another, and the substitution of General
Thomas for Gilbert as a corps commander.  The army was thus compact
and cohesive, undisturbed by discord and unembarrassed by jealousies
of any moment; and it may be said that under a commander who, we
believed, had the energy and skill necessary to direct us to success,
a national confidence in our invincibility made us all keen for a
test of strength with the Confederates.  We had not long to wait.

Early on the morning of December 26, 1862, in a heavy rain, the army
marched, the movement being directed on Murfreesboro', where the
enemy had made some preparation to go into winter-quarters, and to
hold which town it was hoped he would accept battle.  General Thomas
moved by the Franklin and Wilson pikes, General Crittenden by the
Murfreesboro' pike, through Lavergne, and General McCook by the
Nolensville pike--Davis's division in advance.  As McCook's command
neared Nolensville, I received a message from Davis informing me that
the Confederates were in considerable force, posted on a range of
hills in his front, and requesting me to support him in an attack he
was about to make.  When the head of my column arrived at Nolensville
I began massing my troops on the right of the road, and by the time
this formation was nearly completed Davis advanced, but not meeting
with sufficient resistance to demand active assistance from me, he
with his own command carried the hills, capturing one piece of
artillery.  This position of the Confederates was a strong one,
defending Knob's Gap, through which the Nolensville and Triune pike
passed.  On the 27th Johnson's division, followed by mine, advanced
to Triune, and engaged in a severe skirmish near that place, but my
troops were not called into action, the stand made by the enemy being
only for the purpose of gaining time to draw in his outlying troops,
which done, he retired toward Murfreesboro'.  I remained inactive at
Triune during the 28th, but early on the 29th moved out by the Bole
Jack road to the support of, Davis in his advance to Stewart's Creek,
and encamped at Wilkinson's crossroads, from which point to
Murfreesboro', distant about six miles, there was a good turnpike.
The enemy had sullenly resisted the progress of Crittenden and McCook
throughout the preceding three days, and as it was thought probable
that he might offer battle at Stewart's Creek, Thomas, in pursuance
of his original instructions looking to just such a contingency, had
now fallen into the centre by way of the Nolensville crossroads.

On the morning of the 30th I had the advance of McCook's corps on the
Wilkinson pike, Roberts's brigade leading.  At first only slight
skirmishing took place, but when we came within about three miles of
Murfreesboro' the resistance of the enemy's pickets grew serious, and
a little further on so strong that I had to put in two regiments to
push them back.  I succeeded in driving them about half a mile, when
I was directed by McCook to form line of battle and place my
artillery in position so that I could act in concert with Davis's
division, which he wished to post on my right in the general line he
desired to take up.  In obedience to these directions I deployed on
the right of, and oblique to the Wilkinson pike, with a front of four
regiments, a second line of four regiments within short supporting
distance, and a reserve of one brigade in column of regiments to the
rear of my centre.  All this time the enemy kept up a heavy artillery
and musketry fire on my skirmishers, he occupying, with his
sharpshooters, beyond some open fields, a heavy belt of timber to my
front and right, where it was intended the left of Davis should
finally rest.  To gain this point Davis was ordered to swing his
division into it in conjunction with a wheeling movement of my right
brigade, until our continuous line should face nearly due east.  This
would give us possession of the timber referred to, and not only rid
us of the annoying fire from the skirmishers screened by it, but also
place us close in to what was now developing as Bragg's line of
battle.  The movement was begun about half-past 2, and was
successfully executed, after a stubborn resistance.  In this
preliminary affair the enemy had put in one battery of artillery,
which was silenced in a little while, however, by Bush's and
Hescock's guns.  By sundown I had taken up my prescribed position,
facing almost east, my left (Roberts's brigade) resting on the
Wilkinson pike, the right (Sill's brigade) in the timber we had just
gained, and the reserve brigade (Schaefer's) to the rear of my
centre, on some rising ground in the edge of a strip of woods behind
Houghtaling's and Hescock's batteries.  Davis's division was placed
in position on my right, his troops thrown somewhat to the rear, so
that his line formed nearly a right angle with mine, while Johnson's
division formed in a very exposed position on the right of Davis,
prolonging the general line just across the Franklin pike.

The centre, under Thomas, had already formed to my left, the right of
Negley's division joining my left in a cedar thicket near the
Wilkinson pike, while Crittenden's corps was posted on the left of
Thomas, his left resting on Stone River, at a point about two miles
and a half from Murfreesboro'.

The precision that had characterized every manoeuvre of the past
three days, and the exactness with which each corps and division fell
into its allotted place on the evening of the 30th, indicated that at
the outset of the campaign a well-digested plan of operations had
been prepared for us; and although the scheme of the expected battle
was not known to subordinates of my grade, yet all the movements up
to this time had been so successfully and accurately made as to give
much promise for the morrow, and when night fell there was general
anticipation of the best results to the Union army.




CHAPTER XIII.

ASSAULT ON OUR RIGHT FLANK--OCCUPYING A NEW POSITION--THE ENEMY
CHECKED--TERRIBLE LOSS OF OFFICERS--AMMUNITION GIVES OUT
--RECONSTRUCTING THE LINE--COLLECTING THE WOUNDED AND BURYING
THE DEAD--DEALING WITH COWARDS--RESULTS OF THE VICTORY.

The enemy under Bragg lay between us and stone River in order of
battle, his general line conforming to the course of that stream. In
my immediate front he appeared to be established in strong force in a
dense cedar wood, just beyond an open valley, which varied from two
hundred to four hundred yards in width, the cedars extending the
entire length of the valley.  From the events of the day and evening
of the 3oth, it was apparent that the two armies were in close
proximity, and orders received during the night revealed the fact
that Rosecrans intended to attack by throwing his left on the enemy's
right, with the expectation of driving it in toward Murfreesboro', so
that the right of Crittenden's corps could attack Bragg's centre in
reverse, while Thomas supported Crittenden by a simultaneous front
assault; and from the movements of the enemy at daylight next
morning, it was plainly indicated that Bragg had planned to swing his
left on our right by an exactly similar manoeuvre, get possession of
the railroad and the Nashville pike, and if possible cut us off from
our base at Nashville.  The conceptions in the minds of the two
generals were almost identical; but Bragg took the initiative,
beginning his movement about an hour earlier than the time set by
Rosecrans, which gained him an immense advantage in execution in the
earlier stages of the action.

During the evening, feeling keenly all the solicitude which
attends one in anticipation of a battle, I examined my position with
great care, inspecting its whole length several times to remedy any
defects that might exist, and to let the men see that I was alive to
their interests and advantages.  After dark, I went back to the rear
of my reserve brigade, and establishing my headquarters behind the
trunk of a large fallen tree, which would shelter me somewhat from
the cold December wind, lay down beside a small camp-fire to get some
rest.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 31st General Sill came back to me
to report that on his front a continuous movement of infantry and
artillery had been going on all night within the Confederate lines,
and that he was convinced that Bragg was massing on our right with
the purpose of making an attack from that direction early in the
morning.  After discussing for a few minutes the probabilities of
such a course on the part of the enemy, I thought McCook should be
made acquainted with what was going on, so Sill and I went back to
see him at his headquarters, not far from the Griscom House, where we
found him sleeping on some straw in the angle of a worm-fence.  I
waked him up and communicated the intelligence, and our consequent
impressions.  He talked the matter over with us for some little time,
but in view of the offensive-defensive part he was to play in the
coming battle, did not seem to think that there was a necessity for
any further dispositions than had already been taken.  He said that
he thought Johnson's division would be able to take care of the
right, and seemed confident that the early assault which was to be
made from Rosecrans's left would anticipate and check the designs
which we presaged.  We two then returned to my little camp-fire
behind the log, and as we continued talking of what might be expected
from the indications on the right, and Sill becoming more anxious, I
directed two regiments from the reserve to report to him, that they
might be placed within very short supporting distance of his line.
He then rejoined his brigade, better satisfied, but still adhering to
the belief he had expressed when first making his report.

Long before dawn my division breakfasted, and was assembled under
arms, the infantry in line, the cannoneers at their pieces, but while
we were thus preparing, all the recent signs of activity in the
enemy's camp were hushed, a death-like stillness prevailing in the
cedars to our front.  Shortly after daylight General Hardee opened
the engagement, just as Sill had predicted, by a fierce attack on
Johnson's division, the extreme right of the Union line.  Immediate
success attending this assault, Hardee extended the attack gradually
along in front of Davis, hip movement taking the form of a wheel to
the right, the pivot being nearly opposite the left of my division.
Johnson's division soon gave way, and two of Davis's brigades were
forced to fall back with it, though stubbornly resisting the
determined and sweeping onset.

In the meantime the enemy had also attacked me, advancing across an
old cotton-field in Sill's front in heavy masses, which were
furiously opened upon by Bush's battery from Sill's line, and by
Hescock's and Houghtaling's batteries, which had an oblique fire on
the field from a commanding position in rear of my centre.  The
effect of this fire on the advancing column was terrible, but it
continued on till it reached the edge of the timber where Sill's
right lay, when my infantry opened at a range of not over fifty
yards.  For a short time the Confederates withstood the fire, but
then wavered, broke, and fell back toward their original line.  As
they retired, Sill's brigade followed in a spirited charge, driving
them back across the open ground and behind their intrenchments.  In
this charge the gallant Sill was killed; a rifle ball passing through
his upper lip and penetrating the brain.  Although this was a heavy
loss, yet the enemy's discomfiture was such as to give us an hour's
time, and as Colonel Greusel, Thirty-sixth Illinois, succeeded to
Sill's command, I directed him, as he took charge, to recall the
brigade to its original position, for the turning-column on my
extreme right was now assuming the most menacing attitude, and it was
urgently necessary to prepare for it.

When that portion of the enemy driven back by Sill recovered from its
repulse it again advanced to the attack, this time directing its
efforts chiefly upon my extreme right, and the front of Woodruff's
brigade of Davis's division, which brigade still held on in its first
position.  In front of my centre the Confederates were again driven
back, but as the assault on Woodruff was in conjunction with an
advance of the column that had forced Johnson to retire, Woodruff was
compelled unfortunately to give way, and two regiments on the right
of my line went with him, till they rallied on the two reserve
regiments which, in anticipation of the enemy's initiatory attack I
had sent to Sill's rear before daylight.

Both Johnson's and Davis's divisions were now practically gone from
our line, having retired with a loss of all formation, and they were
being closely pursued by the enemy, whose columns were following the
arc of a circle that would ultimately carry him in on my rear.  In
consequence of the fact that this state of things would soon subject
me to a fire in reverse, I hastily withdrew Sill's brigade and the
reserve regiments supporting it, and ordered Roberts's brigade, which
at the close of the enemy's second repulse had changed front toward
the south and formed in column of regiments, to cover the withdrawal
by a charge on the Confederates as they came into the timber where my
right had originally rested.  Roberts made the charge at the proper
time, and was successful in checking the enemy's advance, thus giving
us a breathing-spell, during which I was able to take up a new
position with Schaefer's and Sill's brigades on the commanding ground
to the rear, where Hescock's and Houghtaling's batteries had been
posted all the morning.

The general course of this new position was at right angles with my
original line, and it took the shape of an obtuse angle, with my
three batteries at the apex.  Davis, and Carlin of his division,
endeavored to rally their men here on my right, but their efforts
were practically unavailing,--though the calm and cool appearance of
Carlin, who at the time was smoking a stumpy pipe, had some effect,
and was in strong contrast to the excited manner of Davis, who seemed
overpowered by the disaster that had befallen his command.  But few
could be rallied, however, as the men were badly demoralized, and
most of them fell back beyond the Wilkinson pike, where they
reorganized behind the troops of General Thomas.

At this juncture the enemy's turning-column began advancing again in
concert with Cheatham's division, and as the extreme left of the
Confederates was directed on Griscom's house, and their right on the
Blanton house, my new position was in danger of envelopment.  No hope
of stemming the tide at this point seemed probable, but to gain time
I retained my ground as long as possible, and until, under directions
from General McCook, I moved to the front from my left flank and
attached myself to the right of Negley's division, which up to this
hour had been left almost undisturbed by the enemy in the line it had
taken up the night before.  Under a heavy fire we succeeded in this
manoeuvre, Schaefer's brigade marching first, then the batteries, and
Roberts's and Sill's brigades following.  When my division arrived on
this new ground, I posted Roberts on Negley's right, with Hescock's
and Bush's guns, the brigade and guns occupying a low rocky ridge of
limestone, which faced them toward Murfreesboro', nearly south.  The
rest of my division was aligned facing west, along the edge of a
cedar thicket, the rear rank backed up on the right flank of Roberts,
with Houghtaling's battery in the angle.  This presented Sill's and
Schaefer's brigades in an almost opposite direction to the line we
had so confidently taken up the night before, and covered Negley's
rear.  The enemy, in the meantime, had continued his wheeling
movement till he occupied the ground that my batteries and reserve
brigade had held in the morning, and I had now so changed my position
that the left brigade of my division approached his intrenchments in
front of Stone River, while Sill's and Schaeffer's brigades, by
facing nearly west, confronted the successful troops that had smashed
in our extreme right.

I had hardly got straightened out in this last place when I was
attacked by Cheatham's'division, which, notwithstanding the
staggering blows it had previously received from Sill and Roberts,
now again moved forward in conjunction with the wheeling movement
under the immediate command of Hardee.  One of the most sanguinary
contests of the day now took place.  In fulfillment of Bragg's
original design no doubt, Cheatham's division attacked on my left,
while heavy masses under Hardee, covered by batteries posted on the
high ground formerly occupied by my guns, assaulted my right, the
whole force advancing simultaneously.  At the same time the enemy
opened an artillery fire from his intrenchments in front of
Murfreesboro', and it seemed that he was present on every side.  My
position was strong, however, located in the edge of a dense cedar
thicket and commanding a slight depression of open ground that lay in
my front.  My men were in good spirits too, notwithstanding they had
been a good deal hustled around since daylight, with losses that had
told considerably on their numbers.  Only a short distance now
separated the contending lines, and as the batteries on each side
were not much more than two hundred yards apart when the enemy made
his assault, the artillery fire was fearful in its effect on the
ranks of both contestants, the enemy's heavy masses staggering under
the torrent of shell and canister from our batteries, while our lines
were thinned by his ricochetting projectiles, that rebounded again
and again over the thinly covered limestone formation and sped on to
the rear of Negley.  But all his efforts to dislodge or destroy us
were futile, and for the first time since daylight General Hardee was
seriously checked in the turning movement he had begun for the
purpose of getting possession of the Nashville pike, and though
reinforced until two-fifths of Bragg's army was now at his command,
yet he met with repulse after repulse, which created great gaps in
his lines and taught him that to overwhelm us was hopeless.

As the enemy was recoiling from his first attack, I received a
message from Rosecrans telling me that he was making new
dispositions, and directing me to hold on where I was until they were
completed.  From this I judged that the existing conditions of the
battle would probably require a sacrifice of my command, so I
informed Roberts and Schaefer that we must be prepared to meet the
demand on us by withstanding the assault of the enemy, no matter what
the outcome.  Every energy was therefore bent to the simple holding
of our ground, and as ammunition was getting scarce, instructions
were given throughout the command to have it reserve its fire till
the most effective moment.  In a little while came a second and a
third assault, and although they were as daring and furious as the
first, yet in each case the Confederates were repulsed, driven back
in confusion, but not without deadly loss to us, for the noble
Roberts was killed, and Colonel Harrington, of the Twenty-Seventh
Illinois, who succeeded to his brigade, was mortally wounded a few
minutes later.  I had now on the death-roll three brigade commanders,
and the loss of subordinate officers and men was appalling, but their
sacrifice had accomplished the desired result; they had not fallen in
vain.  Indeed, the bravery and tenacity of my division gave to
Rosecrans the time required to make new dispositions, and exacted
from our foes the highest commendations.

A lull followed the third fierce assault, and an investigation showed
that, with the exception of a few rounds in my brigade, our
ammunition was entirely exhausted; and while it was apparent that the
enemy was reluctant to renew the conflict in my front, yet I was
satisfied I could not hold on much longer without the danger of
ultimate capture, so I prepared to withdraw as soon as the troops of
Rousseau's division, which had been ordered to take up a line on my
right, came into position.  Schaefer's and Sill's brigades being
without a cartridge, I directed them to fix bayonets for a charge,
and await any attempt of the enemy to embarrass my retreat, while
Roberts's brigade, offering such resistance as its small quantity of
ammunition would permit, was pulled slowly in toward the Nashville
pike.  Eighty of the horses of Houghtaling's battery having been
killed, an attempt was made to bring his guns back by hand over the
rocky ground, but it could not be done, and we had to abandon them.
Hescock also had lost most of his horses, but all his guns were
saved.  Bush's battery lost two pieces, the tangled underbrush in the
dense cedars proving an obstacle to getting them away which his
almost superhuman exertions could not surmount.  Thus far the bloody
duel had cost me heavily, one-third of my division being killed or
wounded.  I had already three brigade commanders killed; a little
later I lost my fourth--Colonel Schaefer.

The difficulties of withdrawing were very great, as the ground was
exceptionally rocky, and the growth of cedars almost impenetrable for
wheeled carriages.  Retiring sullenly under a heavy fire, while the
general line was reformed to my right and rear, my division was at
length drawn through the cedars and debouched into an open space near
the Murfreesboro' pike, behind the right of Palmer's division.  Two
regiments of Sill's brigade, however, on account of the conformation
of the ground, were obliged to fall back from the point where
Woodruff's brigade of Davis's division had rallied after the disaster
of the early morning.  The division came out of the cedars with
unbroken ranks, thinned by only its killed and wounded--but few
missing.  When we came into the open ground, McCook directed
Roberts's brigade--now commanded by Colonel Luther P. Bradley--to
proceed a short distance to the rear on the Nashville pike, to repel
the enemy's threatening attempt at our communications.  Willingly and
cheerfully the brigade again entered the fight under these new
conditions, and although it was supplied with but three or four
cartridges to the man now, it charged gallantly and recaptured two
pieces of artillery which the Union troops had had to abandon at that
point.

Shortly after we debouched from the cedars I was directed by
Rosecrans to send some aid to the right of General Palmer's division;
and two of Schaefer's regiments, having obtained ammunition, were
pushed up on Palmer's right, accompanied by four of Hescock's guns;
but the advance of the enemy here had already been checked by Palmer,
and only a desultory contest ensued.  Rosecrans, whom I now met in
the open ground west of the railroad, behind Palmer, directed that my
command should relieve Wood's division, which was required to fall
back and take up the new line that had been marked out while I was
holding on in the cedars.  His usually florid face had lost its ruddy
color, and his anxious eyes told that the disasters of the morning
were testing his powers to the very verge of endurance, but he seemed
fully to comprehend what had befallen us.  His firmly set lips and,
the calmness with which his instructions were delivered inspired
confidence in all around him; and expressing approbation of what my
division had done, while deliberately directing it to a new point, he
renewed in us all the hope of final victory, though it must be
admitted that at this phase of the battle the chances lay largely
with the enemy.

Withdrawing the two regiments and Hescock's battery, that I had
posted on the right of Palmer, I moved as directed by Rosecrans into
the position to the east of the railroad, and formed immediately to
the right of Wood, who was now being attacked all along his front,
but more particularly where his right rested near the railroad.
Under a storm of shot and shell that came in torrents my troops took
up the new ground, advancing through a clump of open timber to Wood's
assistance.  Forming in line in front of the timber we poured a
telling fire into the enemy's ranks, which were then attacking across
some cleared fields; but when he discovered additional troops
confronting him, he gave up the attempt to carry Wood's position.  It
was here that I lost Schaefer, who was killed instantly, making my
fourth brigade commander dead that day.  The enemy in front of Wood
having been checked, our whole line east of the railroad executed
undisturbed its retrograde movement to a position about three hundred
yards to its rear.  When I fell back to the edge of the clump of
timber, where when first coming on the ground I had formed to help
Wood, I was ordered by Rosecrans to prepare to make a charge should
the enemy again assault us.  In anticipation of this work I massed my
troops in close column.  The expected attack never came, however, but
the shot and shell of a furious cannonade told with fatal effect upon
men and officers as they lay on their faces hugging the ground.  The
torments of this trying situation were almost unbearable, but it was
obvious to all that it was necessary to have at hand a compact body
of troops to repel any assault the enemy might make pending the
reconstruction of the extreme right of our line, and a silent
determination to stay seemed to take hold of each individual soldier;
nor was this grim silence interrupted throughout the cannonade,
except in one instance, when one of the regiments broke out in a
lusty cheer as a startled rabbit in search of a new hiding-place
safely ran the whole length of the line on the backs of the men.

While my troops were still lying here, General Rosecrans, with a part
of his staff and a few orderlies, rode out on the rearranged line to
supervise its formation and encourage the men, and in prosecution of
these objects moved around the front of my column of attack, within
range of the batteries that were shelling us so viciously.  As he
passed to the open ground on my left, I joined him.  The enemy seeing
this mounted party, turned his guns upon it, and his accurate aim was
soon rewarded, for a solid shot carried away the head of Colonel
Garesche, the chief-of-staff, and killed or wounded two or three
orderlies.  Garesche's appalling death stunned us all, and a
momentary expression of horror spread over Rosecrans's face; but at
such a time the importance of self-control was vital, and he pursued
his course with an appearance of indifference, which, however, those
immediately about him saw was assumed, for undoubtedly he felt most
deeply the death of his friend and trusted staff-officer.

No other attacks were made on us to the east of the railroad for the
rest of the afternoon, and just before dark I was directed to
withdraw and take up a position along the west side of the Nashville
pike, on the extreme right of our new line, where Roberts's brigade
and the Seventy-third and Eighty-eighth Illinois had already been
placed by McCook.  The day had cost me much anxiety and sadness, and
I was sorely disappointed at the general result, though I could not
be other than pleased at the part taken by my command.  The loss of
my brigade commanders--Sill, Roberts, Schaefer, and Harrington-and a
large number of regimental and battery officers, with so many of
their men, struck deep into my heart: My thinned ranks told the
woeful tale of the fierce struggles, indescribable by words, through
which my division had passed since 7 o'clock in the morning; and
this, added to our hungry and exhausted condition, was naturally
disheartening.  The men had been made veterans, however, by the
fortunes and misfortunes of the day, and as they went into their new
places still confident of final success, it was plain to see that
they felt a self-confidence inspired by the part they had already
played.

My headquarters were now established on the Nashville pike, about
three miles and a half from Murfreesboro'; my division being aligned
to the west of the pike, bowed out and facing almost west, Cleburn's
division of the Confederates confronting it.  Davis's division was
posted on my right, and Walker's brigade of Thomas's corps, which had
reported to me, took up a line that connected my left with Johnson's
division.

Late in the evening General Rosecrans, accompanied by General McCook,
and several other officers whose names I am now unable to recall,
rode by my headquarters on their way to the rear to look for a new
line of battle--on Overall's creek it was said--that would preserve
our communications with Nashville and offer better facilities for
resistance than the one we were now holding.  Considerable time had
elapsed when they returned from this exploration and proceeded to
their respective commands, without intimating to me that anything had
been determined upon by the reconnoissance, but a little later it was
rumored through the different headquarters that while the party was
looking for a new position it discovered the enemy's troops moving
toward our right and rear, the head of his columns being conducted in
the darkness by the aid of torches, and that no alternative was left
us but to hold the lines we then occupied.  The torches had been seen
unquestionably, and possibly created some alarm at first in the minds
of the reconnoitring party, but it was soon ascertained that the
lights came from a battalion of the Fourth regular cavalry that was
picketing our flank and happened to be starting its bivouac fires at
the moment.  The fires and the supposed movements had no weight,
therefore, in deciding the proposition to take up a line at Overall's
creek, but General Rosecrans, fortunately for the army, decided to
remain where he was.  Doubtless reflections during his ride caused
him to realize that the enemy must be quite as much crippled as
himself.  If it had been decided to fall back to Overall's creek, we
could have withdrawn without much difficulty very likely, but such a
retrograde movement would have left to the enemy the entire
battle-field of Stone River and ultimately compelled our retreat
to Nashville.

In the night of December 3rd several slight demonstrations were made
on my front, but from the darkness neither party felt the effect of
the other's fire, and when daylight came again the skirmishers and
lines of battle were in about the same position they had taken up the
evening before.  Soon after daybreak it became evident that the
conflict was to be renewed, and a little later the enemy resumed the
offensive by an attack along my left front, especially on Walker's
brigade.  His attempt was ineffectual, however, and so easily
repulsed as to demonstrate that the desperate character of his
assaults the day before had nearly exhausted his strength.  About 3
o'clock in the afternoon he made another feeble charge on my front,
but our fire from the barricades and rifle-pits soon demoralized his
advancing lines, which fell back in some confusion, thus enabling us
to pick up about a hundred prisoners.  From this time till the
evening of January 3 Bragg's left remained in our front, and
continued to show itself at intervals by weak demonstrations, which
we afterward ascertained were directly intended to cover the
desperate assault he made with Breckenridge on the left of Rosecrans,
an assault that really had in view only a defensive purpose, for
unless Bragg dislodged the troops which were now massing in front of
his right he would be obliged to withdraw General Polk's corps behind
Stone River and finally abandon Murfreesboro'.  The sequel proved
this to be the case; and the ill-judged assault led by Breckenridge
ending in entire defeat, Bragg retired from Murfreesboro' the night
of January 3.

General Rosecrans occupied Murfreesboro' on the 4th and 5th, having
gained a costly victory, which was not decisive enough in its
character to greatly affect the general course of the war, though it
somewhat strengthened and increased our hold on Middle Tennessee.
The enemy in retiring did not fall back very far--only behind Duck
River to Shelbyville and Tullahoma--and but little endeavor was made
to follow him.  Indeed, we were not in condition to pursue, even if
it had been the intention at the outset of the campaign.

As soon as possible after the Confederate retreat I went over the
battle-field to collect such of my wounded as had not been carried
off to the South and to bury my dead.  In the cedars and on the
ground where I had been so fiercely assaulted when the battle opened,
on the morning of the 31st, evidences of the bloody struggle appeared
on every hand in the form of broken fire-arms, fragments of
accoutrements, and splintered trees.  The dead had nearly all been
left unburied, but as there was likelihood of their mutilation by
roving swine, the bodies had mostly been collected in piles at
different points and inclosed by rail fences.  The sad duties of
interment and of caring for the wounded were completed by the 5th,
and on the 6th I moved my division three miles, south of
Murfreesboro' on the Shelbyville pike, going into camp on the banks
of Stone River.  Here the condition of my command was thoroughly
looked into, and an endeavor made to correct such defects as had been
disclosed by the recent battle.

During the engagement there had been little straggling, and my list
of missing was small and legitimate; still, it was known that a very
few had shirked their duty, and an example was necessary.  Among this
small number were four officers who, it was charged, had abandoned
their colors and regiments.  When their guilt was clearly
established, and as soon as an opportunity occurred, I caused the
whole division to be formed in a hollow square, closed in mass, and
had the four officers marched to the centre, where, telling them that
I would not humiliate any officer or soldier by requiring him to
touch their disgraced swords, I compelled them to deliver theirs up
to my colored servant, who also cut from their coats every insignia
of rank.  Then, after there had been read to the command an order
from army headquarters dismissing the four from the service, the
scene was brought to a close by drumming the cowards out of camp.  It
was a mortifying spectacle, but from that day no officer in that
division ever abandoned his colors.

My effective force in the battle of Stone River was 4,154 officers
and men.  Of this number I lost 1,633 killed, wounded, and missing,
or nearly 40 per cent.  In the remaining years of the war, though
often engaged in most severe contests, I never experienced in any of
my commands so high a rate of casualties.  The ratio of loss in the
whole of Rosecrans's army was also high, and Bragg's losses were
almost equally great.  Rosecrans carried into the action about 42,000
officers and men.  He lost 13,230, or 31 per cent.  Bragg's effective
force was 37,800 officers and men; he lost 10,306, or nearly 28 per
cent.

Though our victory was dearly bought, yet the importance of gaining
the day at any price was very great, particularly when we consider
what might have been the result had not the gallantry of the army and
the manoeuvring during the early disaster saved us from ultimate
defeat.  We had started out from Nashville on an offensive campaign,
probably with no intention of going beyond Murfreesboro', in
midwinter, but still with the expectation of delivering a crushing
blow should the enemy accept our challenge to battle.  He met us with
a plan of attack almost the counterpart of our own.  In the execution
of his plan he had many advantages, not the least of which was his
intimate knowledge of the ground, and he came near destroying us.
Had he done so, Nashville would probably have fallen; at all events,
Kentucky would have been opened again to his incursions, and the
theatre of war very likely transferred once more to the Ohio River.
As the case now stood, however, Nashville was firmly established as a
base for future operations, Kentucky was safe from the possibility of
being again overrun, and Bragg, thrown on the defensive, was
compelled to give his thoughts to the protection of the interior of
the Confederacy and the security of Chattanooga, rather than indulge
in schemes of conquest north of the Cumberland River.  While he still
held on in Middle Tennessee his grasp was so much loosened that only
slight effort would be necessary to push him back into Georgia, and
thus give to the mountain region of East Tennessee an opportunity to
prove its loyalty to the Union.

The victory quieted the fears of the West and Northwest, destroyed
the hopes of the secession element in Kentucky, renewed the drooping
spirits of the East Tennesseans, and demoralized the disunionists in
Middle Tennessee; yet it was a negative victory so far as concerned
the result on the battle-field.  Rosecrans seems to have planned the
battle with the idea that the enemy would continue passive, remain
entirely on the defensive, and that it was necessary only to push
forward our left in order to force the evacuation of Murfreesboro';
and notwithstanding the fact that on the afternoon of December 30
McCook received information that the right of Johnson's division.
resting near the Franklin pike, extended only to about the centre of
the Confederate army, it does not appear that attack from that
quarter was at all apprehended by the Union commanders.

The natural line of retreat of the Confederates was not threatened by
the design of Rosecrans; and Bragg, without risk to his
communications, anticipated it by a counter-attack of like character
from his own left, and demolished his adversary's plan the moment we
were thrown on the defensive.  Had Bragg followed up with the spirit
which characterized its beginning the successful attack by Hardee on
our right wing--and there seems no reason why he should not have done
so--the army of Rosecrans still might have got back to Nashville, but
it would have been depleted and demoralized to such a degree as to
unfit it for offensive operations for a long time afterward.  Bragg's
intrenchments in front of Stone River were very strong, and there
seems no reason why he should not have used his plain advantage as
explained, but instead he allowed us to gain time, intrench, and
recover a confidence that at first was badly shaken.  Finally, to cap
the climax of his errors, he directed Breckenridge to make the
assault from his right flank on January 2, with small chance for
anything but disaster, when the real purpose in view could have been
accomplished without the necessity of any offensive manoeuvre
whatever.




CHAPTER XIV.

APPOINTED A MAJOR-GENERAL--THE SECRET EXPEDITION UNDER CARD THE
SCOUT--HIS CAPTURE BY GUERRILLAS--ESCAPE--A REVENGE PARTY--WOMEN
SOLDIERS--A FIGHT WITH SABRES--TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN--A FOOLISH
ADVENTURE.

On the 6th of January, 1863, my division settled quietly down in its
camp south of Murfreesboro'.  Its exhausted condition after the
terrible experiences of the preceding week required attention.  It
needed recuperation, reinforcement, and reorganization, and I set
about these matters without delay, in anticipation of active
operations early in the spring.  No forward movement was made for
nearly six months, however, and throughout this period drills,
parades, reconnoissances, and foraging expeditions filled in the time
profitably.  In addition to these exercises the construction of
permanent fortifications for the security of Murfreesboro' was
undertaken by General Rosecrans, and large details from my troops
were furnished daily for the work.  Much attention was also given to
creating a more perfect system of guard and picket duty-a matter that
had hitherto been somewhat neglected in the army, as its constant
activity had permitted scant opportunity for the development of such
a system.  It was at this time that I received my appointment as a
major-general of Volunteers.  My promotion had been recommended by
General Rosecrans immediately after the battle of Stone River, but
for some reason it was delayed until April, and though a long time
elapsed between the promise and the performance, my gratification was
extreme.

My scout, Card, was exceedingly useful while encamped near
Murfreesboro, making several trips to East Tennessee within the
enemy's lines to collect information as to the condition of the loyal
people there, and to encourage them with the hope of early
liberation.  He also brought back from each trip very accurate
statements as to the strength and doings of the Confederate army,
fixing almost with certainty its numbers and the locations of its
different divisions, and enabling my engineer-officer--Major
Morhardt--to construct good maps of the country in our front.  On
these dangerous excursions Card was always accompanied by one of his
brothers, the other remaining with me to be ready for duty if any
accident occurred to those who had gone out, or in case I wanted to
communicate with them.  In this way we kept well posted, although the
intelligence these men brought was almost always secured at the risk
of their lives.

Early in the spring, before the Tullahoma campaign began, I thought
it would be practicable, by sending out a small secret expedition of
but three or four men, to break the Nashville and Chattanooga
railroad between Chattanooga and the enemy's position at Tullahoma by
burning the bridges in Crow Creek valley from its head to Stevenson,
Alabama, and then the great bridge across the Tennessee River at
Bridgeport.  Feeling confident that I could persuade Card to
undertake the perilous duty, I broached the contemplated project to
him, and he at once jumped at the opportunity of thus distinguishing
himself, saying that with one of his brothers and three other loyal
East Tennesseeans, whose services he knew could be enlisted, he felt
sure of carrying out the idea, so I gave him authority to choose his
own assistants.  In a few days his men appeared at my headquarters,
and when supplied with money in notes of the State Bank of Tennessee,
current everywhere as gold in those days, the party, composed of
Card, the second brother, and the three East Tennesseeans, started on
their precarious enterprise, their course being directed first toward
the Cumberland Mountains, intending to strike the Nashville and
Chattanooga railroad somewhere above Anderson's station.  They
expected to get back in about fifteen days, but I looked for some
knowledge of the progress of their adventure before the expiration of
that period, hoping to hear through Confederate sources prisoners and
the like-of the destruction of the bridges.  I waited in patience for
such news, but none came, and as the time Card had allotted himself
passed by, I watched anxiously for his return, for, as there was
scarcely a doubt that the expedition had proved a failure, the fate
of the party became a matter of deep concern to Card's remaining
brother and to me.  Finally this brother volunteered to go to his
father's house in East Tennessee to get tidings of the party, and I
consented, for the probabilities were that some of them had made
their way to that point, or at least that some information had
reached there about them.  As day after day went by, the time fixed
for this brother's return came round, yet he also remained out; but
some days after the lad was due Card himself turned up accompanied by
the brother he had taken with him, soon explained his delay in
getting back, and gave me the story of his adventures while absent.

After leaving my camp, his party had followed various byways across
the Cumberland Mountains to Crow Creek Valley, as instructed; but
when nearing the railroad above Anderson's Station, they were
captured by some guerrillas prowling about that vicinity, and being
suspected of disloyalty to the Confederacy, were carried to
Chattanooga and imprisoned as Yankee spies.  Their prospects now were
decidedly discouraging, for death stared them in the face.
Fortunately, however, some delays occurred relative to the
disposition that should be made of them, and they, meanwhile,
effected their escape from their jailors by way of one of the prison
windows, from which they managed to displace a bar, and by a skiff,
in the darkness of night, crossed the Tennessee River a little below
Chattanooga.  From this point the party made their way back to my
camp, traveling only at night, hiding in the woods by day, and for
food depending on loyal citizens that Card had become acquainted with
when preaching and peddling.

Card's first inquiry after relating his story was for the youngest
brother, whom he had left with me.  I told him what I had done, in my
anxiety about himself, and that more than sufficient time had elapsed
for his brother's return.  His reply was: "They have caught him.  The
poor fellow is dead."  His surmise proved correct; for news soon came
that the poor boy had been captured at his father's house, and
hanged.  The blow to Card was a severe one, and so hardened his heart
against the guerrillas in the neighborhood of his father's home--for
he knew they were guilty of his brother's murder--that it was with
difficulty I could persuade him to continue in the employment of the
Government, so determined was he to avenge his brother's death at the
first opportunity.  Finally, however, I succeeded in quieting the
almost uncontrollable rage that seemed to possess him, and he
remained with me during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns; but
when we reached Knoxville the next winter, he took his departure,
informing me that he was going for the bushwhackers who had killed
his brother.  A short time after he left me, I saw him at the head of
about thirty well-armed East Tennesseeans--refugees.  They were
determined-looking men, seeking revenge for the wrongs and sufferings
that had been put upon them in the last two years, and no doubt
wreaked their vengeance right and left on all who had been in any way
instrumental in persecuting them.

The feeding of our army from the base at Louisville was attended with
a great many difficulties, as the enemy's cavalry was constantly
breaking the railroad and intercepting our communications on the
Cumberland River at different points that were easily accessible to
his then superior force of troopers.  The accumulation of reserve
stores was therefore not an easy task, and to get forage ahead a few
days was well-nigh impossible, unless that brought from the North was
supplemented by what we could gather from the country.  Corn was
abundant in the region to the south and southwest of Murfreesboro',
so to make good our deficiences in this respect, I employed a brigade
about once a week in the duty of collecting and bringing in forage,
sending out sometimes as many as a hundred and fifty wagons to haul
the grain which my scouts had previously located.  In nearly every
one of these expeditions the enemy was encountered, and the wagons
were usually loaded while the skirmishers kept up a running fire,
Often there would occur a respectable brush, with the loss on each
side of a number of killed and wounded.  The officer in direct
command always reported to me personally whatever had happened during
the time he was out--the result of his reconnoissance, so to speak,
for that war the real nature of these excursions--and on one occasion
the colonel in command, Colonel Conrad, of the Fifteenth Missouri,
informed me that he got through without much difficulty; in fact,
that everything had gone all right and been eminently satisfactory,
except that in returning he had been mortified greatly by the conduct
of the two females belonging to the detachment and division train at
my headquarters.  These women, he said, had given much annoyance by
getting drunk, and to some extent demoralizing his men.  To say that
I was astonished at his statement would be a mild way of putting it,
and had I not known him to be a most upright man and of sound sense,
I should have doubted not only his veracity, but his sanity.
Inquiring who they were and for further details, I was informed that
there certainly were in the command two females, that in some
mysterious manner had attached themselves to the service as soldiers;
that one, an East Tennessee woman, was a teamster in the division
wagon-train and the other a private soldier in a cavalry company
temporarily attached to my headquarters for escort duty.  While out
on the foraging expedition these Amazons had secured a supply of
"apple-jack" by some means, got very drunk, and on the return had
fallen into Stone River and been nearly drowned.  After they had been
fished from, the water, in the process of resuscitation their sex was
disclosed, though up to this time it appeared to be known only to
each other.  The story was straight and the circumstance clear,
so, convinced of Conrad's continued sanity, I directed the
provost-marshal to bring in arrest to my headquarters the two
disturbers of Conrad's peace of mind, After some little search the
East Tennessee woman was found in camp, somewhat the worse for the
experiences of the day before, but awaiting her fate content idly
smoking a cob-pipe.  She was brought to me, and put in duress under
charge of the division surgeon until her companion could be secured.
To the doctor she related that the year before she had "refugeed" from
East Tennessee, and on arriving in Louisville assumed men's apparel
and sought and obtained employment as a teamster in the
quartermaster's department.  Her features were very large, and so
coarse and masculine was her general appearance that she would readily
have passed as a man, and in her case the deception was no doubt
easily practiced.  Next day the "she dragoon" was caught, and proved
to be a rather prepossessing young woman, and though necessarily
bronzed and hardened by exposure, I doubt if, even with these marks of
campaigning, she could have deceived as readily as did her companion.
How the two got acquainted, I never learned, and though they had
joined the army independently of each other, yet an intimacy had
sprung up between them long before the mishaps of the foraging
expedition.  They both were forwarded to army headquarters, and, when
provided with clothing suited to their sex, sent back to Nashville,
and thence beyond our lines to Louisville.

On January 9, by an order from the War Department, the Army of the
Cumberland had been divided into three corps, designated the
Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first.  This order did not alter the
composition of the former grand divisions, nor change the commanders,
but the new nomenclature was a decided improvement over the clumsy
designations Right Wing, Centre, and Left Wing, which were well
calculated to lead to confusion sometimes.  McCook's wing became the
Twentieth Corps, and my division continued of the same organization,
and held the same number as formerly-the Third Division, Twentieth
Corps.  My first brigade was now commanded by Brigadier-General
William H. Lytle, the second by Colonel Bernard Laiboldt, and the
third by Colonel Luther P. Bradley.

On the 4th of March I was directed to move in light marching order
toward Franklin and join General Gordon Granger, to take part in some
operations which he was projecting against General Earl Van Dorn,
then at Spring Hill.  Knowing that my line of march would carry me
through a region where forage was plentiful, I took along a large
train of empty wagons, which I determined to fill with corn and send
back to Murfreesboro', believing that I could successfully cover the
train by Minty's brigade of cavalry, which had joined me for the
purpose of aiding in a reconnoissance toward Shelbyville.  In
marching the column I placed a regiment of infantry at its head, then
the wagon-train, then a brigade of infantry--masking the cavalry
behind this brigade.  The enemy, discovering that the train was with
us, and thinking he could capture it, came boldly out with his,
cavalry to attack.  The head of his column came up to the crossroads
at Versailles, but holding him there, I passed the train and infantry
brigade beyond toward Eagleville, and when my cavalry had been thus
unmasked, Minty, followed by the balance of my division, which was
still behind, charged him with the sabre.  Success was immediate and
complete, and pursuit of the routed forces continued through
Unionville, until we fell upon and drove in the Confederate outposts
at Shelbyville.  Here the enemy was taken by surprise evidently,
which was most fortunate for us, otherwise the consequences might
have been disastrous.  Minty captured in the charge about fifty
prisoners and a few wagons and mules, and thus enabled me to load my
train with corn, and send it back to Murfreesboro' unmolested.  In
this little fight the sabre was freely used by both sides, and I do
not believe that during the whole war I again knew of so large a
percentage of wounds by that arm in proportion to the numbers
engaged.

That night I encamped at Eagleville, and next day reported to Granger
at Franklin, arriving in the midst of much excitement prevailing on
account of the loss of Coburn's brigade, which had been captured the
day before a little distance south of that point, while marching to
form a junction with a column that had been directed on Columbia from
Murfreesboro'.  Shortly after Coburn's capture General Granger had
come upon the scene, and the next day he advanced my division and
Minty's troops directly on Spring Hill, with a view to making some
reprisal; but Van Dorn had no intention of accommodating us, and
retired from Spring Hill, offering but little resistance.  He
continued to fall back, till finally he got behind Duck River, where
operations against him ceased; for, in consequence of the incessant
rains of the season, the streams had become almost impassable.
Later, I returned by way of Franklin to my old camp at Murfreesboro',
passing over on this march the ground on which the Confederate
General Hood met with such disaster the following year in his attack
on Stanley's corps.

My command had all returned from the Franklin expedition to
Murfreesboro' and gone into camp on the Salem pike by the latter part
of March, from which time till June it took part in only the little
affairs of outposts occurring every now and then on my own front.  In
the meanwhile General Rosecrans had been materially reinforced by the
return of sick and wounded men; his army had become well disciplined,
and was tolerably supplied; and he was repeatedly pressed by the
authorities at Washington to undertake offensive operations.

During the spring and early summer Rosecrans resisted, with a great
deal of spirit and on various grounds, these frequent urgings, and
out of this grew up an acrimonious correspondence and strained
feeling between him and General Halleck.  Early in June, however,
stores had been accumulated and other preparations made for a move
forward, Resecrans seeming to have decided that he could safely risk
an advance, with the prospect of good results.  Before finally
deciding, he called upon most of his corps and division commanders
for their opinions on certain propositions which he presented, and
most of them still opposed the projected movement, I among the
number, reasoning that while General Grant was operating against
Vicksburg, it was better to hold Bragg in Middle Tennessee than to
push him so far back into Georgia that interior means of
communication would give the Confederate Government the opportunity
of quickly joining a part of his force to that of General Johnson in
Mississippi.

At this stage, and in fact prior to it, Rosecrans seemed to manifest
special confidence in me, often discussing his plans with me
independent of the occasions on which he formally referred them for
my views.  I recollect that on two different occasions about this
time he unfolded his designs to me in this informal way, outlining
generally how he expected ultimately to force Bragg south of the
Tennessee River, and going into the details of the contemplated move
on Tullahoma.  His schemes, to my mind, were not only comprehensive,
but exact, and showed conclusively, what no one doubted then, that
they were original with him.  I found in them very little to
criticise unfavorably, if we were to move at all, and Rosecrans
certainly impressed me that he favored an advance at an early day,
though many of his generals were against it until the operations on
the Mississippi River should culminate in something definite.  There
was much, fully apparent in the circumstances about his headquarters,
leading to the conviction that Rosecrans originated the Tullahoma
campaign, and the record of his prior performances collaterally
sustains the visible evidence then existing.  In my opinion, then,
based on a clear recollection of various occurrences growing out of
our intimacy, he conceived the plan of the Tullahoma campaign and the
one succeeding it; and is therefore entitled to every credit that
attended their execution, no matter what may be claimed for others.

On the 23d of June Bragg was covering his position north of Duck
River with a front extending from McMinnville, where his cavalry
rested, through Wartrace and Shelbyville to Columbia, his depot being
at Tullahoma.  Rosecrans, thinking that Bragg would offer strong
resistance at Shelbyville--which was somewhat protected by a spur
of low mountains or hills, offshoots of the Cumberland Mountains
--decided to turn that place; consequently, he directed the mass
of the Union army on the enemy's right flank, about Manchester.

On the 26th of June McCook's corps advanced toward Liberty Gap, my
divisions marching on the Shelbyville pike.  I had proceeded but a
few miles when I encountered the enemy's pickets, who fell back to
Christiana, about nine miles from Murfreesboro'.  Here I was assailed
pretty wickedly by the enemy's sharpshooters and a section of
artillery, but as I was instructed to do nothing more than cover the
road from Eagleville, over which Brannan's division was to approach
Christiana, I made little reply to this severe annoyance, wishing to
conceal the strength of my force.  As soon as the head of Brannan's
column arrived I marched across-country to the left, and encamped
that night at the little town of Millersburg, in the vicinity of
Liberty Gap.  I was directed to move from Millersburg, on Hoover's
Gap--a pass in the range of hills already referred to, through which
ran the turnpike from Murfreesboro' to Manchester--but heavy rains
had made the country roads almost impassable, and the last of my
division did not reach Hoover's Gap till the morning of June 27,
after its abandonment by the enemy.  Continuing on to Fairfield, the
head of my column met, south of that place, a small force of
Confederate infantry and cavalry, which after a slight skirmish
Laiboldt's brigade drove back toward Wartrace.  The next morning I
arrived at Manchester, where I remained quiet for the day.  Early on
the 29th I marched by the Lynchburg road for Tullahoma, where the
enemy was believed to be in force, and came into position about six
miles from the town.

By the 31st the whole army had been concentrated, in spite of many
difficulties, and though, on account of the heavy rains that had
fallen almost incessantly since we left Murfreesboro', its movements
had been slow and somewhat inaccurate, yet the precision with which
it took up a line of battle for an attack on Tullahoma showed that
forethought and study had been given to every detail.  The enemy had
determined to fall back from Tullahoma at the beginning of the
campaign, however, and as we advanced, his evacuation had so far
progressed that when, on July 1.  We reached the earthworks thrown.
up early in the year for the defense of the place, he had almost
wholly disappeared, carrying off all his stores and munitions of war
except some little subsistence and eleven pieces of artillery.  A
strong rearguard remained to cover the retreat, and on my front the
usual encounters between advancing and retreating forces took place.
Just before reaching the intrenchments on the Lynchburg road, I came
upon an open space that was covered by a network of fallen trees and
underbrush, which had been slashed all along in front of the enemy's
earthworks.  This made our progress very difficult, but I shortly
became satisfied that there were only a few of the enemy within the
works, so moving a battalion of cavalry that had joined me the day
before down the road as rapidly as the obstructions would permit, the
Confederate pickets quickly departed, and we gained possession of the
town.  Three siege guns, four caissons, a few stores, and a small
number of prisoners fell into my hands.

That same evening orders were issued to the army to push on from
Tullahoma in pursuit, for, as it was thought that we might not be
able to cross Elk River on account of its swollen condition, we could
do the enemy some damage by keeping close as possible at his heels.
I marched on the Winchester road at 3 o'clock on the 2d of July and
about 8 o'clock reached Elk River ford.  The stream was for the time
truly an impassable torrent, and all hope of crossing by the
Winchester ford had to be abandoned.  Deeming that further effort
should be made, however, under guidance of Card, I turned the head of
my column in the direction of Alisona, marching up the river and
nearly parallel with it till I came to Rock Creek.  With a little
delay we got across Rock Creek, which was also much swollen, and
finding a short distance above its mouth a ford on Elk River that
Card said was practicable, I determined to attempt it: Some of the
enemy's cavalry were guarding this ford, but after a sharp little
skirmish my battalion of cavalry crossed and took up a strong
position on the other bank.  The stream was very high and the current
very swift, the water, tumbling along over its rocky bed in an
immense volume, but still it was fordable for infantry if means could
be devised by which the men could keep their feet.  A cable was
stretched across just below the ford as a lifeline for the weaker
ones, and then the men of the entire division having secured their
ammunition by placing the cartridge-boxes on their shoulders, the
column pushed cheerfully into the rushing current.  The men as they
entered the water joined each other in sets of four in a close
embrace, which enabled them to retain a foothold and successfully
resist the force of the flood.  When they were across I turned the
column down the left bank of Elk River, and driving the enemy from
some slight works near Estelle Springs, regained the Winchester road.

By this time it was clear that Bragg intended to fall back behind the
Tennessee River, and our only chance of accomplishing anything of
importance was to smash up his rear-guard before it crossed the
Cumberland Mountains, and in pursuance of this idea I was directed to
attack such of his force as was holding on to Winchester.  At 4
o'clock on the morning of July 2 I moved on that town, and when we
got close to it directed my mounted troops to charge a small force of
Confederate cavalry that was picketing their front.  The Confederates
resisted but little, and our men went with them in a disorderly chase
through the village to Boiling Fork, a small stream about half a mile
beyond.  Here the fleeing pickets, rallying behind a stronger force,
made a stand, and I was directed by McCook to delay till I
ascertained if Davis's division, which was to support me, had made
the crossing of Elk River, and until I could open up communication
with Brannan's division, which was to come in on my left at Decherd.
As soon as I learned that Davis was across I pushed on, but the delay
had permitted the enemy to pull his rear-guard up on the mountain,
and rendered nugatory all further efforts to hurt him materially, our
only returns consisting in forcing him to relinquish a small amount
of transportation and forage at the mouth of the pass just beyond
Cowan, a station on the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga
railroad.

At Cowan, Colonel Watkins, of the Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, reported to
me with twelve hundred mounted men.  Having heard during the night
that the enemy had halted on the mountain near the University--an
educational establishment on the summit--I directed Watkins to make a
reconnoissance and find out the value of the information.  He learned
that Wharton's brigade of cavalry was halted at the University to
cover a moderately large force of the enemy's infantry which had not
yet got down the mountain on the other side, so I pushed Watkins out
again on the 5th, supporting him by a brigade of infantry, which I
accompanied myself.  We were too late, however, for when we arrived
at the top of the mountain Wharton had disappeared, and though
Watkins pursued to Bridgeport, he was able to do nothing more, and on
his return reported that the last of the enemy had crossed the
Tennessee River and burned the railroad bridge.

Nothing further could now be done, so I instructed Watkins to rejoin
the division at Cowan, and being greatly fatigued by the hard
campaigning of the previous ten days, I concluded to go back to my
camp in a more comfortable way than on the back of my tired horse.
In his retreat the enemy had not disturbed the railway track at all,
and as we had captured a hand-car at Cowan, I thought I would have it
brought up to the station near the University to carry me down the
mountain to my camp, and, desiring company, I persuasively invited
Colonel Frank T. Sherman to ride with me.  I sent for the car by a
courier, and for a long time patiently awaited its arrival, in fact,
until all the returning troops had passed us, but still it did not
come.  Thinking it somewhat risky to remain at the station without
protection, Sherman and myself started our horses to Cowan by our
orderlies, and set out on foot to meet the car, trudging along down
the track in momentary expectation of falling in with our private
conveyance.  We had not gone very far before night overtook us, and
we then began to realize the dangers surrounding us, for there we
were alone and helpless, tramping on in the darkness over an unknown
railroad track in the enemy's country, liable on the one hand to go
tumbling through some bridge or trestle, and on the other, to
possible capture or death at the hands of the guerrillas then
infesting these mountains.  Just after dark we came to a little cabin
near the track, where we made bold to ask for water, notwithstanding
the fact that to disclose ourselves to the inmates might lead to
fatal consequences.  The water was kindly given, but the owner and
his family were very much exercised lest some misfortune might befall
us near their house, so they encouraged us to move on with a frankness
inspired by fear of future trouble to themselves.

At every turn we eagerly hoped to meet the hand-car, but it never
came, and we jolted on from tie to tie for eleven weary miles,
reaching Cowan after midnight, exhausted and sore in every muscle
from frequent falls on the rough, unballasted road-bed.  Inquiry.
developed that the car had been well manned, and started to us as
ordered, and nobody could account for its non-arrival.  Further
investigation next day showed, however, that when it reached the foot
of the mountain, where the railroad formed a junction, the improvised
crew, in the belief no doubt that the University was on the main line
instead of near the branch to Tracy City, followed the main stem
until it carried them clear across the range down the Crow Creek
Valley, where the party was captured.

I had reason to remember for many a day this foolish adventure, for
my sore bones and bruised muscles, caused me physical suffering until
I left the Army of the Cumberland the next spring; but I had still
more reason to feel for my captured men, and on this account I have
never ceased to regret that I so thoughtlessly undertook to rejoin my
troops by rail, instead of sticking to my faithful horse.




CHAPTER XV.

ORDERED TO OCCUPY BRIDGEPORT--A SPY--THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA
--GENERAL THOMAS--TREATED TO COFFEE--RESULTS OF THE BATTLE.

The Tullahoma campaign was practically closed by the disappearance of
the enemy from the country north of the Tennessee River.  Middle
Tennessee was once more in the possession of the National troops, and
Rosecrans though strongly urged from Washington to continue on,
resisted the pressure until he could repair the Nashville and
Chattanooga railroad, which was of vital importance in supplying his
army from its secondary base at Nashville.  As he desired to hold
this road to where it crossed the Tennessee, it was necessary to push
a force beyond the mountains, and after a few days of rest at Cowan
my division was ordered to take station at Stevenson, Alabama, the
junction of the Memphis and Charleston road with the Nashville and
Chattanooga, with instructions to occupy Bridgeport also.

The enemy had meanwhile concentrated most of his forces at
Chattanooga for the twofold purpose of holding this gateway of the
Cumberland Mountains, and to assume a defensive attitude which would
enable him to take advantage of such circumstances as might arise in
the development of the offensive campaign he knew we must make.  The
peculiar topography of the country was much to his advantage, and
while we had a broad river and numerous spurs and ridges of the
Cumberland Mountains to cross at a long distance from our base, he
was backed up on his depots of supply, and connected by interior
lines of railway with the different armies of the Confederacy, so
that he could be speedily reinforced.

Bridgeport was to be ultimately a sub-depot for storing subsistence
supplies, and one of the points at which our army would cross the
Tennessee, so I occupied it on July 29 with two brigades, retaining
one at Stevenson, however, to protect that railway junction from
raids by way of Caperton's ferry.  By the 29th of August a
considerable quantity of supplies had been accumulated, and then
began a general movement of our troops for crossing the river.  As
there were not with the army enough pontoons to complete the two
bridges required, I was expected to build one of them of trestles;
and a battalion of the First Michigan Engineers under Colonel Innis
was sent me to help construct the bridge.  Early on the 31st I sent
into the neighboring woods about fifteen hundred men with axes and
teams, and by nightfall they had delivered on the riverbank fifteen
hundred logs suitable for a trestle bridge.  Flooring had been
shipped to me in advance by rail, but the quantity was insufficient,
and the lack had to be supplied by utilizing planking and
weather-boarding taken from barns and houses in the surrounding
country.  The next day Innis's engineers, with the assistance of the
detail that had felled the timber, cut and half-notched the logs, and
put the bridge across; spanning the main channel, which was swimming
deep, with four or five pontoons that had been sent me for this
purpose. On the 2d and 3d of September my division crossed on the
bridge in safety, though we were delayed somewhat because of its
giving way once where the pontoons joined the trestles.  We were
followed by a few detachments from other commands, and by nearly
all the transportation of McCook's corps.

After getting to the south side of the Tennessee River I was ordered
to Valley Head, where McCook's corps was to concentrate.  On the 4th
of September I ascended Sand Mountain, but had got only half way
across the plateau, on top, when night came, the march having been a
most toilsome one.  The next day we descended to the base, and
encamped near Trenton.  On the 10th I arrived at Valley Head, and
climbing Lookout Mountain, encamped on the plateau at Indian Falls.
The following day I went down into Broomtown Valley to Alpine.
The march of McCook's corps from Valley Head to Alpine was in
pursuance of orders directing it to advance on Summerville, the
possession of which place would further threaten the enemy's
communications, it being assumed that Bragg was in full retreat
south, as he had abandoned Chattanooga on the 8th.  This assumption
soon proved erroneous, however, and as we, while in Broomtown Valley,
could not communicate directly with Thomas's corps, the scattered
condition of the army began to alarm us all, and McCook abandoned the
advance to Summerville, ordering back to the summit of Lookout
Mountain such of the corps trains as had got down into Broomtown
Valley.

But before this I had grown uneasy in regard to the disjointed
situation of our army, and, to inform myself of what was going on,
determined to send a spy into the enemy's lines.  In passing Valley
Head on the 10th my scout Card, who had been on the lookout for some
one capable to undertake the task, brought me a Union man with whom
he was acquainted, who lived on Sand Mountain, and had been much
persecuted by guerrillas on account of his loyal sentiments.  He knew
the country well, and as his loyalty was vouched for I asked him to
go into the enemy's camp, which I believed to be near Lafayette, and,
bring me such information as he could gather.  He said such a journey
would be at the risk of his life, and that at best he could not
expect to remain in that section of country if he undertook it, but
that he would run all the chances if I would enable him to emigrate
to the West at the end c f the "job," which I could do by purchasing
the small "bunch" of stock he owned on the mountain.  To this I
readily assented, and he started on the delicate undertaking.  He
penetrated the enemy's lines with little difficulty, but while
prosecuting his search for information was suspected, and at once
arrested and placed under guard.  From this critical situation he
escaped; however, making his way through the enemy's picket-line in
the darkness by crawling on his belly and deceiving the sentinels by
imitating the grunts of the half-wild, sand-colored hogs with which
the country abounded.  He succeeded in reaching Rosecrans's
headquarters finally, and there gave the definite information that
Bragg intended to fight, and that he expected to be reinforced by
Longstreet.

By this time it was clear that Bragg had abandoned Chattanooga with
the sole design of striking us in detail as we followed in pursuit;
and to prevent his achieving this purpose orders came at 12 o'clock,
midnight, for McCook to draw in toward Chattanooga.  This could be
done only by recrossing Lookout Mountain, the enemy's army at
Lafayette now interposing between us and Thomas's corps.  The
retrograde march began at once.  I moved back over the mountain on
the 13th and 14th to Stevens's Mills, and on the 15th and 16th
recrossed through Stevens's Gap, in the Lookout range, and encamped
at its base in McLamore's cove.  The march was made with all possible
celerity, for the situation was critical and demanded every exertion.
The ascent and descent of the mountains was extremely exhausting, the
steep grades often rendering it necessary to drag up and let down by
hand both the transportation and artillery.  But at last we were in
conjunction with the main army, and my division breathed easier.

On the 17th I remained in line of battle all day and night in front
of McLamore's cove, the enemy making slight demonstrations against me
from the direction of Lafayette.  The main body of the army having
bodily moved to the left meanwhile, I followed it on the 18th,
encamping at Pond Spring.  On the 19th I resumed the march to the
left and went into line of battle at Crawfish Springs to cover our
right and rear.  Immediately after forming this line, I again became
isolated by the general movement to the left, and in consequence was
directed to advance and hold the ford of Chickamauga Creek at Lee and
Gordon's Mills, thus coming into close communication with the balance
of our forces.  I moved into this position rapidly, being compelled,
though, first to drive back the enemy's cavalry skirmishers, who,
having crossed to the west side of the creek, annoyed the right flank
of my column a good deal while en route.

Upon arrival at Lee and Gordon's Mills I found the ford over
Chickamauga Creek temporarily uncovered, through the hurried movement
of Wood to the assistance of Davis's division.  The enemy was already
present in small force, with the evident intention of taking
permanent possession, but my troops at once actively engaged him and
recovered the ford with some slight losses.  Scarcely had this been
done when I was directed to assist Crittenden.  Leaving Lytle's
brigade at the ford, I proceeded with Bradley's and Laiboldt's to
help Crittenden, whose main line was formed to the east of the
Chattanooga and Lafayette road, its right trending toward a point on
Chickamauga Creek about a mile and a half north of Lee and Gordon's
Mills.  By the time I had joined Crittenden with my two brigades,
Davis had been worsted in an attack Rosecrans had ordered him to make
on the left of that portion of the enemy's line which was located
along the west bank of the Chickamauga, the repulse being so severe
that one of Davis's batteries had to be abandoned.  Bradley's brigade
arrived on the ground first and was hastily formed and thrown into
the fight, which up to this moment had been very doubtful, fortune
inclining first to one side, then to the other.  Bradley's brigade
went in with steadiness, and charging across an open corn-field that
lay in front of the Lafayette road, recovered Davis's guns and forced
the enemy to retire.  Meanwhile Laiboldt's brigade had come on the
scene, and forming it on Bradley's right, I found myself at the end
of the contest holding the ground which was Davis's original
position.  It was an ugly fight and my loss was heavy, including
Bradley wounded.  The temporary success was cheering, and when
Lytle's brigade joined me a little later I suggested to Crittenden
that we attack, but investigation showed that his troops, having been
engaged all day, were not in condition, so the suggestion could not
be carried out.

The events of the day had indicated that Bragg's main object was to
turn Rosecrans's left; it was therefore still deemed necessary that
the army should continue its flank movement to the left, so orders
came to draw my troops in toward the widow Glenn's house.  By
strengthening the skirmish line and shifting my brigades in
succession from right to left until the point designated was reached,
I was able to effect the withdrawal without much difficulty, calling
in my skirmish line after the main force had retired.

My command having settled down for the night in this new line I rode
to army headquarters, to learn if possible the expectations for the
morrow and hear the result of the battle in General Thomas's front.
Nearly all the superior officers of the army were at headquarters,
and it struck me that much depression prevailed, notwithstanding the
fact that the enemy's attempts during the day to turn our left flank
and also envelop our right had been unsuccessful.  It was now
positively known, through prisoners and otherwise, that Bragg had
been reinforced to such an extent as to make him materially outnumber
us, consequently there was much apprehension for the future.

The necessity of protecting our left was most apparent, and the next
day the drifting in that direction was to be continued.  This
movement in the presence of the enemy, who at all points was actively
seeking an opportunity to penetrate our line and interpose a column
between its right and left, was most dangerous.  But the necessity
for shifting the army to the left was obvious, hence only the method
by which it was undertaken is open to question.  The move was made by
the flank in the face of an exultant foe superior in numbers, and was
a violation of a simple and fundamental military principle.  Under
such circumstances columns naturally stretch out into attenuated
lines, organizations become separated, and intervals occur, all of
which we experienced; and had the orders for the movement been
construed properly I doubt if it could have been executed without
serious danger.  Necessity knows no law, however, and when all the
circumstances of this battle are fully considered it is possible that
justification may be found for the manoeuvres by which the army was
thus drifted to the left.  We were in a bad strait unquestionably,
and under such conditions possibly the exception had to be applied
rather than the rule.

At daylight on the morning of the 20th a dense fog obscured
everything; consequently both armies were passive so far as fighting
was concerned.  Rosecrans took advantage of the inaction to rearrange
his right, and I was pulled back closer to the widow Glenn's house to
a strong position, where I threw together some rails and logs as
barricades, but I was disconnected from the troops on my left by a
considerable interval.  Here I awaited the approach of the enemy, but
he did not disturb me, although about 9 o'clock in the forenoon he
had opened on our extreme left with musketry fire and a heavy
cannonade.  Two hours later it was discovered by McCook that the
interval between the main army and me was widening, and he ordered me
to send Laiboldt's brigade to occupy a portion of the front that had
been covered by Negley's division.  Before getting this brigade into
place, however, two small brigades of Davis's division occupied the
ground, and I directed Laiboldt to form in column of regiments on the
crest of a low ridge in rear of Carlin's brigade, so as to prevent
Davis's right flank from being turned.  The enemy was now feeling
Davis strongly, and I was about sending for Lytle's and Bradley's
brigades when I received an order to move these rapidly to the
extreme left of the army to the assistance of General Thomas.  I rode
hastily back toward their position, but in the meanwhile, they had
been notified by direct orders from McCook, and were moving out at a
double-quick toward the Lafayette road.  By this time the enemy had
assaulted Davis furiously in front and flank, and driven him from his
line, and as the confused mass came back, McCook ordered Laiboldt to
charge by deploying to the front.  This he did through Davis's broken
ranks, but failed to check the enemy's heavy lines, and finally
Laiboldt's brigade broke also and fell to the rear.  My remaining
troops, headed by Lytle, were now passing along the rear of the
ground where this disaster took place--in column on the road--en
route to Thomas, and as the hundreds of fugitives rushed back, McCook
directed me to throw in Lytle's and Bradley's brigades.  This was
hastily done, they being formed to the front under a terrible fire.
Scarcely were they aligned when the same horde of Confederates that
had overwhelmed Davis and Laiboldt poured in upon them a deadly fire
and shivered the two brigades to pieces.  We succeeded in rallying
them, however, and by a counter attack regained the ridge that
Laiboldt had been driven from, where we captured the colors of the
Twenty-fourth Alabama.  We could not hold the ridge, though, and my
troops were driven back with heavy loss, including General Lytle
killed, past the widow Glenn's house, and till I managed to establish
them in line of battle on a range of low hills behind the Dry Valley
road.

During these occurrences General Rosecrans passed down the road
behind my line, and sent word that he wished to see me, but affairs
were too critical to admit of my going to him at once, and he rode on
to Chattanooga.  It is to be regretted that he did not wait till I
could join him, for the delay would have permitted him to see that
matters were not in quite such bad shape as he supposed; still, there
is no disguising the fact that at this juncture his army was badly
crippled.

Shortly after my division had rallied on the low hills already
described, I discovered that the enemy, instead of attacking me in
front, was wedging in between my division and the balance of the
army; in short, endeavoring to cut me off from Chattanooga.  This
necessitated another retrograde movement, which brought me back to
the southern face of Missionary Ridge, where I was joined by Carlin's
brigade of Davis's division.  Still thinking I could join General
Thomas, I rode some distance to the left of my line to look for a way
out, but found that the enemy had intervened so far as to isolate me
effectually.  I then determined to march directly to Rossville, and
from there effect a junction with Thomas by the Lafayette road.  I
reached Rossville about o'clock in the afternoon, bringing with me
eight guns, forty-six caissons, and a long ammunition train, the
latter having been found in a state of confusion behind the widow
Glenn's when I was being driven back behind the Dry Valley road.

The head of my column passed through Rossville, appearing upon
Thomas's left about 6 o'clock in the evening, penetrated without any
opposition the right of the enemy's line, and captured several of his
field-hospitals.  As soon as I got on the field I informed Thomas of
the presence of my command, and asked for orders.  He replied that
his lines were disorganized, and that it would be futile to attack;
that all I could do was to hold on, and aid in covering his
withdrawal to Rossville.

I accompanied him back to Rossville, and when we reached the skirt of
the little hamlet General Thomas halted and we dismounted.  Going
into one of the angles of a worm fence near by I took a rail from the
top and put it through the lower rails at a proper height from the
ground to make a seat, and General Thomas and I sat down while, my
troops were moving by.  The General appeared very much exhausted,
seemed to forget what he had stopped for, and said little or nothing
of the incidents of the day.  This was the second occasion on which I
had met him in the midst of misfortune, for during the fight in the
cedars at Stone River, when our prospects were most disheartening, we
held a brief conversation respecting the line he was then taking up
for the purpose of helping me.  At other times, in periods of
inactivity, I saw but little of him.  He impressed me, now as he did
in the cedars, his quiet, unobtrusive: demeanor communicating a
gloomy rather than a hopeful view of the situation.  This apparent
depression was due no doubt to the severe trial through which he had
gone in the last forty-eight hours, which, strain had exhausted him
very much both physically and mentally.  His success in maintaining
his ground was undoubtedly largely influenced by the fact that
two-thirds of the National forces had been sent to his succor, but his
firm purpose to save the army was the mainstay on which all relied
after Rosecrans left the field.  As the command was getting pretty
well past, I rose to go in order to put my troops into camp.  This
aroused the General, when, remarking that he had a little flask of
brandy in his saddle-holster, he added that he had just stopped for
the purpose of offering me a drink, as he knew I must be very tired.
He requested one of his staff-officers to get the flask, and after
taking a sip himself, passed it to me.  Refreshed by the brandy, I
mounted and rode off to supervise the encamping of my division, by no
means an easy task considering the darkness, and the confusion that
existed among the troops that had preceded us into Rossville.

This done, I lay down at the foot of a tree, with my saddle for a
pillow, and saddle-blanket for a cover.  Some soldiers near me having
built a fire, were making coffee, and I guess I must have been
looking on wistfully, for in a little while they brought me a
tin-cupful of the coffee and a small piece of hard bread, which I
relished keenly, it being the first food that had passed my lips
since the night before.  I was very tired, very hungry, and much
discouraged by what had taken place since morning.  I had been
obliged to fight my command under the most disadvantageous
circumstances, disconnected, without supports, without even
opportunity to form in line of battle, and at one time contending
against four divisions of the enemy.  In this battle of Chickamauga,
out of an effective strength Of 4,000 bayonets, I had lost 1,517
officers and men, including two brigade commanders.  This was not
satisfactory indeed, it was most depressing--and then there was much
confusion prevailing around Rossville; and, this condition of things
doubtless increasing my gloomy reflections, it did not seem to me
that the outlook for the next day was at all auspicious, unless the
enemy was slow to improve his present advantage.  Exhaustion soon
quieted all forebodings, though, and I fell into a sound sleep, from
which I was not aroused till daylight.

On the morning of the 21st the enemy failed to advance, and his
inaction gave us the opportunity for getting the broken and
disorganized army into shape.  It took a large part of the day to
accomplish this, and the chances of complete victory would have been
greatly in Bragg's favor if he could have attacked us vigorously at
this time.  But he had been badly hurt in the two days' conflict, and
his inactivity on the 21st showed that he too had to go through the
process of reorganization.  Indeed, his crippled condition began to
show itself the preceding evening, and I have always thought that,
had General Thomas held on and attacked the Confederate right and
rear from where I made the junction with him on the Lafayette road,
the field of Chickamauga would have been relinquished to us; but it
was fated to be otherwise.

Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden passed out of the battle when they
went back to Chattanooga, and their absence was discouraging to all
aware of it.  Doubtless this had much to do with Thomas's final
withdrawal, thus leaving the field to the enemy, though at an immense
cost in killed and wounded.  The night of the 21st the army moved
back from Rossville, and my division, as the rearguard of the
Twentieth Corps, got within our lines at Chattanooga about 8 o'clock
the morning of the 22d.  Our unmolested retirement from Rossville
lent additional force to the belief that the enemy had been badly
injured, and further impressed me with the conviction that we might
have held on.  Indeed, the battle of Chickamauga was somewhat like
that of Stone River, victory resting with the side that had the grit
to defer longest its relinquishment of the field.

The manoeuvres by which Rosecrans had carried his army over the
Cumberland Mountains, crossed the Tennessee River, and possessed
himself of Chattanooga, merit the highest commendation up to the
abandonment of this town by Bragg on the 8th of September; but I have
always fancied that that evacuation made Rosecrans over-confident,
and led him to think that he could force Bragg south as far as Rome.
After the Union army passed the river and Chattanooga fell into our
hands; we still kept pressing the enemy's communications, and the
configuration of the country necessitated more or less isolation of
the different corps.  McCook's corps of three divisions had crossed
two difficult ridges--Sand and Lookout mountains--to Alpine in
Broomtown Valley with intentions against Summerville.  Thomas's corps
had marched by the way of Stevens's Gap toward Lafayette, which he
expected to occupy.  Crittenden had passed through Chattanooga, at
first directing his march an Ringgold.  Thus the corps of the army
were not in conjunction, and between McCook and Thomas there
intervened a positive and aggressive obstacle in the shape of Bragg's
army concentrating and awaiting reinforcement at Lafayette.  Under
these circumstances Bragg could have taken the different corps in
detail, and it is strange that he did not, even before receiving his
reinforcements, turn on McCook in Broomtown Valley and destroy him.

Intelligence that Bragg would give battle began to come to us from
various sources as early as the 10th of September, and on the 11th
McCook found that he could not communicate with Thomas by the direct
road through Broomtown Valley; but we did not begin closing in toward
Chattanooga till the 13th, and even then the Twentieth Corps had
before it the certainty of many delays that must necessarily result
from the circuitous and difficult mountain roads which we would be
obliged to follow.  Had the different corps, beginning with McCook's,
been drawn in toward Chattanooga between the 8th and 12th of
September, the objective point of the campaign would have remained in
our hands without the battle of Chickamauga, but, as has been seen,
this was not done.  McCook was almost constantly on the march day and
night between the 13th and the 19th, ascending and descending
mountains, his men worried and wearied, so that when they appeared on
the battle-field, their fatigued condition operated greatly against
their efficiency.  This delay in concentration was also the original
cause of the continuous shifting toward our left to the support of
Thomas, by which manoeuvre Rosecrans endeavored to protect his
communications with Chattanooga, and out of which grew the intervals
that offered such tempting opportunities to Bragg.  In addition to
all this, much transpired on the field of battle tending to bring
about disaster.  There did not seem to be any well-defined plan of
action in the fighting; and this led to much independence of judgment
in construing orders among some of the subordinate generals.  It also
gave rise to much license in issuing orders: too many people were
giving important directions, affecting the whole army, without
authority from its head.  In view, therefore, of all the errors that
were committed from the time Chattanooga fell into our hands after
our first crossing the Tennessee, it was fortunate that the Union
defeat was not more complete, that it left in the enemy's possession
not much more than the barren results arising from the simple holding
of the ground on which the engagement was fought.




CHAPTER XVI.

AT CHATTANOOGA--THE ENEMY FORTIFIES LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN AND MISSIONARY
RIDGE--REORGANIZING THE ARMY--REMOVAL OF GENERAL ROSECRANS
--PUNISHMENT OF DESERTERS--GRANT AT CHATTANOOGA--THE FIGHT ON LOOKOUT
MOUNTAIN--A BRAVE COLOR-BEARER--BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.

By 9 o'clock on the morning of September 22 my command took up a
position within the heavy line of intrenchments at Chattanooga, the
greater part of which defenses had been thrown up since the army
commenced arriving there the day before.  The enemy, having now
somewhat recovered from the shock of the recent battle, followed
carefully, and soon invested us close into our lines with a parallel
system of rifle-pits.  He also began at once to erect permanent lines
of earthworks on Missionary Ridge and to establish himself strongly
on Lookout Mountain.  He then sent Wheeler's cavalry north of the
Tennessee, and, aided greatly by the configuration of the ground,
held us in a state of partial siege, which serious rains might
convert into a complete investment.  The occupation of Lookout
Mountain broke our direct communication with Bridgeport--our
sub-depot--and forced us to bring supplies by way of the Sequatchie
Valley and Waldron's Ridge of the Cumberland Mountains, over a road
most difficult even in the summer season, but now liable to be
rendered impassable by autumn rains.  The distance to Bridgeport by
this circuitous route was sixty miles, and the numerous passes,
coves, and small valleys through which the road ran offered tempting
opportunities, for the destruction of trains, and the enemy was not
slow to take advantage of them.  Indeed, the situation was not
promising, and General Rosecrans himself, in communicating with the
President the day succeeding the battle of Chickamauga, expressed
doubts of his ability to hold the gateway of the Cumberland
Mountains.

The position taken up by my troops inside the lines of Chattanooga
was near the old iron-works, under the shadow of Lookout Mountain.
Here we were exposed to a continual fire from the enemy's batteries
for many days, but as the men were well covered by secure though
simple intrenchments, but little damage was done.  My own
headquarters were established on the grounds of Mr. William
Crutchfield, a resident of the place, whose devotion to the Union
cause knew no bounds, and who rendered me--and, in fact, at one time
or another, nearly every general officer in the Army of the
Cumberland--invaluable service in the way of information about the
Confederate army.  My headquarters camp frequently received shots
from the point of Lookout Mountain also, but fortunately no
casualties resulted from this plunging fire, though, I am free to
confess, at first our nerves were often upset by the whirring of
twenty-pounder shells dropped inconsiderately into our camp at
untimely hours of the night.

In a few days rain began to fall, and the mountain roads by which our
supplies came were fast growing impracticable.  Each succeeding train
of wagons took longer to make the trip from Bridgeport, and the draft
mules were dying by the hundreds.  The artillery horses would soon go
too, and there was every prospect that later the troops would starve
unless something could be done.  Luckily for my division, a company
of the Second Kentucky Cavalry had attached itself to my
headquarters, and, though there without authority, had been left
undisturbed in view of a coming reorganization of the army incidental
to the removal of McCook and Crittenden from the command of their
respective corps, a measure that had been determined upon immediately
after the battle of Chickamauga.  Desiring to remain with me, Captain
Lowell H. Thickstun, commanding this company, was ready for any duty
I might find, for him, so I ordered him into the Sequatchie Valley
for the purpose of collecting supplies for my troops, and sent my
scout, Card along to guide him to the best locations.  The company
hid itself away in a deep cove in the upper end of the valley, and by
keeping very quiet and paying for everything it took from the people,
in a few days was enabled to send me large quantities of corn for my
animals and food for the officers and men, which greatly supplemented
the scanty supplies we were getting from the sub-depot at Bridgeport.
In this way I carried men and animals through our beleaguerment in
pretty fair condition, and of the turkeys, chickens, ducks, and eggs
sent in for the messes of my officers we often had enough to divide
liberally among those at different headquarters.  Wheeler's cavalry
never discovered my detached company, yet the chances of its capture
were not small, sometimes giving much uneasiness; still, I concluded
it was better to run all risks than to let the horses die of
starvation in Chattanooga.  Later, after the battle of Missionary
Ridge, when I started to Knoxville, the company joined me in
excellent shape, bringing with it an abundance of food, including a
small herd of beef cattle.

The whole time my line remained near the iron-mills the shelling from
Lookout was kept up, the screeching shots inquisitively asking in
their well-known way, "Where are you? Where are you?" but it is
strange to see how readily, soldiers can become accustomed to the
sound of dangerous missiles under circumstances of familiarity, and
this case was no exception to the rule.  Few casualties occurred, and
soon contempt took the place of nervousness, and as we could not
reply in kind on account of the elevation required for our guns, the
men responded by jeers and imprecations whenever a shell fell into
their camp.

Meantime, orders having been issued for the organization of the army,
additional troops were attached to my command, and it became the
Second Division of the Fourth Army Corps, to which Major-General
Gordon Granger was assigned as commander.  This necessitated a change
of position of the division, and I moved to ground behind our works,
with my right resting on Fort Negley and my left extending well over
toward Fort Wood, my front being parallel to Missionary Ridge.  My
division was now composed of twenty-five regiments, classified into
brigades and demi-brigades, the former commanded by Brigadier-General
G. D. Wagner, Colonel C. G. Harker, and Colonel F. T. Sherman; the
latter, by Colonels Laiboldt, Miller, Wood, Walworth, and Opdyke.
The demi-brigade was an awkward invention of Granger's; but at this
time it was necessitated--perhaps by the depleted condition of our
regiments, which compelled the massing of a great number of
regimental organizations into a division to give it weight and force.

On October 16, 1863, General Grant had been assigned to the command
of the "Military Division of the Mississippi," a geographical area
which embraced the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the
Tennessee, thus effecting a consolidation of divided commands which
might have been introduced most profitably at an earlier date.  The
same order that assigned General Grant relieved General Rosecrans,
and placed General Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland.
At the time of the reception of the order, Rosecrans was busy with
preparations for a movement to open the direct road to Bridgeport
--having received in the interval, since we came back to Chattanooga,
considerable reinforcement by the arrival in his department of the
Eleventh and Twelfth corps, under General Hooker, from the Army of
the Potomac.  With this force Rosecrans had already strengthened
certain important points on the railroad between Nashville and
Stevenson, and given orders to Hooker to concentrate at Bridgeport
such portions of his command as were available, and to hold them in
readiness to advance toward Chattanooga.

On the 19th of October, after turning the command over to Thomas,
General Rosecrans quietly slipped away from the army.  He submitted
uncomplainingly to his removal, and modestly left us without fuss or
demonstration; ever maintaining, though, that the battle of
Chickamauga was in effect a victory, as it had ensured us, he said,
the retention of Chattanooga.  When his departure became known
deep and almost universal regret was expressed, for he was
enthusiastically esteemed and loved by the Army of the Cumberland,
from the day he assumed command of it until he left it,
notwithstanding the censure poured upon him after the battle of
Chickamauga.

The new position to which my division had been moved, in consequence
of the reorganization, required little additional labor to strengthen
it, and the routine of fatigue duty and drills was continued as
before, its monotony occasionally broken by the excitement of an
expected attack, or by amusements of various kinds that were
calculated to keep the men in good spirits.  Toward this result much
was contributed by Mr. James E. Murdock, the actor, who came down
from the North to recover the body of his son, killed at Chickamauga,
and was quartered with me for the greater part of the time he was
obliged to await the successful conclusion of his sad mission.  He
spent days, and even weeks, going about through the division giving
recitations before the camp-fires, and in improvised chapels, which
the men had constructed from refuse lumber and canvas.  Suiting his
selections to the occasion, he never failed to excite intense
interest in the breasts of all present, and when circumstances
finally separated him from us, all felt that a debt of gratitude was
due him that could never be paid.  The pleasure he gave, and the
confident feeling that was now arising from expected reinforcements,
was darkened, however, by one sad incident.  Three men of my division
had deserted their colors at the beginning of the siege and made
their way north.  They were soon arrested, and were brought back to
stand trial for the worst offense that can be committed by a soldier,
convicted of the crime, and ordered to be shot.  To make the example
effective I paraded the whole division for the execution, and on the
13th of November, in the presence of their former comrades, the
culprits were sent, in accordance with the terms of their sentence,
to render their account to the Almighty.  It was the saddest
spectacle I ever witnessed, but there could be no evasion, no
mitigation of the full letter of the law; its timely enforcement was
but justice to the brave spirits who had yet to fight the rebellion
to the end.

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on October 23, and began at once
to carry out the plans that had been formed for opening the shorter
or river road to Bridgeport.  This object was successfully
accomplished by the moving of Hooker's command to Rankin's and
Brown's ferries in concert with a force from the Army of the
Cumberland which was directed on the same points, so by the 27th of
October direct communication with our depots was established.  The
four weeks which followed this cheering result were busy with the
work of refitting and preparing for offensive operations as soon as
General Sherman should reach us with his troops from West Tennessee.
During this period of activity the enemy committed the serious fault
of detaching Longstreet's corps--sending it to aid in the siege of
Knoxville in East Tennessee--an error which has no justification
whatever, unless it be based on the presumption that it was
absolutely necessary that Longstreet should ultimately rejoin Lee's
army in Virginia by way of Knoxville and Lynchburg, with a chance of
picking up Burnside en route.  Thus depleted, Bragg still held
Missionary Ridge in strong force, but that part of his line which
extended across the intervening valley to the northerly point of.
Lookout Mountain was much attenuated.

By the 18th of November General Grant had issued instructions
covering his intended operations.  They contemplated that Sherman's
column, which was arriving by the north bank of the Tennessee, should
cross the river on a pontoon bridge just below the mouth of
Chickamauga Creek and carry the northern extremity of Missionary
Ridge as far as the railroad tunnel; that the Army of the Cumberland
--the centre--should co-operate with Sherman; and that Hooker with a
mixed command should continue to hold Lookout Valley and operate on
our extreme right as circumstances might warrant.  Sherman crossed on
the 24th to perform his alloted part of the programme, but in the
meantime Grant becoming impressed with the idea that Bragg was
endeavoring to get away, ordered Thomas to make a strong
demonstration in his front, to determine the truth or falsity of the
information that had been received.  This task fell to the Fourth
Corps, and at 12 o'clock on the 23d I was notified that Wood's
division would make a reconnoissance to an elevated point in its
front called Orchard Knob, and that I was to support it with my
division and prevent Wood's right flank from being turned by an
advance of the enemy on Moore's road or from the direction of
Rossville.  For this duty I marched my division out of the works
about 2 p.m., and took up a position on Bushy Knob.  Shortly after we
reached this point Wood's division passed my left flank on its
reconnoissance, and my command, moving in support of it, drove in the
enemy's picket-line.  Wood's took possession of Orchard Knob easily,
and mine was halted on a low ridge to the right of the Knob, where I
was directed by General Thomas to cover my front by a strong line of
rifle-pits, and to put in position two batteries of the Fourth
regular artillery that had joined me from the Eleventh Corps.  After
dark Wood began to feel uneasy about his right flank, for a gap
existed between it and my left, so I moved in closer to him, taking
up a line where I remained inactive till the 25th, but suffering some
inconvenience from the enemy's shells.

On the 24th General Sherman made an attack for the purpose of
carrying the north end of Missionary Ridge.  His success was not
complete, although at the time it was reported throughout the army to
be so.  It had the effect of disconcerting Bragg, however, and caused
him to strengthen his right by withdrawing troops from his left,
which circumstance led Hooker to advance on the northerly face of
Lookout Mountain.  At first, with good glasses, we could plainly see
Hooker's troops driving the Confederates up the face of the mountain.
All were soon lost to view in the dense timber, but emerged again on
the open ground, across which the Confederates retreated at a lively
pace, followed by the pursuing line, which was led by a color-bearer,
who, far in advance, was bravely waving on his comrades.  The
gallantry of this man elicited much enthusiasm among us all, but as
he was a considerable distance ahead of his comrades I expected to
see his rashness punished at any moment by death or capture.  He
finally got quite near the retreating Confederates, when suddenly
they made a dash at him, but he was fully alive to such a move, and
ran back, apparently uninjured, to his friends.  About this time a
small squad of men reached the top of Lookout and planted the Stars
and Stripes on its very crest.  Just then a cloud settled down on the
mountain, and a heavy bank of fog obscured its whole face.

After the view was lost the sharp rattle of musketry continued some
time, but practically the fight had been already won by Hooker's men,
the enemy only holding on with a rear-guard to assure his retreat
across Chattanooga Valley to Missionary Ridge.  Later we heard very
heavy cannonading, and fearing that Hooker was in trouble I sent a
staff-officer to find out whether he needed assistance, which I
thought could be given by a demonstration toward Rossville.  The
officer soon returned with the report that Hooker was all right, that
the cannonading was only a part of a little rear-guard fight, two
sections of artillery making all the noise, the reverberations from
point to point in the adjacent mountains echoing and reechoing till
it seemed that at least fifty guns were engaged.

On the morning of the 25th of November Bragg's entire army was
holding only the line of Missionary Ridge, and our troops, being now
practically connected from Sherman to Hooker, confronted it with the
Army of the Cumberland in the centre--bowed out along the front of
Wood's division and mine.  Early in the day Sherman, with great
determination and persistence, made an attempt to carry the high
ground near the tunnel, first gaining and then losing advantage, but
his attack was not crowned with the success anticipated.  Meanwhile
Hooker and Palmer were swinging across Chattanooga Valley, using me
as a pivot for the purpose of crossing Missionary Ridge in the
neighborhood of Rossville.  In the early part of the day I had driven
in the Confederate pickets in my front, so as to prolong my line of
battle on that of Wood, the necessity of continuing to refuse my
right having been obviated by the capture of Lookout Mountain and the
advance of Palmer.

About 2 o'clock orders came to carry the line at the foot of the
ridge, attacking at a signal of six guns.  I had few changes or new
dispositions to make.  Wagner's brigade, which was next to Wood's
division, was formed in double lines, and Harker's brigade took the
same formation on Wagner's right.  Colonel F. T. Sherman's brigade
came on Harker's right, formed in a column of attack, with a front of
three regiments, he having nine.  My whole front was covered with a
heavy line of skirmishers.  These dispositions made, my right rested
a little distance south of Moore's road, my left joined Wood over
toward Orchard Knob, while my centre was opposite Thurman's house
--the headquarters of General Bragg--on Missionary Ridge.  A small
stream of water ran parallel to my front, as far as which the ground
was covered by a thin patch of timber, and beyond the edge of the
timber was an open plain to the foot of Missionary Ridge, varying in
width from four to nine hundred yards.  At the foot of the ridge was
the enemy's first line of rifle-pits; at a point midway up its face,
another line, incomplete; and on the crest was a third line, in which
Bragg had massed his artillery.

The enemy saw we were making dispositions for an attack, and in plain
view of my whole division he prepared himself for resistance,
marching regiments from his left flank with flying colors; and
filling up the spaces not already occupied in his intrenchments.
Seeing the enemy thus strengthening himself, it was plain that we
would have to act quickly if we expected to accomplish much, and I
already began to doubt the feasibility of our remaining in the first
line of rifle-pits when we should have carried them.  I discussed the
order with Wagner, Harker, and Sherman, and they were similarly
impressed, so while anxiously awaiting the signal I sent Captain
Ransom of my staff to Granger, who was at Fort Wood, to ascertain if
we were to carry the first line or the ridge beyond.  Shortly after
Ransom started the signal guns were fired, and I told my brigade
commanders to go for the ridge.

Placing myself in front of Harker's brigade, between the line of
battle and the skirmishers, accompanied by only an orderly so as not
to attract the enemy's fire, we moved out.  Under a terrible storm of
shot and shell the line pressed forward steadily through the timber,
and as it emerged on the plain took the double-quick and with fixed
bayonets rushed at the enemy's first line.  Not a shot was fired from
our line of battle, and as it gained on my skirmishers they melted
into and became one with it, and all three of my brigades went over
the rifle-pits simultaneously.  They then lay down on the face of the
ridge, for a breathing-spell and for protection' from the terrible
fire, of canister and musketry pouring over us from the guns on the
crest.  At the rifle-pits there had been little use for the bayonet,
for most of the Confederate troops, disconcerted by the sudden rush,
lay close in the ditch and surrendered, though some few fled up the
slope to the next line.  The prisoners were directed to move out to
our rear, and as their intrenchments had now come under fire from the
crest, they went with alacrity, and without guard or escort, toward
Chattanooga.

After a short pause to get breath the ascent of the ridge began, and
I rode, into the ditch of the intrenchments to drive out a few
skulkers who were hiding there.  Just at this time I was joined by
Captain Ransom, who, having returned from Granger, told me that we
were to carry only the line at the base, and that in coming back,
when he struck the left of the division, knowing this interpretation
of the order, he in his capacity as an aide-de-camp had directed
Wagner, who was up on the face of the ridge, to return, and that in
consequence Wagner was recalling his men to the base.  I could not
bear to order the recall of troops now so gallantly climbing the hill
step by step, and believing we could take it, I immediately rode to
Wagner's brigade and directed it to resume the attack.  In the
meantime Harker's and F. T. Sherman's troops were approaching the
partial line of works midway of the ridge, and as I returned to the
centre of their rear, they were being led by many stands of
regimental colors.  There seemed to be a rivalry as to which color
should be farthest to the front; first one would go forward a few
feet, then another would come up to it, the color-bearers vying with
one another as to who should be foremost, until finally every
standard was planted on the intermediate works.  The enemy's fire
from the crest during the ascent was terrific in the noise made, but
as it was plunging, it over-shot and had little effect on those above
the second line of pits, but was very uncomfortable for those below,
so I deemed it advisable to seek another place, and Wagner's brigade
having reassembled and again pressed up the ridge, I rode up the face
to join my troops.

As soon as the men saw me, they surged forward and went over the
works on the crest.  The parapet of the intrenchment was too high for
my horse to jump, so, riding a short distance to the left, I entered
through a low place in the line.  A few Confederates were found
inside, but they turned the butts of their muskets toward me in token
of surrender, for our men were now passing beyond them on both their
flanks.

The right and right centre of my division gained the summit first,
they being partially sheltered by a depression in the face of the
ridge, the Confederates in their immediate front fleeing down the
southern face.  When I crossed the rifle-pits on the top the
Confederates were still holding fast at Bragg's headquarters, and a
battery located there opened fire along the crest; making things most
uncomfortably hot.  Seeing the danger to which I was exposed, for I
was mounted, Colonel Joseph Conrad, of the Fifteenth Missouri, ran up
and begged me to dismount.  I accepted his excellent advice, and it
probably saved my life; but poor Conrad was punished for his
solicitude by being seriously wounded in the thigh at the moment he
was thus contributing to my safety.

Wildly cheering, the men advanced along the ridge toward Bragg's
headquarters, and soon drove the Confederates from this last
position, capturing a number of prisoners, among them Breckenridge's
and Bates's adjutant-generals, and the battery that had made such
stout resistance on the crest-two guns which were named "Lady
Breckenridge" and "Lady Buckner" General Bragg himself having barely
time to escape before his headquarters were taken.

My whole division had now reached the summit, and Wagner and Harker
--the latter slightly wounded--joined me as I was standing in the
battery just secured.  The enemy was rapidly retiring, and though
many of his troops, with disorganized wagon-trains and several pieces
of artillery, could be distinctly seen in much confusion about half a
mile distant in the valley below, yet he was covering them with a
pretty well organized line that continued to give us a desultory
fire.  Seeing this, I at once directed Wagner and Harker to take up
the pursuit along Moore's road, which led to Chickamauga Station
--Bragg's depot of supply--and as they progressed, I pushed Sherman's
brigade along the road behind them.  Wagner and Harker soon overtook
the rearguard, and a slight skirmish caused it to break, permitting
nine guns and a large number of wagons which were endeavoring to get
away in the stampede to fall into our hands.

About a mile and a half beyond Missionary Ridge, Moore's road passed
over a second ridge or high range of hills, and here the enemy had
determined to make a stand for that purpose, posting eight pieces of
artillery with such supporting force as he could rally.  He was
immediately attacked by Harker and Wagner, but the position was
strong, the ridge being rugged and difficult of ascent, and after the
first onset our men recoiled.  A staff-officer from Colonel Wood's
demi-brigade informing me at this juncture that that command was too
weak to carry the position in its front, I ordered the Fifteenth
Indiana and the Twenty-Sixth Ohio to advance to Wood's aid, and then
hastening to the front I found his men clinging to the face of the
ridge, contending stubbornly with the rear-guard of the enemy.
Directing Harker to put Opdyke's demi-brigade in on the right, I
informed Wagner that it was necessary to flank the enemy by carrying
the high bluff on our left where the ridge terminated, that I had
designated the Twenty-Sixth Ohio and Fifteenth Indiana for the work,
and that I wished him to join them.

It was now dusk, but the two regiments engaged in the flanking
movement pushed on to gain the bluff.  Just as they reached the crest
of the ridge the moon rose from behind, enlarged by the refraction of
the atmosphere, and as the attacking column passed along the summit
it crossed the moon's disk and disclosed to us below a most
interesting panorama, every figure nearly being thrown out in full
relief.  The enemy, now outflanked on left and right, abandoned his
ground, leaving us two pieces of artillery and a number of wagons.
After this ridge was captured I found that no other troops than mine
were pursuing the enemy, so I called a halt lest I might become too
much isolated.  Having previously studied the topography of the
country thoroughly, I knew that if I pressed on my line of march
would carry me back to Chickamauga station, where we would be in rear
of the Confederates that had been fighting General Sherman, and that
there was a possibility of capturing them by such action; but I did
not feel warranted in marching there alone, so I rode back to
Missionary Ridge to ask for more troops, and upon arriving there I
found Granger in command, General Thomas having gone back to
Chattanooga.

Granger was at Braggy's late headquarters in bed.  I informed him of
my situation and implored him to follow me up with the Army of the
Cumberland, but he declined, saying that he thought we had done well
enough.  I still insisting, he told me finally to push on to the
crossing of Chickamauga Creek, and if I, encountered the enemy he
would order troops to my support.  I returned to my division about
12 o'clock at night, got it under way, and reached the crossing,
about half a mile from the station, at 2 o'clock on the morning of
the 26th, and there found the bridge destroyed, but that the creek
was fordable.  I did not encounter the enemy in any force, but feared
to go farther without assistance.  This I thought I might bring up by
practicing a little deception, so I caused two regiments to simulate
an engagement by opening fire, hoping that this would alarm Granger
and oblige him to respond with troops, but my scheme failed.  General
Granger afterward told me that he had heard the volleys, but
suspected their purpose, knowing that they were not occasioned by a
fight, since they were too regular in their delivery.

I was much disappointed that my pursuit had not been supported, for I
felt that great results were in store for us should the enemy be
vigorously followed.  Had the troops under Granger's command been
pushed out with mine when Missionary Ridge was gained, we could have
reached Chickamauga Station by 12 o'clock the night of the 25th; or
had they been sent even later, when I called for them, we could have
got there by daylight and worked incalculable danger to the
Confederates, for the force that had confronted Sherman did not pass
Chickamauga Station in their retreat till after daylight on the
morning of the 26th.

My course in following so close was dictated by a thorough knowledge
of the topography of the country and a familiarity with its roads,
bypaths, and farm-houses, gained with the assistance of Mr.
Crutchfield; and sure my column was heading in the right direction,
though night had fallen I thought that an active pursuit would almost
certainly complete the destruction of Bragg's army.  When General
Grant came by my bivouac at the crossing of Chickamauga Creek on the
26th, he realized what might have been accomplished had the
successful assault on Missionary Ridge been supplemented by vigorous
efforts on the part of some high officers, who were more interested
in gleaning that portion of the battle-field over which my command
had passed than in destroying a panic-stricken enemy.

Although it cannot be said that the result of the two days'
operations was reached by the methods which General Grant had
indicated in his instructions preceding the battle, yet the general
outcome was unquestionably due to his genius, for the manoeuvring of
Sherman's and Hooker's commands created the opportunity for Thomas's
corps of the Army of the Cumberland to carry the ridge at the centre.
In directing Sherman to attack the north end of the ridge, Grant
disconcerted Bragg--who was thus made to fear the loss of his depot
of supplies at Chickamauga Station--and compelled him to resist
stoutly; and stout resistance to Sherman meant the withdrawal of the
Confederates from Lookout Mountain.  While this attack was in process
of execution advantage was taken of it by Hooker in a well-planned
and well-fought battle, but to my mind an unnecessary one, for our
possession of Lookout was the inevitable result that must follow from
Sherman's threatening attitude.  The assault on Missionary Ridge by
Granger's and Palmer's corps was not premeditated by Grant, he
directing only the line at its base to be carried, but when this fell
into our hands the situation demanded our getting the one at the top
also.

I took into the action an effective force of 6,000, and lost 123
officers and 1,181 men killed and wounded.  These casualties speak
louder than words of the character of the fight, and plainly tell
where the enemy struggled most stubbornly for these figures comprise
one-third the casualties of the entire body of Union troops
--Sherman's and all included.  My division captured 1,762 prisoners
and, in all, seventeen pieces of artillery.  Six of these guns I
turned over with caissons complete; eleven were hauled off the field
and appropriated by an officer of high rank--General Hazen.  I have
no disposition to renew the controversy which grew out of this
matter.  At the time the occurrence took place I made the charge in a
plain official report, which was accepted as correct by the corps and
army commanders, from General Granger up to General Grant.  General
Hazen took no notice of this report then, though well aware of its
existence.  Nearly a quarter of a century later, however, he
endeavored to justify his retention of the guns by trying to show
that his brigade was the first to reach the crest of Missionary
Ridge, and that he was therefore entitled to them.  This claim of
being the first to mount the ridge is made by other brigades than
Hazen's, with equal if not greater force, so the absurdity of his
deduction is apparent:

NOTE: In a book published by General Hazen in 1885, he endeavored to
show, by a number of letters from subordinate officers of his
command, written at his solicitation from fifteen to twenty years
after the occurrence, that his brigade was the first to mount
Missionary Ridge, and that it was entitled to possess these guns.
The doubtful character of testimony dimmed by the lapse of many years
has long been conceded, and I am content to let the controversy stand
the test of history, based on the conclusions of General Grant, as he
drew them from official reports made when the circumstances were
fresh in the minds of all.

General Grant says: "To Sheridan's prompt movement, the Army of the
Cumberland and the nation are indebted for the bulk of the capture of
prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day.  Except for his prompt
pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished."

General Thomas says: "We captured all their cannon and ammunition
before they could be removed or destroyed.  After halting a few
moments to reorganize the troops, who had become somewhat scattered
in the assault of the hill, General Sheridan pushed forward in
pursuit, and drove those in his front who had escaped capture across
Chickamauga Creek."

REPORT OF COLONEL FRANCIS T. SHERMAN, COMMANDING FIRST BRIGADE:
"When within ten yards of the crest, our men seemed to be thrown
forward as if by some powerful engine, and the old flag was planted
firmly and surely on the last line of works of the enemy, followed by
the men, taking one battery of artillery."

REPORT OF COLONEL MICHAEL GOODING, TWENTY-SECOND INDIANA:
...."I pushed men up to the second line of works as fast as possible;
on and on, clear to the top, and over the ridge they went, to the
hollow beyond, killing and wounding numbers of the enemy as we
advanced, and leaving the rebel battery in our rear.  We captured
great numbers of prisoners, and sent them to the rear without guards,
as we deemed the pursuit of the enemy of greater importance....
"I cannot give too much praise to Captain Powers, Company "H,"
Lieutenant Smith, Company "K," Lieutenant Gooding, Company "A," and
Second Lieutenant Moser, Company "G," for their assistance, and for
the gallant manner in which they encouraged their men up the side of
the mountain, and charging the enemy's works right up to the muzzles
of their guns."

REPORT OF COLONEL JASON MARSH, SEVENTY-FOURTH ILLINOIS:
...."The first on the enemy's works, and almost simultaneously, were
Lieutenant Clement, Company "A," Captain Stegner, Company "I,"
Captain Bacon, Company "G," and Captain Leffingwell, with some of
their men.  The enemy was still in considerable force behind their
works; but, for some unaccountable reason, they either fled or
surrendered instantly upon the first few of our men reaching them
--not even trying to defend their battery, which was immediately
captured by Captain Stegner."

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PORTER C. OLSON, THIRTY-SIXTH ILLINOIS:
...."In connection with other regiments of this brigade, we assisted
in capturing several pieces of artillery, a number of caissons, and a
great quantity of small-arms."

REPORT OF COLONEL JOHN Q. LANE:
...."At the house known as Bragg's headquarters, the enemy were
driven from three guns, which fell into our hands."

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. D. WAGNER, SECOND BRIGADE:
...."I ordered the command to storm the ridge, bringing up the
Fifteenth Indiana and Ninety-seventh Ohio, which had not yet been
engaged, although suffering from the enemy's artillery.  The result
is a matter of history, as we gained the ridge, capturing artillery,
prisoners, and small-arms; to what amount, however, I do not know, as
we pushed on after the enemy as soon as I had re-formed the command.
....Captain Tinney, with his usual gallantry, dashed up the line with
the first troops, and with the aid of an orderly (George Dusenbury,
Fifteenth Indiana), turned the loaded gun of the enemy on his
retreating ranks."

REPORT OF CAPTAIN BENJAMIN F. HEGLER, FIFTEENTH INDIANA:
...."Our captures amounted to prisoners not counted, representing
many different regiments; several pieces of artillery, and some
wagons."

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ELIAS NEFF, FORTIETH INDIANA:
...."As the regiment reached the top of the ridge and swept for.
ward, the right passed through, without stopping to take possession,
the battery at General Bragg's headquarters that had fired so
venomously during the whole contest."

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. MOORE, FIFTY-EIGHTH INDIANA:
...."In passing to the front from Missionary Ridge, we saw several
pieces of artillery which had been abandoned by the enemy, though I
did not leave any one in charge of them."

REPORT OF MAJOR C, M. HAMMOND, ONE HUNDREDTH ILLINOIS:
...."I immediately organized my regiment, and while so doing
discovered a number of pieces of artillery in a ravine on my left.  I
sent Lieutenant Stewart, of Company A, to see if these guns which the
enemy had abandoned could not be turned upon them.  He returned and
reported them to be four ten-pound Parrotts and two brass Napoleons;
also that it would require a number of men to place them in position.
I ordered him to report the same to General Wagner, and ask
permission, but before receiving a reply was ordered by you to move
forward my regiment on the left of the Fifty-Eighth Indiana
Volunteers."

REPORT OF COLONEL CHARLES G. HARKER, THIRD BRIGADE:
...."My right and Colonel Sherman's left interlocked, so to speak, as
we approached the summit, and it was near this point that I saw the
first part of my line gain the crest.  This was done by a few brave
men of my own and Colonel Sherman's command driving the enemy from
his intrenchments.  The gap thus opened, our men rushed rapidly in,
and the enemy, loth to give up their position, still remained, firing
at my command toward the left, and the battery in front of the house
known as General Bragg's headquarters was still firing at the troops,
and was captured by our men while the gunners were still at their
posts....
...."We captured and sent to division and corps headquarters 503
prisoners and a large number of small-arms.  In regard to the number
of pieces of artillery, it will probably be difficult to reconcile
the reports of my regimental commanders with the reports of other
regiments and brigades who fought so nobly with my own command, and
who alike are entitled to share the honors and glories of the day.
More anxious to follow the enemy than to appropriate trophies already
secured, we pushed to the front, while the place we occupied on
ascending the hill was soon occupied by other troops, who, I have
learned, claim the artillery as having fallen into their own hands.
It must therefore remain with the division and corps commanders, who
knew the relative position of each brigade and division, to accord to
each the trophies to which they are due.
...."From my personal observation I can claim a battery of six guns
captured by a portion of my brigade."

REPORT OF COLONEL EMERSON OPDYKE, FIRST DEMI-BRIGADE:
...."My command captured Bragg's headquarters, house, and the six
guns which were near there; one of these I ordered turned upon the
enemy, which was done with effect."

REPORT OF COLONEL H. C. DUNLAP, THIRD KENTUCKY:
...."The point at which the centre of my regiment reached the crest
was at the stable to the left of the house said to be Bragg's
headquarters, and immediately in front of the road which leads down
the southern slope of the ridge.  One piece of the abandoned battery,
was to the left of this point, the remainder to the right, near by."

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. A. BULLITT, SIXTY-FIFTH OHIO:
...."The position in which my regiment found itself was immediately
in front of a battery, which belched forth a stream of canister upon
us with terrible rapidity.  In addition to this, the enemy, whenever
driven from other points, rallied around this battery, and defended
it with desperation.  It cost a struggle to take it; but we finally
succeeded, and the colors of the Sixty-fifth Ohio were the first
planted upon the yet smoking guns.  Captain Smith, of my regiment,
was placed in charge of the captured battery, which consisted of 5
guns, 3 caissons, and 17 horses."

REPORT OF CAPTAIN E. P. BATES, ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH OHIO:
...."Perceiving that the ridge across which my regiment extended was
commanded to the very crest by a battery in front, also by those to
right and left, I directed the men to pass up the gorges on either
side.  About forty men, with Captain Parks and Lieutenant Stinger,
passed to the left, the balance to the right, and boldly charged on,
till, foremost with those of other regiments, they stood on the
strongest point of the enemy's works, masters alike of his guns and
position....  Captain Parks reports his skirmish-line to have charged
upon and captured one gun, that otherwise would have been hauled
off."

REPORT OF COLONEL ALLEN BUCKNER, SEVENTY-NINTH ILLINOIS:
...."The right of the regiment rested on the left of the road, where
it crossed the rebel fortification, leading up the hill toward
Bragg's headquarters.  We took a right oblique direction through a
peach orchard until arriving at the woods and logs on the side of the
ridge, when I ordered the men to commence firing, which they did with
good effect, and continued it all the way up until the heights were
gained.  At this point the left of the regiment was near the right of
the house, and I claim that my officers and men captured two large
brass pieces, literally punching the cannoniers from their guns.
Privates John Fregan and Jasper Patterson, from Company "A," rushed
down the hill, captured one caisson, with a cannonier and six horses,
and brought them back."

REPORT OF COLONEL J. R. MILES, TWENTY-SEVENTH ILLINOIS:
...."The regiment, without faltering, finally, at about 4.30 P.M.,
gained the enemy's works in conjunction with a party of the
Thirty-sixth Illinois, who were immediately on our right.  The
regiment, or a portion of it, proceeded to the left, down the ridge,
for nearly or quite a quarter of a mile capturing three or four pieces
of cannon, driving the gunners from them."




CHAPTER XVII.

ORDERED TO RETURN TO CHATTANOOGA--MARCH TO KNOXVILLE--COLLECTING
SUBSISTENCE STORES--A CLEVER STRATAGEM--A BRIDGE OF WAGONS--LOOKING
OUT FOR THE PERSONAL COMFORT OF THE SOLDIERS-A LEAVE OF ABSENCE
--ORDERED TO WASHINGTON--PARTING WITH SHERIDAN'S DIVISION.

The day after the battle of Missionary Ridge I was ordered in the
evening to return to Chattanooga, and from the limited supply of
stores to be had there outfit my command to march to the relief of
Knoxville, where General Burnside was still holding out against the
besieging forces of General Longstreet.  When we left Murfreesboro'
in the preceding June, the men's knapsacks and extra clothing, as
well as all our camp equipage, had been left behind, and these
articles had not yet reached us, so we were poorly prepared for a
winter campaign in the mountains of East Tennessee.  There was but
little clothing to be obtained in Chattanooga, and my command
received only a few overcoats and a small supply of India-rubber
ponchos.  We could get no shoes, although we stood in great need of
them, for the extra pair with which each man had started out from
Murfreesboro' was now much the worse for wear.  The necessity for
succoring Knoxville was urgent, however, so we speedily refitted as
thoroughly as was possible with the limited means at hand.  My
division teams were in very fair condition in consequence of the
forage we had procured in the Sequatchie Valley, so I left the train
behind to bring up clothing when any should arrive in Chattanooga.

Under these circumstances, on the 29th of November the Fourth Corps
(Granger's) took up the line of march for Knoxville, my men carrying
in their haversacks four days' rations, depending for a further
supply of food on a small steamboat loaded with subsistence stores,
which was to proceed up the Tennessee River and keep abreast of the
column.

Not far from Philadelphia, Tennessee, the columns of General
Sherman's army, which had kept a greater distance from the river than
Granger's corps, so as to be able to subsist on the country, came in
toward our right and the whole relieving force was directed on
Marysville, about fifteen miles southwest of Knoxville.  We got to
Marysville December 5, and learned the same day that Longstreet had
shortly before attempted to take Knoxville by a desperate assault,
but signally failing, had raised the siege and retired toward Bean's
Station on the Rutledge, Rogersville, and Bristol road, leading to
Virginia.  From Marysville General Sherman's troops returned to
Chattanooga, while Granger's corps continued on toward Knoxville, to
take part in the pursuit of Longstreet.

Burnside's army was deficient in subsistence, though not to the
extent that we had supposed before leaving Chattanooga.  It had eaten
out the country in the immediate vicinity of Knoxville, however;
therefore my division did not cross the Holstein River, but was
required, in order to maintain itself, to proceed to the region of
the French Broad River.  To this end I moved to Sevierville, and
making this village my headquarters, the division was spread out over
the French Broad country, between Big Pigeon and Little Pigeon
rivers, where we soon had all the mills in operation, grinding out
plenty of flour and meal.  The whole region was rich in provender
of all kinds, and as the people with rare exceptions were
enthusiastically loyal, we in a little while got more than enough
food for ourselves, and by means of flatboats began sending the
surplus down the river to the troops at Knoxville.

The intense loyalty of this part of Tennessee exceeded that of any
other section I was in during the war.  The people could not do too
much to aid the Union cause, and brought us an abundance of
everything needful.  The women were especially loyal, and as many of
their sons and husbands, who had been compelled to "refugee" on
account of their loyal sentiments, returned with us, numbers of the
women went into ecstasies of joy when this part of the Union army
appeared among them.  So long as we remained in the French Broad
region, we lived on the fat of the land, but unluckily our stay was
to be of short duration, for Longstreet's activity kept the
department commander in a state of constant alarm.

Soon after getting the mills well running, and when the shipment of
their surplus product down the river by flatboats had begun, I was
ordered to move to Knoxville, on account of demonstrations by
Longstreet from the direction of Blain's crossroads.  On arriving at
Knoxville, an inspection of my command, showed that the shoes of many
of the men were entirely worn out, the poor fellows having been
obliged to protect their feet with a sort of moccasin, made from
their blankets or from such other material as they could procure.
About six hundred of the command were in this condition, plainly not
suitably shod to withstand the frequent storms of sleet and snow.
These men I left in Knoxville to await the arrival of my train, which
I now learned was en route from Chattanooga with shoes, overcoats,
and other clothing, and with the rest of the division proceeded to
Strawberry Plains, which we reached the latter part of December.

Mid-winter was now upon us, and the weather in this mountain region
of East Tennessee was very cold, snow often falling to the depth of
several inches.  The thin and scanty clothing of the men afforded
little protection, and while in bivouac their only shelter was the
ponchos with which they had been provided before leaving Chattanooga;
there was not a tent in the command.  Hence great suffering resulted,
which I anxiously hoped would be relieved shortly by the arrival of
my train with supplies.  In the course of time the wagons reached
Knoxville, but my troops derived little comfort from this fact, for
the train was stopped by General Foster, who had succeeded Burnside
in command of the department, its contents distributed pro rata to
the different organizations of the entire army, and I received but a
small share.  This was very disappointing, not to say exasperating,
but I could not complain of unfairness, for every command in the army
was suffering to the same extent as mine, and yet it did seem that a
little forethought and exertion on the part of some of the other
superior officers, whose transportation was in tolerable condition,
might have ameliorated the situation considerably.  I sent the train
back at once for more clothing, and on its return, just before
reaching Knoxville, the quartermaster in charge, Captain Philip
Smith, filled the open spaces in the wagons between the bows and load
with fodder and hay, and by this clever stratagem passed it through
the town safe and undisturbed as a forage train.  On Smith's arrival
we lost no time in issuing the clothing, and when it had passed into
the hands of the individual soldiers the danger of its appropriation
for general distribution, like the preceding invoice, was very
remote.

General Foster had decided by this time to move his troops to
Dandridge for the twofold purpose of threatening the enemy's left and
of getting into a locality where we could again gather subsistence
from the French Broad region.  Accordingly we began an advance on the
15th of January, the cavalry having preceded us some time before.
The Twenty-third Corps and Wood's division of the Fourth Corps
crossed the Holstein River by a bridge that had been constructed at
Strawberry Plains.  My division being higher up the stream, forded
it, the water very deep and bitter cold, being filled with slushy
ice.  Marching by way of New Market, I reached Dandridge on the 17th,
and here on my arrival met General Sturgis, then commanding our
cavalry.  He was on the eve of setting out to, "whip the enemy's
cavalry," as he said, and wanted me to go along and see him do it.  I
declined, however, for being now the senior officer present, Foster,
Parke, and Granger having remained at Knoxville and Strawberry
Plains, their absence left me in command, and it was necessary that I
should make disposition of the infantry when it arrived.  As there
were indications of a considerable force of the enemy on the
Russellville road I decided to place the troops in line of battle, so
as to be prepared for any emergency that might arise in the absence
of the senior officers, and I deemed it prudent to supervise
personally the encamping of the men.  This disposition necessarily
required that some of the organizations should occupy very
disagreeable ground, but I soon got all satisfactorily posted with
the exception of General Willich, who expressed some discontent at
being placed beyond the shelter of the timber, but accepted the
situation cheerfully when its obvious necessity was pointed out to
him.

Feeling that all was secure, I returned to my headquarters in the
village with the idea that we were safely established in ease of
attack, and that the men would now have a good rest if left
undisturbed; and plenty to eat, but hardly had I reached my own camp
when a staff-officer came post-haste from Sturgis with the
information that he was being driven back to my lines, despite the
confident invitation to me (in the morning) to go out and witness the
whipping which was to be given to the enemy's cavalry.  Riding to the
front, I readily perceived that the information was correct, and I
had to send a brigade of infantry out to help Sturgis, thus relieving
him from a rather serious predicament.  Indeed, the enemy was present
in pretty strong force, both cavalry and infantry, and from his
vicious attack on Sturgis it looked very much as though he intended
to bring on a general engagement.

Under such circumstances I deemed it advisable that the responsible
commanders of the army should be present, and so informed them.  My
communication brought Parke and Granger to the front without delay,
but Foster could not come, since the hardships of the winter had
reopened an old wound received during the Mexican War, and brought on
much suffering.  By the time Parke and Granger arrived, however, the
enemy, who it turned out was only making a strong demonstration to
learn the object of our movement on Dandridge, seemed satisfied with
the results of his reconnoissance, and began falling back toward
Bull's Gap.  Meanwhile Parke and Granger concluded that Dandridge was
an untenable point, and hence decided to withdraw a part of the army
to Strawberry Plains; and the question of supplies again coming up,
it was determined to send the Fourth Corps to the south side of the
French Broad to obtain subsistence, provided we could bridge the
river so that men could get across the deep and icy stream without
suffering.

I agreed to undertake the construction of a bridge on condition that
each division should send to the ford twenty-five wagons with which
to make it.  This being acceded to, Harker's brigade began the work
next morning at a favorable point a few miles down the river.  As my
quota of wagons arrived, they were drawn into the stream one after
another by the wheel team, six men in each wagon, and as they
successively reached the other side of the channel the mules were
unhitched, the pole of each wagon run under the hind axle of the one
just in front, and the tailboards used so as to span the slight space
between them.  The plan worked well as long as the material lasted,
but no other wagons than my twenty-five coming on the ground, the
work stopped when the bridge was only half constructed.  Informed of
the delay and its cause, in sheer desperation I finished the bridge
by taking from my own division all the wagons needed to make up the
deficiency.

It was late in the afternoon when the work was finished, and I began
putting over one of my brigades; but in the midst of its crossing
word came that Longstreet's army was moving to attack us, which
caused an abandonment of the foraging project, and orders quickly
followed to retire to Strawberry Plains, the retrograde movement to
begin forthwith.  I sent to headquarters information of the plight I
was in--baggage and supplies on the bank and wagons in the stream
--begged to know what was to become of them if we were to hurry off at
a moment's notice, and suggested that the movement be delayed until I
could recover my transportation.  Receiving in reply no assurances
that I should be relieved from my dilemma--and, in fact, nothing
satisfactory--I determined to take upon myself the responsibility of
remaining on the ground long enough to get my wagons out of the river;
so I sent out a heavy force to watch for the enemy, and with the
remainder of the command went to work to break up the bridge. Before
daylight next morning I had recovered everything without interference
by Longstreet, who, it was afterward ascertained, was preparing to
move east toward Lynchburg instead of marching to attack us; the small
demonstration against Dandridge, being made simply to deceive us as to
his ultimate object.  I marched to Strawberry Plains unmolested, and
by taking the route over Bay's Mountain, a shorter one than that
followed by the main body of our troops, reached the point of
rendezvous as soon as the most of the army, for the road it followed
was not only longer, but badly cut up by trains that had recently
passed over it.

Shortly after getting into camp, the beef contractor came in and
reported that a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had captured my
herd of beef cattle.  This caused me much chagrin at first, but the
commissary of my division soon put in an appearance, and assured me
that the loss would not be very disastrous to us nor of much benefit
to the enemy, since the cattle were so poor and weak that they could
not be driven off.  A reconnoissance in force verified the
Commissary's statement.  From its inability to travel, the herd,
after all efforts to carry it off had proved ineffectual, had been
abandoned by its captors.

After the troops from Chattanooga arrived in the vicinity of
Knoxville and General Sherman had returned to Chattanooga, the
operations in East Tennessee constituted a series of blunders,
lasting through the entire winter; a state of affairs doubtless due,
in the main, to the fact that the command of the troops was so
frequently changed.  Constant shifting of responsibility from one to
another ensued from the date that General Sherman, after assuring
himself that Knoxville was safe, devolved the command on Burnside.
It had already been intimated to Burnside that he was to be relieved,
and in consequence he was inactive and apathetic, confining his
operations to an aimless expedition whose advance extended only as
far as Blain's crossroads, whence it was soon withdrawn.  Meanwhile
General Foster had superseded Burnside, but physical disabilities
rendered him incapable of remaining in the field, and then the chief
authority devolved on Parke.  By this time the transmission of power
seemed almost a disease; at any rate it was catching, so, while we
were en route to Dandridge, Parke transferred the command to Granger.
The latter next unloaded it on me, and there is no telling what the
final outcome would have been had I not entered a protest against a
further continuance of the practice, which remonstrance brought
Granger to the front at Dandridge.

While the events just narrated were taking place, General Grant had
made a visit to Knoxville--about the last of December--and arranged
to open the railroad between there and Chattanooga, with a view to
supplying the troops in East Tennessee by rail in the future, instead
of through Cumberland Gap by a tedious line of wagon-trains.  In
pursuance of his plan the railroad had already been opened to Loudon,
but here much delay occurred on account of the long time it took to
rebuild the bridge over the Tennessee.  Therefore supplies were still
very scarce, and as our animals were now dying in numbers from
starvation, and the men were still on short allowance, it became
necessary that some of the troops east of Knoxville should get nearer
to their depot, and also be in a position to take part in the coming
Georgia campaign, or render assistance to General Thomas, should
General Johnston (who had succeeded in command of the Confederate
army) make any demonstration against Chattanooga.  Hence my division
was ordered to take station at Loudon, Tennessee, and I must confess
that we took the road for that point with few regrets, for a general
disgust prevailed regarding our useless marches during the winter.

At this time my faithful scout Card and his younger brother left me,
with the determination, as I have heretofore related, to avenge their
brother's death.  No persuasion could induce Card to remain longer,
for knowing that my division's next operation would be toward
Atlanta, and being ignorant of the country below Dalton, he
recognized and insisted that his services would then become
practically valueless.

At Loudon, where we arrived January 27, supplies were more plentiful,
and as our tents and extra clothing reached us there in a few days,
every one grew contented and happy.  Here a number of my regiments,
whose terms of service were about to expire, went through the process
of "veteranizing," and, notwithstanding the trials and hardships of
the preceding nine months, they re-enlisted almost to a man.

When everything was set in motion toward recuperating and refitting
my troops, I availed myself of the opportunity during a lull that
then existed to take a short leave of absence--a privilege I had not
indulged in since entering the service in 1853.  This leave I spent
in the North with much benefit to my physical condition, for I was
much run down by fatiguing service, and not a little troubled by
intense pain which I at times still suffered from my experience in
the unfortunate hand-car incident on the Cumberland Mountains the
previous July.  I returned from leave the latter part of March,
rejoining my division with the expectation that the campaign in that
section would begin as early as April.

On the 12th of March, 1864, General Grant was assigned to the command
of the armies of the United States, as general-in-chief.  He was
already in Washington, whither he had gone to receive his commission
as lieutenant-general.  Shortly after his arrival there, he commenced
to rearrange the different commands in the army to suit the plans
which he intended to enter upon in the spring, and out of this grew a
change in my career.  Many jealousies and much ill-feeling, the
outgrowth of former campaigns, existed among officers of high grade
in the Army of the Potomac in the winter of 1864, and several general
officers were to be sent elsewhere in consequence.  Among these,
General Alfred Pleasonton was to be relieved from the command of the
cavalry, General Grant having expressed to the President
dissatisfaction that so little had hitherto been accomplished by that
arm of the service, and I was selected as chief of the cavalry corps
of the Army of the Potomac, receiving on the night of the 23d of
March from General Thomas at Chattanooga the following telegram:

"MARCH 23, 1864.
"MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Chattanooga

"Lieutenant-General Grant directs that Major-General Sheridan
immediately repair to Washington and report to the Adjutant-General
of the Army.

"H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."


I was not informed of the purpose for which I was to proceed to
Washington, but I conjectured that it meant a severing of my
relations with the Second Division, Fourth Army Corps.  I at once set
about obeying the order, and as but little preparation was necessary,
I started for Chattanooga the next day, without taking any formal
leave of the troops I had so long commanded.  I could not do it; the
bond existing between them and me had grown to such depth of
attachment that I feared to trust my emotions in any formal parting
from a body of soldiers who, from our mutual devotion, had long
before lost their official designation, and by general consent within
and without the command were called "Sheridan's Division."  When I
took the train at the station the whole command was collected on the
hill-sides around to see me off.  They had assembled spontaneously,
officers and men, and as the cars moved out for Chattanooga they
waved me farewell with demonstrations of affection.

A parting from such friends was indeed to be regretted.  They had
never given me any trouble, nor done anything that could bring aught
but honor to themselves.  I had confidence in them, and I believe
they had in me.  They were ever steady, whether in victory or in
misfortune, and as I tried always to be with them, to put them into
the hottest fire if good could be gained, or save them from
unnecessary loss, as occasion required, they amply repaid all my care
and anxiety, courageously and readily meeting all demands in every
emergency that arose.

In Kentucky, nearly two years before, my lot had been cast with about
half of the twenty-five regiments of infantry that I was just
leaving, the rest joining me after Chickamauga.  It was practically a
new arm of the service to me, for although I was an infantry officer,
yet the only large command which up to that time I had controlled was
composed of cavalry, and most of my experience had been gained in
this arm of the service.  I had to study hard to be able to master
all the needs of such a force, to feed and clothe it and guard all
its interests.  When undertaking these responsibilities I felt that
if I met them faithfully, recompense would surely come through the
hearty response that soldiers always make to conscientious exertion
on the part of their superiors, and not only that more could be
gained in that way than from the use of any species of influence, but
that the reward would be quicker.  Therefore I always tried to look
after their comfort personally; selected their camps, and provided
abundantly for their subsistence, and the road they opened for me
shows that my work was not in vain.  I regretted deeply to have to
leave such soldiers, and felt that they were sorry I was going, and
even now I could not, if I would, retain other than the warmest
sentiments of esteem and the tenderest affection for the officers and
men of "Sheridan's Division," Army of the Cumberland.

On reaching Chattanooga I learned from General Thomas the purpose for
which I had been ordered to Washington.  I was to be assigned to the
command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac.  The
information staggered me at first, for I knew well the great
responsibilities of such a position; moreover, I was but slightly
acquainted with military operations in Virginia, and then, too, the
higher officers of the Army of the Potomac were little known to me,
so at the moment I felt loth to undergo the trials of the new
position.  Indeed, I knew not a soul in Washington except General
Grant and General Halleck, and them but slightly, and no one in
General Meade's army, from the commanding general down, except a few
officers in the lower grades, hardly any of whom I had seen since
graduating at the Military Academy.

Thus it is not much to be wondered at that General Thomas's
communication momentarily upset me.  But there was no help for it, so
after reflecting on the matter a little I concluded to make the best
of the situation.  As in Virginia I should be operating in a field
with which I was wholly unfamiliar, and among so many who were
strangers, it seemed to me that it would be advisable to have, as a
chief staff-officer, one who had had service in the East, if an
available man could be found.  In weighing all these considerations
in my mind, I fixed upon Captain James W. Forsyth, of the Eighteenth
Infantry, then in the regular brigade at Chattanooga--a dear friend
of mine, who had served in the Army of the Potomac, in the Peninsula
and Antietam campaigns.  He at once expressed a desire to accept a
position on my staff, and having obtained by the next day the
necessary authority, he and I started for Washington, accompanied by
Lieutenant T. W. C. Moore, one of my aides, leaving behind Lieutenant
M. V. Sheridan, my other aide, to forward our horses as soon as they
should be sent down to Chattanooga from Loudon, after which he was to
join me.




CHAPTER XVIII.

AT WASHINGTON--MEETING SECRETARY STANTON--INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT
LINCOLN--MADE COMMANDER OF THE CAVALRY CORPS OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC--ITS OFFICERS--GENERAL MEADE's METHOD OF USING CAVALRY
--OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN--SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H.--A DIFFERENCE WITH
GENERAL MEADE--PREPARING TO FIGHT STUART'S CAVALRY.

Accompanied by Captain Forsyth and Lieutenant Moore, I arrived in
Washington on the morning of April, 4, 1864, and stopped at Willard's
Hotel, where, staying temporarily, were many officers of the Army of
the Potomac en route to their commands from leave at the North.
Among all these, however, I was an entire stranger, and I cannot now
recall that I met a single individual whom I had ever before known.

With very little delay after reaching my hotel I made my way to
General Halleck's headquarters and reported to that officer, having
learned in the meantime that General Grant was absent from the city.
General Halleck talked to me for a few minutes, outlining briefly the
nature and duties of my new command, and the general military
situation in Virginia.  When he had finished all he had to say about
these matters, he took me to the office of the Secretary of War, to
present me to Mr. Stanton.  During the ceremony of introduction, I
could feel that Mr. Stanton was eying me closely and searchingly,
endeavoring to form some estimate of one about whom he knew
absolutely nothing, and whose career probably had never been called
to his attention until General Grant decided to order me East, after
my name had been suggested by General Halleck in an interview the two
generals had with Mr. Lincoln.  I was rather young in appearance
--looking even under than over thirty-three years--but five feet five
inches in height, and thin almost to emaciation, weighing only one
hundred and fifteen pounds.  If I had ever possessed any
self-assertion in manner or speech, it certainly vanished in the
presence of the imperious Secretary, whose name at the time was the
synonym of all that was cold and formal.  I never learned what Mr.
Stanton's first impressions of me were, and his guarded and rather
calculating manner gave at this time no intimation that they were
either favorable or unfavorable, but his frequent commendation in
after years indicated that I gained his goodwill before the close of
the war, if not when I first came to his notice; and a more intimate
association convinced me that the cold and cruel characteristics
popularly ascribed to him were more mythical than real.

When the interview with the Secretary was over, I proceeded with
General Halleck to the White House to pay my respects to the
President.  Mr. Lincoln received me very cordially, offering both his
hands, and saying that he hoped I would fulfill the expectations of
General Grant in the new command I was about to undertake, adding
that thus far the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had not done all
it might have done, and wound up our short conversation by quoting
that stale interrogation so prevalent during the early years of the
war, "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?"  His manner did not impress
me, however, that in asking the question he had meant anything beyond
a jest, and I parted from the President convinced that he did not
believe all that the query implied.

After taking leave I separated from General Halleck, and on returning
to my hotel found there an order from the War Department assigning me
to the command of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac.  The next
morning, April 5, as I took the cars for the headquarters of the Army
of the Potomac, General Grant, who had returned to Washington the
previous night from a visit to his family, came aboard the train on
his way to Culpeper Court House, and on the journey down I learned
among other things that he had wisely determined to continue
personally in the field, associating himself with General Meade's
army; where he could supervise its movements directly, and at the
same time escape the annoyances which, should he remain in
Washington, would surely arise from solicitude for the safety of the
Capital while the campaign was in progress.  When we reached Brandy
Station, I left the train and reported to General Meade, who told me
that the headquarters of the Cavalry Corps were some distance back
from the Station, and indicated the general locations of the
different divisions of the corps, also giving me, in the short time I
remained with him, much information regarding their composition.

I reached the Cavalry Corps headquarters on the evening of April 5,
1864, and the next morning issued orders assuming command.  General
Pleasonton had but recently been relieved, and many of his
staff-officers were still on duty at the headquarters awaiting the
arrival of the permanent commander.  I resolved to retain the most of
these officers on my staff, and although they were all unknown to me
when I decided on this course, yet I never had reason to regret it,
nor to question the selections made by my predecessor.

The corps consisted of three cavalry divisions and twelve batteries
of horse artillery.  Brigadier-General A. T. A. Torbert was in
command of the First Division, which was composed of three brigades;
Brigadier-General D. McM. Gregg, of the Second, consisting of two
brigades; and Brigadier-General J. H. Wilson was afterward assigned
to command the Third, also comprising two brigades: Captain Robinson,
a veteran soldier of the Mexican war, was chief of artillery, and as
such had a general supervision of that arm, though the batteries,
either as units or in sections, were assigned to the different
divisions in campaign.

Each one of my division commanders was a soldier by profession.
Torbert graduated from the Military Academy in 1855, and was
commissioned in the infantry, in which arm he saw much service on the
frontier, in Florida, and on the Utah expedition.  At the beginning
of hostilities in April, 1861, he was made a colonel of New Jersey
volunteers, and from that position was promoted in the fall of 1862
to be a brigadier-general, thereafter commanding a brigade of
infantry in the Army of the Potomac till, in the redistribution of
generals, after Grant came to the East, he was assigned to the First
Cavalry Division.

Gregg graduated in 1855 also, and was appointed to the First
Dragoons, with which regiment, up to the breaking out of the war, he
saw frontier service extending from Fort Union, New Mexico, through
to the Pacific coast, and up into Oregon and Washington Territories,
where I knew him slightly.  In the fall of 1861 he became colonel of
the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and a year later was made a
brigadier-general.  He then succeeded to the command of a division of
cavalry, and continued in that position till the close of his
service, at times temporarily commanding the Cavalry Corps.  He was
the only division commander I had whose experience had been almost
exclusively derived from the cavalry arm.

Wilson graduated in 1860 in the Topographical Engineers, and was
first assigned to duty in Oregon, where he remained till July, 1861.
In the fall of that year his active service in the war began, and he
rose from one position to another, in the East and West, till, while
on General Grant's staff, he was made a brigadier-general in the fall
of 1863 in reward for services performed during the Vicksburg
campaign and for engineer duty at Chattanooga preceding the battle of
Missionary Ridge.  At my request he was selected to command the Third
Division.  General Grant thought highly of him, and, expecting much
from his active mental and physical ability, readily assented to
assign him in place of General Kilpatrick.  The only other general
officers in the corps were Brigadier-General Wesley Merritt,
Brigadier-General George A. Custer, and Brigadier-General Henry E.
Davies, each commanding a brigade.

In a few days after my arrival at Brandy Station I reviewed my new
command, which consisted of about twelve thousand officers and men,
with the same number of horses in passable trim.  Many of the general
officers of the army were present at the review, among them Generals
Meade, Hancock, and Sedgwick.  Sedgwick being an old dragoon, came to
renew his former associations with mounted troops, and to encourage
me, as he jestingly said, because of the traditional prejudices the
cavalrymen were supposed to hold against being commanded by an
infantry officer.  The corps presented a fine appearance at the
review, and so far as the health and equipment of the men were
concerned the showing was good and satisfactory; but the horses were
thin and very much worn down by excessive and, it seemed to me,
unnecessary picket duty, for the cavalry picket-line almost
completely encircled the infantry and artillery camps of the army,
covering a distance, on a continuous line, of nearly sixty miles,
with hardly a mounted Confederate confronting it at any point.  From
the very beginning of the war the enemy had shown more wisdom
respecting his cavalry than we.  Instead of wasting its strength by a
policy of disintegration he, at an early day, had organized his
mounted force into compact masses, and plainly made it a favorite;
and, as usual, he was now husbanding the strength of his horses by
keeping them to the rear, so that in the spring he could bring them
out in good condition for the impending campaign.

Before and at the review I took in this situation, and determined to
remedy it if possible; so in due time I sought an interview with
General Meade and informed him that, as the effectiveness of my
command rested mainly on the strength of its horses, I thought the
duty it was then performing was both burdensome and wasteful.  I also
gave him my idea as to what the cavalry should do, the main purport
of which was that it ought to be kept concentrated to fight the
enemy's cavalry.  Heretofore, the commander of the Cavalry Corps had
been, virtually, but an adjunct at army headquarters--a sort of chief
of cavalry--and my proposition seemed to stagger General Meade not a
little.  I knew that it would be difficult to overcome the recognized
custom of using the cavalry for the protection of trains and the
establishment of cordons around the infantry corps, and so far
subordinating its operations to the movements of the main army that
in name only was it a corps at all, but still I thought it my duty to
try.

At first General Meade would hardly listen to my proposition, for he
was filled with the prejudices that, from the beginning of the war,
had pervaded the army regarding the importance and usefulness of
cavalry, General Scott then predicting that the contest would be
settled by artillery, and thereafter refusing the services of
regiment after regiment of mounted troops.  General Meade deemed
cavalry fit for little more than guard and picket duty, and wanted to
know what would protect the transportation trains and artillery
reserve, cover the front of moving infantry columns, and secure his
flanks from intrusion, if my policy were pursued.  I told him that if
he would let me use the cavalry as I contemplated, he need have
little solicitude in these respects, for, with a mass of ten thousand
mounted men, it was my belief that I could make it so lively for the
enemy's cavalry that, so far as attacks from it were concerned, the
flanks and rear of the Army of the Potomac would require little or no
defense, and claimed, further, that moving columns of infantry should
take care of their own fronts.  I also told him that it was my object
to defeat the enemy's cavalry in a general combat, if possible, and
by such a result establish a feeling of confidence in my own troops
that would enable us after awhile to march where we pleased, for the
purpose of breaking General Lee's communications and destroying the
resources from which his army was supplied.

The idea as here outlined was contrary to Meade's convictions, for
though at different times since he commanded the Army of the Potomac
considerable bodies of the cavalry had been massed for some special
occasion, yet he had never agreed to the plan as a permanency, and
could not be bent to it now.  He gave little encouragement,
therefore, to what I proposed, yet the conversation was immediately
beneficial in one way, for when I laid before him the true condition
of the cavalry, he promptly relieved it from much of the arduous and
harassing picket service it was performing, thus giving me about two
weeks in which to nurse the horses before the campaign opened.

The interview also disclosed the fact that the cavalry commander
should be, according to General Meade's views, at his headquarters
practically as one of his staff, through whom he would give detailed
directions as, in his judgment, occasion required.  Meade's ideas and
mine being so widely divergent, disagreements arose between us later
during the battles of the Wilderness, which lack of concord ended in
some concessions on his part after the movement toward Spottsylvania
Court House began, and although I doubt that his convictions were
ever wholly changed, yet from that date on, in the organization of
the Army of the Potomac, the cavalry corps became more of a compact
body, with the same privileges and responsibilities that attached to
the other corps--conditions that never actually existed before.

On the 4th of May the Army of the Potomac moved against Lee, who was
occupying a defensive position on the south bank of the Rapidan.
After detailing the various detachments which I was obliged to supply
for escorts and other mounted duty, I crossed the river with an
effective force of about 10,000 troopers.  In the interval succeeding
my assignment to the command of the cavalry, I had taken the pains to
study carefully the topography of the country in eastern Virginia,
and felt convinced that, under the policy Meade intended I should
follow, there would be little opportunity for mounted troops to
acquit themselves well in a region so thickly wooded, and traversed
by so many almost parallel streams; but conscious that he would be
compelled sooner or later either to change his mind or partially give
way to the pressure of events, I entered on the campaign with the
loyal determination to aid zealously in all its plans.

General Lee's army was located in its winter quarters behind
intrenchments that lay along the Rapidan for a distance of about
twenty miles; extending from Barnett's to Morton's ford.  The fords
below Morton's were watched by a few small detachments of Confederate
cavalry, the main body of which, however, was encamped below
Hamilton's crossing, where it could draw supplies from the rich
country along the Rappahannock.  Only a few brigades of Lee's
infantry guarded the works along the river, the bulk of it being so
situated that it could be thrown to either flank toward which the
Union troops approached.

General Grant adopted the plan of moving by his left flank, with the
purpose of compelling Lee to come out from behind his intrenchments
along Mine Run and fight on equal terms.  Grant knew well the
character of country through which he would have to pass, but he was
confident that the difficulties of operation in the thickly wooded
region of the Wilderness would be counterbalanced by the facility
with which his position would enable him to secure a new base; and by
the fact that as he would thus cover Washington, there would be
little or no necessity for the authorities there to detach from his
force at some inopportune moment for the protection of that city.

In the move forward two divisions of my cavalry took the advance,
Gregg crossing the Rapidan at Ely's ford and Wilson at Germania ford.
Torbert's division remained in the rear to cover the trains and
reserve artillery, holding from Rapidan Station to Culpeper, and
thence through Stevensburg to the Rappahannock River.  Gregg crossed
the Rapidan before daylight, in advance of the Second Corps, and when
the latter reached Ely's ford, he pushed on to Chancellorsville;
Wilson preceded the Fifth Corps to Germania ford, and when it reached
the river he made the crossing and moved rapidly by Wilderness
Tavern, as far as Parker's Store, from which point he sent a heavy
reconnoissance toward Mine Run, the rest of his division bivouacking
in a strong position.  I myself proceeded to Chancellorsville and
fixed my headquarters at that place, whereon the 5th I was joined by
Torbert's division.

Meanwhile, General Meade had crossed the Rapidan and established his
headquarters not far from Germania ford.  From that point he was in
direct communication with Wilson, whose original instructions from me
carried him only as far as Parker's Store, but it being found, during
the night of the 4th, that the enemy was apparently unacquainted with
the occurrences of the day, Meade directed Wilson to advance in the
direction of Craig's Meeting House; leaving one regiment to hold
Parker's Store.  Wilson with the second brigade encountered Rosser's
brigade of cavalry just beyond the Meeting House, and drove it back
rapidly a distance of about two miles, holding it there till noon,
while his first brigade was halted on the north side of Robinson's
Run near the junction of the Catharpen and Parker's Store roads.

Up to this time Wilson had heard nothing of the approach of the Fifth
Corps, and the situation becoming threatening, he withdrew the second
brigade to the position occupied by the first, but scarcely had he
done so when he learned that at an early hour in the forenoon the
enemy's infantry had appeared in his rear at Parker's Store and cut
off his communication with General Meade.  Surprised at this, he
determined to withdraw to Todd's Tavern, but before his resolution
could be put into execution the Confederates attacked him with a
heavy force, and at the same time began pushing troops down the
Catharpen road.  Wilson was now in a perplexing situation, sandwiched
between the Confederates who had cut him off in the rear at Parker's
store and those occupying the Catharpen road, but he extricated his
command by passing it around the latter force, and reached Todd's
Tavern by crossing the Po River at Corbin's bridge.  General Meade
discovering that the enemy had interposed at Parker's store between
Wilson and the Fifth Corps, sent me word to go to Wilson's relief,
and this was the first intimation I received that Wilson had been
pushed out so far, but, surmising that he would retire in the
direction of Todd's Tavern I immediately despatched Gregg's division
there to his relief.  Just beyond Todd's Tavern Gregg met Wilson, who
was now being followed by the enemy's cavalry.  The pursuing force
was soon checked, and then driven back to Shady Grove Church, while
Wilson's troops fell in behind Gregg's line, somewhat the worse for
their morning's adventure.

When the Army of the Potomac commenced crossing the Rapidan on the
4th, General J. E. B. Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry,
began concentrating his command on the right of Lee's infantry,
bringing it from Hamilton's crossing and other points where it had
been wintering.  Stuart's force at this date was a little more than
eight thousand men, organized in two divisions, commanded by Generals
Wade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee.  Hampton's division was composed of
three brigades, commanded by Generals Cordon, Young, and Rosser;
Fitzhugh Lee's division comprised three brigades also, Generals W. H.
F. Lee, Lomax, and Wickham commanding them.

Information of this concentration, and of the additional fact that
the enemy's cavalry about Hamilton's crossing was all being drawn in,
reached me on the 5th, which obviated all necessity for my moving on
that point as I intended at the onset of the campaign.  The
responsibility for the safety of our trains and of the left flank of
the army still continued, however, so I made such dispositions of my
troops as to secure these objects by holding the line of the Brock
road beyond the Furnaces, and thence around to Todd's Tavern and
Piney Branch Church.  On the 6th, through some false information,
General Meade became alarmed about his left flank, and sent me the
following note:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"May 6, 1864.--1 o'clock P. M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN,
"Commanding Cavalry Corps

"Your despatch of 11.45 a.m., received.  General Hancock has been
heavily pressed, and his left turned.  The major-general commanding
thinks that you had better draw in your cavalry, so as to secure the
protection of the trains.  The order requiring an escort for the
wagons to-night has been rescinded.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,
"Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."


On the morning of the 6th Custer's and Devin's brigades had been
severely engaged at the Furnaces before I received the above note.
They had been most successful in repulsing the enemy's attacks,
however, and I felt that the line taken up could be held; but the
despatch from General Humphreys was alarming, so I drew all the
cavalry close in toward Chancellorsville.  It was found later that
Hancock's left had not been turned, and the points thus abandoned had
to be regained at a heavy cost in killed and wounded, to both the
cavalry and the infantry.

On the 7th of May, under directions from headquarters, Army of the
Potomac, the trains were put in motion to go into park at Piney
Branch Church, in anticipation of the movement that was about to be
made for the possession of Spottsylvania Court House.  I felt
confident that the order to move the trains there had been given
without a full understanding of the situation, for Piney Branch
Church was now held by the enemy, a condition which had resulted from
the order withdrawing the cavalry on account of the supposed disaster
to Hancock's left the day before; but I thought the best way to
remedy matters was to hold the trains in the vicinity of Aldrich's
till the ground on which it was intended to park them should be
regained.

This led to the battle of Todd's Tavern, a spirited fight for the
possession of the crossroads at that point, participated in by the
enemy's cavalry and Gregg's division, and two brigades of Torbert's
division, the latter commanded by Merritt, as Torbert became very ill
on the 6th, and had to be sent to the rear.  To gain the objective
point--the crossroads--I directed Gregg to assail the enemy on the
Catharpen road with Irvin Gregg's brigade and drive him over Corbin's
bridge, while Merritt attacked him with the Reserve brigade on the
Spottsylvania road in conjunction with Davies's brigade of Gregg's
division, which was to be put in on the Piney Branch Church road, and
unite with Merritt's left.  Davies's and Irvin Gregg's brigades on my
right and left flanks met with some resistance, yet not enough to
deter them from, executing their orders.  In front of Merritt the
enemy held on more stubbornly, however, and there ensued an
exceedingly severe and, at times, fluctuating fight.  Finally the
Confederates gave way, and we pursued them almost to Spottsylvania
Court House; but deeming it prudent to recall the pursuers about
dark, I encamped Gregg's and Merritt's divisions in the open fields
to the east of Todd's Tavern.

During the preceding three days the infantry corps of the army had
been engaged in the various conflicts known as the battles of the
Wilderness.  The success of the Union troops in those battles had not
been all that was desired, and General Grant now felt that it was
necessary to throw himself on Lee's communications if possible, while
preserving his own intact by prolonging the movement to the left.
Therefore, on the evening of the 7th he determined to shift his whole
army toward Spottsylvania Court House, and initiated the movement by
a night march of the infantry to Todd's Tavern.  In view of what was
contemplated, I gave orders to Gregg and Merritt to move at daylight
on the morning of the 8th, for the purpose of gaining possession of
Snell's bridge over the Po River, the former by the crossing at
Corbin's bridge and the latter by the Block House.  I also directed
Wilson, who was at Alsop's house, to take possession of Spottsylvania
as early as possible on the morning of the 8th, and then move into
position at Snell's bridge conjointly with the other two divisions.
Wilson's orders remained as I had issued them, so he moved
accordingly and got possession of Spottsylvania, driving the enemy's
cavalry a mile beyond, as will be seen by the following despatch sent
me at 9 A. M. of the 8th:

"HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS,
"ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
"SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, May 8, 1864 9 A. M.
"LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FORSYTH, CHIEF-OF-STAFF, C. C.

"Have run the enemy's cavalry a mile from Spottsylvania Court House;
have charged them, and drove them through the village; am fighting
now with a considerable force, supposed to be Lee's division.
Everything all right.

"J. H. WILSON,
"Brigadier-General Commanding.


During the night of the 7th General Meade arrived at Todd's Tavern
and modified the orders I had given Gregg and Merritt, directing
Gregg simply to hold Corbin's bridge, and Merritt to move out in
front of the infantry column marching on the Spottsylvania road.
Merritt proceeded to obey, but in advancing, our cavalry and infantry
became intermingled in the darkness, and much confusion and delay was
the consequence.  I had not been duly advised of these changes in
Gregg's and Merritt's orders, and for a time I had fears for the
safety of Wilson, but, while he was preparing to move on to form his
junction with Gregg and Merritt at Snell's bridge, the advance of
Anderson (who was now commanding Longstreet's corps) appeared on the
scene and drove him from Spottsylvania.

Had Gregg and Merritt been permitted to proceed as they were
originally instructed, it is doubtful whether the battles fought at
Spottsylvania would have occurred, for these two divisions would have
encountered the enemy at the Pa River, and so delayed his march as to
enable our infantry to reach Spottsylvania first, and thus force Lee
to take up a line behind the Po.  I had directed Wilson to move from
the left by "the Gate" through Spottsylvania to Snell's bridge, while
Gregg and Merritt were to advance to the same point by Shady Grove
and the Block House.  There was nothing to prevent at least a partial
success of these operations; that is to say, the concentration of the
three divisions in front of Snell's bridge, even if we could not
actually have gained it.  But both that important point and the
bridge on the Block House road were utterly ignored, and Lee's
approach to Spottsylvania left entirely unobstructed, while three
divisions of cavalry remained practically ineffective by reason of
disjointed and irregular instructions.

On the morning of the 8th, when I found that such orders had been
given, I made some strong remonstrances against the course that had
been pursued, but it was then too late to carry out the combinations
I had projected the night before, so I proceeded to join Merritt on
the Spottsylvania road.  On reaching Merritt I found General Warren
making complaint that the cavalry were obstructing his infantry
column, so I drew Merritt off the road, and the leading division of
the Fifth Corps pushed up to the front.  It got into line about  11
o'clock, and advanced to take the village, but it did not go very far
before it struck Anderson's corps, and was hurled back with heavy
loss.  This ended all endeavor to take Spottsylvania that day.

A little before noon General Meade sent for me, and when I reached
his headquarters I found that his peppery temper had got the better
of his good judgment, he showing a disposition to be unjust, laying
blame here and there for the blunders that had been committed.  He
was particularly severe on the cavalry, saying, among other things,
that it had impeded the march of the Fifth Corps by occupying the
Spottsylvania road.  I replied that if this were true, he himself had
ordered it there without my knowledge.  I also told him that he had
broken up my combinations, exposed Wilson's division to disaster, and
kept Gregg unnecessarily idle, and further, repelled his insinuations
by saying that such disjointed operations as he had been requiring of
the cavalry for the last four days would render the corps inefficient
and useless before long.  Meade was very much irritated, and I was
none the less so.  One word brought on another, until, finally, I
told him that I could whip Stuart if he (Meade) would only let me,
but since he insisted on giving the cavalry directions without
consulting or even notifying me, he could henceforth command the
Cavalry Corps himself--that I would not give it another order.

The acrimonious interview ended with this remark, and after I left
him he went to General Grant's headquarters and repeated the
conversation to him, mentioning that I had said that I could whip
Stuart.  At this General Grant remarked: "Did he say so? Then let him
go out and do it."  This intimation was immediately acted upon by
General Meade, and a little later the following order came to me:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
"May 8th, 1864 1 P. M.

"GENERAL SHERIDAN,
"Commanding Cavalry Corps.

"The major-general commanding directs you to immediately concentrate
your available mounted force, and with your ammunition trains and
such supply trains as are filled (exclusive of ambulances) proceed
against the enemy's cavalry, and when your supplies are exhausted,
proceed via New Market and Green Bay to Haxall's Landing on the James
River, there communicating with General Butler, procuring supplies
and return to this army.  Your dismounted men will be left with the
train here.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,
"Major-General, Chief-of-staff."


As soon as the above order was received I issued instructions for the
concentration of the three divisions of cavalry at Aldrich's to
prepare for the contemplated expedition.  Three days' rations for the
men were distributed, and half rations of grain for one day were
doled out for the horses.  I sent for Gregg, Merritt, and Wilson and
communicated the order to them, saying at the same time, "We are
going out to fight Stuart's cavalry in consequence of a suggestion
from me; we will give him a fair, square fight; we are strong, and I
know we can beat him, and in view of my recent representations to
General Meade I shall expect nothing but success."  I also indicated
to my division commanders the line of march I should take--moving in
one column around the right flank of Lee's army to get in its rear
--and stated at the same time that it was my intention to fight Stuart
wherever he presented himself, and if possible go through to Haxall's
Landing; but that if Stuart should successfully interpose between us
and that point we would swing back to the Army of the Potomac by
passing around the enemy's left flank by way of Gordonsville.  At
first the proposition seemed to surprise the division commanders
somewhat, for hitherto even the boldest, mounted expeditions had been
confined to a hurried ride through the enemy's country, without
purpose of fighting more than enough to escape in case of
molestation, and here and there to destroy a bridge.  Our move would
be a challenge to Stuart for a cavalry duel behind Lee's lines, in
his own country, but the advantages which it was reasonable to
anticipate from the plan being quickly perceived, each division
commander entered into its support unhesitatingly, and at once set
about preparing for the march next day.




CHAPTER XIX.

THE EXPEDITION STARTS--DESTROYING SUPPLIES--OPENING OF THE FIGHT AT
YELLOW TAVERN--GENERAL CUSTER'S BRILLIANT CHARGE--DEATH OF GENERAL
STUART--REMOVING TORPEDOES--EXCITEMENT IN RICHMOND--A NIGHT MARCH
--ENTERPRISING NEWSBOYS--THE EFFECTS OF STUART'S DEFEAT AND DEATH
--END OF THE FIRST EXPEDITION--ITS GREAT SUCCESS AND BENEFICIAL
RESULTS.

The expedition which resulted in the battle of Yellow Tavern and the
death of General Stuart started from the vicinity of Aldrich's toward
Fredericksburg early on the morning of May 9, 1864, marching on the
plank-road, Merritt's division leading.  When the column reached
Tabernacle Church it headed almost due east to the telegraph road,
and thence down that highway to Thornburg, and from that point
through Childsburg to Anderson's crossing of the North Anna River, it
being my desire to put my command south of that stream if possible,
where it could procure forage before it should be compelled to fight.
The corps moved at a walk, three divisions on the same road, making a
column nearly thirteen miles in length, and marched around the right
flank of the enemy unsuspected until my rear guard had passed
Massaponax Church.  Although the column was very long, I preferred to
move it all on one road rather than to attempt combinations for
carrying the divisions to any given point by different routes.
Unless the separate commands in an expedition of this nature are very
prompt in movement, and each fully equal to overcoming at once any
obstacle it may meet, combinations rarely work out as expected;
besides, an engagement was at all times imminent, hence it was
specially necessary to keep the whole force well together.

As soon as the Ny, Po, and Ta rivers were crossed, each of which
streams would have afforded an excellent defensive line to the enemy,
all anxiety as to our passing around Lee's army was removed, and our
ability to cross the North Anna placed beyond doubt. Meanwhile
General Stuart had discovered what we were about, and he set his
cavalry in motion, sending General Fitzhugh Lee to follow and attack
my rear on the Childsburg road, Stuart himself marching by way of
Davenport's bridge, on the North Anna, toward Beaver Dam Station,
near which place his whole command was directed to unite the next
day.

My column having passed the Ta River, Stuart attacked its rear with
considerable vigor, in the hope that he could delay my whole force
long enough to permit him to get at least a part of his command in my
front; but this scheme was frustrated by Davies's brigade, which I
directed to fight as a rear-guard, holding on at one position and
then at another along the line of march just enough to deter the
enemy from a too rapid advance.  Davies performed this responsible
and trying duty with tact and good judgment, following the main
column steadily as it progressed to the south, and never once
permitting Fitzhugh Lee's advance to encroach far enough to compel a
halt of my main body.  About dark Merritt's division crossed the
North Anna at Anderson's ford, while Gregg and Wilson encamped on the
north side, having engaged the enemy, who still hung on my rear up to
a late hour at night.

After Merritt's division passed the river, Custer's brigade proceeded
on to Beaver Dam Station to cut the Virginia Central railroad.
Before reaching the station he met a small force of the enemy, but
this he speedily drove off, recapturing from it about four hundred
Union prisoners, who had been taken recently in the Wilderness and
were being conducted to Richmond.  Custer also destroyed the station,
two locomotives, three trains of cars, ninety wagons, from eight to
ten miles of railroad and telegraph lines, some two hundred thousand
pounds of bacon and other supplies, amounting in all to about a
million and a half of rations, and nearly all they medical stores of
General Lee's army, which had been moved from Orange Court House
either because Lee wished to have them directly in his rear or
because he contemplated falling back to the North Anna.

On the morning of the 10th Gregg and Wilson, while crossing the North
Anna, were again attacked, but were covered by the division on the
south side of the stream; the passage was effected without much loss,
notwithstanding the approach of Stuart on the south bank from the
direction of Davenport's bridge.  The possession of Beaver Dam gave
us an important point, as it opened a way toward Richmond by the
Negro-foot road.  It also enabled us to obtain forage for our
well-nigh famished animals, and to prepare for fighting the enemy,
who, I felt sure, would endeavor to interpose between my column and
Richmond.

Stuart had hardly united his troops near Beaver Dam when he realized
that concentrating there was a mistake, so he began making
dispositions for remedying his error, and while we leisurely took the
Negro-foot toad toward Richmond, he changed his tactics and hauled
off from my rear, urging his horses to the death in order to get in
between Richmond and my column.  This he effected about 10 o'clock on
the morning of the 11th, concentrating at Yellow Tavern, six miles
from the city, on the Brook turnpike.  His change of tactics left my
march on the 10th practically unmolested, and we quietly encamped
that night on the south bank of the South Anna, near Ground Squirrel
Bridge.  Here we procured an abundance of forage, and as the distance
traveled that day had been only fifteen to eighteen miles, men and
horses were able to obtain a good rest during the night.

At 2 o'clock in the morning, May 11, Davies's brigade of Gregg's
division marched for Ashland to cut the Fredericksburg railroad.
Arriving there before the head of the enemy's column, which had to
pass through this same place to reach Yellow Tavern, Davies drove out
a small force occupying the town, burnt a train of cars and a
locomotive, destroyed the railroad for some distance, and rejoined
the main column at Allen's Station on the Fredericksburg and Richmond
railroad.  From Allen's Station the whole command moved on Yellow
Tavern, Merritt in the lead, Wilson following, and Gregg in the rear.

The appearance of Davies's brigade at Ashland in the morning had had
the effect of further mystifying the enemy as to my intentions; and
while he held it incumbent to place himself between me and Richmond,
yet he was still so uncertain of my movements that he committed the
same fault that he did the first day, when he divided his force and
sent a part to follow me on the Childsburg road.  He now divided his
command again, sending a portion to hang upon my rear, while he
proceeded with the rest to Yellow Tavern.  This separation not only
materially weakened the force which might have been thrown across my
line of march, but it also enabled me to attack with almost my entire
corps, while occupying the pursuers with a small rearguard.

By forced marches General Stuart succeeded in reaching Yellow Tavern
ahead of me on May 11; and the presence of, his troops, on the
Ashland and Richmond road becoming known to Merritt as he was
approaching the Brook turnpike, this general pressed forward at once
to the attack.  Pushing his division to the front, he soon got
possession of the turnpike and drove the enemy back several hundred
yards to the east of it.  This success had the effect of throwing the
head of my column to the east of the pike, and I quickly brought up
Wilson and one of Gregg's brigades to take advantage of the situation
by forming a line of battle on that side or the road.  Meanwhile the
enemy, desperate but still confident, poured in a heavy fire from his
line and from a battery which enfiladed the Brook road, and made
Yellow Tavern an uncomfortably hot place.  Gibbs's and Devin's
brigades, however, held fast there, while Custer, supported by
Chapman's brigade, attacked the enemy's left and battery in a mounted
charge.

Custer's charge, with Chapman on his flank and the rest of Wilson's
division sustaining him, was brilliantly executed.  Beginning at a
walk, he increased his gait to a trot, and then at full speed rushed
at the enemy.  At the same moment the dismounted troops along my
whole front moved forward, and as Custer went through the battery,
capturing two of the guns with their cannoneers and breaking up the
enemy's left, Gibbs and Devin drove his centre and right from the
field.  Gregg meanwhile, with equal success, charged the force in his
rear-Gordon's brigadeand the engagement ended by giving us complete
control of the road to Richmond.  We captured a number of prisoners,
and the casualties on both sides were quite severe, General Stuart
himself falling mortally wounded, and General James B. Gordon, one of
his brigade commanders, being killed.

After Custer's charge, the Confederate cavalry was badly broken up,
the main portion of it being driven in a rout toward Ashland and a
small part in the direction of Richmond, which latter force finally
rejoined Fitzhugh Lee near Mechanicsville.  A reconnoitring party
being now sent up the Brook turnpike toward the city, dashed across
the South Fork of the Chickahominy, drove a small force from the
enemy's exterior intrenchments and went within them.  I followed this
party, and after a little exploration found between the two lines of
works a country road that led across to the pike which runs from
Mechanicsville to Richmond.  I thought we could go around within the
outer line of works by this country road across to the Mechanicsville
pike on the south side of the Chickahominy, and encamp the next night
at Fair Oaks; so I determined to make the movement after dark, being
influenced in this to some extent by reports received during the
afternoon from colored people, to the effect that General B. F.
Butler's army had reached a small stream on the south side of the
James, about four miles south of Richmond.  If I could succeed in
getting through by this road, not only would I have a shorter line of
march to Haxall's landing, but there was also a possibility that I
could help Butler somewhat by joining him so near Richmond.
Therefore, after making the wounded as comfortable as possible, we
commenced the march about 11 o'clock on the night of the 11th, and
massed the command on the plateau south of the Meadow bridge near
daylight on the 12th.

The enemy, anticipating that I would march by this route, had planted
torpedoes along it, and many of these exploded as the column passed
over them, killing several horses and wounding a few men, but beyond
this we met with no molestation.  The torpedoes were loaded shells
planted on each side of the road, and so connected by wires attached
to friction-tubes in the shells, that when a horse's hoof struck a
wire the shell was exploded by the jerk on the improvised lanyard.
After the loss of several horses and the wounding of some of the men
by these torpedoes, I gave directions to have them removed, if
practicable, so about twenty-five of the prisoners were brought up
and made to get down on their knees, feel for the wires in the
darkness, follow them up and unearth the shells.  The prisoners
reported the owner of one of the neighboring houses to be the
principal person who had engaged in planting these shells, and I
therefore directed that some of them be carried and placed in the
cellar of his house, arranged to explode if the enemy's column came
that way, while he and his family were brought off as prisoners and
held till after daylight.

Meanwhile the most intense excitement prevailed in Richmond.  The
Confederates, supposing that their capital was my objective point,
were straining every effort to put it in a state of defense, and had
collected between four and five thousand irregular troops, under
General Bragg, besides bringing up three brigades of infantry from
the force confronting General Butler south of the James River, the
alarm being intensified by the retreat, after the defeat at Yellow
Tavern, of Stuart's cavalry, now under General Fitzhugh Lee, by way
of Ashland to Mechanicsville, on the north side of the Chickahominy,
for falling back in that direction, left me between them and
Richmond.

Our march during the night of the 11th was very tedious, on account
of the extreme darkness and frequent showers of rain; but at daylight
on the 12th the head of my column, under Wilson, reached the
Mechanicsville pike.  Here Wilson, encountering the enemy's works and
batteries manned by General Bragg's troops, endeavored to pass.  In
this he failed, and as soon as I was notified that it was
impracticable to reach Fair Oaks by passing between the works and the
Chickahominy, Custer's brigade was directed to make the crossing to
the north side of the Chickahominy, at the Meadow bridge.  Custer
moved rapidly for the bridge, but found it destroyed, and that the
enemy's cavalry was posted on the north side, in front of
Mechanicsville.  When this information came back, I ordered Merritt
to take his whole division and repair the bridge, instructing him
that the crossing must be made at all hazards; for, in view of an
impending attack by the enemy's infantry in Richmond, it was
necessary that I should have the bridge as a means of egress in case
of serious disaster.

All the time that Merritt was occupied in this important duty, the
enemy gave great annoyance to the working party by sweeping the
bridge with a section of artillery and a fire from the supporting
troops, so a small force was thrown across to drive them away.
When Merritt had passed two regiments over, they attacked, but
were repulsed.  The work on the bridge continued, however,
not-withstanding this discomfiture; and when it was finished, Merritt
crossed nearly all his division, dismounted, and again attacked the
enemy, this time carrying the line, of temporary breastworks, built
with logs and rails, and pursuing his broken troops toward Gaines's
Mills.

While Merritt was engaged in this affair, the Confederates advanced
from behind their works at Richmond, and attacked Wilson and Gregg.
Wilson's troops were driven back in some confusion at first; but
Gregg, in anticipation of attack, had hidden a heavy line of
dismounted men in a bushy ravine on his front, and when the enemy
marched upon it, with much display and under the eye of the President
of the Confederacy, this concealed line opened a destructive fire
with repeating carbines; and at the same time the batteries of
horse-artillery, under Captain Robinson, joining in the contest,
belched forth shot and shell with fatal effect.  The galling fire
caused the enemy to falter, and while still wavering Wilson rallied
his men, and turning some of them against the right flank of the
Confederates, broke their line, and compelled them to withdraw for
security behind the heavy works thrown up for the defense of the city
in 1862.

By destroying the Meadow bridge and impeding my column on the
Mechanicsville, pike, the enemy thought to corner us completely, for
he still maintained the force in Gregg's rear that had pressed it the
day before; but the repulse of his infantry ended all his hopes of
doing us any serious damage on the limited ground between the
defenses of Richmond and the Chickahominy.  He felt certain that on
account of the recent heavy rains we could not cross the Chickahominy
except by the Meadow bridge, and it also seemed clear to him that we
could not pass between the river and his intrenchments; therefore he
hoped to ruin us, or at least compel us to return by the same route
we had taken in coming, in which case we would run into Gordon's
brigade, but the signal repulse of Bragg's infantry dispelled these
illusions.

Even had it not been our good fortune to defeat him, we could have
crossed the Chickahominy if necessary at several points that were
discovered by scouting parties which, while the engagement was going
on, I had sent out to look up fords.  This means of getting out from
the circumscribed plateau I did not wish to use, however, unless
there was no alternative, for I wished to demonstrate to the Cavalry
Corps the impossibility of the enemy's destroying or capturing so
large a body of mounted troops.

The chances of seriously injuring, us were more favorable to the
enemy this time than ever they were afterward, for with the troops
from Richmond, comprising three brigades of veterans and about five
thousand irregulars on my front and right flank, with Gordon's
cavalry in the rear, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on my left flank,
holding the Chickahominy and Meadow bridge, I was apparently hemmed
in on every side, but relying on the celerity with which mounted
troops could be moved, I felt perfectly confident that the seemingly
perilous situation could be relieved under circumstances even worse
than those then surrounding us.  Therefore, instead of endeavoring to
get away without a fight, I concluded that there would be little
difficulty in withdrawing, even should I be beaten, and none whatever
if I defeated the enemy.

In accordance with this view I accepted battle; and the complete
repulse of the enemy's infantry, which assailed us from his
intrenchments, and of Gordon's cavalry, which pressed Gregg on the
Brook road, ended the contest in our favor.  The rest of the day we
remained on the battle-field undisturbed, and our time was spent in
collecting the wounded, burying the dead, grazing the horses, and
reading the Richmond journals, two small newsboys with commendable
enterprise having come within our lines from the Confederate capital
to sell their papers.  They were sharp youngsters, and having come
well supplied, they did a thrifty business.  When their stock in
trade was all disposed of they wished to return, but they were so
intelligent and observant that I thought their mission involved other
purposes than the mere sale of newspapers, so they were held till we
crossed the Chickahominy and then turned loose.

After Merritt had crossed the Chickahominy and reached
Mechanicsville, I sent him orders to push on to Gaines's Mills.  Near
the latter place he fell in with the enemy's cavalry again, and
sending me word, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon I crossed the
Chickahominy with Wilson and Gregg, but when we overtook Merritt he
had already brushed the Confederates away, and my whole command went
into camp between Walnut Grove and Gaines's Mills.

The main purposes of the expedition had now been executed. They were
"to break up General Lee's railroad communications, destroy such
depots of supplies as could be found in his rear, and to defeat
General Stuart's cavalry."  Many miles of the Virginia Central and of
the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroads were broken up, and
several of the bridges on each burnt.  At Beaver Dam, Ashland, and
other places, about two millions of rations had been captured and
destroyed. The most important of all, however, was the defeat of
Stuart.  Since the beginning of the war this general had
distinguished himself by his management of the Confederate mounted
force.  Under him the cavalry of Lee's army had been nurtured, and
had acquired such prestige that it thought itself well-nigh
invincible; indeed, in the early years of the war it had proved to be
so.  This was now dispelled by the successful march we had made in
Lee's rear; and the discomfiture of Stuart at Yellow Tavern had
inflicted a blow from which entire recovery was impossible.

In its effect on the Confederate cause the defeat of Stuart was most
disheartening, but his death was even a greater calamity, as is
evidenced by the words of a Confederate writer (Cooke), who says:
"Stuart could be ill spared at this critical moment, and General Lee
was plunged into the deepest melancholy at the intelligence of his
death.  When it reached him he retired from those around him, and
remained for some time communing with his own heart and memory.  When
one of his staff entered and spoke of Stuart, General Lee said: 'I
can scarcely think of him without weeping.'"

From the camp near Gaines's Mills I resumed the march to Haxall's
Landing, the point on the James River contemplated in my instructions
where I was to obtain supplies from General Butler.  We got to the
James on the 14th with all our wounded and a large number of
prisoners, and camped between Haxall's and Shirley.  The prisoners,
as well as the captured guns, were turned over to General Butler's
provost-marshal, and our wounded were quickly and kindly cared for by
his surgeons.  Ample supplies, also, in the way of forage and
rations, were furnished us by General Butler, and the work of
refitting for our return to the Army of the Potomac was vigorously
pushed. By the 17th all was ready, and having learned by scouting
parties sent in the direction of Richmond and as far as Newmarket
that the enemy's cavalry was returning to Lee's army I started that
evening on my return march, crossing the Chickahominy at Jones's
bridge, and bivouacking on the 19th near Baltimore crossroads.

My uncertainty of what had happened to the Army of the Potomac in our
absence, and as to where I should find it, made our getting back a
problem somewhat difficult of solution, particularly as I knew that
reinforcements for Lee had come up from the south to Richmond, and
that most likely some of these troops were being held at different
points on the route to intercept my column.  Therefore I determined
to pass the Pamunkey River at the White House, and sent to Fort
Monroe for a pontoon-bridge on which to make the crossing.  While
waiting for the pontoons I ordered Custer to proceed with his brigade
to Hanover Station, to destroy the railroad bridge over the South
Anna, a little beyond that place; at the same time I sent Gregg and
Wilson to Cold Harbor, to demonstrate in the direction of Richmond as
far as Mechanicsville, so as to cover Custer's movements.  Merritt,
with the remaining brigades of his division, holding fast at
Baltimore crossroads to await events.

After Gregg and Custer had gone, it was discovered that the railroad
bridge over the Pamunkey, near the White House, had been destroyed
but partially--the cross-ties and stringers being burned in places
only--and that it was practicable to repair it sufficiently to carry
us over.  In view of this information General Merritt's two brigades
were at once put on the duty of reconstructing the bridge.  By
sending mounted parties through the surrounding country, each man of
which would bring in a board or a plank, Merritt soon accumulated
enough lumber for the flooring, and in one day the bridge was made
practicable.  On the 22d Gregg, Wilson, and Custer returned.  The
latter had gone on his expedition as far as Hanover Station,
destroyed some commissary stores there, and burned two trestle
bridges over Hanover Creek.  This done, he deemed it prudent to
retire to Hanovertown.  The next morning he again marched to Hanover
Station, and there ascertained that a strong force of the enemy,
consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, was posted at the
South Anna bridges.  These troops had gone there from Richmond en
route to reinforce Lee.  In the face of this impediment Custer's
mission could not be executed fully, so he returned to Baltimore
crossroads.

The whole command was drawn in by noon of the 22d, and that day it
crossed the Pamunkey by Merritt's reconstructed bridge, marching to
Ayletts, on the Mattapony River, the same night.  Here I learned from
citizens, and from prisoners taken during the day by scouting parties
sent toward Hanover Court House, that Lee had been, forced from his
position near Spottsylvania Court House and compelled to retire to
the line of the North Anna.  I then determined to rejoin the Army of
the Potomac at the earliest moment, which I did by making for
Chesterfield Station, where I reported to General Meade on the 24th
of May.

Our return to Chesterfield ended the first independent expedition the
Cavalry Corps had undertaken since coming under my command, and our
success was commended highly by Generals Grant and Meade, both
realizing that our operations in the rear of Lee had disconcerted and
alarmed that general so much as to aid materially in forcing his
retrograde march, and both acknowledged that, by drawing off the
enemy's cavalry during the past fortnight, we had enabled them to
move the Army of the Potomac and its enormous trains without
molestation in the manoeuvres that had carried it to the North Anna.
Then, too, great quantities of provisions and munitions of war had
been destroyed--stores that the enemy had accumulated at sub-depots
from strained resources and by difficult means; the railroads that
connected Lee with Richmond broken, the most successful cavalry
leader of the South killed, and in addition to all this there had
been inflicted on the Confederate mounted troops the most thorough
defeat that had yet befallen them in Virginia.

When the expedition set out the Confederate authorities in Richmond
were impressed, and indeed convinced, that my designs contemplated
the capture of that city, and notwithstanding the loss they sustained
in the defeat and death of Stuart, and their repulse the succeeding
day, they drew much comfort from the fact that I had not entered
their capital.  Some Confederate writers have continued to hold this
theory and conviction since the war.  In this view they were and are
in error.  When Stuart was defeated the main purpose of my
instructions had been carried out, and my thoughts then turned to
joining General Butler to get supplies.  I believed that I could do
this by cutting across to the Mechanicsville pike and Fair Oaks on
the south side of the Chickahominy, but the failure of Wilson's
column to get possession of the outwork which commanded the pike
necessitated my crossing at Meadow bridge, and then moving by
Mechanicsville and Gaines's Mills instead of by the shorter route.
Moreover, my information regarding General Butler's position was
incorrect, so that even had I been successful in getting to Fair Oaks
by the direct road I should still have gained nothing thereby, for I
should still have been obliged to continue down the James River to
Haxall's.




CHAPTER XX.

GENERAL WILSON'S ADVANCE TOWARD HANOVER COURT HOUSE--CROSSING THE
PAMUNKEY--ENGAGEMENT OF HAWE'S SHOP--FIGHT AT MATADEQUIN CREEK
--CAPTURE OF COLD HARBOR--THE FIGHT TO RETAIN THE PLACE--MOVEMENTS
OF GENERAL WILSON.

When I rejoined the Army of the Potomac, near Chesterfield Station,
the heavy battles around Spottsylvania had been fought, and the
complicated manoeuvres by which the whole Union force was swung
across the North Anna were in process of execution.  In conjunction
with these manoeuvres Wilson's division was sent to the right flank
of the army, where he made a reconnoissance south of the North Anna
as far as Little River, crossing the former stream near Jericho
Mills.  Wilson was to operate from day to day on that flank as it
swung to the south, covering to New Castle ferry each advance of the
infantry and the fords left behind on the march.  From the 26th to
the 30th these duties kept Wilson constantly occupied, and also
necessitated a considerable dispersion of his force, but by the 31st
he was enabled to get all his division together again, and crossing
to the south side of the Pamunkey at New Castle ferry, he advanced
toward Hanover Court House.  Near Dr Pride's house he encountered a
division of the enemy's cavalry under General W. H. F. Lee, and drove
it back across Mechamp's Creek, thus opening communication with the
right of our infantry resting near Phillips's Mills.  Just as this
had been done, a little before dark, Wilson received an order from
General Meade directing him to push on toward Richmond until he
encountered the Confederates in such strength that he could no longer
successfully contend against them, and in compliance with this order
occupied Hanover Court House that same day.  Resuming his march at
daylight on June 1, he went ahead on the Ashland road while sending
Chapman's brigade up the south bank of the South Anna to destroy the
bridges on that stream.  Chapman having succeeded in this work,
Wilson re-united his whole command and endeavored to hold Ashland,
but finding the Confederate cavalry and infantry there in strong
force, he was obliged to withdraw to Dr. Price's house.  Here he
learned that the army had gone to the left toward Cold Harbor, so on
the 2d of June he moved to Hawe's Shop.

While Wilson was operating thus on the right, I had to cover with
Gregg's and Torbert's divisions the crossing of the army over the
Pamunkey River at and near Hanovertown.  Torbert having recovered
from the illness which overtook him in the Wilderness, had now
returned to duty.  The march to turn the enemy's right began on the
26th.  Torbert and Gregg in advance, to secure the crossings of the
Pamunkey and demonstrate in such manner as to deceive the enemy as
much as possible in the movement, the two cavalry divisions being
supported by General D. A. Russell's division of the Sixth Corps.

To attain this end in the presence of an ever-watchful foe who had
just recently been reinforced in considerable numbers from Richmond
and further south--almost enough to make up the losses he had
sustained in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania--required the most
vigorous and zealous work on the part of those to whom had been
allotted the task of carrying out the initial manoeuvres.  Torbert
started for Taylor's ford on the Pamunkey with directions to
demonstrate heavily at that point till after dark, as if the crossing
was to be made there, and having thus impressed the enemy, he was to
leave a small guard, withdraw quietly, and march to Hanovertown ford,
where the real crossing was to be effected.  Meanwhile Gregg marched
to Littlepage's crossing of the Pamunkey, with instructions to make
feints in the same manner as Torbert until after dark, when he was to
retire discreetly, leaving a small force to keep up the
demonstration, and then march rapidly to Hanovertown crossing, taking
with him the pontoon-bridge.

At the proper hour Russell took up the march and followed the
cavalry.  The troops were in motion all night, undergoing the usual
delays incident to night marches, and, early on the morning of the
27th the crossing was made, Custer's brigade of Torbert's division
driving from the ford about one hundred of the enemy's cavalry, and
capturing between thirty and forty prisoners.  The remainder of
Torbert's division followed this brigade and advanced to Hanovertown,
where General Gordon's brigade of Confederate cavalry was met.
Torbert attacked this force with Devin's brigade, while he sent
Custer to Hawe's Shop, from which point a road leading to the right
was taken that brought him in rear of the enemy's cavalry; when the
Confederates discovered this manoeuvre, they retired in the direction
of Hanover Court House.  Pursuit continued as far as a little stream
called Crump's Creek, and here Torbert was halted, Gregg moving up on
his line meanwhile, and Russell encamping near the crossing of the
river.  This completed our task of gaining a foothold south of the
Pamunkey, and on the 28th the main army crossed unharassed and took
up a position behind my line, extending south from the river, with
the Sixth Corps on the right across the Hanover Court House road at
Crump's Creek, the Second Corps on the left of the Sixth, and the
Fifth Corps about two miles in front of Hanovertown, its left
extending to the Tolopotomy.

There was now much uncertainty in General Grant's mind as to the
enemy's whereabouts, and there were received daily the most
conflicting statements as to the nature of Lee's movements.  It
became necessary, therefore, to find out by an actual demonstration
what Lee was doing, and I was required to reconnoitre in the
direction of Mechanicsville.  For this purpose I moved Gregg's
division out toward this town by way of Hawe's Shop, and when it had
gone about three-fourths of a mile beyond the Shop the enemy's
cavalry was discovered dismounted and disposed behind a temporary
breastwork of rails and logs.

This was the first occasion on which, since the battle of Yellow
Tavern, the Confederate troopers had confronted us in large numbers,
their mounted operations, like ours, having been dependent more or
less on the conditions that grew out of the movements in which Lee's
infantry had been engaged since the 14th of May.

On that date General Lee had foreshadowed his intention of using his
cavalry in connection with the manoeuvres of his infantry by issuing
an order himself, now that Stuart was dead, directing that the "three
divisions of cavalry serving with the army [Lee's] will constitute
separate commands, and will report directly to and receive orders
from the headquarters of the army."  The order indicates that since
Stuart's death the Confederate cavalry had been re-organized into
three divisions, that were commanded respectively by General Wade
Hampton, General Fitzhugh Lee, and General W. H. F. Lee, the
additional division organization undoubtedly growing out of the fact,
that General M. C. Butler's brigade of about four thousand men had
joined recently from South Carolina.

When this force developed in Gregg's front, he attacked the moment
his troops could be dismounted; and the contest became one of
exceeding stubborness, for he found confronting him Hampton's and
Fitzhugh Lee's divisions, supported by what we then supposed to be a
brigade of infantry, but which, it has since been ascertained, was
Butler's brigade of mounted troops; part of them armed with
long-range rifles.  The contest between the opposing forces was of
the severest character and continued till late in the evening.  The
varying phases of the fight prompted me to reinforce Gregg as much as
possible, so I directed Custer's brigade to report to him, sending,
meanwhile, for the other two brigades of Torbert, but these were not
available at the time--on account of delays which occurred in
relieving them from the line at Crump's Creek--and did not get up
till the fight was over.  As soon as Custer joined him, Gregg
vigorously assaulted the Confederate position along his whole front;
and notwithstanding the long-range rifles of the South Carolinians,
who were engaging in their first severe combat it appears, and fought
most desperately, he penetrated their barricades at several points.

The most determined and obstinate efforts for success were now made
on both sides, as the position at Hawe's Shop had become of very
great importance on account of the designs of both Lee and Grant.
Lee wished to hold this ground while he manoeuvred his army to the
line of the Tolopotomy, where he could cover the roads to Richmond,
while Grant, though first sending me out merely to discover by a
strong reconnoissance the movements of the enemy, saw the value of
the place to cover his new base at the White House, and also to give
us possession of a direct road to Cold Harbor.  Hawe's Shop remained
in our possession finally, for late in the evening Custer's brigade
was dismounted and formed in close column in rear of Gregg, and while
it assaulted through an opening near the centre of his line, the
other two brigades advanced and carried the temporary works.  The
enemy's dead and many of his wounded fell into our hands; also a
considerable number of prisoners, from whom we learned that
Longstreet's and Ewell's corps were but four miles to the rear.

The battle was a decidedly severe one, the loss on each side being
heavy in proportion to the number of troops engaged.  This fight took
place almost immediately in front of our infantry, which, during the
latter part of the contest, was busily occupied in throwing up
intrenchments.  Late in the afternoon I reported to General Meade the
presence of the enemy's infantry, and likewise that Hampton's and
Fitzhugh Lee's divisions were in my front also, and asked, at the
same time; that some of our infantry, which was near at hand, be sent
to my assistance.  I could not convince Meade that anything but the
enemy's horse was fighting us, however, and he declined to push out
the foot-troops, who were much wearied by night marches.  It has been
ascertained since that Meade's conclusions were correct in so far as
they related to the enemy's infantry; but the five cavalry brigades
far outnumbered my three, and it is to be regretted that so much was
risked in holding a point that commanded the roads to Cold Harbor and
Meadow bridge, when there was at hand a preponderating number of
Union troops which might have been put into action.  However, Gregg's
division and Custer's brigade were equal to the situation, all
unaided as they were till dark, when Torbert and Merritt came on the
ground.  The contest not only gave us the crossroads, but also
removed our uncertainty regarding Lee's movements, clearly
demonstrating that his army was retiring by its right flank, so that
it might continue to interpose between Grant and the James River; as
well as cover the direct route to Richmond.

General Lee reported this battle to his Government as a Confederate
victory, but his despatch was sent early in the day, long before the
fight ended, and evidently he could not have known the final result
when he made the announcement, for the fight lasted until dark.
After dark, our own and the Confederate dead having been buried, I
withdrew, and moving to the rear of our infantry, marched all night
and till I reached the vicinity of Old Church, where I had been
instructed to keep a vigilant watch on the enemy with Gregg's and
Torbert's divisions.  As soon as I had taken position at Old Church
my pickets were pushed out in the direction of Cold Harbor, and the
fact that the enemy was holding that point in some force was clearly
ascertained.  But our occupation of Cold Harbor was of the utmost
importance; indeed, it was absolutely necessary that we should
possess it, to secure our communications with the White House, as
well as to cover the extension of our line to the left toward the
James River.  Roads from Bethesda Church, Old Church, and the White
House centred at Cold Harbor, and from there many roads diverged also
toward different crossings of the Chickahominy, which were
indispensable to us.

The enemy too realized the importance of the place, for as soon as he
found himself compelled to take up the line of the Tolopotomy he
threw a body of troops into Cold Harbor by forced marches, and
followed it up by pushing a part of this force out on the Old Church
road as far as Matadequin Creek, where he established a line of
battle, arranging the front of it parallel to the road along the
south bank of the Pamunkey; this for the purpose of endangering our
trains as they moved back and forth between the army and the White
House.

Meanwhile I had occupied Old Church and pushed pickets down toward
Cold Harbor.  The outposts struck each other just north of Matadequin
Creek, and a spirited fight immediately took place.  At first our
pickets were sorely pressed, but Torbert, who was already preparing
to make a reconnoissance, lost no time in reinforcing them on the
north side of the creek with Devin's brigade.  The fight then became
general, both sides, dismounted, stubbornly contesting the ground.
Of the Confederates, General Butler's South Carolinians bore the
brunt of the fight, and, strongly posted as they were on the south
bank of the creek, held their ground with the same obstinacy they had
previously shown at Hawe's Shop.  Finally, however, Torbert threw
Merritt's and Custer's brigades into the action, and the enemy
retired, we pursuing to within a mile and a half of Cold Harbor and
capturing a number of prisoners.  Gregg's division took no part in
the actual fighting, but remained near Old Church observing the roads
on Torberts flanks, one leading toward Bethesda Church on his right,
the other to his left in the direction of the White House.  This
latter road Gregg was particularly instructed to keep open, so as to
communicate with General W. F. Smith, who was then debarking his
corps at the White House, and on the morning of the 31st this
general's advance was covered by a brigade which Gregg had sent him
for the purpose.

Torbert having pursued toward Cold Harbor the troops he fought at
Matadequin Creek, had taken up a position about a mile and a half
from that place, on the Old Church road.  The morning of the 31st I
visited him to arrange for his further advance, intending thus to
anticipate an expected attack from Fitzhugh Lee, who was being
reinforced by infantry.  I met Torbert at Custer's headquarters, and
found that the two had already been talking over a scheme to capture
Cold Harbor, and when their plan was laid before me it appeared so
plainly feasible that I fully endorsed it, at once giving directions
for its immediate execution, and ordering Gregg to come forward to
Torbert's support with such troops as he could spare from the duty
with which he had been charged.

Torbert moved out promptly, Merritt's brigade first, followed by
Custer's, on the direct road to Cold Harbor, while Devin's brigade
was detached, and marched by a left-hand road that would bring him in
on the right and rear of the enemy's line, which was posted in front
of the crossroads.  Devin was unable to carry his part of the
programme farther than to reach the front of the Confederate right,
and as Merritt came into position to the right of the Old Church road
Torbert was obliged to place a part of Custer's brigade on Merritt's
left so as to connect with Devin.  The whole division was now in
line, confronted by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, supported by Clingman's
brigade from Hoke's division of infantry; and from the Confederate
breastworks, hastily constructed out of logs, rails, and earth, a
heavy fire was already being poured upon us that it seemed impossible
to withstand.  None of Gregg's division had yet arrived, and so
stubborn was the enemy's resistance that I began to doubt our ability
to carry the place before reinforcements came up, but just then
Merritt reported that he could turn the enemy's left, and being
directed to execute his proposition, he carried it to a most
successful issue with the First and Second regular cavalry.  Just as
these two regiments passed around the enemy's left and attacked his
rear, the remainder of the division assailed him in front.  This
manoeuvre of Merritt's stampeded the Confederates, and the defenses
falling into our hands easily, we pushed ahead on the Bottom's bridge
road three-fourths of a mile beyond Cold Harbor.

Cold Harbor was now mine, but I was about nine miles away from our
nearest infantry, and had been able to bring up only Davies's brigade
of cavalry, which arrived after the fight.  My isolated position
therefore made me a little uneasy.  I felt convinced that the enemy
would attempt to regain the place, for it was of as much importance
to him as to us, and the presence of his infantry disclosed that he
fully appreciated this.  My uneasiness increased as the day grew
late, for I had learned from prisoners that the balance of Hoke's
division was en route to Cold Harbor, and Kershaw near at hand,
interposing between the Union left near Bethesda Church and my
position.  In view of this state of affairs, I notified General Meade
that I had taken Cold Harbor, but could not with safety to my command
hold it, and forthwith gave directions to withdraw during the night.
The last of my troops had scarcely pulled out, however, when I
received a despatch from Meade directing me to hold Cold Harbor at
every hazard.  General Grant had expected that a severe battle would
have to be fought before we could obtain possession of the place; and
its capture by our cavalry not being anticipated, no preparation had
been made for its permanent occupancy.  No time was to be lost,
therefore, if the advantages which possession of Cold Harbor gave us
were to be improved, so at the same hour that Meade ordered me to
hold the place at all hazards the Sixth Corps was started on a forced
march, by Grant's directions, to aid in that object, and on arrival
to relieve my cavalry.

The moment Meade's order was received, I directed a reoccupation of
Cold Harbor, and although a large portion of Torbert's command was
already well on its way back to the line we held on the morning of
the 31st, this force speedily retraced its steps, and re-entered the
place before daylight; both our departure and return having been
effected without the enemy being aware of our movements.  We now
found that the temporary breastworks of rails and logs which the
Confederates had built were of incalculable benefit to us in
furnishing material with which to establish a line of defense, they
being made available by simply reversing them at some points, or at
others wholly reconstructing them to suit the circumstances of the
ground: The troops, without reserves, were then placed behind our
cover dismounted, boxes of ammunition distributed along the line, and
the order passed along that the place must be held.  All this was
done in the darkness, and while we were working away at our cover the
enemy could be distinctly heard from our skirmish-line giving
commands and making preparations to attack.

Just after daylight on the 1st of June the Confederate infantry under
General Kershaw endeavored to drive us out, advancing against my
right from the Bethesda Church road.  In his assault he was permitted
to come close up to our works, and when within short range such afire
was opened on him from our horse-artillery and repeating carbines
that he recoiled in confusion after the first onset; still, he seemed
determined to get the place, and after reorganizing, again attacked;
but the lesson of the first repulse was not without effect, and his
feeble effort proved wholly fruitless.  After his second failure we
were left undisturbed, and at 9 A.M. I sent the following despatch to
army headquarters:

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,
"ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
"Cold Harbor, Va., June 1, 1864--9 A.M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL HUMPHREYS,
"Chief-of-Staff.

"GENERAL: In obedience to your instructions I am holding Cold Harbor.
I have captured this morning more prisoners; they belong to three
different infantry brigades.  The enemy assaulted the right of my
lines this morning, but were handsomely repulsed.  I have been very
apprehensive, but General Wright is now coming up.  I built slight
works for my men; the enemy came up to them, and were driven back.
General Wright has just arrived.

"P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Major-General Commanding."


About 10 o'clock in the morning the Sixth Corps relieved Torbert and
Davies, having marched all night, and these two generals moving out
toward the Chickahominy covered the left of the infantry line till
Hancock's corps took their place in the afternoon.  By this time
Gregg had joined me with his two brigades, and both Torbert and Gregg
were now marched to Prospect Church, from which point I moved them to
a position on the north side of the Chickahominy at Bottom's bridge.
Here the enemy's cavalry confronted us, occupying the south bank of
the stream, with artillery in position at the fords prepared to
dispute our passage; but it was not intended that we should cross; so
Gregg and Torbert lay quiet in camp at Bottom's bridge and at Old
Church without noteworthy event until the 6th of June.

As before related, Wilson's division struck the enemy's infantry as
well as W. H. F. Lee's cavalry near Ashland on the 1st of June, and
although Chapman destroyed the bridges over the South Anna, which was
his part of the programme, Wilson found it necessary to return to
Price's Store.  From this point he continued to cover the right of
the Army of the Potomac, on the 2d of June driving the rear-guard of
the enemy from Hawe's Shop, the scene of the battle of May 28.  The
same day he crossed Tolopotomy Creek, and passed around the enemy's
left flank so far that Lee thought his left was turned by a strong
force, and under cover of darkness withdrew from a menacing position
which he was holding in front of the Ninth Corps.  This successful
manoeuvre completed, Wilson returned to Hawe's Shop, and on the 4th
went into camp at New Castle ferry, in anticipation of certain
operations of the Cavalry Corps, which were to take place while the
Army of the Potomac was crossing to the south side of the James.




CHAPTER XXI.

THE MOVEMENT TO THE JAMES--THE SECOND EXPEDITION--BATTLE OF
TREVILLIAN STATION--DEFEAT OF GENERAL WADE HAMPTON--MALLORY'S
CROSSROADS--SUFFERING OF THE WOUNDED--SECURING THE TRAINS--GENERAL
GREGG'S STUBBORN FIGHT.

By the 6th of June General Grant again determined to continue the
movement of the army by its left flank to the south bank of the James
River, his unsuccessful attack on the enemy's works near Cold Harbor
having demonstrated that Lee's position north of the Chickahominy
could not be carried by assault with results that would compensate
for the enormous loss of life which must follow; therefore a further
attempt to fight a decisive battle north of Richmond was abandoned.
In carrying the army to the James River the hazardous manoeuvres
would be hampered by many obstacles, such as the thick timber,
underbrush, and troublesome swamps to be met in crossing the
Chickahominy.  Besides, Lee held an interior line, from which all the
direct roads to Richmond could be covered with his infantry, leaving
his cavalry free to confront our advance on the south bank of the
Chickahominy as far down as Jones's bridge, and thence around to
Charles City Court House.  In view of these difficulties it became
necessary to draw off the bulk of the enemy's cavalry while the
movement to the James was in process of execution, and General Meade
determined to do this by requiring me to proceed with two divisions
as far as Charlottesville to destroy the railroad bridge over the
Rivanna River near that town, the railroad itself from the Rivanna to
Gordonsville, and, if practicable, from Gordonsville back toward
Hanover Junction also.


"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"June 5, 1864.  3.30 P. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Commanding Cavalry Corps.

"I am directed by the major-general commanding to furnish the
following instructions for your guidance in the execution of the duty
referred to in the order for movements and changes of position
to-night, a copy of which order accompanies this communication.

"With two divisions of your corps you will move on the morning of the
7th instant to Charlottesville and destroy the railroad bridge over
the Rivanna near that town; you will then thoroughly destroy the
railroad from that point to Gordonsville, and from Gordonsville
toward Hanover Junction, and to the latter point, if practicable.
The chief engineer, Major Duane, will furnish you a canvas
pontoon-train of eight boats.  The chief quartermaster will supply you
with such tools, implements, and materials as you may require for the
destruction of the road.  Upon the completion of this duty you will
rejoin this army.

"A. HUMPHREYS,
"Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."


After Meade's instructions reached me they were somewhat modified by
General Grant, who on the same evening had received information that
General Hunter, commanding the troops in West Virginia, had reached
Staunton and engaged with advantage the Confederate commander,
General Jones, near that place.  General Grant informed me orally
that he had directed Hunter to advance as far as Charlottesville,
that he expected me to unite with him there, and that the two
commands, after destroying the James River canal and the Virginia
Central road, were to join the Army of the Potomac in the manner
contemplated in my instructions from General Meade; and that in view
of what was anticipated, it would be well to break up as much of the
railroad as possible on my way westward.  A copy of his letter to
Hunter comprised my written instructions.  A junction with this
general was not contemplated when the expedition was first conceived,
but became an important though not the paramount object after the
reception of the later information.  The diversion of the enemy's
cavalry from the south side of the Chickahominy was its main purpose,
for in the presence of such a force as Lee's contracted lines would
now permit him to concentrate behind the Chickahominy, the
difficulties of crossing that stream would be largely increased if he
also had at hand a strong body of horse, to gain the time necessary
for him to oppose the movement at the different crossings with masses
of his infantry.

The order calling for two divisions for the expedition, I decided to
take Gregg's and Torbert's, leaving Wilson's behind to continue with
the infantry in its march to the James and to receive instructions
directly from, the headquarters of the army.  All my dismounted men
had been sent to the White House some days before, and they were
directed to report to Wilson as they could be provided with mounts.



"COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1964.

"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER, Commanding Dept West Virginia.

"General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning with instructions to
proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence there the
destruction of the Virginia Central railroad, destroying this way as
much as possible.  The complete destruction of this road and of the
canal on James River is of great importance to us.  According to the
instructions I sent to General Halleck for your guidance, you will
proceed to Lynchburg and commence there.  It would be of great value
to us to get possession of Lynchburg for a single day.  But that
point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to
get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting into the
road or canal at all.  I see, in looking over the letter to General
Halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates
that your route should be from Staunton via Charlottesville.  If you
have so understood it, you will be doing just what I want.  The
direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the
valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately turn east by
the most practicable road until you strike the Lynchburg branch of
the Virginia Central road.  From there move eastward along the line
of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join
General Sheridan.  After the work laid out for General Sheridan and
yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the Army of the Potomac
by the route laid out in General Sheridan's instructions.  If any
portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in
your department, you are authorized to send it back.  If on receipt
of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem it practicable to
reach that point, you will exercise your judgment about going there.
If you should be on the railroad between Charlottesville and
Lynchburg, it may be practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy
the canal.  Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."


Owing to the hard service of the preceding month we had lost many
horses, so the number of dismounted men was large; and my strength
had also been much reduced by killed and wounded during the same
period of activity.  The effective mounted force of my two divisions
was therefore much diminished, they mustering only about six thousand
officers and men when concentrated on June 6 at New Castle ferry.
Here they were provided with three days' rations, intended to last
five days, and with two days' grain for the horses.  The rations and
forty rounds of ammunition per man were to be carried on the persons
of the troopers, the grain on the pommel of the saddle, and the
reserve ammunition in wagons.  One medical wagon and eight ambulances
were also furnished, and one wagon was authorized for each division
and brigade headquarters; enough canvas-covered boats for a small
pontoon-bridge were also provided.

My instructions permitting latitude in the route I should take, I
decided to march along the north bank of the North Anna River, cross
that stream at Carpenter's ford, strike the Virginia Central railroad
at Trevillian Station, destroy it toward Louisa Court House, march
past Gordonsville, strike the railroad again at Cobham's Station, and
destroy it thence to Charlottesville as we proceeded west.  The
success of the last part of this programme would of course depend on
the location of General Hunter when I should arrive in the region
where it would be practicable for us to communicate with each other.

From my camp at New Castle ferry we crossed the Pamunkey, marched
between Aylett's and Dunkirk on the Mattapony River, and on the 8th
of June encamped at Polecat Station.  The next day we resumed the
march along the North Anna--our advance guard skirmishing with a few
mounted men of the enemy, who proved to be irregulars--and bivouacked
on Northeast Creek, near Young's Mills.  This day I learned from some
of these irregulars whom we made prisoners that Breckenridge's
division of infantry, en route to the Shenandoah Valley by way of
Gordonsville, was passing slowly up the railroad parallel to me, and
that the enemy's cavalry had left its position on the south side of
the Chickahominy, and was marching on the old Richmond and
Gordonsville road toward Gordonsville, under command of General Wade
Hampton, the information being confirmed by a scouting party sent out
to cut the telegraph wires along the railroad in the night.
Breckenridge had been ordered back to the valley by General Lee as
soon as he heard of Hunter's victory near Staunton, but now that my
expedition had been discovered, the movement of Breckenridge's troops
on the railroad was being timed to correspond with the marches of my
command till Hampton could get more nearly parallel with me.

On the 10th we resumed the march, passing by Twyman's store, crossing
the North Anna at Carpenter's ford and encamping on the road leading
along the south fork of the North Anna to Trevillian Station.  During
the evening and night of the 10th the boldness of the enemy's
scouting parties, with which we had been coming into collision more
or less every day, perceptibly increased, thus indicating the
presence of a large force, and evidencing that his shorter line of
march had enabled him to bring to my front a strong body of cavalry,
although it started from Lee's army nearly two days later than I did
from Grant's.  The arrival of this body also permitted Breckenridge
to pass on to Gordonsville, and from there to interpose between
General Hunter and me at either Charlottesville or Waynesboro' as
circumstances might determine.

On the night of the Loth General Hampton's division camped about
three miles northwest of Trevillian, at a place called Green Spring
Valley and Fitzhugh Lee's division not far from Louisa Court House,
some six miles east of Trevillian.  Learning that I was at
Carpenter's ford, Hampton marched his division by way of Trevillian
Station toward Clayton's store, on the road from Trevillian to
Carpenter's ford, intending to attack me at Clayton's.  Fitzhugh
Lee's division was to join Hampton at Clayton's store from Louisa
Court House; but on the morning of the 11th the two generals were
separated by several miles.

At daylight of the 11th my march, to Trevillian Station was resumed
on the direct road to that point, and engaging the enemy's pickets
and advanced parties soon after setting out, we began to drive them
in.  Torbert had the lead with Merritt's and Devin's brigades, and as
he pressed back the pickets he came upon the enemy posted behind a
line of barricades in dense timber about three miles from Trevillian.
Meanwhile Custer's brigade had been sent from where we bivouacked, by
a wood road found on our left, to destroy Trevillian Station.  In
following this road Custer got to the rear of Hampton's division,
having passed between its right flank and Fitzhugh Lee's division,
which was at the time marching on the road leading from Louisa Court
House to Clayton's store to unite with Hampton.

Custer, the moment he found himself in Hampton's rear, charged the
led horses, wagons, and caissons found there, getting hold of a vast
number of each, and also of the station itself.  The stampede and
havoc wrought by Custer in Hampton's rear compelled him to turn
Rosser's brigade in that direction, and while it attacked Custer on
one side, Fitzhugh Lee's division, which had followed Custer toward
Trevillian, attacked him on the other.  There then ensued a desperate
struggle for the possession of the captured property, resulting
finally in its being retaken by the enemy.  Indeed, the great number
of horses and vehicles could not be kept on the limited space within
Custer's line, which now formed almost a complete circle; and while
he was endeavoring to remove them to a secure place they, together
with Custer's headquarters wagon and four of his caissons, fell into
the hands of their original owners.

As soon as the firing told that Custer had struck the enemy's rear, I
directed Torbert to press the line in front of Merritt and Devin,
aided by one brigade of Gregg's division on their left, Gregg's other
brigade in the meantime attacking Fitzhugh Lee on the Louisa Court
House road.  The effect of this was to force Hampton back, and his
division was so hard pushed that a portion of it was driven pell-mell
into Custer's lines, leaving there about five hundred prisoners.  The
rest of Hampton's men did not rally till they got some distance west
of Trevillian, while, in the meantime, Gregg had driven Fitzhugh Lee
toward Louisa Court House so far that many miles now intervened
between the two Confederate divisions, precluding their union until
about noon the next day, when Fitzhugh Lee effected the junction
after a circuitous march in the night.  The defeat of Hampton at the
point where he had determined to resist my further advance, and his
retreat westward, gave me undisturbed possession of the station; and
after destroying the railroad to some extent toward Gordonsville, I
went into camp.

From prisoners taken during the day, I gathered that General Hunter,
instead of coming toward Charlottesville, as I had reason to expect,
both from the instructions given me and the directions sent him by
General Grant, was in the neighborhood of Lexington--apparently
moving on Lynchburg--and that Breckenridge was at Gordonsville and
Charlottesville.  I also heard, from the same source, that Ewell's
corps was on its way to Lynchburg, but this intelligence proved
afterward to be incorrect, for these troops, commanded by General
Early, did not leave Richmond till two days later.

There was no doubt as to the information about Hunter's general
location, however.  He was marching toward Lynchburg, away from
instead of toward me, thus making the junction of our commands beyond
all reasonable probability.  So in view of this, I made up my mind to
abandon that part of the scheme, and to return by leisurely marches,
which would keep Hampton's cavalry away from Lee while Grant was
crossing the James River.  I was still further influenced to this
course by the burden which was thrown on me in the large number of
wounded--there being about five hundred cases of my own--and the five
hundred prisoners that I would probably be forced to abandon, should
I proceed farther.  Besides, the recent battle had reduced my supply
of ammunition to a very small amount--not more than enough for one
more respectable engagement; and as the chances were that I would
have to fight a great deal before I could reach Hunter, now that the
enemy's cavalry and Breckenridge's infantry were between us, the
risks of the undertaking seemed too great to warrant it.

The morning of June 12 Gregg's division commenced destroying the
railroad to Louisa Court House, and continued the work during the
day, breaking it pretty effectually.  While Gregg was thus occupied,
I directed Torbert to make a reconnoissance up the Gordonsville road,
to secure a by-road leading over Mallory's ford, on the North Anna,
to the Catharpen road, as I purposed following that route to
Spottsylvania Court House on my return, and thence via Bowling Green
and Dunkirk to the White House.  About a mile beyond Trevillian the
Gordonsville road fork--the left fork leading to Charlottesville--and
about a mile beyond the fork Hampton had taken up and strongly
intrenched a line across both roads, being reinforced by Fitzhugh
Lee, who, as before related, had joined him about noon by a
roundabout march.  Torbert soon hotly engaged this line, and by the
impetuosity of his first attack, gained some advantage; but the
appearance of Fitzhugh Lee's troops on the right, and Hampton's
strong resistance in front, rendered futile all efforts to carry the
position; and, although I brought up one of Gregg's brigades to
Torbert's assistance, yet the by-road I coveted was still held by the
enemy when night closed in.

This engagement, like that off the day before around Trevillian, was
mostly fought dismounted by both sides, as had also been the earlier
fights of the cavalry during the summer in the Wilderness, at Todd's
Tavern, Hawe's Shop, and Matadequin Creek.  Indeed, they could hardly
have been fought otherwise than on foot, as there was little chance
for mounted fighting in eastern Virginia, the dense woods, the
armament of both parties, and the practice of barricading making it
impracticable to use the sabre with anything like a large force; and
so with the exception of Yellow Tavern the dismounted method
prevailed in almost every engagement.

The losses at Mallory's Crossroads were very heavy on both sides.
The character of the fighting, together with the day's results,
demonstrated that it was impossible to make the passage of the North
Anna at Mallory's ford without venturing another battle the next day.
This would consume the little ammunition left, and though we might
gain the road, yet the possibility of having no ammunition whatever
to get back with was too great a hazard, so I gave orders to withdraw
during the night of the 12th.  We retired along the same road by
which we had come, taking with us the prisoners, and all of our
wounded who could be moved.  Those who could not be transported, some
ninety in number, and all the Confederate wounded in my hands, were
left at Trevillian in hospitals, under charge of one of our surgeons,
with plenty of medical and other stores.

We recrossed the North Anna at Carpenter's ford the following
morning, and halting there, unsaddled and turned the horses out to
graze, for they were nearly famished, having had neither food nor
water during the preceding forty-eight hours.  Late in the afternoon
we saddled up and proceeded to Twyman's Store, while General
Hampton's main body moved down the south bank of the North Anna, with
the purpose of intervening between me and the Army of the Potomac, in
the hope of preventing my return to it; but his movements took no
definite shape beyond watching me, however, till several days later,
near St. Mary's Church, when I was crossing the peninsula to the
James River.

On the 14th the march was continued, and we reached the Catharpen
road, upon which it was originally intended to move if we had been
able to cross at Mallory's ford, and this conducted me to Shady Grove
Church.  The next day we passed over the battle-field of
Spottsylvania Court House.  The marks of the recent conflicts about
there were visible on every hand, and in the neighboring houses were
found many Union and Confederate wounded, who had been too severely
hurt to be removed from the field-hospitals at the time of the
battles.  Such of our wounded as were able to travel were brought
away.

On the 16th I marched from Edge Hill on the Ta River through Bowling
Green to Dr. Butler's, on the north side of the Mattapony.  When I
arrived here I was unable to ascertain the position of the Army of
the Potomac, and was uncertain whether or not the base at the White
House had been discontinued.  I had heard nothing from the army for
nine days except rumors through Southern sources, and under these
circumstances did not like to venture between the Mattapony and
Pamunkey rivers, embarrassed as I was with some four hundred wounded,
five hundred prisoners, and about two thousand negroes that had
joined my column in the hope of obtaining their freedom.  I therefore
determined to push down the north bank of the Mattapony far enough to
enable me to send these impediments directly to West Point, where I
anticipated finding some of our gunboats and transports, that could
carry all to the North.  Following this plan, we proceeded through
Walkerton to King and Queen Court House, and bivouacked in its
vicinity the night of the 18th.  Next day I learned that the depot at
the White House had not yet been broken up entirely, and that
supplies were in store for me there; so after sending the wounded,
prisoners, and negroes to West Point under an escort of two
regiments, I turned back to Dunkirk, on the Mattapony, and crossed to
the south side at a place where the stream was narrow enough to
bridge with my pontoon-boats.

In returning from Trevillian, as the most of our wounded were hauled
in old buggies, carts, and such other vehicles as could be made
available in the absence of a sufficient number of ambulances, the
suffering was intense, the heat of the season and dusty roads adding
much to the discomfort.  Each day we halted many times to dress the
wounds of the injured and to refresh them as much as possible, but
our means for mitigating their distress were limited.  The fortitude
and cheerfulness of the poor fellows under such conditions were
remarkable, for no word of complaint was heard.  The Confederate
prisoners and colored people being on foot, our marches were
necessarily made short, and with frequent halts also, but they too
suffered considerably from the heat and dust, though at times the
prisoners were relieved by being mounted on the horses of some of our
regiments, the owners meantime marching on foot.  Where all the
colored people came from and what started them was inexplicable, but
they began joining us just before we reached Trevillian--men, women,
and children with bundles of all sorts containing their few worldly
goods, and the number increased from day to day until they arrived at
West Point.  Probably not one of the poor things had the remotest
idea, when he set out, as to where he would finally land, but to a
man they followed the Yankees in full faith that they would lead to
freedom, no matter what road they took.

On the morning of the 20th, at an early hour, we resumed our march,
and as the column proceeded sounds of artillery were heard in the
direction of the White House, which fact caused us to quicken the
pace.  We had not gone far when despatches from General Abercrombie,
commanding some fragmentary organizations at the White House,
notified me that the place was about to be attacked.  I had
previously sent an advance party with orders to move swiftly toward
the cannonading and report to me by couriers the actual condition of
affairs.  From this party I soon learned that there was no occasion
to push our jaded animals, since the crisis, if there had been one,
was over and the enemy repulsed, so the increased gait was reduced to
a leisurely march that took us late in the afternoon to the north
bank of the Pamunkey, opposite Abercrombie's camp.  When I got to the
river the enemy was holding the bluffs surrounding the White House
farm, having made no effort to penetrate General Abercrombie's line
or do him other hurt than to throw a few shells among the teamsters
there congregated.

Next day Gregg's division crossed the Pamunkey dismounted, and
Torbert's crossed mounted. As soon as the troops were over, Gregg,
supported by Merritt's brigade, moved out on the road to Tunstall's
Station to attack Hampton, posted an the west side of Black Creek,
Custer's brigade meanwhile moving, mounted, on the road to
Cumberland, and Devin's in like manner on the one to Baltimore
crossroads.  This offer of battle was not accepted, however, and
Hampton withdrew from my front, retiring behind the Chickahominy,
where his communications with Lee would be more secure.

While at the White House I received orders to break up that depot
wholly, and also instructions to move the trains which the Army of
the Potomac had left there across the peninsula to the pontoon-bridge
at Deep Bottom on the James River.  These trains amounted to hundreds
of wagons and other vehicles, and knowing full well the dangers which
would attend the difficult problem of getting them over to
Petersburg, I decided to start them with as little delay as
circumstances would permit, and the morning of the 22d sent Torbert's
division ahead to secure Jones's bridge on the Chickahominy, so that
the wagons could be crossed at that point.  The trains followed
Torbert, while Gregg's division marched by a road parallel to the one
on which the wagons were moving, and on their right flank, as they
needed to be covered and protected in that direction only.

The enemy made no effort to attack us while we were moving the trains
that day, and the wagons were all safely parked for the night on the
south side of the Chickahominy, guarded by General Getty, who had
relieved Abercrombie from command of the infantry fragments before we
started off from the White House.

To secure the crossing at Jones's bridge, Torbert had pushed Devin's
brigade out on the Long Bridge road, on the side of the Chickahominy
where, on the morning of the 23d, he was attacked by Chambliss's
brigade of W. H. F. Lee's division.  Devin was driven in some little
distance, but being reinforced by Getty with six companies of colored
troops, he quickly turned the tables on Chambliss and re-established
his picket-posts.  From this affair I learned that Chambliss's brigade
was the advance of the Confederate cavalry corps, while Hampton
discovered from it that we were already in possession of the Jones's
bridge crossing of the Chickahominy; and as he was too late to
challenge our passage of the stream at this point he contented
himself with taking up a position that night so as to cover the roads
leading from Long Bridge to Westover, with the purpose of preventing
the trains from following the river road to the pontoon-bridge at
Deep Bottom.

My instructions required me to cross the trains over the James River
on this pontoon-bridge if practicable, and to reach it I should be
obliged to march through Charles City Court House, and then by
Harrison's Landing and Malvern Hill, the latter point being held by
the enemy.  In fact, he held all the ground between Long Bridge on
the Chickahominy and the pontoon-bridge except the Tete de pont at
the crossing.  Notwithstanding this I concluded to make the attempt,
for all the delays of ferrying the command and trains would be
avoided if we got through to the bridge; and with this object in view
I moved Torbert's division out on the Charles City road to conduct
the wagons.  Just beyond Charles City Court House Torbert encountered
Lomax's brigade, which he drove across Herring Creek on the road to
Westover Church; and reporting the affair to me, I surmised, from the
presence of this force in my front, that Hampton would endeavor to
penetrate to the long column of wagons, so I ordered them to go into
park near Wilcox's landing, and instructed Gregg, whose division had
been marching in the morning along the road leading from Jones's
bridge to St.  Mary's Church for the purpose of covering the exposed
flank of the train, to hold fast near the church without fail till
all the transportation had passed Charles City Court House.

Meanwhile, General Hampton, who had conjectured that I would try to
get the train across the James by the pontoon-bridge at Deep Bottom,
began concentrating all his troops except Lomax's brigade, which was
to confront the head of my column on the river road, in the vicinity
of Nance's Shop.  This was discovered by Gregg at an early hour, and
divining this purpose he had prepared to meet it by constructing
hasty cover for his men before receiving my instructions.  About 4
o'clock in the afternoon Hampton got his force in hand, and with
Fitzhugh Lee's division assailed the whole front of Gregg's line, and
his left flank with Chambliss's and Geary's brigades.  For two hours
he continued to attack, but made little impression on Gregg--gain at
one point being counterbalanced by failure at another.  Because of
the evident strength of Hampton, Gregg had placed all his troops in
line of battle from the first, and on discovery of the enemy's
superior numbers sent message after message to me concerning the
situation, but the messengers never arrived, being either killed or
captured, and I remained in total ignorance till dark of the strait
his division was in.

Toward night it became clear to Gregg that he could maintain the
unequal contest no longer, and he then decided to retreat, but not
until convinced that the time won had enabled all the trains to pass
Charles City Court House in safety.  When he had got all his led
horses fairly on the way, and such of the wounded as could be
transported, he retired by his right flank-in some confusion, it is
true, but stubbornly resisting to Hopewell Church, where Hampton
ceased to press him.

Gregg's losses were heavy, and he was forced to abandon his dead and
most seriously wounded, but the creditable stand made ensured the
safety of the train, the last wagon of which was now parked at
Wilcox's Landing.  His steady, unflinching determination to gain time
for the wagons to get beyond the point of danger was characteristic
of the man, and this was the third occasion on which he had exhibited
a high order of capacity and sound judgment since coming under my
command.  The firmness and coolness with which he always met the
responsibilities of a dangerous place were particularly strong points
in Gregg's make-up, and he possessed so much professional though
unpretentious ability, that it is to be regretted he felt obliged a
few months later to quit the service before the close of the war.

Gregg's fight fully satisfied me that we could not get the trains up
to the pontoon-bridge, for of course Hampton would now throw all his
cavalry in my front, on the river road, where it could be backed up
by Lee's infantry.  Meanwhile, General Meade had become assured of
the same thing, and as he was now growing anxious about the fate of
Wilson's division--which, during my absence, had been sent out to
break the enemy's communications south of Petersburg, by destroying
the Southside and Danville railroads--he sent ferryboats to cross me
over the James.  During the night of the 24th, and next morning, the
immense train--which ought never to have been left for the cavalry to
escort, after a fatiguing expedition of three weeks--was moved back
through Charles City Court House to Douthard's landing, and there
ferried over the river, followed by my troops in like manner.  When
General Hampton discovered this, he moved to Drury's Bluff, and
there, on the morning of the 27th, crossed the James by the
Confederate pontoon-bridge.




CHAPTER XXII.

GENERAL WILSON'S RAID--DESTROYING RAILROADS--HIS DISCOMFITURE
--RESULTS OF HIS RAID--REMOUNTS--MOVEMENT TO THE NORTH SIDE OF THE
JAMES--DECEIVING LEE--MY ISOLATED POSITION--ESTIMATE OF HANCOCK
--SUCCESS OF THE CAVALRY--THEIR CONSTANT DUTIES.

While I was absent on the expedition to Trevillian, the movement of
the Army of the Potomac across the James River was effected, and
Wilson, whom I had left behind for the purpose, was engaged in the
duty of covering its front and rear.  Late on the night of June 12
he, with Chapman's brigade, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge,
in advance of the Fifth Corps, and by 7 o'clock next morning had
driven the enemy's pickets up to White Oak bridge, where he waited
for our infantry.  When that came up, he pushed on as far as Riddle's
Shop, but late that evening the Confederate infantry forced him to
withdraw to St. Mary's Church; for early in the morning General Lee
had discovered the movement of our army, and promptly threw this
column of infantry south of the Chickahominy to White Oak Swamp, with
the design of covering Richmond.  From St. Mary's Church Wilson
guarded all the roads toward White Oak Swamp and Riddle's Shop,
McIntosh's brigade joining him on the 14th, by way of Long Bridge, as
the rear of the Army of the Potomac passed the Chickahominy.  In the
performance of this duty Wilson did not have to fight any engagement
of magnitude, for the bulk of the enemy's cavalry had followed me to
Trevillian.  During the 15th and 16th Wilson drew his troops in
toward the James River, and next day crossed it on the pontoon-bridge
and camped on the Blackwater, near Mt. Sinai Church.  Here he
remained till the 22d of June--the same day I reached the White House
with Gregg and Torbert--when, under orders from General Meade, he set
out to cut the enemy's communications to the south and southwest of
Petersburg.

His instructions implied that the breaking up of the Petersburg and
Lynchburg, and Richmond and Danville railroads at Burkeville was the
most important part of his mission, and that when the work of
destruction began, it should be continued till he was driven off by
the enemy.  Wilson's force consisted of about 5,500 men, General A.
V. Kautz, with the cavalry of the Army of the James, having joined
him for the expedition.  In moving out Wilson crossed the Weldon road
near Ream's Station, first destroying it effectually at that point.
About fourteen miles west of Petersburg he struck the Southside
railroad, and broke it up clear to Burkeville, a distance of thirty
miles.  Having destroyed everything at Burkeville Junction, he moved
along the Danville road to Staunton River, completely wrecking about
thirty miles of that line also.  At Staunton River he found the
railroad bridge strongly guarded, and seeing that he could not burn
it, he began his return march that night, and reached Nottoway River,
some thirty miles south of Petersburg, at noon of the next day--the
28th.

In this expedition Wilson was closely followed from the start by
Barringer's brigade of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, but the operations
were not interfered with materially, his success being signal till he
reached the vicinity of Stony Creek depot on his return.  At this
point General Hampton, with his own and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, got
between Wilson and the Army of the Potomac, there being behind them
at Ream's Station, at the same time, two brigades of infantry under
General Mahone.  A severe battle ensued, resulting in Wilson's
defeat, with the loss of twelve guns and all his wagons.  In
consequence of this discomfiture he was obliged to fall back across
the Nottoway River with his own division, and rejoined the army by
way of Peter's bridge on that stream, while Kautz's division, unable
to unite with Wilson after the two commands had become separated in
the fight, made a circuit of the enemy's left, and reached the lines
of our army in the night of the 28th.

Neither the presence of Hampton's cavalry at Stony Creek depot, nor
the possession of Ream's Station by the Confederate infantry, seems
to have been anticipated by Wilson, for in the report of the
expedition he states:

"Foreseeing the probability of having to return northward, I wrote to
General Meade the evening before starting that I anticipated no
serious difficulty in executing his orders; but unless General
Sheridan was required to keep Hampton's cavalry engaged, and our
infantry to prevent Lee from making detachments, we should probably
experience great difficulty in rejoining the army.  In reply to this
note, General Humphreys, chief-of-staff, informed me it was intended
the Army of the Potomac should cover the Weldon road the next day,
the Southside road the day after, and that Hampton having followed
Sheridan toward Gordonsville, I need not fear any trouble from him."

I doubt that General Meade's letter of instructions and Wilson's note
of the same evening, warrant what General Wilson here says.  It is
true that the Weldon railroad near Ream's Station was not covered by
our infantry, as General Humphreys informed him it would be, but
Wilson is in error when he intimates that he was assured that I would
look after Hampton.  I do not think General Meade's instructions are
susceptible of this interpretation.  I received no orders requiring
me to detain Hampton.  On the contrary, when I arrived at the White
House my instructions required me to break up the depot there, and
then bring the train across the Peninsula as soon as practicable, nor
were these instructions ever modified.  I began the duty imposed on
me on the morning of the 23d, totally in the dark as to what was
expected of Wilson, though it seems, from some correspondence between
Generals Grant and Meade, which I never saw till after the war, that
Grant thought Wilson could rely on Hampton's absence from his field
of operations throughout the expedition.


"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"June 21, 1864. 9:20 A. M.

"BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILSON,
"Commanding Third Division Cavalry Corps.

"The major-general commanding directs that you move your command at
2 A. M. to-morrow, the 22d instant, in execution of the duty assigned
you of destroying certain railroads.  Despatches received from the
White House state that Hampton's cavalry was before that place
yesterday evening, and that General Sheridan had also reached there,
hence it is desirable that you should march at the earliest moment.
In passing Petersburg you will endeavor to avoid the observation of
the enemy, and then move by the shortest routes to the intersection
of the Petersburg and Lynchburg, and the Richmond and Danville
railroads, and destroy both these roads to the greatest extent
possible, continuing their destruction until driven from it by such
attacks of the enemy as you can no longer resist.  The destruction of
those roads to such an extent that they cannot be used by the enemy
in connection with Richmond during the remainder of the campaign is
an important part of the plan of campaign.  The latest information
from Major-General Hunter represents him to be a few miles west of
Lynchburg.  He may endeavor to form a junction with this army; you
will communicate with him if practicable, and have delivered to him
verbally the contents of the following copy of a communication from
Lieutenant-General Grant to the major-general commanding this army.
Lieutenant Brooks, who will accompany your expedition part of the
way, should be informed where General Hunter will probably be found.

"The success of your expedition will depend upon the secrecy with
which it is commenced, and the celerity with which its movements are
conducted; your command will, therefore, have with it the lightest
supplies and smallest number of wheels consistent with the thorough
execution of the duty, the supplies of the section of country you
will operate in being taken into account.  Upon the completion of the
work assigned you, you will rejoin this army.

"The chief quartermaster was directed yesterday to supply you with
the implements and material for the destruction of railroads obtained
for General Sheridan.

"[Signed] "A. A. HUMPHREYS,
"Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."



"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY FORCES,
Mount Sinai Church, June 21, 1864--6 P.M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL HUMPHREYS,"
"Chief-of-Staff.
"The instructions of the major-general commanding, of this date, are
received.  I shall march in obedience thereto at 2 A. M. to-morrow.
Before starting I would like to know if our infantry forces cover the
Weldon road.

"I propose striking the Southside road first at Sutherland Station,
or some point in that vicinity, tearing up the track sufficiently to
delay railroad communication ten or twelve hours.  At this place I
shall detach a force to strike the Richmond and Danville road, by a
rapid march, at the nearest point, tearing up the track at every
practicable point between there and Burkeville.

"From Sutherlands I shall move the main body of my command by the
Great road (breaking the railroad at every convenient point) directly
to Burkeville, which, if we succeed in capturing, will afford us the
opportunity of prosecuting our work with great advantage.  As soon as
I have made dispositions for communicating with Hunter and done all
the damage possible, I shall move with all possible rapidity for
Danville and Grenboro'.

"Circumstances must, however, is a great degree control our movements
after leaving Burkeville.

"If Sheridan will look after Hampton, I apprehend no difficulty, and
hope to be able to do the enemy great damage.  The ammunition issued
to my command is very defective.  The implements for destroying roads
have not yet arrived, but I learn from General Ingalls that they will
certainly be here early to-morrow.

"[Signed] J. H. WILSON,
"Brigadier-General Commanding."


The moment I received orders from General Meade to go to the relief
of Wilson, I hastened with Torbert and Gregg by way of Prince George
Court House and Lee's Mills to Ream's Station.  Here I found the
Sixth Corps, which Meade had pushed out on his left flank immediately
on hearing of Wilson's mishap, but I was too late to render any
material assistance, Wilson having already disappeared, followed by
the enemy.  However, I at once sent out parties to gather
information, and soon learned that Wilson had got safe across the
Nottoway at Peter's bridge and was making for the army by way of
Blunt's bridge, on the Blackwater.

The benefits derived from this expedition, in the destruction of the
Southside and Danville railroads, were considered by General Grant as
equivalent for the losses sustained in Wilson's defeat, for the
wrecking of the railroads and cars was most complete, occasioning at
this, time serious embarrassment to the Confederate Government; but I
doubt if all this compensated for the artillery and prisoners that
fell into the hands of the enemy in the swamps of Hatcher's Run and
Rowanty Creek.  Wilson's retreat from the perilous situation at
Ream's station was a most creditable performance--in the face of two
brigades of infantry and three divisions of cavalry--and in the
conduct of the whole expedition the only criticism that can hold
against him is that he placed too much reliance on meeting our
infantry at Ream's station, seeing that uncontrollable circumstances
might, and did, prevent its being there.  He ought to have marched on
the 28th by Jarrett's Station to Peter's bridge, on the Nottoway, and
Blunts bridge on the Blackwater, to the rear of the Army of the
Potomac.

When the safety of Wilson's command was assured, I was ordered back
to Light House Point, where I had gone into camp after crossing the
James River to rest and recruit my command, now very much reduced in
numbers by reason of casualties to both horses and men.  It had been
marching and fighting for fifty consecutive days, and the fatiguing
service had told so fearfully on my animals that the number of
dismounted men in the corps was very large.  With the exception of
about four hundred horses that I received at the White House, no
animals were furnished to supply the deficiencies which had arisen
from the wearing marches of the past two months until I got to this
camp at Light House Point; here my needs were so obvious that they
could no longer be neglected.

I remained at Light House Point from the 2d to the 26th of July,
recuperating the cavalry, the intensely warm weather necessitating
almost an entire suspension of hostilities on the part of the Army of
the Potomac.  Meanwhile fifteen hundred horses were sent me here, and
these, with the four hundred already mentioned, were all that my
troops received while I held the personal command of the Cavalry
Corps, from April 6 to August 1, 1864.  This was not near enough to
mount the whole command, so I disposed the men who could not be
supplied in a dismounted camp.

By the 26th of July our strength was pretty well restored, and as
General Grant was now contemplating offensive operations for the
purpose of keeping Lee's army occupied around Richmond, and also of
carrying Petersburg by assault if possible, I was directed to move to
the north side of the James River in conjunction with General
Hancock's corps, and, if opportunity offered, to make a second
expedition against the Virginia Central railroad, and again destroy
the bridges on the North Anna, the Little and the South Anna rivers.

I started out on the afternoon of the 26th and crossed the Appomattox
at Broadway landing.  At Deep Bottom I was joined by Kautz's small
division from the Army of the James, and here massed the whole
command, to allow Hancock's corps to take the lead, it crossing to
the north bank of the James River by the bridge below the mouth of
Bailey's Creek.  I moved late in the afternoon, so as not to come
within the enemy's view before dark, and after night-fall Hancock's
corps passed me and began crossing the pontoon-bridge about 2 o'clock
in the morning.

By daylight Hancock was across, the cavalry following.  Soon a
portion of his corps attacked the enemy's works on the east side of
Bailey's Creek, and, aided by the cavalry moving on its right,
captured four pieces of artillery.  This opened the way for Hancock
to push out his whole corps, and as he advanced by a wheel, with his
left as a pivot, the cavalry joined in the movement, pressing forward
on the New Market and Central or Charles City roads.

We did not go far before we found the enemy's infantry posted across
these two roads behind a strong line of intrenchments on the west
bank of Bailey's Creek.  His videttes in front of Ruffin's house on
the New Market road were soon driven in on their main line, and the
high ground before the house was immediately occupied by Torbert and
Gregg, supported by Kautz's division.  By the time the cavalry line
was formed the Confederate General Kershaw, with his own division of
infantry and those of Wilcox and Heath, advanced to attack us.
Directing the most of his troops against the cavalry, which was still
mounted, Kershaw drove it back some distance over the high ground.
When it reached the eastern face of the ridge, however, it was
quickly dismounted, and the men directed to lie down in line of
battle about fifteen yards from the crest, and here the onset of the
enemy was awaited.  When Kershaw's men reached the crest such a
severe fire was opened on them, and at such close quarters, that they
could not withstand it, and gave way in disorder.  They were followed
across the plain by the cavalry, and lost about two hundred and fifty
prisoners and two battle-flags.  The counter attack against the
infantry by Torbert and Gregg re-established our line and gave us the
victory of Darbytown, but it also demonstrated the fact that General
Lee had anticipated the movement around his left flank by
transferring to the north side of the James a large portion of his
infantry and W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry.

This development rendered useless any further effort on Hancock's
part or mine to carry out the plan of the expedition, for General
Grant did not intend Hancock to assault the enemy's works unless
there should be found in them but a very thin line of infantry which
could be surprised.  In such event, Hancock was to operate so that
the cavalry might turn the Confederates on the Central or Charles
City road, but the continually increasing force of the enemy showed
this to be impracticable.  The long front presented by Hancock's
corps and the cavalry deceived General Lee, and he undoubtedly
thought that nearly all of Grant's army had been moved to the north
side of the James River; and to meet the danger he transferred the
most of his own strength to the same side to confront his adversary,
thinning the lines around Petersburg to reinforce those opposing us
on the Central and New Market roads.  This was what Grant hoped Lee
would do in case the operations of Hancock and myself became
impracticable, for Grant had an alternative plan for carrying
Petersburg by assault in conjunction with the explosion of a mine
that had been driven under the enemy's works from the front of
Burnside's corps.

Now that there was no longer a chance for the cavalry to turn the
enemy's left, our attention was directed to keeping up the deception
of Lee, and on the afternoon of the 28th Hancock's corps withdrew to
a line nearer the head of the bridge, the cavalry drawing back to a
position on his right.  From now on, all sorts of devices and
stratagems were practiced--anything that would tend to make the
Confederates believe we were being reinforced, while Hancock was
preparing for a rapid return to Petersburg at the proper time.  In
order to delude the enemy still more after night-fall of the 28th I
sent one of my divisions to the south side of the James, first
covering the bridgeway with refuse hay to keep the tramp of the horses
from being heard.  After daylight the next morning, I marched this
division back again on foot, in full view of the enemy, to create the
impression of a continuous movement large bodies of infantry to the
north side, while the same time Kautz was made to skirmish with the
enemy on our extreme right.  These various artifices had the effect
intended, for by the evening of the 29th Lee had transferred all his
infantry to the north bank of the James, except three divisions, and
all his cavalry save one.

The morning of the 30th had been fixed upon to explode the mine and
assault the enemy's works, so after dark on the evening of the 29th
Hancock hastily but quietly withdrew his corps to the south side to
take part in the engagement which was to succeed the explosion, and I
was directed to follow Hancock.  This left me on the north side of
the river confronting two-thirds of Lee's army in a perilous
position, where I could easily be driven into Curl's Neck and my
whole command annihilated.  The situation, therefore, was not a
pleasant one to contemplate, but it could not be avoided.  Luckily
the enemy did not see fit to attack, and my anxiety was greatly
relieved by getting the whole command safely across the bridge
shortly after daylight, having drawn in the different brigades
successively from my right.  By 10 o'clock on the morning of the 30th
my leading division was well over toward the left of our army in
front of Petersburg, marching with the purpose to get around the
enemy's right flank during the operations that were to succeed the
mine explosion, but when I reached General Meade's headquarters I
found that lamentable failure had attended the assault made when the
enemy's works were blown up in the morning.  Blunder after blunder
had rendered the assault abortive, and all the opportunities opened
by our expedition to the north side were irretrievably lost, so
General Meade at once arrested the movement of the cavalry.

In the expedition to Deep Bottom I was under the command of
Major-General Hancock, who, by seniority, was to control my corps as
well as his own until the way was opened for me to get out on the
Virginia Central railroad.  If this opportunity was gained, I was to
cut loose and damage Lee's communications with the Shenandoah Valley
in such manner as best suited the conditions, but my return was not to
be jeopardized nor long delayed.  This necessitated that Hancock's
line should extend to Bottom's bridge on the Chickahominy.  The
enemy's early discovery of the movement and his concentration of
troops on the north side prevented Hancock from accomplishing the
programme laid out for him.  Its impracticability was demonstrated
early on the 27th, and Hancock's soldierly instincts told him this the
moment he unexpectedly discovered Kershaw blocking the New Market and
Charles City roads.  To Hancock the temptation to assault Kershaw's
position was strong indeed, but if he carried it there would still
remain the dubious problem of holding the line necessary for my safe
return, so with rare judgment he desisted zealously turning to the
alternative proposition--the assault on Petersburg--for more
significant results. This was the only occasion during the war in
which I was associated with Hancock in campaign.  Up till then we had
seldom met, and that was the first opportunity I had to observe his
quick apprehension, his physical courage, and the soldierly
personality which had long before established his high reputation.

On the 1st of August, two days after the mine explosion, I was.
relieved from the personal command of the Cavalry Corps, and ordered
to the Shenandoah Valley, where at a later date Torbert's and
Wilson's divisions joined me.  Practically, after I went to the
valley, my command of the Cavalry Corps became supervisory merely.
During the period of my immediate control of the corps, I tried to
carry into effect, as far as possible, the views I had advanced
before and during the opening of the Wilderness campaign, i.e., "that
our cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and our infantry the
enemy's infantry"; for there was great danger of breaking the spirit
of the corps if it was to be pitted against the enemy's compact
masses of foot-troops posted behind intrenchments, and unless there
was some adequate tactical or strategical advantage to be gained,
such a use of it would not be justified.  Immediately succeeding the
battles of the Wilderness, opportunity offered to put this plan into
execution to some extent, and from that time forward--from the battle
of Yellow Tavern--our success was almost continuous, resulting
finally, before the close of the war, in the nearly total
annihilation of the enemy's cavalry.

The constant activity of the corps from May 5 till August 1 gave
little opportunity for the various division and brigade commanders to
record its work in detail; so there exists but meagre accounts of the
numerous skirmishes and graver conflicts in which, in addition to the
fights mentioned in this narrative, it engaged.  A detailed history
of its performances is not within the province of a work of this
nature; but in review, it can be said, without trespassing on the
reader's time, that the Cavalry Corps led the advance of the Army of
the Potomac into the Wilderness in the memorable campaign of 1864;
that on the expedition by way of Richmond to Haxall's it marked out
the army's line of march to the North Anna; that it again led the
advance to the Tolopotomy, and also to Cold Harbor, holding that
important strategic point at great hazard; and that by the Trevillian
expedition it drew away the enemy's cavalry from the south side of
the Chickahominy, and thereby assisted General Grant materially in
successfully marching to the James River and Petersburg.
Subsequently, Wilson made his march to Staunton bridge, destroying
railroads and supplies of inestimable value, and though this was
neutralized by his disaster near Ream's Station, the temporary
set-back there to one division was soon redeemed by victory over
the Confederate infantry at the battle of Darbytown.

In the campaign we were almost always on the march, night and day,
often unable to care properly for our wounded, and obliged to bury
our dead where they fell; and innumerable combats attest the part the
cavalry played in Grant's march from the Rapidan to Petersburg.  In
nearly all of these our casualties were heavy, particularly so when,
as was often the case, we had to engage the Confederate infantry; but
the enemy returned such a full equivalent in dead and wounded in
every instance, that finally his mounted power, which from the
beginning of the war had been nurtured with a wise appreciation of
its value, was utterly broken.




CHAPTER XXIII.

GENERAL HUNTER'S SUCCESSFUL MARCH AND SUBSEQUENT RETREAT--GENERAL
JUBAL A. EARLY THREATENS WASHINGTON--CHAMBERSBURG, PA., BURNED
--SELECTED TO OPERATE AGAINST GENERAL EARLY--THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY
--THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

When the attempt to take Petersburg in conjunction with the mine
explosion resulted in such a dismal failure, all the operations
contemplated in connection with that project came to a standstill,
and there was every prospect that the intensely hot and sultry
weather would prevent further activity in the Army of the Potomac
till a more propitious season.  Just now, however, the conditions
existing in the Shenandoah Valley and along the upper Potomac
demanded the special attention of General Grant, for, notwithstanding
the successful march that Major-General David Hunter had made toward
Lynchburg early in the summer, what he had first gained was
subsequently lost by strategical mistakes, that culminated in
disaster during the retreat he was obliged to make from the vicinity
of Lynchburg to the Kanawha Valley.  This route of march uncovered
the lower portion of the Valley of the Shenandoah, and with the
exception of a small force of Union troops under General Franz Sigel
posted aft Martinsburg for the purpose of covering the Baltimore and
Ohio railroad, there was nothing at hand to defend the lower valley.

The different bodies of Confederates which compelled Hunter's retreat
were under command of General Jubal A. Early, who had been sent to
Lynchburg with Ewell's corps after the defeat of the Confederate
General W. C. Jones near Staunton on the 5th of June, to take command
of the Valley District.  When Early had forced Hunter into the
Kanawha region far enough to feel assured that Lynchburg could not
again be threatened from that direction, he united to his own corps
General John C. Breckenridge's infantry division and the cavalry of
Generals J. H. Vaughn, John McCausland.  B. T. Johnson, and J. D.
Imboden, which heretofore had been operating in southwest and western
Virginia under General Robert Ransom, Jr., and with the column thus
formed, was ready to turn his attention to the lower Shenandoah
Valley.  At Early's suggestion General Lee authorized him to move
north at an opportune moment, cross the upper Potomac into Maryland
and threaten Washington.  Indeed, General Lee had foreshadowed such a
course when Early started toward Lynchburg for the purpose of
relieving the pressure in front of Petersburg, but was in some doubt
as to the practicability of the movement later, till persuaded to it
by the representations of Early after that general had driven Hunter
beyond the mountains and found little or nothing opposing except the
small force of Sigel, which he thought he could readily overcome by
celerity of movement.

By rapid marching Early reached Winchester on the 2d of July, and on
the 4th occupied Martinsburg, driving General Sigel out of that place
the same day that Hunter's troops, after their fatiguing retreat
through the mountains, reached Charlestown, West Virginia.  Early was
thus enabled to cross the Potomac without difficulty, when, moving
around Harper's Ferry, through the gaps of the South Mountain, he
found his path unobstructed till he reached the Monocacy, where
Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, and some raw troops that had
been collected by General Lew Wallace, met and held the Confederates
till the other reinforcements that had been ordered to the capital
from Petersburg could be brought up.  Wallace contested the line of
the Monocacy with obstinacy, but had to retire finally toward
Baltimore.  The road was then open to Washington, and Early marched
to the outskirts and began against the capital the demonstrations
which were designed to divert the Army of the Potomac from its main
purpose in front of Petersburg.

Early's audacity in thus threatening Washington had caused some
concern to the officials in the city, but as the movement was looked
upon by General Grant as a mere foray which could have no decisive
issue, the Administration was not much disturbed till the
Confederates came in close proximity.  Then was repeated the alarm
and consternation of two years before, fears for the safety of the
capital being magnified by the confusion and discord existing among
the different generals in Washington and Baltimore; and the imaginary
dangers vanished only with the appearance of General Wright, who,
with the Sixth Corps and one division of the Nineteenth Corps, pushed
out to attack Early as soon as he could get his arriving troops in
hand, but under circumstances that precluded celerity of movement;
and as a consequence the Confederates escaped with little injury,
retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed save by some
Union cavalry that had been sent out into Loudoun County by Hunter,
who in the meantime had arrived at Harper's Ferry by the Baltimore
and Ohio railroad.  From Leesburg Early retired through Winchester
toward Strasburg, but when the head of his column reached this place
he found that he was being followed by General Crook with the
combined troops of Hunter and Sigel only, Wright having returned to
Washington under orders to rejoin Meade at Petersburg.  This
reduction of the pursuing force tempting Early to resume the
offensive, he attacked Crook at Kernstown, and succeeded in
administering such a check as to necessitate this general's retreat
to Martinsburg, and finally to Harper's Ferry.  Crook's withdrawal
restored to Early the line of the upper Potomac, so, recrossing this
stream, he advanced again into Maryland, and sending McCausland on to
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, laid that town in ashes, leaving three
thousand non-combatants without shelter or food.

When Early fell back from the vicinity of Washington toward
Strasburg, General Grant believed that he would rejoin Lee, but later
manoeuvres of the enemy indicated that Early had given up this idea,
if he ever, entertained it, and intended to remain in the valley,
since it would furnish Lee and himself with subsistence, and also
afford renewed opportunities for threatening Washington.  Indeed, the
possession of the Valley of the Shenandoah at this time was of vast
importance to Lee's army, and on every hand there were indications
that the Confederate Government wished to hold it at least until
after the crops could be gathered in to their depots at Lynchburg and
Richmond.  Its retention, besides being of great advantage in the
matter of supplies, would also be a menace to the North difficult for
General Grant to explain, and thereby add an element of considerable
benefit to the Confederate cause; so when Early's troops again
appeared at Martinsburg it was necessary for General Grant to
confront them with a force strong enough to put an end to incursions
north of the Potomac, which hitherto had always led to National
discomfiture at some critical juncture, by turning our army in
eastern Virginia from its chief purpose--the destruction of Lee and
the capture of the Confederate capital.

This second irruption of Early, and his ruthless destruction of
Chambersburg led to many recommendations on the part of General Grant
looking to a speedy elimination of the confusion then existing among
the Union forces along the upper Potomac, but for a time the
authorities at Washington would approve none of his propositions.
The President and Secretary Stanton seemed unwilling to adopt his
suggestions, and one measure which he deemed very important--the
consolidation into a single command of the four geographical
districts into which, to relieve political pressure no doubt, the
territory had been divided--met with serious opposition.  Despite
Grant's representations, he could not prevail on the Administration
to approve this measure, but finally the manoeuvres of Early and the
raid to Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance, though Grant had
somewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to appoint a
commander for the forces in the field that were to operate against
Early.

On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as this commander, and
in obedience to his telegraphic summons I repaired to his
headquarters at City Point.  In the interview that followed, he
detailed to me the situation of affairs on the upper Potomac, telling
me that I was to command in the field the troops that were to operate
against Early, but that General Hunter, who was at the head of the
geographical department, would be continued in his position for the
reason that the Administration was reluctant to reconstruct or
consolidate the different districts.  After informing me that one
division of the Cavalry Corps would be sent to my new command, he
went on to say that he wanted me to push the enemy as soon as this
division arrived, and if Early retired up the Shenandoah Valley I was
to pursue, but if he crossed the Potomac I was to put myself south of
him and try to compass his destruction.  The interview having ended,
I returned to Hancock Station to prepare for my departure, and on the
evening of August 1 I was relieved from immediate duty with the Army
of the Potomac, but not from command of the cavalry as a corps
organization.

I arrived at Washington on the 4th of August, and the next day
received instructions from General Halleck to report to General Grant
at Monocacy Junction, whither he had gone direct from City Point, in
consequence of a characteristic despatch from the President
indicating his disgust with the confusion, disorder, and helplessness
prevailing along the upper Potomac, and intimating that Grant's
presence there was necessary.

In company with the Secretary of War I called on the President before
leaving Washington, and during a short conversation Mr. Lincoln
candidly told me that Mr. Stanton had objected to my assignment to
General Hunter's command, because he thought me too young, and that
he himself had concurred with the Secretary; but now, since General
Grant had "ploughed round" the difficulties of the situation by
picking me out to command the "boys in the field," he felt satisfied
with what had been done, and "hoped for the best."  Mr. Stanton
remained silent during these remarks, never once indicating whether
he, too, had become reconciled to my selection or not; and although,
after we left the White House, he conversed with me freely in regard
to the campaign I was expected to make, seeking to impress on me the
necessity for success from the political as well as from the military
point of view, yet he utterly ignored the fact that he had taken any
part in disapproving the recommendation of the general-in-chief.

August 6, I reported to General Grant at the Monocacy, and he there
turned over to me the following instructions, which he had previously
prepared for General Hunter in the expectation that general would
continue to command the department:

"HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
"Monocacy Bridge, Md., Aug.  5, 1864.

"GENERAL: Concentrate all your available force without delay in the
vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and
garrisons for public property as may be necessary.

"Use in this concentration the railroad, if by so doing time can be
saved.  From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved
north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following and
attacking him wherever found; following him, if driven south of the
Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so.  If it is ascertained that
the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south
the main force, detaching, under a competent commander, a sufficient
force to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes.  In
detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en route from
Washington via Rockville may be taken into account.

"There are now on the way to join you three other brigades of the
best of cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses.
These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join
you by the south side of the Potomac.  One brigade will probably
start to-morrow.

"In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as it is expected you will have
to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to
invite the enemy to return.  Take all provisions, forage, and stock
wanted for the use of your command.  Such as cannot be consumed,
destroy.  It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed
--they should, rather, be protected; but the people should be informed
that so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of these
raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all
hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this
you want to keep him always in sight.  Be guided in your course by
the course he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular
vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country
through which you march.

"Very respectfully,
"U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General."

"Major-General D. HUNTER,
"Commanding Department of West Virginia."


When I had read the letter addressed to Hunter, General Grant said I
would be expected to report directly to him, as Hunter had asked that
day to be wholly relieved, not from any chagrin at my assignment to
the control of the active forces of his command, but because he
thought that his fitness for the position he was filling was
distrusted by General Halleck, and he had no wish to cause
embarrassment by remaining where he could but remove me one degree
from the headquarters of the army.  The next day Hunter's unselfish
request was complied with, and an order was issued by the President,
consolidating the Middle Department, the Department of Washington,
the Department of the Susquehanna, and the Department of West
Virginia.

Under this order these four geographical districts constituted the
Middle Military Division, and I was temporarily assigned to command
it.  Hunter's men had been bivouacking for some days past in the
vicinity of Monocacy Junction and Frederick, but before General
Grant's instructions were written out, Hunter had conformed to them
by directing the concentration at Halltown, about four miles in front
of Harper's Ferry, of all his force available for field service.
Therefore the different bodies of troops, with the exception of
Averell's cavalry, which had followed McCausland toward Moorefield
after the burning of Chambersburg, were all in motion toward Halltown
on August 6.

Affairs at Monocacy kept me but an hour or two, and these disposed
of, I continued on to Harper's Ferry by the special train which had
brought me from Washington, that point being intended as my
headquarters while making preparations to advance.  The enemy was
occupying Martinsburg, Williamsport, and Shepherdstown at the time;
sending occasional raiding parties into Maryland as far as
Hagerstown.  The concentration of my troops at Halltown being an
indication to Early that we intended to renew the offensive, however,
he immediately began counter preparations by drawing in all his
detached columns from the north side of the Potomac, abandoning a
contemplated raid into Maryland, which his success against Crook at
Kernstown had prompted him to project, and otherwise disposing
himself for defense.

At Harper's Ferry I made my headquarters in the second story of a
small and very dilapidated hotel, and as soon as settled sent for
Lieutenant John R. Meigs, the chief engineer officer of the command,
to study with him the maps of my geographical division.  It always
came rather easy to me to learn the geography of a new section, and
its important topographical features as well; therefore I found that,
with the aid of Meigs, who was most intelligent in his profession,
the region in which I was to operate would soon be well fixed in my
mind.  Meigs was familiar with every important road and stream, and
with all points worthy of note west of the Blue Ridge, and was
particularly well equipped with knowledge regarding the Shenandoah
Valley, even down to the farmhouses.  He imparted with great
readiness what he knew of this, clearly pointing out its
configuration and indicating the strongest points for Confederate
defense, at the same time illustrating scientifically and forcibly
the peculiar disadvantages under which the Union army had hitherto
labored.

The section that received my closest attention has its northern limit
along the Potomac between McCoy's ferry at the eastern base of the
North Mountain, and Harper's Ferry at the western base of the Blue
Ridge.  The southern limit is south of Staunton, on the divide which
separates the waters flowing into the Potomac from those that run to
the James.  The western boundary is the eastern slope of the
Alleghany Mountains, the eastern, the Blue Ridge; these two distinct
mountain ranges trending about southwest inclose a stretch of quite
open, undulating country varying in width from the northern to the
southern extremity, and dotted at frequent intervals with patches of
heavy woods: At Martinsburg the valley is about sixty miles broad,
and on an east and west line drawn through Winchester about
forty-five, while at Strasburg it narrows down to about twenty-five.
Just southeast of Strasburg, which is nearly midway between the
eastern and western walls of the valley, rises an abrupt range of
mountains called Massanutten, consisting of several ridges which
extend southward between the North and South Forks of the Shenandoah
River until, losing their identity, they merge into lower but broken
ground between New Market and Harrisonburg.  The Massanutten ranges,
with their spurs and hills, divide the Shenandoah Valley into two
valleys, the one next the Blue Ridge being called the Luray, while
that next the North Mountain retains the name of Shenandoah.

A broad macadamized road, leading south from Williamsport, Maryland,
to Lexington, Virginia, was built at an early day to connect the
interior of the latter State with the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, and
along this road are situated the principal towns and villages of the
Shenandoah Valley, with lateral lines of communication extending to
the mountain ranges on the east and west.  The roads running toward
the Blue Ridge are nearly all macadamized, and the principal ones
lead to the railroad system of eastern Virginia through Snicker's,
Ashby's Manassas, Chester, Thornton's Swift Run, Brown's and
Rock-fish gaps, tending to an ultimate centre at Richmond.  These gaps
are low and easy, offering little obstruction to the march of an army
coming from eastern Virginia, and thus the Union troops operating west
of the Blue Ridge were always subjected to the perils of a flank
attack; for the Confederates could readily be brought by rail to
Gordonsville and Charlottesville, from which points they could move
with such celerity through the Blue Ridge that, on more than one
occasion, the Shenandoah Valley had been the theatre of Confederate
success, due greatly to the advantage of possessing these interior
lines.

Nature had been very kind to the valley, making it rich and
productive to an exceptional degree, and though for three years
contending armies had been marching up and down it, the fertile soil
still yielded ample subsistence for Early's men, with a large surplus
for the army of Lee.  The ground had long been well cleared of
timber, and the rolling surface presented so few obstacles to the
movement of armies that they could march over the country in any
direction almost as well as on the roads, the creeks and rivers being
everywhere fordable, with little or no difficulty beyond that of
leveling the approaches.

I had opposing me an army largely composed of troops that had
operated in this region hitherto under "Stonewall" Jackson with
marked success, inflicting defeat on the Union forces almost every
time the two armies had come in contact. These men were now commanded
by a veteran officer of the Confederacy-General Jubal A. Early--whose
past services had so signalized his ability that General Lee
specially selected him to take charge of the Valley District, and,
notwithstanding the misfortunes that befell him later, clung to him
till the end, of the war.  The Confederate army at this date was
about twenty thousand strong, and consisted of Early's own corps,
with Generals Rodes, Ramseur, and Gordon commanding its divisions;
the infantry of Breckenridge from southwestern Virginia; three
battalions of artillery; and the cavalry brigades of Vaughn, Johnson,
McCausland, and Imboden.  This cavalry was a short time afterward
organized into a division under the command of General Lomax.

After discovering that my troops were massing in front of Harper's
Ferry, Early lost not a moment in concentrating his in the vicinity
of Martinsburg, in positions from which he could continue to obstruct
the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and yet be enabled to retire up the
valley under conditions of safety when I should begin an offensive
campaign.

When I took command of the Army of the Shenandoah its infantry force
comprised the Sixth Corps, one division of the Nineteenth Corps, and
two divisions from West Virginia.  The Sixth Corps was commanded
by Major-General Horatio G. Wright; its three divisions by
Brigadier-Generals David A. Russell, Geo.  W. Getty, and James B.
Ricketts. The single division of the Nineteenth Corps had for its
immediate chief Brigadier-General William Dwight, the corps being
commanded by Brigadier-General Wm.  H. Emory.  The troops from West
Virginia were under Brigadier-General George Crook, with Colonels
Joseph Thoburn and Isaac H. Duval as division commanders, and though
in all not more than one fair-sized division, they had been
designated, on account of the department they belonged to, the Army of
West Virginia.  General Torbert's division, then arriving from the
Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, represented the mounted arm
of the service, and in the expectation that Averell would soon join me
with his troopers, I assigned General Torbert as chief of cavalry, and
General Wesley Merritt succeeded to the command of Torbert's division.

General Wright, the commander of the Sixth Corps, was an officer of
high standing in the Corps of Engineers, and had seen much active
service during the preceding three years.  He commanded the
Department of the Ohio throughout the very trying period of the
summer and fall of 1862, and while in that position he, with
other prominent officers, recommended my appointment as a
brigadier-general.  In 1863 he rendered valuable service at the battle
of Gettysburg, following which he was assigned to the Sixth Corps, and
commanded it at the capture of the Confederate works at Rappahannock
Station and in the operations at Mine Run.  He ranked me as a
major-general of volunteers by nearly a year in date of commission,
but my assignment by the President to the command of the army in the
valley met with Wright's approbation, and, so far as I have ever
known, he never questioned the propriety of the President's action.
The Sixth Corps division commanders, Getty, Russell, and Ricketts,
were all educated soldiers, whose records, beginning with the Mexican
War, had already been illustrated in the war of the rebellion by
distinguished service in the Army of the Potomac.

General Emory was a veteran, having graduated at the Military Academy
in 1831, the year I was born.  In early life he had seen much service
in the Artillery, the Topographical Engineers, and the Cavalry, and
in the war of the rebellion had exhibited the most soldierly
characteristics at Port Hudson and on the Red River campaign.  At
this time he had but one division of the Nineteenth Corps present,
which division was well commanded by General Dwight, a volunteer
officer who had risen to the grade of brigadier-general through
constant hard work.  Crook was a classmate of mine--at least, we
entered the Military Academy the same year, though he graduated a
year ahead of me.  We had known each other as boys before we entered
the army, and later as men, and I placed implicit faith in his
experience and qualifications as a general.

The transfer of Torbert to the position of chief of cavalry left
Merritt, as I have already said, in command of the First Cavalry
Division.  He had been tried in the place before, and from the day he
was selected as one of a number of young men to be appointed general
officers, with the object of giving life to the Cavalry Corps, he
filled the measure of expectation.  Custer was one of these young men
too, and though as yet commanding a brigade under Merritt, his
gallant fight at Trevillian Station, as well as a dozen others during
the summer, indicated that he would be equal to the work that was to
fall to him when in a few weeks he should succeed Wilson.  But to go
on down the scale of rank, describing the officers who commanded in
the Army of the Shenandoah, would carry me beyond all limit, so I
refrain from the digression with regret that I cannot pay to each his
well-earned tribute.

The force that I could take with me into the field at this time
numbered about 26,000 men.  Within the limits of the geographical
division there was a much greater number of troops than this.
Baltimore, Washington, Harper's Ferry, Hagerstown, Frederick,
Cumberland, and a score of other points; besides the strong
detachments that it took to keep the Baltimore and Ohio railroad open
through the mountains of West Virginia, and escorts for my trains,
absorbed so many men that the column which could be made available
for field operations was small when compared with the showing on
paper.  Indeed, it was much less than it ought to have been, but for
me, in the face of the opposition made by different interests
involved, to detach troops from any of the points to which they had
been distributed before I took charge was next to impossible.

In a few days after my arrival preparations were completed, and I was
ready to make the first move for the possession of the Shenandoah
Valley.  For the next five weeks the operations on my part consisted
almost wholly of offensive and defensive manoeuvring for certain
advantages, the enemy confining himself meanwhile to measures
intended to counteract my designs.  Upon the advent of Torbert, Early
immediately grew suspicious, and fell back twelve miles south of
Martinsburg, to Bunker Hill and vicinity, where his right flank would
be less exposed, but from which position he could continue to
maintain the break in the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and push
reconnoitring parties through Smithfield to Charlestown.  These
reconnoitring parties exhibited considerable boldness at times, but
since they had no purpose in view save to discover whether or not we
were moving, I did not contest any ground with them except about our
outposts.  Indeed, I desired that Early might remain at some point
well to the north till I was fully prepared to throw my army on his
right and rear and force a battle, and hence I abstained from
disturbing him by premature activity, for I thought that if I could
beat him at Winchester, or north of it, there would be far greater
chances of weighty results.  I therefore determined to bring my
troops, if it were at all possible to do so, into such a position
near that town as to oblige Early to fight.  The sequel proved,
however, that he was accurately informed of all my movements.  To
anticipate them, therefore, he began his retreat up the valley the
day that I moved out from Halltown, and consequently was able to
place himself south of Winchester before I could get there.




CHAPTER XXIV.

MOVING ON GENERAL EARLY--GENERAL GRANT'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS
--DESTROYING THE RESOURCES OF THE VALLEY--REASON FOR THE DESTRUCTION
--WITHDRAWAL TO HALLTOWN--ALARM IN THE NORTH OVER THE RETROGRADE
MOVEMENT--RENEWING THE ADVANCE UP THE VALLEY--GENERAL ANDERSON'S
ATTEMPT TO RETURN TO PETERSBURG--STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES.

For a clear understanding of the operations which preceded the
victories that resulted in almost annihilating General Early's army
in the Shenandoah Valley, it is necessary to describe in considerable
detail the events that took place prior to the 19th of September.  My
army marched from Harper's Ferry on the 10th of August, 1864, General
Torbert with Merritt's division of cavalry moving in advance through
Berryville, going into position near White Post.  The Sixth Corps,
under General Wright, moved by way of Charlestown and Summit Point to
Clifton; General Emory, with Dwight's division of the Nineteenth
Corps, marched along the Berryville pike through Berryville to the
left of the position of the Sixth Corps at Clifton; General Crook's
command, moving on the Kabletown road, passed through Kabletown to
the vicinity of Berryville, and went into position on the left of
Dwight's division, while Colonel Lowell, with a detached force of two
small regiments of cavalry, marched to Summit Point; so that on the
night of August 10 my infantry occupied a line stretching from
Clifton to Berryville, with Merritt's cavalry at White Post and
Lowell's at Summit Point.  The enemy, as stated before, moved at the
same time from Bunker Hill and vicinity, and stretched his line from
where the Winchester and Potomac railroad crosses Opequon Creek to
the point at which the Berryville and Winchester pike crosses the
same stream, thus occupying the west bank to cover Winchester.

On the morning of the 11th the Sixth Corps was ordered to move across
the country toward the junction of the Berryville-Winchester pike and
the Opequon, and to take the crossing and hold it, Dwight's division
being directed to move through Berryville on the White Post road for
a mile, then file to the right by heads of regiments at deploying
distances, and carry the crossing of Opequon Creek at a ford about
three-fourths of a mile from the left of the Sixth Corps, while Crook
was instructed to move out on the White Post road, a mile and a half
beyond Berryville, then head to the right and secure the ford about a
mile to the left of Dwight; Torbert's orders were to push Merritt's
division up the Millwood pike toward Winchester, attack any force he
might run against, and ascertain the movements of the Confederate
army; and lastly, Lowell received instructions to close in from
Summit Point on the right of the Sixth Corps.

My object in securing the fords was to further my march on Winchester
from the southeast, since, from all the information gathered during
the 10th, I still thought Early could be brought to a stand at that
point; but in this I was mistaken, as Torbert's reconnoissance
proved, for on the morning of the 11th, when Merritt had driven the
Confederate cavalry, then covering the Millwood pike west of the
Opequon, off toward Kernstown, he found that their infantry and
artillery were retreating south, up the Valley pike.

As soon as this information was obtained Torbert moved quickly
through the toll-gate on the Front Royal and Winchester road to
Newtown, to strike the enemy's flank and harass him in his retreat,
Lowell following up through Winchester, on the Valley pike; Crook was
turned to the left and ordered to Stony Point, while Emory and
Wright, marching to the left also, were directed to take post on the
night of the 11th between the Millwood and Front Royal roads, within
supporting distance of Crook.  Merritt meeting some of the enemy's
cavalry at the tollgate, drove it in the direction of Newtown till it
got inside the line of Gordon's division of infantry, which had been
thrown out and posted behind barricades to cover the flank of the
main force in its retreat.  A portion of Merritt's cavalry attacked
this infantry and drove in its skirmish-line, and though not able to
dislodge Gordon, Merritt held the ground gained till night-fall, when
the Confederate infantry moved off under cover of darkness to Hupp's
Hill, between Strasburg and Cedar Creek.

The next morning Crook marched from Stony Point to Cedar Creek, Emory
followed with Dwight, and the cavalry moved to the same point by way
of Newtown and the Valley pike, the Sixth Corps following the
cavalry.  That night Crook was in position at Cedar Creek, on the
left of the Valley pike, Emory on the right of the pike, the Sixth
Corps on the right of Emory, and the cavalry on the flanks.  In the
afternoon a heavy skirmish-line had been thrown forward to the
heights on the south side of Cedar Creek, and a brisk affair with the
enemy's pickets took place, the Confederates occupying with their
main force the heights north of Strasburg.  On the morning of the
13th my cavalry went out to reconnoitre toward Strasburg, on the
middle road, about two and a half miles west of the Valley pike, and
discovered that Early's infantry was at Fisher's Hill, where he had
thrown up behind Tumbling Run earthworks extending clear across the
narrow valley between the Massanutten and North mountains.  On the
left of these works he had Vaughan's, McCausland's, and Johnson's
brigades of cavalry under General Lomax, who at this time relieved
General Ramseur from the command of the Confederate mounted forces.

Within the past day or two I had received information that a column
of the enemy was moving up from Culpeper Court House and approaching
Front Royal through Chester Gap, and although the intelligence was
unconfirmed, it caused me much solicitude; for there was strong
probability that such a movement would be made, and any considerable
force advancing through Front Royal toward Winchester could fall upon
my rear and destroy my communication with Harper's Ferry, or, moving
along the base of Massanutten Mountain, could attack my flank in
conjunction with the force at Fisher's Hill without a possibility of
my preventing it.

Neither Wilson's cavalry nor Grower's infantry had yet joined me, and
the necessities, already explained, which obliged me to hold with
string garrisons Winchester and other points heretofore mentioned.
had so depleted my line of battle strength that I knew the enemy
would outnumber me when Anderson's corps should arrive in the valley.
I deemed it advisable, therefore, to act with extreme caution, so,
with the exception of a cavalry reconnoissance on the 13th, I
remained on the defensive, quietly awaiting developments.  In the
evening of that day the enemy's skirmishers withdrew to Tumbling Run,
his main force remaining inactive behind the intrenchments at
Fisher's Hill waiting for the arrival of Anderson.

The rumors in regard to the force advancing from Culpeper kept
increasing every hour, so on the morning of the 14th I concluded to
send a brigade of cavalry to Front Royal to ascertain definitely what
was up.  At the same time I crossed the Sixth Corps to the south side
of Cedar Creek, and occupied the heights near Strasburg.  That day I
received from the hands of Colonel Chipman, of the Adjutant-General's
Department, the following despatch, to deliver which he had ridden in
great haste from Washington through Snicker's Gap, escorted by a
regiment of cavalry:

"CITY POINT, August 12, 1864--9 A. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK

"Inform General Sheridan that it is now certain two (2) divisions of
infantry have gone to Early, and some cavalry and twenty (20) pieces
of artillery.  This movement commenced last Saturday night.  He must
be cautious, and act now on the defensive until movements here force
them to detach to send this way.  Early's force, with this increase,
cannot exceed forty thousand men, but this is too much for General
Sheridan to attack.  Send General Sheridan the remaining brigade of
the Nineteenth Corps.

"I have ordered to Washington all the one-hundred-day men.  Their
time will soon be out, but for the present they will do to serve in
the defenses.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."


The despatch explained the movement from Culpeper, and on the morning
of the 15th Merritt's two remaining brigades were sent to Front Royal
to oppose Anderson, and the Sixth Corps withdrawn to the north side
of Cedar Creek, where it would be in a position enabling me either to
confront Anderson or to act defensively, as desired by General Grant.

To meet the requirements of his instructions I examined the map of
the valley for a defensive line--a position where a smaller number of
troops could hold a larger number--for this information led me to
suppose that Early's force would greatly exceed mine when Anderson's
two divisions of infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry had joined him.
I could see but one such position, and that was at Halltown, in front
of Harper's Ferry.  Subsequent experience convinced me that there was
no other really defensive line in the Shenandoah Valley, for at
almost any other point the open country and its peculiar topography
invites rather than forbids flanking operations.

This retrograde movement would also enable me to strengthen my
command by Grower's division of the Nineteenth Corps and Wilson's
cavalry, both of which divisions were marching from Washington by way
of Snicker's Gap.

After fully considering the matter, I determined to move back to
Halltown, carrying out, as I retired, my instructions to destroy all
the forage and subsistence the country afforded.  So Emory was
ordered to retire to Winchester on the night of the 15th, and Wright
and Crook to follow through Winchester to Clifton the next night.

For the cavalry, in this move to the rear, I gave the following
instructions:

"....In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as it is expected you will
have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left
to invite the enemy to return.  Take all provisions, forage, and
stock wanted for the use of your command.  Such as cannot be
consumed, destroy.  It is not desirable that buildings should be
destroyed--they should, rather, be protected; but the people should
be informed that so long as an army can subsist among them,
recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to
stop them at all hazards...." [Grant's letter of instructions.]


"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,
"Cedar Creek, Va., August 16, 1864.

"GENERAL: In compliance with instructions of the Lieutenant-General
commanding, you will make the necessary arrangements and give the
necessary orders for the destruction of the wheat and hay south of a
line from Millwood to Winchester and Petticoat Gap.  You will seize
all mules, horses, and cattle that may be useful to our army.  Loyal
citizens can bring in their claims against the Government for this
necessary destruction.  No houses will be burned, and officers in
charge of this delicate but necessary duty must inform the people
that the object is to make this valley untenable for the raiding
parties of the rebel army.

"Very respectfully,

"P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Major-General Commanding.

"BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. T. A. TORBERT,
"Chief of Cavalry, Middle Military Division."


During his visit to General Hunter at the Monocacy, General Grant had
not only decided to retain in the Shenandoah Valley a large force
sufficient to defeat Early's army or drive it back to Lee, but he had
furthermore determined to make that sections by the destruction of
its supplies, untenable for continued occupancy by the Confederates.
This would cut off one of Lee's main-stays in the way of subsistence,
and at the same time diminish the number of recruits and conscripts
he received; the valley district while under his control not only
supplying Lee with an abundance of food, but also furnishing him many
men for his regular and irregular forces.  Grant's instructions to
destroy the valley began with the letter of August 5 to Hunter, which
was turned over to me, and this was followed at intervals by more
specific directions, all showing the earnestness of his purpose.


"CITY POINT, Va., Aug. 16--3:30 P. M., 1864.
"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Winchester, Va.:

"If you can possibly spare a division of cavalry, send them through
Loudoun County to destroy and carry off the crops, animals, negroes,
and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms.  In
this way you will get many of Mosby's men.  All male citizens under
fifty can fairly be held as prisoners of war, not as citizen
prisoners.  If not already soldiers, they will be made so the moment
the rebel army gets hold of them.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."



"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"CITY POINT, Aug. 21, 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Charlestown, Va.:

"In stripping Loudoun County of supplies, etc., impress from all
loyal persons so that they may receive pay for what is taken from
them.  I am informed by the Assistant Secretary of War that Loudoun
County has a large population of Quakers, who are all favorably
disposed to the Union.  These people may be exempted from arrest.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."



"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
"CITY POINT, Va., Aug. 26,2:30 P. M. 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Halltown, Va.:

"Telegraphed you that I had good reason for believing that Fitz Lee
had been ordered back here.  I now think it likely that all troops
will be ordered back from the valley except what they believe to be
the minimum number to detain you.  My reason for supposing this is
based upon the fact that yielding up the Weldon road seems to be a
blow to the enemy he cannot stand.  I think I do not overstate the
loss of the enemy in the last two weeks at 10,000 killed and wounded.
We have lost heavily, mostly in captured when the enemy gained
temporary advantages.  Watch closely, and if you find this theory
correct, push with all vigor.  Give the enemy no rest, and if it is
possible to follow to the Virginia Central road, follow that far.  Do
all the damage to railroads and crops you can.  Carry off stock of
all descriptions and negroes, so as to prevent further planting.  If
the war is to last another year we want the Shenandoah Valley to
remain a barren waste.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"CITY POINT, Va., Sept. 4,--10 A. M.--1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Charlestown, Va.:

"In cleaning out the arms-bearing community of Loudoun County and the
subsistence for armies, exercise your own judgment as to who should
be exempt from arrest, and as to who should receive pay for their
stock, grain, etc.  It is our interest that that county should not be
capable of subsisting a hostile army, and at the same time we want to
inflict as little hardship upon Union men as possible.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."



"CITY POINT, Va., Nov. 9, 1864.
"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va.:

"Do you not think it advisable to notify all citizens living east of
the Blue Ridge to move out north of the Potomac all their stock,
grain, and provisions of every description?  There is no doubt about
the necessity of clearing out that country so that it will not
support Mosby's gang.  And the question is whether it is not better
that the people should save what they can.  So long as the war lasts
they must be prevented from raising another crop, both there and as
high up the valley as we can control.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."



He had rightly concluded that it was time to bring the war home to a
people engaged in raising crops from a prolific soil to feed the
country's enemies, and devoting to the Confederacy its best youth.  I
endorsed the programme in all its parts, for the stores of meat and
grain that the valley provided, and the men it furnished for Lee's
depleted regiments, were the strongest auxiliaries he possessed in
the whole insurgent section.  In war a territory like this is a
factor of great importance, and whichever adversary controls it
permanently reaps all the advantages of its prosperity.  Hence, as I
have said, I endorsed Grant's programme, for I do not hold war to
mean simply that lines of men shall engage each other in battle, and
material interests be ignored.  This is but a duel, in which one
combatant seeks the other's life; war means much more, and is far
worse than this.  Those who rest at home in peace and plenty see but
little of the horrors attending such a duel, and even grow
indifferent to them as the struggle goes on, contenting themselves
with encouraging all who are able-bodied to enlist in the cause, to
fill up the shattered ranks as death thins them.  It is another
matter, however, when deprivation and suffering are brought to their
own doors.  Then the case appears much graver, for the loss of
property weighs heavy with the most of mankind; heavier often, than
the sacrifices made on the field of battle.  Death is popularly
considered the maximum of punishment in war, but it is not; reduction
to poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly than
does the destruction of human life, as the selfishness of man has
demonstrated in more than one great conflict.

In the afternoon of the 16th I started back to Winchester, whence I
could better supervise our regressive march.  As I was passing
through Newtown, I heard cannonading from the direction of Front
Royal, and on reaching Winchester, Merritt's couriers brought me word
that he had been attacked at the crossing of the Shenandoah by
Kershaw's division of Anderson's corps and two brigades of Fitzhugh
Lee's cavalry, but that the attack had been handsomely repulsed, with
a capture of two battle-flags and three hundred prisoners.  This was
an absolute confirmation of the despatch from Grant; and I was now
more than satisfied with the wisdom of my withdrawal.

At daylight of the 17th Emory moved from Winchester to Berryville,
and the same morning Crook and Wright reached Winchester, having
started from Cedar Creek the day before.  From Winchester, Crook and
Wright resumed their march toward Clifton, Wright, who had the rear
guard, getting that day as far as the Berryville crossing of the
Opequon, where he was ordered to remain, while Crook went ahead till
he reached the vicinity of Berryville.  On the afternoon of the 17th
Lowell with his two regiments of troopers came into Winchester, where
he was joined by Wilson's mounted division, which had come by a rapid
march from Snicker's ferry.  In the mean time Merritt, after his
handsome engagement with Kershaw near Front Royal, had been ordered
back to the neighborhood of White Post, so that my cavalry outposts
now extended from this last point around to the west of Winchester.

During all these operations the enemy had a signal-station on Three
Top Mountain, almost overhanging Strasburg, from which every movement
made by our troops could be plainly seen; therefore, early on the
morning of the 17th he became aware of the fact that we were retiring
down the valley, and at once made after us, and about sundown drove
Torbert out of Winchester, he having been left there-with Wilson and
Lowell, and the Jersey brigade of the Sixth Corps, to develop the
character of the enemy's pursuit.  After a severe skirmish Wilson and
Lowell fell back to Summit Point, and the Jersey brigade joined its
corps at the crossing of the Opequon.  This affair demonstrated that
Early's whole army had followed us from Fisher's Hill, in concert
with Anderson and Fitzhugh Lee from Front Royal, and the two columns
joined near Winchester the morning of the 18th.

That day I moved the Sixth Corps by way of Clifton to Flowing Spring,
two and a half miles west of Charlestown, on the Smithfield pike; and
Emory, with Dwight's and Grower's divisions (Grower's having joined
that morning from Washington), to a position about the same distance
south of Charlestown, on the Berryville pike.  Following these
movements, Merritt fell back to Berryville, covering the Berryville
pike crossing of the Opequon, and Wilson was stationed at Summit
Point, whence he held a line along the Opequon as far north as the
bridge at Smithfield.  Crook continued to hold on near Clifton until
the next day, and was then moved into place on the left of Emory.

This line was practically maintained till the 21st, when the enemy,
throwing a heavy force across the Opequon by the bridge at
Smithfield, drove in my cavalry pickets to Summit Point, and followed
up with a rapid advance against the position of the Sixth Corps near
Flowing Spring.  A sharp and obstinate skirmish with a heavy
picket-line of the Sixth Corps grew out of this manoeuvre, and
resulted very much in our favor, but the quick withdrawal of the
Confederates left no opportunity for a general engagement.  It seems
that General Early thought I had taken position near Summit Point, and
that by moving rapidly around through Smithfield he could fall upon my
rear in concert with an attack in front by Anderson, but the warm
reception given him disclosed his error, for he soon discovered that
my line lay in front of Charlestown instead of where he supposed.

In the manoeuvre Merritt had been attacked in front of Berryville and
Wilson at Summit Point, the former by cavalry and the latter by
Anderson's infantry.  The exposed positions of Merritt and Wilson
necessitated their withdrawal if I was to continue to act on the
defensive; so, after the army had moved back to Halltown the
preceding night, without loss or inconvenience, I called them in and
posted them on the right of the infantry.

My retrograde move from Strasburg to Halltown caused considerable
alarm in the North, as the public was ignorant of the reasons for it;
and in the excited state of mind then prevailing, it was generally
expected that the reinforced Confederate army would again cross the
Potomac, ravage Maryland and Pennsylvania, and possibly capture
Washington.  Mutterings of dissatisfaction reached me from many
sources, and loud calls were made for my removal, but I felt
confident that my course would be justified when the true situation
was understood, for I knew that I was complying with my instructions.
Therefore I paid small heed to the adverse criticisms pouring down
from the North almost every day, being fully convinced that the best
course was to bide my time, and wait till I could get the enemy into
a position from which he could not escape without such serious
misfortune as to have some bearing on the general result of the war.
Indeed, at this time I was hoping that my adversary would renew the
boldness he had exhibited the early part of the month, and strike for
the north side of the Potomac, and wrote to General Grant on the 20th
of August that I had purposely left everything in that direction open
to the enemy.

On the 22d the Confederates moved to Charlestown and pushed well up
to my position at Halltown.  Here for the next three days they
skirmished with my videttes and infantry pickets, Emory and Cook
receiving the main attention; but finding that they could make no
impression, and judging it to be an auspicious time to intensify the
scare in the North, on the 25th of August Early despatched Fitzhugh
Lee's cavalry to Williamsport, and moved all the rest of his army but
Anderson's infantry and McCausland's cavalry to Kerneysville.  This
same day there was sharp picket firing along the whole front of my
infantry line, arising, as afterward ascertained, from a heavy
demonstration by Anderson.  During this firing I sent Torbert, with
Merritt's and Wilson's divisions, to Kerrteysville, whence he was to
proceed toward Leetown and learn what had become of Fitz. Lee.

About a mile from Leetown Torbert met a small force of Confederate
cavalry, and soon after encountering it, stumbled on Breckenridge's
corps of infantry on the march, apparently heading for Shepherdstown.
The surprise was mutual, for Torbert expected to meet only the
enemy's cavalry, while the Confederate infantry column was
anticipating an unobstructed march to the Potomac.  Torbert attacked
with such vigor as at first to double up the head of Breckenridge's
corps and throw it into confusion, but when the Confederates realized
that they were confronted only by cavalry, Early brought up the whole
of the four infantry divisions engaged in his manoeuvre, and in a
sharp attack pushed Torbert rapidly back.

All the advantages which Torbert had gained by surprising the enemy
were nullified by this counter-attack, and he was obliged to withdraw
Wilson's division toward my right, to the neighborhood of Duffield's
Station, Merritt drawing back to the same point by way of the
Shepherdstown ford.  Custer's brigade becoming isolated after the
fight while assisting the rear guard, was also obliged to retire,
which it did to Shepherdstown and there halted, picketing the river
to Antietam ford.

When Torbert reported to me the nature of his encounter, and that a
part of Early's infantry was marching to the north, while Fitzhugh
Lee's cavalry had gone toward Martinsburg, I thought that the
Confederate general meditated crossing his cavalry into Maryland, so
I sent Wilson by way of Harper's Ferry to watch his movements from
Boonesboro', and at the same time directed Averell, who had reported
from West Virginia some days before, to take post at Williamsport and
hold the crossing there until he was driven away.  I also thought it
possible that Early might cross the Potomac with his whole army, but
the doubts of a movement like this outweighed the probabilities
favoring it.  Nevertheless, to meet such a contingency I arranged to
throw my army on his rear should the occasion arise, and deeming my
position at Halltown the most advantageous in which to await
developments, my infantry was retained there.

If General Early had ever intended to cross the Potomac, Torbert's
discovery of his manoeuvre put an end to his scheme of invasion, for
he well knew that and success he might derive from such a course
would depend on his moving with celerity, and keeping me in ignorance
of his march till it should be well under way; so he settled all the
present uncertainties by retiring with all his troops about
Kerneysville to his old position at Bunker Hill behind the Opequon,
and on the night of the 26th silently withdrew Anderson and
McCausland from my front at Halltown to Stephenson's depot.

By the 27th all of Early's infantry was in position at Brucetown and
Bunker Hill, his cavalry holding the outposts of Leetown and
Smithfield, and on that day Merritt's division attacked the enemy's
horse at Leetown, and pressed it back through Smithfield to the west
side of the Opequon.  This reconnoissance determined definitely that
Early had abandoned the projected movement into Maryland, if he ever
seriously contemplated it; and I marched my infantry out from
Halltown to the front of Charlestown, with the intention of occupying
a line between Clifton and Berryville the moment matters should so
shape themselves that I could do so with advantage.  The night of the
28th Wilson joined me near Charlestown from his points of observation
in Maryland, and the next day Averell crossed the Potomac at
Williamsport and advanced to Martinsburg.

Merritt's possession of Smithfield bridge made Early somewhat uneasy,
since it afforded opportunity for interposing a column between his
right and left flanks, so he concluded to retake the crossing, and,
to this end, on the 29th advanced two divisions of infantry.  A
severe fight followed, and Merritt was forced to retire, being driven
through the village toward Charlestown with considerable loss.  As
Merritt was nearing my infantry line, I ordered.  Ricketts's division
of the Sixth Corps to his relief, and this in a few minutes turned
the tide, the Smithfield crossing of the Opequon being regained, and
afterward held by Lowell's brigade, supported by Ricketts.  The next
morning I moved Torbert, with Wilson and Merritt, to Berryville, and
succeeding their occupation of that point there occurred along my
whole line a lull, which lasted until the 3d of September, being
undisturbed except by a combat near Bunker Hill between Averell's
cavalry and a part of McCausland's, supported by Rodes's division of
infantry, in which affair the Confederates were defeated with the
loss of about fifty prisoners and considerable property in the shape
of wagons and beef-cattle.

Meanwhile Torbert's movement to Berryville had alarmed Early, and as
a counter move on the 2d of September he marched with the bulk of his
army to Summit Point, but while reconnoitring in that region on the
3d he learned of the havoc that Averell was creating in his rear, and
this compelled him to recross to the west side of the Opequon and
mass his troops in the vicinity of Stephenson's depot, whence he
could extend down to Bunker Hill, continue to threaten the Baltimore
and Ohio railroad, and at the same time cover Winchester.

The same day I was moving my infantry to take up the Clifton-Berryville
line, and that afternoon Wright went into position at Clifton, Crook
occupied Berryville, and Emory's corps came in between them, forming
almost a continuous line.  Torbert had moved to White Post meanwhile,
with directions to reconnoitre as far south as the Front Royal Pike.

My infantry had just got fairly into this position about an hour
before sunset, when along Crook's front a combat took place that at
the time caused me to believe it was Early's purpose to throw a
column between Crook and Torbert, with the intention of isolating the
latter; but the fight really arose from the attempt of General
Anderson to return to Petersburg with Kershaw's division in response
to loud calls from General Lee.  Anderson started south on the 3d of
September, and possibly this explains Early's reconnoissance that day
to Summit Point as a covering movement, but his rapid withdrawal left
him in ignorance of my advance, and Anderson marched on heedlessly
toward Berryville, expecting to cross the Blue Ridge through Ashby's
Gap.  At Berryville however, he blundered into Crook's lines about
sunset, and a bitter little fight ensued, in which the Confederates
got so much the worst of it that they withdrew toward Winchester.
When General Early received word of this encounter he hurried to
Anderson's assistance with three divisions, but soon perceiving what
was hitherto unknown to him, that my whole army was on a new line, he
decided, after some slight skirmishing, that Anderson must remain at
Winchester until a favorable opportunity offered for him to rejoin
Lee by another route.

Succeeding the discomfiture of Anderson, some minor operations took
place on the part of, Averell on the right and McIntosh's brigade of
Wilson's division on the left, but from that time until the 19th of
September no engagement of much importance occurred.  The line from
Clifton to Berryville was occupied by the Sixth Corps and Grower's
and Dwight's divisions of the Nineteenth, Crook being transferred to
Summit Point, whence I could use him to protect my right flank and my
communication with Harper's Ferry, while the cavalry threatened the
enemy's right flank and line of retreat up the valley.

The difference of strength between the two armies at this date was
considerably in my favor, but the conditions attending my situation
in a hostile region necessitated so much detached service to protect
trains, and to secure Maryland and Pennsylvania from raids, that my
excess in numbers was almost canceled by these incidental demands
that could not be avoided, and although I knew that I was strong,
yet, in consequence of the injunctions of General Grant, I deemed it
necessary to be very cautious; and the fact that the Presidential
election was impending made me doubly so, the authorities at
Washington having impressed upon me that the defeat of my army might
be followed by the overthrow of the party in power, which event, it
was believed, would at least retard the progress of the war, if,
indeed, it did not lead to the complete abandonment of all coercive
measures.  Under circumstances such as these I could not afford to
risk a disaster, to say nothing of the intense disinclination every
soldier has for such results; so, notwithstanding my superior
strength, I determined to take all the time necessary to equip myself
with the fullest information, and then seize an opportunity under
such conditions that I could not well fail of success.








PERSONAL MEMOIRES OF P. H. SHERIDAN, VOLUME 2.

By Philip Henry Sheridan



CHAPTER I.

ORGANIZING SCOUTS--MISS REBECCA WRIGHT--IMPORTANT INFORMATION--DECIDE
TO MOVE ON NEWTOWN--MEETING GENERAL GRANT--ORGANIZATION OF THE UNION
ARMY--OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF THE OPEQUON--DEATH OF GENERAL RUSSELL
--A TURNING MOVEMENT--A SUCCESSFUL CAVALRY CHARGE--VICTORY--THREE
LOYAL GIRLS--APPOINTED A BRIGADIER-GENERAL IN THE REGULAR ARMY
--REMARKS ON THE BATTLE.

While occupying the ground between Clifton and Berryville, referred
to in the last chapter of the preceding volume, I felt the need of an
efficient body of scouts to collect information regarding the enemy,
for the defective intelligence-establishment with which I started out
from Harper's Ferry early in August had not proved satisfactory.  I
therefore began to organize my scouts on a system which I hoped would
give better results than bad the method hitherto pursued in the
department, which was to employ on this service doubtful citizens and
Confederate deserters.  If these should turn out untrustworthy, the
mischief they might do us gave me grave apprehension, and I finally
concluded that those of our own soldiers who should volunteer for the
delicate and hazardous duty would be the most valuable material, and
decided that they should have a battalion organization and be
commanded by an officer, Major H. K. Young, of the First Rhode Island
Infantry.  These men were disguised in Confederate uniforms whenever
necessary, were paid from the Secret-Service Fund in proportion to
the value of the intelligence they furnished, which often stood us in
good stead in checking the forays of Gilmore, Mosby, and other
irregulars.  Beneficial results came from the plan in many other ways
too, and particularly so when in a few days two of my scouts put me
in the way of getting news conveyed from Winchester.  They had
learned that just outside of my lines, near Millwood, there was
living an old colored man, who had a permit from the Confederate
commander to go into Winchester and return three times a week, for
the purpose of selling vegetables to the inhabitants.  The scouts had
sounded this man, and, finding him both loyal and shrewd, suggested
that he might be made useful to us within the enemy's lines; and the
proposal struck me as feasible, provided there could be found in
Winchester some reliable person who would be willing to co-operate
and correspond with me.  I asked General Crook, who was acquainted
with many of the Union people of Winchester, if he knew of such a
person, and he recommended a Miss Rebecca Wright, a young lady whom
he had met there before the battle of Kernstown, who, he said, was a
member of the Society of Friends and the teacher of a small private
school.  He knew she was faithful and loyal to the Government, and
thought she might be willing to render us assistance, but he could
not be certain of this, for on account of her well known loyalty she
was under constant surveillance.  I hesitated at first, but finally
deciding to try it, despatched the two scouts to the old negro's
cabin, and they brought him to my headquarters late that night.  I
was soon convinced of the negro's fidelity, and asking him if he was
acquainted with Miss Rebecca Wright, of Winchester, he replied that
he knew her well.  There upon I told him what I wished to do, and
after a little persuasion he agreed to carry a letter to her on his
next marketing trip.  My message was prepared by writing it on tissue
paper, which was then compressed into a small pellet, and protected
by wrapping it in tin-foil so that it could be safely carried in the
man's mouth.  The probability, of his being searched when he came to
the Confederate picketline was not remote, and in such event he was
to swallow the pellet.  The letter appealed to Miss Wright's loyalty
and patriotism, and requested her to furnish me with information
regarding the strength and condition of Early's army.  The night
before the negro started one of the scouts placed the odd-looking
communication in his hands, with renewed injunctions as to secrecy
and promptitude.  Early the next morning it was delivered to Miss
Wright, with an intimation that a letter of importance was enclosed
in the tin-foil, the negro telling her at the same time that she
might expect him to call for a message in reply before his return
home.  At first Miss Wright began to open the pellet nervously, but
when told to be careful, and to preserve the foil as a wrapping for
her answer, she proceeded slowly and carefully, and when the note
appeared intact the messenger retired, remarking again that in the
evening he would come for an answer.

On reading my communication Miss Wright was much startled by the
perils it involved, and hesitatingly consulted her mother, but her
devoted loyalty soon silenced every other consideration, and the
brave girl resolved to comply with my request, notwithstanding it
might jeopardize her life.  The evening before a convalescent
Confederate officer had visited her mother's house, and in
conversation about the war had disclosed the fact that Kershaw's
division of infantry and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery had started
to rejoin General Lee.  At the time Miss Wright heard this she
attached little if any importance to it, but now she perceived the
value of the intelligence, and, as her first venture, determined to
send it to me at once, which she did with a promise that in the
future she would with great pleasure continue to transmit information
by the negro messenger.



"SEPTEMBER 15, 1864.

"I learn from Major-General Crook that you are a loyal lady, and
still love the old flag.  Can you inform me of the position of
Early's forces, the number of divisions in his army, and the strength
of any or all of them, and his probable or reported intentions?  Have
any more troops arrived from Richmond, or are any more coming, or
reported to be coming?

"You can trust the bearer."

"I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General Commanding."



"SEPTEMBER 16, 1864.

"I have no communication whatever with the rebels, but will tell you
what I know.  The division of General Kershaw, and Cutshaw's
artillery, twelve guns and men, General Anderson commanding, have
been sent away, and no more are expected, as they cannot be spared
from Richmond.  I do not know how the troops are situated, but the
force is much smaller than represented.  I will take pleasure
hereafter in learning all I can of their strength and position, and
the bearer may call again.

"Very respectfully yours,"
............



Miss Wright's answer proved of more value to me than she anticipated,
for it not only quieted the conflicting reports concerning Anderson's
corps, but was most important in showing positively that Kershaw was
gone, and this circumstance led, three days later, to the battle of
the Opequon, or Winchester as it has been unofficially called.  Word
to the effect that some of Early's troops were under orders to return
to Petersburg, and would start back at the first favorable
opportunity, had been communicated to me already from many sources,
but we had not been able to ascertain the date for their departure.
Now that they had actually started, I decided to wait before offering
battle until Kershaw had gone so far as to preclude his return,
feeling confident that my prudence would be justified by the improved
chances of victory; and then, besides, Mr. Stanton kept reminding me
that positive success was necessary to counteract the political
dissatisfaction existing in some of the Northern States.  This course
was advised and approved by General Grant, but even with his powerful
backing it was difficult to resist the persistent pressure of those
whose judgment, warped by their interests in the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad, was often confused and misled by stories of scouts (sent
out from Washington), averring that Kershaw and Fitzhugh Lee had
returned to Petersburg, Breckenridge to southwestern Virginia, and at
one time even maintaining that Early's whole army was east of the
Blue Ridge, and its commander himself at Gordonsville.

During the inactivity prevailing in my army for the ten days
preceding Miss Wright's communication the infantry was quiet, with
the exception of Getty's division, which made a reconnoissance to the
Opequon, and developed a heavy force of the enemy at Edwards's
Corners.  The cavalry, however, was employed a good deal in this
interval skirmishing heavily at times to maintain a space about six
miles in width between the hostile lines, for I wished to control
this ground so that when I was released from the instructions of
August 12, I could move my men into position for attack without the
knowledge of Early.  The most noteworthy of these mounted encounters
was that of McIntosh's brigade, which captured the Eighth South
Carolina at Abraham's Creek September 13.

It was the evening of the 16th of September that I received from Miss
Wright the positive information that Kershaw was in march toward
Front Royal on his way by Chester Gap to Richmond.  Concluding that
this was my opportunity, I at once resolved to throw my whole force
into Newtown the next day, but a despatch from General Grant
directing me to meet him at Charlestown, whither he was coming to
consult with me, caused me to defer action until after I should see
him.  In our resulting interview at Charlestown, I went over the
situation very thoroughly, and pointed out with so much confidence
the chances of a complete victory should I throw my army across the
Valley pike near Newtown that he fell in with the plan at once,
authorized me to resume the offensive, and to attack Early as soon as
I deemed it most propitious to do so; and although before leaving
City Point he had outlined certain operations for my army, yet he
neither discussed nor disclosed his plans, my knowledge of the
situation striking him as being so much more accurate than his own.


[Extract from "Grant's Memoirs," page 328.]

"....Before starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan,
which I had brought with me; but seeing that he was so clear and so
positive in his views, and so confident of success, I said nothing
about this, and did not take it out of my pocket...."


The interview over, I returned to my army to arrange for its movement
toward Newtown, but while busy with these preparations, a report came
to me from General Averell which showed that Early was moving with
two divisions of infantry toward Martinsburg.  This considerably
altered the state of affairs, and I now decided to change my plan and
attack at once the two divisions remaining about Winchester and
Stephenson's depot, and later, the two sent to Martinsburg; the
disjointed state of the enemy giving me an opportunity to take him in
detail, unless the Martinsburg column should be returned by forced
marches.

While General Early was in the telegraph office at Martinsburg on the
morning of the 18th, he learned of Grant's visit to me; and
anticipating activity by reason of this circumstance, he promptly
proceeded to withdraw so as to get the two divisions within
supporting distance of Ramseur's, which lay across the Berryville
pike about two miles east of Winchester, between Abraham's Creek and
Red Bud Run, so by the night of the 18th Wharton's division, under
Breckenridge, was at Stephenson's depot, Rodes near there, and
Gordon's at Bunker Hill.  At daylight of the 19th these positions of
the Confederate infantry still obtained, with the cavalry of Lomax,
Jackson, and Johnson on the right of Ramseur, while to the left and
rear of the enemy's general line was Fitzhugh Lee, covering from
Stephenson's depot west across the Valley pike to Applepie Ridge.

My army moved at 3 o'clock that morning.  The plan was for Torbert to
advance with Merritt's division of cavalry from Summit Point, carry
the crossings of the Opequon at Stevens's and Lock's fords, and form
a junction near Stephenson's depot, with Averell, who was to move
south from Darksville by the Valley pike.  Meanwhile, Wilson was to
strike up the Berryville pike, carry the Berryville crossing of the
Opequon, charge through the gorge or canyon on the road west of the
stream, and occupy the open ground at the head of this defile.
Wilson's attack was to be supported by the Sixth and Nineteenth
corps, which were ordered to the Berryville crossing, and as the
cavalry gained the open ground beyond the gorge, the two infantry
corps, under command of General Wright, were expected to press on
after and occupy Wilson's ground, who was then to shift to the south
bank of Abraham's Creek and cover my left; Crook's two divisions,
having to march from Summit Point, were to follow the Sixth and
Nineteenth corps to the Opcquon, and should they arrive before the
action began, they were to be held in reserve till the proper moment
came, and then, as a turning-column, be thrown over toward the Valley
pike, south of Winchester.

McIntosh's brigade of Wilson's division drove the enemy's pickets
away from the Berryville crossing at dawn, and Wilson following
rapidly through the gorge with the rest of the division, debouched
from its western extremity with such suddenness as to capture a
small earthwork in front of General Ramseur's main line; and
not-withstanding the Confederate infantry, on recovering from its
astonishment, tried hard to dislodge them, Wilson's troopers
obstinately held the work till the Sixth Corps came up.  I followed
Wilson to select the ground on which to form the infantry.  The Sixth
Corps began to arrive about 8 o'clock, and taking up the line Wilson
had been holding, just beyond the head of the narrow ravine, the
cavalry was transferred to the south side of Abraham's Creek.

The Confederate line lay along some elevated ground about two miles
east of Winchester, and extended from Abraham's Creek north across
the Berryville pike, the left being hidden in the heavy timber on Red
Bud Run.  Between this line and mine, especially on my right, clumps
of woods and patches of underbrush occurred here and there, but the
undulating ground consisted mainly of open fields, many of which were
covered with standing corn that had already ripened.

Much time was lost in getting all of the Sixth and Nineteenth corps
through the narrow defile, Grover's division being greatly delayed
there by a train of ammunition wagons, and it was not until late in
the forenoon that the troops intended for the attack could be got
into line ready to advance.  General Early was not slow to avail
himself of the advantages thus offered him, and my chances of
striking him in detail were growing less every moment, for Gordon and
Rodes were hurrying their divisions from Stephenson's depot
--across-country on a line that would place Gordon in the woods south
of Red Bud Run, and bring Rodes into the interval between Gordon and
Ramseur.

When the two corps had all got through the canyon they were formed
with Getty's division of the Sixth to the left of the Berryville
pike, Rickett's division to the right of the pike, and Russell's
division in reserve in rear of the other two.  Grover's division of
the Nineteenth Corps came next on the right of Rickett's, with Dwight
to its rear in reserve, while Crook was to begin massing near the
Opequon crossing about the time Wright and Emory were ready to
attack.

Just before noon the line of Getty, Ricketts, and Grover moved
forward, and as we advanced, the Confederates, covered by some heavy
woods on their right, slight underbrush and corn-fields along their
Centre, and a large body of timber on their left along the Red Bud,
opened fire from their whole front.  We gained considerable ground at
first, especially on our left but the desperate resistance which the
right met with demonstrated that the time we had unavoidably lost in
the morning had been of incalculable value to Early, for it was
evident that he had been enabled already to so far concentrate his
troops as to have the different divisions of his army in a connected
line of battle, in good shape to resist.

Getty and Ricketts made some progress toward Winchester in connection
with Wilson's cavalry, which was beyond the Senseny road on Getty's
left, and as they were pressing back Ramseur's infantry and Lomax's
cavalry Grover attacked from the right with decided effect.  Grover
in a few minutes broke up Evans's brigade of Gordon's division, but
his pursuit of Evans destroyed the continuity of my general line, and
increased an interval that had already been made by the deflection of
Ricketts to the left, in obedience to instructions that had been
given him to guide his division on the Berryville pike.  As the line
pressed forward, Ricketts observed this widening interval and
endeavored to fill it with the small brigade of Colonel Keifer, but
at this juncture both Gordon and Rodes struck the weak spot where the
right of the Sixth Corps and the left of the Nineteenth should have
been in conjunction, and succeeded in checking my advance by driving
back a part of Ricketts's division, and the most of Grover's.  As
these troops were retiring I ordered Russell's reserve division to be
put into action, and just as the flank of the enemy's troops in
pursuit of Grover was presented, Upton's brigade, led in person by
both Russell and Upton, struck it in a charge so vigorous as to drive
the Confederates back in turn to their original ground.

The success of Russell enabled me to re-establish the right of my
line some little distance in advance of the position from which it
started in the morning, and behind Russell's division (now commanded
by Upton) the broken regiments of Ricketts's division were rallied.
Dwight's division was then brought up on the right, and Grover's men
formed behind it.

The charge of Russell was most opportune, but it cost many men in
killed and wounded.  Among the former was the courageous Russell
himself; killed by a piece of shell that passed through his heart,
although he had previously been struck by a bullet in the left
breast, which wound, from its nature, must have proved mortal, yet of
which he had not spoken.  Russell's death oppressed us all with
sadness, and me particularly.  In the early days of my army life he
was my captain and friend, and I was deeply indebted to him, not only
for sound advice and good example, but for the inestimable service he
had just performed, and sealed with his life, so it may be inferred
how keenly I felt his loss.

As my lines were being rearranged, it was suggested to me to put
Crook into the battle, but so strongly had I set my heart on using
him to take possession of the Valley pike and cut off the enemy, that
I resisted this advice, hoping that the necessity for putting him in
would be obviated by the attack near Stephenson's depot that
Torbert's cavalry was to make, and from which I was momentarily
expecting to hear.  No news of Torbert's progress came, however, so,
yielding at last, I directed Crook to take post on the right of the
Nineteenth Corps and, when the action was renewed, to push his
command forward as a turning-column in conjunction with Emory.  After
some delay in the annoying defile, Crook got his men up, and posting
Colonel Thoburn's division on the prolongation of the Nineteenth
Corps, he formed Colonel Duval's division to the right of Thoburn.
Here I joined Crook, informing him that I had just got word that
Torbert was driving the enemy in confusion along the Martinsburg pike
toward Winchester; at the same time I directed him to attack the
moment all of Duval's men were in line.  Wright was instructed to
advance in concert with Crook, by swinging Emory and the right of the
Sixth Corps to the left together in a half-wheel.  Then leaving
Crook, I rode along the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, the open ground
over which they were passing affording a rare opportunity to witness
the precision with which the attack was taken up from right to left.
Crook's success began the moment he started to turn the enemy's left;
and assured by the fact that Torbert had stampeded the Confederate
cavalry and thrown Breckenridge's infantry into such disorder that it
could do little to prevent the envelopment of Gordon's left, Crook
pressed forward without even a halt.

Both Emory and Wright took up the fight as ordered, and as they did
so I sent word to Wilson, in the hope that he could partly perform
the work originally laid out for Crook, to push along the Senseny
road and, if possible, gain the valley pike south of Winchester.  I
then returned toward my right flank, and as I reached the Nineteenth
Corps the enemy was contesting the ground in its front with great
obstinacy; but Emory's dogged persistence was at length rewarded with
success, just as Crook's command emerged from the morass of Red Bud
Run, and swept around Gordon, toward the right of Breckenridge, who,
with two of Wharton's brigades, was holding a line at right angles
with the Valley pike for the protection of the Confederate rear.
Early had ordered these two brigades back from Stephenson's depot in
the morning, purposing to protect with them his right flank and line
of retreat, but while they were en route to this end, he was obliged
to recall them to his left to meet Crook's attack.

To confront Torbert, Patton's brigade of infantry and some of
Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry had been left back by Breckenridge, but, with
Averell on the west side of the Valley pike and Merritt on the east,
Torbert began to drive this opposing force toward Winchester the
moment he struck it near Stephenson's depot, keeping it on the go
till it reached the position held by Breckenridge, where it
endeavored to make a stand.

The ground which Breckenridge was holding was open, and offered an
opportunity such as seldom had been presented during the war for a
mounted attack, and Torbert was not slow to take advantage of it.
The instant Merritt's division could be formed for the charge, it
went at Breckenridge's infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry with such
momentum as to break the Confederate left, just as Averell was
passing around it.  Merritt's brigades, led by Custer, Lowell, and
Devin, met from the start with pronounced success, and with sabre or
pistol in hand literally rode down a battery of five guns and took
about 1,200 prisoners.  Almost simultaneously with this cavalry
charge, Crook struck Breckenridge's right and Gordon's left, forcing
these divisions to give way, and as they retired, Wright, in a
vigorous attack, quickly broke Rodes up and pressed Ramseur so hard
that the whole Confederate army fell back, contracting its lines
within some breastworks which had been thrown up at a former period
of the war, immediately in front of Winchester.

Here Early tried hard to stem the tide, but soon Torbert's cavalry
began passing around his left flank, and as Crook, Emory, and Wright
attacked in front, panic took possession of the enemy, his troops,
now fugitives and stragglers, seeking escape into and through
Winchester.

When this second break occurred, the Sixth and Nineteenth corps were
moved over toward the Millwood pike to help Wilson on the left, but
the day was so far spent that they could render him no assistance,
and Ramseur's division, which had maintained some organization, was
in such tolerable shape as to check him.  Meanwhile Torbert passed
around to the west of Winchester to join Wilson, but was unable to do
so till after dark.  Crook's command pursued the enemy through the
town to Mill Greek, I going along.

Just after entering the town, Crook and I met, in the main street,
three young girls, who gave us the most hearty reception.  One of
these young women was a Miss Griffith, the other two Miss Jennie and
Miss Susie Meredith.  During the day they had been watching the
battle from the roof of the Meredith residence, with tears and
lamentations, they said, in the morning when misfortune appeared to
have overtaken the Union troops, but with unbounded exultation when,
later, the tide set in against the Confederates.  Our presence was,
to them, an assurance of victory, and their delight being
irrepressible, they indulged in the most unguarded manifestations and
expressions.  When cautioned by Crook, who knew them well, and
reminded that the valley had hitherto been a race-course--one day in
the possession of friends, and the next of enemies--and warned of the
dangers they were incurring by such demonstrations, they assured him
that they had no further fears of that kind now, adding that Early's
army was so demoralized by the defeat it had just sustained that it
would never be in condition to enter Winchester again.  As soon as we
had succeeded in calming the excited girls a little I expressed a
desire to find some place where I could write a telegram to General
Grant informing him of the result of the battle, and General Crook
conducted me to the home of Miss Wright, where I met for the first
time the woman who had contributed so much to our success, and on a
desk in her school-room wrote the despatch announcing that we had
sent Early's army whirling up the valley.

My losses in the battle of the Opequon were heavy, amounting to about
4,500 killed, wounded, and missing.  Among the killed was General
Russell, commanding a division, and the wounded included Generals
Upton, McIntosh and Chapman, and Colonels Duval and Sharpe.  The
Confederate loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners about equaled
mine, General Rodes being of the killed, while Generals Fitzhugh Lee
and York were severely wounded.

We captured five pieces of artillery and nine battle-flags.  The
restoration of the lower valley--from the Potomac to Strasburg--to
the control of the Union forces caused great rejoicing in the North,
and relieved the Administration from further solicitude for the
safety of the Maryland and Pennsylvania borders.  The President's
appreciation of the victory was expressed in a despatch so like Mr.
Lincoln that I give a facsimile of it to the reader:

[In the handwriting of President Lincoln]
"EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
"WASHINGTON, Sep.  20, 1864

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN
"WINCHESTER, VA.

"Have just heard of your great victory.  God bless you all, officers
and men.  Strongly inclined to come up and see you.

"A. LINCOLN."


This he supplemented by promoting me to the grade of
brigadier-general in the regular army, and assigning me to the
permanent command of the Middle Military Department, and following that
came warm congratulations from Mr. Stanton and from Generals Grant,
Sherman, and Meade.

The battle was not fought out on the plan in accordance with which
marching orders were issued to my troops, for I then hoped to take
Early in detail, and with Crook's force cut off his retreat.  I
adhered to this purpose during the early part of the contest, but was
obliged to abandon the idea because of unavoidable delays by which I
was prevented from getting the Sixth and Nineteenth corps through the
narrow defile and into position early enough to destroy Ramseur while
still isolated.  So much delay had not been anticipated, and this
loss of time was taken advantage of by the enemy to recall the troops
diverted to Bunker Hill and Martinsburg on the 17th, thus enabling
him to bring them all to the support of Ramseur before I could strike
with effect.  My idea was to attack Ramseur and Wharton,
successively, at a very early hour and before they could get succor,
but I was not in condition to do it till nearly noon, by which time
Gordon and Rodes had been enabled to get upon the ground at a point
from which, as I advanced, they enfiladed my right flank, and gave it
such a repulse that to re-form this part of my line I was obliged to
recall the left from some of the ground it had gained.  It was during
this reorganization of my lines that I changed my plan as to Crook,
and moved him from my left to my right.  This I did with great
reluctance, for I hoped to destroy Early's army entirely if Crook
continued on his original line of march toward the Valley pike, south
of Winchester; and although the ultimate results did, in a measure
vindicate the change, yet I have always thought that by adhering to
the original plan we might have captured the bulk of Early's army.




CHAPTER 11.

PURSUING EARLY--A SECRET MARCH--FISHER'S HILL--A GREAT SUCCESS
--REMOVAL OF AVERELL--THE RETREAT--CAPTURING AN OLD COMRADE
--THE MURDER OF LIEUTENANT MEIGS.

The night of the 19th of September I gave orders for following Early
up the valley next morning--the pursuit to begin at daybreak--and in
obedience to these directions Torbert moved Averell out on the Back
road leading to Cedar Creek, and Merritt up the Valley pike toward
Strasburg, while Wilson was directed on Front Royal by way of
Stevensburg.  Merritt's division was followed by the infantry,
Emory's and Wright's columns marching abreast in the open country to
the right and left of the pike, and Crook's immediately behind them.
The enemy having kept up his retreat at night, presented no
opposition whatever until the cavalry discovered him posted at
Fisher's Hill, on the first defensive line where he could hope to
make any serious resistance.  No effort was made to dislodge him, and
later in the day, after Wright and Emory came up, Torbert shifted
Merritt over toward the Back road till he rejoined Averell.  As
Merritt moved to the right, the Sixth and Nineteenth corps crossed
Cedar Creek and took up the ground the cavalry was vacating, Wright
posting his own corps to the west of the Valley pike overlooking
Strasburg, and Emory's on his left so as to extend almost to the road
leading from Strasburg to Front Royal.  Crook, as he came up the same
evening, went into position in some heavy timber on the north bank of
Cedar Creek.

A reconnoissance made pending these movements convinced me that the
enemy's position at Fisher's Hill was so strong that a direct assault
would entail unnecessary destruction of life, and, besides, be of
doubtful result.  At the point where Early's troops were in position,
between the Massanutten range and Little North Mountain, the valley
is only about three and a half miles wide.  All along the precipitous
bluff which overhangs Tumbling Run on the south side, a heavy line of
earthworks had been constructed when Early retreated to this point in
August, and these were now being strengthened so as to make them
almost impregnable; in fact, so secure did Early consider himself
that, for convenience, his ammunition chests were taken from the
caissons and placed behind the breastworks.  Wharton, now in command
of Breckenridge's division--its late commander having gone to
southwest Virginia--held the right of this line, with Gordon next
him; Pegram, commanding Ramseur's old division, joined Gordon.
Ramseur with Rodes's division, was on Pegram's left, while Lomax's
cavalry, now serving as foot-troops, extended the line to the Back
road.  Fitzhugh Lee being wounded, his cavalry, under General
Wickham, was sent to Milford to prevent Fisher's Hill from being
turned through the Luray Valley.

In consequence of the enemy's being so well protected from a direct
assault, I resolved on the night of the 20th to use again a
turning-column against his left, as had been done on the 19th at the
Opequon. To this end I resolved to move Crook, unperceived if possible,
over to the eastern face of Little North Mountain, whence he could
strike the left and rear of the Confederate line, and as he broke it
up, I could support him by a left half-wheel of my whole line of
battle. The execution of this plan would require perfect secrecy,
however, for the enemy from his signal-station on Three Top could
plainly see every movement of our troops in daylight.  Hence, to escape
such observation, I marched Crook during the night of the 20th into
some heavy timber north of Cedar Creek, where he lay concealed all day
the 21st.  This same day Wright and Emory were moved up closer to the
Confederate works, and the Sixth Corps, after a severe fight, in which
Ricketts's and Getty were engaged, took up some high ground on the
right of the Manassas Gap railroad in plain view of the Confederate
works, and confronting a commanding point where much of Early's
artillery was massed.  Soon after General Wright had established this
line I rode with him along it to the westward, and finding that the
enemy was still holding an elevated position further to our right, on
the north side of Tumbling Run, I directed this also to be occupied.
Wright soon carried the point, which gave us an unobstructed view of
the enemy's works and offered good ground for our artillery.  It also
enabled me to move the whole of the Sixth Corps to the front till its
line was within about seven hundred yards of the enemy's works; the
Nineteenth Corps, on the morning of the 22d, covering the ground
vacated by the Sixth by moving to the front and extending to the right,
but still keeping its reserves on the railroad.

In the darkness of the night of the gist, Crook was brought across
Cedar Creek and hidden in a clump of timber behind Hupp's Hill till
daylight of the 22d, when, under cover of the intervening woods and
ravines, he was marched beyond the right of the Sixth Corps and again
concealed not far from the Back road.  After Crook had got into this
last position, Ricketts's division was pushed out until it confronted
the left of the enemy's infantry, the rest of the Sixth Corps
extending from Ricketts's left to the Manassas Gap railroad, while
the Nineteenth Corps filled in the space between the left of the
Sixth and the North Fork of the Shenandoah.

When Ricketts moved out on this new line, in conjunction with
Averell's cavalry on his right, the enemy surmising, from information
secured from his signal-station, no doubt, that my attack was to be
made from Ricketts's front, prepared for it there, but no such
intention ever existed.  Ricketts was pushed forward only that he
might readily join Crook's turning-column as it swung into the
enemy's rear.  To ensure success, all that I needed now was enough
daylight to complete my arrangements, the secrecy of movement imposed
by the situation consuming many valuable hours.

While Ricketts was occupying the enemy's attention, Crook, again
moving unobserved into the dense timber on the eastern face of Little
North Mountain, conducted his command south in two parallel columns
until he gained the rear of the enemy's works, when, marching his
divisions by the left flank, he led them in an easterly direction
down the mountain-side.  As he emerged from the timber near the base
of the mountain, the Confederates discovered him, of course, and
opened with their batteries, but it was too late--they having few
troops at hand to confront the turning-column.  Loudly cheering,
Crook's men quickly crossed the broken stretch in rear of the enemy's
left, producing confusion and consternation at every step.

About a mile from the mountain's base Crook's left was joined by
Ricketts, who in proper time had begun to swing his division into the
action, and the two commands moved along in rear of the works so
rapidly that, with but slight resistance, the Confederates abandoned
the guns massed near the centre.  The swinging movement of Ricketts
was taken up successively from right to left throughout my line, and
in a few minutes the enemy was thoroughly routed, the action, though
brief, being none the less decisive.  Lomax's dismounted cavalry gave
way first, but was shortly followed by all the Confederate infantry
in an indescribable panic, precipitated doubtless by fears of being
caught and captured in the pocket formed by Tumbling Run and the
North Fork of the Shenandoah River.  The stampede was complete, the
enemy leaving the field without semblance of organization, abandoning
nearly all his artillery and such other property as was in the works,
and the rout extending through the fields and over the roads toward
Woodstock, Wright and Emory in hot pursuit.

Midway between Fisher's Hill and Woodstock there is some high ground,
where at night-fall a small squad endeavored to stay us with two
pieces of artillery, but this attempt at resistance proved fruitless,
and, notwithstanding the darkness, the guns were soon captured.  The
chase was then taken up by Devin's brigade as soon as it could be
passed to the front, and continued till after daylight the next
morning, but the delays incident to a night pursuit made it
impossible for Devin to do more than pick up stragglers.

Our success was very great, yet I had anticipated results still more
pregnant.  Indeed, I had high hopes of capturing almost the whole of
Early's army before it reached New Market, and with this object in
view, during the manoeuvres of the 21st I had sent Torbert up the
Luray Valley with Wilson's division and two of Merritt's brigades, in
the expectation that he would drive Wickham out of the Luray Pass by
Early's right, and by crossing the Massanutten Mountain near New
Market, gain his rear.  Torbert started in good season, and after
some slight skirmishing at Gooney Run, got as far as Milford, but
failed to dislodge Wickham.  In fact, he made little or no attempt to
force Wickham from his position, and with only a feeble effort
withdrew.  I heard nothing at all from Torbert during the 22d, and
supposing that everything was progressing favorably, I was astonished
and chagrined on the morning of the 23d, at Woodstock, to receive the
intelligence that he had fallen back to Front Royal and Buckton ford.
My disappointment was extreme, but there was now no help for the
situation save to renew and emphasize Torbert's orders, and this was
done at once, notwithstanding that I thought, the delay, had so much
diminished the chances of his getting in the rear of Early as to make
such a result a very remote possibility, unless, indeed, far greater
zeal was displayed than had been in the first attempt to penetrate
the Luray Valley.

The battle of Fisher's Hill was, in a measure, a part of the battle
of the Opequon; that is to say, it was an incident of the pursuit
resulting from that action.  In many ways, however, it was much more
satisfactory, and particularly so because the plan arranged on the
evening of the 20th was carried out to the very letter by Generals
Wright, Crook, and Emory, not only in all their preliminary
manoeuvres, but also during the fight itself.  The only drawback was
with the cavalry, and to this day I have been unable to account
satisfactorily for Torbert's failure.  No doubt, Wickham's position
near Milford was a strong one, but Torbert ought to have made a
fight.  Had he been defeated in this, his withdrawal then to await
the result at Fisher's Hill would have been justified, but it does
not appear that he made any serious effort of all to dislodge the
Confederate cavalry: his impotent attempt not only chagrined me very
much, but occasioned much unfavorable comment throughout the army.

We reached Woodstock early on the morning of the 23d, and halted
there some little time to let the troops recover their organization,
which had been broken in the night march they had just made.  When
the commands had closed up we pushed on toward Edinburg, in the hope
of making more captures at Narrow Passage Creek; but the
Confederates, too fleet for us, got away; so General Wright halted
the infantry not far from Edinburg, till rations could be brought the
men.  Meanwhile I, having remained at Woodstock, sent Dedin's brigade
to press the enemy under every favorable opportunity, and if possible
prevent him from halting long enough to reorganize.  Notwithstanding
Devin's efforts the Confederates managed to assemble a considerable
force to resist him, and being too weak for the rearguard, he awaited
the arrival of Averell, who, I had informed him, would be hurried to
the front with all possible despatch, for I thought that Averell must
be close at hand.  It turned out, however, that he was not near by at
all, and, moreover, that without good reason he had refrained from
taking any part whatever in pursuing the enemy in the flight from
Fisher's Hill; and in fact had gone into camp and left to the
infantry the work of pursuit.

It was nearly noon when Averell came up, and a great deal of precious
time had been lost.  We had some hot words, but hoping that he would
retrieve the mistake of the night before, I directed him to proceed
to the front at once, and in conjunction with Devin close with the
enemy.  He reached Devin's command about 3 o'clock in the afternoon,
just as this officer was pushing the Confederates so energetically
that they were abandoning Mount Jackson, yet Averell utterly failed
to accomplish anything.  Indeed, his indifferent attack was not at
all worthy the excellent soldiers he commanded, and when I learned
that it was his intention to withdraw from the enemy's front, and
this, too, on the indefinite report of a signal-officer that a
"brigade or division" of Confederates was turning his right flank,
and that he had not seriously attempted to verify the information, I
sent him this order:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,
"Woodstock, Va., Sept.  23, 1864

"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL AVERELL

"Your report and report of signal-officer received.  I do not want
you to let the enemy bluff you or your command, and I want you to
distinctly understand this note.  I do not advise rashness, but I do
desire resolution and actual fighting, with necessary casualties,
before you retire.  There must now be no backing or filling by you
without a superior force of the enemy actually engaging you.

"P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Major-General Commanding."


Some little time after this note went to Averell, word was brought me
that he had already carried out the programme indicated when
forwarding the report of the expected turning of his right, and that
he had actually withdrawn and gone into camp near Hawkinsburg.  I
then decided to relieve him from the command of his division, which I
did, ordering him to Wheeling, Colonel William H. Powell being
assigned to succeed him.

The removal of Averell was but the culmination of a series of events
extending back to the time I assumed command of the Middle Military
Division.  At the outset, General Grant, fearing discord on account
of Averell's ranking Torbert, authorized me to relieve the former
officer, but I hoped that if any trouble of this sort arose, it could
be allayed, or at least repressed, during the campaign against Early,
since the different commands would often have to act separately.
After that, the dispersion of my army by the return of the Sixth
Corps and Torbert's cavalry to the Army of the Potomac would take
place, I thought, and this would restore matters to their normal
condition; but Averell's dissatisfaction began to show itself
immediately after his arrival at Martinsburg, on the 14th of August,
and, except when he was conducting some independent expedition, had
been manifested on all occasions since.  I therefore thought that the
interest of the service would be subserved by removing one whose
growing indifference might render the best-laid plans inoperative.


"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION.
"HARRISONBURG, VA., SEPT.  25, 1864 11:30 P. M.
"LIEUT-GENERAL GRANT, Comd'g, City Point, Va.

"I have relieved Averell from his command.  Instead of following the
enemy when he was broken at Fisher's Hill (so there was not a cavalry
organization left), he went into camp and let me pursue the enemy for
a distance of fifteen miles, with infantry, during the night.

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General."


The failure of Averell to press the enemy the evening of the 23d gave
Early time to collect his scattered forces and take up a position on
the east side of the North Fork of the Shenandoah, his left resting
on the west side of that stream at Rude's Hill, a commanding point
about two miles south of Mt. Jackson.  Along this line he had
constructed some slight works during the night, and at daylight on
the 24th, I moved the Sixth and Nineteenth corps through Mt. Jackson
to attack him, sending Powell's division to pass around his left
flank, toward Timberville, and Devin's brigade across the North Fork,
to move along the base of Peaked Ridge and attack his right.  The
country was entirely open, and none of these manoeuvres could be
executed without being observed, so as soon as my advance began, the
enemy rapidly retreated in line of battle up the valley through New
Market, closely followed by Wright and Emory, their artillery on the
pike and their columns on its right and left.  Both sides moved with
celerity, the Confederates stimulated by the desire to escape, and
our men animated by the prospect of wholly destroying Early's army.
The stern-chase continued for about thirteen miles, our infantry
often coming within range, yet whenever we began to deploy, the
Confederates increased the distance between us by resorting to a
double quick, evading battle with admirable tact.  While all this was
going on, the open country permitted us a rare and brilliant sight,
the bright sun gleaming from the arms and trappings of the thousands
of pursuers and pursued.

Near New Market, as a last effort to hold the enemy, I pushed Devin's
cavalry--comprising about five hundred men--with two guns right up on
Early's lines, in the hope that the tempting opportunity given him to
capture the guns would stay his retreat long enough to let my
infantry deploy within range, but he refused the bait, and after
momentarily checking Devin he continued on with little loss and in
pretty good order.

All hope of Torbert's appearing in rear of the Confederates vanished
as they passed beyond New Market.  Some six miles south of this place
Early left the Valley Pike and took the road to Keezletown, a move
due in a measure to Powell's march by way of Timberville toward
Lacy's Springs, but mainly caused by the fact that the Keezletown
road ran immediately along the base of Peaked Mountain--a rugged
ridge affording protection to Early's right flank--and led in a
direction facilitating his junction with Kershaw, who had been
ordered back to him from Culpeper the day after the battle of the
Opequon.  The chase was kept up on the Keezeltown road till darkness
overtook us, when my weary troops were permitted to go into camp; and
as soon as the enemy discovered by our fires that the pursuit had
stopped, he also bivouacked some five miles farther south toward Port
Republic.

The next morning Early was joined by Lomax's cavalry from
Harrisonburg, Wickham's and Payne's brigades of cavalry also uniting
with him from the Luray Valley.  His whole army then fell back to the
mouth of Brown's Gap to await Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's
artillery, now on their return.

By the morning of the 25th the main body of the enemy had disappeared
entirely from my front, and the capture of some small, squads of
Confederates in the neighboring hills furnished us the only incidents
of the day.  Among the prisoners was a tall and fine looking officer,
much worn with hunger and fatigue.  The moment I saw him I recognized
him as a former comrade, George W. Carr, with whom I had served in
Washington Territory.  He was in those days a lieutenant in the Ninth
Infantry, and was one of the officers who superintended the execution
of the nine Indians at the Cascades of the Columbia in 1856.  Carr
was very much emaciated, and greatly discouraged by the turn events
had recently taken.  For old acquaintance sake I gave him plenty to
eat, and kept him in comfort at my headquarters until the next batch
of prisoners was sent to the rear, when he went with them.  He had
resigned from the regular army at the commencement of hostilities,
and, full of high anticipation, cast his lot with the Confederacy,
but when he fell into our hands, his bright dreams having been
dispelled by the harsh realities of war, he appeared to think that
for him there was no future.

Picking up prisoners here and there, my troops resumed their march
directly south on the Valley pike, and when the Sixth and Nineteenth
corps reached Harrisonburg, they went into camp, Powell in the
meanwhile pushing on to Mt. Crawford, and Crook taking up a position
in our rear at the junction of the Keezletown road and the Valley
pike.  Late in the afternoon Torbert's cavalry came in from New
Market arriving at that place many hours later than it had been
expected.

The succeeding day I sent Merritt to Port Republic to occupy the
enemy's attention, while Torbert, with Wilson's division and the
regular brigade, was ordered to Staunton, whence he was to proceed to
Waynesboro' and blow up the railroad bridge.  Having done this,
Torbert, as he returned, was to drive off whatever cattle he could
find, destroy all forage and breadstuffs, and burn the mills.  He
took possession of Waynesboro' in due time, but had succeeded in only
partially demolishing the railroad bridge when, attacked by Pegram's
division of infantry and Wickham's cavalry, he was compelled to fall
back to Staunton.  From the latter place he retired to Bridgewater,
and Spring Hill, on the way, however, fully executing his
instructions regarding the destruction of supplies.

While Torbert was on this expedition, Merritt had occupied Port
Republic, but he happened to get there the very day that Kershaw's
division was marching from Swift Run Gap to join Early.  By accident
Kershaw ran into Merritt shortly after the latter had gained the
village.  Kershaw's four infantry brigades attacked at once, and
Merrit, forced out of Port Republic, fell back toward Cross Keys; and
in anticipation that the Confederates could be coaxed to that point,
I ordered the infantry there, but Torbert's attack at Wavnesboro' had
alarmed Early, and in consequence he drew all his forces in toward
Rock-fish Gap.  This enabled me to re-establish Merritt at Port
Republic, send the Sixth and Nineteenth corps to the neighborhood of
Mt. Crawford to await the return of Torbert, and to post Crook at
Harrisonburg; these dispositions practically obtained till the 6th of
October, I holding a line across the valley from Port Republic along
North River by Mt. Crawford to the Back road near the mouth of Briery
Branch Gap.

It was during this period, about dusk on the evening of October 3,
that between Harrisonburg and Dayton my engineer officer, Lieutenant
John R. Meigs, was murdered within my lines.  He had gone out with
two topographical assistants to plot the country, and late in the
evening, while riding along the public road on his return to camp, he
overtook three men dressed in our uniform.  From their dress, and
also because the party was immediately behind our lines and within a
mile and a half of my headquarters, Meigs and his assistants
naturally thought that they were joining friends, and wholly
unsuspicious of anything to the contrary, rode on with the three men
some little distance; but their perfidy was abruptly discovered by
their suddenly turning upon Meigs with a call for his surrender.  It
has been claimed that, refusing to submit, he fired on the
treacherous party, but the statement is not true, for one of the
topographers escaped--the other was captured--and reported a few
minutes later at my headquarters that Meigs was killed without
resistance of any kind whatever, and without even the chance to give
himself up.  This man was so cool, and related all the circumstances
of the occurrence with such exactness, as to prove the truthfulness
of his statement.  The fact that the murder had been committed inside
our lines was evidence that the perpetrators of the crime, having
their homes in the vicinity, had been clandestinely visiting them,
and been secretly harbored by some of the neighboring residents.
Determining to teach a lesson to these abettors of the foul deed--a
lesson they would never forget--I ordered all the houses within an
area of five miles to be burned.  General Custer, who had succeeded
to the command of the Third Cavalry division (General Wilson having
been detailed as chief of cavalry to Sherman's army), was charged
with this duty, and the next morning proceeded to put the order into
execution.  The prescribed area included the little village of
Dayton, but when a few houses in the immediate neighborhood of the
scene of the murder had been burned, Custer was directed to cease his
desolating work, but to fetch away all the able-bodied males as
prisoners.




CHAPTER III.

REASONS FOR NOT PURSUING EARLY THROUGH THE BLUE RIDGE--GENERAL
TORBERT DETAILED TO GIVE GENERAL ROSSER A "DRUBBING"--GENERAL ROSSER
ROUTED--TELEGRAPHED TO MEET STANTON--LONGSTREET'S MESSAGE--RETURN TO
WINCHESTER--THE RIDE TO CEDAR CREEK--THE RETREATING ARMY--RALLYING
THE TROOPS--REFORMING THE LINE--COMMENCING THE ATTACK--DEFEAT OF THE
CONFEDERATES--APPOINTED A MAJOR-GENERAL IN THE REGULAR ARMY--RESULTS
OF THE BATTLE.

While we lay in camp at Harrisonburg it became necessary to decide
whether or not I would advance to Brown's Gap, and, after driving the
enemy from there, follow him through the Blue Ridge into eastern
Virginia.  Indeed, this question began to cause me solicitude as soon
as I knew Early had escaped me at New Market, for I felt certain that
I should be urged to pursue the Confederates toward Charlottesville
and Gordonsville, and be expected to operate on that line against
Richmond.  For many reasons I was much opposed to such a plan, but
mainly because its execution would involve the opening of the Orange
and Alexandria railroad.  To protect this road against the raids of
the numerous guerrilla bands that infested the region through which
it passed, and to keep it in operation, would require a large force
of infantry, and would also greatly reduce my cavalry; besides, I
should be obliged to leave a force in the valley strong enough to
give security to the line of the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and
Ohio railroad, and this alone would probably take the whole of
Crook's command, leaving me a wholly inadequate number of fighting
men to prosecute a campaign against the city of Richmond.  Then, too,
I was in doubt whether the besiegers could hold the entire army at
Petersburg; and in case they could not, a number of troops sufficient
to crush me might be detached by Lee, moved rapidly by rail, and,
after overwhelming me, be quickly returned to confront General Meade.
I was satisfied, moreover, that my transportation could not supply me
further than Harrisonburg, and if in penetrating the Blue Ridge I met
with protracted resistance, a lack of supplies might compel me to
abandon the attempt at a most inopportune time.

I therefore advised that the Valley campaign be terminated north of
Staunton, and I be permitted to return, carrying out on the way my
original instructions for desolating the Shenandoah country so as to
make it untenable for permanent occupation by the Confederates.  I
proposed to detach the bulk of my army when this work of destruction
was completed, and send it by way of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad
through Washington to the Petersburg line, believing that I could
move it more rapidly by that route than by any other.  I was
confident that if a movement of this character could be made with
celerity it would culminate in the capture of Richmond and possibly
of General Lee's army, and I was in hopes that General Grant would
take the same view of the matter; but just at this time he was so
pressed by the Government and by public-opinion at the North, that he
advocated the wholly different conception of driving Early into
eastern Virginia, and adhered to this plan with some tenacity.
Considerable correspondence regarding the subject took place between
us, throughout which I stoutly maintained that we should not risk, by
what I held to be a false move, all that my army had gained.  I being
on the ground, General Grant left to me the final decision of the
question, and I solved the first step by determining to withdraw down
the valley at least as far as Strasburg, which movement was begun on
the 6th of October.

The cavalry as it retired was stretched across the country from the
Blue Ridge to the eastern slope of the Alleghanies, with orders to
drive off all stock and destroy all supplies as it moved northward.
The infantry preceded the cavalry, passing down the Valley pike, and
as we marched along the many columns of smoke from burning stacks,
and mills filled with grain, indicated that the adjacent country was
fast losing the features which hitherto had made it a great magazine
of stores for the Confederate armies.

During the 6th and 7th of October, the enemy's horse followed us up,
though at a respectful distance.  This cavalry was now under command
of General T. W. Rosser, who on October 5 had joined Early with an
additional brigade from Richmond.  As we proceeded the Confederates
gained confidence, probably on account of the reputation with which
its new commander had been heralded, and on the third day's march had
the temerity to annoy my rear guard considerably.  Tired of these
annoyances, I concluded to open the enemy's eyes in earnest, so that
night I told Torbert I expected him either to give Rosser a drubbing
next morning or get whipped himself, and that the infantry would be
halted until the affair was over; I also informed him that I proposed
to ride out to Round Top Mountain to see the fight.  When I decided
to have Rosser chastised, Merritt was encamped at the foot of Round
Top, an elevation just north of Tom's Brook, and Custer some six
miles farther north and west, near Tumbling Run.  In the night Custer
was ordered to retrace his steps before daylight by the Back road,
which is parallel to and about three miles from the Valley pike, and
attack the enemy at Tom's Brook crossing, while Merritt's
instructions were to assail him on the Valley pike in concert with
Custer.  About 7 in the morning, Custer's division encountered Rosser
himself with three brigades, and while the stirring sounds of the
resulting artillery duel were reverberating through the valley
Merritt moved briskly to the front and fell upon Generals Lomax and
Johnson on the Valley pike.  Merritt, by extending his right, quickly
established connection with Custer, and the two divisions moved
forward together under Torbert's direction, with a determination to
inflict on the enemy the sharp and summary punishment his rashness
had invited.

The engagement soon became general across the valley, both sides
fighting mainly mounted.  For about two hours the contending lines
struggled with each other along Tom's Brook, the charges and counter
charges at many points being plainly visible from the summit of Round
Top, where I had my headquarters for the time.

The open country permitting a sabre fight, both sides seemed bent on
using that arm.  In the centre the Confederates maintained their
position with much stubbornness, and for a time seemed to have
recovered their former spirit, but at last they began to give way on
both flanks, and as these receded, Merritt and Custer went at the
wavering ranks in a charge along the whole front.  The result was a
general smash-up of the entire Confederate line, the retreat quickly
degenerating into a rout the like of which was never before seen.
For twenty-six miles this wild stampede kept up, with our troopers
close at the enemy's heels; and the ludicrous incidents of the chase
never ceased to be amusing topics around the camp-fires of Merritt
and Custer.  In the fight and pursuit Torbert took eleven pieces of
artillery, with their caissons, all the wagons and ambulances the
enemy had on the ground, and three hundred prisoners.  Some of
Rosser's troopers fled to the mountains by way of Columbia Furnace,
and some up the Valley pike and into the Massamitten Range,
apparently not discovering that the chase had been discontinued till
south of Mount Jackson they rallied on Early's infantry.

After this catastrophe, Early reported to General Lee that his
cavalry was so badly demoralized that it should be dismounted; and
the citizens of the valley, intensely disgusted with the boasting and
swaggering that had characterized the arrival of the "Laurel Brigade"
in that section, baptized the action (known to us as Tom's Brook) the
"Woodstock Races," and never tired of poking fun at General Rosser
about his precipitate and inglorious flight.  (When Rosser arrived
from Richmond with his brigade he was proclaimed as the savior of the
Valley, and his men came all bedecked with laurel branches.)

On the 10th my army, resuming its retrograde movement, crossed to the
north side of Cedar Creek.  The work of repairing the Manassas Gap
branch of the Orange and Alexandria railroad had been begun some days
before, out from Washington, and, anticipating that it would be in
readiness to transport troops by the time they could reach Piedmont,
I directed the Sixth Corps to continue its march toward Front Royal,
expecting to return to the Army of the Potomac by that line.  By the
12th, however, my views regarding the reconstruction of this railroad
began to prevail, and the work on it was discontinued.  The Sixth
Corps, therefore, abandoned that route, and moved toward Ashby's Gap
with the purpose of marching direct to Washington, but on the 13th I
recalled it to Cedar Creek, in consequence of the arrival of the
enemy's infantry at Fisher's Hill, and the receipt, the night before,
of the following despatch, which again opened the question of an
advance on Gordonsville and Charlottesville:


(Cipher.)
"WASHINGTON, October 12, 1864, 12 M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN:

"Lieutenant-General Grant wishes a position taken far enough south to
serve as a base for further operations upon Gordonsville and
Charlottesville.  It must be strongly fortified and provisioned.
Some point in the vicinity of Manassas Gap would seem best suited for
all purposes.  Colonel Alexander, of the Engineers, will be sent to
consult with you as soon as you connect with General Augur.

"H.  W.  HALLECK, Major-General."


As it was well known in Washington that the views expressed in the
above despatch were counter to my convictions, I was the next day
required by the following telegram from Secretary Stanton to repair
to that city:


"WASHINGTON, October 13, 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN
(through General Augur)

"If you can come here, a consultation on several points is extremely
desirable.  I propose to visit General Grant, and would like to see
you first.

"EDWIN M.  STANTON,
"Secretary of War."


I got all ready to comply with the terms of Secretary Stanton's
despatch, but in the meantime the enemy appeared in my front in
force, with infantry and cavalry, and attacked Colonel Thoburn, who
had been pushed out toward Strasburg from Crook's command, and also
Custer's division of cavalry on the Back road.  As afterward
appeared, this attack was made in the belief that all of my troops
but Crook's had gone to Petersburg.  From this demonstration there
ensued near Hupp's Hill a bitter skirmish between Kershaw and
Thoburn, and the latter was finally compelled to withdraw to the
north bank of Cedar Creek.  Custer gained better results, however, on
the Back road, with his usual dash driving the enemy's cavalry away
from his front, Merritt's division then joining him and remaining on
the right.

The day's events pointing to a probability that the enemy intended to
resume the offensive, to anticipate such a contingency I ordered the
Sixth Corps to return from its march toward Ashby's Gap.  It reached
me by noon of the 14th, and went into position to the right and rear
of the Nineteenth Corps, which held a line along the north bank of
Cedar Creek, west of the Valley pike.  Crook was posted on the left
of the Nineteenth Corps and east of the Valley pike, with Thoburn's
division advanced to a round hill, which commanded the junction of
Cedar Creek and the Shenandoah River, while Torbert retained both
Merritt and Custer on the right of the Sixth Corps, and at the
same time covered with Powell the roads toward Front Royal.  My
head-quarters were at the Belle Grove House, which was to the west of
the pike and in rear of the Nineteenth Corps.  It was my intention to
attack the enemy as soon as the Sixth Corps reached me, but General
Early having learned from his demonstration that I had not detached as
largely as his previous information had led him to believe, on the
night of the 13th withdrew to Fisher's Hill; so, concluding that he
could not do us serious hurt from there, I changed my mind as to
attacking, deciding to defer such action till I could get to
Washington, and come to some definite understanding about my future
operations.

To carry out this idea, on the evening of the 15th I ordered all of
the cavalry under General Torbert to accompany me to Front Royal,
again intending to push it thence through Chester Gap to the Virginia
Central railroad at Charlottesville, to destroy the bridge over the
Rivanna River, while I passed through Manassas Gap to Rectortown, and
thence by rail to Washington.  On my arrival with the cavalry near
Front Royal on the 16th, I halted at the house of Mrs. Richards, on
the north bank of the river, and there received the following
despatch and inclosure from General Wright, who had been left in
command at Cedar Creek:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY Division,
"October 16, 1864.

"GENERAL:

"I enclose you despatch which explains itself.  If the enemy should
be strongly reenforced in cavalry, he might, by turning our right,
give us a great deal of trouble.  I shall hold on here until the
enemy's movements are developed, and shall only fear an attack on my
right, which I shall make every preparation for guarding against and
resisting.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"H.  G.  WRIGHT, Major-General Commanding.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Commanding Middle Military Division."


[INCLOSURE.] "To LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EARLY:

"Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush
Sheridan.

"LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General."


The message from Longstreet had been taken down as it was being
flagged from the Confederate signal-station on Three Top Mountain,
and afterward translated by our signal officers, who knew the
Confederate signal code.  I first thought it a ruse, and hardly worth
attention, but on reflection deemed it best to be on the safe side,
so I abandoned the cavalry raid toward Charlottesville, in order to
give General Wright the entire strength of the army, for it did not
seem wise to reduce his numbers while reinforcement for the enemy
might be near, and especially when such pregnant messages were
reaching Early from one of the ablest of the Confederate generals.
Therefore I sent the following note to General Wright:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,
"Front Royal, October 16, 1864.

"GENERAL: The cavalry is all ordered back to you; make your position
strong.  If Longstreet's despatch is true, he is under the impression
that we have largely detached.  I will go over to Augur, and may get
additional news.  Close in Colonel Powell, who will be at this point.
If the enemy should make an advance, I know you will defeat him.
Look well to your ground and be well prepared.  Get up everything
that can be spared.  I will bring up all I can, and will be up on
Tuesday, if not sooner.

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H.  G.  WRIGHT,
"Commanding Sixth Army Corps."


At 5 o'clock on the evening of the 16th I telegraphed General Halleck
from Rectortown, giving him the information which had come to me from
Wright, asking if anything corroborative of it had been received from
General Grant, and also saying that I would like to see Halleck; the
telegram ending with the question: "Is it best for me to go to see
you?"  Next morning I sent back to Wright all the cavalry except one
regiment, which escorted me through Manassas Gap to the terminus of
the railroad from Washington.  I had with me Lieutenant-Colonel James
W.  Forsyth, chief-of-staff, and three of my aides, Major George A.
Forsyth, Captain Joseph O'Keefe, and Captain Michael V. Sheridan.  I
rode my black horse, Rienzi, and the others their own respective
mounts.

Before leaving Cedar Creek I had fixed the route of my return to be
by rail from Washington to Martinsburg, and thence by horseback to
Winchester and Cedar Creek, and had ordered three hundred cavalry to
Martinsburg to escort me from that point to the front.  At Rectortown
I met General Augur, who had brought a force out from Washington to
reconstruct and protect the line of railroad, and through him
received the following reply from General Halleck:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"WASHINGTON, D.C., October 16 1864

"To MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN,
"Rectortown, Va.

General Grant says that Longstreet brought with him no troops from
Richmond, but I have very little confidence in the information
collected at his headquarters.  If you can leave your command with
safety, come to Washington, as I wish to give you the views of the
authorities here.

"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."


In consequence of the Longstreet despatch, I felt a concern about my
absence which I could hardly repress, but after duly considering what
Halleck said, and believing that Longstreet could not unite with
Early before I got back, and that even if he did Wright would be able
to cope with them both, I and my staff, with our horses, took the
cars for Washington, where we arrived on the morning of the 17th at
about 8 o'clock.  I proceeded at an early hour to the War Department,
and as soon as I met Secretary Stanton, asked him for a special train
to be ready at 12 o'clock to take me to Martinsburg, saying that in
view of existing conditions I must get back to my army as quickly as
possible.  He at once gave the order for the train, and then the
Secretary, Halleck, and I proceeded to hold a consultation in regard
to my operating east of the Blue Ridge.  The upshot was that my views
against such a plan were practically agreed to, and two engineer
officers were designated to return with me for the purpose of
reporting on a defensive line in the valley that could be held while
the bulk of my troops were being detached to Petersburg.  Colonel
Alexander and Colonel Thom both of the Engineer Corps, reported to
accompany me, and at 12 o'clock we took the train.

We arrived about dark at Martinsburg, and there found the escort of
three hundred men which I had ordered before leaving Cedar Creek.  We
spent that night at Martinsburg, and early next morning mounted and
started up the Valley pike for Winchester, leaving Captain Sheridan
behind to conduct to the army the Commissioners whom the State of New
York had sent down to receive the vote of her troops in the coming
Presidential election.  Colonel Alexander was a man of enormous
weight, and Colonel Thom correspondingly light, and as both were
unaccustomed to riding we had to go slowly, losing so much time, in
fact, that we did not reach Winchester till between 3 and 4 o'clock
in the afternoon, though the distance is but twenty-eight miles.  As
soon as we arrived at Colonel Edwards's headquarters in the town,
where I intended stopping for the night, I sent a courier to the
front to bring me a report of the condition of affairs, and then took
Colonel Alexander out on the heights about Winchester, in order that
he might overlook the country, and make up his mind as to the utility
of fortifying there.  By the time we had completed our survey it was
dark, and just as we reached Colonel Edwards's house on our return a
courier came in from Cedar Creek bringing word that everything was
all right, that the enemy was quiet at Fisher's Hill, and that a
brigade of Grover's division was to make a reconnoissance in the
morning, the 19th, so about 10 o'clock I went to bed greatly
relieved, and expecting to rejoin my headquarters at my leisure next
day.

Toward 6 o'clock the morning of the 19th, the officer on picket duty
at Winchester came to my room, I being yet in bed, and reported
artillery firing from the direction of Cedar Creek.  I asked him if
the firing was continuous or only desultory, to which he replied that
it was not a sustained fire, but rather irregular and fitful.  I
remarked: "It's all right; Grover has gone out this morning to make a
reconnoissance, and he is merely feeling the enemy." I tried to go to
sleep again, but grew so restless that I could not, and soon got up
and dressed myself.  A little later the picket officer came back and
reported that the firing, which could be distinctly heard from his
line on the heights outside of Winchester, was still going on.  I
asked him if it sounded like a battle, and as he again said that it
did not, I still inferred that the cannonading was caused by Grover's
division banging away at the enemy simply to find out what he was up
to.  However, I went down-stairs and requested that breakfast be
hurried up, and at the same time ordered the horses to be saddled and
in readiness, for I concluded to go to the front before any further
examinations were made in regard to the defensive line.

We mounted our horses between half-past 8 and 9, and as we were
proceeding up the street which leads directly through Winchester,
from the Logan residence, where Edwards was quartered, to the Valley
pike, I noticed that there were many women at the windows and doors
of the houses, who kept shaking their skirts at us and who were
otherwise markedly insolent in their demeanor, but supposing this
conduct to be instigated by their well-known and perhaps natural
prejudices, I ascribed to it no unusual significance.  On reaching
the edge of the town I halted a moment, and there heard quite
distinctly the sound of artillery firing in an unceasing roar.
Concluding from this that a battle was in progress, I now felt
confident that the women along the street had received intelligence
from the battle, field by the "grape-vine telegraph," and were in
raptures over some good news, while I as yet was utterly ignorant of
the actual situation.  Moving on, I put my head down toward the
pommel of my saddle and listened intently, trying to locate and
interpret the sound, continuing in this position till we had crossed
Mill Creek, about half a mile from Winchester.  The result of my
efforts in the interval was the conviction that the travel of the
sound was increasing too rapidly to be accounted for by my own rate
of motion, and that therefore my army must be falling back.

At Mill Creek my escort fell in behind, and we were going ahead at a
regular pace, when, just as we made the crest of the rise beyond the
stream, there burst upon our view the appalling spectacle of a
panic-stricken army-hundreds of slightly wounded men, throngs of others
unhurt but utterly demoralized, and baggage-wagons by the score, all
pressing to the rear in hopeless confusion, telling only too plainly
that a disaster had occurred at the front.  On accosting some of the
fugitives, they assured me that the army was broken up, in full
retreat, and that all was lost; all this with a manner true to that
peculiar indifference that takes possession of panic-stricken men.  I
was greatly disturbed by the sight, but at once sent word to Colonel
Edwards commanding the brigade in Winchester, to stretch his troops
across the valley, near Mill Creek, and stop all fugitives, directing
also that the transportation be, passed through and parked on the north
side of the town.

As I continued at a walk a few hundred yards farther, thinking all
the time of Longstreet's telegram to Early, "Be ready when I join
you, and we will crush Sheridan," I was fixing in my mind what I
should do.  My first thought was too stop the army in the suburbs of
Winchester as it came back, form a new line, and fight there; but as
the situation was more maturely considered a better conception
prevailed.  I was sure the troops had confidence in me, for
heretofore we had been successful; and as at other times they had
seen me present at the slightest sign of trouble or distress, I felt
that I ought to try now to restore their broken ranks, or, failing in
that, to share their fate because of what they had done hitherto.

About this time Colonel Wood, my chief commissary, arrived from the
front and gave me fuller intelligence, reporting that everything was
gone, my headquarters captured, and the troops dispersed.  When I
heard this I took two of my aides-de-camp, Major. George A. Forsyth
and Captain Joseph O'Keefe, and with twenty men from the escort
started for the front, at the same time directing Colonel James W.
Forsyth and Colonels Alexander and Thom to remain behind and do what
they could to stop the runaways.

For a short distance I traveled on the road, but soon found it so
blocked with wagons and wounded men that my progress was impeded, and
I was forced to take to the adjoining fields to make haste.  When
most of the wagons and wounded were past I returned to the road,
which was thickly lined with unhurt  men, who, having got far enough
to the rear to be out of danger, had halted, without any
organization, and begun cooking coffee, but when they saw me they
abandoned their coffee, threw up their hats, shouldered their
muskets, and as I passed along turned to follow with enthusiasm and
cheers.  To acknowledge this exhibition of feeling I took off my hat,
and with Forsyth and O'Keefe rode some distance in advance of my
escort, while every mounted officer who saw me galloped out on either
side of the pike to tell the men at a distance that I had come back.
In this way the news was spread to the stragglers off the road, when
they, too, turned their faces to the front and marched toward the
enemy, changing in a moment from the depths of depression, to the
extreme of enthusiasm.  I already knew that even in the ordinary
condition of mind enthusiasm is a potent element with soldiers, but
what I saw that day convinced me that if it can be excited from a
state of despondency its power is almost irresistible.  I said
nothing except to remark as I rode among those on the road: "If I had
been, with you this morning this disaster would not have happened.
We must face the other way; we will go back and recover our camp."

My first halt was made just north of Newtown, where I met a chaplain
digging his heels into the sides of his jaded horse, and making for
the rear with all possible speed.  I drew up for an instant, and
inquired of him how matters were going at the front.  He replied,
"Everything is lost; but all will be right when you get there"; yet
notwithstanding this expression of confidence in me, the parson at
once resumed his breathless pace to the rear.  At Newtown I was
obliged to make a circuit to the left, to get round the village.  I
could not pass through it, the streets were so crowded, but meeting
on this detour Major McKinley, of Crook's staff, he spread the news
of my return through the motley throng there.

When nearing the Valley pike, just south of Newtown I saw about
three-fourths of a mile west of the pike a body of troops, which
proved to be Ricketts's and Wheaton's divisions of the Sixth Corps,
and then learned that the Nineteenth Corps had halted a little to the
right and rear of these; but I did not stop, desiring to get to the
extreme front.  Continuing on parallel with the pike, about midway
between Newtown and Middletown I crossed to the west of it, and a
little later came up in rear of Getty's division of the Sixth Corps.
When I arrived, this division and the cavalry were the only troops in
the presence of and resisting the enemy; they were apparently acting
as a rear-guard at a point about three miles north of the line we
held at Cedar Creek when the battle began.  General Torbert was the
first officer to meet me, saying as he rode up, "My God! I am glad
you've come." Getty's division, when I found it, was about a mile
north of Middletown, posted on the reverse slope of some slightly
rising ground, holding a barricade made with fence-rails, and
skirmishing slightly with the enemy's pickets.  Jumping my horse over
the line of rails, I rode to the crest of the elevation, and there
taking off my hat, the men rose up from behind their barricade with
cheers of recognition.  An officer of the Vermont brigade, Colonel A.
S. Tracy, rode out to the front, and joining me, informed me that
General Louis A. Grant was in command there, the regular division
commander, General Getty, having taken charge of the Sixth Corps in
place of  Ricketts, wounded early in the action, while temporarily
commanding the corps.  I then turned back to the rear of Getty's
division, and as I came behind it, a line of regimental flags rose up
out of the ground, as it seemed, to welcome me.  They were mostly the
colors of Crook's troops, who had been stampeded and scattered in the
surprise of the morning.  The color-bearers, having withstood the
panic, had formed behind the troops of Getty.  The line with the
colors was largely composed of officers, among whom I recognized
Colonel R. B. Hayes, since president of the United States, one of the
brigade commanders.  At the close of this incident I crossed the
little narrow valley, or depression, in rear of Getty's line, and
dismounting on the opposite crest, established that point as my
headquarters.  In a few minutes some of my staff joined me, and the
first directions I gave were to have the Nineteenth Corps and the two
divisions of Wright's corps brought to the front, so they could be
formed on Getty's division, prolonged to the right; for I had already
decided to attack the enemy from that line as soon as I could get
matters in shape to take the offensive.  Crook met me at this time,
and strongly favored my idea of attacking, but said, however, that
most of his troops were gone.  General Wright came up a little later,
when I saw that he was wounded, a ball having grazed the point of his
chin so as to draw the blood plentifully.

Wright gave me a hurried account of the day's events, and when told
that we would fight the enemy on the line which Getty and the cavalry
were holding, and that he must go himself and send all his staff to
bring up the troops, he zealously fell in with the scheme; and it was
then that the Nineteenth Corps and two divisions of the Sixth were
ordered to the front from where they had been halted to the right and
rear of Getty.

After this conversation I rode to the east of the Valley pike and to
the left of Getty's division, to a point from which I could obtain a
good view of the front, in the mean time sending Major Forsyth to
communicate with Colonel Lowell (who occupied a position close in
toward the suburbs of Middletown and directly in front of Getty's
left) to learn whether he could hold on there.  Lowell replied that
he could.  I then ordered Custer's division back to the right flank,
and returning to the place where my headquarters had been established
I met near them Ricketts's division under General Keifer and General
Frank Wheaton's division, both marching to the front.  When the men
of these divisions saw me they began cheering and took up the double
quick to the front, while I turned back toward Getty's line to point
out where these returning troops should be placed.  Having done this,
I ordered General Wright to resume command of the Sixth Corps, and
Getty, who was temporarily in charge of it, to take command of his
own division.  A little later the Nineteenth Corps came up and was
posted between the right of the Sixth Corps and Middle Marsh Brook.

All this had consumed a great deal of time, and I concluded to visit
again the point to the east of the Valley pike, from where I had
first observed the enemy, to see what he was doing.  Arrived there, I
could plainly see him getting ready for attack, and Major Forsyth now
suggested that it would be well to ride along the line of battle
before the enemy assailed us, for although the troops had learned of
my return, but few of them had seen me.  Following his suggestion I
started in behind the men, but when a few paces had been taken I
crossed to the front and, hat in hand, passed along the entire length
of the infantry line; and it is from this circumstance that many of
the officers and men who then received me with such heartiness have
since supposed that that was my first appearance on the field.  But
at least two hours had elapsed since I reached the ground, for it was
after mid-day, when this incident of riding down the front took
place, and I arrived not later, certainly, than half-past 10 o'clock.

After re-arranging the line and preparing to attack I returned again
to observe the Confederates, who shortly began to advance on us.  The
attacking columns did not cover my entire front, and it appeared that
their onset would be mainly directed against the Nineteenth Corps,
so, fearing that they might be too strong for Emory on account of his
depleted condition (many of his men not having had time to get up
from the rear), and Getty's division being free from assault I
transferred a part of it from the extreme left to the support of the
Nineteenth Corps.  The assault was quickly repulsed by Emory,
however, and as the enemy fell back Getty's troops were returned to
their original place.  This repulse of the Confederates made me feel
pretty safe from further offensive operations on their part, and I
now decided to suspend the fighting till my thin ranks were further
strengthened by the men who were continually coming up from the rear,
and particularly till Crook's troops could be assembled on the
extreme left.

In consequence of the despatch already mentioned, "Be ready when I
join you, and we will crush Sheridan," since learned to have been
fictitious, I had been supposing all day that Longstreet's troops
were present, but as no definite intelligence on this point had been
gathered, I concluded, in the lull that now occurred, to ascertain
something positive regarding Longstreet; and Merritt having been
transferred to our left in the morning, I directed him to attack an
exposed battery then at the edge of Middletown, and capture some
prisoners.  Merritt soon did this work effectually, concealing his
intention till his troops got close in to the enemy, and then by a
quick dash gobbling up a number of Confederates.  When the prisoners
were brought in, I learned from them that the only troops of
Longstreet's in the fight were of Kershaw's division, which had
rejoined Early at Brown's Gap in the latter part of September, and
that the rest of Longstreet's corps was not on the field.  The
receipt of this information entirely cleared the way for me to take
the offensive, but on the heels of it came information that
Longstreet was marching by the Front Royal pike to strike my rear at
Winchester, driving Powell's cavalry in as he advanced.  This renewed
my uneasiness, and caused me to delay the general attack till after
assurances came from Powell denying utterly the reports as to
Longstreet, and confirming the statements of the prisoners.

Between half-past and 4 o'clock, I was ready to assail, and decided
to do so by advancing my infantry line in a swinging movement, so as
to gain the Valley pike with my right between Middletown and the
Belle Grove House; and when the order was passed along, the men
pushed steadily forward with enthusiasm and confidence.  General
Early's troops extended some little distance beyond our right, and
when my flank neared the overlapping enemy, he turned on it, with the
effect of causing a momentary confusion, but General McMillan quickly
realizing the danger, broke the Confederates at the reentering angle
by a counter charge with his brigade, doing his work so well that the
enemy's flanking troops were cut off from their main body and left to
shift for themselves.  Custer, who was just then moving in from the
west side of Middle Marsh Brook, followed McMillan's timely blow with
a charge of cavalry, but before starting out on it, and while his men
were forming, riding at full speed himself, to throw his arms around
my neck.  By the time he had disengaged himself from this embrace,
the troops broken by McMillan had gained some little distance to
their rear, but Custer's troopers sweeping across the Middletown
meadows and down toward Cedar Creek, took many of them prisoners
before they could reach the stream--so I forgave his delay.

My whole line as far as the eye could see was now driving everything
before it, from behind trees, stone walls, and all such sheltering
obstacles, so I rode toward the left to ascertain how matters were
getting on there.  As I passed along behind the advancing troops,
first General Grover, and then Colonel Mackenzie, rode up to welcome
me.  Both were severely wounded, and I told them to leave the field,
but they implored permission to remain till success was certain.
When I reached the Valley pike Crook had reorganized his men, and as
I desired that they should take part in the fight, for they were the
very same troops that had turned Early's flank at Winchester and at
Fisher's Hill, I ordered them to be pushed forward; and the alacrity
and celerity with which they moved on Middletown demonstrated that
their ill-fortune of the morning had not sprung from lack of valor.

Meanwhile Lowell's brigade of cavalry, which, it will be remembered,
had been holding on, dismounted, just north of Middletown ever since
the time I arrived from Winchester, fell to the rear for the purpose
of getting their led horses.  A momentary panic was created in the
nearest brigade of infantry by this withdrawal of Lowell, but as soon
as his men were mounted they charged the enemy clear up to the stone
walls in the edge of Middletown; at sight of this the infantry
brigade renewed its attack, and the enemy's right gave way.  The
accomplished Lowell received his death-wound in this courageous
charge.

All our troops were now moving on the retreating Confederates, and as
I rode to the front Colonel Gibbs, who succeeded Lowell, made ready
for another mounted charge, but I checked him from pressing the
enemy's right, in the hope that the swinging attack from my right
would throw most of the Confederates to the east of the Valley pike,
and hence off their line of retreat through Strasburg to Fisher's
Hill.  The eagerness of the men soon frustrated this anticipation,
however, the left insisting on keeping pace with the centre and
right, and all pushing ahead till we regained our old camps at Cedar
Creek.  Beyond Cedar Creek, at Strasburg, the pike makes a sharp turn
to the west toward Fisher's Hill, and here Merritt uniting with
Custer, they together fell on the flank of the retreating columns,
taking many prisoners, wagons, and guns, among the prisoners being
Major-General Ramseur, who, mortally wounded, died the next day.

When the news of the victory was received, General Grant directed a
salute of one hundred shotted guns to be fired into Petersburg, and
the President at once thanked the army in an autograph letter.  A few
weeks after, he promoted me, and I received notice of this in a
special letter from the Secretary of War, saying:

"--that for the personal gallantry, military skill, and just confidence
in the courage and patriotism of your troops, displayed by you on the
19th day of October at Cedar Run, whereby, under the blessing of
Providence, your routed army was reorganized, a great National
disaster averted, and a brilliant victory achieved over the rebels
for the third time in pitched battle within thirty days, Philip H.
Sheridan is appointed a major-general in the United States Army."

The direct result of the battle was the recapture of all the
artillery, transportation, and camp equipage we had lost, and in
addition twenty-four pieces of the enemy's artillery, twelve hundred
prisoners, and a number of battle-flags.  But more still flowed from
this victory, succeeding as it did the disaster of the morning, for
the reoccupation of our old camps at once re-established a morale
which for some hours had been greatly endangered by ill-fortune.

It was not till after the battle that I learned fully what had taken
place before my arrival, and then found that the enemy, having
gathered all the strength he could through the return of
convalescents and other absentees, had moved quietly from Fisher's
Hill, in the night of the 18th and early on the morning of the 19th,
to surprise my army, which, it should be remembered, was posted on
the north bank of Cedar Creek, Crook holding on the left of the
Valley pike, with Thoburn's division advanced toward the creek on
Duval's (under Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes) and Kitching's
provisional divisions to the north and rear of Thoburn.  The
Nineteenth Corps was on the right of Crook, extending in a
semi-circular line from the pike nearly to Meadow Brook, while the
Sixth Corps lay to the west of the brook in readiness to be used as a
movable column.  Merritt's division was to the right and rear of the
Sixth Corps, and about a mile and a half west of Merrit was Custer
covering the fords of Cedar Creek as far west as the Middle road.

General Early's plan was for one column under General Gordon,
consisting of three divisions of infantry (Gordon's, Ramseur's, and
Pegram's), and Payne's brigade of cavalry to cross the Shenandoah
River directly east of the Confederate works at Fisher's Hill, march
around the northerly face of the Massanutten Mountain, and again
cross the Shenandoah at Bowman's and McInturff's fords.  Payne's task
was to capture me at the Belle Grove House.  General Early himself,
with Kershaw's and Wharton's divisions, was to move through
Strasburg, Kershaw, accompanied by Early, to cross Cedar Creek at
Roberts's ford and connect with Gordon, while Wharton was to continue
on the Valley pike to Hupp's Hill and join the left of Kershaw, when
the crossing of the Valley pike over Cedar Creek became free.

Lomax's cavalry, then in the Luray Valley, was ordered to join the
right of Gordon on the field of battle, while Rosser was to carry the
crossing of Cedar Creek on the Back road and attack Custer.  Early's
conceptions were carried through in the darkness with little accident
or delay, Kershaw opening the fight by a furious attack on Thoburn's
division, while at dawn and in a dense fog Gordon struck Crook's
extreme left, surprising his pickets, and bursting into his camp with
such suddenness as to stampede Crook's men.  Gordon directing his
march on my headquarters (the Belle Grove House), successfully turned
our position as he gained the Valley pike, and General Wright was
thus forced to order the withdrawal of the Nineteenth Corps from its
post at the Cedar Creek crossing, and this enabled Wharton to get
over the stream there unmolested and join Kershaw early in the
action.

After Crook's troops had been driven from their camps, General Wright
endeavored to form a line with the Sixth Corps to hold the Valley
pike to the left of the Nineteenth, but failing in this he ordered
the withdrawal of the latter corps, Ricketts, temporarily commanding
the Sixth Corps, checking Gordon till Emory had retired.  As already
stated, Wharton was thus permitted to cross Cedar Creek on the pike,
and now that Early had a continuous line, he pressed his advantage so
vigorously that the whole Union army was soon driven from its camps
in more or less disorder; and though much disjointed resistance was
displayed, it may be said that no systematic stand was made until
Getty's division, aided by Torbert's cavalry, which Wright had
ordered to the left early in the action, took up the ground where, on
arriving from Winchester, I found them.

When I left my command on the 16th, little did I anticipate that
anything like this would happen.  Indeed, I felt satisfied that Early
was, of himself, too weak to take the offensive, and although I
doubted the Longstreet despatch, yet I was confident that, even
should it prove true, I could get back before the junction could be
made, and at the worst I felt certain that my army was equal to
confronting the forces of Longstreet and Early combined.  Still, the
surprise of the morning might have befallen me as well as the general
on whom it did descend, and though it is possible that this could
have been precluded had Powell's cavalry been closed in, as suggested
in my despatch from Front Royal, yet the enemy's desperation might
have prompted some other clever and ingenious scheme for relieving
his fallen fortunes in the Shenandoah Valley.




CHAPTER IV.

GENERAL EARLY REORGANIZES HIS FORCES--MOSBY THE GUERRILLA--GENERAL
MERRITT SENT TO OPERATE AGAINST MOSBY--ROSSER AGAIN ACTIVE--GENERAL
CUSTER SURPRISED--COLONEL YOUNG SENT TO CAPTURE GILMORE THE
GUERRILLA--COLONEL YOUNG'S SUCCESS--CAPTURE OF GENERAL KELLY AND
GENERAL CROOK--SPIES--WAS WILKES BOOTH A SPY?--DRIVING THE
CONFEDERATES OUT OF THE VALLEY--THE BATTLE OF WAYNESBORO'--MARCHING
TO JOIN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Early's broken army practically made no halt in its retreat after the
battle of Cedar-Creek until it reached New Market, though at Fisher's
Hill was left a small rear-guard of cavalry, which hastily decamped,
however, when charged by Gibbs's brigade on the morning of the 20th.
Between the date of his signal defeat and the 11th of November, the
enemy's scattered forces had sufficiently reorganized to permit his
again making a reconnoissance in the valley as far north as Cedar
Creek, my army having meanwhile withdrawn to Kernstown, where it had
been finally decided that a defensive line should be held to enable
me to detach troops to General Grant, and where, by reconstructing
the Winchester and Potomac railroad from Stephenson's depot to
Harper's Ferry, my command might be more readily, supplied.  Early's
reconnoissance north of Cedar Creek ended in a rapid withdrawal of
his infantry after feeling my front, and with the usual ill-fortune
to his cavalry; Merritt and Custer driving Rosser and Lomax with ease
across Cedar Creek on the Middle and Back roads, while Powell's
cavalry struck McCausland near Stony Point, and after capturing two
pieces of artillery and about three hundred officers and men chased
him into the Luray Valley.

Early got back to New Market on the 14th of November, and, from lack
of subsistence, being unable to continue demonstrations to prevent my
reinforcement of General Grant, began himself to detach to General
Lee by returning Kershaw's division to Petersburg, as was definitely
ascertained by Torbert in a reconnoissance to Mount Jackson.  At this
time General Grant wished me to send him the Sixth Corps, and it was
got ready for the purpose, but when I informed him that Torbert's
reconnoissance had developed the fact that Early still retained four
divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, it was decided, on my
suggestion, to let the Sixth Corps remain till the season should be a
little further advanced, when the inclemency of the weather would
preclude infantry campaigning.  These conditions came about early in
December, and by the middle of the month the whole of the Sixth Corps
was at Petersburg; simultaneously with its transfer to that line
Early sending his Second Corps to Lee.

During the entire campaign I had been annoyed by guerrilla bands
under such partisan chiefs as Mosby, White, Gilmore, McNeil, and
others, and this had considerably depleted my line-of-battle
strength, necessitating as it did large, escorts for my
supply-trains.  The most redoubtable of these leaders was Mosby, whose
force was made up from the country around Upperville, east of the Blue
Ridge, to which section he always fled for a hiding-place when he
scented danger.  I had not directed any special operations against
these partisans while the campaign was active, but as Mosby's men had
lately killed, within my lines, my chief quartermaster, Colonel Tolles,
and Medical Inspector Ohlenchlager, I concluded to devote particular
attention to these "irregulars" during the lull that now occurred; so
on the 28th of November, I directed General Merritt to march to the
Loudoun Valley and operate against Mosby, taking care to clear the
country of forage and subsistence, so as to prevent the guerrillas from
being harbored there in the future their destruction or capture being
well-nigh impossible, on account of their intimate knowledge of the
mountain region.  Merritt carried out his instructions with his usual
sagacity and thoroughness, sweeping widely over each side of his
general line of march with flankers, who burned the grain and brought
in large herds of cattle, hogs and sheep, which were issued to the
troops.

While Merritt was engaged in this service the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad once more received the attention of the enemy; Rosser, with
two brigades of cavalry, crossing the Great North Mountain, capturing
the post of New Creek, with about five hundred prisoners and seven
guns, destroying all the supplies of the garrison, and breaking up
the railroad track.  This slight success of the Confederates in West
Virginia, and the intelligence that they were contemplating further
raids in that section, led me to send, Crook there with one division,
his other troops going to City Point; and, I hoped that all the
threatened places would thus be sufficiently protected, but
negligence at Beverly resulted in the capture of that station by
Rosser on the 11th of January.

In the meanwhile, Early established himself with Wharton's division
at Staunton in winter quarters, posting his cavalry in that
neighborhood also, except a detachment at New Market, and another
small one at the signal-station on Three Top Mountain.  The winter was
a most severe one, snow falling frequently to the depth of several
inches, and the mercury often sinking below zero.  The rigor of the
season was very much against the success of any mounted operations,
but General Grant being very desirous to have the railroads broken up
about Gordonsville and Charlottesville, on the 19th of December I
started the cavalry out for that purpose, Torbert, with Merritt and
Powell, marching through Chester Gap, while Custer moved toward
Staunton to make a demonstration in Torbert's favor, hoping to hold
the enemy's troops in the valley.  Unfortunately, Custer did not
accomplish all that was expected of him, and being surprised by
Rosser and Payne near Lacy's Springs before reveille, had to abandon
his bivouac and retreat down the valley, with the loss of a number of
prisoners, a few horses, and a good many horse equipments, for,
because of the suddenness of Rosser's attack, many of the men had no
time to saddle up.  As soon as Custer's retreat was assured,
Wharton's division of infantry was sent to Charlottesville to check
Torbert, but this had already been done by Lomax, with the assistance
of infantry sent up from Richmond.  Indeed, from the very beginning
of the movement the Confederates had been closely observing the
columns of Torbert and Custer, and in consequence of the knowledge
thus derived, Early had marched Lomax to Gordonsville in anticipation
of an attack there, at the same time sending Rosser down the valley
to meet Custer.  Torbert in the performance of his task captured two
pieces of artillery from Johnson's and McCausland's brigades, at
Liberty Mills on the Rapidan River, but in the main the purpose of
the raid utterly failed, so by the 27th of December he returned,
many, of his men badly frost-bitten from the extreme cold which had
prevailed.

This expedition practically closed all operations for the season, and
the cavalry was put into winter cantonment near Winchester.  The
distribution of my infantry to Petersburg and West Virginia left with
me in the beginning of the new year, as already stated, but the one
small division of the Nineteenth Corps.  On account of this
diminution of force, it became necessary for me to keep thoroughly
posted in regard to the enemy, and I now realized more than I had
done hitherto how efficient my scouts had become since under the
control of Colonel Young; for not only did they bring me almost every
day intelligence from within Early's lines, but they also operated
efficiently against the guerrillas infesting West Virginia.

Harry Gilmore, of Maryland, was the most noted of these since the
death of McNeil, and as the scouts had reported him in Harrisonburg
the latter part of January, I directed two of the most trustworthy to
be sent to watch his movements and ascertain his purposes.  In a few
days these spies returned with the intelligence that Gilmore was on
his way to Moorefield, the centre of a very disloyal section in West
Virginia, about ninety miles southwest of Winchester, where, under
the guise of a camp-meeting, a gathering was to take place, at which
he expected to enlist a number of men, be joined by a party of about
twenty recruits coming from Maryland, and then begin depredations
along the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.  Believing that Gilmore might
be captured, I directed Young to undertake the task, and as a
preliminary step he sent to Moorefield two of his men who early in
the war had "refugeed" from that section and enlisted in one of the
Union regiments from West Virginia.  In about a week these men came
back and reported that Gilmore was living at a house between three
and four miles from Moorefield, and gave full particulars as to his
coming and going, the number of men he had about there and where they
rendezvoused.

With this knowledge at hand I directed Young to take twenty of his
best men and leave that night for Moorefield, dressed in Confederate
uniforms, telling him that I would have about three hundred cavalry
follow in his wake when he had got about fifteen miles start, and
instructing him to pass his party off as a body of recruits for
Gilmore coming from Maryland and pursued by the Yankee cavalry.  I
knew this would allay suspicion and provide him help on the road;
and, indeed, as Colonel Whittaker, who alone knew the secret,
followed after the fleeing "Marylanders," he found that their advent
had caused so little remark that the trail would have been lost had
he not already known their destination.  Young met with a hearty,
welcome wherever he halted on the way, and as he passed through the
town of Moorefield learned with satisfaction that Gilmore still made
his headquarters at the house where the report of the two scouts had
located him a few days before.  Reaching the designated place about
12 o'clock on the night of the 5th of February, Young, under the
representation that he had come directly from Maryland and was being
pursued by the Union cavalry, gained immediate access to Gilmore's
room.  He found the bold guerrilla snugly tucked in bed, with two
pistols lying on a chair near by.  He was sleeping so soundly that to
arouse him Young had to give him a violent shake.  As he awoke and
asked who was disturbing his slumbers, Young, pointing at him a
cocked six-shooter, ordered him to dress without delay, and in answer
to his inquiry, informed him that he was a prisoner to one of
Sheridan's staff.  Meanwhile Gilmore's men had learned of his
trouble, but the early appearance of Colonel Whittaker caused them to
disperse; thus the last link between Maryland and the Confederacy was
carried a prisoner to Winchester, whence he was sent to Fort Warren.

The capture of Gilmore caused the disbandment of the party he had
organized at the "camp-meeting," most of the men he had recruited
returning to their homes discouraged, though some few joined the
bands of Woodson and young Jesse McNeil, which, led by the latter,
dashed into Cumberland, Maryland, at 3 O'clock on the morning of the
21st of February and made a reprisal by carrying off General Crook
and General Kelly, and doing their work so silently and quickly that
they escaped without being noticed, and were some distance on their
way before the colored watchman at the hotel where Crook was
quartered could compose himself enough to give the alarm.  A troop of
cavalry gave hot chase from Cumberland, striving to intercept the
party at Moorefield and other points, but all efforts were fruitless,
the prisoners soon being beyond reach.

Although I had adopted the general rule of employing only soldiers as
scouts, there was an occasional exception to it.  I cannot say that
these exceptions proved wholly that an ironclad observance of the
rule would have been best, but I am sure of it in one instance.  A
man named Lomas, who claimed to be a Marylander, offered me his
services as a spy, and coming highly recommended from Mr. Stanton,
who had made use of him in that capacity, I employed him.  He made
many pretensions, often appearing over anxious to impart information
seemingly intended to impress me with his importance, and yet was
more than ordinarily intelligent, but in spite of that my confidence
in him was by no means unlimited.  I often found what he reported to
me as taking place within the Confederate lines corroborated by
Young's men, but generally there were discrepancies in his tales,
which led me to suspect that he was employed by the enemy as well as
by me.  I felt, however, that with good watching he could do me
little harm, and if my suspicions were incorrect he might be very
useful, so I held on to him.

Early in February Lomas was very solicitous for me to employ a man
who, he said, had been with Mosby, but on account of some quarrel in
the irregular camp had abandoned that leader.  Thinking that with two
of them I might destroy the railroad bridges east of Lynchburg, I
concluded, after the Mosby man had been brought to my headquarters by
Lomas about 12 o'clock one night, to give him employment, at the same
time informing Colonel Young that I suspected their fidelity,
however, and that he must test it by shadowing their every movement.
When Lomas's companion entered my room he was completely disguised,
but on discarding the various contrivances by which his identity was
concealed he proved to be a rather slender, dark-complexioned,
handsome young man, of easy address and captivating manners.  He gave
his name as Renfrew, answered all my questions satisfactorily, and
went into details about Mosby and his men which showed an intimacy
with them at some time.  I explained to the two men the work I had
laid out for them, and stated the sum of money I would give to have
it done, but stipulated that in case of failure there would be no
compensation whatever beyond the few dollars necessary for their
expenses.  They readily assented, and it was arranged that they
should start the following night.  Meanwhile Young had selected his
men to shadow them, and in two days reported my spies as being
concealed at Strasburg, where they remained, without making the
slightest effort to continue on their mission, and were busy, no
doubt, communicating with the enemy, though I was not able to fasten
this on them.  On the 16th of February they returned to Winchester,
and reported their failure, telling so many lies about their
hazardous adventure as to remove all remaining doubt as to their
double-dealing.  Unquestionably they were spies from the enemy, and
hence liable to the usual penalties of such service; but it struck me
that through them, I might deceive Early as to the time of opening
the spring campaign, I having already received from General Grant an
intimation of what was expected of me.  I therefore retained the men
without even a suggestion of my knowledge of their true character,
Young meanwhile keeping close watch over all their doings.

Toward the last of February General Early had at Staunton two
brigades of infantry under Wharton.  All the rest of the infantry
except Echol's brigade, which was in southwestern Virginia, had been
sent to Petersburg during the winter, and Fitz. Lee's two brigades of
cavalry also.  Rosser's men were mostly at their homes, where, on
account of a lack of subsistence and forage in the valley, they had
been permitted to go, subject to call.  Lomax's cavalry was at
Millboro, west of Staunton, where supplies were obtainable.  It was
my aim to get well on the road before Early could collect these
scattered forces, and as many of the officers had been in the habit
of amusing themselves fox-hunting during the latter part of the
winter, I decided to use the hunt as an expedient for stealing a
march on the enemy, and had it given out officially that a grand
fox-chase would take place on the 29th of February.  Knowing that
Lomas, and Renfrew would spread the announcement South, they were
permitted to see several red foxes that had been secured, as well as a
large pack of hounds which Colonel Young had collected for the sport,
and were then started on a second expedition to burn the bridges.  Of
course, they were shadowed as usual, and two days later, after they had
communicated with friends from their hiding-place, in Newtown, they
were arrested.  On the way north to Fort Warren they escaped from their
guards when passing through Baltimore, and I never heard of them again,
though I learned that, after the assassination of, Mr. Lincoln,
Secretary Stanton strongly suspected his friend Lomas of being
associated with the conspirators, and it then occurred to me that the
good-looking Renfrew may have been Wilkes Booth, for he certainly bore
a strong resemblance to Booth's pictures.

On the 27th of February my cavalry entered upon the campaign which
cleared the Shenandoah Valley of every remnant of organized
Confederates.  General Torbert being absent on leave at this time, I
did not recall him, but appointed General Merritt Chief of Cavalry.
for Torbert had disappointed me on two important occasions--in the
Luray Valley during the battle of Fisher's Hill, and on the recent
Gordonsville expedition--and I mistrusted his ability to conduct any
operations requiring much self-reliance.  The column was composed of
Custer's and Devin's divisions of cavalry, and two sections of
artillery, comprising in all about 10,000 officers and men.  On
wheels we had, to accompany this column, eight ambulances, sixteen
ammunition wagons, a pontoon train for eight canvas boats, and a
small supply-train, with fifteen days' rations of coffee, sugar, and
salt, it being intended to depend on the country for the meat and
bread ration, the men carrying in their haversacks nearly enough to
subsist them till out of the exhausted valley.

Grant's orders were for me to destroy the Virginia Central railroad
and the James River canal, capture Lynchburg if practicable, and then
join General Sherman in North Carolina wherever he might be found, or
return to Winchester, but as to joining Sherman I was to be governed
by the state of affairs after the projected capture of Lynchburg.
The weather was cold, the valley and surrounding mountains being
still covered with snow; but this was fast disappearing, however,
under the heavy rain that was coming down as the column moved along
up the Valley pike at a steady gait that took us to Woodstock the
first day.  The second day we crossed the North Fork of the
Shenandoah on our pontoon-bridge, and by night-fall reached Lacy's
Springs, having seen nothing of the enemy as yet but a few partisans
who hung on our flanks in the afternoon.

March 1 we encountered General Rosser at Mt. Crawford, he having been
able to call together only some five or six hundred of his troops,
our unsuspected march becoming known to Early only the day before.
Rosser attempted to delay us here, trying to burn the bridges over
the Middle Fork of the Shenandoah, but two regiments from Colonel
Capehart's brigade swam the stream and drove Rosser to Kline's Mills,
taking thirty prisoners and twenty ambulances and wagons.

Meanwhile General Early was busy at Staunton, but not knowing my
objective point, he had ordered the return of Echol's brigade from
southwestern Virginia for the protection of Lynchburg, directed
Lomax's cavalry to concentrate at Pond Gap for the purpose of
harassing me if I moved toward Lynchburg, and at the same time
marched Wharton's two brigades of infantry, Nelson's artillery, and
Rosser's cavalry to Waynesboro', whither he went also to remain till
the object of my movement was ascertained.

I entered Staunton the morning of March 2, and finding that Early had
gone to Waynesboro' with his infantry and Rosser, the question at
once arose whether I should continue my march to Lynchburg direct,
leaving my adversary in my rear, or turn east and open the way
through Rockfish Gap to the Virginia Central railroad and James River
canal.  I felt confident of the success of the latter plan, for I
knew that Early numbered there not more than two thousand men; so,
influenced by this, and somewhat also by the fact that Early had left
word in Staunton that he would fight at Waynesboro', I directed
Merritt to move toward that place with Custer, to be closely followed
by Devin, who was to detach one brigade to destroy supplies at
Swoope's depot.  The by-roads were miry beyond description, rain
having fallen almost incessantly since we left Winchester, but
notwithstanding the down-pour the column pushed on, men and horses
growing almost unrecognizable from the mud covering them from head to
foot.

General Early was true to the promise made his friends in Staunton,
for when Custer neared Waynesboro' he found, occupying a line of
breastworks on a ridge west of the town, two brigades of infantry,
with eleven pieces of artillery and Rosser's cavalry.  Custer, when
developing the position of the Confederates, discovered that their
left was somewhat exposed instead of resting on South River; he
therefore made his dispositions for attack, sending around that flank
the dismounted regiments from Pennington's brigade, while he himself,
with two brigades, partly mounted and partly dismounted, assaulted
along the whole line of breastworks.  Pennington's flanking movement
stampeded the enemy in short order, thus enabling Custer to carry the
front with little resistance, and as he did so the Eighth New York
and First Connecticut, in a charge in column, broke through the
opening made by Custer, and continued on through the town of
Waynesboro', never stopping till they crossed South River.  There,
finding themselves immediately in the enemy's rear, they promptly
formed as foragers and held the east bank of the stream till all the
Confederates surrendered except Rosser, who succeeded in making his
way back to the valley, and Generals Early, Wharton, Long, and
Lilley, who, with fifteen or twenty men, escaped across the Blue
Ridge.  I followed up the victory immediately by despatching Capehart
through Rock-fish Gap, with orders to encamp on the east side of the
Blue Ridge.  By reason of this move all the enemy's stores and
transportation fell into our hands, while we captured on the field
seventeen battle flags, sixteen hundred officers and men, and eleven
pieces of artillery.  This decisive victory closed hostilities in the
Shenandoah Valley.  The prisoners and artillery were sent back to
Winchester next morning, under a guard of 1,500 men, commanded by
Colonel J.  H.  Thompson, of the First New Hampshire.

The night of March 2 Custer camped at Brookfield, Devin remaining at
Waynesboro'.  The former started for Charlottesville the next morning
early, followed by Devin with but two brigades, Gibbs having been
left behind to blow up the iron railroad bridge across South River.
Because of the incessant rains and spring thaws the roads were very
soft, and the columns cut them up terribly, the mud being thrown by
the sets of fours across the road in ridges as much as two feet high,
making it most difficult to get our wagons along, and distressingly
wearing on the animals toward the middle and rear of the columns.
Consequently I concluded to rest at Charlottesville for a couple of
days and recuperate a little, intending at the same time to destroy,
with small parties, the railroad from that point toward Lynchburg.
Custer reached Charlottesville the 3d, in the afternoon, and was met
at the outskirts by a deputation of its citizens, headed by the
mayor, who surrendered the town with medieval ceremony, formally
handing over the keys of the public buildings and of the University
of Virginia.  But this little scene did not delay Custer long enough
to prevent his capturing, just beyond the village, a small body of
cavalry and three pieces of artillery.  Gibbs's brigade, which was
bringing up my mud-impeded train, did not arrive until the 5th of
March.  In the mean time Young's scouts had brought word that the
garrison of Lynchburg was being increased and the fortifications
strengthened, so that its capture would be improbable.  I decided,
however, to move toward the place as far as Amherst Court House,
which is sixteen miles short of the town, so Devin, under Merritt's
supervision, marched along the James River, destroying the canal,
while Custer pushed ahead on the railroad and broke it up.  The two
columns were to join at New Market, whence I intended to cross the
James River at some point east of Lynchburg, if practicable, so as to
make my way to Appomattox Court House, and destroy the Southside
railroad as far east as Farmville.  Owing to its swollen condition
the river was unfordable but knowing that there was a covered bridge
at Duguidsville, I hoped to secure it by a dash, and cross there, but
the enemy, anticipating this, had filled the bridge with inflammable
material, and just as our troops got within striking distance it
burst into flames.  The bridge at Hardwicksville also having been
burned by the enemy, there was now no means of crossing except by
pontoons.  But, unfortunately, I had only eight of these, and they
could not be made to span the swollen river.

Being thus unable to cross until the river should fall, and knowing
that it was impracticable to join General Sherman, and useless to
adhere to my alternative instructions to return to Winchester, I now
decided to destroy still more thoroughly the James River canal and
the Virginia Central railroad and then join General Grant in front of
Petersburg.  I was master of the whole country north of the James as
far down as Goochland; hence the destruction of these arteries of
supply could be easily compassed, and feeling that the war was
nearing its end, I desired my cavalry to be in at the death.

On March 9 the main column started eastward down the James River,
destroying locks, dams, and boats, having been preceded by Colonel
Fitzhugh's brigade of Devin's division in a forced march to Goochland
and Beaver Dam Creek, with orders to destroy everything below
Columbia.  I made Columbia on the 10th, and from there sent a
communication to General Grant reporting what had occurred, informing
him of my condition and intention, asking him to send forage and
rations to meet me at the White House, and also a pontoon-bridge to
carry me over the Pamunkey, for in view of the fact that hitherto it
had been impracticable to hold Lee in the trenches around Petersburg,
I regarded as too hazardous a march down the south bank of the
Pamunkey, where the enemy, by sending troops out from Richmond, might
fall upon my flank and rear.  It was of the utmost importance that
General Grant should receive these despatches without chance of
failure, in order that I might, depend absolutely on securing
supplies at the White House; therefore I sent the message in
duplicate, one copy overland direct to City Point by two scouts,
Campbell and Rowan, and the other by Fannin and Moore, who were to go
down the James River in a small boat to Richmond, join the troops in
the trenches in front of Petersburg, and, deserting to the Union
lines, deliver their tidings into General Grant's hands.  Each set of
messengers got through, but the copy confided to Campbell and Rowan
was first at Grant's headquarters.

I halted for one day at Columbia to let my trains catch up, for it
was still raining and the mud greatly delayed the teams, fatiguing
and wearying the mules so much that I believe we should have been
forced to abandon most of the wagons except for the invaluable help
given by some two thousand negroes who had attached themselves to the
column: they literally lifted the wagons out of the mud.  From
Columbia Merritt, with Devin's division, marched to Louisa Court
House and destroyed the Virginia Central to Frederick's Hall.
Meanwhile Custer was performing similar work from Frederick's Hall to
Beaver Dam Station, and also pursued for a time General Early, who,
it was learned from despatches captured in the telegraph office at
Frederick's Hall, was in the neighborhood with a couple of hundred
men.  Custer captured some of these men and two of Early's
staff-officers, but the commander of the Valley District, accompanied
by a single orderly, escaped across the South Anna and next day made
his way to Richmond, the last man of the Confederate army that had so
long contended with us in the Shenandoah Valley.

At Frederick's Hall, Young's scouts brought me word from Richmond
that General Longstreet was assembling a force there to prevent my
junction with Grant, and that Pickett's division, which had been sent
toward Lynchburg to oppose my march, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, were
moving east on the Southside railroad, with the object of
circumventing me.  Reasoning that Longstreet could interpose
effectually only by getting to the White House ahead of me, I pushed
one column under Custer across the South Anna, by way of Ground
Squirrel bridge, to Ashland, where it united with Merritt, who had
meanwhile marched through Hanover Junction.  Our appearance at
Ashland drew the Confederates out in that direction, as was hoped,
so, leaving Colonel Pennington's brigade there to amuse them, the
united command retraced its route to Mount Carmel church to cross the
North Anna.  After dark Pennington came away, and all the troops
reached the church by midnight of the 15th.

Resuming the march at an early hour next morning, we took the road by
way of King William Court House to the White House, where, arriving
on the 18th, we found, greatly to our relief, the supplies which I
had requested to be sent there.  In the meanwhile the enemy had
marched to Hanover Court House, but being unable either to cross the
Pamunkey there or forestall me at the White House on the south side
of the river, he withdrew to Richmond without further effort to
impede my column.

The hardships of this march far exceeded those of any previous
campaigns by the cavalry.  Almost incessant rains had drenched us for
sixteen days and nights, and the swollen streams and well-nigh
bottomless roads east of Staunton presented grave difficulties on
every hand, but surmounting them all, we destroyed the enemy's means
of subsistence, in quantities beyond computation, and permanently
crippled the Virginia Central railroad, as well as the James River
canal, and as each day brought us nearer the Army of the Potomac, all
were filled with the comforting reflection that our work in the
Shenandoah Valley had been thoroughly done, and every one was buoyed
up by the cheering thought that we should soon take part in the final
struggle of the war.




CHAPTER V.

TRANSFERRED TO PETERSBURG--GENERAL RAWLINS CORDIAL WELCOME--GENERAL
GRANT's ORDERS AND PLANS--A TRIP WITH MR. LINCOLN AND GENERAL GRANT
--MEETING GENERAL SHERMAN--OPPOSED TO JOINING THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
--OPENING OF THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN--GENERAL GRANT AND GENERAL RAWLINS.

The transfer of my command from the Shenandoah Valley to the field of
operations in front of Petersburg was not anticipated by General
Grant; indeed, the despatch brought from Columbia by my scouts,
asking that supplies be sent me at the White House, was the first
word that reached him concerning the move.  In view of my message the
general-in-chief decided to wait my arrival before beginning spring
operations with the investing troops south of the James River, for he
felt the importance of having my cavalry at hand in a campaign which
he was convinced would wind up the war.  We remained a few days at
the White House resting and refitting the cavalry, a large amount of
shoeing being necessary; but nothing like enough horses were at hand
to replace those that had died or been disabled on the mud march from
Staunton to the Pamunkey River, so a good many of the men were still
without mounts, and all such were sent by boat to the dismounted camp
near City Point.  When all was ready the column set out for Hancock
Station, a point on the military railroad in front of Petersburg, and
arriving there on the 27th of March, was in orders reunited with its
comrades of the Second Division, who had been serving with the Army
of the Potomac since we parted from them the previous August.
General Crook, who had been exchanged within a few days, was now in
command of this Second Division.  The reunited corps was to enter
upon the campaign as a separate army, I reporting directly to General
Grant; the intention being thus to reward me for foregoing, of my own
choice, my position as a department commander by joining the armies
at Petersburg.

Taking the road across the Peninsula, I started from the White House
with Merritt's column on the 25th of March and encamped that night at
Harrison's Landing.  Very early next morning, in conformity with a
request from General Grant, I left by boat for City Point, Merritt
meanwhile conducting the column across the James River to the point
of rendezvous, The trip to City Point did not take long, and on
arrival at army headquarters the first person I met was General John
A. Rawlins, General Grant's chief-of-staff.  Rawlins was a man of
strong likes and dislikes, and positive always both in speech and
action, exhibiting marked feelings when greeting any one, and on this
occasion met me with much warmth.  His demonstrations of welcome
over, we held a few minutes' conversation about the coming campaign,
he taking strong ground against a part of the plan of operations
adopted, namely, that which contemplated my joining General Sherman's
army.  His language was unequivocal and vehement, and when he was
through talking, he conducted me to General Grant's quarters, but he
himself did not enter.

General Grant was never impulsive, and always met his officers in an
unceremonious way, with a quiet "How are you" soon putting one at his
ease, since the pleasant tone in which he spoke gave assurance of
welcome, although his manner was otherwise impassive.  When the
ordinary greeting was over, he usually waited for his visitor to open
the conversation, so on this occasion I began by giving him the
details of my march from Winchester, my reasons for not joining
Sherman, as contemplated in my instructions, and the motives which
had influenced me to march to the White House.  The other provision
of my orders on setting out from Winchester--the alternative return
to that place--was not touched upon, for the wisdom of having ignored
that was fully apparent.  Commenting on this recital of my doings,
the General referred only to the tortuous course of my march from
Waynesboro' down, our sore trials, and the valuable services of the
scouts who had brought him tidings of me, closing with the remark
that it was, rare a department commander voluntarily deprived himself
of independence, and added that I should not suffer for it.  Then
turning to the business for which he had called me to City Point, he
outlined what he expected me to do; saying that I was to cut loose
from the Army of the Potomac by passing its left flank to the
southward along the line of the Danville railroad, and after crossing
the Roanoke River, join General Sherman.  While speaking, he handed
me a copy of a general letter of instructions that had been drawn up
for the army on the 24th.  The letter contained these words
concerning the movements of my command:

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under
General Davies, will move at the same time (29th inst.) by the Weldon
road and the Jerusalem plank-road, turning west from the latter
before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column before
reaching Stony Creek.  General Sheridan will then move independently
under other instructions which will be given him.  All dismounted
cavalry belonging to the Army of the Potomac, and the dismounted
cavalry from the Middle Military Division not required for guarding
property belonging to their arm of the service, will report to
Brigadier-General Benham to be added to the defenses of City Point."

When I had gone over the entire letter I showed plainly that I was
dissatisfied with it, for, coupled with what the General had outlined
orally, which I supposed was the "other instructions," I believed it
foreshadowed my junction with General Sherman.  Rawlins thought so
too, as his vigorous language had left no room to doubt, so I
immediately began to offer my objections to the programme.  These
were, that it would be bad policy to send me down to the Carolinas
with a part of the Army of the Potomac, to come back to crush Lee
after the destruction of General Johnston's army; such a course would
give rise to the charge that his own forces around Petersburg were
not equal to the task, and would seriously affect public opinion in
the North; that in fact my cavalry belonged to the Army of the
Potomac, which army was able unaided to destroy Lee, and I could not
but oppose any dispersion of its strength.

All this was said in a somewhat emphatic manner, and when I had
finished he quietly told me that the portion of my instructions from
which I so strongly dissented was intended as a "blind" to cover any
check the army in its general move, to the left might meet with, and
prevent that element in the North which held that the war could be
ended only through negotiation, from charging defeat.  The fact that
my cavalry was not to ultimately join Sherman was a great relief to
me, and after expressing the utmost confidence in the plans unfolded
for closing the war by directing every effort to the annihilation of
Lee's army, I left him to go to General Ingalls's quarters.  On the
way I again met Rawlins, who, when I told him that General Grant had
intimated his intention to modify the written plan of operations so
far as regarded the cavalry, manifested the greatest satisfaction,
and I judged from this that the new view of the matter had not
previously been communicated to the chief-of-staff, though he must
have been acquainted of course with the programme made out on the
24th of March.

Toward noon General Grant sent for me to accompany him up the river.
When I joined the General he informed me that the President was on
board the boat--the steamer Mary Martin.  For some days Mr. Lincoln
had been at City Point, established on the steamer River Queen,
having come down from Washington to be nearer his generals, no doubt,
and also to be conveniently situated for the reception of tidings
from the front when operations began, for he could not endure the
delays in getting news to Washington.  This trip up the James had
been projected by General Meade, but on account of demands at the
front he could not go, so the President, General Grant, and I
composed the party.  We steamed up to where my cavalry was crossing
on the pontoon-bridge below the mouth of the Dutch Gap canal, and for
a little while watched the column as it was passing over the river,
the bright sunshine presaging good weather, but only to delude, as
was proved by the torrents of rain brought by the succeeding days of
March.  On the trip the President was not very cheerful.  In fact, he
was dejected, giving no indication of his usual means of diversion,
by which (his quaint stories) I had often heard he could find relief
from his cares.  He spoke to me of the impending operations and asked
many questions, laying stress upon the one, "What would be the result
when the army moved out to the left, if the enemy should come down
and capture City Point?" the question being prompted, doubtless, by
the bold assault on our lines and capture of Fort Steadman two days
before by General Gordon.  I answered that I did not think it at all
probable that General Lee would undertake such a desperate measure to
relieve the strait he was in; that General Hartranft's successful
check to Gordon had ended, I thought, attacks of such a character;
and in any event General Grant would give Lee all he could attend to
on the left.  Mr. Lincoln said nothing about my proposed route of
march, and I doubt if he knew of my instructions, or was in
possession at most of more than a very general outline of the plan of
campaign.  It was late when the Mary Martin returned to City Point,
and I spent the night there with General Ingalls.

The morning of the 27th I went out to Hancock Station to look after
my troops and prepare for moving two days later.  In the afternoon I
received a telegram from General Grant, saying: "General Sherman will
be here this evening to spend a few hours.  I should like to have you
come down."  Sherman's coming was a surprise--at least to me it was
--this despatch being my first intimation of his expected arrival.
Well knowing the zeal and emphasis with which General Sherman would
present his views, there again came into my mind many misgivings with
reference to the movement of the cavalry, and I made haste to start
for Grant's headquarters.  I got off a little after 7 o'clock, taking
the rickety military railroad, the rails of which were laid on the
natural surface of the ground, with grading only here and there at
points of absolute necessity, and had not gone far when the
locomotive jumped the track.  This delayed my arrival at City Point
till near midnight, but on repairing to the little cabin that
sheltered the general-in-chief, I found him and Sherman still up
talking over the problem whose solution was near at hand.  As already
stated, thoughts as to the tenor of my instructions became uppermost
the moment I received the telegram in the afternoon, and they
continued to engross and disturb me all the way down the railroad,
for I feared that the telegram foreshadowed, under the propositions
Sherman would present, a more specific compliance with the written
instructions than General Grant had orally assured me would be
exacted.

My entrance into the shanty suspended the conversation for a moment
only, and then General Sherman, without prelude, rehearsed his plans
for moving his army, pointing out with every detail how he would come
up through the Carolinas to join the troops besieging Petersburg and
Richmond, and intimating that my cavalry, after striking the
Southside and Danville railroads, could join him with ease.  I made
no comments on the projects for moving, his own troops, but as soon
as opportunity offered, dissented emphatically from the proposition
to have me join the Army of the Tennessee, repeating in substance
what I had previously expressed to General Grant.

My uneasiness made me somewhat too earnest, I fear, but General Grant
soon mollified me, and smoothed matters over by practically repeating
what he had told me in regard to this point at the close of our
interview the day before, so I pursued the subject no further.  In a
little while the conference ended, and I again sought lodging at the
hospitable quarters of Ingalls.

Very early the next morning, while I was still in bed, General
Sherman came to me and renewed the subject of my joining him, but
when he saw that I was unalterably opposed to it the conversation
turned into other channels, and after we had chatted awhile he
withdrew, and later in the day went up the river with the President,
General Grant, and Admiral Porter, I returning to my command at
Hancock Station, where my presence was needed to put my troops in
march next day.

During the entire winter General Grant's lines fronting Petersburg
had extended south of the Appomattox River, practically from that
stream around to where the Vaughn road crosses Hatcher's Run, and
this was nearly the situation Wilien the cavalry concentrated at
Hancock Station, General Weitzel holding the line north of the
Appomattox, fronting Richmond and Bermuda Hundred.

The instructions of the 24th of March contemplated that the campaign
should begin with the movement of Warren's corps (the Fifth) at
3 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, and Humphreys's (the Second) at
6; the rest of the infantry holding on in the trenches.  The cavalry
was to move in conjunction with Warren and Humphreys, and make its
way out beyond our left as these corps opened the road.

The night of the 28th I received the following additional
instructions, the general tenor of which again disturbed me, for
although I had been assured that I was not to join General Sherman,
it will be seen that the supplemental directions distinctly present
that alternative, and I therefore feared that during the trip up the
James River on the morning of the 28th General Grant had returned to
his original views:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"City Point, Va., March 28, 1865.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN:

"The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughn road at 3 A.M.
tomorrow morning.  The Second moves at about 9 A.M., having but about
three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on
the right of the Fifth Corps, after the latter reaches Dinwiddie
Court House.

"Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being
confined to any particular road or roads.  You may go out by the
nearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and
passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the
enemy as soon as you can.  It is not the intention to attack the
enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out if possible.
Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be
attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with
the full reliance that the army will engage or follow the enemy, as
circumstances will dictate.  I shall be on the field, and will
probably be able to communicate with you; should I not do so, and you
find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may
cut loose and push for the Danville road.  If you find it practicable
I would like you to cross the Southside road, between Petersburg and
Burkeville, and destroy it to some extent.  I would not advise much
detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which I would
like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible; make your
destruction of that road as complete as possible; you can then pass
on to the Southside road, west of Burkeville, and destroy that in
like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads,
which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may
return to this army, selecting your road farther south, or you may go
on into North Carolina and join General Sherman.  Should you select
the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so
that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General."


These instructions did not alter my line of march for the morrow, and
I trusted matters would so come about as not to require compliance
with those portions relative to the railroads and to joining Sherman;
so early on the 29th I moved my cavalry out toward Ream's Station on
the Weldon road, Devin commanding the First Division, with Colonels
Gibbs, Stagg, and Fitzhugh in charge of the brigades; the Third
Division under Custer, Colonels Wells, Capehart and Pennington being
the brigade commanders.  These two divisions united were commanded by
Merritt, as they had been since leaving Winchester.  Crook headed the
Second Division, his brigades being under General Davies and Colonels
John I. Gregg and Smith.

Our general direction was westward, over such routes as could be
found, provided they did not embarrass the march of the infantry.
The roads, from the winter's frosts and rains, were in a frightful
state, and when it was sought to avoid a spot which the head of the
column had proved almost bottomless, the bogs and quicksands of the
adjoining fields demonstrated that to make a detour was to go from
bad to worse.  In the face of these discouragements we floundered on,
however, crossing on the way a series of small streams swollen to
their banks.  Crook and Devin reached the county-seat of Dinwiddie
about 5 o'clock in the evening, having encountered only a small
picket, that at once gave way to our advance.  Merritt left Custer at
Malon's crossing of Rowanty Creek to care for the trains containing
our subsistence and the reserve ammunition, these being stuck in the
mire at, intervals all the way back to the Jerusalem plank-road; and
to make any headway at all with the trains, Custer's men often had to
unload the wagons and lift them out of the boggy places.

Crook and Devin camped near Dinwiddie Court House in such manner as
to cover the Vaughn, Flatfoot, Boydton, and Five Forks roads; for, as
these all intersected at Dinwiddie, they offered a chance for the
enemy's approach toward the rear of the Fifth Corps, as Warren
extended to the left across the Boydton road.  Any of these routes
leading to the south or west might also be the one on which, in
conformity with one part of my instructions, I was expected to get
out toward the Danville and Southside railroads, and the Five Forks
road would lead directly to General Lee's right flank, in case
opportunity was found to comply with the other part.  The place was,
therefore, of great strategic value, and getting it without cost
repaid us for floundering through the mud.

Dinwiddie Court House, though a most important point in the campaign,
was far from attractive in feature, being made up of a half-dozen
unsightly houses, a ramshackle tavern propped up on two sides with
pine poles, and the weatherbeaten building that gave official name to
the cross-roads.  We had no tents--there were none in the command--so
I took possession of the tavern for shelter for myself and staff, and
just as we had finished looking over its primitive interior a rain
storm set in.

The wagon containing my mess equipment was back somewhere on the
road, hopelessly stuck in the mud, and hence we had nothing to eat
except some coffee which two young women living at the tavern kindly
made for us; a small quantity of the berry being furnished from the
haversacks of my escort.  By the time we got the coffee, rain was
falling in sheets, and the evening bade fair to be a most dismal one;
but songs and choruses set up by some of my staff--the two young
women playing accompaniments on a battered piano--relieved the
situation and enlivened us a little.  However, the dreary night
brought me one great comfort; for General Grant, who that day had
moved out to Gravelly Run, sent me instructions to abandon all idea
of the contemplated raid, and directed me to act in concert with the
infantry under his immediate command, to turn, if possible, the right
flank of Lee's army.  The despatch made my mind easy with respect to
the objectionable feature of my original instructions, and of course
relieved me also from the anxiety growing out of the letter received
at Hancock Station the night of the 28th; so, notwithstanding the
suspicions excited by some of my staff concerning the Virginia
feather-bed that had been assigned me, I turned in at a late hour and
slept most soundly.

The night of the 29th the left of General Grant's infantry--Warren's
corps--rested on the Boydton road, not far from its intersection with
the Quaker road.  Humphreys's corps was next to Warren; then came
Ord, next Wright, and then Parke, with his right resting on the
Appomattox.  The moving of Warren and Humphreys to the left during
the day was early discovered by General Lee.  He met it by extending
the right of his infantry on the White Oak road, while drawing in the
cavalry of W. H. F. Lee and Rosser along the south bank of Stony
Creek to cover a crossroads called Five Forks, to anticipate me
there; for assuming that my command was moving in conjunction with
the infantry, with the ultimate purpose of striking the Southside
railroad, Lee made no effort to hold Dinwiddie, which he might have
done with his cavalry, and in this he made a fatal mistake.  The
cavalry of Fitz. Lee was ordered at this same time from Sunderland
depot to Five Forks, and its chief placed in command of all the
mounted troops of General Lee's army.

At daylight on the 30th I proceeded to make dispositions under the
new conditions imposed by my modified instructions, and directed
Merritt to push Devin out as far as the White Oak road to make a
reconnoissance to Five Forks, Crook being instructed to send Davies's
brigade to support Devin.  Crook was to hold, with Gregg's brigade,
the Stony Creek crossing of the Boydton plank road, retaining Smith's
near Dinwiddie, for use in any direction required.  On the 29th W. H.
F. Lee conformed the march of his cavalry with that of ours, but my
holding Stony Creek in this way forced him to make a detour west of
Chamberlin's Run, in order to get in communication with his friends
at Five Forks.

The rain that had been falling all night gave no sign of stopping,
but kept pouring down all day long, and the swamps and quicksands
mired the horses, whether they marched in the roads or across the
adjacent fields.  Undismayed, nevertheless, each column set out for
its appointed duty, but shortly after the troops began to move I
received from General Grant this despatch, which put a new phase on
matters:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"GRAVELLY RUN, March 30, 1865.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN:

"The heavy rain of to-day will make it impossible for us to do much
until it dries up a little, or we get roads around our rear repaired.
You may, therefore, leave what cavalry you deem necessary to protect
the left, and hold such positions as you deem necessary for that
purpose, and send the remainder back to Humphrey's Station where they
can get hay and grain.  Fifty wagons loaded with forage will be sent
to you in the morning.  Send an officer back to direct the wagons
back to where you want them.  Report to me the cavalry you will leave
back, and the position you will occupy.  Could not your cavalry go
back by the way of Stony Creek depot and destroy or capture the store
of supplies there?

"U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General."


When I had read and pondered this, I determined to ride over to
General Grant's headquarters on Gravelly Run, and get a clear idea of
what it was proposed to do, for it seemed to me that a suspension of
operations would be a serious mistake.  Mounting a powerful gray
pacing horse called Breckenridge (from its capture from one of
Breckenridge's staff-officers at Missionary Ridge), and that I knew
would carry me through the mud, I set out accompanied by my Assistant
Adjutant-General, Colonel Frederick C.  Newhall, and an escort of
about ten or fifteen men.  At first we rode north up the Boydton
plank-road, and coming upon our infantry pickets from a direction
where the enemy was expected to appear, they began to fire upon us,
but seeing from our actions that we were friends, they ceased, and
permitted us to pass the outposts.  We then struggled on in a
northeasterly direction across-country, till we struck the Vaughn
road.  This carried us to army headquarters, which were established
south of Gravelly Run in an old cornfield.  I rode to within a few
yards of the front of General Grant's tent, my horse plunging at
every step almost to his knees in the mud, and dismounted near a
camp-fire, apparently a general one, for all the staff-officers were
standing around it on boards and rails placed here and there to keep
them from sinking into the mire.

Going directly to General Grant's tent, I found him and Rawlins
talking over the question of suspending operations till the weather
should improve.  No orders about the matter had been issued yet,
except the despatch to me, and Rawlins, being strongly opposed to the
proposition, was frankly expostulating with General Grant, who, after
greeting me, remarked, in his quiet way: "Well, Rawlins, I think you
had better take command."  Seeing that there was a difference up
between Rawlins and his chief, I made the excuse of being wet and
cold, and went outside to the fire.  Here General Ingalls met me and
took me to his tent, where I was much more comfortable than when
standing outside, and where a few minutes later we were joined by
General Grant.  Ingalls then retired, and General Grant began talking
of our fearful plight, resulting from the rains and mud, and saying
that because of this it seemed necessary to suspend operations.  I at
once begged him not to do so, telling him that my cavalry was already
on the move in spite of the difficulties, and that although a
suspension of operations would not be fatal, yet it would give rise
to the very charge of disaster to which he had referred at City
Point, and, moreover, that we would surely be ridiculed, just as
General Burnside's army was after the mud march of 1863.  His better
judgment was against suspending operations, but the proposition had
been suggested by all sorts of complaints as to the impossibility of
moving the trains and the like, so it needed little argument to
convince him, and without further discussion he said, in that manner
which with him meant a firmness of purpose that could not be changed
by further complainings, "We will go on."  I then told him that I
believed I could break in the enemy's right if he would let me have
the Sixth Corps; but saying that the condition of the roads would
prevent the movement of infantry, he replied that I would have to
seize Five Forks with the cavalry alone.

On my way back to Dinwiddie I stopped at the headquarters of General
Warren, but the General being asleep, I went to the tent of one of
his staff-officers.  Colonel William T. Gentry, an old personal
friend with whom I had served in Oregon.  In a few minutes Warren
came in and we had a short conversation, he speaking rather
despondently of the outlook, being influenced no doubt by the
depressing weather.

From Warren's headquarters I returned, by the Boydton road to
Dinwiddie Court House, fording Gravelly Run with ease.  When I got as
far as the Dabney road I sent Colonel Newhall out on it toward Five
Forks, with orders for Merritt to develop the enemy's position and
strength, and then rode on to Dinwiddie to endeavor to get all my
other troops up.  Merritt was halted at the intersection of the Five
Forks and Gravelly Church roads when Newhall delivered the orders,
and in compliance moving out Gibbs's brigade promptly, sharp
skirmishing was brought on, Gibbs driving the Confederates to Five
Forks, where he found them behind a line of breastworks running along
the White Oak road.  The reconnoissance demonstrating the intention
of the enemy to hold this point, Gibbs was withdrawn.

That evening, at 7 o'clock, I reported the position of the
Confederate cavalry, and stated that it had been reinforced by
Pickett's division of infantry.  On receipt of this despatch, General
Grant offered me the Fifth Corps, but I declined to take it, and
again asked for the Sixth, saying that with it I believed I could
turn the enemy (Pickett's) left, or break through his lines.  The
morning of the 31st General Grant replied the the Sixth Corps could
not be taken from its position in the line, and offered me the
Second; but in the mean time circumstances had changed, and no corps
was ordered.




CHAPTER VI.

BATTLE OF DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE--PICKETT REPULSED--REINFORCED BY THE
FIFTH CORPS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--TURNING THE CONFEDERATE LEFT--AN
UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS--RELIEVING GENERAL WARREN--THE WARREN COURT OF
INQUIRY--GENERAL SHERMAN'S OPINION.

The night of March 30 Merritt, with Devin's division and Davies's
brigade, was camped on the Five Forks road about two miles in front
of Dinwiddie, near J. Boisseau's.  Crook, with Smith and Gregg's
brigades, continued to cover Stony Creek, and Custer was still back
at Rowanty Creek, trying to get the trains up.  This force had been
counted while crossing the creek on the 29th, the three divisions
numbering 9,000 enlisted men, Crook having 3,300, and Custer and
Devin 5,700.

During the 30th, the enemy had been concentrating his cavalry, and by
evening General W. H. F. Lee and General Rosser had joined Fitzhugh
Lee near Five Forks.  To this force was added, about dark, five
brigades of infantry--three from Pickett's division, and two from
Johnson's--all under command of Pickett.  The infantry came by the
White Oak road from the right of General Lee's intrenchments, and
their arrival became positively known to me about dark, the
confirmatory intelligence being brought in then by some of Young's
scouts who had been inside the Confederate lines.

On the 31st, the rain having ceased, directions were given at an
early hour to both Merritt and Crook to make reconnoissances
preparatory to securing Five Forks, and about 9 o'clock Merritt
started for the crossroads, Davies's brigade supporting him.  His
march was necessarily slow because of the mud, and the enemy's
pickets resisted with obstinacy also, but the coveted crossroads fell
to Merritt without much trouble, as the bulk of the enemy was just
then bent on other things.  At the same hour that Merritt started,
Crook moved Smith's brigade out northwest from Dinwiddie to
Fitzgerald's crossing of Chamberlain's Creek, to cover Merritt's
left, supporting Smith by placing Gregg to his right and rear.  The
occupation of this ford was timely, for Pickett, now in command of
both the cavalry and infantry, was already marching to get in
Merritt's rear by crossing Chamberlain's Creek.

To hold on to Fitzgerald's ford Smith had to make a sharp fight, but
Mumford's cavalry attacking Devin, the enemy's infantry succeeded in
getting over Chamberlain's Creek at a point higher up than
Fitzgerald's ford, and assailing Davies, forced him back in a
northeasterly direction toward the Dinwiddie and Five Forks road in
company with Devin.  The retreat of Davies permitted Pickett to pass
between Crook and Merritt, which he promptly did, effectually
separating them and cutting off both Davies and Devin from the road
to Dinwiddie, so that to get to that point they had to retreat across
the country to B. Boisseau's and then down the Boydton road.

Gibbs's brigade had been in reserve near the intersection of the Five
Forks and Dabney roads, and directing Merritt to hold on there, I
ordered Gregg's brigade to be mounted and brought to Merritt's aid,
for if Pickett continued in pursuit north of the Five Forks road he
would expose his right and rear, and I determined to attack him, in
such case, from Gibbs's position.  Gregg arrived in good season, and
as soon as his men were dismounted on Gibbs's left, Merritt assailed
fiercely, compelling Pickett to halt and face a new foe, thus
interrupting an advance that would finally have carried Pickett into
the rear of Warren's corps.

It was now about 4 o'clock in the afternoon and we were in a critical
situation, but having ordered Merritt to bring Devin and Davies to
Dinwiddie by the Boydton road, staff-officers were sent to hurry
Custer to the same point, for with its several diverging roads the
Court House was of vital importance, and I determined to stay there
at all hazards.  At the same time orders were sent to Smith's
brigade, which, by the advance of Pickett past its right flank and
the pressure of W. H. F. Lee on its front, had been compelled to give
up Fitzgerald's crossing, to fall back toward Dinwiddie but to
contest every inch of ground so as to gain time.

When halted by the attack of Gregg and Gibbs, Pickett, desisting from
his pursuit of Devin, as already stated, turned his undivided
attention to this unexpected force, and with his preponderating
infantry pressed it back on the Five Forks road toward Dinwiddle,
though our men, fighting dismounted behind barricades at different
points, displayed such obstinacy as to make Pickett's progress slow,
and thus give me time to look out a line for defending the Court
House.  I selected a place about three-fourths of a mile northwest of
the crossroads, and Custer coming up quickly with Capehart's brigade,
took position on the left of the road to Five Forks in some open
ground along the crest of a gentle ridge.  Custer got Capehart into
place just in time to lend a hand to Smith, who, severely pressed,
came back on us here from his retreat along Chamberlain's "bed"--the
vernacular for a woody swamp such as that through which Smith
retired.  A little later the brigades of Gregg and Gibbs, falling to
the rear slowly and steadily, took up in the woods a line which
covered the Boydton Road some distance to the right of Capehart, the
intervening gap to be filled with Pennington's brigade.  By this time
our horse-artillery, which for two days had been stuck in the mud,
was all up, and every gun was posted in this line.

It was now near sunset, and the enemy's cavalry thinking the day was
theirs, made a dash at Smith, but just as the assailants appeared in
the open fields, Capehart's men opened so suddenly on their left
flank as to cause it to recoil in astonishment, which permitted Smith
to connect his brigade with Custer unmolested.  We were now in good
shape behind the familiar barricades, and having a continuous line,
excepting only the gap to be filled with Pennington, that covered
Dinwiddie and the Boydton Road.  My left rested in the woods about
half a mile west of the Court House, and the barricades extended from
this flank in a semicircle through the open fields in a northeasterly
direction, to a piece-of thick timber on the right, near the Boydton
Road.

A little before the sun went down the Confederate infantry was formed
for the attack, and, fortunately for us, Pennington's brigade came up
and filled the space to which it was assigned between Capehart and
Gibbs, just as Pickett moved out across the cleared fields in front
of Custer, in deep lines that plainly told how greatly we were
outnumbered.

Accompanied by Generals Merritt and Custer and my staff, I now rode
along the barricades to encourage the men.  Our enthusiastic
reception showed that they were determined to stay.  The cavalcade
drew the enemy's fire, which emptied several of the saddles--among
others Mr. Theodore Wilson, correspondent of the New York Herald,
being wounded.  In reply our horse-artillery opened on the advancing
Confederates, but the men behind the barricades lay still till
Pickett's troops were within short range.  Then they opened, Custer's
repeating rifles pouring out such a shower of lead that nothing could
stand up against it.  The repulse was very quick, and as the gray
lines retired to the woods from which but a few minutes before they
had so confidently advanced, all danger of their taking Dinwiddie or
marching to the left and rear of our infantry line was over,
at least for the night.  The enemy being thus checked, I sent a
staff-officer--Captain Sheridan--to General Grant to report what had
taken place during the afternoon, and to say that I proposed to stay at
Dinwiddie, but if ultimately compelled to abandon the place, I would do
so by retiring on the Vaughn road toward Hatcher's Run, for I then
thought the attack might be renewed next morning.  Devin and Davies
joined me about dark, and my troops being now well in hand, I sent a
second staff-officer--Colonel John Kellogg--to explain my situation
more fully, and to assure General Grant that I would hold on at
Dinwiddie till forced to let go.

By following me to Dinwiddie the enemy's infantry had completely
isolated itself, and hence there was now offered the Union troops a
rare opportunity.  Lee was outside of his works, just as we desired,
and the general-in-chief realized this the moment he received the
first report of my situation; General Meade appreciated it too from
the information he got from Captain Sheridan, en route to army
headquarters with the first tidings, and sent this telegram to
General Grant:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"March 31, 1865.  9:45 p.m.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT:

"Would it not be well for Warren to go down with his whole corps and
smash up the force in front of Sheridan?  Humphreys can hold the line
to the Boydton plank-road, and the refusal along with it.  Bartlett's
brigade is now on the road from G. Boisseau's, running north, where
it crosses Gravelly Run, he having gone down the White Oak road.
Warren could go at once that way, and take the force threatening
Sheridan in rear at Dinwiddie, and move on the enemy's rear with the
other two.

"G. G. MEADE, Major-General."


An hour later General Grant replied in these words:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"DABNEY'S MILLS, March 311, 1865.  10:15 P. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
"Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not to stop for
anything.  Let Griffin (Griffin had been ordered by Warren to the
Boydton road to protect his rear) go on as he was first directed.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."


These two despatches were the initiatory steps in sending the Fifth
Corps, under Major-General G. K. Warren, to report to me, and when I
received word of its coming and also that Genera Mackenzie's cavalry
from the Army of the James was likewise to be added to my command,
and that discretionary authority was given me to use all my forces
against Pickett, I resolved to destroy him, if it was within the
bounds of possibility, before he could rejoin Lee.

In a despatch, dated 10:05 p.m., telling me of the coming of Warren
and Mackenzie, General Grant also said that the Fifth Corps should
reach me by 12 o'clock that night, but at that hour not only had none
of the corps arrived, but no report from it, so believing that if it
came all the way down to Dinwiddie the next morning, our opportunity
would be gone, I concluded that it would be best to order Warren to
move in on the enemy's rear while the cavalry attacked in front, and,
therefore, at 3 o'clock in the morning of April 1 sent this despatch
to General Warren:

"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, DINWIDDIE C. H.,
"April 1, 1865--3. A.M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL WARREN,
"Commanding Fifth Army Corps.

"I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court House, on the road leading
to Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile with General Custer's
division.  The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover
the road just this side of A. Adams's house, which leads across
Chamberlain's bed, or run.  I understand you have a division at J.[G]
Boisseau's; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line and almost on
his flank.  I will hold on here.  Possibly they may attack Custer at
daylight; if so, attack instantly and in full force.  Attack at
daylight anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the road this side
of Adams's house, and if I do, you can capture the whole of them.
Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak
road, will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any
force that may escape you by a flank movement.  Do not fear my
leaving here.  If the enemy remains, I shall fight at daylight.

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General."


With daylight came a slight fog, but it lifted almost immediately,
and Merritt moved Custer and Devin forward.  As these divisions
advanced the enemy's infantry fell back on the Five Forks road, Devin
pressing him along the road, while Custer extended on the left over
toward Chamberlain's Run, Crook being held in watch along Stony
Creek, meanwhile, to be utilized as circumstances might require when
Warren attacked.

The order of General Meade to Warren the night of March 31--a copy
being sent me also--was positive in its directions, but as midnight
came without a sign of or word from the Fifth Corps, notwithstanding
that was the hour fixed for its arrival, I nevertheless assumed that
there were good reasons for its non-appearance, but never once
doubted that measures would be taken to comply with my despatch Of
3 A. M. and therefore hoped that, as Pickett was falling back slowly
toward Five Forks, Griffin's and Crawford's divisions would come in
on the Confederate left and rear by the Crump road near J.[G]
Boisseau's house.

But they did not reach there till after the enemy had got by.  As a
matter of fact, when Pickett was passing the all-important point
Warren's men were just breaking from the bivouac in which their chief
had placed them the night before, and the head of Griffin's division
did not get to Boisseau's till after my cavalry, which meanwhile had
been joined by Ayres's division of the Fifth Corps by way of the
Boydton and Dabney roads.  By reason of the delay in moving Griffin
and Crawford, the enemy having escaped, I massed the Fifth Corps at
J.[G] Boisseau's so that the men could be rested, and directed it to
remain there; General Warren himself had not then come up.  General
Mackenzie, who had reported just after daybreak, was ordered at first
to stay at Dinwiddie Court House, but later was brought along the
Five Forks road to Dr. Smith's, and Crook's division was directed to
continue watching the crossings of Stony Creek and Chamberlain's Run.

That we had accomplished nothing but to oblige our foe to retreat was
to me bitterly disappointing, but still feeling sure that he would
not give up the Five Forks crossroads without a fight, I pressed him
back there with Merritt's cavalry, Custer advancing on the Scott
road, while Devin drove the rearguard along that leading from J.[G]
Boisseau's to Five Forks.

By 2 o'clock in the afternoon Merritt had forced the enemy inside his
intrenchments, which began with a short return about three-quarters
of a mile east of the Forks and ran along the south side of the White
Oak road to a point about a mile west of the Forks.  From the left of
the return over toward Hatcher's Run was posted Mumford's cavalry,
dismounted.  In the return itself was Wallace's brigade, and next on
its right came Ransom's, then Stewart's, then Terry's, then Corse's.
On the right of Corse was W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry.  Ten
pieces of artillery also were in this line, three on the right of the
works, three near the centre at the crossroads, and four on the left,
in the return.  Rosser's cavalry was guarding the Confederate trains
north of Hatcher's Run beyond the crossing of the Ford road.

I felt certain the enemy would fight at Five Forks--he had to--so,
while we were getting up to his intrenchments, I decided on my plan
of battle.  This was to attack his whole front with Merritt's two
cavalry divisions, make a feint of turning his right flank, and with
the Fifth Corps assail his left.  As the Fifth Corps moved into
action, its right flank was to be covered by Mackenzie's cavalry,
thus entirely cutting off Pickett's troops from communication with
Lee's right flank, which rested near the Butler house at the junction
of the Claiborne and White Oaks roads.  In execution of this plan,
Merritt worked his men close in toward the intrenchments, and while
he was thus engaged, I ordered Warren to bring up the Fifth Corps,
sending the order by my engineer officer, Captain Gillespie, who had
reconnoitred the ground in the neighborhood of Gravelly Run Church,
where the infantry was to form for attack.

Gillespie delivered the order about 1 o'clock, and when the corps was
put in motion, General Warren joined me at the front.  Before he
came, I had received, through Colonel Babcock, authority from General
Grant to relieve him, but I did not wish to do it, particularly on
the eve of battle; so, saying nothing at all about the message
brought me, I entered at once on the plan for defeating Pickett,
telling Warren how the enemy was posted, explaining with considerable
detail, and concluding by stating that I wished his troops to be
formed on the Gravelly Church road, near its junction with the White
Oak road, with two divisions to the front, aligned obliquely to the
White Oak road, and one in reserve, opposite the centre of these two.

General Warren seemed to understand me clearly, and then left to join
his command, while I turned my attention to the cavalry, instructing
Merritt to begin by making demonstrations as though to turn the
enemy's right, and to assault the front of the works with his
dismounted cavalry as soon as Warren became engaged.  Afterward I
rode around to Gravelly Run Church, and found the head of Warren's
column just appearing, while he was sitting under a tree making a
rough sketch of the ground.  I was disappointed that more of the
corps was not already up, and as the precious minutes went by without
any apparent effort to hurry the troops on to the field, this
disappointment grew into disgust.  At last I expressed to Warren my
fears that the cavalry might expend all their ammunition before the
attack could be made, that the sun would go down before the battle
could be begun, or that troops from Lee's right, which, be it
remembered, was less than three miles away from my right, might, by
striking my rear, or even by threatening it, prevent the attack on
Pickett.

Warren did not seem to me to be at all solicitous; his manner
exhibited decided apathy, and he remarked with indifference that
"Bobby Lee was always getting people into trouble."  With unconcern
such as this, it is no wonder that fully three hours' time was
consumed in marching his corps from J.[G]  Boisseau's to Gravelly Run
Church, though the distance was but two miles.  However, when my
patience was almost worn out, Warren reported his troops ready,
Ayres's division being formed on the west side of the Gravelly Church
road, Crawford's on the east side, and Griffin in reserve behind the
right of Crawford, a little different from my instructions.  The
corps had no artillery present, its batteries, on account of the mud,
being still north of Gravelly Run.  Meanwhile Merritt had been busy
working his men close up to the intrenchments from the angle of the
return west, along the White Oak road.

About 4 o'clock Warren began the attack.  He was to assault the left
flank of the Confederate infantry at a point where I knew Pickett's
intrenchments were refused, almost at right angles with the White Oak
road.  I did not know exactly how far toward Hatcher's Run this part
of the works extended, for here the videttes of Mumford's cavalry
were covering, but I did know where the refusal began.  This return,
then, was the point I wished to assail, believing that if the assault
was made with spirit, the line could be turned.  I therefore intended
that Ayres and Crawford should attack the refused trenches squarely,
and when these two divisions and Merritt's cavalry became hotly
engaged, Griffin's division was to pass around the left of the
Confederate line; and I personally instructed Griffin how I wished
him to go in, telling him also that as he advanced, his right flank
would be taken care of by Mackenzie, who was to be pushed over toward
the Ford road and Hatcher's Run.

The front of the corps was oblique to the White Oak road; and on
getting there, it was to swing round to the left till perpendicular
to the road, keeping closed to the left.  Ayres did his part well,
and to the letter, bringing his division square up to the front of
the return near the angle; but Crawford did not wheel to the left, as
was intended.  On the contrary, on receiving fire from Mumford's
cavalry, Crawford swerved to the right and moved north from the
return, thus isolating his division from Ayres; and Griffin,
uncertain of the enemy's position, naturally followed Crawford.

The deflection of this division on a line of march which finally
brought it out on the Ford road near C. Young's house, frustrated the
purpose I had in mind when ordering the attack, and caused a gap
between Ayres and Crawford, of which the enemy quickly took
advantage, and succeeded in throwing a part of Ayres's division into
confusion.  At this juncture I sent word to General Warren to have
Crawford recalled; for the direction he was following was not only a
mistaken one, but, in case the assault at the return failed, he ran
great risk of capture.  Warren could not be found, so I then sent for
Griffin--first by Colonel Newhall, and then by Colonel Sherman--to
come to the aid of Ayres, who was now contending alone with that part
of the enemy's infantry at the return.  By this time Griffin had
observed and appreciated Crawford's mistake, however, and when the
staff-officers reached him, was already faced to the left; so,
marching across Crawford's rear, he quickly joined Ayres, who
meanwhile had rallied his troops and carried the return.

When Ayres's division went over the flank of the enemy's works,
Devin's division of cavalry, which had been assaulting the front,
went over in company with it; and hardly halting to reform, the
intermingling infantry and dismounted cavalry swept down inside the
intrenchments, pushing to and beyond Five Forks, capturing thousands
of prisoners.  The only stand the enemy tried to make was when he
attempted to form near the Ford road.  Griffin pressed him so hard
there, however, that he had to give way in short order, and many of
his men, with three pieces of artillery, fell into the hands of
Crawford while on his circuitous march.

The right of Custer's division gained a foothold on the enemy's works
simultaneously with Devin's, but on the extreme left Custer had a
very severe combat with W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, as well as with
Corse's and Terry's infantry.  Attacking Terry and Corse with
Pennington's brigade dismounted, he assailed Lee's cavalry with his
other two brigades mounted, but Lee held on so obstinately that
Custer gained but little ground till our troops, advancing behind the
works, drove Corse and Terry out.  Then Lee made no further stand
except at the west side of the Gillian field, where, assisted by
Corse's brigade, he endeavored to cover the retreat, but just before
dark Custer, in concert with some Fifth Corps regiments under Colonel
Richardson, drove ihe last of the enemy westward on the White Oak
road.

Our success was unqualified; we had overthrown Pickett, taken six
guns, thirteen battle-flags, and nearly six thousand prisoners.  When
the battle was practically over, I turned to consider my position
with reference to the main Confederate army.  My troops, though
victorious, were isolated from the Army of the Potomac, for on the
31st of March the extreme left of that army had been thrown back
nearly to the Boydton plank-road, and hence there was nothing to
prevent the enemy's issuing from his trenches at the intersection of
the White Oak and Claiborne roads and marching directly on my rear.
I surmised that he might do this that night or early next morning.
It was therefore necessary to protect myself in this critical
situation, and General Warren having sorely disappointed me, both in
the moving of his corps and in its management during the battle, I
felt that he was not the man to rely upon under such circumstances,
and deeming that it was to the best interest of the service as well
as but just to myself, I relieved him, ordering him to report to
General Grant.

I then put Griffin in command of the Fifth Corps, and directed him to
withdraw from the pursuit as quickly as he could after following the
enemy a short distance, and form in line of battle near Gravelly Run
Church, at right angles with the White Oak road, with Ayres and
Crawford facing toward the enemy at the junction of the White Oak and
Claiborne roads, leaving Bartlett, now commanding Griffin's division,
near the Ford road.  Mackenzie also was left on the Ford road at the
crossing of Hatcher's Run, Merritt going into camp on the Widow
Gillian's plantation.  As I had been obliged to keep Crook's division
along Stony Creek throughout the day, it had taken no active part in
the battle.

Years after the war, in 1879, a Court of Inquiry was given General
Warren in relation to his conduct on the day of the battle.  He
assumed that the delay in not granting his request for an inquiry,
which was first made at the close of the war, was due to opposition
on my part.  In this he was in error; I never opposed the ordering of
the Court, but when it was finally decided to convene it I naturally
asked to be represented by counsel, for the authorization of the
Inquiry was so peculiarly phrased that it made me practically a
respondent.


"NEW YORK CITY, May 3, 1880

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. HANCOCK, U. S. A.
"President Court of Inquiry, Governor's Island.

"Sir: Since my arrival in this city, under a subpoena to appear and
testify before the Court of which you are president, I have been
indirectly and unofficially informed that the Court some time ago
forwarded an invitation to me (which has not been received) to appear
personally or by counsel, in order to aid it in obtaining a knowledge
as to the facts concerning the movements terminating in the battle of
'Five Forks,' with reference to the direct subjects of its inquiry.
Any invitation of this character I should always and do consider it
incumbent on me to accede to, and do everything in my power in
furtherance of the specific purposes for which courts of inquiry are
by law instituted.

"The order convening the Court (a copy of which was not received by
me at my division headquarters until two days after the time
appointed for the Court to assemble) contemplates an inquiry based on
the application of Lieutenant Colonel G. K. Warren, Corps of
Engineers, as to his conduct while major-general commanding the Fifth
Army Corps, under my command, in reference to accusations or
imputations assumed in the order to have been made against him, and I
understand through the daily press that my official report of the
battle of Five Forks has been submitted by him as a basis of inquiry.

"If it is proposed to inquire, either directly or indirectly, as to
any action of mine so far as the commanding general Fifth Army Corps
was concerned, or my motives for such action, I desire to be
specifically informed wherein such action or transaction is alleged
to contain an accusation or imputation to become a subject of
inquiry, so that, knowing what issues are raised, I may intelligently
aid the Court in arriving at the facts.

"It is a long time since the battle of Five Forks was fought, and
during the time that has elapsed the official reports of that battle
have been received and acknowledged by the Government; but now, when
the memory of events has in many instances grown dim, and three of
the principal actors on that field are dead--Generals Griffin,
Custer, and Devin, whose testimony would have been valuable--an
investigation is ordered which might perhaps do injustice unless the
facts pertinent to the issues are fully developed.

"My duties are such that it will not be convenient for me to be
present continuously during the sessions of the Court.  In order,
however, that everything may be laid before it in my power pertinent
to such specific issues as are legally raised, I beg leave to
introduce Major Asa Bird Gardner as my counsel.

"Very respectfully,

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Lieut.-General."


Briefly stated, in my report of the battle of Five Forks there were
four imputations concerning General Warren.  The first implied that
Warren failed to reach me on the 1st of April, when I had reason to
expect him; the second, that the tactical handling of his corps was
unskillful; the third, that he did not exert himself to get his corps
up to Gravelly Run Church; and the fourth, that when portions of his
line gave way he did not exert himself to restore confidence to his
troops.  The Court found against him on the first and second counts,
and for him on the third and fourth.  This finding was unsatisfactory
to General Warren, for he hoped to obtain such an unequivocal
recognition of his services as to cast discredit on my motives for
relieving him.  These were prompted by the conditions alone--by the
conduct of General Warren as described, and my consequent lack of
confidence in him.

It will be remembered that in my conversation with General Grant on
the 30th, relative to the suspension of operations because of the
mud, I asked him to let me have the Sixth Corps to help me in
breaking in on the enemy's right, but that it could not be sent me;
it will be recalled also that the Fifth Corps was afterward tendered
and declined.  From these facts it has been alleged that I was
prejudiced against General Warren, but this is not true.  As we had
never been thrown much together I knew but little of him.  I had no
personal objection to him, and certainly could have none to his
corps.  I was expected to do an extremely dangerous piece of work,
and knowing the Sixth Corps well--my cavalry having campaigned with
it so successfully in the Shenandoah Valley, I naturally preferred
it, and declined the Fifth for no other reason.  But the Sixth could
not be given, and the turn of events finally brought me the Fifth
after my cavalry, under the most trying difficulties, had drawn the
enemy from his works, and into such a position as to permit the
realization of General Grant's hope to break up with my force Lee's
right flank.  Pickett's isolation offered an opportunity which we
could not afford to neglect, and the destruction of his command would
fill the measure of General Grant's expectations as well as meet my
own desires.  The occasion was not an ordinary one, and as I thought
that Warren had not risen to its demand in the battle, I deemed it
injudicious and unsafe under the critical conditions existing to
retain him longer.  That I was justified in this is plain to all who
are disposed to be fair-minded, so with the following extract from
General Sherman's review of the proceedings of the Warren Court, and
with which I am convinced the judgment of history will accord, I
leave the subject:

"....It would be an unsafe and dangerous rule to hold the commander
of an army in battle to a technical adherence to any rule of conduct
for managing his command.  He is responsible for results, and holds
the lives and reputations of every officer and soldier under his
orders as subordinate to the great end--victory.  The most important
events are usually compressed into an hour, a minute, and he cannot
stop to analyze his reasons.  He must act on the impulse, the
conviction, of the instant, and should be sustained in his
conclusions, if not manifestly unjust.  The power to command men, and
give vehement impulse to their joint action, is something which
cannot be defined by words, but it is plain and manifest in battles,
and whoever commands an army in chief must choose his subordinates by
reason of qualities which can alone be tested in actual conflict.

"No one has questioned the patriotism, integrity, and great
intelligence of General Warren.  These are attested by a long record
of most excellent service, but in the clash of arms at and near Five
Forks, March 31 and April 1, 1865, his personal activity fell short
of the standard fixed by General Sheridan, on whom alone rested the
great responsibility for that and succeeding days.

"My conclusion is that General Sheridan was perfectly justified in
his action in this case, and he must be fully and entirely sustained
if the United States expects great victories by her arms in the
future."




CHAPTER VII.

RESULT OF THE BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--RETREAT OF LEE--AN INTERCEPTED
DESPATCH--AT AMELIA COURT HOUSE--BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--THE
CONFEDERATES' STUBBORN RESISTANCE--A COMPLETE VICTORY--IMPORTANCE OF
THE BATTLE.

When the news of the battle at Five Forks reached General Grant, he
realized that the decisive character of our victory would necessitate
the immediate abandonment of Richmond and Petersburg by the enemy;
and fearing that Lee would escape without further injury, he issued
orders, the propriety of which must be settled by history, to assault
next morning the whole intrenched line.  But Lee could not retreat at
once.  He had not anticipated dissster at Five Forks, and hence was
unprepared to withdraw on the moment; and the necessity of getting
off his trains and munitions of war, as well as being obliged to
cover the flight of the Confederate Government, compelled him to hold
on to Richmond and Petersburg till the afternoon of the 2d, though
before that Parke, Ord, and Wright had carried his outer
intrenchments at several points, thus materially shortening the line
of investment.

The night of the 1st of April, General Humphreys's corps--the Second
--had extended its left toward the White Oak road, and early next
morning, under instructions from General Grant, Miles's division of
that corps reported to me, and supporting him with Ayres's and
Crawford's divisions of the Fifth Corps, I then directed him to
advance toward Petersburg and attack the enemy's works at the
intersection of the Claiborne and White Oak roads.

Such of the enemy as were still in the works Miles easily forced
across Hatcher's Run, in the direction of Sutherland's depot, but the
Confederates promptly took up a position north of the little stream,
and Miles being anxious to attack, I gave him leave, but just at this
time General Humphreys came up with a request to me from General
Meade to return Miles.  On this request I relinquished command of the
division, when, supported by the Fifth Corps it could have broken in
the enemy's right at a vital point; and I have always since regretted
that I did so, for the message Humphreys conveyed was without
authority from General Grant, by whom Miles had been sent to me, but
thinking good feeling a desideratum just then, and wishing to avoid
wrangles, I faced the Fifth Corps about and marched it down to Five
Forks, and out the Ford road to the crossing of Hatcher's Run.  After
we had gone, General Grant, intending this quarter of the field to be
under my control, ordered Humphreys with his other two divisions to
move to the right, in toward Petersburg.  This left Miles entirely
unsupported, and his gallant attack made soon after was unsuccessful
at first, but about 3 o'clock in the afternoon he carried the point
which covered the retreat from Petersburg and Richmond.

Merritt had been sent westward, meanwhile, in the direction of Ford's
Station, to break the enemy's horse which had been collecting to the
north of Hatcher's Run.  Meeting, with but little opposition, Merritt
drove this cavalry force in a northerly direction toward Scott's
Corners, while the Fifth Corps was pushed toward Sutherland's depot,
in the hope of coming in on the rear of the force that was
confronting Miles when I left him.  Crawford and Merritt engaged the
enemy lightly just before night, but his main column, retreating
along the river road south of the Appomattox, had got across Namozine
Creek, and the darkness prevented our doing more than to pick up some
stragglers.  The next morning the pursuit was resumed, the cavalry
again in advance, the Fifth Corps keeping up with it all the while,
and as we pressed our adversaries hundreds and hundreds of prisoners,
armed and unarmed, fell into our hands, together with many wagons and
five pieces of artillery.  At Deep Creek the rearguard turned on us,
and a severe skirmish took place.  Merritt, finding the enemy very
strong, was directed to await the arrival of Crook and for the rear
division of the Fifth Corps; but by the time they reached the creek,
darkness had again come to protect the Confederates, and we had to be
content with meagre results at that point.

From the beginning it was apparent that Lee, in his retreat, was
making for Amelia Court House, where his columns north and south of
the Appomattox River could join, and where, no doubt, he expected to
meet supplies, so Crook was ordered to march early on April 4 to
strike the Danville railroad, between Jettersville and Burkeville,
and then move south along the railroad toward Jettersville, Merritt
to move toward Amelia Court House, and the Fifth Corps to
Jettersville itself.

The Fifth Corps got to Jettersville about 5 in the afternoon, and I
immediately intrenched it across the Burkeville road with the
determination to stay there till the main army could come up, for I
hoped we could force Lee to surrender at Amelia Court House, since a
firm hold on Jettersville would cut him off from his line of retreat
toward Burkeville.

Accompanied only by my escort--the First United States Cavalry, about
two hundred strong--I reached Jettersville some little time before
the Fifth Corps, and having nothing else at hand I at once deployed
this handful of men to cover the crossroads till the arrival of the
corps.  Just as the troopers were deploying, a man on a mule, heading
for Burkeville, rode into my pickets.  He was arrested, of course,
and being searched there was found in his boots this telegram in
duplicate, signed by Lee's Commissary General.

"The army is at Amelia Court House, short of provisions.  Send
300,000 rations quickly to Burkeville Junction." One copy was
addressed to the supply department at Danville, and the other to that
at Lynchburg.  I surmised that the telegraph lines north of
Burkeville had been broken by Crook after the despatches were
written, which would account for their being transmitted by
messenger.  There was thus revealed not only the important fact that
Lee was concentrating at Amelia Court House, but also a trustworthy
basis for estimating his troops, so I sent word to Crook to strike up
the railroad toward me, and to Merritt--who, as I have said, had
followed on the heels of the enemy--to leave Mackenzie there and
himself close in on Jettersville.  Staff-officers were also
despatched to hurry up Griffin with the Fifth Corps, and his tired men
redoubled their strides.

My troops too were hard up for rations, for in the pursuit we could
not wait for our trains, so I concluded to secure if possible these
provisions intended for Lee.  To this end I directed Young to send
four of his best scouts to Burkeville Junction.  There they were to
separate, two taking the railroad toward Lynchburg and two toward
Danville, and as soon as a telegraph station was reached the telegram
was to be transmitted as it had been written and the provisions thus
hurried forward.

Although the Fifth Corps arrived at Jettersville the evening of April
4, as did also Crook's and Merritt's cavalry, yet none of the army of
the Potomac came up till about 3 o'clock the afternoon of the 5th,
the Second Corps, followed by the Sixth, joining us then.  General
Meade arrived at Jettersville an hour earlier, but being ill,
requested me to put his troops in position.  The Fifth Corps being
already intrenched across the Amelia Court House road facing north, I
placed the Sixth on its right and the Second on its left as they
reached the ground.

As the enemy had been feeling us ever since morning--to learn what he
was up to I directed Crook to send Davies's brigade on a
reconnoissance to Paine's crossroads.  Davies soon found out that Lee
was trying to escape by that flank, for at the crossroads he found
the Confederate trains and artillery moving rapidly westward.  Having
driven away the escort, Davies succeeded in burning nearly two
hundred wagons, and brought off five pieces of artillery.  Among
these wagons were some belonging to General, Lee's and to General
Fitzhugh Lee's headquarters.  This work through, Davies withdrew and
rejoined Crook, who, with Smith and Gregg, was established near Flat
Creek.

It being plain that Lee would attempt to escape as soon as his trains
were out of the way, I was most anxious to attack him when the Second
Corps began to arrive, for I felt certain that unless we did so he
would succeed in passing by our left flank, and would thus again make
our pursuit a stern-chase; but General Meade, whose plan of attack
was to advance his right flank on Amelia Court House, objected to
assailing before all his troops were up.

I then sent despatches to General Grant, explaining what Davies had
done, and telling him that the Second Corps was arriving, and that I
wished he himself was present.  I assured him of my confidence in our
capturing Lee if we properly exerted ourselves, and informed him,
finally, that I would put all my cavalry, except Mackenzie, on my
left, and that, with such a disposition of my forces, I could see no
escape for Lee.  I also inclosed him this letter, which had just been
captured:

"AMELIA C. H., April 5, 1865.

"DEAR MAMMA:

"Our army is ruined, I fear.  We are all safe as yet.  Shyron left us
sick.  John Taylor is well--saw him yesterday.  We are in line of
battle this morning.  General Robert Lee is in the field near us.  My
trust is still in the justice of our cause, and that of God.  General
Hill is killed.  I saw Murray a few minutes since.  Bernard, Terry
said, was taken prisoner, but may yet get out.  I send this by a
negro I see passing up the railroad to Mechlenburg.  Love to all.

"Your devoted son,

"Wm. B. TAYLOR, Colonel."


General Grant, who on the 5th was accompanying General Ord's column
toward Burkeville Junction, did not receive this intelligence till
nearly nightfall, when within about ten miles of the Junction.  He
set out for Jettersville immediately, but did not reach us till near
midnight, too late of course to do anything that night.  Taking me
with him, we went over to see Meade, whom he then directed to advance
early in the morning on Amelia Court House.  In this interview Grant
also stated that the orders Meade had already issued would permit
Lee's escape, and therefore must be changed, for it was not the aim
only to follow the enemy, but to get ahead of him, remarking during
the conversation that, "he had no doubt Lee was moving right then."
On this same occasion Meade expressed a desire to have in the
proposed attack all the troops of the Army of the Potomac under his
own command, and asked for the return of the Fifth Corps.  I made no
objections, and it was ordered to report, to him.

When, on the morning of the 6th, Meade advanced toward Amelia Court
House, he found, as predicted, that Lee was gone.  It turned out that
the retreat began the evening of the 5th and continued all night.
Satisfied that this would be the case, I did not permit the cavalry
to participate in Meade's useless advance, but shifted it out toward
the left to the road running from Deatonsville to Rice's station,
Crook leading and Merritt close up.  Before long the enemy's trains
were discovered on this road, but Crook could make but little
impression on them, they were so strongly guarded; so, leaving
Stagg's brigade and Miller's battery about three miles southwest of
Deatonsville--where the road forks, with a branch leading north
toward the Appomattox--to harass the retreating column and find a
vulnerable point, I again shifted the rest of the cavalry toward the
left, across-country, but still keeping parallel to the enemy's line
of march.

Just after crossing Sailor's Greek, a favorable opportunity offering,
both Merritt and Crook attacked vigorously, gained the Rice's Station
road, destroyed several hundred wagons, made many prisoners, and
captured sixteen pieces of artillery.  This was important, but more
valuable still was the fact that we were astride the enemy's line of
retreat, and had cut off from joining Longstreet, waiting at Rice's
Station, a corps of Confederate infantry under General Ewell,
composed of Anderson's, Kershaw's, and Custis Lee's divisions.
Stagg's brigade and Miller's battery, which, as I have said, had been
left at the forks of the Deatonsville road, had meanwhile broken in
between the rear of Ewell's column and the head of Gordon's, forcing
Gordon to abandon his march for Rice's Station, and to take the
right-hand road at the forks, on which he was pursued by General
Humphreys.

The complete isolation of Ewell from Longstreet in his front and
Gordon in his rear led to the battle of Sailor's Creek, one of the
severest conflicts of the war, for the enemy fought with desperation
to escape capture, and we, bent on his destruction, were no less
eager and determined.  The capture of Ewell, with six of his generals
and most of his troops, crowned our success, but the fight was so
overshadowed by the stirring events of the surrender three days
later, that the battle has never been accorded the prominence it
deserves.

The small creek from which the field takes its name flows in a
northwesterly direction across the road leading from Deatonsville to
Rice's Station.  By shifting to the left, Merritt gained the Rice's
Station road west of the creek, making havoc of the wagon-trains,
while Crook struck them further on and planted himself square across
the road.  This blocked Ewell, who, advancing Anderson to some high
ground west of the creek, posted him behind barricades, with the
intention of making a hard fight there, while the main body should
escape through the woods in a westerly direction to roads that led to
Farmville.  This was prevented, however, by Crook forming his
division, two brigades dismounted and one mounted, and at once
assaulting all along Anderson's front and overlapping his right,
while Merritt fiercely attacked to the right of Crook.  The enemy
being thus held, enabled the Sixth Corps--which in the meantime I had
sent for--to come upon the ground, and Ewell, still contending with
the cavalry, found himself suddenly beset by this new danger from his
rear.  To, meet it, he placed Kershaw to the right and Custis Lee to
the left of the Rice's Station road, facing them north toward and
some little distance from Sailor's Creek, supporting Kershaw with
Commander Tucker's Marine brigade.  Ewell's skirmishers held the line
of Sailor's Creek, which runs through a gentle valley, the north
slope of which was cleared ground.

By General Grant's directions the Sixth Corps had been following my
route of march since the discovery, about 9 o'clock in the morning,
that Lee had decamped from Amelia Court House.  Grant had promptly
informed me of this in a note, saying, "The Sixth Corps will go in
with a vim any place you may dictate," so when I sent word to Wright
of the enemy's isolation, and asked him to hurry on with all speed,
his gallant corps came as fast as legs could carry them, he sending
to me successively Major McClellan and Colonel Franklin, of his
staff, to report his approach.

I was well advised as to the position of the enemy through
information brought me by an intelligent young soldier, William A.
Richardson, Company "A," Second Ohio, who, in one of the cavalry
charges on Anderson, had cleared the barricades and made his way back
to my front through Ewell's line.  Richardson had told me just how
the main body of the enemy was posted, so as Seymour's division
arrived I directed General Wright to put it on the right of the road,
while Wheaton's men, coming up all hot and out of breath, promptly
formed on Seymour's left.  Both divisions thus aligned faced
southwest toward Sailor's Creek, and the artillery of the corps being
massed to the left and front of the Hibbon house, without waiting for
Getty's division--for I feared that if we delayed longer the enemy
might effect his escape toward Farmville--the general attack was
begun.  Seymour and Wheaton, moving forward together, assailed the
enemy's front and left, and Stagg's brigade, too, which in the mean
time had been placed between Wheaton's left and Devin's right, went
at him along with them, Merritt and Crook resuming the fight from
their positions in front of Anderson.  The enemy, seeing little
chance of escape, fought like a tiger at bay, but both Seymour and
Wheaton pressed him vigorously, gaining ground at all points except
just to the right of the road, where Seymour's left was checked.
Here the Confederates burst back on us in a counter-charge, surging
down almost to the creek, but the artillery, supported by Getty, who
in the mean time had come on the ground, opened on them so terribly
that this audacious and furious onset was completely broken, though
the gallant fellows fell back to their original line doggedly, and
not until after they had almost gained the creek.  Ewell was now
hemmed in on every side, and all those under his immediate command
were captured.  Merritt and Crook had also broken up Anderson by this
time, but he himself, and about two thousand disorganized men escaped
by making their way through the woods toward the Appomattox River
before they could be entirely enveloped.  Night had fallen when the
fight was entirely over, but Devin was pushed on in pursuit for about
two miles, part of the Sixth Corps following to clinch a victory
which not only led to the annihilation of one corps of Lee's
retreating army, but obliged Longstreet to move up to Farmville, so
as to take a road north of the Appomattox River toward Lynchburg
instead of continuing toward Danville.

At the close of the battle I sent one of my staff--Colonel Redwood
Price--to General Grant to report what had been done; that we had
taken six generals and from nine to ten thousand prisoners.  On his
way Price stopped at the headquarters of General Meade, where he
learned that not the slightest intelligence of the occurrence on my
line had been received, for I not being under Meade's command, he had
paid no attention to my movements.  Price gave the story of the
battle, and General Meade, realizing its importance, sent directions
immediately to General Wright to make his report of the engagement to
the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, assuming that Wright was
operating independently of me in the face of Grant's despatch Of
2 o'clock, which said that Wright was following the cavalry and would
"go in with a vim" wherever I dictated.  Wright could not do else
than comply with Meade's orders in the case, and I, being then in
ignorance of Meade's reasons for the assumption, could say nothing.
But General Grant plainly intending, and even directing, that the
corps should be under my command, remedied this phase of the matter,
when informed of what had taken place, by requiring Wright to send a
report of the battle through me.  What he then did, and what his
intentions and orders were, are further confirmed by a reference to
the episode in his "Memoirs," where he gives his reasons for ordering
the Sixth Corps to abandon the move on Amelia Court House and pass to
the left of the army.  On the same page he also says, referring to
the 6th of April: "The Sixth Corps now remained with the cavalry
under Sheridan's direct command until after the surrender."  He
unquestionably intended all of this, but his purpose was partly
frustrated by General Meade's action next morning in assuming
direction of the movements of the corps; and before General Grant
became aware of the actual conditions the surrender was at hand.




CHAPTER VIII.

LINCOLN'S LACONIC DESPATCH--CAPTURING LEE'S SUPPLIES--DELIGHTED
ENGINEERS--THE CONFEDERATES' LAST EFFORT--A FLAG OF TRUCE--GENERAL
GEARY'S "LAST DITCH" ABSURDITY--MEETING OF GRANT AND LEE--THE
SURRENDER--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL GRANT.

The first report of the battle of Sailor's Creek that General Grant
received was, as already stated, an oral message carried by Colonel
Price, of my staff.  Near midnight I sent a despatch giving the names
of the generals captured.  These were Ewell, Kershaw, Barton, Corse,
Dubose, and Custis Lee.  In the same despatch I wrote: "If the thing
is pressed, I think that Lee will surrender."  When Mr. Lincoln, at
City Point, received this word from General Grant, who was
transmitting every item of news to the President, he telegraphed
Grant the laconic message: "Let the thing be pressed." The morning of
the 7th we moved out at a very early hour, Crook's division marching
toward Farmville in direct pursuit, while Merritt and Mackenzie were
ordered to Prince Edward's Court House to anticipate any effort Lee
might make to escape through that place toward Danville since it had
been discovered that Longstreet had slipped away already from the
front of General Ord's troops at Rice's Station.  Crook overtook the
main body of the Confederates at Farmville, and promptly attacked
their trains on the north side of the Appomattox with Gregg's
brigade, which was fiercely turned upon and forced to re-cross the
river with the loss of a number of prisoner's, among them Gregg
himself.  When Crook sent word of this fight, it was clear that Lee
had abandoned all effort to escape to the southwest by way of
Danville.  Lynchburg was undoubtedly his objective point now; so,
resolving to throw my cavalry again across his path, and hold him
till the infantry could overtake him, I directed everything on
Appomattox depot, recalling Crook the night of the 7th to Prospect
Station, while Merritt camped at Buffalo Creek, and Mackenzie made a
reconnoissance along the Lynchburg railroad.

At break of day, April 8, Merritt and Mackenzie united with Crook at
Prospect Station, and the cavalry all moved then toward Appomattox
depot.  Hardly had it started when one of the scouts--Sergeant White
--informed me that there were four trains of cars at the depot loaded
with supplies for Lee's army; these had been sent from Lynchburg, in
compliance with the telegram of Lee's commissary-general, which
message, it will be remembered, was captured and transmitted to
Lynchburg by two of Young's scouts on the 4th.  Sergeant White, who
had been on the lookout for the trains ever since sending the
despatch, found them several miles west of Appomattox depot feeling
their way along, in ignorance of Lee's exact position.  As he had the
original despatch with him, and took pains to dwell upon the pitiable
condition of Lee's army, he had little difficulty in persuading the
men in charge of the trains to bring them east of Appomattox Station,
but fearing that the true state of affairs would be learned before
long, and the trains be returned to Lynchburg, he was painfully
anxious to have them cut off by breaking the track west of the
station.

The intelligence as to the trains was immediately despatched to
Crook, and I pushed on to join him with Merritt's command.  Custer
having the advance, moved rapidly, and on nearing the station
detailed two regiments to make a detour southward to strike the
railroad some distance beyond and break the track.  These regiments
set off at a gallop, and in short order broke up the railroad enough
to prevent the escape of the trains, Custer meanwhile taking
possession of the station, but none too soon, for almost at the
moment he did so the advance-guard of Lee's army appeared, bent on
securing the trains.  Without halting to look after the cars further,
Custer attacked this advance-guard and had a spirited fight, in which
he drove the Confederates away from the station, captured twenty-five
pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and a large park of wagons,
which, in the hope that they would reach Lynchburg next day, were
being pushed ahead of Lee's main body.

Devin coming up a little before dusk, was put in on the right of
Custer, and one of Crook's brigades was sent to our left and the
other two held in reserve.  I then forced the enemy back on the
Appomattox road to the vicinity of the Court House, and that the
Confederates might have no rest, gave orders to continue the
skirmishing throughout the night.  Meanwhile the captured trains had
been taken charge of by locomotive engineers, soldiers of the
command, who were delighted evidently to get back at their old
calling.  They amused themselves by running the trains to and fro,
creating much confusion, and keeping up such an unearthly screeching
with the whistles that I was on the point of ordering the cars
burned.  They finally wearied of their fun, however, and ran the
trains off to the east toward General Ord's column.

The night of the 8th I made my headquarters at a little frame house
just south of the station.  I did not sleep at all, nor did anybody
else, the entire command being up all night long; indeed, there had
been little rest in the cavalry for the past eight days.  The
necessity of getting Ord's column up was so obvious now that
staff-officer after staff-officer was sent to him and to General Grant
requesting that the infantry be pushed on, for if it could get to the
front, all knew that the rebellion would be ended on the morrow.
Merritt, Crook, Custer, and Devin were present at frequent intervals
during the night, and everybody was overjoyed at the prospect that
our weary work was about to end so happily.  Before sun-up General
Ord arrived, and informed me of the approach of his column, it having
been marching the whole night.  As he ranked me, of course I could
give him no orders, so after a hasty consultation as to where his
troops should be placed we separated, I riding to the front to
overlook my line near Appomattox Court House, while he went back to
urge along his weary troops.

The night before General Lee had held a council with his principal
generals, when it was arranged that in the morning General Gordon
should undertake to break through my cavalry, and when I neared my
troops this movement was beginning, a heavy line of infantry bearing
down on us from the direction of the village.  In front of Crook and
Mackenzie firing had already begun, so riding to a slight elevation
where a good view of the Confederates could be had, I there came to
the conclusion that it would be unwise to offer more resistance than
that necessary to give Ord time to form, so I directed Merritt to
fall back, and in retiring to shift Devin and Custer to the right so
as to make room for Ord, now in the woods to my rear.  Crook, who
with his own and Mackenzie's divisions was on my extreme left
covering some by-roads, was ordered to hold his ground as long as
practicable without sacrificing his men, and, if forced to retire, to
contest with obstinacy the enemy's advance.

As already stated, I could not direct General Ord's course, he being
my senior, but hastily galloping back to where he was, at the edge of
the timber, I explained to him what was taking place at the front.
Merritt's withdrawal inspired the Confederates, who forthwith began
to press Crook, their line of battle advancing with confidence till
it reached the crest whence I had reconnoitred them.  From this
ground they could see Ord's men emerging from the woods, and the
hopelessness of a further attack being plain, the gray lines
instinctively halted, and then began to retire toward a ridge
immediately fronting Appomattox Court House, while Ord, joined on his
right by the Fifth Corps, advanced on them over the ground that
Merritt had abandoned.

I now directed my steps toward Merritt, who, having mounted his
troopers, had moved them off to the right, and by the time I reached
his headquarters flag he was ready for work, so a move on the enemy's
left was ordered, and every guidon was bent to the front.  As the
cavalry marched along parallel with the Confederate line, and in
toward its left, a heavy fire of artillery opened on us, but this
could not check us at such a time, and we soon reached some high
ground about half a mile from the Court House, and from here I could
see in the low valley beyond the village the bivouac undoubtedly of
Lee's army.  The troops did not seem to be disposed in battle order,
but on the other side of the bivouac was a line of battle--a heavy
rear-guard--confronting, presumably, General Meade.

I decided to attack at once, and formations were ordered at a trot
for a charge by Custer's and Devin's divisions down the slope leading
to the camps.  Custer was soon ready, but Devin's division being in
rear its formation took longer, since he had to shift further to the
right; Devin's preparations were, therefore, but partially completed
when an aide-decamp galloped up to with the word from Custer, "Lee
has surrendered; do not charge; the white flag is up."  The enemy
perceiving that Custer was forming for attack, had sent the flag out
to his front and stopped the charge just in time.  I at once sent
word of the truce to General Ord, and hearing nothing more from
Custer himself, I supposed that he had gone down to the Court House
to join a mounted group of Confederates that I could see near there,
so I, too, went toward them, galloping down a narrow ridge, staff and
orderlies following; but we had not got half way to the Court House
when, from a skirt of timber to our right, not more than three
hundred yards distant, a musketry fire was opened on us.  This halted
us, when, waving my hat, I called out to the firing party that we
were under a truce, and they were violating it.  This did not stop
them, however, so we hastily took shelter in a ravine so situated as
to throw a ridge between us and the danger.

We traveled in safety down this depression to its mouth, and thence
by a gentle ascent approached the Court House.  I was in advance,
followed by a sergeant carrying my battleflag.  When I got within
about a hundred and fifty yards of the enemy's line, which was
immediately in front of the Court House, some of the Confederates
leveled their pieces at us, and I again halted.  Their officers kept
their men from firing, however, but meanwhile a single-handed contest
had begun behind me, for on looking back I heard a Confederate
soldier demanding my battle-flag from the color-bearer, thinking, no
doubt, that we were coming in as prisoners.  The sergeant had drawn
his sabre and was about to cut the man down, but at a word from me he
desisted and carried the flag back to my staff, his assailant quickly
realizing that the boot was on the other leg.

These incidents determined me to remain where I was till the return
of a staff-officer whom I had sent over to demand an explanation from
the group of Confederates for which I had been heading.  He came back
in a few minutes with apologies for what had occurred, and informed
me that General Gordon and General Wilcox were the superior officers
in the group.  As they wished me to join them I rode up with my
staff, but we had hardly met when in front of Merritt firing began.
At the sound I turned to General Gordon, who seemed embarrassed by
the occurrence, and remarked: "General, your men fired on me as I was
coming over here, and undoubtedly they are treating Merritt and
Custer the same way.  We might as well let them fight it out."  He
replied, "There must be some mistake."  I then asked, "Why not send a
staff-officer and have your people cease firing; they are violating
the flag." He answered, "I have no staff-officer to send."  Whereupon
I said that I would let him have one of mine, and calling for
Lieutenant Vanderbilt Allen, I directed him to carry General Gordon's
orders to General Geary, commanding a small brigade of South Carolina
cavalry, to discontinue firing.  Allen dashed off with the message
and soon delivered it, but was made a prisoner, Geary saying, "I do
not care for white flags: South Carolinians never surrender...."  By
this time Merritt's patience being exhausted, he ordered an attack,
and this in short order put an end to General Geary's "last ditch"
absurdity, and extricated Allen from his predicament.

When quiet was restored Gordon remarked: "General Lee asks for a
suspension of hostilities pending the negotiations which he is having
with General Grant."  I rejoined: "I have been constantly informed of
the progress of the negotiations, and think it singular that while
such discussions are going on, General Lee should have continued his
march and attempted to break through my lines this morning.  I will
entertain no terms except that General Lee shall surrender to General
Grant on his arrival here.  If these terms are not accepted we will
renew hostilities."  Gordon replied: "General Lee's army is
exhausted.  There is no doubt of his surrender to General Grant."

It was then that General Ord joined us, and after shaking hands all
around, I related the situation to him, and Gordon went away agreeing
to meet us again in half an hour.  When the time was up he came back
accompanied by General Longstreet, who brought with him a despatch,
the duplicate of one that had been sent General Grant through General
Meade's lines back on the road over which Lee had been retreating.

General Longstreet renewed the assurances that already had been given
by Gordon, and I sent Colonel Newhall with the despatch to find
General Grant and bring him to the front.  When Newhall started,
everything on our side of the Appomattox Court House was quiet, for
inevitable surrender was at hand, but Longstreet feared that Meade,
in ignorance of the new conditions on my front might attack the
Confederate rearguard.  To prevent this I offered to send Colonel J.
W. Forsyth through the enemy's lines to let Meade know of my
agreement, for he too was suspicious that by a renewed correspondence
Lee was endeavoring to gain time for escape.  My offer being
accepted, Forsyth set out accompanied by Colonel Fairfax, of
Longstreet's staff, and had no difficulty in accomplishing his
mission.

About five or six miles from Appomattox, on the road toward Prospect
Station near its intersection with the Walker's Church road, my
adjutant-general, Colonel Newhall, met General Grant, he having
started from north of the Appomattox River for my front the morning
of April 9, in consequence of the following despatches which had been
sent him the night before, after we had captured Appomattox Station
and established a line intercepting Lee:

"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, April 8, 1865--9:20 P. M.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,
"Commanding Armies of the U.  S.

"General: I marched early this morning from Buffalo Creek and
Prospect Station on Appomattox Station, where my scouts had reported
trains of cars with supplies for Lee's army.  A short time before
dark General Custer, who had the advance, made a dash at the station,
capturing four trains of supplies with locomotives.  One of the
trains was burned and the others were run back toward Farmville for
security.  Custer then pushed on toward Appomattox Court House,
driving the enemy--who kept up a heavy fire of artillery--charging
them repeatedly and capturing, as far as reported, twenty-five pieces
of artillery and a number of prisoners and wagons.  The First Cavalry
Division supported him on the right.  A reconnoissance sent across
the Appomattox reports the enemy moving on the Cumberland road to
Appomattox Station, where they expect to get supplies.  Custer is
still pushing on.  If General Gibbon and the Fifth Corps can get up
to-night, we will perhaps finish the job in the morning.  I do not
think Lee means to surrender until compelled to do so.

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General."



"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY, April 8, 1865--9:40 p.m.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.
"Commanding Armies U. S.

"GENERAL: Since writing the accompanying despatch, General Custer
reports that his command has captured in all thirty-five pieces of
artillery, one thousand prisoners--including one general officer--and
from one hundred and fifty to two hundred wagons.

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General."


In attempting to conduct the lieutenant-general and staff back by a
short route, Newhall lost his bearings for a time, inclining in
toward the enemy's lines too far, but regained the proper direction
without serious loss of time.  General Grant arrived about 1 o'clock
in the afternoon, Ord and I, dismounted, meeting him at the edge of
the town, or crossroads, for it was little more.  He remaining
mounted, spoke first to me, saying simply,

"How are you, Sheridan?"  I assured him with thanks that I was
"first-rate," when, pointing toward the village, he asked, "Is
General Lee up there?" and I replied: "There is his army down in that
valley, and he himself is over in that house (designating McLean's
house) waiting to surrender to you."  The General then said, "Come,
let us go over," this last remark being addressed to both Ord and me.
We two then mounted and joined him, while our staff-officers
followed, intermingling with those of the general-in-chief as the
cavalcade took its way to McLean's house near by, and where General
Lee had arrived some time before, in consequence of a message from
General Grant consenting to the interview asked for by Lee through
Meade's front that morning--the consent having been carried by
Colonel Babcock.

When I entered McLean's house General Lee was standing, as was also
his military secretary, Colonel Marshall, his only staff-officer
present.  General Lee was dressed in a new uniform and wore a
handsome sword.  His tall, commanding form thus set off contrasted
strongly with the short figure of General Grant, clothed as he was in
a soiled suit, without sword or other insignia of his position except
a pair of dingy shoulder-straps.  After being presented, Ord and I,
and nearly all of General Grant's staff, withdrew to await the
agreement as to terms, and in a little while Colonel Babcock came to
the door and said, "The surrender had been made; you can come in
again."

When we re-entered General Grant was writing; and General Lee, having
in his hand two despatches, which I that morning requested might be
returned, as I had no copies of them, addressed me with the remark:
"I am sorry.  It is probable that my cavalry at that point of the
line did not fully understand the agreement." These despatches had
been sent in the forenoon, after the fighting had been stopped,
notifying General Lee that some of his cavalry in front of Crook was
violating the suspension of hostilities by withdrawing.  About
3 o'clock in the afternoon the terms of surrender were written out
and accepted, and General Lee left the house, as he departed
cordially shaking hands with General Grant.  A moment later he
mounted his chunky gray horse, and lifting his hat as he passed out
of the yard, rode off toward his army, his arrival there being
announced to us by cheering, which, as it progressed, varying in
loudness, told he was riding through the bivouac of the Army of
Northern Virginia.

The surrender of General Lee practically ended the war of the
rebellion.  For four years his army had been the main-stay of the
Confederacy; and the marked ability with which he directed its
operations is evidenced both by his frequent successes and the length
of time he kept up the contest.  Indeed, it may be said that till
General Grant was matched against him, he never met an opponent he
did not vanquish, for while it is true that defeat was inflicted on
the Confederates at Antietam and Gettysburg, yet the fruits of these
victories were not gathered, for after each of these battles Lee was
left unmolested till he had a chance to recuperate.

The assignment of General Grant to the command of the Union armies in
the winter of 1863-64 gave presage of success from the start, for his
eminent abilities had already been proved, and besides, he was a
tower of strength to the Government, because he had the confidence of
the people.  They knew that henceforth systematic direction would be
given to our armies in every section of the vast territory over which
active operations were being prosecuted, and further, that this
coherence, this harmony of plan, was the one thing needed to end the
war, for in the three preceding years there had been illustrated most
lamentable effects of the absence of system.  From the moment he set
our armies in motion simultaneously, in the spring of 1864, it could
be seen that we should be victorious ultimately, for though on
different lines we were checked now and then, yet we were harassing
the Confederacy at so many vital points that plainly it must yield to
our blows.  Against Lee's army, the forefront of the Confederacy,
Grant pitted himself; and it may be said that the Confederate
commander was now, for the first time, overmatched, for against all
his devices--the products of a mind fertile in defense--General Grant
brought to bear not only the wealth of expedient which had hitherto
distinguished him, but also an imperturbable tenacity, particularly
in the Wilderness and on the march to the James, without which the
almost insurmountable obstacles of that campaign could not have been
overcome.  During it and in the siege of Petersburg he met with many
disappointments--on several occasions the shortcomings of generals,
when at the point of success, leading to wretched failures.  But so
far as he was concerned, the only apparent effect of these
discomfitures was to make him all the more determined to discharge
successfully the stupendous trust committed to his care, and to bring
into play the manifold resources of his well ordered military mind.
He guided every subordinate then, and in the last days of the
rebellion, with a fund of common sense and superiority of intellect,
which have left an impress so distinct as to exhibit his great
personality.  When his military history is analyzed after the lapse
of years, it will show, even more clearly than now, that during these
as well as in his previous campaigns he was the steadfast Centre
about and on which everything else turned.




CHAPTER IX.

ORDERED TO GREENSBORO', N. C.--MARCH TO THE DAN RIVER--ASSIGNED TO
THE COMMAND WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--LEAVING WASHINGTON--FLIGHT OF
GENERAL EARLY--MAXIMILIAN--MAKING DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE UPPER RIO
GRANDE--CONFEDERATES JOIN MAXIMILIAN--THE FRENCH INVASION OF MEXICO
AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE REBELLION--ASSISTING THE LIBERALS
--RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC.

The surrender at Appomattox put a stop to all military operations on
the part of General Grant's forces, and the morning of April 10 my
cavalry began its march to Petersburg, the men anticipating that they
would soon be mustered out and returned to their homes.  At Nottoway
Court House I heard of the assassination of the President.  The first
news came to us the night after the dastardly deed, the telegraph
operator having taken it from the wires while in transmission to
General Meade.  The despatch ran that Mr. Lincoln had been, shot at
10 o'clock that morning at Willard's Hotel, but as I could conceive
of nothing to take the President there I set the story down as a
canard, and went to bed without giving it further thought.  Next
morning, however, an official telegram confirmed the fact of the
assassination, though eliminating the distorted circumstances that
had been communicated the night before.

When we reached Petersburg my column was halted, and instructions
given me to march the cavalry and the Sixth Corps to Greensboro',
North Carolina, for the purpose of aiding General Sherman (the
surrender of General Johnston having not yet been effected), so I
made the necessary preparations and moved on the 24th of April,
arriving at South Boston, on the Dan River, the 28th, the Sixth Corps
having reached Danville meanwhile.  At South Boston I received a
despatch from General Halleck, who immediately after Lee's surrender
had been assigned to command at Richmond, informing me that General
Johnston had been brought to terms.  The necessity for going farther
south being thus obviated we retraced our steps to Petersburg, from
which place I proceeded by steamer to Washington, leaving, the
cavalry to be marched thither by easy stages.

The day after my arrival in Washington an important order was sent
me, accompanied by the following letter of instructions, transferring
me to a new field of operations:


"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.
"Washington, D. C., May 17, 1865.

"GENERAL: Under the orders relieving you from the command of the
Middle Military Division and assigning you to command west of the
Mississippi, you will proceed without delay to the West to arrange
all preliminaries for your new field of duties.

"Your duty is to restore Texas, and that part of Louisiana held by
the enemy, to the Union in the shortest practicable time, in a way
most effectual for securing permanent peace.

"To do this, you will be given all the troops that can be spared
by Major-General Canby, probably twenty-five thousand men of
all arms; the troops with Major-General J. J. Reynolds, in
Arkansas, say twelve thousand, Reynolds to command; the Fourth
Army Corps, now at Nashville, Tennessee, awaiting orders; and
the Twenty-Fifth Army Corps, now at City Point, Virginia, ready
to embark.

"I do not wish to trammel you with instructions; I will state,
however, that if Smith holds out, without even an ostensible
government to receive orders from or to report to, he and his men are
not entitled to the considerations due to an acknowledged
belligerent.  Theirs are the conditions of outlaws, making war
against the only Government having an existence over the territory
where war is now being waged.

"You may notify the rebel commander west of the Mississippi--holding
intercourse with him in person, or through such officers of the rank
of major-general as you may select--that he will be allowed to
surrender all his forces on the same terms as were accorded to Lee
and Johnston.  If he accedes, proceed to garrison the Red River as
high up as Shreveport, the seaboard at Galveston, Malagorda Bay,
Corpus Christi, and mouth of the Rio Grande.

"Place a strong force on the Rio Grande, holding it at least to a
point opposite Camargo, and above that if supplies can be procured.

"In case of an active campaign (a hostile one) I think a heavy force
should be put on the Rio Grande as a first preliminary.  Troops for
this might be started at once.  The Twenty-Fifth Corps is now
available, and to it should be added a force of white troops, say
those now under Major-General Steele.

"To be clear on this last point, I think the Rio Grande should be
strongly held, whether the forces in Texas surrender or not, and that
no time should be lost in getting troops there.  If war is to be
made, they will be in the right place; if Kirby Smith surrenders,
they will be on the line which is to be strongly garrisoned.

"Should any force be necessary other than those designated, they can
be had by calling for them on Army Headquarters.

"U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General.

"To MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN,
"United States Army."


On receipt of these instructions I called at once on General Grant,
to see if they were to be considered so pressing as to preclude my
remaining in Washington till after the Grand Review, which was fixed
for the 23d and 24th of May, for naturally I had a strong desire to
head my command on that great occasion.  But the General told me that
it was absolutely necessary to go at once to force the surrender of
the Confederates under Kirby Smith.  He also told me that the States
lately in rebellion would be embraced in two or three military
departments, the commanders of which would control civil affairs
until Congress took action about restoring them to the Union, since
that course would not only be economical and simple, but would give
the Southern people confidence, and encourage them to go to work,
instead of distracting them with politics.

At this same interview he informed me that there was an additional
motive in sending me to the new command, a motive not explained by
the instructions themselves, and went on to say that, as a matter of
fact, he looked upon the invasion of Mexico by Maximilian as a part
of the rebellion itself, because of the encouragement that invasion
had received from the Confederacy, and that our success in putting
down secession would never be complete till the French and Austrian
invaders were compelled to quit the territory of our sister republic.
With regard to this matter, though, he said it would be necessary for
me to act with great circumspection, since the Secretary of State,
Mr. Seward, was much opposed to the use of our troops along the
border in any active way that would be likely to involve us in a war
with European powers.

Under the circumstances, my disappointment at not being permitted to
participate in the review had to be submitted to, and I left
Washington without an opportunity of seeing again in a body the men
who, while under my command, had gone through so many trials and
unremittingly pursued and, assailed the enemy, from the beginning of
the campaign of 1864 till the white flag came into their hands at
Appomattox Court House.

I went first to St.  Louis, and there took the steamboat for New
Orleans, and when near the mouth of the Red River received word from
General Canby that Kirby Smith had surrendered under terms similar to
those accorded Lee and Johnston.  But the surrender was not carried
out in good faith, particularly by the Texas troops, though this I
did not learn till some little time afterward when I was informed
that they had marched off to the interior of the State in several
organized bodies, carrying with them their camp equipage, arms,
ammunition, and even some artillery, with the ultimate purpose of
going to Mexico.  In consequence of this, and also because of the
desire of the Government to make a strong showing of force in Texas,
I decided to traverse the State with two columns of cavalry,
directing one to San Antonio under Merritt, the other to Houston
under Custer.  Both commands were to start from the Red River
--Shreveport and Alexandria--being the respective initial points--and
in organizing the columns, to the mounted force already on the Red
River were added several regiments of cavalry from the east bank of
the Mississippi, and in a singular way one of these fell upon the
trail of my old antagonist, General Early.  While crossing the river
somewhere below Vicksburg some of the men noticed a suspicious
looking party being ferried over in a rowboat, behind which two
horses were swimming in tow.  Chase was given, and the horses, being
abandoned by the party, fell into the hands of our troopers, who,
however, failed to capture or identify the people in the boat.  As
subsequently ascertained, the men were companions of Early, who was
already across the Mississippi, hidden in the woods, on his way with
two or three of these followers to join the Confederates in Texas,
not having heard of Kirby Smith's surrender.  A week or two later I
received a letter from Early describing the affair, and the capture
of the horses, for which he claimed pay, on the ground that they were
private property, because he had taken them in battle.  The letter
also said that any further pursuit of Early would be useless, as he
"expected to be on the deep blue sea" by the time his communication
reached me.  The unfortunate man was fleeing from imaginary dangers,
however, for striking his trail was purely accidental, and no effort
whatever was being made to arrest him personally.  Had this been
especially desired it might have been accomplished very readily just
after Lee's surrender, for it was an open secret that Early was then
not far away, pretty badly disabled with rheumatism.

By the time the two columns were ready to set out for San Antonio and
Houston, General Frank Herron,--with one division of the Thirteenth
Corps, occupied Galveston, and another division under General Fred
Steele had gone to Brazos Santiago, to hold Brownsville and the line
of the Rio Grande, the object being to prevent, as far as possible,
the escaping Confederates from joining Maximilian.  With this purpose
in view, and not forgetting Grant's conviction that the French
invasion of Mexico was linked with the rebellion, I asked for an
increase of force to send troops into Texas in fact, to concentrate
at available points in the State an army strong enough to move
against the invaders of Mexico if occasion demanded.  The Fourth and
Twenty-fifth army corps being ordered to report to me, accordingly, I
sent the Fourth Corps to Victoria and San Antonio, and the bulk of
the Twenty-fifth to Brownsville.  Then came the feeding and caring
for all these troops--a difficult matter--for those at Victoria and
San Antonio had to be provisioned overland from Indianola across the
"hog-wallow prairie," while the supplies for the forces at
Brownsville and along the Rio Grande must come by way of Brazos
Santiago, from which point I was obliged to construct, with the labor
of the men, a railroad to Clarksville, a distance of about eighteen
miles.

The latter part of June I repaired to Brownsville myself to impress
the Imperialists, as much as possible, with the idea that we intended
hostilities, and took along my chief of scouts--Major Young--and four
of his most trusty men, whom I had had sent from Washington.  From
Brownsville I despatched all these men to important points in
northern Mexico, to glean information regarding the movements of the
Imperial forces, and also to gather intelligence about the
ex-Confederates who had crossed the Rio Grande.  On information
furnished by these scouts, I caused General Steele to make
demonstrations all along the lower Rio Grande, and at the same time
demanded the return of certain munitions of war that had been turned
over by ex-Confederates to the Imperial General (Mejia) commanding at
Matamoras.  These demands, backed up as they were by such a
formidable show of force created much agitation and demoralization
among the Imperial troops, and measures looking to the abandonment of
northern Mexico were forthwith adopted by those in authority--a
policy that would have resulted in the speedy evacuation of the
entire country by Maximilian, had not our Government weakened;
contenting itself with a few pieces of the contraband artillery
varnished over with the Imperial apologies.  A golden opportunity was
lost, for we had ample excuse for crossing the boundary, but Mr.
Seward being, as I have already stated, unalterably opposed to any
act likely to involve us in war, insisted on his course of
negotiation with Napoleon.

As the summer wore away, Maximilian, under Mr. Seward's policy,
gained in strength till finally all the accessible sections of Mexico
were in his possession, and the Republic under President Juarez
almost succumbed.  Growing impatient at this, in the latter part of
September I decided to try again what virtue there might be in a
hostile demonstration, and selected the upper Rio Grande for the
scene of my attempt.  Merritt's cavalry and the Fourth Corps still
being at San Antonio, I went to that place and reviewed these troops,
and having prepared them with some ostentation for a campaign, of
course it was bruited about that we were going to invade Mexico.
Then, escorted by a regiment of horse I proceeded hastily to Fort
Duncan, on the Rio Grande just opposite the Mexican town of Piedras
Negras.  Here I opened communication with President Juarez, through
one of his staff, taking care not to do this in the dark, and the
news, spreading like wildfire, the greatest significance was ascribed
to my action, it being reported most positively and with many
specific details that I was only awaiting the arrival of the troops,
then under marching orders at San Antonio, to cross the Rio Grande in
behalf of the Liberal cause.

Ample corroboration of the reports then circulated was found in my
inquiries regarding the quantity of forage we could depend upon
getting in Mexico, our arrangements for its purchase, and my sending
a pontoon train to Brownsville, together with which was cited the
renewed activity of the troops along the lower Rio Grande.  These
reports and demonstrations resulted in alarming the Imperialists so
much that they withdrew the French and Austrian soldiers from
Matamoras, and practically abandoned the whole of northern Mexico as
far down as Monterey, with the exception of Matamoras, where General
Mejia continued to hang on with a garrison of renegade Mexicans.

The abandonment of so much territory in northern Mexico encouraged
General Escobedo and other Liberal leaders to such a degree that they
collected a considerable army of their followers at Comargo, Mier,
and other points.  At the same time that unknown quantity, Cortinas,
suspended his free-booting for the nonce, and stoutly harassing
Matamoras, succeeded in keeping its Imperial garrison within the
fortifications.  Thus countenanced and stimulated, and largely
supplied with arms and ammunition, which we left at convenient places
on our side of the river to fall into their hands, the Liberals,
under General Escobedo--a man of much force of character--were
enabled in northern Mexico to place the affairs of the Republic on a
substantial basis.

But in the midst of what bade fair to cause a final withdrawal of the
foreigners, we were again checked by our Government, as a result of
representations of the French Minister at Washington.  In October, he
wrote to Mr. Seward that the United States troops on the Rio Grande
were acting "in exact opposition to the repeated assurances Your
Excellency has given me concerning the desire of the Cabinet at
Washington to preserve the most strict neutrality in the events now
taking place in Mexico," and followed this statement with an emphatic
protest against our course.  Without any investigation whatever by
our State Department, this letter of the French Minister was
transmitted to me, accompanied by directions to preserve a strict
neutrality; so, of course, we were again debarred from anything like
active sympathy.

After this, it required the patience of Job to abide the slow and
poky methods of our State Department, and, in truth, it was often
very difficult to restrain officers and men from crossing the Rio
Grande with hostile purpose.  Within the knowledge of my troops,
there had gone on formerly the transfer of organized bodies of
ex-Confederates to Mexico, in aid of the Imperialists, and at this
period it was known that there was in preparation an immigration
scheme having in view the colonizing, at Cordova and one or two other
places, of all the discontented elements of the defunct Confederacy
--Generals Price, Magruder, Maury, and other high personages being
promoters of the enterprise, which Maximilian took to readily.  He
saw in it the possibilities of a staunch support to his throne, and
therefore not only sanctioned the project, but encouraged it with
large grants of land, inspirited the promoters with titles of
nobility, and, in addition, instituted a system of peonage, expecting
that the silver hook thus baited would be largely swallowed by the
Southern people.

The announcement of the scheme was followed by the appointment of
commissioners in each of the Southern States to send out emigrants;
but before any were deluded into starting, I made to General Grant a
report of what was going on, with the recommendation that measures be
taken, through our State Department, looking to the suppression of
the colony; but, as usual, nothing could be effected through that
channel; so, as an alternative, I published, in April, 1866, by
authority of General Grant, an order prohibiting the embarkation from
ports in Louisiana and Texas, for ports in Mexico, of any person
without a permit from my headquarters.  This dampened the ardor of
everybody in the Gulf States who had planned to go to Mexico; and
although the projectors of the Cordova Colonization Scheme--the name
by which it was known--secured a few innocents from other districts,
yet this set-back led ultimately to failure.

Among the Liberal leaders along the Rio Grande during this period
there sprang up many factional differences from various causes, some
personal, others political, and some, I regret to say, from downright
moral obliquity--as, for example, those between Cortinas and Canales
--who, though generally hostile to the Imperialists, were freebooters
enough to take a shy at each other frequently, and now and then even
to join forces against Escobedo, unless we prevented them by coaxing
or threats.  A general who could unite these several factions was
therefore greatly needed, and on my return to New Orleans I so
telegraphed General Grant, and he, thinking General Caravajal (then
in Washington seeking aid for the Republic) would answer the purpose,
persuaded him to report to me in New Orleans.  Caravajal promptly
appeared, but he did not impress me very favorably.  He was old and
cranky, yet, as he seemed anxious to do his best, I sent him over to
Brownsville, with credentials, authorizing him to cross into Mexico,
and followed him myself by the next boat.  When I arrived in
Brownsville, matters in Matamoras had already reached a crisis.
General Mejia, feeling keenly the moral support we were giving the
Liberals, and hard pressed by the harassing attacks of Cortinas and
Canales, had abandoned the place, and Caravajal, because of
his credentials from our side, was in command, much to the
dissatisfaction of both those chiefs whose differences it was
intended he should reconcile.

The day after I got to Brownsville I visited Matamoras, and had a
long interview with Caravajal.  The outcome of this meeting was, on
my part, a stronger conviction than ever that he was unsuitable, and
I feared that either Canales or Cortinas would get possession of the
city.  Caravajal made too many professions of what he would do--in
short, bragged too much--but as there was no help for the situation,
I made the best of it by trying to smooth down the ruffled feathers
of Canales and Cortinas.  In my interview with Caravajal I
recommended Major Young as a confidential man, whom he could rely
upon as a "go-between" for communicating with our people at
Brownsville, and whom he could trust to keep him informed of the
affairs of his own country as well.

A day or two afterward I recrossed the Gulf to New Orleans, and then,
being called from my headquarters to the interior of Texas, a
fortnight passed before I heard anything from Brownsville.  In the
meanwhile Major Young had come to New Orleans, and organized there a
band of men to act as a body-guard for Caravajal, the old wretch
having induced him to accept the proposition by representing that it
had my concurrence.  I at once condemned the whole business, but
Young, having been furnished with seven thousand dollars to recruit
the men and buy their arms, had already secured both, and was so
deeply involved in the transaction, he said, that he could not
withdraw without dishonor, and with tears in his eyes he besought me
to help him.  He told me he had entered upon the adventure in the
firm belief that I would countenance it; that the men and their
equipment were on his hands; that he must make good his word at all
hazards; and that while I need not approve, yet I must go far enough
to consent to the departure of the men, and to loan him the money
necessary to provision his party and hire a schooner to carry them to
Brazos.  It was hard in deed to resist the appeals of this man, who
had served me so long and so well, and the result of his pleading was
that I gave him permission to sail, and also loaned him the sum asked
for; but I have never ceased to regret my consent, for misfortune
fell upon the enterprise almost from its inception.

By the time the party got across the Gulf and over to Brownsville,
Caravajal had been deposed by Canales, and the latter would not
accept their services.  This left Young with about fifty men to whom
he was accountable, and as he had no money to procure them
subsistence, they were in a bad fix.  The only thing left to do was
to tender their services to General Escobedo, and with this in view
the party set out to reach the General's camp, marching up the Rio
Grande on the American side, intending to cross near Ringgold Bar
racks.  In advance of them, however, had spread far and wide the
tidings of who they were, what they proposed to do, and where they
were going, and before they could cross into Mexico they were
attacked by a party of ex-Confederates and  renegade Mexican
rancheros.  Being on American soil, Young forbade his men to return
the fire, and bent all his efforts to getting them over the river;
but in this attempt they were broken up, and became completely
demoralized.  A number of the men were drowned while swimming the
river, Young himself was shot and killed, a few were captured, and
those who escaped--about twenty in all--finally joined Escobedo, but
in such a  plight as to be of little use.  With this distressing
affair came to an end pretty much all open participation of American
sympathizers with the Liberal cause, but the moral support afforded
by the presence of our forces continued, and this was frequently
supplemented with material aid in the shape of munitions of war,
which we liberally supplied, though constrained to do so by the most
secret methods.

The term of office of Juarez as President of the Mexican Republic
expired in December, 1865, but to meet existing exigencies he had
continued himself in office by proclamation, a course rendered
necessary by the fact that no elections could be held on account of
the Imperial occupation of most of the country.  The official who, by
the Mexican Constitution, is designated for the succession in such an
emergency, is the President of the Supreme Court, and the person then
eligible under this provision was General Ortega, but in the interest
of the Imperialists he had absented himself from Mexico, hence the
patriotic course of Juarez in continuing himself at the head of
affairs was a necessity of the situation.  This action of the
President gave the Imperialists little concern at first, but with the
revival of the Liberal cause they availed themselves of every means
to divide its supporters, and Ortega, who had been lying low in the
United States, now came forward to claim the Presidency.  Though
ridiculously late for such a step, his first act was to issue a
manifesto protesting against the assumption of the executive
authority by Juarez.  The protest had little effect, however, and his
next proceeding was to come to New Orleans, get into correspondence
with other disaffected Mexicans, and thus perfect his plans.  When he
thought his intrigue ripe enough for action, he sailed for Brazos,
intending to cross the Rio Grande and assert his claims with arms.
While he was scheming in New Orleans, however, I had learned what he
was up to, and in advance of his departure had sent instructions to
have him arrested on American soil.  Colonel Sedgwick, commanding at
Brownsville, was now temporary master of Matamoras also, by reason of
having stationed some American troops there for the protection of
neutral merchants, so when Ortega appeared at Brazos, Sedgwick
quietly arrested him and held him till the city of Matamoras was
turned over to General Escobedo, the authorized representative of
Juarez; then Escobedo took charge, of Ortega, and with ease prevented
his further machinations.

During the winter and spring of 1866 we continued covertly supplying
arms and ammunition to the Liberals--sending as many as 30,000
muskets from Baton Rouge Arsenal alone--and by mid-summer Juarez,
having organized a pretty good sized army, was in possession of the
whole line of the Rio Grande, and, in fact, of nearly the whole of
Mexico down to San Louis Potosi.  Then thick and fast came rumors
pointing to the tottering condition of Maximilian's Empire-first,
that Orizaba and Vera Cruz were being fortified; then, that the
French were to be withdrawn; and later came the intelligence that the
Empress Carlotta had gone home to beg assistance from Napoleon, the
author of all of her husband's troubles.  But the situation forced
Napoleon to turn a deaf ear to Carlotta's prayers.  The brokenhearted
woman besought him on her knees, but his fear of losing an army made
all pleadings vain.  In fact, as I ascertained by the following
cablegram which came into my hands, Napoleon's instructions for the
French evacuation were in Mexico at the very time of this pathetic
scene between him and Carlotta.  The despatch was in cipher when I
received it, but was translated by the telegraph operator at my
headquarters, who long before had mastered the key of the French
cipher:

"PARIS, January 10, 1867.  FRENCH CONSUL, New Orleans, La.

"To GENERAL CASTELNAU, at Mexico.

"Received your despatch of the 9th December.  Do not compel the
Emperor to abdicate, but do not delay the departure of the troops;
bring back all those who will not remain there.  Most of the fleet
has left.

"NAPOLEON."


This meant the immediate withdrawal of the French.  The rest of the
story--which has necessarily been but in outline--is soon told.
Maximilian, though deserted, determined to hold out to the last, and
with the aid of disloyal Mexicans stuck to his cause till the spring.
When taken prisoner at Queretaro, he was tried and executed under
circumstances that are well known.  From promptings of humanity
Secretary Seward tried hard to save the Imperial prisoner, but
without success.  The Secretary's plea for mercy was sent through me
at New Orleans, and to make speed I hired a steamer to proceed with
it across the Gulf to Tampico.  The document was carried by Sergeant
White, one of my scouts, who crossed the country from Tampico, and
delivered it to Escobedo at Queretaro; but Mr. Seward's
representations were without avail--refused probably because little
mercy had been shown certain Liberal leaders unfortunate enough to
fall into Maximilian's hands during the prosperous days of his
Empire.

At the close of our war there was little hope for the Republic of
Mexico.  Indeed, till our troops were concentrated on the Rio Grande
there was none.  Our appearance in such force along the border
permitted the Liberal leaders, refugees from their homes, to
establish rendezvous whence they could promulgate their plans in
safety, while the countenance thus given the cause, when hope was
well-nigh gone, incited the Mexican people to renewed resistance.
Beginning again with very scant means, for they had lost about all,
the Liberals saw their cause, under the influence of such significant
and powerful backing, progress and steadily grow so strong that
within two years Imperialism had received its death-blow.  I doubt
very much whether such, results could have been achieved without the
presence of an American army on the Rio Grande, which, be it
remembered, was sent there because, in General Grant's words, the
French invasion of Mexico was so closely related to the rebellion as
to be essentially a part of it.




CHAPTER X.

A. J. HAMILTON APPOINTED PROVISIONAL GOVERNOR OF TEXAS--ASSEMBLES A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION--THE TEXANS DISSATISFIED--LAWLESSNESS
--OPPRESSIVE LEGISLATION--EX-CONFEDERATES CONTROLLING LOUISIANA--A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION--THE MEETING SUPPRESSED--A BLOODY RIOT--MY
REPORTS OF THE MASSACRE--PORTIONS SUPPRESSED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
--SUSTAINED BY A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE--THE RECONSTRUCTION LAWS.

Although in 1865-66 much of my attention was directed to
international matters along the Rio Grande, the civil affairs of
Texas and Louisiana required a certain amount of military supervision
also in the absence of regularly established civil authority.  At the
time of Kirby Smith's surrender the National Government had
formulated no plan with regard to these or the other States lately in
rebellion, though a provisional Government had been set up in
Louisiana as early as 1864.  In consequence of this lack of system,
Governor Pendleton Murray, of Texas, who was elected under
Confederate rule, continued to discharge the duties of Governor till
President Johnson, on June 17, in harmony with his amnesty
proclamation of May 29, 1865, appointed A. J. Hamilton provisional
Governor.  Hamilton was empowered by the President to call a
Constitutional convention, the delegates to which were to be elected,
under certain prescribed qualifications, for the purpose of
organizing the political affairs of the State, the Governor to be
guided by instructions similar to those given the provisional
Governor of North Carolina (W. W. Holden), when appointed in May.

The convening of this body gave rise to much dissatisfaction among
the people of Texas.  They had assumed that affairs were to go on as
of old, and that the reintegration of the State was to take place
under the administration of Governor Murray, who, meanwhile, had
taken it upon himself, together with the Legislature, to authorize
the election of delegates to a State Convention, without restriction
as to who should be entitled to vote.  Thus encouraged, the element
but lately in armed rebellion was now fully bent on restoring the
State to the Union without any intervention whatever of the Federal
Government; but the advent of Hamilton put an end to such illusions,
since his proclamation promptly disfranchised the element in
question, whose consequent disappointment and chagrin were so great
as to render this factor of the community almost uncontrollable.  The
provisional Governor at once rescinded the edict of Governor Murray,
prohibited the assembling of his convention, and shortly after
called, one himself, the delegates to which were to b chosen by
voters who could take the amnesty-oath.  The proclamation convening
this assemblage also announced the policy that would be pursued in
governing the State until its affairs were satisfactorily
reorganized, defined in brief the course to be followed by the
Judiciary, and provided for the appointment, by the Governor, of
county officials to succeed those known to be disloyal.  As this
action of Hamilton's disfranchised all who could not take the amnesty
oath, and of course deprived them of the offices, it met at once with
pronounced and serious opposition, and he quickly realized that he
had on his hands an arduous task to protect the colored people,
particularly as in the transition state of society just after the
close of the war there prevailed much lawlessness, which vented
itself chiefly on the freedmen.  It was greatly feared that political
rights were to be given those so recently in servitude, and as it was
generally believed that such enfranchisement would precipitate a race
war unless the freedmen were overawed and kept in a state of
subjection, acts of intimidation were soon reported from all parts of
the State.

Hamilton, an able, determined, and fearless man, tried hard to curb
this terrorism, but public opinion being strong against him, he could
accomplish little without military aid.  As department commander, I
was required, whenever called upon, to assist his government, and as
these requisitions for help became necessarily very frequent, the
result was that shortly after he assumed his duties, detachments of
troops were stationed in nearly every county of the State.  By such
disposition of my forces fairly good order was maintained under the
administration of Hamilton, and all went well till the inauguration
of J. W. Throckmorton, who, elected Governor in pursuance of an
authorization granted by the convention which Hamilton had called
together, assumed the duties of the office August 9, 1866.

One of Governor Throckmorton's first acts was to ask the withdrawal
or non-interference of the military.  This was not all granted, but
under his ingenious persuasion President Johnson, on the 13th of
August, 1866, directed that the new State officials be entrusted with
the unhampered control of civil affairs, and this was more than
enough to revive the bulldozing methods that had characterized the
beginning of Hamilton's administration.  Oppressive legislation in
the shape of certain apprentice and vagrant laws quickly followed,
developing a policy of gross injustice toward the colored people on
the part of the courts, and a reign of lawlessness and disorder
ensued which, throughout the remote districts of the State at least,
continued till Congress, by what are known as the Reconstruction
Acts, took into its own hands the rehabilitation of the seceded
States.

In the State of Louisiana a provisional government, chosen by the
loyal element, had been put in operation, as already mentioned, as
early as 1864.  This was effected under encouragement given by
President Lincoln, through the medium of a Constitutional convention,
which met at New Orleans in April, 1864, and adjourned in July.  The
constitution then agreed upon was submitted to the people, and in
September, 1864, was ratified by a vote of the few loyal residents of
the State.

The government provided under this constitution being looked upon as
provisional merely, was never recognized by Congress, and in 1865 the
returned Confederates, restored to citizenship by the President's
amnesty proclamation, soon got control of almost all the State.  The
Legislature was in their hands, as well as most of the State and
municipal offices; so, when the President, on the 20th of August,
1866, by proclamation, extended his previous instructions regarding
civil affairs in Texas so as to have them apply to all the seceded
States, there at once began in Louisiana a system of discriminative
legislation directed against the freedmen, that led to flagrant
wrongs in the enforcement of labor contracts, and in the remote
parishes to numbers of outrages and murders.

To remedy this deplorable condition of things, it was proposed, by
those who had established the government of 1864, to remodel the
constitution of the State; and they sought to do this by reassembling
the convention, that body before its adjournment having provided for
reconvening under certain conditions, in obedience to the call of its
president.  Therefore, early in the summer of 1866, many members of
this convention met in conference at New Orleans, and decided that a
necessity existed for reconvening the delegates, and a proclamation
was issued accordingly by B. K. Howell, President-pro-tempore.

Mayor John T.  Monroe and the other officials of New Orleans looked
upon this proposed action as revolutionary, and by the time the
convention assembled (July 30), such bitterness of feeling prevailed
that efforts were made by the mayor and city police to suppress the
meeting.  A bloody riot followed, resulting, in the killing and
wounding of about a hundred and sixty persons.

I happened to be absent from the city at the time, returning from
Texas, where I had been called by affairs on the Rio Grande.  On my
way up from the mouth of the Mississippi I was met on the night of
July 30 by one of my staff, who reported what had occurred, giving
the details of the massacre--no milder term is fitting--and informing
me that, to prevent further slaughter, General Baird, the senior
military officer present, had assumed control of the municipal
government.  On reaching the city I made an investigation, and that
night sent the following report of the affair:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF,
"NEW ORLEANS, LA., Aug.  1, 1866.

"GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

"You are doubtless aware of the serious riot which occurred in this
city on the 30th.  A political body, styling themselves the
Convention of 1864, met on the 30th, for, as it is alleged, the
purpose of remodeling the present constitution of the State.  The
leaders were political agitators and revolutionary men, and the
action of the convention was liable to produce breaches of the public
peace.  I had made up my mind to arrest the head men, if the
proceedings of the convention were calculated to disturb the
tranquility of the Department; but I had no cause for action until
they committed the overt act.  In the meantime official duty called
me to Texas, and the mayor of the city, during my absence suppressed
the convention by the use of the police force, and in so doing
attacked the members of the convention, and a party of two hundred
negroes, with fire-arms, clubs, and knives, in a manner so
unnecessary and atrocious as to compel me to say that it was murder.
About forty whites and blacks were thus killed, and about one hundred
and sixty wounded.  Everything is now quiet, but I deem it best to
maintain a military supremacy in the city for a few days, until the
affair is fully investigated.  I believe the sentiment of the general
community is great regret at this unnecessary cruelty, and that the
police could have made any arrest they saw fit without sacrificing
lives.

"P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Major-General Commanding."


On receiving the telegram, General Grant immediately submitted it
to the President.  Much clamor being made at the North for the
publication of the despatch, Mr. Johnson pretended to give it to the
newspapers.  It appeared in the issues of August 4, but with this
paragraph omitted, viz.:

"I had made up my mind to arrest the head men, if the proceedings of
the convention were calculated to disturb the tranquility of the
Department, but I had no cause for action until they committed the
overt act.  In the mean time official duty called me to Texas, and
the mayor of the city, during my absence, suppressed the convention
by the use of the police force, and in so doing attacked the members
of the convention, and a party of two hundred negroes, with
fire-arms, clubs, and knives, in a manner so unnecessary and atrocious
as to compel me to say it was murder."

Against this garbling of my report--done by the President's own order
--I strongly demurred; and this emphatic protest marks the beginning of
Mr. Johnson's well-known personal hostility toward me.  In the mean
time I received (on August 3) the following despatch from General Grant
approving my course:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"WAR DEPT., WASHINGTON, D. C., "August 3, 1866--5 p.m.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Commanding Mil. Div. of the Gulf,
"New Orleans, La.

"Continue to enforce martial law, so far as may be necessary to
preserve the peace; and do not allow any of the civil authorities to
act, if you deem such action dangerous to the public safety.  Lose no
time in investigating and reporting the causes that led to the riot,
and the facts which occurred.

"U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General."


In obedience to the President's directions, My report of August 1 was
followed by another, more in detail, which I give in full, since it
tells the whole story of the riot:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF,
"NEW ORLEANS, LA., August 6, 1866.

"His EXCELLENCY ANDREW JOHNSON,
"President United States.

"I have the honor to make the following reply to your despatch of
August 4.  A very large number of colored people marched in
procession on Friday night, July twenty-seven (27), and were
addressed from the steps of the City Hall by Dr. Dostie, ex-Governor
Hahn, and others.  The speech of Dostie was intemperate in language
and sentiment.  The speeches of the others, so far as I can learn,
were characterized by moderation.  I have not given you the words of
Dostie's speech, as the version published was denied; but from what I
have learned of the man, I believe they were intemperate.

"The convention assembled at twelve (12) M.  on the thirtieth (30),
the timid members absenting themselves because the tone of the
general public was ominous of trouble.  I think there were about
twenty-six (26) members present.  In front of the Mechanics
Institute, where the meeting was held, there were assembled some
colored men, women, and children, perhaps eighteen (18) or twenty
(20), and in the Institute a number of colored men, probably one
hundred and fifty (150).  Among those outside and inside there might
have been a pistol in the possession of every tenth (10) man.

"About one (1) p. m.  a procession of say from sixty (60) to one
hundred and thirty (130) colored men marched up Burgundy Street and
across Canal Street toward the convention, carrying an American flag.
These men had about one pistol to every ten men, and canes and clubs
in addition.  While crossing Canal Street a row occurred.  There were
many spectators on the street, and their manner and tone toward the
procession unfriendly.  A shot was fired, by whom I am not able to
state, but believe it to have been by a policeman, or some colored
man in the procession.  This led to other shots and a rush after the
procession.  On arrival at the front of the Institute there was some
throwing of brickbats by both sides.  The police, who had been held
well in hand, were vigorously marched to the scene of disorder.  The
procession entered the Institute with the flag, about six (6) or
eight (8) remaining outside.  A row occurred between a policeman and
one of these colored men, and a shot was again fired by one of the
parties, which led to an indiscriminate fire on the building through
the windows by the policemen.  This had been going on for a short
time, when a white flag was displayed from the windows of the
Institute, whereupon the firing ceased, and the police rushed into
the building.

"From the testimony of wounded men, and others who were inside the
building, the policemen opened an indiscriminate fire upon the
audience until they had emptied their revolvers, when they retired,
and those inside barricaded the doors.  The door was broken in, and
the firing again commenced, when many of the colored and white people
either escaped throughout the door or were passed out by the
policemen inside; but as they came out the policemen who formed the
circle nearest the building fired upon them, and they were again
fired upon by the citizens that formed the outer circle.  Many of
those wounded and taken prisoners, and others who were prisoners and
not wounded, were fired upon by their captors and by citizens.  The
wounded were stabbed while lying on the ground, and their heads
beaten with brickbats.  In the yard of the building, whither some of
the colored men had escaped and partially secreted themselves, they
were fired upon and killed or wounded by policemen.  Some were killed
and wounded several squares from the scene.  Members of the
convention were wounded by the police while in their hands as
prisoners, some of them mortally.

"The immediate cause of this terrible affair was the assemblage of
this Convention; the remote cause was the bitter and antagonistic
feeling which has been growing in this community since the advent of
the present Mayor, who, in the organization of his police force,
selected many desperate men, and some of them known murderers.
People of clear views were overawed by want of confidence in the
Mayor, and fear of the thugs, many of which he had selected for his
police force.  I have frequently been spoken to by prominent citizens
on this subject, and have heard them express fear, and want of
confidence in Mayor Monroe.  Ever since the intimation of this last
convention movement I must condemn the course of several of the city
papers for supporting, by their articles, the bitter feeling of bad
men.  As to the merciless manner in which the convention was broken
up, I feel obliged to confess strong repugnance.

"It is useless to disguise the hostility that exists on the part of a
great many here toward Northern men, and this unfortunate affair has
so precipitated matters that there is now a test of what shall be the
status of Northern men--whether they can live here without being in
constant dread or not, whether they can be protected in life and
property, and have justice in the courts.  If this matter is
permitted to pass over without a thorough and determined prosecution
of those engaged in it, we may look out for frequent scenes of the
same kind, not only here, but in other places.  No steps have as yet
been taken by the civil authorities to arrest citizens who were
engaged in this massacre, or policemen who perpetrated such
cruelties.  The members of the convention have been indicted by the
grand jury, and many of them arrested and held to bail.  As to
whether the civil authorities can mete out ample justice to the
guilty parties on both sides, I must say it is my opinion,
unequivocally, that they cannot.  Judge Abell, whose course I have
closely watched for nearly a year, I now consider one of the most
dangerous men that we have here to the peace and quiet of the city.
The leading men of the convention--King, Cutler, Hahn, and others
--have been political agitators, and are bad men.  I regret to say that
the course of Governor Wells has been vacillating, and that during the
late trouble he has shown very little of the man.

"P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Major-General Commanding."


Subsequently a military commission investigated the subject of the
riot, taking a great deal of testimony.  The commission substantially
confirmed the conclusions given in my despatches, and still later
there was an investigation by a select committee of the House of
Representatives, of which the Honorables Samuel Shellabarger, of
Ohio, H. L. Elliot, of Massachusetts, and B. M. Boyer, of
Pennsylvania, were the members.  The majority report of the committee
also corroborated, in all essentials, my reports of the distressing
occurrence.  The committee likewise called attention to a violent
speech made by Mr. Johnson at St. Louis in September, 1866, charging
the origin of the riot to Congress, and went on to say of the speech
that "it was an unwarranted and unjust expression of hostile feeling,
without pretext or foundation in fact."  A list of the killed and
wounded was embraced in the committee's report, and among other
conclusions reached were the following: "That the meeting of July 30
was a meeting of quiet citizens, who came together without arms and
with intent peaceably to discuss questions of public concern....
There has been no occasion during our National history when a riot
has occurred so destitute of justifiable cause, resulting in a
massacre so inhuman and fiend-like, as that which took place at New
Orleans on the 30th of July last.  This riotous attack upon the
convention, with its terrible results of massacre and murder, was not
an accident.  It was the determined purpose of the mayor of the city
of New Orleans to break up this convention by armed force."

The statement is also made, that, "He [the President] knew that
'rebels' and 'thugs' and disloyal men had controlled the election of
Mayor Monroe, and that such men composed chiefly his police force."

The committee held that no legal government existed in Louisiana, and
recommended the temporary establishment of a provisional government
therein; the report concluding that "in the meantime the safety of
all Union men within the State demands that such government be formed
for their protection, for the well being of the nation and the
permanent peace of the Republic."

The New Orleans riot agitated the whole country, and the official and
other reports served to intensify and concentrate the opposition to
President Johnson's policy of reconstruction, a policy resting
exclusively on and inspired solely by the executive authority--for it
was made plain, by his language and his acts, that he was seeking to
rehabilitate the seceded States under conditions differing not a whit
from those existing before the rebellion; that is to say, without the
slightest constitutional provision regarding the status of the
emancipated slaves, and with no assurances of protection for men who
had remained loyal in the war.

In December, 1866, Congress took hold of the subject with such vigor
as to promise relief from all these perplexing disorders, and, after
much investigation and a great deal of debate, there resulted the
so-called "Reconstruction Laws," which, for a clear understanding of
the powers conferred on the military commanders, I deem best to append
in full:

AN ACT to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel
States.

WHEREAS, no legal State governments or adequate protection for life
or property now exist in the rebel States of Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana,
Florida, Texas, and Arkansas; and whereas, it is necessary that peace
and good order should be enforced in said States until loyal and
republican State governments can be legally established; therefore,

BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That said rebel
States shall be divided into military districts and made subject to
the military authority of the United States as hereinafter
prescribed; and for that purpose Virginia shall constitute the first
district; North Carolina and South Carolina, the second district;
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, the third district; Mississippi and
Arkansas, the fourth district; and Louisiana and Texas, the fifth
district.

SEC. 2.  And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the
President to assign to the command of each of said districts an
officer of the army not below the rank of brigadier-general, and to
detail a sufficient military force to enable such officer to perform
his duties and enforce his authority within the district to which he
is assigned.

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of each
officer assigned as aforesaid to protect all persons in their rights
of person and property, to suppress insurrection, disorder, and
violence, and to punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers of
the public peace and criminals, and to this end he may allow local
civil tribunals to take jurisdiction of and to try offenders, or,
when in his judgment it may be necessary for the trial of offenders,
he shall have power to organize military commissions or tribunals for
that purpose, and all interference, under cover of State authority,
with the exercise of military authority under this act, shall be null
and void.

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That all persons put under
military arrest by virtue of this act shall be tried without
unnecessary delay, and no cruel or unjust punishment shall be
inflicted; and no sentence of any military commission or tribunal
hereby authorized affecting the life or liberty of any person, shall
be executed until it is approved by the officer in command of the
district; and the laws and regulations for the government of the army
shall not be affected by this act except in so far as they conflict
with its provisions: Provided, That no sentence of death, under the
provisions of this act, shall be carried into effect without the
approval of the President.

SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That when the people of any one of
said rebel States shall have formed a constitution of government in
conformity with the Constitution of the United States in all
respects, framed by a convention of delegates elected by the male
citizens of said State twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever
race, color, or previous condition, who have been resident in said
State for one year previous to the day of such election, except such
as may be disfranchised for participation in the rebellion, or for
felony at common law; and when such constitution shall provide that
the elective franchise shall be enjoyed by all such persons as have
the qualifications herein stated for electors of delegates; and when
such constitution shall be ratified by a majority of the persons
voting on the question of ratification who are qualified as electors
for delegates, and when such constitution shall have been submitted
to Congress for examination and approval, and Congress shall have
approved the same; and when said State, by a vote of its legislature
elected under said constitution, shall have adopted the amendment to
the Constitution of the United States proposed by the Thirty-ninth
Congress, and known as article fourteen; and when said article shall
have become a part of the Constitution of the United States, said
State shall be declared entitled to representation in Congress, and
senators and representatives shall be admitted therefrom on their
taking the oath prescribed by law; and then and thereafter the
preceding sections of this act shall be inoperative in said State:
Provided, That no person excluded from the privilege of holding
office by said proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United
States shall be eligible to election as a member of the convention to
frame a constitution for any of said rebel States, nor shall any such
person vote for members of such convention.

SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That until the people of said
rebel States shall be by law admitted to representation in the
Congress of the United States, any civil government which may exist
therein shall be deemed provisional only, and in all respects subject
to the paramount authority of the United States at any time to
abolish, modify, control, or supersede the same; and in all elections
to any office under such provisional governments all persons shall be
entitled to vote, and none others, who are entitled to vote under the
fifth section of this act; and no person shall be eligible to any
office under any such provisional governments who would be
disqualified from holding office under the provisions of the third
article of said constitutional amendment.

SCHUYLER COLFAX,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

LAFAYETTE S. FOSTER,
President of the Senate pro tempore.


AN ACT supplementary to an act entitled "An act to provide for the
more efficient government of the rebel States," passed March second,
eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and to facilitate restoration.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That before the first
day of September, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, the commanding
general in each district defined by an act entitled "An act to
provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States,"
passed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, shall cause a
registration to be made of the male citizens of the United States,
twenty-one years of age and upwards, resident in each county or
parish in the State or States included in his district, which
registration shall include only those persons who are qualified to
vote for delegates by the act aforesaid, and who shall have taken and
subscribed the following oath or affirmation: "I,------, do
solemnly swear (or affirm), in the presence of the Almighty God, that
I am a citizen of the State of ---------; that I have resided in said
State for----- months next preceding this day, and now reside in the
county of -------, or the parish of --------, in said State, (as the
case may be); that I am twenty-one years old; that I have not been
disfranchised for participation in any rebellion or civil war against
the United States, nor for felony committed against the laws of any
State or of the United States; that I have never been a member of any
State Legislature, nor held any executive or judicial office in any
State, and afterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion against
the United States, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof;
that I have never taken an oath as a member of Congress of the United
States, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the constitution of the United States, and
afterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United
States or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof; that I will
faithfully support the Constitution and obey the laws of the United
States, and will, to the best of my ability, encourage others so to
do: so help me God."; which oath or affirmation may be administered
by any registering officer.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That after the completion of the
registration hereby provided for in any State, at such time and
places therein as the commanding general shall appoint and direct, of
which at least thirty days' public notice shall be given, an election
shall be held of delegates to a convention for the purpose of
establishing a constitution and civil government for such State loyal
to the Union, said convention in each State, except Virginia, to
consist of the same number of members as the most numerous branch of
the State Legislature of such State in the year eighteen hundred and
sixty, to be apportioned among the several districts, counties, or
parishes of such State by the commanding general, giving each
representation in the ratio of voters registered as aforesaid as
nearly as may be.  The convention in Virginia shall consist of the
same number of members as represented the territory now constituting
Virginia in the most numerous branch of the Legislature of said State
in the year eighteen hundred and sixty, to be apportioned as
aforesaid.

SEC.  3. And be it further enacted, That at said election the
registered voters of each State shall vote for or against a
convention to form a constitution therefor under this act.  Those
voting in favor of such a convention shall have written or printed on
the ballots by which they vote for delegates, as aforesaid, the words
"For a convention," and those voting against such a convention shall
have written or printed on such ballot the words "Against a
convention." The persons appointed to superintend said election, and
to make return of the votes given thereat, as herein provided, shall
count and make return of the votes given for and against a
convention; and the commanding general to whom the same shall have
been returned shall ascertain and declare the total vote in each
State for and against a convention.  If a majority of the votes given
on that question shall be for a convention, then such convention
shall be held as hereinafter provided; but if a majority of said
votes shall, be against a convention, then no such convention shall
be held under this act: Provided, That such convention shall not be
held unless a majority of all such registered voters shall have voted
on the question of holding such convention.

SEC.  4.  And be it further enacted, That the commanding general of
each district shall appoint as many boards of registration as may be
necessary, consisting of three loyal officers or persons, to make and
complete the registration, superintend the election, and make return
to him of the votes, list of voters, and of the persons elected as
delegates by a plurality of the votes cast at said election; and upon
receiving said returns he shall open the same, ascertain the persons
elected as delegates, according to the returns of the officers who
conducted said election, and make proclamation thereof; and if a
majority of the votes given on that question shall be for a
convention, the commanding general, within sixty days from the date
of election, shall notify the delegates to assemble in convention, at
a time and place to be mentioned in the notification, and said
convention, when organized, shall proceed to frame a constitution and
civil government according to the provisions of this act, and the act
to which it is supplementary; and when the same shall have been so
framed, said constitution shall be submitted by the convention for
ratification to the persons registered under the provisions of this
act at an election to be conducted by the officers or persons
appointed or to be appointed by the commanding general, as
hereinbefore provided, and to be held after the expiration of thirty
days from the date of notice thereof, to be given by said convention;
and the returns thereof shall be made to the commanding general of
the district.

SEC.  5.  And be it further enacted, That if, according to said
returns, the constitution shall be ratified by a majority of the
votes of the registered electors qualified as herein specified, cast
at said election, at least one-half of all the registered voters
voting upon the question of such ratification, the president of the
convention shall transmit a copy of the same, duly certified, to the
President of the United States, who shall forthwith transmit the same
to Congress, if then in session, and if not in session, then
immediately upon its next assembling; and if it shall moreover appear
to Congress that the election was one at which all the registered and
qualified electors in the State had an opportunity to vote freely,
and without restraint, fear, or the influence of fraud, and if the
Congress shall be satisfied that such constitution meets the approval
of a majority of all the qualified electors in the State, and if the
said constitution shall be declared by Congress to be in conformity
with the provisions of the act to which this is supplementary, and
the other provisions of said act shall have been complied with, and
the said constitution shall be approved by Congress, the State shall
be declared entitled to representation, and senators and
representatives shall be admitted therefrom as therein provided.

SEC.  6.  And be it further enacted, That all elections in the States
mentioned in the said "Act to provide for the more efficient
government of the rebel States" shall, during the operation of said
act, be by ballot; and all officers making the said registration of
voters and conducting said elections, shall, before entering upon the
discharge of their duties, take and subscribe the oath prescribed by
the act approved July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two,
entitled "An act to prescribe an oath of office": Provided, That if
any person shall knowingly and falsely take and subscribe any oath in
this act prescribed, such person so offending and being thereof duly
convicted, shall be subject to the pains, penalties, and disabilities
which by law are provided for the punishment of the crime of wilful
and corrupt perjury.

SEC. 7. And be if further enacted, That all expenses incurred by the
several commanding generals, or by virtue of any orders issued, or
appointments made, by them, under or by virtue of this act, shall be
paid out of any moneys in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.

SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That the convention for each State
shall prescribe the fees, salary, and compensation to be paid to all
delegates and other officers and agents herein authorized or
necessary to carry into effect the purposes of this act not herein
otherwise provided for, and shall provide for the levy and collection
of such taxes on the property in such State as may be necessary to
pay the same.

SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That the word "article," in the
sixth section of the act to which this is supplementary, shall be
construed to mean, "section."

SCHUYLER COLFAX,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

B. F. WADE,
President of the Senate pro tempore.




CHAPTER XI.

PASSAGE OF THE RECONSTRUCTION ACT OVER THE PRESIDENT'S VETO--PLACED
IN COMMAND OF THE FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT--REMOVING OFFICERS--MY
REASONS FOR SUCH ACTION--AFFAIRS IN LOUISIANA AND TEXAS--REMOVAL OF
GOVERNOR WELLS--REVISION OF THE JURY LISTS--RELIEVED FROM THE COMMAND
OF THE FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT.

The first of the Reconstruction laws was passed March 2, 1867, and
though vetoed by the President, such was the unanimity of loyal
sentiment and the urgency demanding the measure, that the bill became
a law over the veto the day the President returned it to Congress.
March the 11th this law was published in General Orders No. 10, from
the Headquarters of the Army, the same order assigning certain
officers to take charge of the five military districts into which the
States lately in rebellion were subdivided, I being announced as the
commander of the Fifth Military District, which embraced Louisiana
and Texas, a territory that had formed the main portion of my command
since the close of the war.

Between the date of the Act and that of my assignment, the Louisiana
Legislature, then in special session, had rejected a proposed repeal
of an Act it had previously passed providing for an election of
certain municipal officers in New Orleans.  This election was set for
March 11, but the mayor and the chief of police, together with
General Mower, commanding the troops in the city, having expressed to
me personally their fears that the public peace would be disturbed by
the election, I, in this emergency, though not yet assigned to the
district, assuming the authority which the Act conferred on district
commanders, declared that the election should not take place; that no
polls should be opened on the day fixed; and that the whole matter
would stand postponed till the district commander should be
appointed, or special instructions be had.  This, my first official
act under the Reconstruction laws, was rendered necessary by the
course of a body of obstructionists, who had already begun to give
unequivocal indications of their intention to ignore the laws of
Congress.

A copy of the order embodying the Reconstruction law, together with
my assignment, having reached me a few days after, I regularly
assumed control of the Fifth Military District on March 19, by an
order wherein I declared the State and municipal governments of the
district to be provisional only, and, under the provisions of the
sixth section of the Act, subject to be controlled, modified,
superseded, or abolished.  I also announced that no removals from
office would be made unless the incumbents failed to carry out the
provisions of the law or impeded reorganization, or unless willful
delays should necessitate a change, and added: "Pending the
reorganization, it is, desirable and intended to create as little
disturbance in the machinery of the various branches of the
provisional governments as possible, consistent with the law of
Congress and its successful execution, but this condition is
dependent upon the disposition shown by the people, and upon the
length of time required for reorganization."

Under these limitations Louisiana and Texas retained their former
designations as military districts, the officers in command
exercising their military powers as heretofore.  In addition, these
officers were to carry out in their respective commands all
provisions of the law except those specially requiring the action of
the district commander, and in cases of removals from and appointment
to office.

In the course of legislation the first Reconstruction act, as I have
heretofore noted, had been vetoed.  On the very day of the veto,
however, despite the President's adverse action, it passed each House
of Congress by such an overwhelming majority as not only to give it
the effect of law, but to prove clearly that the plan of
reconstruction presented was, beyond question, the policy endorsed by
the people of the country.  It was, therefore, my determination to
see to the law's zealous execution in my district, though I felt
certain that the President would endeavor to embarrass me by every
means in his power, not only on account of his pronounced personal
hostility, but also because of his determination not to execute but
to obstruct the measures enacted by Congress.

Having come to this conclusion, I laid down, as a rule for my
guidance, the principle of non-interference with the provisional
State governments, and though many appeals were made to have me
rescind rulings of the courts, or interpose to forestall some
presupposed action to be taken by them, my invariable reply was that
I would not take cognizance of such matters, except in cases of
absolute necessity.  The same policy was announced also in reference
to municipal affairs throughout the district, so long as the action
of the local officers did not conflict with the law.

In a very short time, however, I was obliged to interfere in
municipal matters in New Orleans, for it had become clearly apparent
that several of the officials were, both by acts of omission and
commission, ignoring the law, so on the 27th of March I removed from
office the Mayor, John T.  Monroe; the Judge of the First District
Court, E. Abell; and the Attorney-General of the State, Andrew S.
Herron; at the same time appointing to the respective offices thus
vacated Edward Heath, W. W. Howe, and B. L. Lynch.  The officials
thus removed had taken upon themselves from the start to pronounce
the Reconstruction acts unconstitutional, and to advise such a course
of obstruction that I found it necessary at an early dav to replace
them by men in sympathy with the law, in order to make plain my
determination to have its provisions enforced.  The President at once
made inquiry, through General Grant, for the cause of the removal,
and I replied:

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT,
"New Orleans, La., April 19, 1867.

"GENERAL: On the 27th day of March last I removed from office Judge
E. Abell, of the Criminal Court of New Orleans; Andrew S. Herron,
Attorney-General of the State of Louisiana; and John T. Monroe, Mayor
of the City of New Orleans.  These removals were made under the
powers granted me in what is usually termed the 'military bill,'
passed March 2, 1867, by the Congress of the United States.

"I did not deem it necessary to give any reason for the removal of
these men, especially after the investigations made by the military
board on the massacre Of July 30, 1866, and the report of the
congressional committee on the same massacre; but as some inquiry has
been made for the cause of removal, I would respectfully state as
follows:

"The court over which judge Abell presided is the only criminal court
in the city of New Orleans, and for a period of at least nine months
previous to the riot Of July 30 he had been educating a large portion
of the community to the perpetration of this outrage, by almost
promising no prosecution in his court against the offenders, in case
such an event occurred.  The records of his court will show that he
fulfilled his promise, as not one of the guilty has been prosecuted.

"In reference to Andrew J. Herron, Attorney-General of the State of
Louisiana, I considered it his duty to indict these men before this
criminal court.  This he failed to do, but went so far as to attempt
to impose on the good sense of the whole nation by indicting the
victims of the riot instead of the rioters; in other words, making
the innocent guilty and the guilty innocent.  He was therefore, in my
belief, an able coadjutor with judge Abell in bringing on the
massacre of July 30.

"Mayor Monroe controlled the element engaged in this riot, and when
backed by an attorney-general who would not prosecute the guilty, and
a judge who advised the grand jury to find the innocent guilty and
let the murderers go free, felt secure in engaging his police force
in the riot and massacre.

"With these three men exercising a large influence over the worst
elements of the population of this city, giving to those elements an
immunity for riot and bloodshed, the general-in-chief will see how
insecurely I felt in letting them occupy their respective positions
in the troubles which might occur in registration and voting in the
reorganization of this State.

"I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Major-General U. S. A.


"GENERAL U. S. GRANT,
"Commanding Armies of the United States,
"Washington, D. C."


To General Grant my reasons were satisfactory, but not so to the
President, who took no steps, however, to rescind my action, for he
knew that the removals were commended by well-nigh the entire
community in the city, for it will be understood that Mr. Johnson
was, through his friends and adherents in Louisiana and Texas, kept
constantly advised of every step taken by me.  Many of these persons
were active and open opponents of mine, while others were spies,
doing their work so secretly and quickly that sometimes Mr. Johnson
knew of my official acts before I could report them to General Grant.

The supplemental Reconstruction act which defined the method of
reconstruction became a law despite the President's veto on March 23.
This was a curative act, authorizing elections and prescribing
methods of registration.  When it reached me officially I began
measures for carrying out its provisions, and on the 28th of March
issued an order to the effect that no elections for the State,
parish, or municipal officers would be held in Louisiana until the
provisions of the laws of Congress entitled "An act to provide for
the more efficient government of the rebel States," and of the act
supplemental thereto, should have been complied with.  I also
announced that until elections were held in accordance with these
acts, the law of the Legislature of the State providing for the
holding over of those persons whose terms of office otherwise would
have expired, would govern in all cases excepting only those special
ones in which I myself might take action.  There was one parish,
Livingston, which this order did no reach in time to prevent the
election previously ordered there, and which therefore took place,
but by a supplemental order this election was declare null and void.

In April.  I began the work of administering the Supplemental Law,
which, under  certain condition of eligibility, required a
registration of the voter of the State, for the purpose of electing
delegate to a Constitutional convention.  It therefore became
necessary to appoint Boards of Registration throughout the election
districts, and on April 10 the boards for the Parish of Orleans were
given out, those for the other parishes being appointed ten days
later.  Before announcing these boards, I had asked to be advised
definitely as to what persons were disfranchised by the law, and was
directed by General Grant to act upon my own interpretation of it,
pending an opinion expected shortly from the Attorney-General--Mr.
Henry Stanbery--so, for the guidance of the boards, I gave the
following instructions:

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT.
"New Orleans, La., April 10, 1867.

"Special Orders, No. 15.

"....In obedience to the directions contained in the first section of
the Law of Congress entitled "An Act supplemental to an Act entitled
'An Act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel
States'" the registration of the legal voters, according to that law
in the Parish of Orleans, will be commenced on the 15th instant, and
must be completed by the 15th of May.

"The four municipal districts of the City of New Orleans and the
Parish of Orleans, right bank (Algiers), will each constitute a
Registration district.  Election precincts will remain as at present
constituted.

"....Each member of the Board of Registers, before commencing his
duties, will file in the office of the Assistant-Inspector-General at
these headquarters, the oath required in the sixth section of the Act
referred to, and be governed in the execution of his duty by the
provisions of the first section of that Act, faithfully administering
the oath therein prescribed to each person registered.

"Boards of Registers will immediately select suitable offices within
their respective districts, having reference to convenience and
facility of registration, and will enter upon their duties on the day
designated.  Each Board will be entitled to two clerks.  Office-hours
for registration will be from 8 o'clock till 12 A. M., and from 4
till 7 P. M.

"When elections are ordered, the Board of Registers for each district
will designate the number of polls and the places where they shall be
opened in the election precincts within its district, appoint the
commissioners and other officers necessary for properly conducting
the elections, and will superintend the same.

"They will also receive from the commissioners of elections of the
different precincts the result of the vote, consolidate the same, and
forward it to the commanding general.

"Registers and all officers connected with elections will be held to
a rigid accountability and will be subject to trial by military
commission for fraud, or unlawful or improper conduct in the
performance of their duties.  Their rate of compensation and manner
of payment will be in accordance with the provisions of sections six
and seven of the supplemental act.

"....Every male citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old
and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who has
been resident in the State of Louisiana for one year and Parish of
Orleans for three months previous to the date at which he presents
himself for registration, and who has not been disfranchised by act
of Congress or for felony at common law, shall, after having taken
and subscribed the oath prescribed in the first section of the act
herein referred to, be entitled to be, and shall be, registered as a
legal voter in the Parish of Orleans and State of Louisiana.

"Pending the decision of the Attorney-General of the United States on
the question as to who are disfranchised by law, registers will give
the most rigid interpretation to the law, and exclude from
registration every person about whose right to vote there may be a
doubt.  Any person so excluded who may, under the decision of the
Attorney-General, be entitled to vote, shall be permitted to register
after that decision is received, due notice of which will be given.

"By command of Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN,

"GEO. L. HARTSUFF,
"Assistant Adjutant-General."


The parish Boards of Registration were composed of three members
each.  Ability to take what was known as the "ironclad oath" was the
qualification exacted of the members, and they were prohibited from
becoming candidates for office.  In the execution of their duties
they were to be governed by the provisions of the supplemental act.
It was also made one of their functions to designate the number and
location of the polling-places in the several districts, to appoint
commissioners for receiving the votes and in general to attend to
such other matters as were necessary, in order properly to conduct
the voting, and afterward to receive from the commissioners the
result of the vote and forward it to my headquarters.  These
registers, and all other officers having to do with elections, were
to be held to a rigid accountability, and be subject to trial by
military commission for fraud or unlawful or improper conduct in the
performance of their duties; and in order to be certain that the
Registration Boards performed their work faithfully and
intelligently, officers of the army were appointed as supervisors.
To this end the parishes were grouped together conveniently in
temporary districts, each officer having from three to five parishes
to supervise.  The programme thus mapped out for carrying out the law
in Louisiana was likewise adhered to in Texas, and indeed was
followed as a model in some of the other military districts.

Although Military Commissions were fully authorized by the
Reconstruction acts, yet I did not favor their use in governing the
district, and probably would never have convened one had these acts
been observed in good faith.  I much preferred that the civil courts,
and the State and municipal authorities already in existence, should
perform their functions without military control or interference, but
occasionally, because the civil authorities neglected their duty, I
was obliged to resort to this means to ensure the punishment Of
offenders.  At this time the condition of the negroes in Texas and
Louisiana was lamentable, though, in fact, not worse than that of the
few white loyalists who had been true to the Union during the war.
These last were singled out as special objects of attack, and were,
therefore, obliged at all times to be on the alert for the protection
of their lives and property.  This was the natural outcome of Mr.
Johnson's defiance of Congress, coupled with the sudden conversion to
his cause of persons in the North--who but a short time before had
been his bitterest enemies; for all this had aroused among the
disaffected element new hopes of power and place, hopes of being at
once put in political control again, with a resumption of their
functions in State and National matters without any preliminary
authorization by Congress.  In fact, it was not only hoped, but
expected, that things were presently to go on just as if there had
been no war.

In the State of Texas there were in 1865 about 200,000 of the colored
race-roughly, a third of the entire population--while in Louisiana
there were not less than 350,000, or more than one-half of all the
people in the State.  Until the enactment of the Reconstruction laws
these negroes were without rights, and though they had been liberated
by the war, Mr. Johnson's policy now proposed that they should have
no political status at all, and consequently be at the mercy of a
people who, recently their masters, now seemed to look upon them as
the authors of all the misfortunes that had come upon the land.
Under these circumstances the blacks naturally turned for protection
to those who had been the means of their liberation, and it would
have been little less than inhuman to deny them sympathy.  Their
freedom had been given them, and it was the plain duty of those in
authority to make it secure, and screen them from the bitter
political resentment that beset them, and to see that they had a fair
chance in the battle of life.  Therefore, when outrages and murders
grew frequent, and the aid of the military power was an absolute
necessity for the protection of life, I employed it unhesitatingly
--the guilty parties being brought to trial before military
commissions--and for a time, at least, there occurred a halt in the
march of terrorism inaugurated by the people whom Mr. Johnson had
deluded.

The first, Military Commission was convened to try the case of John
W. Walker, charged with shooting a negro in the parish of St. John.
The proper civil authorities had made no effort to arrest Walker, and
even connived at his escape, so I had him taken into custody in New
Orleans, and ordered him tried, the commission finding him guilty,
and sentencing him to confinement in the penitentiary for six months.
This shooting was the third occurrence of the kind that had taken
place in St.  John's parish, a negro being wounded in each case, and
it was plain that the intention was to institute there a practice of
intimidation which should be effective to subject the freedmen to the
will of their late masters, whether in making labor contracts, or in
case these newly enfranchised negroes should evince a disposition to
avail themselves of the privilege to vote.

The trial and conviction of Walker, and of one or two others for
similar outrages, soon put a stop to every kind of "bull-dozing" in
the country parishes; but about this time I discovered that many
members of the police force in New Orleans were covertly intimidating
the freedmen there, and preventing their appearance at the
registration offices, using milder methods than had obtained in the
country, it is true, but none the less effective.

Early in 1866 the Legislature had passed an act which created for the
police of New Orleans a residence qualification, the object of which
was to discharge and exclude from the force ex-Union soldiers.  This
of course would make room for the appointment of ex-Confederates, and
Mayor Monroe had not been slow in enforcing the provisions of the
law.  It was, in fact, a result of this enactment that the police was
so reorganized as to become the willing and efficient tool which it
proved to be in the riot of 1866; and having still the same
personnel, it was now in shape to prevent registration by threats,
unwarranted arrests, and by various other influences, all operating
to keep the timid blacks away from the registration places.

That the police were taking a hand in this practice of repression, I
first discovered by the conduct of the assistant to the chief of the
body, and at once removed the offender, but finding this ineffectual
I annulled that part of the State law fixing the five years'
residence restriction, and restored the two years' qualification,
thus enabling Mayor Heath, who by my appointment had succeeded
Monroe, to organize the force anew, and take about one-half of its
members from ex-Union soldiers who when discharged had settled in New
Orleans.  This action put an end to intimidation in the parish of
Orleans; and now were put in operation in all sections the processes
provided by the supplemental Reconstruction law for the summoning of
a convention to form a Constitution preparatory to the readmission of
the State, and I was full of hope that there would now be much less
difficulty in administering the trust imposed by Congress.

During the two years previous great damage had been done the
agricultural interests of Louisiana by the overflow of the
Mississippi, the levees being so badly broken as to require extensive
repairs, and the Legislature of 1866 had appropriated for the purpose
$4,000,000, to be raised by an issue of bonds.  This money was to be
disbursed by a Board of Levee Commissioners then in existence, but
the term of service of these commissioners, and the law creating the
board, would expire in the spring of 1867.  In order to overcome this
difficulty the Legislature passed a bill continuing the commissioners
in office but as the act was passed inside of ten days before the
adjournment of the Legislature, Governor Wells pocketed the bill, and
it failed to become a law.  The Governor then appointed a board of
his own, without any warrant of law whatever.  The old commissioners
refused to recognize this new board, and of course a conflict of
authority ensued, which, it was clear, would lead to vicious results
if allowed to continue; so, as the people of the State had no
confidence in either of the boards, I decided to end the contention
summarily by appointing an entirely new commission, which would
disburse the money honestly, and further the real purpose for which
it had been appropriated.  When I took this course the legislative
board acquiesced, but Governor Wells immediately requested the
President to revoke my order, which, however, was not done, but
meanwhile the Secretary of War directed me to suspend all proceedings
in the matter, and make a report of the facts.  I complied in the
following telegram:

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT,
"NEW ORLEANS, La., June 3, 1867.

"SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of
this date in reference to the Levee Commissioners in this State.

"The following were my reasons for abolishing the two former boards,
although I intended that my order should be sufficiently explanatory:

"Previous to the adjournment of the Legislature last winter it passed
an act continuing the old Levee board in office, so that the four
millions of dollars ($4,000,000) in bonds appropriated by the
Legislature might be disbursed by a board of rebellious antecedents.

"After its adjournment the Governor of the State appointed a board of
his own, in violation of this act, and made the acknowledgment to me
in person that his object was to disburse the money in the interest
of his own party by securing for it the vote of the employees at the
time of election.

"The board continued in office by the Legislature refused to turn
over to the Governor's board, and each side appealed to me to sustain
it, which I would not do.  The question must then have gone to the
courts, which, according to the Governor's judgment when he was
appealing to me to be sustained, would require one year for decision.
Meantime the State was overflowed, the Levee boards tied up by
political chicanery, and nothing done to relieve the poor people, now
fed by the charity of the Government and charitable associations of
the North.

"To obviate this trouble, and to secure to the overflowed districts
of the State the immediate relief which the honest disbursement of
the four millions ($4,000,000) would give, my order dissolving both
boards was issued.

"I say now, unequivocally, that Governor Wells is a political
trickster and a dishonest man.  I have seen him myself, when I first
came to this command, turn out all the Union men who had supported
the Government, and put in their stead rebel soldiers who had not yet
doffed their gray uniform.  I have seen him again, during the July
riot of 1866, skulk away where I could not find him to give him a
guard, instead of coming out as a manly representative of the State
and joining those who were preserving the peace.  I have watched him
since, and his conduct has been as sinuous as the mark left in the
dust by the movement of a snake.

"I say again that he is dishonest, and that dishonesty is more than
must be expected of me.

"P. H. SHERIDAN,
"Major-General, U. S. A.

"Hon. E. M. STANTON,
"Secretary of War, Washington, D. C."


The same day that I sent my report to the Secretary of War I removed
from office Governor Wells himself, being determined to bear no
longer with the many obstructions he had placed in the way of
reorganizing the civil affairs of the State.  I was also satisfied
that he was unfit to retain the place, since he was availing himself
of every opportunity to work political ends beneficial to himself.
In this instance Wells protested to me against his removal, and also
appealed to the President for an opinion of the Attorney-General as
to my power in the case; and doubtless he would have succeeded in
retaining his office, but for the fact that the President had been
informed by General James B. Steadman and others placed to watch me
that Wells was wholly unworthy.


"NEW ORLEANS, June 19, 1867.
"ANDREW JOHNSON, President United States,
"Washington City:

"Lewis D.  Campbell leaves New Orleans for home this evening.  Want
of respect for Governor Wells personally, alone represses the
expression of indignation felt by all honest and sensible men at the
unwarranted usurpation of General Sheridan in removing the civil
officers of Louisiana.  It is believed here that you will reinstate
Wells.  He is a bad man, and has no influence.

"I believe Sheridan made the removals to embarrass you, believing the
feeling at the North would sustain him.  My conviction is that on
account of the bad character of Wells and Monroe, you ought not to
reinstate any who have been removed, because you cannot reinstate any
without reinstating all, but you ought to prohibit the exercise of
this power in the future.

"Respectfully yours,

"JAMES B. STEADMAN."


I appointed Mr. Thomas J. Durant as Wells's successor, but he
declining, I then appointed Mr. Benjamin F. Flanders, who, after I
had sent a staff-officer to forcibly eject Wells in case of
necessity, took possession of the Governor's office.  Wells having
vacated, Governor Flanders began immediately the exercise of his
duties in sympathy with the views of Congress, and I then notified
General Grant that I thought he need have no further apprehension
about the condition of affairs in Louisiana, as my appointee was a
man of such integrity and ability that I already felt relieved of
half my labor.  I also stated in the same despatch that nothing would
answer in Louisiana but a bold and firm course, and that in taking
such a one I felt that I was strongly supported; a statement that was
then correct, for up to this period the better classes were disposed
to accept the Congressional plan of reconstruction.

During the controversy over the Levee Commissioners, and the
correspondence regarding the removal of Governor Wells, registration
had gone on under the rules laid down for the boards.  The date set
for closing the books was the 30th of June, but in the parish of
Orleans the time was extended till the 15th of July.  This the
President considered too short a period, and therefore directed the
registry lists not to be closed before the 1st of August, unless
there was some good reason to the contrary.  This was plainly
designed to keep the books open in order that under the
Attorney-General's interpretation of the Reconstruction laws, published
June 20, many persons who had been excluded by the registration boards
could yet be registered, so I decided to close the registration, unless
required by the President unconditionally, and in specific orders, to
extend the time.  My motives were manifold, but the main reasons were
that as two and a half months had been given already, the number of
persons who, under the law, were qualified for registry was about
exhausted; and because of the expense I did not feel warranted in
keeping up the boards longer, as I said, "to suit new issues coming in
at the eleventh hour," which would but open a "broad macadamized road
for perjury and fraud."

When I thus stated what I intended to do, the opinion of the
Attorney-General had not yet been received.  When it did reach me it
was merely in the form of a circular signed by Adjutant-General
Townsend, and had no force of law.  It was not even sent as an order,
nor was it accompanied by any instructions, or by anything except the
statement that it was transmitted to the 11 respective military
commanders for their information, in order that there might be
uniformity in the execution  of the Reconstruction acts.  To adopt
Mr. Stanbery's interpretation of the law and reopen registration
accordingly, would defeat the purpose of Congress, as well as add to
my perplexities.  Such a course would also require that the officers
appointed by me for the performance of specified duties, under laws
which I was empowered to interpret and enforce, should receive their
guidance and instructions from an unauthorized source, so on
communicating with General Grant as to how I should act, he directed
me to enforce my own construction of the military bill until ordered
to do otherwise.

Therefore the registration continued as I had originally directed,
and nothing having been definitely settled at Washington in relation
to my extending the time, on the 10th of July I ordered all the
registration boards to select, immediately, suitable persons to act
as commissioners of election, and at the same time specified the
number of each set of commissioners, designated the polling-places,
gave notice that two days would be allowed for voting, and followed
this with an order discontinuing registration the 31st of July, and
then another appointing the 27th and 28th of September as the time
for the election of delegates to the State convention.

In accomplishing the registration there had been little opposition
from the mass of the people, but the press of New Orleans, and the
office-holders and office-seekers in the State generally, antagonized
the work bitterly and violently, particularly after the promulgation
of the opinion of the Attorney-General.  These agitators condemned
everybody and everything connected with the Congressional plan of
reconstruction; and the pernicious influence thus exerted was
manifested in various ways, but most notably in the selection of
persons to compose the jury lists in the country parishes it also
tempted certain municipal officers in New Orleans to perform illegal
acts that would seriously have affected the credit of the city had
matters not been promptly corrected by the summary removal from
office of the comptroller and the treasurer, who had already issued a
quarter of a million dollars in illegal certificates.  On learning of
this unwarranted and unlawful proceeding, Mayor Heath demanded an
investigation by the Common Council, but this body, taking its cue
from the evident intention of the President to render abortive the
Reconstruction acts, refused the mayor's demand.  Then he tried to
have the treasurer and comptroller restrained by injunction, but the
city attorney, under the same inspiration as the council, declined to
sue out a writ, and the attorney being supported in this course by
nearly all the other officials, the mayor was left helpless in his
endeavors to preserve the city's credit.  Under such circumstances he
took the only step left him--recourse to the military commander; and
after looking into the matter carefully I decided, in the early part
of August, to give the mayor officials who would not refuse to make
an investigation of the illegal issue of certificates, and to this
end I removed the treasurer, surveyor, comptroller, city attorney,
and twenty-two of the aldermen; these officials, and all of their
assistants, having reduced the financial credit of New Orleans to a
disordered condition, and also having made efforts--and being then
engaged in such--to hamper the execution of the Reconstruction laws.

This action settled matters in the city, but subsequently I had to
remove some officials in the parishes--among them a justice of the
peace and a sheriff in the parish of Rapides; the justice for
refusing to permit negro witnesses to testify in a certain murder
case, and for allowing the murderer, who had foully killed a colored
man, to walk out of his court on bail in the insignificant sum of
five hundred dollars; and the sheriff, for conniving at the escape
from jail of another alleged murderer.  Finding, however, even after
these removals, that in the country districts murderers and other
criminals went unpunished, provided the offenses were against negroes
merely (since the jurors were selected exclusively from the whites,
and often embraced those excluded from the exercise of the election
franchise) I, having full authority under the Reconstruction laws,
directed such a revision of the jury lists as would reject from them
every man not eligible for registration as a voter.  This order was
issued August 24, and on its promulgation the President relieved me
from duty and assigned General Hancock as my successor.


"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT,
"NEW ORLEANS, LA., August 24, 1867.

"SPECIAL ORDERS, No.  125.

"The registration of voters of the State of Louisiana, according to
the law of Congress, being complete, it is hereby ordered that no
person who is not registered in accordance with said law shall be
considered as, a duly qualified voter of the State of Louisiana.  All
persons duly registered as above, and no others, are consequently
eligible, under the laws of the State of Louisiana, to serve as
jurors in any of the courts of the State.

"The necessary revision of the jury lists will immediately be made by
the proper officers.

"All the laws of the State respecting exemptions, etc., from jury
duty will remain in force.

"By command of Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN.

"GEO. L. HARTNUFF, Asst. Adj't-General."


Pending the arrival of General Hancock, I turned over the command of
the district September 1 to General Charles Griffin; but he dying of
yellow fever, General J. A. Mower succeeded him, and retained command
till November 29, on which date General Hancock assumed control.
Immediately after Hancock took charge, he revoked my order of August
24 providing for a revision of the jury lists; and, in short,
President Johnson's policy now became supreme, till Hancock himself
was relieved in March, 1868.

My official connection with the reconstruction of Louisiana and Texas
practically closed with this order concerning the jury lists.  In my
judgment this had become a necessity, for the disaffected element,
sustained as it was by the open sympathy of the President, had grown
so determined in its opposition to the execution of the
Reconstruction acts that I resolved to remove from place and power
all obstacles; for the summer's experience had convinced me that in
no other way could the law be faithfully administered.

The President had long been dissatisfied with my course; indeed, he
had harbored personal enmity against me ever since he perceived that
he could not bend me to an acceptance of the false position in which
he had tried to place me by garbling my report of the riot of 1866.
When Mr. Johnson decided to remove me, General Grant protested in
these terms, but to no purpose:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"WASHINGTON, D. C., August 17, 1867

"SIR: I am in receipt of your order of this date directing the
assignment of General G. H. Thomas to the command of the Fifth
Military District, General Sheridan to the Department of the
Missouri, and General Hancock to the Department of the Cumberland;
also your note of this date (enclosing these instructions), saying:
'Before you issue instructions to carry into effect the enclosed
order, I would be pleased to hear any suggestions you may deem
necessary respecting the assignments to which the order refers.'

"I am pleased to avail myself of this invitation to urge--earnestly
urge--urge in the name of a patriotic people, who have sacrificed
hundreds of thousands of loyal lives and thousands of millions of
treasure to preserve the integrity and union of this country--that
this order be not insisted on.  It is unmistakably the expressed wish
of the country that General Sheridan should not be removed from his
present command.

"This is a republic where the will of the people is the law of the
land.  I beg that their voice may be heard.

"General Sheridan has performed his civil duties faithfully and
intelligently.  His removal will only be regarded as an effort to
defeat the laws of Congress.  It will be interpreted by the
unreconstructed element in the South--those who did all they could to
break up this Government by arms, and now wish to be the only element
consulted as to the method of restoring order--as a triumph.  It will
embolden them to renewed opposition to the will of the loyal masses,
believing that they have the Executive with them.

"The services of General Thomas in battling for the Union entitle him
to some consideration.  He has repeatedly entered his protest against
being assigned to either of the five military districts, and
especially to being assigned to relieve General Sheridan.

"There are military reasons, pecuniary reasons, and above all,
patriotic reasons, why this should not be insisted upon.

"I beg to refer to a letter marked 'private,' which I wrote to the
President when first consulted on the subject of the change in the
War Department.  It bears upon the subject of this removal, and I had
hoped would have prevented it.

"I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT,
"General U. S. A., Secretary of War ad interim.

"His Excellency A. JOHNSON,
"President of the United States."


I was ordered to command the Department of the Missouri (General
Hancock, as already noted, finally becoming my successor in the Fifth
Military District), and left New Orleans on the 5th of September.  I
was not loath to go.  The kind of duty I had been performing in
Louisiana and Texas was very trying under the most favorable
circumstances, but all the more so in my case, since I had to contend
against the obstructions which the President placed in the way from
persistent opposition to the acts of Congress as well as from
antipathy to me--which obstructions he interposed with all the
boldness and aggressiveness of his peculiar nature.

On more than one occasion while I was exercising this command,
impurity of motive was imputed to me, but it has never been
truthfully shown (nor can it ever be) that political or corrupt
influences of any kind controlled me in any instance.  I simply tried
to carry out, without fear or favor, the Reconstruction acts as they
came to me.  They were intended to disfranchise certain persons, and
to enfranchise certain others, and, till decided otherwise, were the
laws of the land; and it was my duty to execute them faithfully,
without regard, on the one hand, for those upon whom it was thought
they bore so heavily, nor, on the other, for this or that political
party, and certainly without deference to those persons sent to
Louisiana to influence my conduct of affairs.

Some of these missionaries were high officials, both military and
civil, and I recall among others a visit made me in 1866 by a
distinguished friend of the President, Mr. Thomas A. Hendricks.  The
purpose of his coming was to convey to me assurances of the very high
esteem in which I was held by the President, and to explain
personally Mr. Johnson's plan of reconstruction, its flawless
constitutionality, and so on.  But being on the ground, I had before
me the exhibition of its practical working, saw the oppression and
excesses growing out of it, and in the face of these experiences even
Mr. Hendricks's persuasive eloquence was powerless to convince me of
its beneficence.  Later General Lovell H. Rousseau came down on a
like mission, but was no more successful than Mr. Hendricks.

During the whole period that I commanded in Louisiana and Texas my
position was a most unenviable one.  The service was unusual, and the
nature of it scarcely to be understood by those not entirely familiar
with the conditions existing immediately after the war.  In
administering the affairs of those States, I never acted except by
authority, and always from conscientious motives.  I tried to guard
the rights of everybody in accordance with the law.  In this I was
supported by General Grant and opposed by President Johnson.  The
former had at heart, above every other consideration, the good of his
country, and always sustained me with approval and kind suggestions.
The course pursued by the President was exactly the opposite, and
seems to prove that in the whole matter of reconstruction he was
governed less by patriotic motives than by personal ambitions.  Add
to this his natural obstinacy of character and personal enmity toward
me, and no surprise should be occasioned when I say that I heartily
welcomed the order that lifted from me my unsought burden.




CHAPTER XII.

AT FORT LEAVENWORTH--THE TREATY OF MEDICINE LODGE--GOING TO FORT
DODGE--DISCONTENTED INDIANS--INDIAN OUTRAGES--A DELEGATION OF CHIEFS
--TERRIBLE INDIAN RAID--DEATH OF COMSTOCK--VAST HERDS OF BUFFALO
--PREPARING FOR A WINTER CAMPAIGN--MEETING "BUFFALO BILL"
--HE UNDERTAKES A DANGEROUS TASK--FORSYTH'S GALLANT FIGHT--RESCUED.

The headquarters of the military department to which I was assigned
when relieved from duty at New Orleans was at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, and on the 5th of September I started for that post.  In due
time I reached St. Louis, and stopped there a day to accept an
ovation tendered in approval of the course I had pursued in the Fifth
Military District--a public demonstration apparently of the most
sincere and hearty character.

From St. Louis to Leavenworth took but one night, and the next day I
technically complied with my orders far enough to permit General
Hancock to leave the department, so that he might go immediately to
New Orleans if he so desired, but on account of the yellow fever
epidemic then prevailing, he did not reach the city till late in
November.

My new command was one of the four military departments that composed
the geographical division then commanded by Lieutenant-General
Sherman.  This division had been formed in 1866, with a view to
controlling the Indians west of the Missouri River, they having
become very restless and troublesome because of the building of the
Pacific railroads through their hunting-grounds, and the
encroachments of pioneers, who began settling in middle and western
Kansas and eastern Colorado immediately after the war.

My department embraced the States of Missouri and Kansas, the Indian
Territory, and New Mexico.  Part of this section of country--western
Kansas particularly--had been frequently disturbed and harassed
during two or three years past, the savages every now and then
massacring an isolated family, boldly attacking the surveying and
construction parties of the Kansas-Pacific railroad, sweeping down on
emigrant trains, plundering and burning stage-stations and the like
along the Smoky Hill route to Denver and the Arkansas route to New
Mexico.

However, when I relieved Hancock, the department was comparatively
quiet.  Though some military operations had been conducted against
the hostile tribes in the early part of the previous summer, all
active work was now suspended in the attempt to conclude a permanent
peace with the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, and Comanches, in
compliance with the act of Congress creating what was known as the
Indian Peace Commission of 1867.

Under these circumstances there was little necessity for my remaining
at Leavenworth, and as I was much run down in health from the
Louisiana climate, in which I had been obliged to live continuously
for three summers (one of which brought epidemic cholera, and another
a scourge of yellow fever), I took a leave of absence for a few
months, leaving Colonel A. J. Smith, of the Seventh Cavalry,
temporarily in charge of my command.

On this account I did not actually go on duty in the department of
the Missouri till March, 1868.  On getting back I learned that the
negotiations of the Peace Commissioners held at Medicine Lodge, about
seventy miles south of Fort Larned had resulted in a treaty with the
Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, and Comanches, by which agreement it
was supposed all troubles had been settled.  The compact, as
concluded, contained numerous provisions, the most important to us
being one which practically relinquished the country between the
Arkansas and Platte rivers for white settlement; another permitted
the peaceable construction of the Pacific railroads through the same
region; and a third requiring the tribes signing the treaty to retire
to reservations allotted them in the Indian Territory.  Although the
chiefs and head-men were well-nigh unanimous in ratifying these
concessions, it was discovered in the spring of 1868 that many of the
young men were bitterly opposed to what had been done, and claimed
that most of the signatures had been obtained by misrepresentation
and through proffers of certain annuities, and promises of arms and
ammunition to be issued in the spring of 1868.  This grumbling was
very general in extent, and during the winter found outlet in
occasional marauding, so, fearing a renewal of the pillaging and
plundering at an early day, to prepare myself for the work evidently
ahead the first thing I did on assuming permanent command was to make
a trip to Fort Larned and Fort Dodge, near which places the bulk of
the Indians had congregated on Pawnee and Walnut creeks.  I wanted to
get near enough to the camps to find out for myself the actual state
of feeling among the savages, and also to familiarize myself with the
characteristics of the Plains Indians, for my previous experience had
been mainly with mountain tribes on the Pacific coast.  Fort Larned I
found too near the camps for my purpose, its proximity too readily
inviting unnecessary "talks," so I remained here but a day or two,
and then went on to Dodge, which, though considerably farther away
from the camps, was yet close enough to enable us to obtain easily
information of all that was going on.

It took but a few days at Dodge to discover that great discontent
existed about the Medicine Lodge concessions, to see that the young
men were chafing and turbulent, and that it would require much tact
and good management on the part of the Indian Bureau to persuade the
four tribes to go quietly to their reservations, under an agreement
which, when entered into, many of them protested had not been fully
understood.

A few hours after my arrival a delegation of prominent chiefs called
on me and proposed a council, where they might discuss their
grievances, and thus bring to the notice of the Government the
alleged wrongs done them; but this I refused, because Congress had
delegated to the Peace Commission the whole matter of treating with
them, and a council might lead only to additional complications.  My
refusal left them without hope of securing better terms, or of even
delaying matters longer; so henceforth they were more than ever
reckless and defiant.  Denunciations of the treaty became outspoken,
and as the young braves grew more and more insolent every day, it
amounted to conviction that, unless by some means the irritation was
allayed, hostilities would surely be upon us when the buffalo
returned to their summer feeding-grounds between the Arkansas and the
Platte.

The principal sufferers in this event would be the settlers in middle
and western Kansas, who, entirely ignorant of the dangers hanging
over them, were laboring to build up homes in a new country.  Hence
the maintenance of peace was much to be desired, if it could be
secured without too great concessions, and although I would not meet
the different tribes in a formal council, yet, to ward off from
settlers as much as possible the horrors of savage warfare, I showed,
by resorting to persuasive methods, my willingness to temporize a
good deal.  An abundant supply of rations is usually effective to
keep matters quiet in such cases, so I fed them pretty freely, and
also endeavored to control them through certain men who, I found,
because of former associations, had their confidence.  These men,
employed as scouts, or interpreters, were Mr. William Comstock, Mr.
Abner S. Grover, and Mr. Richard Parr.  They had lived on the Plains
for many years with different tribes of Indians, had trapped and
hunted with them, and knew all the principal chiefs and headmen.
Through such influences, I thought I saw good chances of preserving
peace, and of inducing the discontented to go quietly to their
reservations in the Indian Territory as soon as General Hazen, the
representative of the Peace Commissioners, was ready to conduct them
there from Fort Larned.

Before returning to Leavenworth I put my mediators (as I may call
them) under charge of an officer of the army, Lieutenant F. W.
Beecher, a very intelligent man, and directed him to send them out to
visit among the different tribes, in order to explain what was
intended by the treaty of Medicine Lodge, and to make every effort
possible to avert hostilities.  Under these instructions Comstock and
Grover made it their business to go about among the Cheyennes--the
most warlike tribe of all--then camping about the headwaters of
Pawnee and Walnut creeks, and also to the north and west of Fort
Wallace, while Parr spent his time principally with the Kiowas and
Comanches.

From the different posts--Wallace, Dodge, and Larned Lieutenant
Beecher kept up communication with all three scouts, and through him
I heard from them at least once a week.  Every now and then some
trouble along the railroad or stage routes would be satisfactorily
adjusted and quiet restored, and matters seemed to be going on very
well, the warm weather bringing the grass and buffalo in plenty, and
still no outbreak, nor any act of downright hostility.  So I began to
hope that we should succeed in averting trouble till the favorite war
season of the Indians was over, but the early days of August rudely
ended our fancied tranquility.

In July the encampments about Fort Dodge began to break up, each band
or tribe moving off to some new location north of the Arkansas,
instead of toward its proper reservation to the south of that river.
Then I learned presently that a party of Cheyennes had made a raid on
the Kaws--a band of friendly Indians living near Council Grove--and
stolen their horses, and also robbed the houses of several white
people near Council Grove.  This raid was the beginning of the Indian
war of 1868.  Immediately following it, the Comanches and Kiowas came
to Fort Larned to receive their annuities, expecting to get also the
arms and ammunition promised them at Medicine Lodge, but the raid to
Council Grove having been reported to the Indian Department, the
issue of arms was suspended till reparation was made.  This action of
the Department greatly incensed the savages, and the agent's offer of
the annuities without guns and pistols was insolently refused, the
Indians sulking back to their camps, the young men giving themselves
up to war-dances, and to powwows with "medicine-men," till all hope
of control was gone.

Brevet Brigadier-General Alfred Sully, an officer of long experience
in Indian matters, who at this time was in command of the District of
the Arkansas, which embraced Forts Larned and Dodge, having notified
me of these occurrences at Larned, and expressed the opinion that the
Indians were bent on mischief, I directed him there immediately to
act against them.  After he reached Larned, the chances for peace
appeared more favorable.  The Indians came to see him, and protested
that it was only a few bad young men who had been depredating, and
that all would be well and the young men held in check if the agent
would but issue the arms and ammunition.  Believing their promises,
Sully thought that the delivery of the arms would solve all the
difficulties, so on his advice the agent turned them over along with
the annuities, the Indians this time condescendingly accepting.

This issue of arms and ammunition was a fatal mistake; Indian
diplomacy had overreached Sully's experience, and even while the
delivery was in progress a party of warriors had already begun a raid
of murder and rapine, which for acts of devilish cruelty perhaps has
no parallel in savage warfare.  The party consisted of about two
hundred Cheyennes and a few Arapahoes, with twenty Sioux who had been
visiting their friends, the Cheyennes.  As near as could be
ascertained, they organized and left their camps along Pawnee Creek
about the 3d of August.  Traveling northeast, they skirted around
Fort Harker, and made their first appearance among the settlers in
the Saline Valley, about thirty miles north of that post.  Professing
friendship and asking food at the farm-houses, they saw the
unsuspecting occupants comply by giving all they could spare from
their scanty stores.  Knowing the Indian's inordinate fondness for
coffee, particularly when well sweetened, they even served him this
luxury freely.  With this the demons began their devilish work.
Pretending to be indignant because it was served them in tin cups,
they threw the hot contents into the women's faces, and then, first
making prisoners of the men, they, one after another, ravished the
women till the victims became insensible.  For some inexplicable
reason the two farmers were neither killed nor carried off, so after
the red fiends had gone, the unfortunate women were brought in to
Fort Harker, their arrival being the first intimation to the military
that hostilities had actually begun.

Leaving the Saline, this war-party crossed over to the valley of the
Solomon, a more thickly settled region, and where the people were in
better circumstances, their farms having been started two or three
years before.  Unaware of the hostile character of the raiders, the
people here received them in the friendliest way, providing food, and
even giving them ammunition, little dreaming of what was impending.
These kindnesses were requited with murder and pillage, and worse,
for all the women who fell into their hands were subjected to horrors
indescribable by words.  Here also the first murders were committed,
thirteen men and two women being killed.  Then, after burning five
houses and stealing all the horses they could find, they turned back
toward the Saline, carrying away as prisoners two little girls named
Bell, who have never been heard of since.

It was probably the intention to finish, as they marched back to the
south, the devilish work begun on the Saline, but before they reached
that valley on the return, the victims left there originally had fled
to Fort Harker, as already explained, and Captain Benteen was now
nearing the little settlement with a troop of cavalry, which he had
hurriedly marched from Fort Zarah.  The savages were attacking the
house of a Mr. Schermerhorn, where a few of the settlers had
collected for defense, when Benteen approached.  Hearing the firing,
the troopers rode toward the sound at a gallop, but when they
appeared in view, coming over the hills, the Indians fled in all
directions, escaping punishment through their usual tactics of
scattering over the Plains, so as to leave no distinctive trail.

When this frightful raid was taking place, Lieutenant Beecher, with
his three scouts--Comstock, Grover, and Parr--was on Walnut Creek.
Indefinite rumors about troubles on the Saline and Solomon reaching
him, he immediately sent Comstock and Grover over to the headwaters
of the Solomon, to the camp of a band of Cheyennes, whose chief was
called "Turkey Leg," to see if any of the raiders belonged there; to
learn the facts, and make explanations, if it was found that the
white people had been at fault.  For years this chief had been a
special friend of Comstock and Grover.  They had trapped, hunted, and
lived with his band, and from this intimacy they felt confident of
being able to get "Turkey Leg" to quiet his people, if any of them
were engaged in the raid; and, at all events, they expected, through
him and his band, to influence the rest of the Cheyennes.  From the
moment they arrived in the Indian village, however, the two scouts
met with a very cold reception.  Neither friendly pipe nor food was
offered them, and before they could recover from their chilling
reception, they were peremptorily ordered out of the village, with
the intimation that when the Cheyennes were on the war-path the
presence of whites was intolerable.  The scouts were prompt to leave,
of course, and for a few miles were accompanied by an escort of seven
young men, who said they were sent with them to protect the two from
harm.  As the party rode along over the prairie, such a depth
of attachment was professed for Comstock and Grover that,
notwithstanding all the experience of their past lives, they were
thoroughly deceived, and in the midst of a friendly conversation some
of the young warriors fell suddenly to the rear and treacherously
fired on them.

At the volley Comstock fell from his horse instantly killed.  Grover,
badly wounded in the shoulder, also fell to the ground near Comstock
Seeing his comrade was dead, Grover made use of his friend's body to
protect himself, lying close behind it.  Then took place a remarkable
contest, Grover, alone and severely wounded, obstinately fighting the
seven Indians, and holding them at bay for the rest of the day.
Being an expert shot, and having a long-range repeating rifle, he
"stood off" the savages till dark.  Then cautiously crawling away on
his belly to a deep ravine, he lay close, suffering terribly from his
wound, till the following night, when, setting out for Fort Wallace,
he arrived there the succeeding day, almost crazed from pain and
exhaustion.

Simultaneously with the fiendish atrocities committed on the Saline
and Solomon rivers and the attack on Comstock and Grover, the
pillaging and murdering began on the Smoky Hill stage-route, along
the upper Arkansas River and on the headwaters of the Cimarron.  That
along the Smoky Hill and north of it was the exclusive work of, the
Cheyennes, a part of the Arapahoes, and the few Sioux allies
heretofore mentioned, while the raiding on the Arkansas and Cimarron
was done principally by the Kiowas under their chief, Satanta, aided
by some of the Comanches.  The young men of these tribes set out on
their bloody work just after the annuities and guns were issued at
Larned, and as soon as they were well on the road the rest of the
Comanches and Kiowas escaped from the post and fled south of the
Arkansas.  They were at once pursued by General Sully with a small
force, but by the time he reached the Cimarron the war-party had
finished its raid on the upper Arkansas, and so many Indians combined
against Sully that he was compelled to withdraw to Fort Dodge, which
he reached not without considerable difficulty, and after three
severe fights.

These, and many minor raids which followed, made it plain that a
general outbreak was upon us.  The only remedy, therefore, was to
subjugate the savages immediately engaged in the forays by forcing
the several tribes to settle down on the reservations set apart by
the treaty of Medicine Lodge.  The principal mischief-makers were the
Cheyennes.  Next in deviltry were the Kiowas, and then the Arapahoes
and Comanches.  Some few of these last two tribes continued friendly,
or at least took no active part in the raiding, but nearly all the
young men of both were the constant allies of the Cheyennes and
Kiowas.  All four tribes together could put on the war-path a
formidable force of about 6,000 warriors.  The subjugation of this
number of savages would be no easy task, so to give the matter my
undivided attention I transferred my headquarters from Leavenworth to
Fort Hays, a military post near which the prosperous town of Hays
City now stands.

Fort Hays was just beyond the line of the most advanced settlements,
and was then the terminus of the Kansas-Pacific railroad.  For this
reason it could be made a depot of supplies, and was a good point
from which to supervise matters in the section of country to be
operated in, which district is a part of the Great American Plains,
extending south from the Platte River in Nebraska to the Red River in
the Indian Territory, and westward from the line of frontier
settlements to the foothills of the Rocky Mountains, a vast region
embracing an area of about 150,000 square miles.  With the exception
of a half-dozen military posts and a few stations on the two overland
emigrant routes--the Smoky Hill to Denver, and the Arkansas to New
Mexico--this country was an unsettled waste known only to the Indians
and a few trappers.  There were neither roads nor well-marked trails,
and the only timber to be found--which generally grew only along the
streams--was so scraggy and worthless as hardly to deserve the name.
Nor was water by any means plentiful, even though the section is
traversed by important streams, the Republican, the Smoky Hill, the
Arkansas, the Cimarron, and the Canadian all flowing eastwardly, as
do also their tributaries in the main.  These feeders are sometimes
long and crooked, but as a general thing the volume of water is
insignificant except after rain-falls.  Then, because of unimpeded
drainage, the little streams fill up rapidly with torrents of water,
which quickly flows off or sinks into the sand, leaving only an
occasional pool without visible inlet or outlet.

At the period of which I write, in 1868, the Plains were covered with
vast herds of buffalo--the number has been estimated at 3,000,000
head--and with such means of subsistence as this everywhere at hand,
the 6,000 hostiles were wholly unhampered by any problem of
food-supply.  The savages were rich too according to Indian standards,
many a lodge owning from twenty to a hundred ponies; and
consciousness of wealth and power, aided by former temporizing, had
made them not only confident but defiant.  Realizing that their
thorough subjugation would be a difficult task, I made up my mind to
confine operations during the grazing and hunting season to
protecting the people of the new settlements and on the overland
routes, and then, when winter came, to fall upon the savages
relentlessly, for in that season their ponies would be thin, and weak
from lack of food, and in the cold and snow, without strong ponies to
transport their villages and plunder, their movements would be so
much impeded that the troops could overtake them.

At the outbreak of hostilities I had in all, east of New Mexico, a
force of regulars numbering about 2,600 men--1,200 mounted and 1,400
foot troops.  The cavalry was composed of the Seventh and Tenth
regiments; the infantry, of the Third and Fifth regiments and four
companies of the Thirty-Eighth.  With these few troops all the posts
along the Smoky Hill and Arkansas had to be garrisoned, emigrant
trains escorted, and the settlements and routes of travel and the
construction parties on the Kansas-Pacific railway protected.  Then,
too, this same force had to furnish for the field small movable
columns, that were always on the go, so it will be rightly inferred
that every available man was kept busy from the middle of August till
November; especially as during this period the hostiles attacked over
forty widely dispersed places, in nearly all cases stealing horses,
burning houses, and killing settlers.  It was of course impossible to
foresee where these descents would be made, but as soon as an attack
was heard of assistance was always promptly rendered, and every now
and then we succeeded in killing a few savages.  As a general thing,
though, the raiders escaped before relief arrived, and when they had
a few miles the start, all efforts to catch them were futile.  I
therefore discouraged long pursuits, and, in fact, did not approve of
making any at all unless the chances of obtaining paying results were
very evident, otherwise the troops would be worn out by the time the
hard work of the winter was demanded from them.

To get ready for a winter campaign of six months gave us much to do.
The thing most needed was more men, so I asked for additional
cavalry, and all that could be spareds--even troops of the Fifth
Cavalry--was sent tome.  Believing this reinforcement insufficient,
to supplement it I applied for a regiment of Kansas volunteers, which
request being granted, the organization of the regiment was
immediately begun at Topeka.  It was necessary also to provide a
large amount of transportation and accumulate quantities of stores,
since the campaign probably would not end till spring.  Another
important matter was to secure competent guides for the different
columns of troops, for, as I have said, the section of country to be
operated in was comparatively unknown.

In those days the railroad town of Hays City was filled with so
called "Indian scouts," whose common boast was of having slain scores
of redskins, but the real scout--that is, a 'guide and trailer
knowing the habits of the Indians--was very scarce, and it was hard
to find anybody familiar with the country south of the Arkansas,
where the campaign was to be made.  Still, about Hays City and the
various military posts there was some good material to select from,
and we managed to employ several men, who, from their experience on
the Plains in various capacities, or from natural instinct and
aptitude, soon became excellent guides and courageous and valuable
scouts, some of them, indeed, gaining much distinction.  Mr. William
F. Cody ("Buffalo Bill"), whose renown has since become world-wide,
was one of the men thus selected.  He received his sobriquet from his
marked success in killing buffaloes for a contractor, to supply fresh
meat to the construction parties, on the Kansas-Pacific railway.  He
had given up this business, however, and was now in the employ of the
quartermaster's department of the army, and was first brought to my
notice by distinguishing himself in bringing me an important despatch
from Fort Larned to Fort Hays, a distance of sixty-five miles,
through a section infested with Indians.  The despatch informed me
that the Indians near Larned were preparing to decamp, and this
intelligence required that certain orders should be carried to Fort
Dodge, ninety-five miles south of Hays.  This too being a
particularly dangerous route--several couriers having been killed on
it--it was impossible to get one of the various "Petes," "Jacks," or
"Jims" hanging around Hays City to take my communication.  Cody
learning of the strait I was in, manfully came to the rescue, and
proposed to make the trip to Dodge, though he had just finished his
long and perilous ride from Larned.  I gratefully accepted his offer,
and after four or five hours' rest he mounted a fresh horse and
hastened on his journey, halting but once to rest on the way, and
then only for an hour, the stop being made at Coon Creek, where he
got another mount from a troop of cavalry.  At Dodge he took six
hours' sleep, and then continued on to his own post--Fort Larned
--with more despatches.  After resting twelve hours at Larned, he was
again in the saddle with tidings for me at Fort Hays, General Hazen
sending him, this time, with word that the villages had fled to the
south of the Arkansas.  Thus, in all, Cody rode about 350 miles in less
than sixty hours, and such an exhibition of endurance and courage was
more than enough to convince me that his services would be extremely
valuable in the campaign, so I retained him at Fort Hays till the
battalion of the Fifth Cavalry arrived, and then made him chief of
scouts for that regiment.

The information brought me by Cody on his second trip from Larned
indicated where the villages would be found in the winter, and I
decided to move on them about the 1st of November.  Only the women
and children and the decrepit old men were with the villages, however
enough, presumably, to look after the plunder most of the warriors
remaining north of the Arkansas to continue their marauding.  Many
severe fights occurred between our troops and these marauders, and in
these affairs, before November 1 over a hundred Indians were killed,
yet from the ease with which the escaping savages would disappear
only to fall upon remote settlements with pillage and murder, the
results were by no means satisfactory.  One of the most noteworthy of
these preliminary affairs was the gallant fight made on the
Republican River the 17th of September by my Aide, Colonel George A.
Forsyth, and party, against about seven hundred Cheyennes and Sioux.
Forsyth, with Lieutenant Beecher, and Doctor J. H. Mooers as surgeon,
was in charge of a company of citizen scouts, mostly expert
rifle-shots, but embracing also a few Indian fighters, among these
Grover and Parr.  The company was organized the latter part of August
for immediate work in defense of the settlements, and also for future
use in the Indian Territory when the campaign should open there.  About
the time the company had reached its complement--it was limited to
forty-seven men and three officers--a small band of hostiles began
depredations near Sheridan City, one of the towns that grew up
over-night on the Kansas-Pacific railway.  Forsyth pursued this party,
but failing to overtake it, made his way into Fort Wallace for rations,
intending to return from there to Fort Hays.  Before he started back,
however, another band of Indians appeared near the post and stole some
horses from the stage company.  This unexpected raid made Forsyth hot
to go for the marauders, and he telegraphed me for permission, which I
as promptly gave him.  He left the post on the 10th of September, the
command consisting of himself, Lieutenant Beecher, Acting Assistant
Surgeon Mooers, and the full strength, forty-seven men, with a few pack
mules carrying about ten days' rations.

He headed north toward the Republican River.  For the first two days
the trail was indistinct and hard to follow.  During the next three
it continued to grow much larger, indicating plainly that the number
of Indians ahead was rapidly increasing.  Of course this sign meant a
fight as soon as a large enough force was mustered, but as this was
what Forsyth was after, he pushed ahead with confidence and alacrity.
The night of the 16th of September he encamped on the Arickaree
branch of the Republican, not far from the forks of the river, with
the expectation of resuming the march as usual next day, for the
indications were that the main body of the savages must be still a
long way off, though in the preceding twenty-four hours an occasional
Indian had been seen.

But the enemy was much nearer than was thought, for at daybreak on
the morning of the 17th he made known his immediate presence by a
sudden dash at Forsyth's horses, a few of which were stampeded and
captured before the scouts could reach them.  This dash was made by a
small party only to get the horses, so those engaged in it were soon
driven off, but a few minutes later hundreds of savages--it was
afterward learned that seven hundred warriors took part in the fight
--hitherto invisible, showed themselves on the hills overlooking the
camp and so menacingly as to convince Forsyth that his defense must
be one of desperation.  The only place at hand that gave any hope of
successful resistance was a small island in the Arickaree, the
channel on one side being about a foot deep while on the other it was
completely dry; so to this position a hurried retreat was made.  All
the men and the remaining animals reached the island in safety, but
on account of the heavy fire poured in from the neighboring hills the
packs containing the rations and medicines had to be abandoned.

On seeing Forsyth's hasty move, the Indians, thinking they had him,
prepared to overwhelm the scouts by swooping down on one side of the
island with about five hundred mounted warriors, while about two
hundred, covered by the tall grass in the river-bottom attacked the
other side, dismounted.  But the brave little band sadly disappointed
them.  When the charge came it was met with such a deadly fire that a
large number of the fiends were killed, some of them even after
gaining the bank of the island.  This check had the effect of making
the savages more wary, but they were still bold enough to make two
more assaults before mid-day.  Each of these ending like the first,
the Indians thereafter contented themselves with shooting
all the horses, which had been tied up to some scraggy little
cottonwood-trees, and then proceeded to lay siege to the party.

The first man struck was Forsyth himself.  He was hit three times in
all--twice in one leg, both serious wounds, and once on the head, a
slight abrasion of the scalp.  A moment later Beecher was killed and
Doctor Mooers mortally wounded: and in addition to these misfortunes
the scouts kept getting hit, till several were killed, and the whole
number of casualties had reached twenty-one in a company of
forty-seven.  Yet with all this, and despite the seeming hopelessness
of the situation, the survivors kept up their pluck undiminished, and
during a lull succeeding the third repulse dug into the loose soil till
the entire party was pretty well protected by rifle-pits.  Thus covered
they stood off the Indians for the next three days, although of course
their condition became deplorable from lack of food, while those who
were hurt suffered indescribable agony, since no means were at hand for
dressing their wounds.

By the third day the Indians, seeming to despair of destroying the
beleaguered party before succor might arrive, began to draw off, and
on the fourth wholly disappeared.  The men were by this time nearly
famished for food.  Even now there was nothing to be had except
horse-meat from the carcasses of the animals killed the first day,
and this, though decidedly unpalatable, not to say disgusting, had to
be put up with, and so on such unwholesome stuff they managed to live
for four days longer, at the end of which time they were rescued by a
column of troops under Colonel Bankhead, which had hastened from Fort
Wallace in response to calls for help, carried there by two brave
fellows--Stilwell and Truedell--who, volunteering to go for relief,
had slipped through the Indians, and struck out for that post in the
night after the first day's fight.




CHAPTER XIII,

FITTING OUT THE WINTER EXPEDITION--ACCOMPANYING THE MAIN FORCE--THE
OTHER COLUMNS--STRUCK BY A BLIZZARD--CUSTER'S FIGHT ON THE WASHITA
--DEFEAT AND DEATH OF BLACK KETTLE--MASSACRE OF ELLIOTT'S PARTY
--RELIEF OF COLONEL CRAWFORD.

The end of October saw completed the most of my arrangements for the
winter campaign, though the difficulties and hardships to be
encountered had led several experienced officers of the army, and
some frontiersmen like Mr. James Bridger, the famous scout and, guide
of earlier days, to discourage the project.  Bridger even went so far
as to come out from St. Louis to dissuade me, but I reasoned that as
the soldier was much better fed and clothed than the Indian, I had
one great advantage, and that, in short, a successful campaign could
be made if the operations of the different columns were energetically
conducted.  To see to this I decided to go in person with the main
column, which was to push down into the western part of the Indian
Territory, having for its initial objective the villages which, at
the beginning of hostilities, had fled toward the head-waters of the
Red River, and those also that had gone to the same remote region
after decamping from the neighborhood of Larned at the time that
General Hazen sent Buffalo Bill to me with the news.

The column which was expected to do the main work was to be composed
of the Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, commanded by Colonel
Crawford; eleven troops of the Seventh United States Cavalry, under
General Custer, and a battalion of five companies of infantry under
Brevet Major John H. Page.  To facilitate matters, General Sully, the
district commander, was ordered to rendezvous these troops and
establish a supply depot about a hundred miles south of Fort Dodge,
as from such a point operations could be more readily conducted.  He
selected for the depot a most suitable place at the confluence of
Beaver and Wolf creeks, and on his arrival there with Custer's and
Page's commands, named the place Camp Supply.

In conjunction with the main column, two others also were to
penetrate the Indian Territory.  One of these, which was to march
east from New Mexico by way of Fort Bascom was to be composed of six
troops of the Third Cavalry and two companies of infantry, the whole
under Colonel A. W. Evans.  The other, consisting of seven troops of
the Fifth Cavalry, and commanded by Brevet Brigadier-General Eugene
A. Carr, was to march southeast from Fort Lyon; the intention being
that Evans and Carr should destroy or drive in toward old Fort Cobb
any straggling bands that might be prowling through the country west
of my own line of march; Carr, as he advanced, to be joined by Brevet
Brigadier-General W. H. Penrose, with five troops of cavalry already
in the field southeast of Lyon.  The Fort Bascom column, after
establishing a depot of supplies at Monument Creek, was to work down
the main Canadian, and remain out as long as it could feed itself
from New Mexico; Carr, having united with Penrose on the North
Canadian, was to operate toward the Antelope Hills and headwaters of
the Red River; while I, with the main column was to move southward to
strike the Indians along the Washita, or still farther south on
branches of the Red River.

It was no small nor easy task to outfit all these troops by the time
cold weather set in, and provide for them during the winter, but by
the 1st of November I had enough supplies accumulated at Forts Dodge
and Lyon for my own and Carr's columns, and in addition directed
subsistence and forage for three months to be sent to Fort Gibson for
final delivery at Fort Arbuckle, as I expected to feed the command
from this place when we arrived in the neighborhood of old Fort Cobb,
but through some mismanagement few of these stores got further than
Gibson before winter came on.

November 1, all being ready, Colonel Grawford was furnished with
competent guides, and, after sending two troops to Fort Dodge to act
as my escort, with the rest of his regiment he started from Topeka
November 5, under orders to march straight for the rendezvous at the
junction of Beaver and Wolf creeks.  He was expected to reach his
destination about the 20th, and there unite with the Seventh Cavalry
and the battalion of infantry, which in the mean time were on the
march from Dodge.  A few days later Carr and Evans began their march
also, and everything being now in motion, I decided to go to Camp
Supply to give the campaign my personal attention, determined to
prove that operations could be successfully conducted in spite of
winter, and bent on showing the Indians that they were not secure
from punishment because of inclement weather--an ally on which they
had hitherto relied with much assurance.

We started from Fort Hays on the 15th of November, and the first
night out a blizzard struck us and carried away our tents; and as the
gale was so violent that they could not be put up again, the rain and
snow drenched us to the skin.  Shivering from wet and cold, I took
refuge under a wagon, and there spent such a miserable night that,
when at last morning came, the gloomy predictions of old man Bridger
and others rose up before me with greatly increased force.  As we
took the road the sleet and snow were still falling, but we labored
on to Dodge that day in spite of the fact that many of the mules
played out on the way.  We stayed only one night at Dodge, and then
on the 17th, escorted by a troop of cavalry and Forsyth's scouts, now
under the command of Lieutenant Lewis Pepoon, crossed the Arkansas
and camped the night of the 18th at Bluff Creek, where the two troops
of the Nineteenth Kansas, previously detailed as my escort, were
awaiting our coming.  As we were approaching this camp some
suspicious looking objects were seen moving off at a long distance to
the east of us, but as the scouts confidently pronounced them
buffalo, we were unaware of their true character till next morning,
when we became satisfied that what we had seen were Indians, for
immediately after crossing Beaver Creek we struck a trail, leading to
the northeast, of a war party that evidently came up from the
head-waters of the Washita River.

The evening of November 21st arrived at the Camp Supply depot, having
traveled all day in another snowstorm that did not end till
twenty-four hours later.  General Sully, with Custer's regiment and the
infantry battalion, had reached the place several days before, but the
Kansas regiment had not yet put in an appearance.  All hands were hard
at work trying to shelter the stores and troops, but from the trail
seen that morning, believing that an opportunity offered to strike an
effective blow, I directed Custer to call in his working parties and
prepare to move immediately, without waiting for Crawford's regiment,
unaccountably absent.  Custer was ready to start by the 23d, and he was
then instructed to march north to where the trail had been seen near
Beaver Creek and follow it on the back track, for, being convinced that
the war party had come from the Washita, I felt certain that this plan
would lead directly to the villages.

The difficulties attending a winter campaign were exhibited now with
their full force, as the march had to be conducted through a
snow-storm that hid surrounding objects, and so covered the country as
to alter the appearance of the prominent features, making the task of
the guides doubly troublesome; but in spite of these obstacles fifteen
miles had been traversed when Custer encamped for the night. The next
day the storm had ceased, and the weather was clear and cold.  The
heavy fall of snow had of course obliterated the trail in the bottoms,
and everywhere on the level; but, thanks to the wind, that had swept
comparatively bare the rough places and high ground, the general
direction could be traced without much trouble.  The day's march, which
was through a country abounding with buffalo, was unattended by any
special incident at first, but during the afternoon, after getting the
column across the Canadian River--an operation which, on account of the
wagons, consumed considerable time--Custer's scouts (friendly Osages)
brought back word that, some miles ahead, they had struck fresh signs,
a trail coming into the old one from the north, which, in their
opinion, indicated that the war party was returning to the villages.

On the receipt of this news, Custer, leaving a guard with the wagons,
hastily assembled the rest of his men' and pushing on rapidly,
overtook the scouts and a detailed party from his regiment which had
accompanied them, all halted on the new trail awaiting his arrival.
A personal examination satisfied Custer that the surmises of his
scouts were correct; and also that the fresh trail in the deep snow
could at night be followed with ease.  After a short halt for supper
and rest the pursuit was resumed, the Osage scouts in advance, and
although the hostile Indians were presumed to be yet some distance
off, every precaution was taken to prevent detection and to enable
our troops to strike them unawares.  The fresh trail, which it was
afterward ascertained had been made by raiders from Black Kettle's
village of Cheyennes, and by some Arapahoes, led into the valley of
the Washita, and growing fresher as the night wore on, finally
brought the Osages upon a campfire, still smoldering, which, it was
concluded, had been built by the Indian boys acting as herders of the
ponies during the previous day.  It was evident, then, that the
village could be but a few miles off; hence the pursuit was continued
with redoubled caution until, a few hours before dawn of the 27th, as
the leading scouts peered over a rise on the line of march, they
discovered a large body of animals in the valley below.

As soon as they reported this discovery, Custer determined to
acquaint himself with the situation by making a reconnoissance in
person, accompanied by his principal officers.  So, sending back word
to halt the cavalry, he directed the officers to ride forward with
him; then dismounting, the entire party crept cautiously to a high
point which overlooked the valley, and from where, by the bright moon
then shining, they saw just how the village was situated. Its
position was such as to admit of easy approach from all sides.  So,
to preclude an escape of the Indians, Custer decided to attack at
daybreak, and from four different directions.

The plan having been fully explained to the officers, the remaining
hours of the night were employed in making the necessary
dispositions.  Two of the detachments left promptly, since they had
to make a circuitous march of several miles to Teach the points
designated for their attack; the third started a little later; and
then the fourth and last, under Custer himself, also moved into
position.  As the first light grew visible in the east, each column
moved closer in to the village, and then, all dispositions having
been made according to the prearranged plan, from their appointed
places the entire force to the opening notes of "Garry Owen," played
by the regimental band as the signal for the attack--dashed at a
gallop into the village.  The sleeping and unsuspecting savages were
completely surprised by the onset; yet after the first confusion,
during which the impulse to escape principally actuated them, they
seized their weapons, and from behind logs and trees, or plunging
into the stream and using its steep bank as a breastwork, they poured
upon their assailants a heavy fire, and kept on fighting with every
exhibition of desperation.  In such a combat mounted men were
useless, so Custer directed his troopers to fight on, foot, and the
Indians were successively driven from one point of vantage to
another, until, finally, by 9 o'clock the entire camp was in his
possession and the victory complete.  Black Kettle and over one
hundred of his warriors were killed, and about fifty women and
children captured; but most of the noncombatants, as well as a few
warriors and boys, escaped in the confusion of the fight.  Making
their way down the river, these fugitives alarmed the rest of the
Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and also the Kiowas and Comanches, whose
villages were in close proximity--the nearest not more than two miles
off.

Then of course all the warriors of these tribes rallied to attack
Custer, who meantime was engaged burning Black Kettle's camp and
collecting his herds of ponies.  But these new foes were rather wary
and circumspect, though they already had partial revenge in an
unlooked for way by cutting off Major Elliott and fifteen men, who
had gone off in pursuit of a batch of young warriors when the fight
was going on at the village.  In fact, the Indians had killed
Elliott's whole party, though neither the fate of the poor fellows,
nor how they happened to be caught, was known till long afterward.
It was then ascertained that the detachment pursued a course due
south, nearly at right angles to the Washita River, and after
galloping a couple of miles over the hills, crossing a small branch
of the Washita on the way, they captured some of the fugitives.  In
bringing the prisoners back, Elliott was in turn attacked on the open
prairie by a large number of savages from farther down the Washita,
who by this time were swarming to the aid of Black Kettle's village.
The little band fought its way gallantly to within rifle-range of the
small creek referred to, but could get no farther, for the Indians
had taken up a position in the bed of the stream, and from under
cover of its banks Elliott and all his remaining men were quickly
killed.  No relief was sent them, for Custer, not having seen Elliott
set out, knew nothing of the direction taken, and, besides, was busy
burning the villages and securing the ponies, and deeply concerned,
too, with defending himself from the new dangers menacing him.
Elliott and his brave little party were thus left to meet their fate
alone.

While Custer was burning the lodges and plunder and securing the
ponies, the Indians from the villages down the Washita were gathering
constantly around him till by mid-day they had collected in
thousands, and then came a new problem as to what should be done.  If
he attacked the other villages, there was great danger of his being
overwhelmed, and should he start back to Camp Supply by daylight, he
would run the risk of losing his prisoners and the ponies, so,
thinking the matter over, he decided to shoot all the ponies, and
keep skirmishing with the savages till nightfall, and then, under
cover of the darkness, return to Camp Supply; a programme that was
carried out successfully, but Custer's course received some severe
criticism because no effort was made to discover what had become of
Elliott.

Custer had, in all, two officers and nineteen men killed, and two
officers and eleven men wounded.  The blow struck was a most
effective one, and, fortunately, fell on one of the most villainous of
the hostile bands that, without any provocation whatever, had
perpetrated the massacres on the Saline and Solomon, committing
atrocities too repulsive for recital, and whose hands were still red
from their bloody work on the recent raid.  Black Kettle, the chief,
was an old man, and did not himself go with the raiders to the Saline
and Solomon, and on this account his fate was regretted by some.  But
it was old age only that kept him back, for before the demons set out
from Walnut Creek he had freely encouraged them by "making medicine,"
and by other devilish incantations that are gone through with at war
and scalp dances.

When the horrible work was over he undertook to shield himself by
professions of friendship, but being put to the test by my offering
to feed and care for all of his band who would come in to Fort Dodge
and remain there peaceably, he defiantly refused.  The consequence of
this refusal was a merited punishment, only too long delayed.

I received the first news of Custer's fight on the Washita on the
morning of November 29.  It was brought to me by one of his white
scouts, "California Joe," a noted character, who had been
experiencing the ups and downs of pioneer life ever since crossing
the Plains in 1849.  Joe was an invaluable guide and Indian fighter
whenever the clause of the statute prohibiting liquors in the Indian
country happened to be in full force.  At the time in question the
restriction was by no means a dead letter, and Joe came through in
thirty-six hours, though obliged to keep in hiding during daylight of
the 28th.  The tidings brought were joyfully received by everybody at
Camp Supply, and they were particularly agreeable tome, for, besides
being greatly worried about the safety of the command in the extreme
cold and deep snows, I knew that the immediate effect a victory would
be to demoralize the rest of the hostiles, which of course would
greatly facilitate and expedite our ultimate success.  Toward evening
the day after Joe arrived the head of Custer's column made its
appearance on the distant hills, the friendly Osage scouts and the
Indian prisoners in advance.  As they drew near, the scouts began a
wild and picturesque performance in celebration of the victory,
yelling, firing their guns, throwing themselves on the necks and
sides of their horses to exhibit their skill in riding, and going
through all sorts of barbaric evolutions and gyrations, which were
continued till night, when the rejoicings were ended with the hideous
scalp dance.

The disappearance of Major Elliott and his party was the only damper
upon our pleasure, and the only drawback to the very successful
expedition.  There was no definite information as to the detachment,
--and Custer was able to report nothing more than that he had not
seen Elliott since just before the fight began.  His theory was,
however, that Elliott and his men had strayed off on account of
having no guide, and would ultimately come in all right to Camp
Supply or make their way back to Fort Dodge; a very unsatisfactory
view of the matter, but as no one knew the direction Elliott had
taken, it was useless to speculate on other suppositions, and
altogether too late to make any search for him.  I was now anxious to
follow up Custer's stroke by an immediate move to the south with the
entire column, but the Kansas regiment had not yet arrived.  At first
its nonappearance did not worry me much, for I attributed the delay
to the bad weather, and supposed Colonel Crawford had wisely laid up
during the worst storms.  Further, waiting, however, would give the
Indians a chance to recover from the recent dispiriting defeat, so I
sent out scouting parties to look Crawford up and hurry him along.
After a great deal of searching, a small detachment of the regiment
was found about fifty miles below us on the North Canadian, seeking
our camp.  This detachment was in a pretty bad plight, and when
brought in, the officer in charge reported that the regiment, by not
following the advice of the guide sent to conduct it to Camp Supply,
had lost its way.  Instead of relying on the guides, Crawford had
undertaken to strike through the canyons of the Cimarron by what
appeared to him a more direct route, and in the deep gorges, filled
as they were with snow, he had been floundering about for days
without being able to extricate his command.  Then, too, the men were
out of rations, though they had been able to obtain enough buffalo
meat to keep from starving.  As for the horses, since they could get
no grass, about seven hundred of them had already perished from
starvation and exposure.  Provisions and guides were immediately sent
out to the regiment, but before the relief could reach Crawford his
remaining horses were pretty much all gone, though the men were
brought in without loss of life.  Thus, the regiment being dismounted
by this misfortune at the threshold of the campaign, an important
factor of my cavalry was lost to me, though as foot-troops the Kansas
volunteers continued to render very valuable services till mustered
out the next spring.




CHAPTER XIV.

A WINTER EXPEDITION--HERDS OF BUFFALO--WOLVES--BLIZZARDS--A TERRIBLE
NIGHT--FINDING THE BODIES OF ELLIOTT'S PARTY--THE ABANDONED INDIAN
CAMPS--PUSHING DOWN THE WASHITA--THE CAPTURED CHIEFS--EVANS'S
SUCCESSFUL FIGHT--ESTABLISHING FORT SILL--"CALIFORNIA JOE"--DUPLICITY
OF THE CHEYENNES--ORDERED TO REPAIR TO WASHINGTON.

A few days were necessarily lost setting up and refitting the Kansas
regiment after its rude experience in the Cimarron canyons.  This
through with, the expedition, supplied with thirty days' rations,
moved out to the south on the 7th of December, under my personal
command.  We headed for the Witchita Mountains, toward which rough
region all the villages along the Washita River had fled after
Custer's fight with Black Kettle.  My line of march was by way of
Custer's battle-field, and thence down the Washita, and if the
Indians could not sooner be brought to terms, I intended to follow
them into the Witchita Mountains from near old Fort Cobb.  The snow
was still deep everywhere, and when we started the thermometer was
below zero, but the sky being clear and the day very bright, the
command was in excellent spirits.  The column was made up of ten
companies of the Kansas regiment, dismounted; eleven companies of the
Seventh Cavalry, Pepoon's scouts, and the Osage scouts.  In addition
to Pepoon's men and the Osages, there was also "California Joe," and
one or two other frontiersmen besides, to act as guides and
interpreters.  Of all these the principal one, the one who best knew
the country, was Ben Clark, a young man who had lived with the
Cheyennes during much of his boyhood, and who not only had a pretty
good knowledge of the country, but also spoke fluently the Cheyenne
and Arapahoe dialects, and was an adept in the sign language.

The first day we made only about ten miles, which carried us to the
south bank of Wolf Creek.  A considerable part of the day was devoted
to straightening out matters in the command, and allowing time for
equalizing the wagon loads, which as a general thing, on a first
day's march, are unfairly distributed.  And then there was an
abundance of fire-wood at Wolf Creek; indeed, here and on Hackberry
Creek--where I intended to make my next camp--was the only timber
north of the Canadian River; and to select the halting places near a
plentiful supply of wood was almost indispensable, for as the men
were provided with only shelter-tents, good fires were needed in
order to keep warm.

The second day, after marching for hours through vast herds of
buffalo, we made Hackberry Creek; but not, however, without several
stampedes in the wagon-train, the buffalo frightening the mules so
that it became necessary to throw out flankers to shoot the leading
bulls and thus turn off the herds.  In the wake of every drove
invariably followed a band of wolves.  This animal is a great coward
usually, but hunger had made these so ravenous that they would come
boldly up to the column, and as quick as a buffalo was killed, or
even disabled, they would fall upon the carcass and eagerly devour
it.  Antelope also were very numerous, and as they were quite tame
--being seldom chased--and naturally very inquisitive, it was not an
unfrequent thing to see one of the graceful little creatures run in
among the men and be made a prisoner.  Such abundance of game
relieved the monotony of the march to Hackberry Creek, but still,
both men and animals were considerably exhausted by their long tramp,
for we made over thirty miles that day.

We camped in excellent shape on the creek and it was well we did, for
a "Norther," or "blizzard," as storms on the Plains are now termed
struck us in the night.  During the continuance of these blizzards,
which is usually about three days, the cold wind sweeps over the
Plains with great force, and, in the latitude of the Indian
Territory, is weighted with great quantities of sleet and snow,
through which it is often impossible to travel; indeed, these
"Northers" have many times proved fatal to the unprotected
frontiersman.  With our numbers the chance of any one's being lost,
and perishing alone (one of the most common dangers in a blizzard),
was avoided; but under any circumstances such a storm could but
occasion intense suffering to all exposed to it, hence it would have
been well to remain in camp till the gale was over, but the time
could not be spared.  We therefore resumed the march at an early hour
next morning, with the expectation of making the south bank of the
main Canathan and there passing the night, as Clark assured me that
timber was plentiful on that side of the river.  The storm greatly
impeded us, however, many of the mules growing discouraged, and some
giving out entirely, so we could not get to Clark's "good camp," for
with ten hours of utmost effort only about half a day's distance
could be covered, when at last, finding the struggle useless, we were
forced to halt for the night in a bleak bottom on the north bank of
the river.  But no one could sleep, for the wind swept over us with
unobstructed fury, and the only fuel to be had was a few green
bushes.  As night fell a decided change of temperature added much to
our misery, the mercury, which had risen when the "Norther" began,
again falling to zero.  It can be easily imagined that under such
circumstances the condition of the men was one of extreme discomfort;
in truth, they had to tramp up and down the camp all night long to
keep from freezing.  Anything was a relief to this state of things,
so at the first streak of day we quit the dreadful place and took up
the march.

A seemingly good point for crossing the Canadian was found a couple
of miles down the stream, where we hoped to get our train over on the
ice, but an experiment proving that it was not strong enough, a ford
had to be made, which was done by marching some of the cavalry
through the river, which was about half a mile wide, to break up the
large floes when they had been cut loose with axes.  After much hard
work a passage-way was thus opened, and by noon the command was
crossed to the south bank, and after thawing out and drying our
clothes before big fires, we headed for a point on the Washita, where
Clark said there was plenty of wood, and good water too, to make us
comfortable till the blizzard had blown over.

We reached the valley of the Washita a little before dark, and camped
some five or six miles above the scene of Custer's fight, where I
concluded to remain at least a day, to rest the command and give it a
chance to refit.  In the mean time I visited the battle-field in
company with Custer and several other officers, to see if there was a
possibility of discovering any traces of Elliotts party.  On arriving
at the site of the village, and learning from Custer what
dispositions had been made in approaching for the attack, the
squadron of the escort was deployed and pushed across the river at
the point where Elliott had crossed.  Moving directly to the south,
we had not gone far before we struck his trail, and soon the whole
story was made plain by our finding, on an open level space about two
miles from the destroyed village, the dead and frozen bodies of the
entire party.  The poor fellows were all lying within a circle not
more than fifteen or twenty paces in diameter, and the little piles
of empty cartridge shells near each body showed plainly that every
man had made a brave fight.  None were scalped, but most of them were
otherwise horribly mutilated, which fiendish work is usually done by
the squaws.  All had been stripped of their clothing, but their
comrades in the escort were able to identify the bodies, which being
done, we gave them decent burial.  Their fate was one that has
overtaken many of our gallant army in their efforts to protect the
frontiersmen's homes and families from savages who give no quarter,
though they have often received it, and where the possibility of
defeat in action carries with it the certainty of death and often of
preceding torture.

From the meadow where Elliott was found we rode to the Washita, and
then down the river through the sites of the abandoned villages, that
had been strung along almost continuously for about twelve miles in
the timber skirting the stream.  On every hand appeared ample
evidence that the Indians had intended to spend the winter here, for
the ground was littered with jerked meat, bales of buffalo robes,
cooking utensils, and all sorts of plunder usually accumulated in a
permanent Indian camp.  There were, also, lying dead near the
villages hundreds of ponies, that had been shot to keep them from
falling into our hands, the scant grazing and extreme cold having
made them too weak to be driven along in the flight.  The wholesale
slaughter of these ponies was a most cheering indication that our
campaign would be ultimately successful, and we all prayed for at
least a couple of months more of cold weather and plenty of snow.

At the Kiowa village we found the body of a white woman--a Mrs.
Blynn--and also that of her child.  These captives had been taken by
the Kiowas near Fort Lyon the previous summer, and kept close
prisoners until the stampede began, the poor woman being reserved to
gratify the brutal lust of the chief, Satanta; then, however, Indian
vengeance demanded the murder of the poor creatures, and after
braining the little child against a tree, the mother was shot through
the forehead, the weapon, which no doubt brought her welcome release,
having been fired so close that the powder had horribly disfigured
her face.  The two bodies were wrapped in blankets and taken to camp,
and afterward carried along in our march, till finally they were
decently interred at Fort Arbuckle..

At an early hour on December 12 the command pulled out from its cosy
camp and pushed down the valley of the Washita, following immediately
on the Indian trail which led in the direction of Fort Cobb, but
before going far it was found that the many deep ravines and canyons
on this trail would delay our train very much, so we moved out of the
valley and took the level prairie on the divide.  Here the traveling
was good, and a rapid gait was kept up till mid-day, when, another
storm of sleet and snow coming on, it became extremely difficult for
the guides to make out the proper course; and fearing that we might
get lost or caught on the open plain without wood or water--as we had
been on the Canadian--I turned the command back to the valley,
resolved to try no more shortcuts involving the risk of a disaster to
the expedition.  But to get back was no slight task, for a dense fog
just now enveloped us, obscuring all landmarks.  However, we were
headed right when the fog set in, and we had the good luck to reach
the valley before night-fall, though there was a great deal of
floundering about, and also much disputing among the guides as to
where the river would be found Fortunately we struck the stream right
at a large grove of timber, and established ourselves, admirably.  By
dark the ground was covered with twelve or fifteen inches of fresh
snow, and as usual the temperature rose very sensibly while the storm
was on, but after night-fall the snow ceased and the skies cleared
up.  Daylight having brought zero weather again, our start on the
morning of the 17th was painful work, many of the men freezing their
fingers while handling the horse equipments, harness, and tents.
However, we got off in fairly good season, and kept to the trail
along the Washita notwithstanding the frequent digging and bridging
necessary to get the wagons over ravines.

Continuing on this line for three days, we at length came to a point
on the Washita where all signs indicated that we were nearing some of
the villages.  Wishing to strike them as soon as possible, we made a
very early start next morning, the 17th.  A march of four or five
miles brought us to a difficult ravine, and while we were making
preparations to get over, word was brought that several Indians had
appeared in our front bearing a white flag and making signs that they
had a communication to deliver.  We signaled back that they would be
received, when one of the party came forward alone and delivered a
letter, which proved to be from General Hazen, at Fort Cobb.  The
letter showed that Hazen was carrying on negotiations with the
Indians, and stated that all the tribes between Fort Cobb and my
column were friendly, but the intimation was given that the
Cheyennes and Arapahoes were still hostile, having moved off
southward toward the Red River.  It was added that Satanta and Lone
Wolf--the chiefs of the Kiowas--would give information of the
whereabouts of the hostiles; and such a communication coming direct
from the representative of the Indian Department, practically took
the Kiowas--the village at hand was of that tribe--under its
protection, and also the Comanches, who were nearer in to Cobb.  Of
course, under such circumstances I was compelled to give up the
intended attack, though I afterward regretted that I had paid any
heed to the message, because Satanta and Lone Wolf proved, by
trickery and double dealing, that they had deceived Hazen into
writing the letter.

When I informed the Klowas that I would respect Hazen's letter
provided they all came into Fort Cobb and gave themselves up, the two
chiefs promised submission, and, as an evidence of good faith,
proposed to accompany the column to Fort Cobb with a large body of
warriors, while their villages moved to the same point by easy
stages, along the opposite bank of the river--claiming this to be
necessary from the poor condition of the ponies.  I had some
misgivings as to the sincerity of Satanta and Lone Wolf, but as I
wanted to get the Kiowas where their surrender would be complete, so
that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes could then be pursued, I agreed to
the proposition, and the column moved on.  All went well that day,
but the next it was noticed that the warriors were diminishing, and
an investigation showed that a number of them had gone off on various
pretexts--the main one being to help along the women and children
with the villages.  With this I suspected that they were playing me
false, and my suspicions grew into certainty when Satanta himself
tried to make his escape by slipping beyond the flank of the column
and putting spurs to his pony.  Fortunately, several officers saw
him, and quickly giving chase, overhauled him within a few hundred
yards.  I then arrested both him and Lone Wolf and held them as
hostages--a measure that had the effect of bringing back many of the
warriors already beyond our reach.

When we arrived at Fort Cobb we found some of the Comanches already
there, and soon after the rest of them, excepting one band, came in
to the post.  The Kiowas, however, were not on hand, and there were
no signs to indicate their coming.  At the end of two days it was
plain enough that they were acting in bad faith, and would continue
to unless strong pressure was brought to bear.  Indeed, they had
already started for the Witchita Mountains, so I put on the screws at
once by issuing an order to hang Satanta and Lone Wolf, if their
people did not surrender at Fort Cobb within forty-eight hours.  The
two chiefs promised prompt compliance, but begged for more time,
seeking to explain the non-arrival of the women and children through
the weak condition of the ponies; but I was tired of their duplicity,
and insisted on my ultimatum.

The order for the execution brought quick fruit.  Runners were sent
out with messages, by the two prisoners, appealing to their people to
save the lives of their chiefs, and the result was that the whole
tribe came in to the post within the specified time.  The two
manacled wretches thus saved their necks; but it is to be regretted
that the execution did not come off; for some years afterward their
devilish propensities led them into Texas, where both engaged in the
most horrible butcheries.

The Kiowas were now in our hands, and all the Comanches too, except
one small band, which, after the Custer fight, had fled toward the
headwaters of the Red River.  This party was made up of a lot of very
bad Indians--outlaws from the main tribe--and we did not hope to
subdue them except by a fight, and of this they got their fill; for
Evans, moving from Monument Creek toward the western base of the
Witchita Mountains on Christmas Day, had the good fortune to strike
their village.  In the snow and cold his approach was wholly
unexpected, and he was thus enabled to deal the band a blow that
practically annihilated it.  Twenty-five warriors were killed
outright, most of the women and children captured, and all the
property was destroyed.  Only a few of the party escaped, and some of
these made their way in to Fort Cobb, to join the rest of their tribe
in confinement; while others, later in the season, surrendered at
Fort Bascom.

This sudden appearance of Evans in the Red River region also alarmed
the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and their thoughts now began to turn to
submission.  Food was growing scarce with them, too, as there was but
little game to be found either in the Witchita Mountains or on the
edge of the Staked Plains, and the march of Carr's column from
Antelope Hills precluded their returning to where the buffalo ranged.
Then, too, many of their ponies were dead or dying, most of their
tepees and robes had been abandoned, and the women and children,
having been kept constantly on the move in the winter's storms, were
complaining bitterly of their sufferings.

In view of this state of things they intimated, through their
Comanche-Apache friends at Fort Cobb, that they would like to make
terms.  On receiving their messages I entered into negotiations with
Little Robe, chief of the Cheyennes, and Yellow Bear, chief of the
Arapahoes, and despatched envoys to have both tribes understand
clearly that they must recognize their subjugation by surrendering at
once, and permanently settling on their reservations in the spring.
Of course the usual delays of Indian diplomacy ensued, and it was
some weeks before I heard the result.

Then one of my messengers returned with word that Little Robe and
Yellow Bear were on their way to see me.  They arrived a few days
later, and, promptly acceding to the terms, promised to bring their
people in, but as many of them would have to come on foot on account
of the condition of the ponies, more time was solicited.  Convinced
of the sincerity of their professions I gave them a reasonable
extension, and eventually Yellow Bear made good his word, but Little
Robe, in spite of earnest and repeated efforts, was unable to deliver
his people till further operations were begun against them.

While these negotiations were in progess I came to the conclusion
that a permanent military post ought to be established well down on
the Kiowa and Comanche reservation, in order to keep an eye on these
tribes in the future, Fort Cobb, being an unsuitable location,
because too far to the north to protect the Texas frontier, and too
far away from where it was intended to permanently place the Indians.
With this purpose in view I had the country thoroughly explored, and
afterward a place was fixed upon not far from the base of the
Witchita Mountains, and near the confluence of Medicine Bluff and
Cash creeks, where building stone and timber could be obtained in
plenty, and to this point I decided to move.  The place was named
Camp Sill-now Fort Sill--in honor of my classmate, General Sill,
killed at Stone River; and to make sure of the surrendered Indians, I
required them all, Kiowas, Comanches, and Comanche-Apaches, to
accompany us to the new post, so they could be kept under military
control till they were settled.

During the march to the new camp the weather was not so cold as that
experienced in coming down from Camp Supply; still, rains were
frequent, and each was invariably followed by a depression of
temperature and high winds, very destructive to our animals, much
weakened by lack of food.  The men fared pretty well, however, for on
the rough march along the Washita, and during our stay at Fort Cobb,
they had learned to protect themselves materially from the cold.  For
this they had contrived many devices, the favorite means being
dugouts--that is, pits dug in the ground, and roofed over, with
shelter-tents, and having at one end a fire-place and chimney
ingeniously constructed with sod.  In these they lived very snugly
--four men in each--and would often amuse themselves by poking their
heads out and barking at the occupants of adjacent huts in imitation
of the prairie-dog, whose comfortable nests had probably suggested
the idea of dugouts.  The men were much better off, in fact, than
many of the officers, for the high winds frequently made havoc with
our wall-tents.  The horses and mules suffered most of all.  They
could not be sheltered, and having neither grain nor grass, the poor
beasts were in no condition to stand the chilling blasts.  Still, by
cutting down cottonwood-trees, and letting the animals browse on the
small soft branches, we managed to keep them up till, finally even
this wretched food beginning to grow scarce, I had all except a few
of the strongest sent to Fort Arbuckle, near which place we had been
able, fortunately, to purchase some fields of corn from the
half-civilized Chickasaws and Choctaws.

Through mismanagement, as previously noted, the greater part of the
supplies which I had ordered hauled to Arbuckle the preceding fall
had not got farther on the way than Fort Gibson, which post was about
four hundred miles off, and the road abominable, particularly east of
Arbuckle, where it ran through a low region called "boggy bottom."
All along this route were abandoned wagons, left sticking in the mud,
and hence the transportation was growing so short that I began to
fear trouble in getting subsistence up for the men.  Still, it would
not do to withdraw, so I made a trip to Arbuckle chiefly for the
purpose of reorganizing the transportation, but also with a view to
opening a new route to that post, the road to lie on high ground, so
as to avoid the creeks and mud that had been giving us so much
trouble.  If such a road could be made, I hoped to get up enough
rations and grain from the cornfields purchased to send out a
formidable expedition against the Cheyennes, so I set out for
Arbuckle accompanied by my quartermaster, Colonel A. J. McGonigle.
"California Joe" also went along to guide us through the scrub-oaks
covering the ridge, but even the most thorough exploration failed to
discover any route more practicable than that already in use; indeed,
the high ground was, if anything, worse than the bottom land, our
horses in the springy places and quicksands often miring to their
knees.  The ground was so soft and wet, in fact, that we had to make
most of the way on foot, so by the time we reached Arbuckle I was
glad to abandon the new road project.

Finding near Arbuckle more fields of corn than those already
purchased, I had them bought also, and ordered more of the horses
back there to be fed.  I next directed every available mule to be put
to hauling rations, having discovered that the full capacity of the
transportation had not yet been brought into play in forwarding
stores from Gibson, and with this regulation of the supply question I
was ready to return immediately to Camp Sill.  But my departure was
delayed by California Joe, who, notwithstanding the prohibitory laws
of the Territory, in some unaccountable way had got gloriously tipsy,
which caused a loss of time that disgusted me greatly; but as we
could not well do without Joe, I put off starting till the next day,
by which time it was thought he would sober up.  But I might just as
well have gone at first, for at the end of the twenty-four hours the
incorrigible old rascal was still dead drunk.  How he had managed to
get the grog to keep up his spree was a mystery which we could not
solve, though we had had him closely watched, so I cut the matter
short by packing him into my ambulance and carrying him off to Camp
Sill.

By the time I got back to Sill, the Arapahoes were all in at the
post, or near at hand.  The promised surrender of the Cheyennes was
still uncertain of fulfillment, however, and although Little Robe and
his family had remained with us in evidence of good faith, the
messages he sent to his followers brought no assurance of the tribe's
coming in--the runners invariably returning with requests for more
time, and bringing the same old excuse of inability to move because
the ponies were so badly off.  But more time was just what I was
determined not to grant, for I felt sure that if a surrender was not
forced before the spring grass came, the ponies would regain their
strength, and then it would be doubtful if the Cheyennes came in at
all.

To put an end to these delays, Custer proposed to go out and see the
Cheyennes himself, taking with him for escort only such number of men
as could be fairly well mounted from the few horses not sent back to
Arbuckle.  At first I was inclined to disapprove Custer's
proposition, but he urged it so strongly that I finally consented,
though with some misgivings, for I feared that so small a party might
tempt the Cheyennes to forget their pacific professions and seek to
avenge the destruction of Black Kettle's band.  However, after
obtaining my approval, Custer, with characteristic energy, made his
preparations, and started with three or four officers and forty
picked men, taking along as negotiators Yellow Bear and Little Robe,
who were also to conduct him to the head-waters of the Red River,
where it was supposed the Cheyennes would be found.  His progress was
reported by couriers every few days, and by the time he got to the
Witchita foot-hills he had grown so sanguine that he sent California
Joe back to me with word that he was certain of success.  Such
hopeful anticipation relieved me greatly, of course, but just about
the time I expected to hear that his mission had been achieved I was
astonished by the party's return.  Inquiring as to the trouble, I
learned that out toward the Staked Plains every sign of the Cheyennes
had disappeared.  Surprised and disappointed at this, and discouraged
by the loneliness of his situation--for in the whole region not a
trace of animal life was visible, Custer gave up the search, and none
too soon, I am inclined to believe, to save his small party from
perishing.

This failure put a stop to all expeditions till the latter part of
February, by which time I had managed to lay in enough rations to
feed the command for about thirty days; and the horses back at
Arbuckle having picked up sufficiently for field service they were
ordered to Sill, and this time I decided to send Custer out with his
own and the Kansas regiment, with directions to insist on the
immediate surrender of the Cheyennes, or give them a sound thrashing.
He was ordered to get everything ready by March 1, and then move to
the mouth of Salt Creek, on the North Fork of the Red River, at which
place I proposed to establish a new depot for feeding the command.
Trains could reach this point from Camp Supply more readily than from
Arbuckle, and wishing to arrange this part of the programme in
person, I decided to return at once to Supply, and afterward rejoin
Custer at Salt Creek, on what, I felt sure, was to be the final
expedition of the campaign.  I made the three hundred and sixty miles
from Sill to Supply in seven days, but much to my surprise there
found a despatch from General Grant directing me to repair
immediately to Washington.  These orders precluded, of course, my
rejoining the command; but at the appointed time it set out on the
march, and within three weeks brought the campaign to a successful
close.

In this last expedition, for the first few days Custer's route was by
the same trail he had taken in January--that is to say, along the
southern base of the Witchita Mountains--but this time there was more
to encourage him than before, for, on getting a couple of marches
beyond old Camp Radziminski, on all sides were fresh evidences of
Indians, and every effort was bent to strike them.

From day to day the signs grew hotter, and toward the latter part of
March the game was found.  The Indians being in a very forlorn
condition, Custer might have destroyed most of the tribe, and
certainly all their villages, but in order to save two white women
whom, it was discovered, they held as captives, he contented himself
with the renewal of the Cheyennes' agreement to come in to Camp
Supply.  In due time the entire tribe fulfilled its promise except
one small band under "Tall Bull," but this party received a good
drubbing from General Carr on the Republican early in May.  After
this fight all the Indians of the southern Plains settled down on
their reservations, and I doubt whether the peace would ever again
have been broken had they not in after years been driven to
hostilities by most unjust treatment.

It was the 2d of March that I received at Camp Supply Grant's
despatch directing me to report immediately in Washington.  It had
been my intention, as I have said, to join Custer on the North Fork
of the Red River, but this new order required me to recast my plans,
so, after arranging to keep the expedition supplied till the end of
the campaign, I started for Washington, accompanied by three of my
staff--Colonels McGonigle and Crosby, and Surgeon Asch, and Mr. Deb.
Randolph Keim, a representative of the press, who went through the
whole campaign, and in 1870 published a graphic history of it.  The
day we left Supply we, had another dose of sleet and snow, but
nevertheless we made good time, and by night-fall reached Bluff
Creek.  In twenty-four hours more we made Fort Dodge, and on the 6th
of March arrived at Fort Hays.  Just south of the Smoky Hill River, a
little before we got to the post, a courier heading for Fort Dodge
passed us at a rapid gait.  Suspecting that he had despatches for me,
I directed my outrider to overtake him and find out.  The courier
soon turned back, and riding up to my ambulance handed me a telegram
notifying me that General Grant, on the day of his inauguration,
March 4, 1869, had appointed me Lieutenant-General of the Army.  When
I reported in Washington, the President desired me to return to New
Orleans and resume command of the Fifth Military District, but this
was not at all to my liking, so I begged off, and was assigned to
take charge of the Division of the Missouri, succeeding General
Sherman, who had just been ordered to assume command of the Army.




CHAPTER XV.

INSPECTING MILITARY POSTS IN UTAH AND MONTANA--DESIRE TO WITNESS THE
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR--ON A SAND-BAR IN THE MISSOURI--A BEAR HUNT--AN
INDIAN SCARE--MYRIADS OF MOSQUITOES--PERMISSION GIVEN TO VISIT
EUROPE--CALLING ON PRESIDENT GRANT--SAILING FOR LIVERPOOL--ARRIVAL IN
BERLIN.

After I had for a year been commanding the Division of the Missouri,
which embraced the entire Rocky Mountain region, I found it necessary
to make an inspection of the military posts in northern Utah and
Montana, in order by personal observation to inform myself of their
location and needs, and at the same time become acquainted with the
salient geographical and topographical features of that section of my
division.  Therefore in May, 1870, I started west by the
Union-Pacific railroad, and on arriving at Corinne' Station, the next
beyond Ogden, took passage by stage-coach for Helena, the capital of
Montana Territory.  Helena is nearly five hundred miles north of
Corinne, and under ordinary conditions the journey was, in those
days, a most tiresome one.  As the stage kept jogging on day and
night, there was little chance for sleep, and there being with me a
sufficient number of staff-officers to justify the proceeding, we
chartered the "outfit," stipulating that we were to stop over one
night on the road to get some rest.  This rendered the journey more
tolerable, and we arrived at Helena without extraordinary fatigue.

Before I left Chicago the newspapers were filled with rumors of
impending war between Germany and France.  I was anxious to observe
the conflict, if it was to occur, but reports made one day concerning
the beginning of hostilities would be contradicted the next, and it
was not till I reached Helena that the despatches lost their doubtful
character, and later became of so positive a nature as to make it
certain that the two nations would fight.  I therefore decided to cut
short my tour of inspection, so that I could go abroad to witness the
war, if the President would approve.  This resolution limited my stay
in Helena to a couple of days, which were devoted to arranging for an
exploration of what are now known as the Upper and the Lower Geyser
Basins of the Yellowstone Park.  While journeying between Corinne and
Helena I had gained some vague knowledge of these geysers from an old
mountaineer named Atkinson, but his information was very indefinite,
mostly second-hand; and there was such general uncertainty as to the
character of this wonderland that I authorized an escort of soldiers
to go that season from Fort Ellis with a small party, to make such
superficial explorations as to justify my sending an engineer officer
with a well-equipped expedition there next summer to scientifically
examine and report upon the strange country.  When the arrangements
for this preliminary expedition were completed I started for Fort
Benton, the head of navigation on the Missouri River, on the way
passing through Fort Shaw, on Sun River.  I expected to take at
Benton a steamboat to Fort Stevenson, a military post which had been
established about eighty miles south of Fort Buford, near a
settlement of friendly Mandan and Arickaree Indians, to protect them
from the hostile Sioux.  From there I was to make my way overland,
first to Fort Totten near Devil's lake in Dakota, and thence by way
of Fort Abercrombie to Saint Cloud, Minnesota, the terminus of the
railroad.

Luckily I met with no delay in getting a boat at Benton, and though
the water was extremely low, we steamed down the channel of the
Missouri with but slight detention till we got within fifty miles of
Fort Buford.  Here we struck on a sandbar with such force of steam
and current as to land us almost out of the water from stem to
midships.  This bad luck was tantalizing, for to land on a bar when
your boat is under full headway down-stream in the Missouri River is
no trifling matter, especially if you want to make time, for the
rapid and turbid stream quickly depositing sand under the hull, makes
it commonly a task of several days to get your boat off again.  As
from our mishap the loss of much time was inevitable, I sent a
messenger to Fort Buford for a small escort, and for horses to take
my party in to the post.  Colonel Morrow, the commandant, came
himself to meet us, bringing a strong party of soldiers and some
friendly Indian scouts, because, he said, there were then in the
region around Buford so many treacherous band of Sioux as to make
things exceedingly unsafe.

Desiring to reach the post without spending more than one night on
the way, we abandoned our steamer that evening, and set off at an
early hour the next morning.  We made camp at the end of the day's
march within ten miles of Buford, and arrived at the post without
having had any incident of moment, unless we may dignify as one a
battle with three grizzly bears, discovered by our friendly Indians
the morning of our second day's journey.  While eating our breakfast
--a rather slim one, by the way--spread on a piece of canvas, the
Indians, whose bivouac was some distance off, began shouting
excitedly, "Bear! bear!" and started us all up in time to see, out on
the plain some hundreds of yards away, an enormous grizzly and two
almost full-grown cubs.  Chances like this for a bear hunt seldom
offered, so there was hurried mounting--the horses being already
saddled--and a quick advance made on the game from many directions,
Lieutenant Townsend, of the escort, and five or six of the Indians
going with me.  Alarmed by the commotion, bruin and her cubs turned
about, and with an awkward yet rapid gait headed for a deep ravine,
in which there was brushwood shelter.

My party rode directly across the prairie and struck the trail not
far behind the game.  Then for a mile or more the chase was kept up,
but with such poor shooting because of the "buck fever" which had
seized most of us, that we failed to bring down any of the grizzlies,
though the cubs grew so tired that the mother was often obliged to
halt for their defense, meanwhile urging them on before her.  When
the ravine was gained she hid the cubs away in the thick brushwood,
and then coming out where we could plainly see her, stood on the
defense just within the edge of the thicket, beyond the range of our
rifles though, unless we went down into the canyon, which we would
have to do on foot, since the precipitous wall precluded going on
horseback.  For an adventure like this I confess I had little
inclination, and on holding a council of war, I found that the
Indians had still less, but Lieutenant Townsend, who was a fine shot,
and had refrained from firing hitherto in the hope that I might bag
the game, relieved the embarrassing situation and saved the credit of
the party by going down alone to attack the enemy.  Meanwhile I
magnanimously held his horse, and the Sioux braves did a deal of
shouting, which they seemed to think of great assistance.

Townsend, having descended to the bottom of the ravine, approached
within range, when the old bear struck out, dashing into and out of
the bushes so rapidly, however, that he could not get fair aim at
her, but the startled cubs running into full view, he killed one at
the first shot and at the second wounded the other.  This terribly
enraged the mother, and she now came boldly out to fight, exposing
herself in the open ground so much as to permit a shot, that brought
her down too, with a broken shoulder.  Then the Indians and I,
growing very brave, scrambled down to--take part in the fight.  It
was left for me to despatch the wounded cub and mother, and having
recovered possession of my nerves, I did the work effectively, and we
carried off with us the skins of the three animals as trophies of the
hunt and evidence of our prowess.

As good luck would have it, when we reached Buford we found a
steamboat there unloading stores, and learned that it would be ready
to start down the river the next day.  Embarking on her, we got to
Stevenson in a few hours, and finding at the post camp equipage that
had been made ready for our use in crossing overland to Fort Totten,
we set out the following forenoon, taking with us a small escort of
infantry, transported in two light wagons, a couple of Mandans and
the post interpreter going along as mounted guides.

To reach water we had to march the first day to a small lake forty
miles off, and the oppressive heat, together with the long distance
traveled, used up one of the teams so much that, when about to start
out the second morning, we found the animals unable to go on with any
prospect of finishing the trip, so I ordered them to be rested
forty-eight hours longer, and then taken back to Stevenson.  This
diminished the escort by one-half, yet by keeping the Indians and
interpreter on the lookout, and seeing that our ambulance was kept
closed up on the wagon carrying the rest of the detachment, we could,
I thought, stand off any ordinary party of hostile Indians.

About noon I observed that the scouts in advance had left the trail
and begun to reconnoitre a low ridge to their right, the sequel of
which was that in a few minutes they returned to the wagons on a dead
run and reported Sioux just ahead.  Looking in the direction
indicated, I could dimly see five or six horsemen riding in a circle,
as Indians do when giving warning to their camp, but as our halt
disclosed that we were aware of their proximity, they darted back
again behind the crest of the ridge.  Anticipating from this move an
immediate attack, we hastily prepared for it by unhooking the mules
from the wagon and ambulance, so that we could use the vehicles as a
barricade.  This done, I told the interpreter to take the Mandan
scouts and go over toward the ridge and reconnoitre again.  As the
scouts neared the crest two of them dismounted, and, crawling slowly
on their bellies to the summit, took a hasty look and returned at
once to their horses, coming back with word that in the valley beyond
was a camp of at least a hundred Sioux lodges, and that the Indians
were hurriedly getting ready to attack us.  The news was anything but
cheering, for with a village of that size the warriors would number
two or three hundred, and could assail us from every side.

Still, nothing could be done, but stand and take what was to come,
for there was no chance of escape--it being supreme folly to
undertake in wagons a race with Indians to Fort Stevenson, sixty
miles away.  To make the best of the situation, we unloaded the
baggage, distributing and adjusting the trunks, rolls of bedding,
crackerboxes, and everything else that would stop a bullet, in such
manner as to form a square barricade, two sides of which were the
wagons, with the mules haltered to the wheels.  Every man then
supplied himself with all the ammunition he could carry, and the
Mandan scouts setting up the depressing wail of the Indian
death-song, we all awaited the attack with the courage of despair.

But no attack came; and time slipping by, and we still unmolested,
the interpreter and scouts were sent out to make another
reconnoissance.  Going through just such precautions as before in
approaching the ridge, their slow progress kept us in painful
suspense; but when they got to the crest the strain on our nerves was
relieved by seeing them first stand up boldly at full height, and
then descend beyond.  Quickly returning, they brought welcome word
that the whole thing was a mistake, and no Sioux were there at all.
What had been taken for a hundred Indian lodges turned out to be the
camp of a Government train on its way to Fort Stevenson, and the
officer in charge seeing the scouts before they discovered him, and
believing them to be Sioux, had sent out to bring his herds in.  It
would be hard to exaggerate the relief that this discovery gave us,
and we all breathed much easier.  The scare was a bad one, and I have
no hesitation in saying that, had we been mounted, it is more than
likely that, instead of showing fight, we would have taken up a
lively pace for Fort Stevenson.

After reciprocal explanations with the officer in charge of the
train, the march was resumed, and at the close of that day we camped
near a small lake about twenty miles from Fort Totten.  From Totten
we journeyed on to Fort Abercrombie.  The country between the two
posts is low and flat, and I verily believe was then the favorite
abiding-place of the mosquito, no matter where he most loves to dwell
now; for myriads of the pests rose up out of the tall rank grass
--more than I ever saw before or since--and viciously attacked both
men and animals.  We ourselves were somewhat protected by gloves and
head-nets, provided us before leaving Totten, but notwithstanding these
our sufferings were well-nigh intolerable; the annoyance that the poor
mules experienced must, therefore, have been extreme; indeed, they were
so terribly stung that the blood fairly trickled down their sides.
Unluckily, we had to camp for one night in this region; but we partly
evaded the ravenous things by banking up our tent walls with earth, and
then, before turning in, sweeping and smoking out such as had got
inside.  Yet with all this there seemed hundreds left to sing and sting
throughout the night.  The mules being without protection, we tried
hard to save them from the vicious insects by creating a dense smoke
from a circle of smothered fires, within which chain the grateful
brutes gladly stood; but this relief was only partial, so the moment
there was light enough to enable us to hook up we pulled out for
Abercrombie in hot haste.

From Abercrombie we drove on to Saint Cloud, the terminus of the
railroad, where, considerably the worse for our hurried trip and
truly wretched experience with the mosquitoes, we boarded the welcome
cars.  Two days later we arrived in Chicago, and having meanwhile
received word from General Sherman that there would be no objection
to my going to Europe, I began making arrangements to leave, securing
passage by the steamship Scotia.

President Grant invited me to come to see him at Long Branch before I
should sail, and during my brief visit there he asked which army I
wished to accompany, the German or the French.  I told him the
German, for the reason that I thought more could be seen with the
successful side, and that the indications pointed to the defeat of
the French.  My choice evidently pleased him greatly, as he had the
utmost contempt for Louis Napoleon, and had always denounced him as a
usurper and a charlatan.  Before we separated, the President gave me
the following letter to the representatives of our Government abroad,
and with it I not only had no trouble in obtaining permission to go
with the Germans, but was specially favored by being invited to
accompany the headquarters of the King of Prussia:

"LONG BRANCH, N. J., July 25, 1870.

"Lieutenant-General P. H. Sheridan, of the United State Army, is
authorized to visit Europe, to return at his own pleasure, unless
otherwise ordered.  He is commended to the good offices of all
representatives of this Government whom he may meet abroad.

"To citizens and representatives of other Governments I introduce
General Sheridan as one of the most skillful, brave and deserving
soldiers developed by the great struggle through which the United
States Government has just passed.  Attention paid him will be duly
appreciated by the country he has served so faithfully and
efficiently.

"U. S. GRANT."


Word of my intended trip was cabled to Europe in the ordinary press
despatches, and our Minister to France, Mr. Elihu B. Washburn, being
an intimate friend of mine, and thinking that I might wish to attach
myself to the French army, did me the favor to take preliminary steps
for securing the necessary authority.  He went so far as to broach
the subject to the French Minister of War, but in view of the
informality of the request, and an unmistakable unwillingness to
grant it being manifested, Mr. Washburn pursued the matter no
further.  I did not learn of this kindly interest in my behalf till
after the capitulation of Paris, when Mr. Washburn told me what he
had done of his own motion.  Of course I thanked him gratefully, but
even had he succeeded in getting the permission he sought I should
not have accompanied the French army.

I sailed from New York July 27, one of my aides-de-camp, General
James W. Forsyth, going with me.  We reached Liverpool August 6, and
the next day visited the American Legation in London, where we saw
all the officials except our Minister, Mr. Motley, who, being absent,
was represented by Mr. Moran, the Secretary of the Legation.  We left
London August 9 for Brussels, where we were kindly cared for by the
American Minister, Mr. Russell Jones who the same evening saw us off
for Germany.  Because of the war we secured transportation only as
far as Vera, and here we received information that the Prussian
Minister of War had telegraphed to the Military Inspector of
Railroads to take charge of us on our arrival a Cologne, and send us
down to the headquarter of the Prussian army, but the Inspector, for
some unexplained reason, instead of doing this, sent us on to Berlin.
Here our Minister, Mr. George Bancroft, met us with a telegram from
the German Chancellor, Count Bismarck, saying we were expected to
come direct to the King's headquarters and we learned also that a
despatch had been sent to the Prussian Minister at Brussels directing
him to forward us from Cologne to the army, instead of allowing us to
go on to Berlin, but that we had reached and quit Brussels without
the Minister's knowledge.




CHAPTER XVI.

LEAVING FOR THE SEAT OF WAR--MEETING WITH PRINCE BISMARCK--HIS
INTEREST IN PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA--HIS INCLINATIONS IN EARLY
LIFE--PRESENTED TO THE KING--THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE--THE GERMAN
PLAN--ITS FINAL SUCCESS--SENDING NEWS OF THE VICTORY--MISTAKEN FOR A
FRENCHMAN.

Shortly after we arrived in Berlin the Queen sent a messenger
offering us an opportunity to pay our respects, and fixed an hour for
the visit, which was to take place the next day; but as the tenor of
the despatch Mr. Bancroft had received from Count Bismarck indicated
that some important event which it was desired I should witness was
about to happen at the theatre of war, our Minister got us excused
from our visit of ceremony, and we started for the headquarters of
the German army that evening--our stay in the Prussian capital having
been somewhat less than a day.

Our train was a very long one, of over eighty cars, and though drawn
by three locomotives, its progress to Cologne was very slow and the
journey most tedious.  From Cologne we continued on by rail up the
valley of the Rhine to Bingebruck, near Bingen, and thence across
through Saarbrucken to Remilly, where we left the railway and rode in
a hay-wagon to Pont-a-Mousson, arriving there August 17, late in the
afternoon.  This little city had been ceded to France at the Peace of
Westphalia, and although originally German, the people had become, in
the lapse of so many years, intensely French in sentiment.  The town
was so full of officers and men belonging to the German army that it
was difficult to get lodgings, but after some delay we found quite
comfortable quarters at one of the small hotels, and presently, after
we had succeeded in getting a slender meal, I sent my card to Count
von Bismarck, the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, who
soon responded by appointing an hour--about 9 o'clock the same
evening--for an interview.

When the Count received me he was clothed in the undress uniform of
the Cuirassier regiment, of which he was the colonel.  During the
interview which ensued, he exhibited at times deep anxiety regarding
the conflict now imminent, for it was the night before the battle of
Gravelotte, but his conversation was mostly devoted to the state of
public sentiment in America, about which he seemed much concerned,
inquiring repeatedly as to which side--France or Prussia--was charged
with bringing on the war.  Expressing a desire to witness the battle
which was expected to occur the next day, and remarking that I had
not had sufficient time to provide the necessary transportation, he
told me to be ready at 4 o'clock in the morning, and he would take me
out in his own carriage and present me to the King--adding that he
would ask one of his own staff-officers, who he knew had one or two
extra horses, to lend me one.  As I did not know just what my status
would be, and having explained to the President before leaving
America that I wished to accompany the German army unofficially, I
hardly knew whether to appear in uniform or not, so I spoke of this
matter too, and the Count, after some reflection, thought it best for
me to wear my undress uniform, minus the sword, however, because I
was a non combatant.

At 4 o'clock the next morning, the 18th, I repaired to the
Chancellor's quarters.  The carriage was at the door, also the
saddle-horse, but as no spare mount could be procured for General
Forsyth, he had to seek other means to reach the battle-field.  The
carriage was an open one with two double seats, and in front a single
one for a messenger; it had also a hand-brake attached.


Count Bismarck and I occupied the rear seat, and Count
Bismarck-Bohlen--the nephew and aide-decamp to the Chancellor--and
Doctor Busch were seated facing us.  The conveyance was strong,
serviceable, and comfortable, but not specially prepossessing, and
hitched to it were four stout horses--logy, ungainly animals, whose
clumsy harness indicated that the whole equipment was meant for heavy
work.  Two postilions in uniform, in high military saddles on the nigh
horse of each span, completed the establishment.

All being ready, we took one of the roads from Pont-a-Mousson to
Rezonville, which is on the direct road from Metz to Chalons, and
near the central point of the field where, on the 16th of August, the
battle of Mars-la-Tour had been fought.  It was by this road that the
Pomeranians, numbering about 30,000 men, had been ordered to march to
Gravelotte, and after proceeding a short distance we overtook the
column.  As this contingent came from Count Bismarck's own section of
Germany, there greeted us as we passed along, first in the dim light
of the morning, and later in the glow of the rising sun, continuous
and most enthusiastic cheering for the German Chancellor.

On the way Count Bismarck again recurred to the state of public
opinion in America with reference to the war.  He also talked much
about our form of government, and said that in early life his
tendencies were all toward republicanism, but that family influence
had overcome his preferences, and intimated that, after adopting a
political career, he found that Germany was not sufficiently advanced
for republicanism.  He said, further, that he had been reluctant to
enter upon this public career, that he had always longed to be a
soldier, but that here again family opposition had turned him from
the field of his choice into the sphere of diplomacy.

Not far from Mars-la-Tour we alighted, and in a little while an
aide-de-camp was introduced, who informed me that he was there to
conduct and present me to his Majesty, the King of Prussia.  As we were
walking along together, I inquired whether at the meeting I should
remove my cap, and he said no; that in an out-of-door presentation it
was not etiquette to uncover if in uniform.  We were soon in presence
of the King, where--under the shade of a clump of second-growth
poplar-trees, with which nearly all the farms in the north of France
are here and there dotted--the presentation was made in the simplest
and most agreeable manner.

His Majesty, taking my hand in both of his, gave me a thorough
welcome, expressing, like Count Bismarck, though through an
interpreter, much interest as to the sentiment in my own country
about the war.  At this time William the First of Prussia was
seventy-three years of age, and, dressed in the uniform of the
Guards, he seemed to be the very ideal soldier, and graced with most
gentle and courteous manners.  The conversation, which was brief, as
neither of us spoke the other's native tongue, concluded by his
Majesty's requesting me in the most cordial way to accompany his
headquarters during the campaign.  Thanking him for his kindness, I
rejoined Count Bismarck's party, and our horses having arrived
meantime, we mounted and moved off to the position selected for the
King to witness the opening of the battle.

This place was on some high ground overlooking the villages of
Rezonville and Gravelotte, about the centre of the battlefield of
Mars-la-Tour, and from it most of the country to the east toward Metz
could also be seen.  The point chosen was an excellent one for the
purpose, though in one respect disagreeable, since the dead bodies of
many of the poor fellows killed there two days before were yet
unburied.  In a little while the King's escort began to remove these
dead, however, bearing them away on stretchers improvised with their
rifles, and the spot thus cleared was much more acceptable.  Then,
when such unexploded shells as were lying around loose had been
cautiously carried away, the King, his brother, Prince Frederick
Charles Alexander, the chief-of-staff, General von Moltke, the
Minister of War, General von Roon, and Count von Bismarck assembled
on the highest point, and I being asked to join the group, was there
presented to General von Moltke.  He spoke our language fluently, and
Bismarck having left the party for a time to go to a neighboring
house to see his son, who had been wounded at Mars-la-Tour, and about
whom he was naturally very anxious, General von Moltke entertained me
by explaining the positions of the different corps, the nature and
object of their movements then taking place, and so on.

Before us, and covering Metz, lay the French army, posted on the
crest of a ridge extending north, and about its centre curving
slightly westward toward the German forces.  The left of the French
position was but a short distance from the Moselle, and this part of
the line was separated from the Germans by a ravine, the slopes,
fairly well wooded, rising quite sharply; farther north, near the
centre, this depression disappeared, merged in the general swell of
the ground, and thence on toward the right the ground over which an
approach to the French line must be made was essentially a natural
open glacis, that could be thoroughly swept by the fire of the
defenders.

The line extended some seven or eight miles.  To attack this
position, formidable everywhere, except perhaps on the right flank,
the Germans were bringing up the combined forces of the First and
Second armies, troops that within the past fortnight had already
successfully met the French in three pitched battles.  On the right
was the First Army, under command of General Von Steinmetz, the
victors, August 6, of Spicheren, near Saar, and, eight days later, of
Colombey, to the east of Metz; while the centre and left were
composed of the several corps of the Second Army, commanded by Prince
Frederick Charles of Prussia, a part of whose troops had just been
engaged in the sanguinary battle of Mars-la-Tour, by which Bazaine
was cut off from the Verdun road, and forced back toward Metz.

At first the German plan was simply to threaten with their right,
while the corps of the Second Army advanced toward the north, to
prevent the French, of whose intentions there was much doubt, from
escaping toward Chalons; then, as the purposes of the French might
be, developed, these corps were to change direction toward the enemy
successively, and seek to turn his right flank.  But the location of
this vital turning-point was very uncertain, and until it was
ascertained and carried, late in the afternoon, the action raged with
more or less intensity along the entire line.

But as it is not my purpose to describe in detail the battle of
Gravelotte, nor any other, I will speak of some of its incidents
merely.  About noon, after many preliminary skirmishes, the action
was begun according to the plan I have already outlined, the Germans
advancing their left while holding on strongly with their right, and
it was this wing (the First Army) that came under my observation from
the place where the King's headquarters were located.  From here we
could see, as I have said, the village of Gravelotte.  Before it lay
the German troops, concealed to some extent, especially to the left,
by clumps of timber here and there.  Immediately in front of us,
however, the ground was open, and the day being clear and sunny, with
a fresh breeze blowing (else the smoke from a battle between four
hundred thousand men would have obstructed the view altogether), the
spectacle presented Was of unsurpassed magnificence and sublimity.
The German artillery opened the battle, and while the air was filled
with shot and shell from hundreds of guns along their entire line,
the German centre and left, in rather open order, moved out to the
attack, and as they went forward the reserves, in close column, took
up positions within supporting distances, yet far enough back to be
out of range.

The French artillery and mitrailleuses responded vigorously to the
Krupps, and with deadly effect, but as far as we could see the German
left continued its advance, and staff-officers came up frequently to
report that all was going on well at points hidden from our view
These reports were always made to the King first, and whenever
anybody arrived with tidings of the fight we clustered around to hear
the news, General Von Moltke unfolding a map meanwhile, and
explaining the situation.  This done, the chief of the staff, while
awaiting the next report, would either return to a seat that had been
made for him with some knapsacks, or would occupy the time walking
about, kicking clods of dirt or small stones here and there, his
hands clasped behind his back, his face pale and thoughtful.  He was
then nearly seventy years old, but because of his emaciated figure,
the deep wrinkles in his face, and the crow's-feet about his eyes, he
looked even older, his appearance being suggestive of the practice of
church asceticisms rather than of his well-known ardent devotion to
the military profession.

By the middle of the afternoon the steady progress of the German left
and centre had driven the French from their more advanced positions
from behind stone walls and hedges, through valleys and hamlets, in
the direction of Metz, but as yet the German right had accomplished
little  except to get possession of the village of Gravelotte,
forcing the French across the deep ravine I have mentioned, which
runs north and south a little distance east of ihe town.

But it was now time for the German right to move in earnest to carry
the Rozerieulles ridge, on which crest the French had evidently
decided to make an obstinate fight to cover their withdrawal to Metz.
As the Germans moved to the attack here, the French fire became heavy
and destructive, so much so, indeed, as to cause General Von
Steinmetz to order some cavalry belonging to the right wing to make a
charge.  Crossing the ravine before described, this body of horse
swept up the slope beyond, the front ranks urged forward by the
momentum from behind.  The French were posted along a sunken road,
behind stone walls and houses, and as the German cavalry neared these
obstructions it received a dreadful fire without the least chance of
returning it, though still pushed on till the front ranks were
crowded into the deep cut of the road.  Here the slaughter was
terrible, for the horsemen could make no further headway; and because
of the blockade behind, of dead and wounded men and animals, an
orderly retreat was impossible, and disaster inevitable.

About the time the charge was ordered, the phase of the battle was
such that the King concluded to move his headquarters into the
village of Gravelotte; and just after getting there, we first learned
fully of the disastrous result of the charge which had been entered
upon with such spirit; and so much indignation was expressed against
Steinmetz, who, it was claimed, had made an unnecessary sacrifice of
his cavalry, that I thought he would be relieved on the spot; though
this was not done.

Followed by a large staff, General Steinmetz appeared in the village
presently, and approached the King.  When near, he bowed with great
respect, and I then saw that he was a very old man though his
soldierly figure, bronzed face, and shortcropped hair gave some
evidence of vigor still.  When the King spoke to him I was not close
enough to learn what was said; but his Majesty's manner was
expressive of kindly feeling, and the fact that in a few moments the
veteran general returned to the command of his troops, indicated
that, for the present at least, his fault had been overlooked.

The King then moved out of the village, and just a little to the east
and north of it the headquarters were located on high, open ground,
whence we could observe the right of the German infantry advancing up
the eastern face of the ravine.  The advance, though slow and
irregular, resulted in gradually gaining ground, the French resisting
stoutly with a stubborn musketry fire all along the slopes.  Their
artillery was silent, however; and from this fact the German
artillery officers grew jubilant, confidently asserting that their
Krupp guns had dismounted the French batteries and knocked their
mitrailleuses to pieces.  I did not indulge in this confidence,
however; for, with the excellent field-glass I had, I could
distinctly see long columns of French troops moving to their right,
for the apparent purpose of making a vigorous fight on that flank;
and I thought it more than likely that their artillery would be heard
from before the Germans could gain the coveted ridge.

The Germans labored up the glacis slowly at the most exposed places;
now crawling on their bellies, now creeping on hands and knees, but,
in the main, moving with erect and steady bearing.  As they
approached within short range, they suddenly found that the French
artillery and mitrallleuses had by no means been silenced--about two
hundred pieces opening on them with fearful effect, while at the same
time the whole crest blazed with a deadly fire from the Chassepot
rifles.  Resistance like this was so unexpected by the Germans that
it dismayed them; and first wavering a moment, then becoming
panic-stricken, they broke and fled, infantry, cavalry, and artillery
coming down the slope without any pretence of formation, the French
hotly following and pouring in a heavy and constant fire as the
fugitives fled back across the ravine toward Gravelotte.  With this
the battle on the right had now assumed a most serious aspect, and
the indications were that the French would attack the heights of
Gravelotte; but the Pomeranian corps coming on the field at this
crisis, was led into action by Von Moltke, himself, and shortly after
the day was decided in favor of the Germans.

When the French guns opened fire, it was discovered that the King's
position was within easy range, many of the shells falling near
enough to make the place extremely uncomfortable; so it was suggested
that he go to a less exposed point.  At first he refused to listen to
this wise counsel, but yielded finally--leaving the ground with
reluctance, however--and went back toward Rezonville.  I waited for
Count Bismarck, who did not go immediately with the King, but
remained at Gravelotte, looking after some of the escort who had been
wounded.  When he had arranged for their care, we set out to rejoin
the King, and before going far, overtook his Majesty, who had stopped
on the Chalons road, and was surrounded by a throng of fugitives,
whom he was berating in German so energetic as to remind me forcibly
of the "Dutch" swearing that I used to hear in my boyhood in Ohio.
The dressing down finished to his satisfaction, the King resumed his
course toward Re'zonville, halting, however, to rebuke in the same
emphatic style every group of runaways he overtook.

Passing through Rezonville, we halted just beyond the village; there
a fire was built, and the King, his brother, Prince Frederick
Charles, and Von Roon were provided with rather uncomfortable seats
about it, made by resting the ends of a short ladder on a couple of
boxes.  With much anxiety and not a little depression of spirits news
from the battle-field was now awaited, but the suspense did not last
long, for presently came the cheering intelligence that the French
were retiring, being forced back by the Pomeranian corps, and some of
the lately broken right wing organizations, that had been rallied on
the heights of Gravelotte.  The lost ground being thus regained, and
the French having been beaten on their right, it was not long before
word came that Bazaine's army was falling back to Metz, leaving the
entire battle-field in possession of the Germans.

During the excitement of the day I had not much felt the want of
either food or water, but now that all was over I was nearly
exhausted, having had neither since early morning.  Indeed, all of
the party were in like straits; the immense armies had not only eaten
up nearly everything in the country, but had drunk all the wells dry,
too, and there seemed no relief for us till, luckily, a squad of
soldiers came along the road with a small cask of wine in a cart.
One of the staff-officers instantly appropriated the keg, and
proceeded to share his prize most generously.  Never had I tasted
anything so refreshing and delicious, but as the wine was the
ordinary sour stuff drunk by the peasantry of northern France, my
appreciation must be ascribed to my famished condition rather than to
any virtues of the beverage itself.

After I had thus quenched my thirst the King's, brother called me
aside, and drawing from his coat-tail pocket a piece of stale black
bread, divided it with me, and while munching on this the Prince
began talking of his son--General Prince Frederick Charles, popularly
called the Red Prince--who was in command of the Second Army in this
battle--the German left wing.  In recounting his son's professional
career the old man's face was aglow with enthusiasm, and not without
good cause, for in the war between Prussia and Austria in 1866, as
well as in the present campaign, the Red Prince had displayed the
highest order of military genius.

The headquarters now became the scene of much bustle, despatches
announcing the victory being sent in all directions.  The first one
transmitted was to the Queen, the King directing Count Bismarck to
prepare it for his signature; then followed others of a more official
character, and while these matters were being attended to I thought I
would ride into the village to find, if possible, some water for my
horse.  Just as I entered the chief street, however, I was suddenly
halted by a squad of soldiers, who, taking me for a French officer
(my coat and forage cap resembling those of the French), leveled
their pieces at me.  They were greatly excited, so much so, indeed,
that I thought my hour had come, for they could not understand
English, and I could not speak German, and dare not utter
explanations in French.  Fortunately a few disconnected German words
came to me in the emergency.  With these I managed to delay my
execution, and one of the party ventured to come up to examine the
"suspect" more closely.  The first thing he did was to take off my
cap, and looking it over carefully, his eyes rested on the three
stars above the visor, and, pointing to them, he emphatically
pronounced me French.  Then of course they all became excited again,
more so than before, even, for they thought I was trying to practice
a ruse, and I question whether I should have lived to recount the
adventure had not an officer belonging to the King's headquarters
been passing by just then, when, hearing the threatenings and
imprecations, he rode up to learn the cause of the hubbub, and
immediately recognized and released me.  When he told my wrathy
captors who I was, they were much mortified of course, and made the
most profuse apologies, promising that no such mistake should occur
again, and so on; but not feeling wholly reassured, for my uniform
was still liable to mislead, I was careful to return to headquarters
in company with my deliverer.  There I related what had occurred, and
after a good laugh all round, the King provided me with a pass which
he said would preclude any such mishap in the future, and would also
permit me to go wherever I pleased--a favor rarely bestowed.




CHAPTER XVII

SEARCHING FOR QUARTERS--HUNTING UP PROVISIONS--A SLENDER BREAKFAST
--GOING OVER THE BATTLEFIELD--THE GERMAN ARTILLERY--A GROUP OF WOUNDED
--DINING WITH THE KING--ON THE MARCH--THE BAVARIANS--KIRSCHWASSER
--URGING ON THE TROOPS.

While I was absent, as related in the preceding chapter, it had been
decided that the King's quarters should be established for the night
in the village of Rezonville; and as it would be very difficult, at
such a late hour, to billet the whole party regularly, Count Bismarck
and I went off to look for shelter for ourselves.  Remembering that I
had seen, when seeking to water my horse, a partly burned barn with
some fresh-looking hay in it, I suggested that we lodge there.  He
too thought it would answer our purpose, but on reaching it we found
the unburned part of the barn filled with wounded, and this
necessitating a further search we continued on through the village in
quest of some house not yet converted into a hospital.  Such,
however, seemed impossible to come upon, so at last the Count fixed
on one whose upper floor, we learned, was unoccupied, though the
lower one was covered with wounded.

Mounting a creaky ladder--there was no stairway--to the upper story,
we found a good-sized room with three large beds, one of which the
Chancellor assigned to the Duke of Mecklenburg and aide, and another
to Count Bismarck-Bohlen and me, reserving the remaining one for
himself.  Each bed, as is common in Germany and northern France, was
provided with a feather tick, but the night being warm, these spreads
were thrown off, and discovering that they would make a comfortable
shakedown on the floor, I slept there leaving Bismarck-Bohlen
unembarrassed by companionship--at least of a human kind.

At daylight I awoke, and seeing that Count Bismarck was already
dressed and about to go down the ladder, I felt obliged to follow his
example, so I too turned out, and shortly descended to the
ground-floor, the only delays of the toilet being those incident to
dressing, for there were no conveniences for morning ablutions.  Just
outside the door I met the Count, who, proudly exhibiting a couple of
eggs he had bought from the woman of the house, invited me to
breakfast with him, provided we could beg some coffee from the king's
escort.  Putting the eggs under my charge, with many injunctions as
to their safe-keeping, he went off to forage for the coffee, and
presently returned, having been moderately successful.  One egg
apiece was hardly enough, however, to appease the craving of two
strong men ravenous from long fasting.  Indeed, it seemed only to
whet the appetite, and we both set out on an eager expedition for
more food.  Before going far I had the good luck to meet a sutler's
wagon, and though its stock was about all sold, there were still left
four large bologna sausages, which I promptly purchased--paying a
round sum for them too--and hastening back found the Count already
returned, though without bringing anything at all to eat; but he had
secured a couple of bottles of brandy, and with a little of this--it
was excellent, too--and the sausages, the slim ration of eggs and
coffee was amply reinforced.

Breakfast over, the Chancellor invited me to accompany him in a ride
to the battle-field, and I gladly accepted, as I very much desired to
pass over the ground in front of Gravelotte, particularly so to see
whether the Krupp guns had really done the execution that was claimed
for them by the German artillery officers.  Going directly through
the village of Gravelotte, following the causeway over which the
German cavalry had passed to make its courageous but futile charge,
we soon reached the ground where the fighting had been the most
severe.  Here the field was literally covered with evidences of the
terrible strife, the dead and wounded strewn thick on every side.

In the sunken road the carnage had been awful; men and horses having
been slaughtered there by hundreds, helpless before the murderous
fire delivered from behind a high stone wall impracticable to mounted
troops.  The sight was sickening to an extreme, and we were not slow
to direct our course elsewhere, going up the glacis toward the French
line, the open ground over which we crossed being covered with
thousands of helmets, that had been thrown off by the Germans during
the fight and were still dotting the field, though details of
soldiers from the organizations which had been engaged here were
about to begin to gather up their abandoned headgear.

When we got inside the French works, I was astonished to observe how
little harm had been done the defenses by the German artillery, for
although I had not that serene faith in the effectiveness of their
guns held by German artillerists generally, yet I thought their
terrific cannonade must have left marked results.  All I could
perceive, however, was a disabled gun, a broken mitrailleuse, and two
badly damaged caissons.

Everything else, except a little ammunition in the trenches, had been
carried away, and it was plain to see, from the good shape in which
the French left wing had retired to Metz, that its retreat had been
predetermined by the disasters to the right wing.

By this hour the German cavalry having been thrown out to the front
well over toward Metz, we, following it to get a look at the city,
rode to a neighboring summit, supposing it would be a safe point of
observation; but we shortly realized the contrary, for scarcely had
we reached the crest when some of the French pickets, lying concealed
about six hundred yards off, opened fire, making it so very hot for
us that, hugging the necks of our horses, we incontinently fled.
Observing what had taken place, a troop of German cavalry charged the
French outpost and drove it far enough away to make safe our return,
and we resumed possession of the point, but only to discover that the
country to the east was so broken and hilly that no satisfactory view
of Metz could be had.

Returning to Gravelotte, we next visited that part of the battlefield
to the northeast of the village, and before long Count Bismarck
discovered in a remote place about twenty men dreadfully wounded.
These poor fellows had had no attention whatever, having been
overlooked by the hospital corps, and their condition was most
pitiful.  Yet there was one very handsome man in the group--a captain
of artillery--who, though shot through the right breast, was
talkative and cheerful, and felt sure of getting well.  Pointing,
however, to a comrade lying near, also shot in the breast, he
significantly shook his head; it was easy to see on this man's face
the signs--of fast approaching death.

An orderly was at once despatched for a surgeon, Bismarck and I doing
what we could meanwhile to alleviate the intense sufferings of the
maimed men, bringing them water and administering a little brandy,
for the Count still had with him some of the morning's supply.  When
the surgeons came, we transferred the wounded to their care, and
making our way to Rezonville, there took the Count's carriage to
rejoin the King's headquarters, which in the mean time had been moved
to Pont-a-Mousson.  Our route led through the village of Gorze, and
here we found the streets so obstructed with wagons that I feared it
would take us the rest of the day to get through, for the teamsters
would not pay the slightest heed to the cries of our postilions.  The
Count was equal to the emergency, however, for, taking a pistol from
behind his cushion, and bidding me keep my seat, he jumped out and
quickly began to clear the street effectively, ordering wagons to the
right and left.  Marching in front of the carriage and making way for
us till we were well through the blockade, he then resumed his seat,
remarking, "This is not a very dignified business for the Chancellor
of the German Confederation, but it's the only way to get through."

At Pont-a-Mousson I was rejoined by my aide, General Forsyth, and for
the next two days our attention was almost wholly devoted to securing
means of transportation.  This was most difficult to obtain, but as I
did not wish to impose on the kindness of the Chancellor longer, we
persevered till, finally, with the help of Count Bismarck-Bohlen, we
managed to get tolerably well equipped with a saddle-horse apiece,
and a two-horse carriage.  Here also, on the afternoon of August 21,
I had the pleasure of dining with the King.  The dinner was a simple
one, consisting of soup, a joint, and two or three vegetables; the
wines vin ordinaire and Burgundy.  There were a good many persons of
high rank present, none of whom spoke English, however, except
Bismarck, who sat next the King and acted as interpreter when his
Majesty conversed with me.  Little was said of the events taking
place around us, but the King made many inquiries concerning the war
of the rebellion, particularly with reference to Grant's campaign at
Vicksburg; suggested, perhaps, by the fact that there, and in the
recent movements of the German army, had been applied many similar
principles of military science.

The French army under Marshal Bazaine having retired into the
fortifications of Metz, that stronghold was speedily invested by
Prince Frederick Charles.  Meantime the Third Army, under the Crown
Prince of Prussia--which, after having fought and won the battle of
Worth, had been observing the army of Marshal MacMahon during and
after the battle of Gravelotte--was moving toward Paris by way of
Nancy, in conjunction with an army called the Fourth, which had been
organized from the troops previously engaged around Metz, and on the
22d was directed toward Bar-le-Duc under the command of the Crown
Prince of Saxony.  In consequence of these operations the King
decided to move to Commercy, which place we reached by carriage,
traveling on a broad macadamized road lined on both sides with
poplar-trees, and our course leading through a most beautiful country
thickly dotted with prosperous-looking villages.

On reaching Commercy, Forsyth and I found that quarters had been
already selected for us, and our names written on the door with chalk
the quartermaster charged with the billeting of the officers at
headquarters having started out in advance to perform this duty and
make all needful preparations for the King before he arrived, which
course was usually pursued thereafter, whenever the royal
headquarters took up a new location.

Forsyth and I were lodged with the notary of the village, who over
and over again referred to his good fortune in not having to
entertain any of the Germans.  He treated us most hospitably, and
next morning,  on departing, we offered compensation by tendering a
sum--about what our bill would have been at a good hotel--to be used
for the "benefit of the wounded or the Church."  Under this
stipulation the notary accepted, and we followed that plan of paying
for food and lodging afterward, whenever quartered in private houses.

The next day I set out in advance of the headquarters, and reached
Bar-le-Duc about noon, passing on the way the Bavarian contingent of
the Crown Prince's army.  These Bavarians were trim-looking soldiers,
dressed in neat uniforms of light blue; they looked healthy and
strong, but seemed of shorter stature than the North Germans I had
seen in the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and General von
Steinmetz.  When, later in the day the King arrived, a guard for him
was detailed from this Bavarian contingent; a stroke of policy no
doubt, for the South Germans were so prejudiced against their
brothers of the North that no opportunity to smooth them down was
permitted to go unimproved.

Bar-le-Duc, which had then a population of about 15,000, is one of
the prettiest towns I saw in France, its quaint and ancient buildings
and beautiful boulevards charming the eye as well as exciting deep
interest.  The King and his immediate suite were quartered on one of
the best boulevards in a large building--the Bank of France--the
balcony of which offered a fine opportunity to observe a part of the
army of the Crown Prince the next day on its march toward Vitry.
This was the first time his Majesty had had a chance to see any of
these troops--as hitherto he had accompanied either the army of
Prince Frederick Charles, or that of General Steinmetz--and the
cheers with which he was greeted by the Bavarians left no room for
doubting their loyalty to the Confederation, notwithstanding ancient
jealousies.

While the troops were passing, Count Bismarck had the kindness to
point out to me the different organizations, giving scraps of their
history, and also speaking concerning the qualifications of the
different generals commanding them.  When the review was over we went
to the Count's house, and there, for the first time in my life, I
tasted kirschwasser, a very strong liquor distilled from cherries.
Not knowing anything about the stuff, I had to depend on Bismarck's
recommendation, and he proclaiming it fine, I took quite a generous
drink, which nearly strangled me and brought on a violent fit of
coughing.  The Chancellor said, however, that this was in no way due
to the liquor, but to my own inexperience, and I was bound to believe
the distinguished statesman, for he proved his words by swallowing a
goodly dose with an undisturbed and even beaming countenance,
demonstrating his assertion so forcibly that I forthwith set out with
Bismarck-Bohlen to lay in a supply for myself.

I spent the night in a handsome house, the property of an
exceptionally kind and polite gentleman bearing the indisputably
German name of Lager, but who was nevertheless French from head to
foot, if intense hatred of the Prussians be a sign of Gallic
nationality.  At daybreak on the 26th word came for us to be ready to
move by the Chalons road at 7 o'clock, but before we got off, the
order was suspended till 2 in the afternoon.  In the interval General
von Moltke arrived and held a long conference with the King, and when
we did pull out we traveled the remainder of the afternoon in company
with a part of the Crown Prince's army, which after this conference
inaugurated the series of movements from Bar-le-Duc northward, that
finally compelled the surrender at Sedan.  This sudden change of
direction I did not at first understand, but soon learned that it was
because of the movements of Marshal MacMahon, who, having united the
French army beaten at Worth with three fresh corps at Chalons, was
marching to relieve Metz in obedience to orders from the Minister of
War at Paris.

As we passed along the column, we noticed that the Crown Prince's
troops were doing their best, the officers urging the men to their
utmost exertions, persuading weary laggards and driving up
stragglers.  As a general thing, however, they marched in good shape,
notwithstanding the rapid gait and the trying heat, for at the outset
of the campaign the Prince had divested them of all impedimenta
except essentials, and they were therefore in excellent trim for a
forced march.

The King traveled further than usual that day--to Clermont--so we did
not get shelter till late, and even then not without some confusion,
for the quartermaster having set out toward Chalons before the change
of programme was ordered, was not at hand to provide for us.  I had
extreme good luck, though, in being quartered with a certain
apothecary, who, having lived for a time in the United States,
claimed it as a privilege even to lodge me, and certainly made me his
debtor for the most generous hospitality.  It was not so with some of
the others, however; and Count Bismarck was particularly unfortunate,
being billeted in a very small and uncomfortable house, where,
visiting him to learn more fully what was going on, I found him,
wrapped in a shabby old dressing-gown, hard at work.  He was
established in a very small room, whose only furnishings consisted of
a table--at which he was writing--a couple of rough chairs, and the
universal feather-bed, this time made on the floor in one corner of
the room.  On my remarking upon the limited character of his
quarters, the Count replied, with great good-humor, that they were
all right, and that he should get along well enough.  Even the tramp
of his clerks in the attic, and the clanking of his orderlies' sabres
below, did not disturb him much; he said, in fact, that he would have
no grievance at all were it not for a guard of Bavarian soldiers
stationed about the house for his safety, he presumed the sentinels
from which insisted on protecting and saluting the Chancellor of the
North German Confederation in and out of season, a proceeding that
led to embarrassment sometimes, as he was much troubled with a severe
dysentery.  Notwithstanding his trials, however, and in the midst of
the correspondence on which he was so intently engaged, he graciously
took time to explain that the sudden movement northward from
Bar-le-Duc was, as I have previously recounted, the result of
information that Marshal MacMahon was endeavoring to relieve Metz by
marching along the Belgian frontier; "a blundering manoeuvre," remarked
the Chancellor, "which cannot be accounted for, unless it has been
brought about by the political situation of the French."




CHAPTER XVIII.

AFTER MacMAHON--THE BATTLE AT BEAUMONT--THE FRENCH SURPRISED--THE
MARCHING OF THE GERMAN SOLDIERS--THE BATTLE OF SEDAN--GALLANT CAVALRY
CHARGES--DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH--THE SURRENDER OF NAPOLEON--BISMARCK
AND THE KING--DECORATING THE SOLDIERS.

All night long the forced march of the army went on through Clermont,
and when I turned out, just after daylight, the columns were still
pressing forward, the men looking tired and much bedraggled, as
indeed they had reason to be, for from recent rains the roads were
very sloppy.  Notwithstanding this, however, the troops were pushed
ahead with all possible vigor to intercept MacMahon and force a
battle before he could withdraw from his faulty movement, for which
it has since been ascertained he was not at all responsible.  Indeed,
those at the royal headquarters seemed to think of nothing else than
to strike MacMahon, for, feeling pretty confident that Metz could not
be relieved, they manifested not the slightest anxiety on that score.

By 8 o'clock, the skies having cleared, the headquarters set out for
Grand Pre', which place we reached early in the afternoon, and that
evening I again had the pleasure of dining with the King.  The
conversation at table was almost wholly devoted to the situation, of
course, everybody expressing surprise at the manoeuvre of the French
at this time, their march along the Belgian frontier being credited
entirely to Napoleon.  Up to bed-time there was still much
uncertainty as to the exact positions of the French, but next morning
intelligence being received which denoted the probability of a
battle, we drove about ten miles, to Buzancy, and there mounting our
horses, rode to the front.

The French were posted not far from Buzancy in a strong position,
their right resting near Stonne and the left extending over into the
woods beyond Beaumont.  About 10 o'clock the Crown Prince of Saxony
advanced against this line, and while a part of his army turned the
French right, compelling it to fall back rapidly, the German centre
and right attacked with great vigor and much skill, surprising one of
the divisions of General De Failly's corps while the men were in the
act of cooking their breakfast.

The French fled precipitately, leaving behind their tents and other
camp equipage, and on inspecting the ground which they had abandoned
so hastily, I noticed on all sides ample evidence that not even the
most ordinary precautions had been taken to secure the division from
surprise, The artillery horses had not been harnessed, and many of
them had been shot down at the picket-rope where they had been
haltered the night before, while numbers of men were lying dead with
loaves of bread or other food instead of their muskets in their
hands.

Some three thousand prisoners and nearly all the artillery and
mitrailleuses of the division--were captured, while the fugitives
were pursued till they found shelter behind--Douay's corps and the
rest of De Failly's beyond Beaumont.  The same afternoon there were
several other severe combats along the Meuse, but I had no chance of
witnessing any of them, and just before night-fall I started back to
Buzancy, to which place the King's headquarters had been brought
during the day.

The morning of the 31st the King moved to Vendresse.  First sending
our carriage back to Grand Pre' for our trunks, Forsyth and I mounted
our horses and rode to the battle-field accompanied by an English
nobleman, the Duke of Manchester.  The part of the field we traversed
was still thickly strewn with the dead of both armies, though all the
wounded had been collected in the hospitals.  In the village of
Beaumont, we stopped to take a look at several thousand French
prisoners, whose worn clothing and evident dejection told that they
had been doing a deal of severe marching under great discouragements.

The King reached the village shortly after, and we all continued on
to Chemery, just beyond where his Majesty alighted from his carriage
to observe his son's troops file past as they came in from the
direction of Stonne.  This delay caused us to be as late as 9 o'clock
before we got shelter that night, but as it afforded me the best
opportunity I had yet had for seeing the German soldiers on the
march, I did not begrudge the time.  They moved in a somewhat open
and irregular column of fours, the intervals between files being
especially intended to give room for a peculiar swinging gait, with
which the men seemed to urge themselves over the ground with ease and
rapidity.  There was little or no straggling, and being strong, lusty
young fellows, and lightly equipped--they carried only needle-guns,
ammunition, a very small knapsack, a water-bottle, and a haversack
--they strode by with an elastic step, covering at least three miles an
hour.

It having been definitely ascertained that the demoralized French
were retiring to Sedan, on the evening of August 31 the German army
began the work of hemming them in there, so disposing the different
corps as to cover the ground from Donchery around by Raucourt to
Carignan.  The next morning this line was to be drawn in closer on
Sedan; and the Crown Prince of Saxony was therefore ordered to take
up a position to the north of Bazeilles, beyond the right bank of the
Meuse, while the Crown Prince of Prussia was to cross his right wing
over the Meuse at Remilly, to move on Bazeilles, his centre meantime
marching against a number of little hamlets still held by the French
between there and Donchery.  At this last-mentioned place strong
reserves were to be held, and from it the Eleventh Corps, followed by
the Fifth and a division of cavalry, was to march on St. Menges.

Forsyth and I started early next morning, September 1, and in a thick
fog-which, however, subsequently gave place to bright sunshine--we
drove to the village of Chevenges, where, mounting our horses, we
rode in a northeasterly direction to the heights of Frenois and
Wadelincourt, bordering the river Meuse on the left bank, where from
the crest we had a good view of the town of Sedan with its circling
fortifications, which, though extensive, were not so formidable as
those around Metz.  The King and his staff were already established
on these heights, and at a point so well chosen that his Majesty
could observe the movements of both armies immediately east and south
of Sedan, and also to the northwest toward Floing and the Belgian
frontier.

The battle was begun to the east and northeast of Sedan as early as
half-past 4 o'clock by the German right wing--the fighting being
desultory--and near the same hour the Bavarians attacked Bazeilles.
This village, some two miles southeast of Sedan, being of importance,
was defended with great obstinacy, the French contesting from street
to street and house to house the attack of the Bavarians till near
10 o'clock, when, almost every building being knocked to pieces, they
were compelled to relinquish the place.  The possession of this
village gave the Germans to the east of Sedan a continuous line,
extending from the Meuse northward through La Moncelle and Daigny to
Givonne, and almost to the Belgian frontier.

While the German centre and right were thus engaged, the left had
moved in accordance with the prescribed plan.  Indeed, some of these
troops had crossed the Meuse the night before, and now, at a little
after 6 o'clock, their advance could be seen just north of the
village of Floing.  Thus far these columns, under the immediate eye
of the Crown Prince of Prussia, had met with no opposition to their
march, and as soon as they got to the high ground above the village
they began extending to the east, to connect with the Army of the
Meuse.  This juncture was effected at Illy without difficulty, and
the French army was now completely encompassed.

After a severe fight, the Crown Prince drove the French through
Floing, and as the ground between this village and Sedan is an
undulating open plain, everywhere visible, there was then offered a
rare opportunity for seeing the final conflict preceding the
surrender.  Presently up out of the little valley where Floing is
located came the Germans, deploying just on the rim of the plateau a
very heavy skirmish-line, supported by a line of battle at close
distance.  When these skirmishers appeared, the French infantry had
withdrawn within its intrenched lines, but a strong body of their
cavalry, already formed in a depression to the right of the Floing
road, now rode at the Germans in gallant style, going clear through
the dispersed skirmishers to the main line of battle.  Here the
slaughter of the French was awful, for in addition to the deadly
volleys from the solid battalions of their enemies, the skirmishers,
who had rallied in knots at advantageous places, were now delivering
a severe and effective fire.  The gallant horsemen, therefore, had to
retire precipitately, but re-forming in the depression, they again
undertook the hopeless task of breaking the German infantry, making
in all four successive charges.  Their ardor and pluck were of no
avail, however, for the Germans, growing stronger every minute by the
accession of troops from Floing, met the fourth attack in such large
force that, even before coming in contact with their adversaries, the
French broke and retreated to the protection of the intrenchments,
where, from the beginning of the combat, had been lying plenty of
idle infantry, some of which at least, it seemed plain to me, ought
to have been thrown into the fight.  This action was the last one of
consequence around Sedan, for, though with the contraction of the
German lines their batteries kept cannonading more or less, and the
rattle of musketry continued to be heard here and there, yet the hard
fighting of the day practically ended on the plateau of Floing.

By 3 o'clock, the French being in a desperate and hopeless situation,
the King ordered the firing to be stopped, and at once despatched one
of his staff--Colonel von Bronsart--with a demand for a surrender.
Just as this officer was starting off, I remarked to Bismarck that
Napoleon himself would likely be one of the prizes, but the Count,
incredulous, replied, "Oh no; the old fox is too cunning to be caught
in such a trap; he has doubtless slipped off to Paris"--a belief
which I found to prevail pretty generally about headquarters.

In the lull that succeeded, the King invited many of those about him
to luncheon, a caterer having provided from some source or other a
substantial meal of good bread, chops and peas, with a bountiful
supply of red and sherry wines.  Among those present were Prince
Carl, Bismarck, Von Moltke, Von Roon, the Duke of Weimar, the Duke of
Coburg, the Grand-Duke of Mecklenburg, Count Hatzfeldt, Colonel
Walker, of the English army, General Forsyth, and I.  The King was
agreeable and gracious at all times, but on this occasion he was
particularly so, being naturally in a happy frame of mind because
this day the war had reached a crisis which presaged for the near
future the complete vanquishment of the French.

Between 4 and 5 o'clock Colonel von Bronsart returned from his
mission to Sedan, bringing word to the King that the commanding
officer there General Wimpffen, wished to know, in order that the
further effusion of blood might be spared, upon what terms he might
surrender.  The Colonel brought the intelligence also that the French
Emperor was in the town.  Soon after Von Bronsart's arrival a French
officer approached from Sedan, preceded by a white flag and two
German officers.  Coming up the road till within a few hundred yards
of us, they halted; then one of the Germans rode forward to say that
the French officer was Napoleon's adjutant, bearing an autograph
letter from the Emperor to the King of Prussia.  At this the King,
followed by Bismarck, Von Moltke, and Von Roon, walked out to the
front a little distance and halted, his Majesty still in advance, the
rest of us meanwhile forming in a line some twenty paces to the rear
of the group.  The envoy then approached, at first on horseback, but
when within about a hundred yards he dismounted, and uncovering, came
the remaining distance on foot, bearing high up in his right hand the
despatch from Napoleon.  The bearer proved to be General Reille, and
as he handed the Emperor's letter to the King, his Majesty saluted
him with the utmost formality and precision.  Napoleon's letter was
the since famous one, running so characteristically, thus: "Not
having been able to die in the midst of my troops, there is nothing
left me but to place my sword in your Majesty's hands." The reading
finished, the King returned to his former post, and after a
conference with Bismarck, Von Moltke, and Von Roon, dictated an
answer accepting Napoleon's surrender, and requesting him to
designate an officer with power to treat for the capitulation of the
army, himself naming Von Moltke to represent the Germans.  The King
then started for Vendresse, to pass the night.  It was after
7 o'clock now, and hence too late to arrange anything more where we
were, so further negotiations were deferred till later in the
evening; and I, wishing to be conveniently near Bismarck, resolved to
take up quarters in Donchery.  On our way thither we were met by the
Count's nephew, who assuring us that it would be impossible to find
shelter there in the village, as all the houses were filled with
wounded, Forsyth and I decided to continue on to Chevenge.  On the
other hand, Bismarck-Bohlen bore with him one great comfort--some
excellent brandy.  Offering the flask to his uncle, he said: "You've
had a hard day of it; won't you refresh yourself?"  The Chancellor,
without wasting time to answer, raised the bottle to his lips,
exclaiming: "Here's to the unification of Germany!" which sentiment
the gurgling of an astonishingly long drink seemed to emphasize.  The
Count then handed the bottle back to his nephew, who, shaking it,
ejaculated, "Why, we can't pledge you in return--there is nothing
left!" to which came the waggish response, "I beg pardon; it was so
dark I couldn't see"; nevertheless there was a little remaining, as I
myself can aver.

Having left our carriage at Chevenge, Forsyth and I stopped there to
get it, but a long search proving fruitless, we took lodging in the
village at the house of the cure, resolved to continue the hunt in
the morning.  But then we had no better success, so concluding that
our vehicle had been pressed into the hospital service, we at an
early hour on the 2d of September resumed the search, continuing on
down the road in the direction of Sedan.  Near the gate of the city
we came on the German picket-line, and one of the Officers,
recognizing our uniforms--he having served in the war of the
rebellion--stepped forward and addressed me in good English.  We
naturally fell into conversation, and in the midst of it there came
out through the gate an open carriage, or landau, containing two men,
one of whom, in the uniform of a general and smoking a cigarette, we
recognized, when the conveyance drew near, as the Emperor Louis
Napoleon.  The landau went on toward Donchery at a leisurely pace,
and we, inferring that there was something more important at hand
just then than the recovery of our trap, followed at a respectful
distance.  Not quite a mile from Donchery is a cluster of three or
four cottages, and at the first of these the landau stopped to await,
as we afterward ascertained, Count Bismarck, with whom the diplomatic
negotiations were to be settled.  Some minutes elapsed before he
came, Napoleon remaining seated in his carriage meantime, still
smoking, and accepting with nonchalance the staring of a group of
German soldiers near by, who were gazing on their fallen foe with
curious and eager interest.

Presently a clattering of hoofs was heard, and looking toward the
sound, I perceived the Chancellor cantering down the road.  When
abreast of the carriage he dismounted, and walking up to it, saluted
the Emperor in a quick, brusque way that seemed to startle him.
After a word or two, the party moved perhaps a hundred yards further
on, where they stopped opposite the weaver's cottage so famous from
that day.  This little house is on the east side of the Donchery
road, near its junction with that to Frenois, and stands about twenty
paces back from the highway.  In front is a stone wall covered with
creeping vines, and from a gate in this wall runs to the front door a
path, at this time bordered on both sides with potato vines.

The Emperor having alighted at the gate, he and Bismarck walked
together along the narrow path and entered the cottage.  Reappearing
in about a quarter of an hour, they came out and seated themselves in
the open air, the weaver having brought a couple of chairs.  Here
they engaged in an animated conversation, if much gesticulation is
any indication.  The talk lasted fully an hour, Bismarck seeming to
do most of it, but at last he arose, saluted the Emperor, and strode
down the path toward his horse.  Seeing me standing near the gate, he
joined me for a moment, and asked if I had noticed how the Emperor
started when they first met, and I telling him that I had, he added,
"Well, it must have been due to my manners, not my words, for these
we're, 'I salute your Majesty just as I would my King.'"  Then the
Chancellor continued to chat a few minutes longer, assuring me that
nothing further was to be done there, and that we had better go to
the Chateau Bellevue, where, he said, the formal surrender was to
take place.  With this he rode off toward Vendresse to communicate
with his sovereign, and Forsyth and I made ready to go to the Chateau
Bellevue.

Before we set out, however, a number of officers of the King's suite
arrived at the weaver's cottage, and from them I gathered that there
were differences at the royal headquarters as to whether peace should
be made then at Sedan, or the war continued till the French capital
was taken.  I further heard that the military advisers of the King
strongly advocated an immediate move on Paris, while the Chancellor
thought it best to make peace now, holding Alsace and Lorraine, and
compelling the payment of an enormous levy of money; and these rumors
were most likely correct, for I had often heard Bismarck say that
France being the richest country in Europe, nothing could keep her
quiet but effectually to empty her pockets; and besides this, he
impressed me as holding that it would be better policy to preserve
the Empire.

On our way to the chateau we fell in with a number of artillery
officers bringing up their guns hurriedly to post them closer in to
the beleaguered town on a specially advantageous ridge.  Inquiring
the cause of this move, we learned that General Wimpffen had not yet
agreed to the terms of surrender; that it was thought he would not,
and that they wanted to be prepared for any such contingency.  And
they were preparing with a vengeance too, for I counted seventy-two
Krupp guns in one continuous line trained on the Chateau Bellevue and
Sedan.

Napoleon went directly from the weaver's to the Chateau Bellevue, and
about 10 o'clock the King of Prussia arrived from Frenois,
accompanied by a few of his own suite and the Crown Prince with
several members of his staff; and Von Moltke and Wimpffen having
settled their points of difference before the two monarchs met,
within the next half-hour the articles of capitulation were formally
signed.

On the completion of the surrender--the occasion being justly
considered a great one--the Crown Prince proceeded to distribute
among the officers congregated in the chateau grounds 'the order of
the Iron Cross'--a generous supply of these decorations being carried
in a basket by one of his orderlies, following him about as he walked
along.  Meantime the King, leaving Napoleon in the chateau to
ruminate on the fickleness of fortune, drove off to see his own
victorious soldiers, who greeted him with huzzas that rent the air,
and must have added to the pangs of the captive Emperor.




CHAPTER XIX.

RIDING OVER THE BATTLEFIELD--DESTRUCTION OF BAZEILLES--MISTAKES OF
THE FRENCH--MARSHAL BAZAINE ON TO PARIS--A WEEK IN MEAUX--RHEIMS--ON
THE PICKETLINE-UNDER FIRE--A SURRENDER--AT VERSAILLES--GENERAL
BURNSIDE AND Mr. FORBES IN PARIS.

The Crown Prince having got to the bottom of his medal basket-that is
to say, having finished his liberal distribution of decorations to
his officers--Forsyth and I rode off by way of Wadelincourt to
Bazeilles to see what had taken place on that part of the field, and
the sight that met our eyes as we entered the village was truly
dreadful to look upon.  Most of the houses had been knocked down or
burned the day before, but such as had been left standing were now in
flames, the torch having been applied because, as it was claimed,
Frenchmen concealed in them had fired on the wounded.  The streets
were still encumbered with both German and French dead, and it was
evident that of those killed in the houses the bodies had not been
removed, for the air was loaded with odors of burning flesh.  From
Bazeille we rode on toward the north about two miles, along where the
fight had been largely an artillery duel, to learn what we could of
the effectiveness of the Krupp gun.  Counting all the French dead we
came across killed by artillery, they figured up about three hundred
--a ridiculously small number; in fact, not much more than one dead
man for each Krupp gun on that part of the line.  Although the number
of dead was in utter disproportion to the terrific six-hour
cannonade, yet small as it was the torn and mangled bodies made such
a horrible sight that we turned back toward Bazeilles without having
gone further than Givonne.

At Bazeilles we met the King, accompanied by Bismarck and several of
the staff.  They too had been riding over the field, the King making
this a practice, to see that the wounded were not neglected.  As I
drew up by the party, Bismarck accosted me with, "Well, General,
aren't you hungry?  This is just the place to whet one's appetite
--these burning Frenchmen--Ugh!" and shrugging his shoulders in evident
disgust, he turned away to join his Majesty in further explorations,
Forsyth and I continuing on to Chevenges.  Here we got the first
inkling of what had become of our carriage since leaving it two days
before: it had been pressed into service to carry wounded officers from
the field during the battle, but afterward released, and was now safe
at the house in Vendresse where we had been quartered the night of the
31st, so, on hearing this, we settled to go there again to lodge, but
our good friend, the cure', insisting that we should stay with him, we
remained in Chevenges till next morning.

On September 3 the King removed from Vendresse to Rethel, where he
remained two days; in the mean while the Germans, 240,000 strong,
beginning their direct march to Paris.  The French had little with
which to oppose this enormous force, not more, perhaps, than 50,000
regular troops; the rest of their splendid army had been lost or
captured in battle, or was cooped up in the fortifications of Metz,
Strasburg, and other places, in consequence of blunders without
parallel in history, for which Napoleon and the Regency in Paris must
be held accountable.  The first of these gross faults was the fight
at Worth, where MacMahon, before his army was mobilized, accepted
battle with the Crown Prince, pitting 50,000 men against 175,000; the
next was Bazaine's fixing upon Metz as his base, and stupidly putting
himself in position to be driven back to it, when there was no
possible obstacle to his joining forces with MacMahon at Chalons;
while the third and greatest blunder of all was MacMahon's move to
relieve Metz, trying to slip 140,000 men along the Belgian frontier.
Indeed, it is exasperating and sickening to think of all this; to
think that Bazaine carried into Metz--a place that should have been
held, if at all, with not over 25,000 men--an army of 180,000,
because it contained, the excuse was, "an accumulation of stores."
With all the resources of rich France to draw upon, I cannot conceive
that this excuse was sincere; on the contrary, I think that the
movement of Bazaine must have been inspired by Napoleon with a view
to the maintenance of his dynasty rather than for the good of France.

As previously stated, Bismarck did not approve of the German army's
moving on Paris after the battle of Sedan.  Indeed, I think he
foresaw and dreaded the establishment of a Republic, his idea being
that if peace was made then, the Empire could be continued in the
person of the Prince Imperial who--, coming to the throne under
German influences, would be pliable in his hands.  These views found
frequent expression in private, and in public too; I myself
particularly remember the Chancellor's speaking thus most unguardedly
at a dinner in Rheims.  But he could not prevent the march to Paris;
it was impossible to stop the Germans, flushed with success.  "On to
Paris" was written by the soldiers on every door, and every
fence-board along the route to the capital, and the thought of a
triumphant march down the Champs Elysees was uppermost with every
German, from the highest to the lowest grade.

The 5th of September we set out for Rheims.  There it was said the
Germans would meet with strong resistance, for the French intended to
die to the last man before giving up that city.  But this proved all
fudge, as is usual with these "last ditch" promises, the garrison
decamping immediately at the approach of a few Uhlans.  So far as I
could learn, but a single casualty happened; this occurred to an
Uhlan, wounded by a shot which it was reported was fired from a house
after the town was taken; so, to punish this breach of faith, a levy
of several hundred bottles of champagne was made, and the wine
divided about headquarters, being the only seizure made in the city,
I believe, for though Rheims, the centre of the champagne district,
had its cellars well stocked, yet most of them being owned by German
firms, they received every protection.

The land about Rheims is of a white, chalky character, and very poor,
but having been terraced and enriched with fertilizers, it produces
the champagne grape in such abundance that the region, once
considered valueless, and named by the peasantry the "land of the
louse," now supports a dense population.  We remained in Rheims eight
days, and through the politeness of the American Consul--Mr. Adolph
Gill--had the pleasure of seeing all the famous wine cellars, and
inspecting the processes followed in champagne making, from the step
of pressing the juice from the grape to that which shows the wine
ready for the market.  Mr. Gill also took us to see everything else
of special interest about the city, and there being much to look at
--fine old churches, ancient fortifications, a Roman gateway, etc.
--the days slipped by very quickly, though the incessant rains
somewhat interfered with our enjoyment.

For three or four days all sorts of rumors were rife as to what was
doing in Paris, but nothing definite was learned till about the 9th;
then Count Bismarck informed me that the Regency had been overthrown
on the 4th, and that the Empress Eugenie had escaped to Belgium.  The
King of Prussia offered her an asylum with the Emperor at
Wilhelmshohe, "where she ought to go," said the Chancellor, "for her
proper place is with her husband," but he feared she would not.  On
the same occasion he also told me that Jules Favre--the head of the
Provisional Government--had sent him the suggestion that, the Empire
being gone, peace should be made and the Germans withdrawn, but that
he (Bismarck) was now compelled to recognize the impossibility of
doing this till Paris was taken, for although immediately after the
surrender of Sedan he desired peace, the past few days had made it
plain that the troops would not be satisfied with anything short of
Paris, no matter what form of Government the French should ultimately
adopt.

The German army having met with no resistance whatever in its march
on Paris, its advance approached the capital rapidly, and by the 14th
of September the royal headquarters moved by a fine macadamized road
to the Chateau Thierry, and on the 5th reached Meaux, about
twenty-eight miles from Paris, where we remained four days awaiting the
reconstruction of some railroad and canal bridges.  The town of Meaux
has a busy population of about 10,000 souls, in peaceable times
principally occupied in manufacturing flour for the Paris market,
having a fine waterpower for the many mills.  These were kept going day
and night to supply the German army; and it was strange to see with
what zeal Frenchmen toiled to fill the stomachs of their inveterate
enemies, and with what alacrity the mayor and other officials filled
requisitions for wine, cheese, suits of livery, riding-whips, and even
squab pigeons.

During our stay at Meaux the British Minister Lord Lyons, endeavored
to bring about a cessation of hostilities, to this end sending his
secretary out from Paris with a letter to Count Bismarck, offering to
serve as mediator.  The Chancellor would not agree to this, however,
for he conjectured that the action of the British Minister had been
inspired by Jules Favre, who, he thought, was trying to draw the
Germans into negotiations through the medium of a third party only
for purposes of delay.  So the next morning Lord Lyons's secretary,
Mr. Edward Malet, returned to Paris empty-handed, except that he bore
a communication positively declining mediation; which message,
however, led no doubt to an interview between Bismarck and Favre a
couple of days later.

The forenoon of September 19 the King removed to the Chateau
Ferrieres--a castle belonging to the Rothschild family, where
Napoleon had spent many happy days in the time of his prosperity.
His Majesty took up his quarters here at the suggestion of the owner,
we were told, so that by the presence of the King the magnificent
chateau and its treasures of art would be unquestionably protected
from all acts of vandalism.

All of the people at headquarters except the King's immediate suite
were assigned quarters at Lagny; and while Forsyth and I, accompanied
by Sir Henry Havelock, of the British army, were driving thither, we
passed on the road the representative of the National Defense
Government, Jules Favre, in a carriage heading toward Meaux.
Preceded by a flag of truce and accompanied by a single, companion,
he was searching for Count Bismarck, in conformity, doubtless, with
the message the Chancellor had sent to Paris on the 17th by the
British secretary.  A half-mile further on we met Bismarck.  He too
was traveling toward Meaux, not in the best of humor either, it
appeared, for having missed finding the French envoy at the
rendezvous where they had agreed to meet, he stopped long enough to
say that the "air was full of lies, and that there were many persons
with the army bent on business that did not concern them."

The armies of the two Crown Princes were now at the outskirts of
Paris.  They had come from Sedan mainly by two routes--the Crown
Prince of Saxony marching by the northern line, through Laon and
Soissons, and the Crown Prince of Prussia by the southern line,
keeping his right wing on the north bank of the Marne, while his left
and centre approached the French capital by roads between that river
and the Seine.

The march of these armies had been unobstructed by any resistance
worth mentioning, and as the routes of both columns lay through a
region teeming with everything necessary for their support, and rich
even in luxuries, it struck me that such campaigning was more a vast
picnic than like actual war.  The country supplied at all points
bread, meat, and wine in abundance, and the neat villages, never more
than a mile or two apart, always furnished shelter; hence the
enormous trains required to feed and provide camp equipage for an
army operating in a sparsely settled country were dispensed with; in
truth, about the only impedimenta of the Germans was their wagons
carrying ammunition, pontoon-boats, and the field-telegraph.

On the morning of the 20th I started out accompanied by Forsyth and
Sir Henry Havelock, and took the road through Boissy St. George,
Boissy St. Martins and Noisy Le Grand to Brie.  Almost every foot of
the way was strewn with fragments of glass from wine bottles, emptied
and then broken by the troops.  There was, indeed, so much of this
that I refrain from making any estimate of the number of bottles,
lest I be thought to exaggerate, but the road was literally paved
with glass, and the amount of wine consumed (none was wasted) must
have been enormous, far more, even, than I had seen evidence of at
any time before.  There were two almost continuous lines of broken
bottles along the roadsides all the way down from Sedan; but that
exhibit was small compared with what we saw about Brie.

At Brie we were taken charge of by the German commandant of the
place.  He entertained us most hospitably for an hour or so, and
then, accompanied by a lieutenant, who was to be our guide, I set out
ahead of my companions to gain a point on the picket-line where I
expected to get a good look at the French, for their rifle-pits were
but a few hundred yards off across the Marne, their main line being
just behind the rifle-pits.  As the lieutenant and I rode through the
village, some soldiers warned us that the adventure would be
dangerous, but that we could probably get to the desired place unhurt
if we avoided the French fire by forcing our horses to a run in
crossing some open streets where we would be exposed.  On getting to
the first street my guide galloped ahead to show the way, and as the
French were not on the lookout for anything of the kind at these
dangerous points, only a few stray shots were drawn by the
lieutenant, but when I followed, they were fully up to what was going
on, and let fly a volley every time they saw me in the open.
Fortunately, however, in their excitement they overshot, but when I
drew rein alongside of my guide under protection of the bluff where
the German picket was posted, my hair was all on end, and I was about
as badly scared as ever I had been in my life.  As soon as I could
recover myself I thought of Havelock and Forsyth, with the hope that
they would not follow; nor did they, for having witnessed my
experience, they wisely concluded that, after all, they did not care
so much to see the French rifle-pits.

When I had climbed to the top of the bluff I was much disappointed,
for I could see but little--only the advanced rifle-pits across the
river, and Fort Nogent beyond them, not enough, certainly, to repay a
non-combatant for taking the risk of being killed.  The next question
was to return, and deciding to take no more such chances as those we
had run in coming out, I said we would wait till dark, but this
proved unnecessary, for to my utter astonishment my guide informed me
that there was a perfectly safe route by which we might go back.  I
asked why we had not taken it in coming, and he replied that he had
thought it "too long and circuitous."  To this I could say nothing,
but I concluded that that was not quite the correct reason; the truth
is that early that morning the young fellow had been helping to empty
some of the many wine bottles I saw around Brie, and consequently had
a little more "Dutch courage"--was a little more rash--than would
have been the case under other conditions.

I rode back to Brie by the "long and circuitous" route, and inquiring
there for my companions, found Havelock waiting to conduct me to the
village of Villiers, whither, he said, Forsyth had been called to
make some explanation about his passport, which did not appear to be
in satisfactory shape.  Accordingly we started for Villiers, and
Havelock, being well mounted on an English "hunter," and wishing to
give me an exhibition of the animal's training and power, led the way
across ditches and fences, but my horse, never having followed "the
hounds," was unsafe to experiment with, so, after trying a low fence
or two, I decided to leave my friend alone in his diversion, and a
few moments later, seeing both horse and rider go down before a ditch
and high stone wall, I was convinced that my resolution was a
discreet one.  After this mishap, which luckily resulted in no harm,
I hoped Sir Henry would give up the amusement, but by failure
becoming only the more determined, in a second effort he cleared the
wall handsomely and rode across-country to the villages.  Following
the road till it passed under a railway bridge, I there thought I saw
a chance to gain Villiers by a short-cut, and changing my course
accordingly, I struck into a large vineyard to the left, and
proceeding a few hundred yards through the vines, came suddenly upon
a German picket-post.  The guard immediately leveled their rifles at
me, when, remembering my Rezonville experience of being taken for a
French officer because of my uniform, I hastily flung myself from the
saddle in token of surrender.  The action being rightly interpreted,
the men held their fire, and as my next thought was the King's pass I
reached under my coat-skirt for the document, but this motion being
taken as a grab for my pistol, the whole lot of them--some ten in
number--again aimed at me, and with such loud demands for surrender
that I threw up my hands and ran into their ranks.  The officer of
the guard then coming up, examined my credentials, and seeing that
they were signed by the King of Prussia, released me and directed the
recovery of my horse, which was soon caught, and I was then conducted
to the quarters of the commandant, where I found Forsyth with his
pass properly vised, entirely ignorant of my troubles, and
contentedly regaling himself on cheese and beer.  Havelock having got
to the village ahead of me, thanks to his cross-country ride, was
there too, sipping beer with Forsyth; nor was I slow to follow their
example, for the ride of the day, though rather barren in other
results, at any rate had given me a ravenous appetite.

Late that evening, the 20th, we resumed our old quarters at Lagny,
and early next day I made a visit to the royal headquarters at
Ferrires, where I observed great rejoicing going on, the occasion for
it being an important victory gained near Mendon, a French corps of
about 30,000 men under General Ducrot having been beaten by the Fifth
Prussian and Second Bavarian corps.  Ducrot had been stubbornly
holding ground near Mendon for two or three days, much to the
embarrassment of the Germans too, since he kept them from closing a
gap in their line to the southwest of Paris; but in the recent fight
he had been driven from the field with such heavy loss as to render
impossible his maintaining the gap longer.  The Crown Prince of
Prussia was thus enabled to extend his left, without danger, as far
as Bougival, north of Versailles, and eventually met the right of the
Crown Prince of Saxony, already at Denil, north of St. Denis.  The
unbroken circle of investment around Paris being well-nigh assured,
news of its complete accomplishment was momentarily expected;
therefore everybody was jubilant on account of the breaking up of
Ducrot, but more particularly because word had been received the same
morning that a correspondence had begun between Bazaine and Prince
Frederick Charles, looking to the capitulation of Metz, for the
surrender of that place would permit the Second Army to join in the
siege of Paris.

Learning all this, and seeing that the investment was about
completed, I decided to take up my quarters at Versailles, and
started for that place on the 22d, halting at Noisy le Grand to take
luncheon with some artillery officers, whose acquaintance we had made
the day of the surrender at Sedan.  During the meal I noticed two
American flags flying on a couple of houses near by.  Inquiring the
significance of this, I was told that the flags had been put up to
protect the buildings--the owners, two American citizens, having in a
bad fright abandoned their property, and, instead of remaining
outside, gone into Paris,--"very foolishly," said our hospitable
friends, "for here they could have obtained food in plenty, and been
perfectly secure from molestation."

We arrived at Versailles about 7 o'clock that evening and settled
ourselves in the Hotel Reservoir, happy to find there two or three
American families, with whom, of course, we quickly made
acquaintance.  This American circle was enlarged a few days later by
the arrival of General Wm. B. Hazen, of our army, General Ambrose E.
Burnside, and Mr. Paul Forbes.  Burnside and Forbes were hot to see,
from the French side, something of the war, and being almost beside
themselves to get into Paris, a permit was granted them by Count
Bismarck, and they set out by way of Sevres, Forsyth and I
accompanying them as far as the Palace of St. Cloud, which we,
proposed to see, though there were strict orders against its being
visited generally.  After much trouble we managed, through the "open
sesame" of the King's pass, to gain access to the palace; but to our
great disappointment we found that all the pictures had been cut from
the frames and carried off to Paris, except one portrait, that of
Queen Victoria, against whom the French were much incensed.  All
other works of art had been removed, too--a most fortunate
circumstance, for the palace being directly on the German line, was
raked by the guns from the fortress of Mont Valerien, and in a few
days burned to the ground.

In less than a week Burnside and Forbes returned from Paris.  They
told us their experience had been interesting, but were very reticent
as to particulars, and though we tried hard to find out what they had
seen or done, we could get nothing from them beyond the general
statement that they had had a good time, and that General Trochu had
been considerate enough to postpone a sortie, in order to let them
return; but this we did not quite swallow.  After a day or two they
went into Paris again, and I then began to suspect that they were
essaying the role of mediators, and that Count Bismarck was feeding
their vanity with permits, and receiving his equivalent by learning
the state of affairs within the beleaguered city.

From about the 1st of October on, the Germans were engaged in making
their enveloping lines impenetrable, bringing up their reserves,
siege guns, and the like, the French meanwhile continuing to drill
and discipline the National Guard and relieving the monotony
occasionally by a more or less spirited, but invariably abortive,
sortie.  The most notable of these was that made by General Vinoy
against the heights of Clamart, the result being a disastrous repulse
by the besiegers.  After this, matters settled down to an almost
uninterrupted quietude, only a skirmish here and there; and it being
plain that the Germans did not intend to assault the capital, but
would accomplish its capture by starvation, I concluded to find out
from Count Bismarck about when the end was expected, with the purpose
of spending the interim in a little tour through some portions of
Europe undisturbed by war, returning in season for the capitulation.
Count Bismarck having kindly advised me as to the possible date.

Forsyth and I, on the 14th of October, left Versailles, going first
direct to the Chateau Ferrieres to pay our respects to the King,
which we did, and again took luncheon with him.  From the chateau we
drove to Meaux, and there spent the night; resuming our journey next
morning, we passed through Epernay, Rheims, and Rethel to Sedan,
where we tarried a day, and finally, on October 18, reached Brussels.




CHAPTER XX.

BRUSSELS--DECIDING TO VISIT EASTERN EUROPE--AUSTRIA--DOWN THE DANUBE
--IN CONSTANTINOPLE--THE LADIES OF THE HAREM--THE SULTAN--TURKISH
SOLDIERS--A BANQUET--A VISIT IN ATHENS--KING GEORGE OF GREECE--VICTOR
EMMANUEL--"BEDEVILED WITH CARES OF STATE"--DEER SHOOTING--A MILITARY
DINNER--RETURN TO VERSAILLES--GERMANS ENTERING PARIS--CRITICISM ON
THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR--CONCLUSION.

On reaching Brussels, one of the first things to do was to pay my
respects to the King of Belgium, which I did, accompanied by our
Minister, Mr. Russell Jones.  Later I dined with the King and Queen,
meeting at the dinner many notable people, among them the Count and
Countess of Flanders.  A day or two in Brussels sufficed to mature
our plans for spending the time up to the approximate date of our
return to Paris; and deciding to visit eastern Europe, we made Vienna
our first objective, going there by way of Dresden.

At Vienna our Minister, Mr. John Jay, took charge of us--Forsyth was
still with me--and the few days' sojourn was full of interest.  The
Emperor being absent from the capital, we missed seeing him; but the
Prime Minister, Count von Beust, was very polite to us, and at his
house we had the pleasure of meeting at dinner Count Andrassy, the
Prime Minister of Hungary.

From Vienna we went to Buda-Pesth, the Hungarian capital; and thence,
in a I small, crowded, and uncomfortable steamboat, down the Danube
to Rustchuck, whence we visited Bucharest--all who travel in eastern
Europe do so--and then directing our course southward, we went first
to Varna, and from that city by steamer through the Black Sea to
Constantinople.

We reached the Turkish capital at the time of Ramadan, the period of
the year (about a month) during which the Mohammedans are commanded
by the Koran to keep a rigorous fast every day from sunrise till
sunset.  All the followers of the Prophet were therefore busy with
their devotions--holding a revival, as it were; hence there was no
chance whatever to be presented to the Sultan, Abdul Aziz, it being
forbidden during the penitential season for him to receive
unbelievers, or in fact any one except the officials of his
household.  However, the Grand Vizier brought me many messages of
welcome, and arranged that I should be permitted to see and salute
his Serene Highness on the Esplanade as he rode by on horseback to
the mosque.

So, the second day after arrival, the Grand Vizier drove me in a
barouche to the Esplanade, where we took station about midway of its
length an hour or so before the Sultan was to appear.  Shortly after
we reached the Esplanade, carriages occupied by the women of the
Sultan's harem began to appear, coming out from the palace grounds
and driving up and down the roadway.  Only a few of the women were
closely veiled, a majority of them wearing an apology for veiling,
merely a strip of white lace covering the forehead down to the
eyebrows.  Some were yellow, and some white-types of the Mongolian
and Caucasian races.  Now and then a pretty face was seen, rarely a
beautiful one.  Many were plump, even to corpulence, and these were
the closest veiled, being considered the greatest beauties I presume,
since with the Turk obesity is the chief element of comeliness.  As
the carriages passed along in review, every now and then an occupant,
unable or unwilling to repress her natural promptings, would indulge
in a mild flirtation, making overtures by casting demure
side-glances, throwing us coquettish kisses, or waving strings of amber
beads with significant gestures, seeming to say: "Why don't you
follow?"  But this we could not do if we would, for the Esplanade
throughout its entire length was lined with soldiers, put there
especially to guard the harem first, and later, the Sultan on his
pilgrimage to the mosque.

But as it was now time for His Serene Highness to make his appearance
the carriages containing his wives drove off into the palace grounds,
which were inclosed by a high wall, leaving the Esplanade wholly
unencumbered except by the soldiers.  Down between the two ranks,
which were formed facing each other, came the Sultan on a white
steed--a beautiful Arabian--and having at his side his son, a boy
about ten or twelve years old, who was riding a pony, a diminutive
copy of his father's mount, the two attended by a numerous
body-guard, dressed in gorgeous Oriental uniforms.  As the procession
passed our carriage, I, as pre-arranged, stood up and took off my
hat, His Serene Highness promptly acknowledging the salute by raising
his hand to the forehead.  This was all I saw of him, yet I received
every kindness at his hands, being permitted to see many of his
troops, to inspect all the ordnance, equipment, and other military
establishments about Constantinople, and to meet numbers of the high
functionaries of the Empire.

Among other compliments tendered through his direction, and which I
gladly accepted, was a review of all the troops then in Stamboul
--about 6,000--comprising infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

They were as fine looking a body of soldiers as I ever saw--well
armed and well clothed, the men all large and of sturdy appearance.

After the review we attended a grand military dinner given by the
Grand Vizier.  At the hour set for this banquet we presented
ourselves at the palace of the Grand Vizier, and being ushered into a
large drawing-room, found already assembled there the guests invited
to meet us.  Some few spoke French, and with these we managed to
exchange an occasional remark; but as the greater number stood about
in silence, the affair, thus far, was undeniably a little stiff.
Just before the dinner was announced, all the Turkish officers went
into an adjoining room, and turning their faces to the east,
prostrated themselves to the floor in prayer.  Then we were all
conducted to a large salon, where each being provided with a silver
ewer and basin, a little ball of highly perfumed soap and a napkin,
set out on small tables, each guest washed his hands.  Adjacent to
this salon was the dining-room, or, rather, the banqueting room, a
very large and artistically frescoed hall, in the centre of which
stood a crescent-shaped table, lighted with beautiful silver
candelabra, and tastefully decorated with flowers and fruits.  The
viands were all excellent; cooked, evidently, by a French chef, and
full justice was done the dishes, especially by the Turks, who, of
course, had been fasting all day.

At the close of the banquet, which consisted of not less than fifteen
courses, we withdrew to a smoking-room, where the coffee was served
and cigarettes and chibouks offered us--the latter a pipe having a
long flexible stem with an amber mouthpiece.  I chose the chibouk,
and as the stem of mine was studded with precious stones of enormous
value, I thought I should enjoy it the more; but the tobacco being
highly flavored with some sort of herbs, my smoke fell far short of
my anticipations.  The coffee was delicious, however, and I found
this to be the case wherever I went in Constantinople, whether in
making calls or at dinner, the custom of offering coffee and tobacco
on these occasions being universal.

The temptations to linger at Constantinople were many indeed, not the
least being the delightful climate; and as time pressed, we set out
with much regret on the return journey, stopping a few days at
Athens, whence we made several short excursions into the interior.
King George and Queen Olga made our stay in Athens one of extreme
interest and exceeding pleasure.  Throwing aside all ceremony, they
breakfasted and dined us informally, gave us a fine ball, and in
addition to these hospitalities showed us much personal attention,
his Majesty even calling upon me, and the Queen sending her children
to see us at our hotel.

Of course we visited all that remained of the city's ancient
civilization--the Acropolis, temples, baths, towers, and the like;
nor did we omit to view the spot where St. Paul once instructed the
Athenians in lessons of Christianity.  We traveled some little
through the country districts outside of Athens, and I noticed that
the peasantry, in point of picturesqueness of dress and color of
complexion, were not unlike the gypsies we see at times in America.
They had also much of the same shrewdness, and, as far as I could
learn, were generally wholly uneducated, ignorant, indeed, except as
to one subject--politics--which I was told came to them intuitively,
they taking to it, and a scramble for office, as naturally as a duck
to water.  In fact, this common faculty for politics seems a
connecting link between the ancient and modern Greek.

Leaving Athens with the pleasantest recollections, we sailed for
Messina, Sicily, and from there went to Naples, where we found many
old friends; among them Mr. Buchanan Reed, the artist and poet, and
Miss Brewster, as well as a score or more of others of our
countrymen, then or since distinguished, in art and letters at home
and abroad.  We remained some days in Naples, and during the time
went to Pompeii to witness a special excavation among the ruins of
the buried city, which search was instituted on account of our visit.
A number of ancient household articles were dug up, and one, a terra
cotta lamp bearing upon its crown in bas-relief the legend of "Leda
and the Swan," was presented to me as a souvenir of the occasion,
though it is usual for the Government to place in its museums
everything of such value that is unearthed.

From Naples to Rome by rail was our next journey.  In the Eternal
City we saw picture-galleries, churches, and ruins in plenty, but all
these have been so well described by hundreds of other travelers that
I shall not linger even to name them.  While at Rome we also
witnessed an overflow of the Tiber, that caused great suffering and
destroyed much property.  The next stage of our tour took us to
Venice, then to Florence--the capital of Italy--for although the
troops of the King of Italy had taken possession of Rome the
preceding September, the Government itself had not yet removed
thither.

At Florence, our Minister, Mr. Marsh, though suffering with a lame
foot, took me in charge, and in due course of time I was presented to
King Victor-Emmanuel.  His Majesty received me informally at his
palace in a small, stuffy room--his office, no doubt--and an untidy
one it was too.  He wore a loose blouse and very baggy trousers; a
comfortable suit, certainly, but not at all conducing to an ideal
kingliness of appearance.

His Majesty's hobby was hunting, and no sooner had I made my bow than
he began a conversation on that subject, thrusting his hands nearly
up to the elbows into the pockets of his trousers.  He desired to
learn about the large game of America, particularly the buffalo, and
when I spoke of the herds of thousands and thousands I had seen on
the plains of western Kansas, he interrupted me to bemoan the fate
which kept him from visiting America to hunt, even going so far as to
say that "he didn't wish to be King of Italy, anyhow, but would much
prefer to pass his days hunting than be bedeviled with the cares of
state." On one of his estates, near Pisa, he had several large herds
of deer, many wild boars, and a great deal of other game. Of this
preserve he was very proud, and before we separated invited me to go
down there to shoot deer, adding that he would be there himself if he
could, but feared that a trip which he had to take to Milan would
interfere, though he wished me to go in any event.

I gladly accepted the invitation, and in two or three days was
notified when I would be expected at the estate.  At the designated
time I was escorted to Pisa by an aide-de-camp, and from there we
drove the few miles to the King's chateau, where we fortified
ourselves for the work in hand by an elaborate and toothsome
breakfast of about ten courses.  Then in a carriage we set out for
the King's stand in the hunting-grounds, accompanied by a crowd of
mounted game-keepers, who with great difficulty controlled the pack
of sixty or seventy hounds, the dogs and keepers together almost
driving me to distraction with their yelping and yelling.  On
reaching the stand, I was posted within about twenty' yards of a
long, high picket-fence, facing the fence and covered by two trees
very close together.  It was from behind these that the King usually
shot, and as I was provided with a double-barreled shot-gun, I
thought I could do well, especially since close in rear of me stood
two game-keepers to load and hand me a second gun when the first was
emptied.

Meantime the huntsmen and the hounds had made a circuit of the park
to drive up the game.  The yelps of the hounds drawing near, I
cautiously looked in the direction of the sound, and the next moment
saw a herd of deer close in to the fence, and coming down at full
speed.  Without a miss, I shot the four leading ones as they tried
to run the gauntlet, for in passing between the stand and the fence,
the innocent creatures were not more than ten to fifteen paces from
me.  At the fourth I stopped, but the gamekeepers insisted on more
butchery, saying, "No one but the King ever did the like" (I guess no
one else had ever had the chance), so, thus urged, I continued firing
till I had slaughtered eleven with eleven shots--an easy task with a
shot-gun and buckshot cartridges.

The "hunt" being ended--for with this I had had enough, and no one
else was permitted to do any shooting--the aide-decamp directed the
game to be sent to me in Florence, and we started for the chateau.
On the way back I saw a wild boar the first and only one I ever saw
--my attention being drawn to him by cries from some of the
game-keepers.  There was much commotion, the men pointing out the game
and shouting excitedly, "See the wild boar!" otherwise I should not
have known what was up, but now, looking in the indicated direction, I
saw scudding over the plain what appeared to me to be nothing but a
halfgrown black pig, or shoat.  He was not in much of a hurry either,
and gave no evidence of ferocity, yet it is said that this
insignificant looking animal is dangerous when hunted with the spear
--the customary way.  After an early dinner at the chateau we returned
to Florence, and my venison next day arriving, it was distributed among
my American friends in the city.

Shortly after the hunt the King returned from Milan, and then honored
me with a military dinner, his Majesty and all the guests, numbering
eighty, appearing in full uniform.  The banqueting hall was lighted
with hundreds of wax candles, there was a profusion of beautiful
flowers, and to me the scene altogether was one of unusual
magnificence.  The table service was entirely of gold--the celebrated
set of the house of Savoy--and behind the chair of each guest stood a
servant in powdered wig and gorgeous livery of red plush.  I sat at
the right of the King, who--his hands resting on his sword, the hilt
of which glittered with jewels--sat through the hour and a half at
table without once tasting food or drink, for it was his rule to eat
but two meals in twenty-four hours--breakfast at noon, and dinner at
midnight.  The King remained silent most of the time, but when he did
speak, no matter on what subject, he inevitably drifted back to
hunting.  He never once referred to the Franco-Prussian war, nor to
the political situation in his own country, then passing through a
crisis.  In taking leave of his Majesty I thanked him with deep
gratitude for honoring me so highly, and his response was that if
ever he came to America to hunt buffalo, he should demand my
assistance.

From Florence I went to Milan and Geneva, then to Nice, Marseilles,
and Bordeaux.  Assembled at Bordeaux was a convention which had been
called together by the government of the National Defense for the
purpose of confirming or rejecting the terms of an armistice of
twenty-one days, arranged between Jules Favre and Count Bismarck in
negotiations begun at Versailles the latter part of January.  The
convention was a large body, chosen from all parts of France, and was
unquestionably the most noisy, unruly and unreasonable set of beings
that I ever saw in a legislative assembly.  The frequent efforts of
Thiers, Jules Favre, and other leading men to restrain the more
impetuous were of little avail.  When at the sittings a delegate
arose to speak on some question, he was often violently pulled to his
seat and then surrounded by a mob of his colleagues, who would throw
off their coats and gesticulate wildly, as though about to fight.

But the bitter pill of defeat had to be swallowed in some way, so the
convention delegated M. Thiers to represent the executive power of
the country, with authority to construct a ministry three
commissioners were appointed by the Executive, to enter into further
negotiations with Count Bismarck at Versailles and arrange a peace,
the terms of which, however, were to be submitted to the convention
for final action.  Though there had been so much discussion, it took
but a few days to draw up and sign a treaty at Versailles, the
principal negotiators being Thiers and Jules Favre for France, and
Bismarck on the part of the Germans.  The terms agreed upon provided
for the occupation of Paris till ratification should be had by the
convention at Bordeaux; learning of which stipulation from our
Minister, Mr. Washburn, I hurried off to Paris to see the conquerors
make their triumphal entry.

In the city the excitement was at fever heat, of course; the entire
population protesting with one voice that they would never, never
look upon the hated Germans marching through their beloved city.  No!
when the day arrived they would hide themselves in their houses, or
shut their eyes to such a hateful sight.  But by the 1st of March a
change had come over the fickle Parisians, for at an early hour the
sidewalks were jammed with people, and the windows and doors of the
houses filled with men, women, and children eager to get a look at
the conquerors.  Only a few came in the morning, however--an
advance-guard of perhaps a thousand cavalry and infantry.  The main
column marched from the Arc-de-Triomphe toward the middle of the
afternoon. In its composition it represented United Germany--Saxons,
Bavarians, and the Royal Guard of Prussia--and, to the strains of
martial music, moving down the Champ Elysees to the Place de la
Concorde, was distributed thence over certain sections of the city
agreed upon beforehand.  Nothing that could be called a disturbance
took place during the march; and though there was a hiss now and then
and murmurings of discontent, yet the most noteworthy mutterings were
directed against the defunct Empire.  Indeed, I found everywhere that
the national misfortunes were laid at Napoleon's door--he, by this
time, having become a scapegoat for every blunder of the war.

The Emperor William (he had been proclaimed German Emperor at
Versailles the 18th of January) did not accompany his troops into
Paris, though he reviewed them at Long Champs before they started.
After the occupation of the city he still remained at Versailles, and
as soon as circumstances would permit, I repaired to the Imperial
headquarters to pay my respects to his Majesty under his new title
and dignities, and to say good-bye.

Besides the Emperor, the only persons I me at Versailles were General
von Moltke and Bismarck.  His Majesty was in a very agreeable frame
of mind, and as bluff and hearty as usual.  His increased rank and
power had effected no noticeable change of any kind in him, and by
his genial and cordial ways he made me think that my presence with
the German army had contributed to his pleasure.  Whether this was
really so or not, I shall always believe it true, for his kind words
and sincere manner could leave no other conclusion.

General von Moltke was, as usual, quiet and reserved, betraying not
the slightest consciousness of his great ability, nor the least
indication of pride on account of his mighty work.  I say this
advisedly, for it is an undoubted fact that it was his marvelous
mind that perfected the military system by which 800,000 men were
mobilized with unparalleled celerity and moved with such certainty of
combination that, in a campaign of seven months, the military power
of France was destroyed and her vast resources sorely crippled.

I said good-bye to Count Bismarck, also, for at that busy time the
chances of seeing him again were very remote.  The great Chancellor
manifested more joy over the success of the Germans than did anyone
else at the Imperial headquarters.  Along with his towering strength
of mind and body, his character partook of much of the enthusiasm and
impulsiveness commonly restricted to younger men, and now in his
frank, free way be plainly showed his light-heartedness and
gratification at success.  That which for years his genius had been
planning and striving for--permanent unification of the German
States, had been accomplished by the war.  It had welded them
together in a compact Empire which no power in Europe could disrupt,
and as such a union was the aim of Bismarck's life, he surely had a
right to feel jubilant.

Thanks to the courtesies extended me, I had been able to observe the
principal battles, and study many of the minor details of a war
between two of the greatest military nations of the world, and to
examine critically the methods followed abroad for subsisting,
equipping, and manoeuvring vast bodies of men during a stupendous,
campaign.  Of course I found a great deal to interest and instruct
me, yet nowadays war is pretty much the same everywhere, and this one
offered no marked exception to my previous experiences.  The methods
pursued on the march were the same as we would employ, with one most
important exception.  Owing to the density of population throughout
France it was always practicable for the Germans to quarter their
troops in villages, requiring the inhabitants to subsist both
officers and men.  Hence there was no necessity for camp and garrison
equipage, nor enormous provision trains, and the armies were
unencumbered by these impedimenta, indispensable when operating in a
poor and sparsely settled country.  As I have said before, the only
trains were those for ammunition, pontoon-boats, and the field
telegraph, and all these were managed by special corps.  If
transportation was needed for other purposes, it was obtained by
requisition from the invaded country, just as food and forage were
secured.  Great celerity of combination was therefore possible, the
columns moving in compact order, and as all the roads were broad and
macadamized, there was little or nothing to delay or obstruct the
march of the Germans, except when their enemy offered resistance, but
even this was generally slight and not very frequent, for the French
were discouraged by disaster from the very outset of the campaign.

The earlier advantages gained by the Germans may be ascribed to the
strikingly prompt mobilization of their armies, one of the most
noticeable features of their perfect military system, devised by
almost autocratic power; their later successes were greatly aided by
the blunders of the French, whose stupendous errors materially
shortened the war, though even if prolonged it could, in my opinion,
have had ultimately no other termination.

As I have previously stated, the first of these blunders was the
acceptance of battle by MacMahon at Worth; the second in attaching
too much importance to the fortified position of Metz, resulting in
three battles Colombey, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte--all of which
were lost; and the third, the absurd movement of MacMahon along the
Belgian frontier to relieve Metz, the responsibility for which, I am
glad to say, does not belong to him.

With the hemming in of Bazaine at Metz and the capture of MacMahon's
army at Sedan the crisis of the war was passed, and the Germans
practically the victors.  The taking of Paris was but a sentiment
--the money levy could have been made and the Rhine provinces held
without molesting that city, and only the political influences
consequent upon the changes in the French Government caused peace to
be deferred.

I did not have much opportunity to observe the German cavalry, either
on the march or in battle.  The only time I saw any of it engaged was
in the unfortunate charge at Gravelotte.  That proved its mettle good
and discipline fair, but answered no other purpose.  Such of it as
was not attached to the infantry was organized in divisions, and
operated in accordance with the old idea of covering the front and
flanks of the army, a duty which it thoroughly performed.  But thus
directed it was in no sense an independent corps, and hence cannot
be, said to have accomplished anything in the campaign, or have had a
weight or influence at all proportionate to its strength.  The method
of its employment seemed to me a mistake, for, being numerically
superior to the French cavalry, had it been massed and manoeuvred
independently of the infantry, it could easily have broken up the
French communications, and done much other work of weighty influence
in the prosecution of the war.

The infantry was as fine as I ever saw, the men young and hardy in
appearance, and marching always with an elastic stride.  The infantry
regiment, however, I thought too large--too many men for a colonel to
command unless he has the staff of a general--but this objection may
be counterbalanced by the advantages resulting from associating
together thus intimately the men from the same district, or county as
we would call it; the celerity of mobilization, and, in truth, the
very foundation of the German system, being based on this local or
territorial scheme of recruiting.

There was no delay when the call sounded for the march; all turned
out promptly, and while on the road there was very little straggling,
only the sick falling out.  But on such fine, smooth roads, and with
success animating the men from the day they struck the first blow, it
could hardly be expected that the columns would not keep well closed
up.  Then, too, it must be borne in mind that, as already stated,
'campaigning' in France--that is, the marching, camping, and
subsisting of an army--is an easy matter, very unlike anything we,
had during the war of the rebellion.  To repeat: the country is rich,
beautiful, and densely populated, subsistence abundant, and the
roads--all macadamized highways; thus the conditions; are altogether
different from those existing with us.  I think that under the same
circumstances our troops would have done as well as the Germans,
marched as admirably, made combinations as quickly and accurately,
and fought with as much success.  I can but leave to conjecture how.
the Germans would have got along on bottomless roads--often none at
all--through the swamps and quicksands of northern Virginia, from,
the Wilderness to Petersburg, and from Chattanooga to Atlanta and the
sea.

Following the operations of the German armies from the battle of
Gravelotte to the siege of Paris, I may, in conclusion, say that I
saw no new military principles developed, whether of strategy or
grand tactics, the movements of the different armies and corps being
dictated and governed by the same general laws that have so long
obtained, simplicity of combination and manoeuvre, and the
concentration of a numerically superior force at the vital point.

After my brief trip to Versailles, I remained in Paris till the
latter part of March.  In company with Mr. Washburn, I visited the
fortifications for the defense of the city, and found them to be
exceptionally heavy; so strong, indeed, that it would have been very
hard to carry the place by a general assault.  The Germans, knowing
the character of the works, had refrained from the sacrifice of life
that such an attempt must entail, though they well knew that many of
the forts were manned by unseasoned soldiers.  With only a combat
here and there, to tighten their lines or repulse a sortie, they
wisely preferred to wait till starvation should do the work with
little loss and absolute certainty.

The Germans were withdrawn from Paris on the 3d of March, and no
sooner were they gone than factional quarrels, which had been going
on at intervals ever since the flight of the Empress and the fall of
her regency on the 4th of September, were renewed with revolutionary
methods that eventually brought about the Commune.  Having witnessed
one or two of these outbreaks, and concluding that while such
turbulence reigned in the city it would be of little profit for me to
tarry there, I decided to devote the rest of the time I could be away
from home to travel in England, Ireland, and Scotland.  My journeys
through those countries were full of pleasure and instruction, but as
nothing I saw or did was markedly different from what has been so
often described by others, I will save the reader this part of my
experience.  I returned to America in the fall, having been absent a
little more than a year, and although I saw much abroad of absorbing
interest, both professional and general, yet I came back to my native
land with even a greater love for her, and with increased admiration
for her institutions.





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Memoirs of Three Civil War Generals,
Complete, by U. S. Grant, W. T. Sherman, P. H. Sheridan

*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THREE CIVIL WAR GENERALS ***

***** This file should be named 4546.txt or 4546.zip *****
This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
        http://www.gutenberg.net/4/5/4/4546/

Produced by David Widger. Additional proofing was done by Bryan
Sherman on the Sherman series.  The Grant series was originally
produced by Glen Bledsoe


Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
will be renamed.

Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
redistribution.



*** START: FULL LICENSE ***

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK

To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
http://gutenberg.net/license).


Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
electronic works

1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.

1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
works.  See paragraph 1.E below.

1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.

1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
States.

1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:

1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
copied or distributed:

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net

1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
1.E.9.

1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.

1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.

1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg-tm License.

1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.net),
you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
that

- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."

- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
     License.  You must require such a user to return or
     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
     Project Gutenberg-tm works.

- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
     of receipt of the work.

- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.

1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.

1.F.

1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
your equipment.

1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.

1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
opportunities to fix the problem.

1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.

1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.


Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm

Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org.


Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation

The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
http://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.

The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
page at http://pglaf.org

For additional contact information:
     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
     Chief Executive and Director
     gbnewby@pglaf.org


Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation

Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
particular state visit http://pglaf.org

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
ways including including checks, online payments and credit card
donations.  To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate


Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
works.

Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.


Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.


Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:

     http://www.gutenberg.net

This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.